Sunday, April 08, 2007
Matthew Green's Arguments Against The Resurrection
Matthew Green of Debunking Christianity has reposted some of his arguments against the resurrection. Apparently, he copied and pasted some of his previous comments without editing them. He refers to "Jason" without explaining which Jason he has in mind. He probably was copying and pasting from one of his responses to me written last year. For those who are interested, I replied to some of Matthew's arguments here. The article is lengthy. For those who don't want to read the whole piece, but are looking for a discussion of particular subjects, use the Ctrl F feature on your keyboard.
For God so loved the world
“One of my problems with calvinist compatibilists is that they do verbal magic tricks. Rather than being forthright about their views, they cover up what they believe with words like compatibilism, free agency, soft determinism, etc. What they believe is that everything is predetermined by God and so “choices” as normally understood do not occur, cannot occur. I would appreciate it if rather than redefining words away from their standard meaning and usage, they could simply acknowledge that their view eliminates the possibility of “choices” as ordinarily understood.”
Two problems:
i) Henry, in his semantic naiveté, doesn’t know the difference between the meaning of words and the meaning of concepts. He acts as if you could learn all about the theory of evolution or the theory of relativity by just looking up the words “evolution” or “relativity” in Webster’s.
This is a debate over the concept of freedom, the concept of choice, not a debate over the dictionary definition of this or that word.
ii) He also pays us the unintended compliment of alleging that we made up these words. But Peter, Manata, and I employ standard philosophical usage. Henry should spend a little time with the Oxford Handbook of Free Will.
Calvinism didn’t invent these categories. And the terminology is standard philosophical jargon.
“They also do the same with bible verses. John 3:16 says God loves the world enough to send His Son . . . But the calvinist compatibilists come along and the passage needs to be modified a bit. For example bring in a distinction between ‘without exception’ versus ‘without distinction’, and poof the verse loses its meaning since we now **know** that it doesn’t really mean everybody (without exception) but it must mean all types of elect people in the world (without distinction). So rather that being a clear verse on the love of God for mankind, it is really a verse telling us how he loves the elect throughout the world.”
Henry is now advertising his ignorance of Biblical lexicography. “Kosmos” doesn’t have a single meaning in NT usage generally or Johannine usage in particular. Rather, it has wide semantic domain. For example, Peter Cottrell & Max Turner list seven different senses (among others) for kosmos, including “the beings (human and supernatural) in rebellion against God, together with the systems under their control, viewed as opposed to God,” Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation (1989), 176.
Which meaning is appropriate depends on the given context as well as overall theology of the author.
Likewise, Horst Balz defines kosmos in such ways as: “in the Johannine theology one finds again the basic elements of the Pauline understanding of kosmos in the extreme and intensified radicality of the estrangement and ungodliness of the kosmos…the concern is with the nature of the world that has fallen away from God and is ruled by the evil one,” EDNT 2:312.
And as Andrew Lincoln, in his recent commentary on John, explains, “Some argue that the term ‘world’ here simply has neutral connotations—the created human world. But the characteristic use of ‘the world’ (ho kosmos) elsewhere in the narrative is with negative overtones—the world in its alienation from and hostility to its creator’s purposes. It makes better sense in a soteriological context to see the latter notion as in view. God loves that which has become hostile to God. The force is not, then, that the world is so vast that it takes a great deal of love to embrace it, but rather that the world has become so alienated from God that it takes an exceedingly great kind of love to love it at all,” The Gospel According to St. John (Henrickson 2005), 154.
Henry pays lip service to Scripture, but he’s too lazy to consult the standard commentaries, lexicons, or monographs on lexical semantics. In Johannine usage, “kosmos” does not mean “everyone.” Rather, it’s a loaded word with a qualitative rather than quantitative connotation.
But even if you don’t know Greek, or read the standard exegetical and lexical literature, you could figure out for yourself that “kosmos” can’t mean “everyone” in general Johannine usage, by spending a little time with an English concordance. Just try substituting “everyone” for “world” in the following verses and see how much sense it makes:
“The Spirit of truth. The world cannot accept him, because it neither sees him nor knows him. But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you” (Jn 14:17).
Note the contrast between those who receive the Spirit and those who don’t. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then no one receives the Spirit.
“If you belonged to the world, it would love you as its own. As it is, you do not belong to the world, but I have chosen you out of the world. That is why the world hates you” (Jn 15:19).
Note the contrast between those whom the “world” loves and those whom it hates. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then no such dichotomy is possible.
“I have given them your word and the world has hated them, for they are not of the world any more than I am of the world” (Jn 17:14).
Same disjunction as we saw under Jn 15:19.
“The world and its desires pass away, but the man who does the will of God lives forever” (1 Jn 2:17).
Note the contrast between the fleeting world and eternal life. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then the existence of the believer is just as transient as the existence of the unbeliever.
“For everyone born of God overcomes the world. This is the victory that has overcome the world, even our faith.” (1 Jn 5:4).
Notice the antithesis between the regenerate who overcome the world, and the state of the unregenerate. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then no one overcomes the world.
“We know that we are children of God, and that the whole world is under the control of the evil one” (1 Jn 5:19).
Observe the contrast between the children of God and all those who lie under Satan’s dominion. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then everyone is a Satanist.
“On the other hand most christians believe that God loves people enough to send Jesus to the world to make salvation possible to all people and that people’s eternal destinies are not set before they are born, but depend how they respond as individuals to the work of God in revealing Himself to them.”
i) Is loving sinners just enough to make salvation merely *possible* for everyone while leaving everyone vulnerable to eternal damnation the most loving thing that God could do?
Which is more loving—to throw a drowning man a life preserver and say to him: “now you have a chance to save yourself–take it or leave it!” Or jumping in and actually pulling him to safety?
An Arminian lifeguard never rescues a drowning man since that would violate his freewill. Instead, the Arminian lifeguard throws him a life preserver, then goes on a lunch break.
ii) In what sense does Henry think that everyone has a shot at salvation? Everyone hasn’t heard the gospel. So Henry must take the position that you don’t have to believe in Jesus to be saved. Yet, in opposing universalism, he says that you do have to believe in Jesus to be saved. Or does Henry subscribe to postmortem evangelism?
“In theological determinism, the damned are damned ‘and there was nothing THEY could do about it, if they weren’t CHOSEN.’ In the other view of non-calvinists, God makes it possible for all to be saved so all have the opportunity to be saved and those not saved are those who freely rejected God’s gracious working in their lives.”
An in classical Arminianism, to which Henry evidently subscribes, God foreknew who would freely spurn his grace and spend eternity in hell, and yet God went ahead and created the damned in full knowledge of their infernal fate. How is that the most loving thing that God could do for them?
“One of the reasons that Calvinists have attempted to go to atheist philosophers to find arguments for their view is that they don’t have a strong philosophical argument to overcome people’s innumerable experiences of free will and choices.”
Several problems:
i) As I recall, Henry doesn’t hesitate to cite Searle and Kant in his favor. So he appeals to secular philosophers when they agree with him. And what about Stewart Goetz, whom he also cites? Is Goetz a Christian philosopher or a secular philosopher?
Henry also makes favorable appeal to Moreland, Plantinga, Craig, Flint, Freddoso, and the Thomists. But while they are Christian philosophers, they are also Christian philosophers who make extensive use of secular philosophers to defend their Christian faith.
Such is Henry’s forked-tongued rhetoric on secular philosophy.
ii) Everyone has a philosophy. The only question is whether you have a thoughtful, consistent philosophy, or a half-baked philosophy.
iii) Henry is appealing to “experience.” And he’s appealing to universal human experience (as he construes it).
So unbelievers have the same experience. Secular philosophers have the same experience. Secular philosophers who are soft determinists, hard determinists, compatibilists, and semicompatibilists have the same experience.
It is therefore duplicitous of Henry to appeal to human experience and then disqualify the analysis of human experience by secular philosophers.
iv) An appeal to experience to prove something is a philosophical appeal. It is therefore subject to rational scrutiny.
“And Jesus says that the drawing involves Him being lifted up on the cross and this drawing involves all men (“And I, if I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to Myself” Jn. 12:32).”
Henry also doesn’t know the difference between sense and reference. He acts as if a universal quantifier (“all”) specifies the referent. But it doesn’t. Its denotation must be supplied by context. In context, Jn 12:32 has reference to the multiethnic scope of the gospel—which sweeps in Gentiles as well as Jews (cf. 12:20).
“People can and do resist the work of the Spirit. Stephen in the midst of an evangelistic message in which the Spirit was certainly working explicitly states that people do (which means they can) resist the Holy Spirit: “You men who are stiff necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears are always resisting the Holy Spirit; you are doing just as your fathers did" (Acts 7:51, just as their fathers did, means that this resisting of the Holy Spirit was not a one time occurrence or exception, but occurred repeatedly, it occurred in the Old Testament, in the New Testament [e.g. the Pharisees committing the unpardonable sin in response to the Ministry of Jesus] and it occurs today as well).”
Henry is ignorant of the doctrine he’s opposing. In Calvinism, “irresistible” grace denotes regeneration. Regeneration is irresistible.
Acts 7:51 isn’t talking about the work of the Spirit in regeneration. Rather, it’s talking about the work of the Spirit in prophetic preaching. These are further examples of how Henry quotes Scripture instead of exegeting Scripture. He simply indulges in acontextual prooftexting.
“Though if the Spirit works on a person, that does not **necessitate** salvation as people do in fact resist the Spirit. If you want lots of evidence of resistance of the Spirit, just examine the Old Testament and see how many times God’s people resisted the Lord.”
No, they didn’t resist the Lord. Rather, they resisted the word of the Lord. And they resisted the preaching of the prophets because they were *hardened* by God (Isa 6).
“Third, the possibility which you leave out is someone being drawn by God and yet resisting the Holy Spirit, responding in unbelief.”
So unbelievers respond in unbelief. If that is Henry’s tautology of grace, then no one would ever be saved.
“The cross of Christ is a provision for all but only applied to those who believe. Just because the provision is sufficient for all does not automatically lead to universalism with everyone being saved.”
But, for Henry, the cross is insufficient to save anyone. So, for him, the cross is, at most, a necessary, but insufficient, condition of salvation. Same thing with Henry’s diluted pneumatology.
“So the Spirit must draw a person and that person must respond with faith or they will not be saved.”
So an unbeliever must respond in faith. But the Spirit cannot make an unbeliever a believer. Faith is not a gift of God. How, then, does an unbeliever ever become a believer?
“Merely stating your assumption. No where in the text of John 6 or anywhere else for that matter does it state that only the elect are drawn. Also where in the text of John 6 does it say “he must chose who to draw” with the meaning that He only draws the elect? It says No one comes unless drawn, it says that if they respond in faith to this drawing they will be believers and will be raised up (throughout John 6 the point is made repeatedly that if you do not **partake** of Christ you cannot be saved; and in the context it is not talking about cannibalism but about having faith in Christ; if you have faith in Jesus you will be saved and raised, if you do not partake of His flesh/have faith in Jesus you cannot be saved). Calvinists tend to prooftext from isolated verses in John 6 without also emphasizing the other verses about the importance of faith to salvation which are actually more frequent in John 6 than the Calvinist “prooftexts”.”
I already pointed Henry to Carson’s commentary on John, which exegetes these Reformed prooftexts in context, just as I referred him to Schreiner’s online article on the priority of regeneration, just as I referred him to Warfield’s online article on predestination, just as I referred him to Beale’s online article on the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart—not to mention Baugh’s online article on Rom 9. Not to mention Schreiner’s commentary on Romans. Has Henry bothered to interact with a single one of these exegetical arguments for Calvinism? No.
“When those biblical instructions are ignored or put aside so that people can merely be argumentative, condescending, verbally combative, then the philosophizing that ought to be taking place is impeded and obstructed and can become quite evil.”
Henry is a false teacher. The Bible has very harsh things to say about false teachers. And keep in mind that, in the NT, the false teachers were professing Christians. But that doesn’t prevent the Bible from denouncing them in no uncertain terms.
I would be prepared to cut Henry some slack if he were an honest man. But he prevaricates. He raises objections. When we answer him on his own grounds, he then chooses to ignore the counterarguments, change the subject, or repeat himself ad nauseum.
So Henry isn’t even true to his own objections.
Two problems:
i) Henry, in his semantic naiveté, doesn’t know the difference between the meaning of words and the meaning of concepts. He acts as if you could learn all about the theory of evolution or the theory of relativity by just looking up the words “evolution” or “relativity” in Webster’s.
This is a debate over the concept of freedom, the concept of choice, not a debate over the dictionary definition of this or that word.
ii) He also pays us the unintended compliment of alleging that we made up these words. But Peter, Manata, and I employ standard philosophical usage. Henry should spend a little time with the Oxford Handbook of Free Will.
Calvinism didn’t invent these categories. And the terminology is standard philosophical jargon.
“They also do the same with bible verses. John 3:16 says God loves the world enough to send His Son . . . But the calvinist compatibilists come along and the passage needs to be modified a bit. For example bring in a distinction between ‘without exception’ versus ‘without distinction’, and poof the verse loses its meaning since we now **know** that it doesn’t really mean everybody (without exception) but it must mean all types of elect people in the world (without distinction). So rather that being a clear verse on the love of God for mankind, it is really a verse telling us how he loves the elect throughout the world.”
Henry is now advertising his ignorance of Biblical lexicography. “Kosmos” doesn’t have a single meaning in NT usage generally or Johannine usage in particular. Rather, it has wide semantic domain. For example, Peter Cottrell & Max Turner list seven different senses (among others) for kosmos, including “the beings (human and supernatural) in rebellion against God, together with the systems under their control, viewed as opposed to God,” Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation (1989), 176.
Which meaning is appropriate depends on the given context as well as overall theology of the author.
Likewise, Horst Balz defines kosmos in such ways as: “in the Johannine theology one finds again the basic elements of the Pauline understanding of kosmos in the extreme and intensified radicality of the estrangement and ungodliness of the kosmos…the concern is with the nature of the world that has fallen away from God and is ruled by the evil one,” EDNT 2:312.
And as Andrew Lincoln, in his recent commentary on John, explains, “Some argue that the term ‘world’ here simply has neutral connotations—the created human world. But the characteristic use of ‘the world’ (ho kosmos) elsewhere in the narrative is with negative overtones—the world in its alienation from and hostility to its creator’s purposes. It makes better sense in a soteriological context to see the latter notion as in view. God loves that which has become hostile to God. The force is not, then, that the world is so vast that it takes a great deal of love to embrace it, but rather that the world has become so alienated from God that it takes an exceedingly great kind of love to love it at all,” The Gospel According to St. John (Henrickson 2005), 154.
Henry pays lip service to Scripture, but he’s too lazy to consult the standard commentaries, lexicons, or monographs on lexical semantics. In Johannine usage, “kosmos” does not mean “everyone.” Rather, it’s a loaded word with a qualitative rather than quantitative connotation.
But even if you don’t know Greek, or read the standard exegetical and lexical literature, you could figure out for yourself that “kosmos” can’t mean “everyone” in general Johannine usage, by spending a little time with an English concordance. Just try substituting “everyone” for “world” in the following verses and see how much sense it makes:
“The Spirit of truth. The world cannot accept him, because it neither sees him nor knows him. But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you” (Jn 14:17).
Note the contrast between those who receive the Spirit and those who don’t. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then no one receives the Spirit.
“If you belonged to the world, it would love you as its own. As it is, you do not belong to the world, but I have chosen you out of the world. That is why the world hates you” (Jn 15:19).
Note the contrast between those whom the “world” loves and those whom it hates. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then no such dichotomy is possible.
“I have given them your word and the world has hated them, for they are not of the world any more than I am of the world” (Jn 17:14).
Same disjunction as we saw under Jn 15:19.
“The world and its desires pass away, but the man who does the will of God lives forever” (1 Jn 2:17).
Note the contrast between the fleeting world and eternal life. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then the existence of the believer is just as transient as the existence of the unbeliever.
“For everyone born of God overcomes the world. This is the victory that has overcome the world, even our faith.” (1 Jn 5:4).
Notice the antithesis between the regenerate who overcome the world, and the state of the unregenerate. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then no one overcomes the world.
“We know that we are children of God, and that the whole world is under the control of the evil one” (1 Jn 5:19).
Observe the contrast between the children of God and all those who lie under Satan’s dominion. But if the “world” means “everyone,” then everyone is a Satanist.
“On the other hand most christians believe that God loves people enough to send Jesus to the world to make salvation possible to all people and that people’s eternal destinies are not set before they are born, but depend how they respond as individuals to the work of God in revealing Himself to them.”
i) Is loving sinners just enough to make salvation merely *possible* for everyone while leaving everyone vulnerable to eternal damnation the most loving thing that God could do?
Which is more loving—to throw a drowning man a life preserver and say to him: “now you have a chance to save yourself–take it or leave it!” Or jumping in and actually pulling him to safety?
An Arminian lifeguard never rescues a drowning man since that would violate his freewill. Instead, the Arminian lifeguard throws him a life preserver, then goes on a lunch break.
ii) In what sense does Henry think that everyone has a shot at salvation? Everyone hasn’t heard the gospel. So Henry must take the position that you don’t have to believe in Jesus to be saved. Yet, in opposing universalism, he says that you do have to believe in Jesus to be saved. Or does Henry subscribe to postmortem evangelism?
“In theological determinism, the damned are damned ‘and there was nothing THEY could do about it, if they weren’t CHOSEN.’ In the other view of non-calvinists, God makes it possible for all to be saved so all have the opportunity to be saved and those not saved are those who freely rejected God’s gracious working in their lives.”
An in classical Arminianism, to which Henry evidently subscribes, God foreknew who would freely spurn his grace and spend eternity in hell, and yet God went ahead and created the damned in full knowledge of their infernal fate. How is that the most loving thing that God could do for them?
“One of the reasons that Calvinists have attempted to go to atheist philosophers to find arguments for their view is that they don’t have a strong philosophical argument to overcome people’s innumerable experiences of free will and choices.”
Several problems:
i) As I recall, Henry doesn’t hesitate to cite Searle and Kant in his favor. So he appeals to secular philosophers when they agree with him. And what about Stewart Goetz, whom he also cites? Is Goetz a Christian philosopher or a secular philosopher?
Henry also makes favorable appeal to Moreland, Plantinga, Craig, Flint, Freddoso, and the Thomists. But while they are Christian philosophers, they are also Christian philosophers who make extensive use of secular philosophers to defend their Christian faith.
Such is Henry’s forked-tongued rhetoric on secular philosophy.
ii) Everyone has a philosophy. The only question is whether you have a thoughtful, consistent philosophy, or a half-baked philosophy.
iii) Henry is appealing to “experience.” And he’s appealing to universal human experience (as he construes it).
So unbelievers have the same experience. Secular philosophers have the same experience. Secular philosophers who are soft determinists, hard determinists, compatibilists, and semicompatibilists have the same experience.
It is therefore duplicitous of Henry to appeal to human experience and then disqualify the analysis of human experience by secular philosophers.
iv) An appeal to experience to prove something is a philosophical appeal. It is therefore subject to rational scrutiny.
“And Jesus says that the drawing involves Him being lifted up on the cross and this drawing involves all men (“And I, if I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to Myself” Jn. 12:32).”
Henry also doesn’t know the difference between sense and reference. He acts as if a universal quantifier (“all”) specifies the referent. But it doesn’t. Its denotation must be supplied by context. In context, Jn 12:32 has reference to the multiethnic scope of the gospel—which sweeps in Gentiles as well as Jews (cf. 12:20).
“People can and do resist the work of the Spirit. Stephen in the midst of an evangelistic message in which the Spirit was certainly working explicitly states that people do (which means they can) resist the Holy Spirit: “You men who are stiff necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears are always resisting the Holy Spirit; you are doing just as your fathers did" (Acts 7:51, just as their fathers did, means that this resisting of the Holy Spirit was not a one time occurrence or exception, but occurred repeatedly, it occurred in the Old Testament, in the New Testament [e.g. the Pharisees committing the unpardonable sin in response to the Ministry of Jesus] and it occurs today as well).”
Henry is ignorant of the doctrine he’s opposing. In Calvinism, “irresistible” grace denotes regeneration. Regeneration is irresistible.
Acts 7:51 isn’t talking about the work of the Spirit in regeneration. Rather, it’s talking about the work of the Spirit in prophetic preaching. These are further examples of how Henry quotes Scripture instead of exegeting Scripture. He simply indulges in acontextual prooftexting.
“Though if the Spirit works on a person, that does not **necessitate** salvation as people do in fact resist the Spirit. If you want lots of evidence of resistance of the Spirit, just examine the Old Testament and see how many times God’s people resisted the Lord.”
No, they didn’t resist the Lord. Rather, they resisted the word of the Lord. And they resisted the preaching of the prophets because they were *hardened* by God (Isa 6).
“Third, the possibility which you leave out is someone being drawn by God and yet resisting the Holy Spirit, responding in unbelief.”
So unbelievers respond in unbelief. If that is Henry’s tautology of grace, then no one would ever be saved.
“The cross of Christ is a provision for all but only applied to those who believe. Just because the provision is sufficient for all does not automatically lead to universalism with everyone being saved.”
But, for Henry, the cross is insufficient to save anyone. So, for him, the cross is, at most, a necessary, but insufficient, condition of salvation. Same thing with Henry’s diluted pneumatology.
“So the Spirit must draw a person and that person must respond with faith or they will not be saved.”
So an unbeliever must respond in faith. But the Spirit cannot make an unbeliever a believer. Faith is not a gift of God. How, then, does an unbeliever ever become a believer?
“Merely stating your assumption. No where in the text of John 6 or anywhere else for that matter does it state that only the elect are drawn. Also where in the text of John 6 does it say “he must chose who to draw” with the meaning that He only draws the elect? It says No one comes unless drawn, it says that if they respond in faith to this drawing they will be believers and will be raised up (throughout John 6 the point is made repeatedly that if you do not **partake** of Christ you cannot be saved; and in the context it is not talking about cannibalism but about having faith in Christ; if you have faith in Jesus you will be saved and raised, if you do not partake of His flesh/have faith in Jesus you cannot be saved). Calvinists tend to prooftext from isolated verses in John 6 without also emphasizing the other verses about the importance of faith to salvation which are actually more frequent in John 6 than the Calvinist “prooftexts”.”
I already pointed Henry to Carson’s commentary on John, which exegetes these Reformed prooftexts in context, just as I referred him to Schreiner’s online article on the priority of regeneration, just as I referred him to Warfield’s online article on predestination, just as I referred him to Beale’s online article on the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart—not to mention Baugh’s online article on Rom 9. Not to mention Schreiner’s commentary on Romans. Has Henry bothered to interact with a single one of these exegetical arguments for Calvinism? No.
“When those biblical instructions are ignored or put aside so that people can merely be argumentative, condescending, verbally combative, then the philosophizing that ought to be taking place is impeded and obstructed and can become quite evil.”
Henry is a false teacher. The Bible has very harsh things to say about false teachers. And keep in mind that, in the NT, the false teachers were professing Christians. But that doesn’t prevent the Bible from denouncing them in no uncertain terms.
I would be prepared to cut Henry some slack if he were an honest man. But he prevaricates. He raises objections. When we answer him on his own grounds, he then chooses to ignore the counterarguments, change the subject, or repeat himself ad nauseum.
So Henry isn’t even true to his own objections.
Sunrise
"Each of Jesus' deeds and words and attitudes was glorious, but it is the way they come together in beautiful summation - I called it an exquisite array - that constitutes his glory. But the climax of the glory of his life on earth was the way it ended. It was as if all the darker colors in the spectrum of glory came together in the most beautiful sunset on Good Friday, with the crucified Christ as the blood-red sun in the crimson sky. And it was as if all the brighter colors in the spectrum of glory came together in the most beautiful sunrise on Easter morning, with the risen Christ as the golden sun shining in full strength. Both the glory of the sunset and the glory of the sunrise shone on the horizon of a lifetime of incomparably beautiful love. This is what Paul meant in 2 Corinthians 4:4 when he spoke of 'the glory of Christ.' It is the glory of a person." (John Piper, God Is The Gospel [Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 2005], p. 65)
Saturday, April 07, 2007
Would You Chuck The Bad Arguments?
“How much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?”
Herein lies the ancient roots of many atheological arguments, especially pop arguments by amateur internet atheologians. Just because a woodchuck could chuck would, doesn’t mean he would. Perhaps it would be different for each woodchuck. Maybe Bob the woodchuck would chuck 1 pound of wood because Bob doesn’t happen to like chucking wood. But, Jim the woodchuck likes the idea of chucking wood and so he would chuck 100 pounds of wood. Maybe, though, the question just means, if a woodchuck could indeed chuck wood, how much could he chuck. But, then, “would” is used as a synonym for “could.” Thus the twister would read: “How much wood could a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood.” “Would” usually connotes a disposition or willingness to do something, i.e, “Would you pick up eggs for me while you’re at the store?” So, just because Bob could chuck wood doesn’t mean he would chuck as much as Jim. That a woodchuck could chuck wood doesn’t entail that he would. This is a modal fallacy. Now, before you go getting all upset and say that I’m taking this children’s game too far, remember that I’m just saying that the roots of many amateur atheological arguments have their roots in children’s games. The difference is that the game doesn’t pretend to be making any serious point, and so we can go easy on any in depth analysis.
I’m of course granting the atheist the gratuitous assumption that claims like this:
The argument is basically claiming that Jesus must not have been God because if He was he could have done certain things, and, being supposedly “all-loving,” he would have done those things.
Or, take these myriad claims by John Loftus,
We can find these argumentum ad tongue twistums all over the place, though. One more should suffice.
So, like we agreed above, just because a woodchuck could chuck wood, doesn’t mean that it would. “Would” implies desire or willingness. I know you “could” pick up eggs at the store for me -- after all, you are going there, and have the money, but I want to know if you will (or, “would”) pick them up for me.
Indeed, we apply this type of reasoning all the time. If a person S gets murdered, then S1 - Sn are not considered suspects just because they could kill S. Now, if S* was willing to or desired to murder S, then we would have a suspect. Just because someone S could do some action A does not imply that S would A.
Now, if S* could not murder S, say, he was a quadriplegic and was 1,000 miles away at the time, attending a dinner with President Bush, then it wouldn’t matter if he desired to. But, we must all agree that just because someone could doesn’t imply that they would. To blame someone for an action, they must have at least been able to do it, but that’s not sufficient to charge someone with a crime.
Thus the atheological arguments must not simply make the rather obvious point that an omnipotent being could do X, Y, and Z, and then enthymematically conclude that God would have done X, Y, and Z if He were really God.
Since could doesn’t imply would, the atheological argumentum ad tongue twistums tendentiously smuggle in anthropocentric notions of what God would or would not do. That is, since could does not entail would, it is tendentious to tell us what God is willing to, or desires to, do; especially if He has not revealed that He is so willing, and you're importing humanistic desires on to God. The atheologian has not taken any of these supposed Divine desires out of Scripture. And, if I may be so bold, I don’t think God told the atheologian what He desired. So, upon inspection, all these (fairly frequent) atheological arguments tell us is simply a autobiographical report of what the atheist thinks God should, or should not, be like if He existed.
They atheist supposes that God is like Jim, our wood-loving woodchuck. And since the atheist knows God’s dispositions, he can then say that God “would” do X, and since He’s omnipotent, nothing should stop Him.
So, take Loftus’ “arguments” (yes, those were intended to be scare quotes). Given the assumption that God wants to reveal himself to everyone in a way that the person would think is acceptable enough to believe -- like God is some puppy clamoring for anyone and everyone’s affection and attention -- then maybe God “would” have reincarnated Himself every subsequent generation, vanishing before their eyes if they tried to kill him. (One must wonder, though, why they would try and “kill him” if Loftus thinks this is such a good way to reveal yourself. I mean, who would want to kill God. Humans would love God if only they had the opportunity to believe in Him, says Loftus. Despite Loftus’ slip, I digress in continuing on…)
Basically, the argument goes like this: “But, but, but, God could save every single person on earth.” We can reply, “Why would you think God would do a thing like that?” Surely the “But, but, but, that would make God a big meany” argument isn’t the comeback here, is it?
The atheist would laugh if police knocked on his door and said that since he merely “could have” murdered his neighbor, they were going to arrest him. The atheist must admit that the mere fact that God “could” X, does not imply that He “would” X. The atheist must show that God is disposed, or willing to, do X. This latter requirement is simply lacking.
Frequently the atheist will say, “Well if I could have stopped 9/11, I would have.” Why? “Well, because then all those people wouldn’t have died.” But here the “willingness” to stop 9/11 is that man, his life, and avoidance of human suffering is the highest good. So we see that the atheist views God as having the same desires as him. God is simply a more powerful humanist. Jehovah is a crypto-humanist! And the atheists say that Christians have made God into their image (yes, that was meant to be sarcastic).
The “God could do X” argument is simply an argument from certain unbiblical assumptions of what God would be disposed or willing to do given that He’s the kind of being the atheist thinks He is, or should be. Since God doesn’t do what the atheist (says) he’d do if he (the atheist) were running the universe, then God must not exist. The atheist is jealous that s/he isn’t running the show. The atheist looks at divinity in a modern, Burger King way; he wants it his way. And since things aren’t done his way, he’ll take to undermining the one in charge. This is Monday morning quarterback atheology. “Oh, he shouldn’t have thrown it to him on that one play.” “Boy, if I were coaching I would’ve went for it on 4th down.” Or, like those clawing for a promotion at a large company: “Smith totally botched that deal, if I had his job I would have handled the Yakazawa’s differently.”
It’s actually sad to see atheists acting like this. Kind of pathetic.
Bottom line, God owns the company. He’s running the show. He has shown that He will judge the world by raising His Son from the dead. This Easter Sunday you should reflect on the fact that Jesus has shown that death isn’t the end of us. Each and everyone of us will stand before God on judgment day. Jesus rose from the dead some two thousand years ago. You don’t have to like it, but it happened. You can trust in Christ as your only hope, or, like a dog returns to his vomit, you can come back on Monday and shop these types of pathetic arguments around some more. Cross your arms, stiffen your upper lip, and throw a big hissy fit because God didn’t give you wings so you could fly or neuter you like Loftus dog. Pout because Jesus doesn’t come back every generation and disappear before people kill him. “Harrumph(!), I won’t believe in God because He won’t ‘provide a blazing cross in the sky.’” Seriously, jokes over guys. Grow up.
Herein lies the ancient roots of many atheological arguments, especially pop arguments by amateur internet atheologians. Just because a woodchuck could chuck would, doesn’t mean he would. Perhaps it would be different for each woodchuck. Maybe Bob the woodchuck would chuck 1 pound of wood because Bob doesn’t happen to like chucking wood. But, Jim the woodchuck likes the idea of chucking wood and so he would chuck 100 pounds of wood. Maybe, though, the question just means, if a woodchuck could indeed chuck wood, how much could he chuck. But, then, “would” is used as a synonym for “could.” Thus the twister would read: “How much wood could a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood.” “Would” usually connotes a disposition or willingness to do something, i.e, “Would you pick up eggs for me while you’re at the store?” So, just because Bob could chuck wood doesn’t mean he would chuck as much as Jim. That a woodchuck could chuck wood doesn’t entail that he would. This is a modal fallacy. Now, before you go getting all upset and say that I’m taking this children’s game too far, remember that I’m just saying that the roots of many amateur atheological arguments have their roots in children’s games. The difference is that the game doesn’t pretend to be making any serious point, and so we can go easy on any in depth analysis.
I’m of course granting the atheist the gratuitous assumption that claims like this:
“At a larger level, if Jesus were God, he could have performed so many real miracles. He could have, for example, eliminated smallpox and a host of other diseases that science is busy eliminating today.”
The argument is basically claiming that Jesus must not have been God because if He was he could have done certain things, and, being supposedly “all-loving,” he would have done those things.
Or, take these myriad claims by John Loftus,
God could reveal himself in every generation in a myriad of ways since he is supposedly an omniscient being.
He could become incarnate in every generation and do miracles for all to see. If people wanted to kill him again and he didn't need to die again, he could simply vanish before their eyes.
He could spontaneously appear and heal people, or end a famine, or stop a war.
He could raise up John F. Kennedy from the dead.
He could provide a blazing cross in the sky.
He could restore an amputated limb in full sight of an crowd of people which would include all of the best magicians along with the Mythbusters and James Randi, who would all find fault if fault could be found.
He could do any and all of the miracles he did in the Bible from time to time, including miraculously feeding 5000 men with their families. The list of things God could do in each generation is endless.
We can find these argumentum ad tongue twistums all over the place, though. One more should suffice.
God could have appeared to Herod in a dream and told him not to kill these children.
God could have killed Herod.
God could have guided the wise men so that Herod would not have felt mocked by them.
God could have protected the babies.
God could have spoken to the murdering soldiers and turned them away from the task.
God could have sent all of these families to Egypt when he sent Jesus and his family there.
God could have made it so that no male children besides Jesus were born during that time.
God could have changed history so that Herod was not king.
So, like we agreed above, just because a woodchuck could chuck wood, doesn’t mean that it would. “Would” implies desire or willingness. I know you “could” pick up eggs at the store for me -- after all, you are going there, and have the money, but I want to know if you will (or, “would”) pick them up for me.
Indeed, we apply this type of reasoning all the time. If a person S gets murdered, then S1 - Sn are not considered suspects just because they could kill S. Now, if S* was willing to or desired to murder S, then we would have a suspect. Just because someone S could do some action A does not imply that S would A.
Now, if S* could not murder S, say, he was a quadriplegic and was 1,000 miles away at the time, attending a dinner with President Bush, then it wouldn’t matter if he desired to. But, we must all agree that just because someone could doesn’t imply that they would. To blame someone for an action, they must have at least been able to do it, but that’s not sufficient to charge someone with a crime.
Thus the atheological arguments must not simply make the rather obvious point that an omnipotent being could do X, Y, and Z, and then enthymematically conclude that God would have done X, Y, and Z if He were really God.
Since could doesn’t imply would, the atheological argumentum ad tongue twistums tendentiously smuggle in anthropocentric notions of what God would or would not do. That is, since could does not entail would, it is tendentious to tell us what God is willing to, or desires to, do; especially if He has not revealed that He is so willing, and you're importing humanistic desires on to God. The atheologian has not taken any of these supposed Divine desires out of Scripture. And, if I may be so bold, I don’t think God told the atheologian what He desired. So, upon inspection, all these (fairly frequent) atheological arguments tell us is simply a autobiographical report of what the atheist thinks God should, or should not, be like if He existed.
They atheist supposes that God is like Jim, our wood-loving woodchuck. And since the atheist knows God’s dispositions, he can then say that God “would” do X, and since He’s omnipotent, nothing should stop Him.
So, take Loftus’ “arguments” (yes, those were intended to be scare quotes). Given the assumption that God wants to reveal himself to everyone in a way that the person would think is acceptable enough to believe -- like God is some puppy clamoring for anyone and everyone’s affection and attention -- then maybe God “would” have reincarnated Himself every subsequent generation, vanishing before their eyes if they tried to kill him. (One must wonder, though, why they would try and “kill him” if Loftus thinks this is such a good way to reveal yourself. I mean, who would want to kill God. Humans would love God if only they had the opportunity to believe in Him, says Loftus. Despite Loftus’ slip, I digress in continuing on…)
Basically, the argument goes like this: “But, but, but, God could save every single person on earth.” We can reply, “Why would you think God would do a thing like that?” Surely the “But, but, but, that would make God a big meany” argument isn’t the comeback here, is it?
The atheist would laugh if police knocked on his door and said that since he merely “could have” murdered his neighbor, they were going to arrest him. The atheist must admit that the mere fact that God “could” X, does not imply that He “would” X. The atheist must show that God is disposed, or willing to, do X. This latter requirement is simply lacking.
Frequently the atheist will say, “Well if I could have stopped 9/11, I would have.” Why? “Well, because then all those people wouldn’t have died.” But here the “willingness” to stop 9/11 is that man, his life, and avoidance of human suffering is the highest good. So we see that the atheist views God as having the same desires as him. God is simply a more powerful humanist. Jehovah is a crypto-humanist! And the atheists say that Christians have made God into their image (yes, that was meant to be sarcastic).
The “God could do X” argument is simply an argument from certain unbiblical assumptions of what God would be disposed or willing to do given that He’s the kind of being the atheist thinks He is, or should be. Since God doesn’t do what the atheist (says) he’d do if he (the atheist) were running the universe, then God must not exist. The atheist is jealous that s/he isn’t running the show. The atheist looks at divinity in a modern, Burger King way; he wants it his way. And since things aren’t done his way, he’ll take to undermining the one in charge. This is Monday morning quarterback atheology. “Oh, he shouldn’t have thrown it to him on that one play.” “Boy, if I were coaching I would’ve went for it on 4th down.” Or, like those clawing for a promotion at a large company: “Smith totally botched that deal, if I had his job I would have handled the Yakazawa’s differently.”
It’s actually sad to see atheists acting like this. Kind of pathetic.
Bottom line, God owns the company. He’s running the show. He has shown that He will judge the world by raising His Son from the dead. This Easter Sunday you should reflect on the fact that Jesus has shown that death isn’t the end of us. Each and everyone of us will stand before God on judgment day. Jesus rose from the dead some two thousand years ago. You don’t have to like it, but it happened. You can trust in Christ as your only hope, or, like a dog returns to his vomit, you can come back on Monday and shop these types of pathetic arguments around some more. Cross your arms, stiffen your upper lip, and throw a big hissy fit because God didn’t give you wings so you could fly or neuter you like Loftus dog. Pout because Jesus doesn’t come back every generation and disappear before people kill him. “Harrumph(!), I won’t believe in God because He won’t ‘provide a blazing cross in the sky.’” Seriously, jokes over guys. Grow up.
Today's Your Lucky Day!
On the heels of Steve's post, which came on the heels of mine, which came on the heels of another one of mine, which came on the heels of Steve's post, which came off the heels of another one of Steve's posts, and which came off the heels of Peter's post, and which was caused - through prior factors that Peter had no control over - by my original post, I now bring van Inwagen's argument in its more developed stage: The Luck Objection.
**QUOTE**
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Kane's requirement that the causation of a choice that is an SFW [pm: self-forming wills] be nondeterministic has drawn the objection that indeterminism located here would diminish the agent's control over the making of the choice. The objection is often couched in terms of luck. (It is so developed by Almeida and Bernstein [2003], Ekstrom [2000: 105], Haji [1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, and 2001], Mele [1998, 1999a, 1999b, and forthcoming], and Strawson [1994].) If the agent's effort of will nondeterministically causes her choice, then, whichever choice the agent makes, there was, until the occurrence of that choice, a chance that it would not occur. If the agent's effort to chose in accord with her moral judgment happens to succeed, the objection goes, then her choice is at least partly due to good luck. In another possible world with exactly the same laws of nature and exactly the same history up until the occurrence of the choice, the agent's (or her counterpart's) effort fails; there, but for good luck, goes she. And analogously, if, in the actual world, the agent's effort fails, then her choice is at least partly due to bad luck. Either way, the choice is to some degree due to luck. And to that degree, the objection concludes, the control that the agent exercises in making the choice is diminished.
Kane's claim that indeterminacy precludes exact sameness has been contested (see Clarke [1999 and 2003b: 86-87] and O'Connor [1996]). And Haji (1999a) and Mele (1999a and 1999b) contend that the argument from luck is just as effective if we consider an agent and her counterpart who are as similar as can be, given the indeterminacy of their efforts. Indeed, the argument might be advanced without any appeal to other worlds or counterparts: given that there is a chance that the effort will fail, the agent is lucky, it may be said, if it succeeds.
A further reply from Kane to the argument from luck appeals to the active nature of efforts of will. When an agent makes an effort to choose to do what she believes she ought to do, she actively tries to bring about a certain choice. When the agent makes that choice, she succeeds, despite the indeterminism, at doing what she was (actively) trying to do. And Kane points out that typically, when this is so, the indeterminism does not undermine responsibility (and hence it does not so diminish active control that there is not enough for responsibility). He describes a case (1999b: 227) in which a man hits a glass tabletop attempting to shatter it. Even though it is undetermined whether his effort will succeed, Kane notes, if the man does succeed, he may well be responsible for breaking the tabletop.
If left here, the reply would fail to address the problem of luck in a case where the agent chooses to do what she is tempted to do rather than what she believes she ought to do. In response to this shortcoming, Kane (1999a, 1999b, 2000b, 2000c, and 2002) has recently proposed a "doubling" of effort in cases of moral conflict. In such a case, he now holds, the agent makes two, simultaneous efforts of will, both indeterminate in strength. The agent tries to make the moral choice, and at the same time she tries to make the self-interested choice. Whichever choice she makes, then, she succeeds, despite the indeterminism, at doing something that she was actively trying to do.
This doubling of efforts of will introduces a troubling incoherence into cases of moral conflict. If an agent is actively trying, at one time, to make each of two obviously incompatible choices, that fact raises a serious question about the agent's rationality.
A final difficulty for agent-causal views accepts that all they require might be possible. The objection may still be raised that actions produced as required by such an account would be too subject to luck to be free actions. Van Inwagen has raised a similar objection to agent-causal accounts—though without referring to luck—on several occasions (see his 1983: 145 and 2000). Haji (2004) and Mele (forthcoming) present the objection in terms of luck as follows. Recall Leo's decision (section 3.1) to tell the truth. Until he makes the decision, there remains a chance that he will not decide to tell the truth, but will instead decide to lie. Likewise, until he makes the decision, there remains a chance that he will not cause a decision to tell the truth, but will instead cause a decision to lie. Then, in some possible world W with the same laws as those in the actual world, and with the same history up to the time of the decision, Leo decides at that time to lie, and he causes that decision to lie. The actual world, where Leo decides to tell the truth (and causes that decision), and world W, where he decides to lie (and causes that decision), do not differ in any respect until the time at which Leo makes the decision (which is also the time at which Leo causes the decision). There is, then, no difference between these two worlds to account for the difference in the decision, and likewise no difference to account for the difference in Leo's agent causings. Hence the difference between these two worlds is just a matter of luck. But if the difference between these two worlds is just a matter of luck, then Leo does not freely make his decision in the actual world.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/
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**END QUOTE**
Basically, control of action is required for moral responsibility and free will. If the action is due to luck, i.e., nothing determines wether an agent will A or B, and if he A'ed then he is worthy of prase but if he had B'ed he'd be worthy of blame, then it seems the control required for freedom and moral responsibility is only to be found in determinism and a compatibilism.
**QUOTE**
______________________
His philosophical task, then, is to show that a choice may be free, in the sense that it is something for which its agent is morally responsible, even though it was not guaranteed by antecedent mental processes. He must explain how the taking of a decision can be free while not the necessary outcome of the reasoning from which it issues. One might think, however, that I am responsible for choosing, e.g., to support a certain cause only if that mental act is secured by the exercise of my reasoning ability. Moreover, having weighed the cause’s pros and cons as I did, unless I was rationally bound to decide in its favor the outcome of this reasoning process seems inexplicable and, thus, not something for which I should be held accountable: praised or blamed. My decision must be rational if praiseworthy or blameworthy, but (unless I am in a situation like that of Buridan’s ass) how could it be rational if the reasons motivating it are consistent with the opposite choice? A mechanism that could take a set of reasons as the basis for more than one course of action appears erratic. Its exercise, thus, would fail to insure a rational result redounding to my credit or discredit.3 Kane, therefore, faces a dilemma: either some actions are undetermined, in which cases the control and rationality requirements of free agency are not satisfied, or a free agent’s conduct is always determined and explicable in terms of reasons that render irrational all but one course of action, in which case the alternative rational possibilities requirement of libertarian free agency can not be met.4 Alternatively, Kane must respond to the following chain argument:
1. If an act is free, then its agent has control over its performance
2. If an act’s performance is controlled by its agent, then it is the product of a reliable mechanism.
3. If an act is free, then it is rational.
4. If an act is rational, then it is the product of a reliable mechanism.
5. If an act is the product of a reliable mechanism, then it is the necessary outcome of the mechanism’s processing of its antecedents (specifically, the reasons arising in its favor).
6. If an act is the necessary outcome of a mechanism’s processing of its antecedents, then it is produced deterministically.
7. Thus, if an act is free, it is produced deterministically.
- Robert Allen
http://www.class.uidaho.edu/inpc/4th-2001/Papers/kane.htm
______________________
**END QUOTE**
**QUOTE**
___________________________
Kane's requirement that the causation of a choice that is an SFW [pm: self-forming wills] be nondeterministic has drawn the objection that indeterminism located here would diminish the agent's control over the making of the choice. The objection is often couched in terms of luck. (It is so developed by Almeida and Bernstein [2003], Ekstrom [2000: 105], Haji [1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, and 2001], Mele [1998, 1999a, 1999b, and forthcoming], and Strawson [1994].) If the agent's effort of will nondeterministically causes her choice, then, whichever choice the agent makes, there was, until the occurrence of that choice, a chance that it would not occur. If the agent's effort to chose in accord with her moral judgment happens to succeed, the objection goes, then her choice is at least partly due to good luck. In another possible world with exactly the same laws of nature and exactly the same history up until the occurrence of the choice, the agent's (or her counterpart's) effort fails; there, but for good luck, goes she. And analogously, if, in the actual world, the agent's effort fails, then her choice is at least partly due to bad luck. Either way, the choice is to some degree due to luck. And to that degree, the objection concludes, the control that the agent exercises in making the choice is diminished.
Kane's claim that indeterminacy precludes exact sameness has been contested (see Clarke [1999 and 2003b: 86-87] and O'Connor [1996]). And Haji (1999a) and Mele (1999a and 1999b) contend that the argument from luck is just as effective if we consider an agent and her counterpart who are as similar as can be, given the indeterminacy of their efforts. Indeed, the argument might be advanced without any appeal to other worlds or counterparts: given that there is a chance that the effort will fail, the agent is lucky, it may be said, if it succeeds.
A further reply from Kane to the argument from luck appeals to the active nature of efforts of will. When an agent makes an effort to choose to do what she believes she ought to do, she actively tries to bring about a certain choice. When the agent makes that choice, she succeeds, despite the indeterminism, at doing what she was (actively) trying to do. And Kane points out that typically, when this is so, the indeterminism does not undermine responsibility (and hence it does not so diminish active control that there is not enough for responsibility). He describes a case (1999b: 227) in which a man hits a glass tabletop attempting to shatter it. Even though it is undetermined whether his effort will succeed, Kane notes, if the man does succeed, he may well be responsible for breaking the tabletop.
If left here, the reply would fail to address the problem of luck in a case where the agent chooses to do what she is tempted to do rather than what she believes she ought to do. In response to this shortcoming, Kane (1999a, 1999b, 2000b, 2000c, and 2002) has recently proposed a "doubling" of effort in cases of moral conflict. In such a case, he now holds, the agent makes two, simultaneous efforts of will, both indeterminate in strength. The agent tries to make the moral choice, and at the same time she tries to make the self-interested choice. Whichever choice she makes, then, she succeeds, despite the indeterminism, at doing something that she was actively trying to do.
This doubling of efforts of will introduces a troubling incoherence into cases of moral conflict. If an agent is actively trying, at one time, to make each of two obviously incompatible choices, that fact raises a serious question about the agent's rationality.
A final difficulty for agent-causal views accepts that all they require might be possible. The objection may still be raised that actions produced as required by such an account would be too subject to luck to be free actions. Van Inwagen has raised a similar objection to agent-causal accounts—though without referring to luck—on several occasions (see his 1983: 145 and 2000). Haji (2004) and Mele (forthcoming) present the objection in terms of luck as follows. Recall Leo's decision (section 3.1) to tell the truth. Until he makes the decision, there remains a chance that he will not decide to tell the truth, but will instead decide to lie. Likewise, until he makes the decision, there remains a chance that he will not cause a decision to tell the truth, but will instead cause a decision to lie. Then, in some possible world W with the same laws as those in the actual world, and with the same history up to the time of the decision, Leo decides at that time to lie, and he causes that decision to lie. The actual world, where Leo decides to tell the truth (and causes that decision), and world W, where he decides to lie (and causes that decision), do not differ in any respect until the time at which Leo makes the decision (which is also the time at which Leo causes the decision). There is, then, no difference between these two worlds to account for the difference in the decision, and likewise no difference to account for the difference in Leo's agent causings. Hence the difference between these two worlds is just a matter of luck. But if the difference between these two worlds is just a matter of luck, then Leo does not freely make his decision in the actual world.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/
_____________________
**END QUOTE**
Basically, control of action is required for moral responsibility and free will. If the action is due to luck, i.e., nothing determines wether an agent will A or B, and if he A'ed then he is worthy of prase but if he had B'ed he'd be worthy of blame, then it seems the control required for freedom and moral responsibility is only to be found in determinism and a compatibilism.
**QUOTE**
______________________
His philosophical task, then, is to show that a choice may be free, in the sense that it is something for which its agent is morally responsible, even though it was not guaranteed by antecedent mental processes. He must explain how the taking of a decision can be free while not the necessary outcome of the reasoning from which it issues. One might think, however, that I am responsible for choosing, e.g., to support a certain cause only if that mental act is secured by the exercise of my reasoning ability. Moreover, having weighed the cause’s pros and cons as I did, unless I was rationally bound to decide in its favor the outcome of this reasoning process seems inexplicable and, thus, not something for which I should be held accountable: praised or blamed. My decision must be rational if praiseworthy or blameworthy, but (unless I am in a situation like that of Buridan’s ass) how could it be rational if the reasons motivating it are consistent with the opposite choice? A mechanism that could take a set of reasons as the basis for more than one course of action appears erratic. Its exercise, thus, would fail to insure a rational result redounding to my credit or discredit.3 Kane, therefore, faces a dilemma: either some actions are undetermined, in which cases the control and rationality requirements of free agency are not satisfied, or a free agent’s conduct is always determined and explicable in terms of reasons that render irrational all but one course of action, in which case the alternative rational possibilities requirement of libertarian free agency can not be met.4 Alternatively, Kane must respond to the following chain argument:
1. If an act is free, then its agent has control over its performance
2. If an act’s performance is controlled by its agent, then it is the product of a reliable mechanism.
3. If an act is free, then it is rational.
4. If an act is rational, then it is the product of a reliable mechanism.
5. If an act is the product of a reliable mechanism, then it is the necessary outcome of the mechanism’s processing of its antecedents (specifically, the reasons arising in its favor).
6. If an act is the necessary outcome of a mechanism’s processing of its antecedents, then it is produced deterministically.
7. Thus, if an act is free, it is produced deterministically.
- Robert Allen
http://www.class.uidaho.edu/inpc/4th-2001/Papers/kane.htm
______________________
**END QUOTE**
The future ain't what it used to be!
Paul Manata quoted an objection to libertarianism by Peter van Inwagen:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwvanInwagen2.html
The basic idea is that if an agent is free in the libertarian sense, then no antecedent condition determines the outcome—so that if you repeat the past, then, sooner or later, the agent would have done otherwise. I’d like to briefly elaborate on the implications of this position.
1.Traditionally, libertarianism involves the axiomatic assumption that I can’t be held responsible for my actions unless I was free to do otherwise.
But as Van Inwagen shows, libertarianism is far more radical than it would initially seem to be. For the logic of libertarianism is not merely that I *could* have done otherwise, but that I *would* have done otherwise. Not merely that I’m free to make either choice, but that I opt for both.
In other words, there’s a possible world in which I leave Keilah, and another possible world in which I stay in Keilah. That’s what it means to have libertarian freedom. That’s how the freedom to do otherwise cashes out. There is a possible world corresponding to each choice. A possible world in which I exercise each option. I didn’t choose one over another. I did both—but not in the same world.
2.This, in turn, raises the question of what individuates the real world from a possible world. What’s the differential factor? Why is only one of my possible choices exemplified in the real world? Or, to put it another way, why do I find myself in a world where I make one choice rather than the other?
Obviously I didn’t instantiate this scenario. For if my choice is what actuates a possible world (or world-segment), then there would be more than one real world (or world-segment) since I make different choices in different possible worlds.
3. So some other agent or agency must be behind which choice of mine sticks. Which possibility plays out in actuality.
For I didn’t get to choose which choice would make the final cut; which choice, out of all the alternative choices which I made in different possible worlds, would be concretely exemplified in space and time. I didn’t get to choose which possible world would become the actual world.
But where does that leave the libertarian assumption about the preconditions of personal responsibility?
4.This, in turn, goes to the question of how the future comes to be. How does the future eventuate?
According to libertarianism, the past does not determine the future. Rather, the agent is in some measure the creator of his own future—and thereby his future existence.
Yet libertarianism doesn’t say that I’m the source of everything that happens to me. I didn’t cause myself to still have a body a minute from now.
So libertarianism has an oddly honeycombed view of existence, as if parts of reality are determined by the past, while other parts are blank spaces waiting to be penciled in by the agent.
This is a very peculiar view of reality. I originate part of my future reality, while other parts are caused by something else. Although I can’t actuate my body from one moment to the next, yet somehow I’m able to actuate other eventualities. I better be careful where I step lest I fall into a hole of nothingness.
5.But it gets even stranger. Not only do I, as a libertarian agent, create a part of my own future, but I can create a part of your future as well. For some of my choices negate some of your choices.
If, for example, you and I both love the same girl in high school, but I’m the one who captures her heart, then I end up creating a very different future for you than you would have chosen had you married her instead of me. (And remember that there’s a possible world in which she does become your wife.)
In that respect, I created your future. Indeed, I created the future you. The person you will be. The future in which you will exist. You would still exist, but apart from my choice, you would not exist in that particular future.
6.As a result, libertarianism confers godlike powers on the agent. Godlike power over his fellow agents. I can enact your future, or parts thereof, without your consent.
But, once again, it’s hard to see how this does justice to the libertarian preconditions of responsibility.
7.In that respect, there is a sense in which, according to libertarianism, the past determines the future. By my past action, in winning the hand of the woman we both wanted to marry, I end up determining a different future for you than you would have chosen for yourself.
But, once more, it’s hard to see how this does justice to the libertarian preconditions of responsibility.
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwvanInwagen2.html
The basic idea is that if an agent is free in the libertarian sense, then no antecedent condition determines the outcome—so that if you repeat the past, then, sooner or later, the agent would have done otherwise. I’d like to briefly elaborate on the implications of this position.
1.Traditionally, libertarianism involves the axiomatic assumption that I can’t be held responsible for my actions unless I was free to do otherwise.
But as Van Inwagen shows, libertarianism is far more radical than it would initially seem to be. For the logic of libertarianism is not merely that I *could* have done otherwise, but that I *would* have done otherwise. Not merely that I’m free to make either choice, but that I opt for both.
In other words, there’s a possible world in which I leave Keilah, and another possible world in which I stay in Keilah. That’s what it means to have libertarian freedom. That’s how the freedom to do otherwise cashes out. There is a possible world corresponding to each choice. A possible world in which I exercise each option. I didn’t choose one over another. I did both—but not in the same world.
2.This, in turn, raises the question of what individuates the real world from a possible world. What’s the differential factor? Why is only one of my possible choices exemplified in the real world? Or, to put it another way, why do I find myself in a world where I make one choice rather than the other?
Obviously I didn’t instantiate this scenario. For if my choice is what actuates a possible world (or world-segment), then there would be more than one real world (or world-segment) since I make different choices in different possible worlds.
3. So some other agent or agency must be behind which choice of mine sticks. Which possibility plays out in actuality.
For I didn’t get to choose which choice would make the final cut; which choice, out of all the alternative choices which I made in different possible worlds, would be concretely exemplified in space and time. I didn’t get to choose which possible world would become the actual world.
But where does that leave the libertarian assumption about the preconditions of personal responsibility?
4.This, in turn, goes to the question of how the future comes to be. How does the future eventuate?
According to libertarianism, the past does not determine the future. Rather, the agent is in some measure the creator of his own future—and thereby his future existence.
Yet libertarianism doesn’t say that I’m the source of everything that happens to me. I didn’t cause myself to still have a body a minute from now.
So libertarianism has an oddly honeycombed view of existence, as if parts of reality are determined by the past, while other parts are blank spaces waiting to be penciled in by the agent.
This is a very peculiar view of reality. I originate part of my future reality, while other parts are caused by something else. Although I can’t actuate my body from one moment to the next, yet somehow I’m able to actuate other eventualities. I better be careful where I step lest I fall into a hole of nothingness.
5.But it gets even stranger. Not only do I, as a libertarian agent, create a part of my own future, but I can create a part of your future as well. For some of my choices negate some of your choices.
If, for example, you and I both love the same girl in high school, but I’m the one who captures her heart, then I end up creating a very different future for you than you would have chosen had you married her instead of me. (And remember that there’s a possible world in which she does become your wife.)
In that respect, I created your future. Indeed, I created the future you. The person you will be. The future in which you will exist. You would still exist, but apart from my choice, you would not exist in that particular future.
6.As a result, libertarianism confers godlike powers on the agent. Godlike power over his fellow agents. I can enact your future, or parts thereof, without your consent.
But, once again, it’s hard to see how this does justice to the libertarian preconditions of responsibility.
7.In that respect, there is a sense in which, according to libertarianism, the past determines the future. By my past action, in winning the hand of the woman we both wanted to marry, I end up determining a different future for you than you would have chosen for yourself.
But, once more, it’s hard to see how this does justice to the libertarian preconditions of responsibility.
The Unexpected Nature Of The Resurrection
"It is well recognized that the narratives of the passion and especially the crucifixion itself constantly quote or allude to the Old Testament, especially to the words of righteous sufferers in the Psalms. There is an intertextual network that serves to interpret the passion of Jesus by setting it within the experience and the expectation of Israel. But when we read on to the accounts of the empty tomb and the resurrection appearances there are hardly any such allusions. The stories show little sign of following literary precedents, and standard narrative motifs, the building blocks of many an ancient story, are rare. For all the ingenuity of scholars these stories remain strangely sui generis and lacking theological interpretation. None of the standard Jewish formulas or images of resurrection occur. We seem to be shown the extraordinary novum, the otherness of resurrection, through the eyes of those whose ordinary reality it invaded. The perplexity, the doubt, the fear, the joy, the recognition are those of deep memory, mediated, to be sure, by literary means, but not entirely hidden behind the text." (Richard Bauckham, Jesus And The Eyewitnesses [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2006], pp. 504-505)
Friday, April 06, 2007
Agent-causation
van Inwagen pushed this argument as a libertarian. So, the below argument isn't prejudiced by compatibilist assumptions.
**QUOTE**
_________________________
I want to close by explaining why van Inwagen thinks one important group of incompatibilists, those who appeal to what is called agent-causation, do not appreciate the depth and difficulty of the problem of free will. Many philosophers would agree with this judgment for the simple reason that they think that the concept of agent-causation is incoherent, or think that agent-causation is metaphysically impossible. Van Inwagen is inclined to agree with them (although he has no firm opinion on this question), but he has lately stressed a different point. It is this: suppose there is nothing conceptually or metaphysically impossible about agent-causation; suppose in fact that agent-causation is a real phenomenon and that an episode of agent-causation figures among the antecedents of every voluntary movement of a human hand or limb or vocal apparatus. Van Inwagen’s position is that even if this is so, and even if (as some have argued) we understand the concept of agent-causation at least as well as we understand the concept of event-causation, all this does nothing to diminish the mystery of free will. I will try to explain why van Inwagen thinks this by considering a particular human action. Suppose Marie wants to vote in favor of the proposal before the meeting, and that, for this reason, she raises her right hand when the chair says, “All in favor. . .?” Suppose that one of the causal antecedents of her hand’s rising was a certain event in her brain that was undetermined by past events, that the state of her body and her immediate environment at the moment this brain-event occurred was causally sufficient for her hand’s rising, that if this event had not occurred, her hand would not have risen, and that she, Marie, a particular member of the metaphysical category “substance” or “continuant,” was the cause—that is to say, the agent-cause—of that crucial brain-event. The friends of agent-causation, if van Inwagen understands them, believe that these suppositions are sufficient for her having freely raised her hand. If that is so, these suppositions must entail the following proposition: at some moment shortly before Marie raised her hand, she was able to raise her hand and she was able not to raise her hand. But van Inwagen doesn’t see why this entailment should be supposed to hold. In fact, he thinks he sees a good argument for the conclusion that it was not up to her whether her hand rose. Suppose God were miraculously to return the world to precisely the state it was in, say, one minute before Marie raised her hand, and that he then allowed affairs once more to proceed, without any further miracles. What would happen? What would Marie do? Well, if her raising her hand was a free act, and if free will is incompatible with determinism, then we can’t say. We can say only that she might have raised her hand and might not have raised her hand. If God were to cause this episode to be thus “replayed” a very large number of times, it might turn out that she raised her hand in thirty percent of the replays and refrained from raising it in seventy percent of the replays. This much is a simple consequence of incompatibilism, and it brings one of the main reason philosophers become compatibilists into stark relief. It seems to lead us inescapably to the conclusion that on each particular replay, what Marie does on that occasion is a mere matter of chance. And if there are no replays, if there is only one occasion on which Marie is in this situation, it seems to lead us just as inescapably to the conclusion that on that one occasion what Marie does is a mere matter of chance. And if it is a mere matter of chance whether Marie raised her hand, then it cannot have been true beforehand that Marie was both able to raise her hand and able to refrain from raising her hand, for to have both these abilities would be to be able to determine the outcome of a process whose outcome is due to chance. It is true that we have, by stipulation, inserted into this process, this process whose outcome is due to chance, an episode of agent-causation. But, if I may so express myself, so what? That doesn’t change the fact that the outcome of that process was due to chance. If God caused Marie’s decision to be replayed a very large number of times, sometimes (in thirty percent of the replays, let us say) Marie would have agent-caused the crucial brain event and sometimes (in seventy percent of the replays, let us say) she would not have. Surely, then, whether she agent-caused the brain-event was a mere matter of chance? Whether her deliberations were followed by her agent-causing the brain event was, it would seem, a matter of chance; Marie, therefore, cannot have been both able to agent-cause the brain-event and able to refrain from agent-causing the brain-event, for to have both these abilities would be to be able to determine the outcome of a process whose outcome was due to chance—an impossible ability. I conclude that even if an episode of agent-causation is among the causal antecedents of every voluntary human action, these episodes do nothing to undermine the prima facie impossibility of an undetermined free act. Postulating agent-causation, therefore, does nothing to diminish the mystery of free will. Van Inwagen’s conclusion is that incompatibilists had better abandon the concept of agent-causation, and seek a resolution of the mystery of free will elsewhere—if, indeed, there is an “elsewhere.”"
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwvanInwagen2.html
_________________________
**END QUOTE**
**QUOTE**
_________________________
I want to close by explaining why van Inwagen thinks one important group of incompatibilists, those who appeal to what is called agent-causation, do not appreciate the depth and difficulty of the problem of free will. Many philosophers would agree with this judgment for the simple reason that they think that the concept of agent-causation is incoherent, or think that agent-causation is metaphysically impossible. Van Inwagen is inclined to agree with them (although he has no firm opinion on this question), but he has lately stressed a different point. It is this: suppose there is nothing conceptually or metaphysically impossible about agent-causation; suppose in fact that agent-causation is a real phenomenon and that an episode of agent-causation figures among the antecedents of every voluntary movement of a human hand or limb or vocal apparatus. Van Inwagen’s position is that even if this is so, and even if (as some have argued) we understand the concept of agent-causation at least as well as we understand the concept of event-causation, all this does nothing to diminish the mystery of free will. I will try to explain why van Inwagen thinks this by considering a particular human action. Suppose Marie wants to vote in favor of the proposal before the meeting, and that, for this reason, she raises her right hand when the chair says, “All in favor. . .?” Suppose that one of the causal antecedents of her hand’s rising was a certain event in her brain that was undetermined by past events, that the state of her body and her immediate environment at the moment this brain-event occurred was causally sufficient for her hand’s rising, that if this event had not occurred, her hand would not have risen, and that she, Marie, a particular member of the metaphysical category “substance” or “continuant,” was the cause—that is to say, the agent-cause—of that crucial brain-event. The friends of agent-causation, if van Inwagen understands them, believe that these suppositions are sufficient for her having freely raised her hand. If that is so, these suppositions must entail the following proposition: at some moment shortly before Marie raised her hand, she was able to raise her hand and she was able not to raise her hand. But van Inwagen doesn’t see why this entailment should be supposed to hold. In fact, he thinks he sees a good argument for the conclusion that it was not up to her whether her hand rose. Suppose God were miraculously to return the world to precisely the state it was in, say, one minute before Marie raised her hand, and that he then allowed affairs once more to proceed, without any further miracles. What would happen? What would Marie do? Well, if her raising her hand was a free act, and if free will is incompatible with determinism, then we can’t say. We can say only that she might have raised her hand and might not have raised her hand. If God were to cause this episode to be thus “replayed” a very large number of times, it might turn out that she raised her hand in thirty percent of the replays and refrained from raising it in seventy percent of the replays. This much is a simple consequence of incompatibilism, and it brings one of the main reason philosophers become compatibilists into stark relief. It seems to lead us inescapably to the conclusion that on each particular replay, what Marie does on that occasion is a mere matter of chance. And if there are no replays, if there is only one occasion on which Marie is in this situation, it seems to lead us just as inescapably to the conclusion that on that one occasion what Marie does is a mere matter of chance. And if it is a mere matter of chance whether Marie raised her hand, then it cannot have been true beforehand that Marie was both able to raise her hand and able to refrain from raising her hand, for to have both these abilities would be to be able to determine the outcome of a process whose outcome is due to chance. It is true that we have, by stipulation, inserted into this process, this process whose outcome is due to chance, an episode of agent-causation. But, if I may so express myself, so what? That doesn’t change the fact that the outcome of that process was due to chance. If God caused Marie’s decision to be replayed a very large number of times, sometimes (in thirty percent of the replays, let us say) Marie would have agent-caused the crucial brain event and sometimes (in seventy percent of the replays, let us say) she would not have. Surely, then, whether she agent-caused the brain-event was a mere matter of chance? Whether her deliberations were followed by her agent-causing the brain event was, it would seem, a matter of chance; Marie, therefore, cannot have been both able to agent-cause the brain-event and able to refrain from agent-causing the brain-event, for to have both these abilities would be to be able to determine the outcome of a process whose outcome was due to chance—an impossible ability. I conclude that even if an episode of agent-causation is among the causal antecedents of every voluntary human action, these episodes do nothing to undermine the prima facie impossibility of an undetermined free act. Postulating agent-causation, therefore, does nothing to diminish the mystery of free will. Van Inwagen’s conclusion is that incompatibilists had better abandon the concept of agent-causation, and seek a resolution of the mystery of free will elsewhere—if, indeed, there is an “elsewhere.”"
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwvanInwagen2.html
_________________________
**END QUOTE**
Why I believe in global warming
Revelation 8:6-10
6Then the seven angels who had the seven trumpets prepared to sound them.
7The first angel sounded his trumpet, and there came hail and fire mixed with blood, and it was hurled down upon the earth. A third of the earth was burned up, a third of the trees were burned up, and all the green grass was burned up.
8The second angel sounded his trumpet, and something like a huge mountain, all ablaze, was thrown into the sea. A third of the sea turned into blood, 9a third of the living creatures in the sea died, and a third of the ships were destroyed.
10The third angel sounded his trumpet, and a great star, blazing like a torch, fell from the sky on a third of the rivers and on the springs of water—
Revelation 20:7-10
7When the thousand years are over, Satan will be released from his prison 8and will go out to deceive the nations in the four corners of the earth—Gog and Magog—to gather them for battle. In number they are like the sand on the seashore. 9They marched across the breadth of the earth and surrounded the camp of God's people, the city he loves. But fire came down from heaven and devoured them. 10And the devil, who deceived them, was thrown into the lake of burning sulfur, where the beast and the false prophet had been thrown. They will be tormented day and night forever and ever.
6Then the seven angels who had the seven trumpets prepared to sound them.
7The first angel sounded his trumpet, and there came hail and fire mixed with blood, and it was hurled down upon the earth. A third of the earth was burned up, a third of the trees were burned up, and all the green grass was burned up.
8The second angel sounded his trumpet, and something like a huge mountain, all ablaze, was thrown into the sea. A third of the sea turned into blood, 9a third of the living creatures in the sea died, and a third of the ships were destroyed.
10The third angel sounded his trumpet, and a great star, blazing like a torch, fell from the sky on a third of the rivers and on the springs of water—
Revelation 20:7-10
7When the thousand years are over, Satan will be released from his prison 8and will go out to deceive the nations in the four corners of the earth—Gog and Magog—to gather them for battle. In number they are like the sand on the seashore. 9They marched across the breadth of the earth and surrounded the camp of God's people, the city he loves. But fire came down from heaven and devoured them. 10And the devil, who deceived them, was thrown into the lake of burning sulfur, where the beast and the false prophet had been thrown. They will be tormented day and night forever and ever.
Mount Calvary
Now I saw in my dream, that the highway up which Christian was to go, was fenced on either side with a wall, and that wall was called Salvation. Up this way, therefore, did burdened Christian run, but not without great difficulty, because of the load on his back.
He ran thus till he came at a place somewhat ascending; and upon that place stood a cross, and a little below, in the bottom, a sepulchre. So I saw in my dream, that just as Christian came up with the cross, his burden loosed from off his shoulders, and fell from off his back, and began to tumble, and so continued to do till it came to the mouth of the sepulchre, where it fell in, and I saw it no more.
Then was Christian glad and lightsome, and said with a merry heart, "He hath given me rest by his sorrow, and life by his death." Then he stood still a while, to look and wonder; for it was very surprising to him that the sight of the cross should thus ease him of his burden. He looked, therefore, and looked again, even till the springs that were in his head sent the waters down his cheeks. Now as he stood looking and weeping, behold, three Shining Ones came to him, and saluted him with, "Peace be to thee." So the first said to him, "Thy sins be forgiven thee"; the second stripped him of his rags, and clothed him with change of raiment; the third also set a mark on his forehead, and gave him a roll with a seal upon it, which he bid him look on as he ran, and that he should give it in at the celestial gate: so they went their way. Then Christian gave three leaps for joy, and went on singing,
Thus far did I come laden with my sin,
Nor could aught ease the grief that I was in,
Till I came hither. What a place is this!
Must here be the beginning of my bliss?
Must here the burden fall from off my back?
Must here the strings that bound it to me crack?
Blest cross! blest sepulchre! blest rather be
The Man that there was put to shame for me!
The Dying Thief Rejoiced
For anybody who's interested, I wrote an article last year about the thief on the cross, as he relates to justification through faith alone and some other issues.
Thursday, April 05, 2007
More on TAG and Certainity....
I've been asked to comment on a critique of Van Tillian presuppositional apologetics by Brian Bosse.
But, I won't really be commenting on the actual critique itself as (1) I agree with the conclusion, but (2) think it has been already done by those like Anderson, Byron, Choi, Sudduth, and Welty, and (3) I find the use of all the symbollic logic in the critique rather unnecessary because the same thing has been done without it, as in (2), for instance. This should not take anything away from Bosse's series, and the comments aren't meant to undermine. Brian and I have known each other for a few years now. He was pushing his conclusion back then while I was still a right wing Van Tillian TAGster. I should say, though, that it's not so much a critique of Van Tillian presuppositional apologetics as it is a critique of one argument that some Van Tillians employ. For example, James Anderson would call himself a "Van Tillian," but he wouldn't be touched by this argument. Bosse agrees with this, though, and has stated: "If the Van Tillian removes his claim to “objective, certain proof,” then he is left with a very powerful apologetic indeed. Even though the proof does not meet the strict criteria for objective certainty, that does not mean it is wrong."
What I will do, instead, is comment on some of the discussions on Bosse's critique that is being had on the Puritan Board.
Basically, the claim made from some is that TAG still provides certainty.
Here's how some say the argument is certain:
As it is, this is vague. What are "the premises" that one "should not doubt" or "does not have the right" to doubt? How is "should" and "the right to," to be understood here. Say that followers of Allah are taught that it is impious to doubt his word in the Koran, say that no mere human has the "right" to question Allah. Therefore, the Muslim can say they are philosophically and epistemically and objectively certain of it because Allah says that it is so and, furthermore, man "should" not, and does not have the "right" to, doubt Allah's word? Also, what does "infallibly certain" mean? Is there a "fallible certainty?" That is, it's likely to be true, but we could be wrong? So, the argument gives one "fallible certainty." And that means, "the argument's conclusion could be wrong." I think the opponant of the above claim would gladly accept this idea as it is consistent with his argument against strong modal TAG.
From the Christian's perspective, one "should" not disagree with God's word. But, the "conclusion" of TAG is that: "The Christian worldview alone is the necessary precondition required to make experience intelligible." Is this in the Bible? Is it God's word? Mere piety does not entail that we "should" not doubt something.
Furthermore, what is meant by "the Christian worldview," CWV? Has this been spelled out? It obviously isn't the claim that Abraham came from the land of Ur. Michael Butler even agrees with that.
One "should not" doubt the conclusion of TAG only if it's true. But, isn't that the debate? It thus looks like this idea of certainty requires one to accept the conclusion of TAG. Furthermore, mention is made of premises and conclusions. If the argument hasn't been made, then, though one may still believe the conclusion, one hasn't given any one any cogent reason to agree with it. So, "should" we agree with things we have no good or cogent reason to? Do we not have "the right" to doubt the conclusion of an argument which doesn't get to the conclusion, or cannot demonstrate the conclusion?
Lastly, the above smacks of deontological constraints, these constraints have fallen on hard times.
At any rate, since the above subjective considerations of certainty have been weighed and found wanting, let's look at what Greg Bahnsen has to say about certainty. In his article Pragmatism, Prejudice, And Presuppositionalism, PPP, Bahnsen lays out the conditions required for a worldview to provide certainty. Bahnsen says that "if epistemological certainty" is to be achieved, the worldview will need to: (a) avoid the ego-centric predicament, (b) prevent internal incoherence, and (c) be able to solve life's philosophical problems and be applied to the questions of life.
One can ask whether these three things that are said to be required for epistemic certainty are jointly necessary and sufficient. If so, if another worldview can do (a), (b), and (c), then we have a worldview that can provide epistemic certainty. This worldview will, per (c), provide preconditions for intelligibility, and if this is so, then the conclusion of TAG is, at best, not established, at worse, false.
Now, instead of the above quote, Bahnsen provides a quote which he thinks is the criteria for granting a position the honorific title of "epistemological certainty." He takes Frankfurt's stricture:
So, say that there is a worldview that has all the features the TAGster says is necessary for intelligibility, but say this worldview has a quadune God rather than a triune one.
The TAGster must critique this worldview, If this worldview, call it Fristianity, can answer (a) - (c) above, then it is immune from Bahnsen's claims that it doesn't provide certainty. Furthermore, in PPP, p.285, Bahnsen says that all such worldviews must be approached internally.
Now, if the TAGster cannot show that Fristianity is internally incoherent, then it looks as if it can also provide these "preconditions." If so, the TAGster has failed to show that one has "no right" to doubt the conclusion. Since this worldview seems to also supply the preconditions for rational inquiry, then it meets Frankfurt's stricture. Furthermore, since all that is different is that it posits a 4-in-1 god instead of a 3-in-1 God, and the worldview has all the other features which as supposed to be necessary for rationality (but, as I said above, the TAgster needs to spell these out instead of saying, "it's a package deal"), and there is nothing I can see about the idea of 4 that is different from 3 for accounting for the one and many, etc., then, according to the TAGster's claim above, the "should not" and "have no right to" doubt this argument.
Now, what's the cash value here? Are we not supposed to be able to know that Christianity is true because of the above? I don't think so. Are we in trouble apologetically? I don't think so. For one, this Fristian move isn't open to anyone as a real option in the debate. Atheists and Muslims alike must reject their worldview to advance the Fristian position as their ability to provide preconditions of knowledge. Christianity still gives a worldview where preconditions for things like knowledge are to be had. So, we can stanrt and end with our worldview. If the only place the sinner can hide is by believing in a made up worldview, I'd say we're pretty good apologetically.
I actually find zero psychological or emotional problems admitting this. Ultimately, at the end of the day, I trust in the word of Christ. The mere logically possibility that another worldview also can provide for preconditions of knowledge does not bother me. I don't see anywhere where God promises that I'll have this kind of certainty. I am called to trust in His word. I don't question it. I should not, and do not have a right to, question it. No man should. I am rational in my belief, and I believe there are many good arguments and reasons for belief. All of these are, and should be, trumped by the testimony of God. That's my highest authority. I am psychologically certain of it. We don't have epistemic certainty because we cannot, as Dr. Sudduth argues, "preclude all possible reasons for doubting the truth of the proposition or belief in question" (emphasis added).
Though it may be offensive, I don't mean to be, those that fight against this seem to have a security blanket mentality. They seem to think that if there is a possibility that they could be wrong, then they cannot know whome they have believed in, and thus might as well become atheists. Talking to friends over the past months, they have admitted that this was the reason they fought against the above considerations.
Now, I admit the possibility that some day one could show the strong modal TAG. One could come up with an actual proof showing that 3-in-1 is necessary. This would be welcomed. At this point, though, we must be honest and admit that it hasn't been done. But I don’t think this is cause for concern for the Christian. Just like the kid on Mr. Mom who was asked to give up his woobie, he found out that the world wasn’t so scary as he had previously thought. He actually came out the better for it. Since I believe Christianity is true, no arguments will knock it down. But, though we’ll win the fight, we were never promised an easy battle. The magic bullet isn’t to be had, so get to training. In fact, after rejecting the strong modal version of TAG I have come to see just how strong the case for Christian theism really is!
Now, that we don’t have cogent arguments against all possible reasons to doubt that the CWV alone provides the necessary preconditions for knowledge does not entail that we should doubt Christianity. It is broadly logically possible that I am a butterfly dreaming that I am a man, should I therefore doubt that I am a man?
Indeed, it can be argued that there are norms of knowledge. Even the skeptic presupposes this in his doubts. So, to doubt presupposes things. I believe a case can be made that theism, esp. Christian theism, provides preconditions for norms of knowledge. The argument for that, though, could also be given by the Fristian. But I don’t let this possibility act as a reason to doubt Christianity. I have no reason to doubt it. Furthermore, it can be successfully argued that given something like Christian theism, we are warranted in believing that our cognitive faculties are successfully aimed at truth. Accepting beliefs like Naturalism and Evolution give us reasons to actually doubt that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Everyone knows that Christianity is the only game in town here. No one really believes that Fristianity is the case. Thus, even given Fristianity, there is no good reason to doubt the argument from the Christian, even if it is not epistemologically certain in the sense of being indubitable in the sense of refuting all possible reasons for doubt.
God made us. We know we’re sinners. Despite the attitudes of the apostate, even he suffers from guilt. The Christian does not doubt God’s word, because we have nowhere else to go, only He has the words of eternal life. The apologetical reasons for our claims are very strong, the atheological reasons against it are exactly as weak. The sinner does not have an excuse, if that’s what you’re wondering. To say he does presupposes that Jehovah will grant that one has an excuse for denying what he knows (God exists) even though there was a broadly logical possibility that another made up worldview could also provide the preconditions for knowledge. To say he does presupposes that what Paul meant by “know” in Romans 1 was “infallible knowledge of the Cartesian sort.” I have no excuse to not provide for my son even though there is a logical possibility that he is a craftily constructed robot from Alpha Centari who needs no care. How much more then does the unbeliever not have an excuse to not believe in God because of the wild possibility that a worldview just like it in all the essential areas, but has a 4-in-1 God rather than a trinity, can “provide for the preconditions of rationality?" So, that argument against denying the strong modal TAG is also found wanting.
Some would say that I make “possibility” more ultimate than God’s say-so. But, this (a) presupposes that God has indeed said “the CWV alone provides for the preconditions of intelligibility,” and (b) that, even if the Bible does say this, that I deny that it does. Denying that one can show that p, does not entail that one denies that p. My claim is that no one has shown this, but this does not entail anything problematic for the Christian apologist. This is simply a point of intellectual honesty, not of making possibility more ultimate than God's say-so. God's say-so is ultimate for me. When he tells me things, that's good enough for me. Indeed, if the Bible doesn't claim what the TAGster does, and the argument can be shown to be false (as it stands) then, actually, the Christian apologist's position and reputation are actually strengthened by dropping a bad argument. The argument can be amended, and then employed in a way not subject to a (as of yet) unanswerable critique.
But, I won't really be commenting on the actual critique itself as (1) I agree with the conclusion, but (2) think it has been already done by those like Anderson, Byron, Choi, Sudduth, and Welty, and (3) I find the use of all the symbollic logic in the critique rather unnecessary because the same thing has been done without it, as in (2), for instance. This should not take anything away from Bosse's series, and the comments aren't meant to undermine. Brian and I have known each other for a few years now. He was pushing his conclusion back then while I was still a right wing Van Tillian TAGster. I should say, though, that it's not so much a critique of Van Tillian presuppositional apologetics as it is a critique of one argument that some Van Tillians employ. For example, James Anderson would call himself a "Van Tillian," but he wouldn't be touched by this argument. Bosse agrees with this, though, and has stated: "If the Van Tillian removes his claim to “objective, certain proof,” then he is left with a very powerful apologetic indeed. Even though the proof does not meet the strict criteria for objective certainty, that does not mean it is wrong."
What I will do, instead, is comment on some of the discussions on Bosse's critique that is being had on the Puritan Board.
Basically, the claim made from some is that TAG still provides certainty.
Here's how some say the argument is certain:
"The argument is claimed to be objectively certain not because one does or does not hold to the conclusion as infallibly certain but because one should or has not right to deny the premises or the conclusion."
As it is, this is vague. What are "the premises" that one "should not doubt" or "does not have the right" to doubt? How is "should" and "the right to," to be understood here. Say that followers of Allah are taught that it is impious to doubt his word in the Koran, say that no mere human has the "right" to question Allah. Therefore, the Muslim can say they are philosophically and epistemically and objectively certain of it because Allah says that it is so and, furthermore, man "should" not, and does not have the "right" to, doubt Allah's word? Also, what does "infallibly certain" mean? Is there a "fallible certainty?" That is, it's likely to be true, but we could be wrong? So, the argument gives one "fallible certainty." And that means, "the argument's conclusion could be wrong." I think the opponant of the above claim would gladly accept this idea as it is consistent with his argument against strong modal TAG.
From the Christian's perspective, one "should" not disagree with God's word. But, the "conclusion" of TAG is that: "The Christian worldview alone is the necessary precondition required to make experience intelligible." Is this in the Bible? Is it God's word? Mere piety does not entail that we "should" not doubt something.
Furthermore, what is meant by "the Christian worldview," CWV? Has this been spelled out? It obviously isn't the claim that Abraham came from the land of Ur. Michael Butler even agrees with that.
One "should not" doubt the conclusion of TAG only if it's true. But, isn't that the debate? It thus looks like this idea of certainty requires one to accept the conclusion of TAG. Furthermore, mention is made of premises and conclusions. If the argument hasn't been made, then, though one may still believe the conclusion, one hasn't given any one any cogent reason to agree with it. So, "should" we agree with things we have no good or cogent reason to? Do we not have "the right" to doubt the conclusion of an argument which doesn't get to the conclusion, or cannot demonstrate the conclusion?
Lastly, the above smacks of deontological constraints, these constraints have fallen on hard times.
At any rate, since the above subjective considerations of certainty have been weighed and found wanting, let's look at what Greg Bahnsen has to say about certainty. In his article Pragmatism, Prejudice, And Presuppositionalism, PPP, Bahnsen lays out the conditions required for a worldview to provide certainty. Bahnsen says that "if epistemological certainty" is to be achieved, the worldview will need to: (a) avoid the ego-centric predicament, (b) prevent internal incoherence, and (c) be able to solve life's philosophical problems and be applied to the questions of life.
One can ask whether these three things that are said to be required for epistemic certainty are jointly necessary and sufficient. If so, if another worldview can do (a), (b), and (c), then we have a worldview that can provide epistemic certainty. This worldview will, per (c), provide preconditions for intelligibility, and if this is so, then the conclusion of TAG is, at best, not established, at worse, false.
Now, instead of the above quote, Bahnsen provides a quote which he thinks is the criteria for granting a position the honorific title of "epistemological certainty." He takes Frankfurt's stricture:
"The claim that a basis for doubt is inconceivable is justified whenever a denial of the claim would violate the conditions or presuppositions of rational inquiry...since inquiry is fundamentally an attempt to discriminate between what is to be accepted and what is to be rejected, nothing can rationally be conceived which involves denying the necessity for making these discriminations or undermining the possibility of making them." Bahnsen, PPP, p.292
So, say that there is a worldview that has all the features the TAGster says is necessary for intelligibility, but say this worldview has a quadune God rather than a triune one.
The TAGster must critique this worldview, If this worldview, call it Fristianity, can answer (a) - (c) above, then it is immune from Bahnsen's claims that it doesn't provide certainty. Furthermore, in PPP, p.285, Bahnsen says that all such worldviews must be approached internally.
Now, if the TAGster cannot show that Fristianity is internally incoherent, then it looks as if it can also provide these "preconditions." If so, the TAGster has failed to show that one has "no right" to doubt the conclusion. Since this worldview seems to also supply the preconditions for rational inquiry, then it meets Frankfurt's stricture. Furthermore, since all that is different is that it posits a 4-in-1 god instead of a 3-in-1 God, and the worldview has all the other features which as supposed to be necessary for rationality (but, as I said above, the TAgster needs to spell these out instead of saying, "it's a package deal"), and there is nothing I can see about the idea of 4 that is different from 3 for accounting for the one and many, etc., then, according to the TAGster's claim above, the "should not" and "have no right to" doubt this argument.
Now, what's the cash value here? Are we not supposed to be able to know that Christianity is true because of the above? I don't think so. Are we in trouble apologetically? I don't think so. For one, this Fristian move isn't open to anyone as a real option in the debate. Atheists and Muslims alike must reject their worldview to advance the Fristian position as their ability to provide preconditions of knowledge. Christianity still gives a worldview where preconditions for things like knowledge are to be had. So, we can stanrt and end with our worldview. If the only place the sinner can hide is by believing in a made up worldview, I'd say we're pretty good apologetically.
I actually find zero psychological or emotional problems admitting this. Ultimately, at the end of the day, I trust in the word of Christ. The mere logically possibility that another worldview also can provide for preconditions of knowledge does not bother me. I don't see anywhere where God promises that I'll have this kind of certainty. I am called to trust in His word. I don't question it. I should not, and do not have a right to, question it. No man should. I am rational in my belief, and I believe there are many good arguments and reasons for belief. All of these are, and should be, trumped by the testimony of God. That's my highest authority. I am psychologically certain of it. We don't have epistemic certainty because we cannot, as Dr. Sudduth argues, "preclude all possible reasons for doubting the truth of the proposition or belief in question" (emphasis added).
Though it may be offensive, I don't mean to be, those that fight against this seem to have a security blanket mentality. They seem to think that if there is a possibility that they could be wrong, then they cannot know whome they have believed in, and thus might as well become atheists. Talking to friends over the past months, they have admitted that this was the reason they fought against the above considerations.
Now, I admit the possibility that some day one could show the strong modal TAG. One could come up with an actual proof showing that 3-in-1 is necessary. This would be welcomed. At this point, though, we must be honest and admit that it hasn't been done. But I don’t think this is cause for concern for the Christian. Just like the kid on Mr. Mom who was asked to give up his woobie, he found out that the world wasn’t so scary as he had previously thought. He actually came out the better for it. Since I believe Christianity is true, no arguments will knock it down. But, though we’ll win the fight, we were never promised an easy battle. The magic bullet isn’t to be had, so get to training. In fact, after rejecting the strong modal version of TAG I have come to see just how strong the case for Christian theism really is!
Now, that we don’t have cogent arguments against all possible reasons to doubt that the CWV alone provides the necessary preconditions for knowledge does not entail that we should doubt Christianity. It is broadly logically possible that I am a butterfly dreaming that I am a man, should I therefore doubt that I am a man?
Indeed, it can be argued that there are norms of knowledge. Even the skeptic presupposes this in his doubts. So, to doubt presupposes things. I believe a case can be made that theism, esp. Christian theism, provides preconditions for norms of knowledge. The argument for that, though, could also be given by the Fristian. But I don’t let this possibility act as a reason to doubt Christianity. I have no reason to doubt it. Furthermore, it can be successfully argued that given something like Christian theism, we are warranted in believing that our cognitive faculties are successfully aimed at truth. Accepting beliefs like Naturalism and Evolution give us reasons to actually doubt that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Everyone knows that Christianity is the only game in town here. No one really believes that Fristianity is the case. Thus, even given Fristianity, there is no good reason to doubt the argument from the Christian, even if it is not epistemologically certain in the sense of being indubitable in the sense of refuting all possible reasons for doubt.
God made us. We know we’re sinners. Despite the attitudes of the apostate, even he suffers from guilt. The Christian does not doubt God’s word, because we have nowhere else to go, only He has the words of eternal life. The apologetical reasons for our claims are very strong, the atheological reasons against it are exactly as weak. The sinner does not have an excuse, if that’s what you’re wondering. To say he does presupposes that Jehovah will grant that one has an excuse for denying what he knows (God exists) even though there was a broadly logical possibility that another made up worldview could also provide the preconditions for knowledge. To say he does presupposes that what Paul meant by “know” in Romans 1 was “infallible knowledge of the Cartesian sort.” I have no excuse to not provide for my son even though there is a logical possibility that he is a craftily constructed robot from Alpha Centari who needs no care. How much more then does the unbeliever not have an excuse to not believe in God because of the wild possibility that a worldview just like it in all the essential areas, but has a 4-in-1 God rather than a trinity, can “provide for the preconditions of rationality?" So, that argument against denying the strong modal TAG is also found wanting.
Some would say that I make “possibility” more ultimate than God’s say-so. But, this (a) presupposes that God has indeed said “the CWV alone provides for the preconditions of intelligibility,” and (b) that, even if the Bible does say this, that I deny that it does. Denying that one can show that p, does not entail that one denies that p. My claim is that no one has shown this, but this does not entail anything problematic for the Christian apologist. This is simply a point of intellectual honesty, not of making possibility more ultimate than God's say-so. God's say-so is ultimate for me. When he tells me things, that's good enough for me. Indeed, if the Bible doesn't claim what the TAGster does, and the argument can be shown to be false (as it stands) then, actually, the Christian apologist's position and reputation are actually strengthened by dropping a bad argument. The argument can be amended, and then employed in a way not subject to a (as of yet) unanswerable critique.
Running scared
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College Prep
Most of us know about the spiritual cliché of the young man (or woman) who grows up in the church, and promptly loses his faith as soon as he goes to college (or seminary). This is due, in large part, to a lack of adequate preparation.
Below is a reading list which should lay a foundation for a well-informed faith in Scripture. A few comments and caveats:
Always get the latest (revised) edition of any work.
Bauckham is a moderate rather than inerrantist. Still, he’s very useful. The same thing could be said of Craig Evans.
Blomberg’s Historical Reliability of the Gospels is especially useful from the standpoint of hermeneutics. Most so-called Bible “errors” and “contradictions” are due to an artificially wooden notion of what the author was aiming at. Such allegations disregard literary conventions and the like. Blomberg is very good at presenting what might be called a hermeneutic of inerrancy.
Wait until he comes out with the second, revised edition of this title.
Long is in some ways the OT counterpart to Blomberg on the hermeneutics of inerrancy.
Collins is an OEC. I often disagree with him. However, when he’s good, he’s very good.
Walton is also an OEC. There are times when he accentuates the continuity between the OT and ANE to the expense of discontinuity. In general, though, he does an excellent job of enabling the modern reader to “hear” the text the way the original audience would have heard it. We can go seriously astray when we take our own cultural outlook as the point of reference.
JETS has a couple of book reviews which outline the strengths and weaknesses of the titles by Kitchen and (the multi-authored) Provan/Long/Longman:
http://www.etsjets.org/jets/journal/48/48-1/48-1-pp115-197_JETS.pdf
A Survey of Old Testament Introduction
by Gleason Archer
Is The New Testament Reliable?
by Paul Barnett
The Birth Of Christianity: The First Twenty Years (After Jesus)
by Paul Barnett
Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony
by Richard Bauckham
The Historical Reliability of the Gospels
by Craig L. Blomberg
The Historical Reliability of John's Gospel: Issues & Commentary
by Craig L. Blomberg
Luke 1:1-9:50 (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament)
by Darrell L. Bock
Luke 9:51-24:53 (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament)
by Darrell L. Bock
Acts (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament)
by Darrell L. Bock
Introduction to the New Testament, An
by D. A. Carson (Author), Douglas J. Moo
Genesis 1-4: A Linguistic, Literary, And Theological Commentary
by C. John Collins
Genesis: Volume 1 (Evangelical Press Study Commentary)
by John D. Currid
Exodus, Volume 1: Chapters 1-18 (An EP Study Commentary)
by John D. Currid
Fabricating Jesus: How Modern Scholars Distort the Gospels
by Craig A. Evans
New Testament Introduction (Master Reference Collection)
by Donald Guthrie
Ancient Israel in Sinai: The Evidence for the Authenticity of the Wilderness Tradition
by James K. Hoffmeier
Israel in Egypt: The Evidence for the Authenticity of the Exodus Tradition
by James K. Hoffmeier
A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew
by Craig S. Keener
The Gospel of John: A Commentary (2 Volume Set)
by Craig S. Keener
On the Reliability of the Old Testament
by K. A. Kitchen
Encountering John: The Gospel in Historical, Literary, and Theological Perspective (Encountering Biblical Studies)
by Andreas J. Köstenberger
Art of Biblical History, The
by V. Philips Long
Reading And Writing In The Time Of Jesus
by A. R. Millard
A Biblical History of Israel
by Iain W. Provan, V. Philips Long, Tremper Longman
Exodus (The New American Commentary)
by Douglas K. Stuart
The First Edition of the New Testament (Print on Demand)
by David Trobisch
Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible
by John H. Walton
The NIV Application Commentary Genesis
by Dr. John H. Walton
Below is a reading list which should lay a foundation for a well-informed faith in Scripture. A few comments and caveats:
Always get the latest (revised) edition of any work.
Bauckham is a moderate rather than inerrantist. Still, he’s very useful. The same thing could be said of Craig Evans.
Blomberg’s Historical Reliability of the Gospels is especially useful from the standpoint of hermeneutics. Most so-called Bible “errors” and “contradictions” are due to an artificially wooden notion of what the author was aiming at. Such allegations disregard literary conventions and the like. Blomberg is very good at presenting what might be called a hermeneutic of inerrancy.
Wait until he comes out with the second, revised edition of this title.
Long is in some ways the OT counterpart to Blomberg on the hermeneutics of inerrancy.
Collins is an OEC. I often disagree with him. However, when he’s good, he’s very good.
Walton is also an OEC. There are times when he accentuates the continuity between the OT and ANE to the expense of discontinuity. In general, though, he does an excellent job of enabling the modern reader to “hear” the text the way the original audience would have heard it. We can go seriously astray when we take our own cultural outlook as the point of reference.
JETS has a couple of book reviews which outline the strengths and weaknesses of the titles by Kitchen and (the multi-authored) Provan/Long/Longman:
http://www.etsjets.org/jets/journal/48/48-1/48-1-pp115-197_JETS.pdf
A Survey of Old Testament Introduction
by Gleason Archer
Is The New Testament Reliable?
by Paul Barnett
The Birth Of Christianity: The First Twenty Years (After Jesus)
by Paul Barnett
Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony
by Richard Bauckham
The Historical Reliability of the Gospels
by Craig L. Blomberg
The Historical Reliability of John's Gospel: Issues & Commentary
by Craig L. Blomberg
Luke 1:1-9:50 (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament)
by Darrell L. Bock
Luke 9:51-24:53 (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament)
by Darrell L. Bock
Acts (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament)
by Darrell L. Bock
Introduction to the New Testament, An
by D. A. Carson (Author), Douglas J. Moo
Genesis 1-4: A Linguistic, Literary, And Theological Commentary
by C. John Collins
Genesis: Volume 1 (Evangelical Press Study Commentary)
by John D. Currid
Exodus, Volume 1: Chapters 1-18 (An EP Study Commentary)
by John D. Currid
Fabricating Jesus: How Modern Scholars Distort the Gospels
by Craig A. Evans
New Testament Introduction (Master Reference Collection)
by Donald Guthrie
Ancient Israel in Sinai: The Evidence for the Authenticity of the Wilderness Tradition
by James K. Hoffmeier
Israel in Egypt: The Evidence for the Authenticity of the Exodus Tradition
by James K. Hoffmeier
A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew
by Craig S. Keener
The Gospel of John: A Commentary (2 Volume Set)
by Craig S. Keener
On the Reliability of the Old Testament
by K. A. Kitchen
Encountering John: The Gospel in Historical, Literary, and Theological Perspective (Encountering Biblical Studies)
by Andreas J. Köstenberger
Art of Biblical History, The
by V. Philips Long
Reading And Writing In The Time Of Jesus
by A. R. Millard
A Biblical History of Israel
by Iain W. Provan, V. Philips Long, Tremper Longman
Exodus (The New American Commentary)
by Douglas K. Stuart
The First Edition of the New Testament (Print on Demand)
by David Trobisch
Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible
by John H. Walton
The NIV Application Commentary Genesis
by Dr. John H. Walton
The Lord Of All
"He that hung up the earth in space was Himself hanged up; He that fixed the heavens was fixed with nails; He that bore up the earth was borne up on a tree; the Lord of all was subjected to ignominy in a naked body - God put to death! the King of Israel slain with Israel's right hand! Alas for the new wickedness of the new murder! The Lord was exposed with naked body: He was not deemed worthy even of covering; and, in order that He might not be seen, the luminaries turned away, and the day became darkened because they slew God, who hung naked on the tree. It was not the body of our Lord that the luminaries covered with darkness when they set, but the eyes of men. For, because the people quaked not, the earth quaked; because they were not affrighted, the earth was affrighted. Thou smotest thy Lord: thou also hast been smitten upon the earth. And thou indeed liest dead; but He is risen from the place of the dead, and ascended to the height of heaven, having suffered for the sake of those who suffer, and having been bound for the sake of Adam's race which was imprisoned, and having been judged for the sake of him who was condemned, and having been buried for the sake of him who was buried." (source)
Wednesday, April 04, 2007
Contemporary Compatibilism
Steve posted below on Classical Compatibilism. I'll post on Contemporary Compatibilism. Hoping to bring the concept up to today, but recognizing that this brief post will not do the job justice. However, this will be, as in Steve's post, "a place to start." I guess I can start with drawing a contemporary distinction between semi-compatibilism SC and compatibilism proper CP.
SC is the view that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, but not compatible with freedom to do otherwise.
CP is the claim that determinism is compatible with freedom to do otherwise.
I think most Calvinists who call themselves compatibilists actually are, more properly, defined as semi-compatibilists.
Classical compatibilists said, in an unrefined way, that all that is required for freedom is "ability to do what one wants to do." But, this has seen attack. For example, some people suffering from mental disorders do "what they want to do" yet we wouldn't say that they acted freely in these instances.
Contemporary compatibilists have sought to refine this idea, ruling out cases like the above. One such answer is that of Fischer. This can be called "Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism," RRC. The discussions about RRC are myriad, in depth, and detailed. I'll offer an "enough-to-get-started" quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Now, there are a few things that sparked discussions leading to contemporary compatibilism. In interest of time, I'll mention one of them - Frankfurt Style Counter examples, FSC's. Names after philosopher Harry Frankfurt, the thought experiments ask us to imagine cases where a person S does an action A, and S did A of her own decision, i.e., she was not coerced, and S, in some of these experiments, was morally responsible for A. A classic example is,
Thus, for obvious reasons, many have concluded that FSC's are decisive refutations to a widely held libertarian constraint on free will called, in contemporary literature, PAP's: Principle of Alternate Possibility. Some, not willing to give up libertarianism, have rejected PAP's as a necessary feature of what is entailed by making a free choice. Theologically, we can also see how the notion of PAP isn't easily accepted by the Calvinist. God has determined the end from the beginning, and no one can thwart his plan. Many libertarians would hold that the historical past could have been exactly the same (including God's decree), yet S could have done other than S did in this world. Or, given the Calvinist notion of depravity, sinners cannot please God in their sinful nature. They do not have the ability to please God. But, they are still responsible, and Scripture says that they do what they do freely, i.e., without coercion (Acts 2 comes to mind, for one example).
Thus SC's think they have good reasons to believe that "freedom to do otherwise" is not necessary for free will or moral responsibility. S does what S wants to do, given the appropriate RRC, and these seem to satisfy requirements for freedom. So, the SC denies any "freedom to do otherwise" constraint. This does need to be specified in more detail, though. For example, there are different senses of "can" as used in "he can do otherwise." One way the compatibilist can agree that S "could" have done otherwise is by claiming that S was physically "able" to do A. Somewhat analogous, there is a sense in which Jesus' bones "could" not have been broken since Jehovah prophesied that they wouldn't be. But, there is another sense where they "could" have indeed been broken - they weren't made of steel. Jesus wasn't Wolverine. He had human bones and human bones "can" be broken. Thus, physically, an unregenerate "can" accept Christ since he can physically say the words "I trust and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ." But, in another sense, he "cannot" (cf. John 6:44). So, "can" all men accept Jesus, sic et non.
Next, contemporary compatibilism has made interesting strides in regards to how one can be morally responsible for doing something that he was determined to do.
SC denies that determinism is compatible with "ability to do otherwise," (not all contemporary compatibilists agree. So, this is why I think Calvinists should be SC's) but they say that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. Again, this is a detailed maze of arguments and counter-arguments. A person is morally responsible when she can not only do moral right and/or wrong, but also is accountable for her actions. Thus a person is a fitting subject of praise or punishment.
Contemporary compatibilism is very entrenched in this debate. Many think it is incoherent to punish or reward someone for doing what they were determined to do. Or, to punish or reward for simply acting according to some pre-determined nature. Interestingly, some say that you shouldn't beat your dog for panting, yet they give an "atta boy" to their dogs for "being loyal." Besides my canine digression, a contemporary distinction is drawn by Fischer regarding SC's view of moral responsibility being compatible with determinism. He makes a distinction with respects to Regulative Control RC and Guidance Control GC. And agent with RC can regulate between different alternatives. An agent with GC brings about her conduct, even if there are no other alternatives to her actions. Here in GC we see the denial of PAP's which were, you will recall, allegedly (and decisively IMHO) refuted by FSC's. Furthermore, invoking views of secondary causation like those found in the Westminster Confession of Faith allow for agents to guide their actions. Moreover, that all is determined by God does not mean that agents can't guide or bring about their actions. So, that S determined that S* would A does not imply that S did A instead of S*. For example, Acts 2 tells us that it was not God, but then lawless men, who put Jesus to death. We are also told that God foreordained this. Thus we see that S foreordaining that S* would do A does not imply that S* isn't the one who does A.
Thus, for Fischer, it is only GC that is necessary for moral responsibility. RC could not be necessary for morality given FSC's. GC assumes what is called Source Control. Source Control simply maintains that the agent must be the source of his actions in some important or crucial way. Many incompatibilists have constructed an argument against Source Control theories (remember, the Confession says that there is a sense that we cause our actions, hence I find a source theory there). The key premise for the argument is:
A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source .
Obviously "ultimate source" would need to be defined, but most Christians (libertarians included!) must deny that we are the ultimate source of our actions. Furthermore, it is an "important way" to be involved in bringing about your conduct if you are a means in bringing it about. Calvinism says that God works through means. He does not accomplish ends irregardless of the means. This is fatalism. Fischer employs an actual-sequence RRC mechanism which is fully possessed by the agent (i.e. it is his own mechanism) and issues in the agent’s guidance control over his own action. Thus the agent brings about his actions in an important way, even though s/he is not the ultimate source of said actions.
Lastly, some have asked about whether our choices are “real” given determinism. I admit I don’t really understand the point. Isn’t a choice “real” if it occurs at all? Furthermore, before me I have a Ruth’s Christ steak and a plate of cheese and crackers. There are two options and, given Semi-Compatibilism, I have the ability to choose whichever one I want to. So, I choose, of course, the sizzling and mouth tantalizing steak from Ruth’s Chris (which sizzles because it is on a plate that is about 500 degrees, and is cooked in butter). This was pre-determined. Given God’s decree, I could not have actually picked the cheese and crackers. I could not because as, say, Isaiah 46:10 tells us: “Declaring the end from the beginning, And from ancient times things which have not been done, Saying, 'My purpose will be established, And I will accomplish all My good pleasure';” God declared that I would pick the steak, He cannot be wrong, hence I could not have, in a libertarian way, have chosen the cheese. But, did I not “really” chose the steak? After all, that’s what I wanted.
I think we can take our cue from Jesus. Before I explain, allow a brief digression, and apologies to those who aren’t familiar with the eschatological terms. I think one of the best lines I have ever heard was in a debate between gene Cook and Hyper-preterist H.L. James. Now, H.L. was kind of ridiculing the idea of a bodily resurrection. He pointed out that Jesus had holes in his hands, and so asked if Gene would have tattoos, scars, or things like that in heaven. Gene’s voice and response was unforgettable. In a humble sounding voice, he meekly replied: “If it’s good enough for Jesus, it’s good enough for me.” Now, I don’t think Gene think we will have said scars, but even if we did, so what. Our Lord has them. Of course he has them for theological reasons that we don’t need to get into. My point in all this is to talk about a choice Jesus made. If it’s “good enough” for Him to cal it a choice, then it’s “good enough” for me to call my choices, choices. If it’s “real enough” for Jesus, it’s “real enough” for me.
In John 6:70 Jesus tells us that he chose all 12 disciples, yet one, speaking of Judas, was the devil. In John 13:18 Jesus tells us that he chose Judas, along with the other 11, “so that the Scriptures may be fulfilled.” Now, this shows that it was pre-determined that Judas would betray Jesus. We are told in Hebrews 6 that it is “impossible” that God can lie. So, was it “possible” that Jesus could have, in a libertarian way, chosen rabbi Larry over Judas? If Jesus had libertarian free will, wouldn’t his “choice,” to be real” have to be between at least two live options, both of which were possible to actuate? If it was “possible” that Jesus could falsify Jehovah’s prophecy, God would have turned out a liar. But, this is “impossible,” therefore it seems “impossible” that Jesus could have chosen otherwise. Yet. Jesus calls it a “choice.” Hence if my choices aren’t real, neither was Jesus.’ If the libertarian doesn’t allow me to have a “real” choice, so what? If it is good enough for Jesus, it’s good enough for me.
As many can see, the debate is a detailed and rigorous one. If the contemporary Christian wants to engage in a contemporary defense of our basic beliefs about God, His sovereignty, and man's responsibility, s/he would do well to study some of the contemporary literature. We should not sit back, at least those interested, while the Arminian makes headway in the area of analytic philosophy, making many of us look sloppy. I feel it can only strengthen our extremely strong theological case if we learn to employ contemporary philosophic arguments for compatibilism (semi, for us) and moral responsibility in light of determinism. Furthermore, many Arminians simply will avoid Scripture in the debate, and it would serve well to be able to answer them on their own grounds. Lastly, the above is, as I said, a rough and ready, all too brief, discussion of contemporary compatibilism. I recognize that many can find fault with the above. My main goal was to briefly explain some of the language and ideas used in contemporary debate, and possibly spur future interest. Hopefully I at least achieved the latter.
SC is the view that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, but not compatible with freedom to do otherwise.
CP is the claim that determinism is compatible with freedom to do otherwise.
I think most Calvinists who call themselves compatibilists actually are, more properly, defined as semi-compatibilists.
Classical compatibilists said, in an unrefined way, that all that is required for freedom is "ability to do what one wants to do." But, this has seen attack. For example, some people suffering from mental disorders do "what they want to do" yet we wouldn't say that they acted freely in these instances.
Contemporary compatibilists have sought to refine this idea, ruling out cases like the above. One such answer is that of Fischer. This can be called "Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism," RRC. The discussions about RRC are myriad, in depth, and detailed. I'll offer an "enough-to-get-started" quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
A reasons-responsiveness theory turns upon dispositional features of an agent's relation to reasons issuing in freely willed action. Appropriately reasons-responsive conduct is sensitive to rational considerations. The view is not merely that an agent would display herself in some counterfactual situations to be responsive to reasons, but rather that her responsiveness to reasons in some counterfactual situations is evidence that her actual conduct itself — the causes giving rise to it — is also in response to rational considerations. SOURCE
Now, there are a few things that sparked discussions leading to contemporary compatibilism. In interest of time, I'll mention one of them - Frankfurt Style Counter examples, FSC's. Names after philosopher Harry Frankfurt, the thought experiments ask us to imagine cases where a person S does an action A, and S did A of her own decision, i.e., she was not coerced, and S, in some of these experiments, was morally responsible for A. A classic example is,
Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones' plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned that Jones might waiver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened. SOURCE
Thus, for obvious reasons, many have concluded that FSC's are decisive refutations to a widely held libertarian constraint on free will called, in contemporary literature, PAP's: Principle of Alternate Possibility. Some, not willing to give up libertarianism, have rejected PAP's as a necessary feature of what is entailed by making a free choice. Theologically, we can also see how the notion of PAP isn't easily accepted by the Calvinist. God has determined the end from the beginning, and no one can thwart his plan. Many libertarians would hold that the historical past could have been exactly the same (including God's decree), yet S could have done other than S did in this world. Or, given the Calvinist notion of depravity, sinners cannot please God in their sinful nature. They do not have the ability to please God. But, they are still responsible, and Scripture says that they do what they do freely, i.e., without coercion (Acts 2 comes to mind, for one example).
Thus SC's think they have good reasons to believe that "freedom to do otherwise" is not necessary for free will or moral responsibility. S does what S wants to do, given the appropriate RRC, and these seem to satisfy requirements for freedom. So, the SC denies any "freedom to do otherwise" constraint. This does need to be specified in more detail, though. For example, there are different senses of "can" as used in "he can do otherwise." One way the compatibilist can agree that S "could" have done otherwise is by claiming that S was physically "able" to do A. Somewhat analogous, there is a sense in which Jesus' bones "could" not have been broken since Jehovah prophesied that they wouldn't be. But, there is another sense where they "could" have indeed been broken - they weren't made of steel. Jesus wasn't Wolverine. He had human bones and human bones "can" be broken. Thus, physically, an unregenerate "can" accept Christ since he can physically say the words "I trust and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ." But, in another sense, he "cannot" (cf. John 6:44). So, "can" all men accept Jesus, sic et non.
Next, contemporary compatibilism has made interesting strides in regards to how one can be morally responsible for doing something that he was determined to do.
SC denies that determinism is compatible with "ability to do otherwise," (not all contemporary compatibilists agree. So, this is why I think Calvinists should be SC's) but they say that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. Again, this is a detailed maze of arguments and counter-arguments. A person is morally responsible when she can not only do moral right and/or wrong, but also is accountable for her actions. Thus a person is a fitting subject of praise or punishment.
Contemporary compatibilism is very entrenched in this debate. Many think it is incoherent to punish or reward someone for doing what they were determined to do. Or, to punish or reward for simply acting according to some pre-determined nature. Interestingly, some say that you shouldn't beat your dog for panting, yet they give an "atta boy" to their dogs for "being loyal." Besides my canine digression, a contemporary distinction is drawn by Fischer regarding SC's view of moral responsibility being compatible with determinism. He makes a distinction with respects to Regulative Control RC and Guidance Control GC. And agent with RC can regulate between different alternatives. An agent with GC brings about her conduct, even if there are no other alternatives to her actions. Here in GC we see the denial of PAP's which were, you will recall, allegedly (and decisively IMHO) refuted by FSC's. Furthermore, invoking views of secondary causation like those found in the Westminster Confession of Faith allow for agents to guide their actions. Moreover, that all is determined by God does not mean that agents can't guide or bring about their actions. So, that S determined that S* would A does not imply that S did A instead of S*. For example, Acts 2 tells us that it was not God, but then lawless men, who put Jesus to death. We are also told that God foreordained this. Thus we see that S foreordaining that S* would do A does not imply that S* isn't the one who does A.
Thus, for Fischer, it is only GC that is necessary for moral responsibility. RC could not be necessary for morality given FSC's. GC assumes what is called Source Control. Source Control simply maintains that the agent must be the source of his actions in some important or crucial way. Many incompatibilists have constructed an argument against Source Control theories (remember, the Confession says that there is a sense that we cause our actions, hence I find a source theory there). The key premise for the argument is:
A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source .
Obviously "ultimate source" would need to be defined, but most Christians (libertarians included!) must deny that we are the ultimate source of our actions. Furthermore, it is an "important way" to be involved in bringing about your conduct if you are a means in bringing it about. Calvinism says that God works through means. He does not accomplish ends irregardless of the means. This is fatalism. Fischer employs an actual-sequence RRC mechanism which is fully possessed by the agent (i.e. it is his own mechanism) and issues in the agent’s guidance control over his own action. Thus the agent brings about his actions in an important way, even though s/he is not the ultimate source of said actions.
Lastly, some have asked about whether our choices are “real” given determinism. I admit I don’t really understand the point. Isn’t a choice “real” if it occurs at all? Furthermore, before me I have a Ruth’s Christ steak and a plate of cheese and crackers. There are two options and, given Semi-Compatibilism, I have the ability to choose whichever one I want to. So, I choose, of course, the sizzling and mouth tantalizing steak from Ruth’s Chris (which sizzles because it is on a plate that is about 500 degrees, and is cooked in butter). This was pre-determined. Given God’s decree, I could not have actually picked the cheese and crackers. I could not because as, say, Isaiah 46:10 tells us: “Declaring the end from the beginning, And from ancient times things which have not been done, Saying, 'My purpose will be established, And I will accomplish all My good pleasure';” God declared that I would pick the steak, He cannot be wrong, hence I could not have, in a libertarian way, have chosen the cheese. But, did I not “really” chose the steak? After all, that’s what I wanted.
I think we can take our cue from Jesus. Before I explain, allow a brief digression, and apologies to those who aren’t familiar with the eschatological terms. I think one of the best lines I have ever heard was in a debate between gene Cook and Hyper-preterist H.L. James. Now, H.L. was kind of ridiculing the idea of a bodily resurrection. He pointed out that Jesus had holes in his hands, and so asked if Gene would have tattoos, scars, or things like that in heaven. Gene’s voice and response was unforgettable. In a humble sounding voice, he meekly replied: “If it’s good enough for Jesus, it’s good enough for me.” Now, I don’t think Gene think we will have said scars, but even if we did, so what. Our Lord has them. Of course he has them for theological reasons that we don’t need to get into. My point in all this is to talk about a choice Jesus made. If it’s “good enough” for Him to cal it a choice, then it’s “good enough” for me to call my choices, choices. If it’s “real enough” for Jesus, it’s “real enough” for me.
In John 6:70 Jesus tells us that he chose all 12 disciples, yet one, speaking of Judas, was the devil. In John 13:18 Jesus tells us that he chose Judas, along with the other 11, “so that the Scriptures may be fulfilled.” Now, this shows that it was pre-determined that Judas would betray Jesus. We are told in Hebrews 6 that it is “impossible” that God can lie. So, was it “possible” that Jesus could have, in a libertarian way, chosen rabbi Larry over Judas? If Jesus had libertarian free will, wouldn’t his “choice,” to be real” have to be between at least two live options, both of which were possible to actuate? If it was “possible” that Jesus could falsify Jehovah’s prophecy, God would have turned out a liar. But, this is “impossible,” therefore it seems “impossible” that Jesus could have chosen otherwise. Yet. Jesus calls it a “choice.” Hence if my choices aren’t real, neither was Jesus.’ If the libertarian doesn’t allow me to have a “real” choice, so what? If it is good enough for Jesus, it’s good enough for me.
As many can see, the debate is a detailed and rigorous one. If the contemporary Christian wants to engage in a contemporary defense of our basic beliefs about God, His sovereignty, and man's responsibility, s/he would do well to study some of the contemporary literature. We should not sit back, at least those interested, while the Arminian makes headway in the area of analytic philosophy, making many of us look sloppy. I feel it can only strengthen our extremely strong theological case if we learn to employ contemporary philosophic arguments for compatibilism (semi, for us) and moral responsibility in light of determinism. Furthermore, many Arminians simply will avoid Scripture in the debate, and it would serve well to be able to answer them on their own grounds. Lastly, the above is, as I said, a rough and ready, all too brief, discussion of contemporary compatibilism. I recognize that many can find fault with the above. My main goal was to briefly explain some of the language and ideas used in contemporary debate, and possibly spur future interest. Hopefully I at least achieved the latter.
Classical compatibilism
Since, in modern times, Calvinism is generally associated with compatibilism, and since that term is frequently used at T-blog, it might be helpful to offer some basic definitions. According to classical compatibilism:
“To be free, most compatibilists have insisted, means in ordinary language (1) to have the *power* or *ability* to do what we will (desire or choose) to do, and this entails (2) the absence of *constraints* or *impediments* preventing us from doing what we will, desire, or choose. The constraints or impediments they have in mind include physical restraints, lack of opportunity, duress or coercion, physical or mental impairment, and the like.”
“What do they say about the freedom *to do otherwise*? It is also defined by classical compatibilists in terms of (1) and (2). You are free to do otherwise than meet your friend when you (1) have the power or ability to avoid meeting him, and which entails in turn that (2) there are no constraints or impediments preventing you from avoiding the meeting (e.g., no one is forcing you at gunpoint to meet him)."
"It does mean you *would* do it, *if* you wanted or desired to do it. Thus they hold that (1) and (2) entail a third feature of classical compatibilism, namely, that terms such as *can*, *power*, *ability*, and *freedom* should be given a *conditional* or *hypothetical* analysis: (3) that an agent can (has the power, is able, is free, to) do something means that the agent would do it, if the agent wanted (or desired or chose) to do it."
“To say ‘you could have done otherwise’ would only amount to the counterfactual claim that you would have done otherwise, if (contrary to fact) the past (or the laws) had been different in some way, for example, if you had wanted or desired or chosen otherwise."
R. Kane, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford 2002), 12-13.
Contemporary compatibilism has developed a number of further refinements, but that's a place to start.
“To be free, most compatibilists have insisted, means in ordinary language (1) to have the *power* or *ability* to do what we will (desire or choose) to do, and this entails (2) the absence of *constraints* or *impediments* preventing us from doing what we will, desire, or choose. The constraints or impediments they have in mind include physical restraints, lack of opportunity, duress or coercion, physical or mental impairment, and the like.”
“What do they say about the freedom *to do otherwise*? It is also defined by classical compatibilists in terms of (1) and (2). You are free to do otherwise than meet your friend when you (1) have the power or ability to avoid meeting him, and which entails in turn that (2) there are no constraints or impediments preventing you from avoiding the meeting (e.g., no one is forcing you at gunpoint to meet him)."
"It does mean you *would* do it, *if* you wanted or desired to do it. Thus they hold that (1) and (2) entail a third feature of classical compatibilism, namely, that terms such as *can*, *power*, *ability*, and *freedom* should be given a *conditional* or *hypothetical* analysis: (3) that an agent can (has the power, is able, is free, to) do something means that the agent would do it, if the agent wanted (or desired or chose) to do it."
“To say ‘you could have done otherwise’ would only amount to the counterfactual claim that you would have done otherwise, if (contrary to fact) the past (or the laws) had been different in some way, for example, if you had wanted or desired or chosen otherwise."
R. Kane, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford 2002), 12-13.
Contemporary compatibilism has developed a number of further refinements, but that's a place to start.
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