Monday, August 05, 2019

"Race-traitors"

I thought about doing a post on this epithet before the mass shootings over the weekend, so the timing is coincidental. The "race-traitor" epithet is used both by (some) whites and blacks. Is that ever a legitimate category?

1. According to the Urban Dictionary, it's sometimes used for sexual "race mixing". That's an illegitimate use of the designation.

2. In addition, it's applied to individuals accused of selling out the interests of their own race. That's more complicated:

i) I think there are cases where that designation is legitimate. For instance, there are black politicians who support policies detrimental to the black community. Because, historically, the Democrat party is majority white, you have black Democrats who kowtow to liberal white policies in order to be players in the Democrat party.

To take another example, Mainland China is assimilating Hong Kong. It has stooges in the Hong Kong government who betray the interests of the Hong Kong people. The same may be said for the Hong Kong police. Likewise, there are white Democrats who promote policies that discriminate against whites.

ii) That said, in my anecdotal experience, it's my impression that white racists have a white first ethic. You put your own race first. You should have greater solidarity with members of your own (white) race than other races or ethnicities. But that's absurd. By that logic, I have greater solidarity with Elizabeth Warren than Russell Wilson, Mayor Pete Buttboy than Sen. Tim Scott, "Caitlyn" Jenner than Bobby Jindal, Rosie O'Donnell than Francis Chan, Boy George than Izzy Folau, Elton John than Michael Nazir Ali, Richard Dawkins than Voddie Baucham–to name a few.

iii) Perhaps a less extreme version of (ii) would claim that all things being equal, you should have greater solidarity with members of your own race. That's the default position, but it can be overridden.

However, that's too abstract to be meaningful. Race is always one factor among many, and some factors are much more important to individual and social identity than biological race, such as religion, common interests, biological sex, and sexual orientation.

iv) Finally, race is fluid. Many individuals can't be classified as members of one biological race. Biological race is a spectrum, easier to sort out at the ends of the spectrum than in the blended middle. That's why racial purists abhor "miscegenation". They understand that racial categories are often rather arbitrary and unstable.

Declaring war on white nationalism

In the wake of the mass shootings over the weekend, some conservatives have said now's the time to declare a war on violent white supremacy/nationalism. That raises several issues:
i) I'd note in passing that pundits use "white racist," "white nationalist," and "white supremacist" as synonyms. It's possible that there are some conceptual distinctions here. Since, however, I think they're all bad, I won't bother to parse the usage. For simplicity, I'll say "racist".
ii) Warfare metaphors are just that–metaphors. So what does it actually mean to wage war on this phenomenon?
iii) White racist terrorism, like domestic terrorism generally, is a crime, and ought to be treated as such.
iv) However, white racist ideology or rhetoric is a different matter. Both liberal and conservative pundits denounce it, which is fine at one level. It merits denunciation.
However, that's not a way to "win a war". Indeed, that may harden white racists. I suspect many of them feel like a righteous remnant. To be reviled and marginalized by the "establishment" reinforces their victimology, their persecution complex. So while denouncing white racism is valid on the merits, if our only response is to hurl epithets at them, that's counterproductive. They expect that. To be hated by the "establishment" is a badge of honor.
v) There's the old strategy of fighting bad ideas with good ideas. Instead of just denouncing them, an effort should be made to engage their arguments (such as they were). Although rational persuasion won't change the minds of hardcore racists, you can reach some people by listening to them. If they are show enough respect to be listened to, it creates an opening to change minds.
For instance, I once wrote a critique of white nationalist Francis Nigel Lee.
I figured that he could make the best case for white nationalism, so he was a good foil.
vi) It's necessary to distinguish between perceived grievances and legitimate grievances. Likewise, it's necessary to distinguish between legitimate grievances and illegitimate outlets. Some are losers looking for an excuse–someone else to blame. Others may have real grievances, but if their grievances are demonized, that pushes them into fringe groups.
vii) Apropos (vi), how many white racists are primarily motivated by ideology? By contrast, how many white racists are motivated by something else, and the ideology is just a side-effect? Take a generation of alienated young men due to fatherlessness. That may put them at risk of falling into social media groups with young men who share the same experience, who look for scapegoats.
Take the crisis facing some rural or working-class communities, highlighted by Tucker Carlson. Likewise, I saw a presentation by Jordan Peterson about how, in a hitech society, there just aren't jobs for people below a certain IQ–whereas there used to be jobs for them.
viii) In addition, Democrats need to own up to the fact that the anti-white, anti-male, anti-Christian, anti-Jew, anti-straight, anti-rural, anti-working-class policies of the Obama administration made Trump a politically viable candidate.
ix) If the authorities crack down on white terrorism but turn a blind eye to other examples of domestic terrorism like Antifa, that will reinforce white racism. They will see that the authorities are singling out caucasians, which plays right into their narrative. And, indeed, it is racist to crack down on white terrorism while giving other domestic terrorist movements like Antifa a pass.
x) Moreover, the crackdown on violent white racism can easily provide cover for Democrats to go after their political opponents. In the wake of the shootings, we see Elizabeth Warren call Fox News a "hate-for-profit" machine.
Likewise, the NYT runs back-to-back stories smearing all conservatives as agents of white domestic terrorism:

So this is just a pretext to use the police powers of gov't to shut down political dissent. A Hunger Games scenario.
I just saw a tweet by homosexual pollster Nate Silver obliterating the distinction between domestic and international terrorism:

But there's a crucial distinction. International terrorism properly falls under the laws of war. By contrast, domestic terrorism is a crime. The accused, especially citizens, enjoy full due process rights.
xi) Finally, there's the question of how seriously to take manifestos by contemporary domestic terrorists. As I recall, this custom goes back to the Unabomber. In the past you had domestic terrorists writing manifestoes to explain their intentions. These were like suicide notes.
But nowadays we need to be less credulous. It's possible for a domestic terrorist to cynically give reasons for his actions that are not his real reasons. From what I've read, some domestic terrorists want to spark a civil war. They bait the authorities into cracking down, in hopes that the oppressive measures will ignite a popular uprising.
They know how to push the buttons of the "news media" and the authorities. They are banking on the very predictable reaction of the establishment. So I don't think we can automatically take contemporary manifestos at face value. Some of them may be playing the establishment.






















What happens when you disarm the public

But the real problem lies in the police, that vast body of men and women, largely absent from the streets we pay them to patrol. In the last week, I have not seen one police officer on foot, anywhere, and I have looked out for them.

They have become a closed society, quite Left-wing, pursuing their own politically correct agendas, uninterested in their main job of deterring crime by being present on the streets.

https://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2019/07/peter-hitchens-dont-be-duped-by-cheery-boris-johnson-its-your-duty-to-be-glum.html

Let's ban everything!

https://armedacademic.org/2019/08/05/priorities/

Armed academic

Tim Hsiao's new website focuses on gun rights.

An Orthodox Perspective on Roman Catholicism

Unlike the stereotypical Catholic/Protestant debate, this attacks Catholicism from a different front:


Ironically, it reveals how legalistic Eastern Orthodoxy is, with its thicket of man-made rules and duties. The encounter between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism is a spectacle in mutual destruction. 

Woke Shooters

Just a couple of comments on the recent shooters.

i. This stresses the importance for law-abiding citizens to carry to protect themselves, families, and others.

ii. The El Paso Shooter's manifesto shows he subscribed to Democratic narratives (e.g. radical environmentalism, anti-corporate, zero-population-growth). He also carries the Democratic heritage of racism, in this case against Hispanics. The Ohio shooter was woke himself, a pro-Satanist leftist, hater of law enforcement, and a supporter of communist Elizabeth Warren, as it is being revealed.

iii. Those who blame "mental illness" are giving the shooters too much credit as it excuses their real impetus: evil.


Gott mit uns

I got into an impromptu debate with an apostate Christian who is now an atheist.

[How do you know drowning people is morally wrong?] I know drowning is a very unpleasant sensation and can lead to death. As I wouldn’t what it to happen to me I in turn don’t wish it on others. It’s called empathy.

1. So your morality is ultimately based on your intuition? Your sense or feelings? Such as feeling "a very unpleasant sensation". Such as feeling a sense of "empathy". However, you earlier condemned Hitler and the Holocaust. Yet Hitler felt no empathy for the Jewish people. Hence, by your logic, Hitler did not do anything morally wrong by killing Jews in the Holocaust, did he?

2. A person can also feel "a very unpleasant sensation" when they're undergoing euthanasia. Would you therefore argue euthanasia is morally illicit?

hitler was a Christian so....

1. Hitler came from a Catholic background, just like Stalin came from a Russian Orthodox background (Stalin became an atheist), but Hitler persecuted Christians and hated Christians. Philosophically speaking, one could argue Hitler often promoted the views of Friedrich Nietzsche who was an ardent atheist and nihilist.

2. In fact, Hitler considered Christianity weak. A religion only fit for "slaves". And even Joseph Goebbels, who knew Hitler closely, said: "The Führer is deeply religious, though completely anti-Christian. He views Christianity as a symptom of decay. Rightly so. It is a branch of the Jewish race. This can be seen in the similarity of their religious rites. Both [Judaism and Christianity] have no point of contact to the animal element, and thus, in the end they will be destroyed."

3. However you're missing the actual point. I'm responding to you on your own grounds. This isn't about Hitler, but about your argument. Hitler is simply one example among many. You argued for morality based on feelings like "empathy". Well, if morality is ultimately based on whether or not we have empathy toward another person, then someone who has no empathy toward a group of people - such as Hitler lacking empathy toward Jews, or such as ISIS lacking empathy toward non-Muslims including non-Sunni Muslims - then by your logic how have they wronged the other person?

Euthanasia is a complex issue that requires consent and extenuating circumstances. The right to die for example. Alleviate suffering as such.

1. Again, you missed the point. The point is, by your own logic, euthanasia would be wrong because the person would feel "a very unpleasant sensation and can lead to death".

2. You need to find a better argument if you want to ground objective moral values and duties on atheism. If you can't ground objective moral values and duties, then you have no basis by which to morally judge another person's morality. Such as by calling God a "sadistic jerk" as well as condemning ancient peoples like Israelites and early Christians. At best, it's just your own intuition or feelings or somesuch, but your own personal feelings aren't necessarily a reliable moral compass.

3. Given atheism, what happens to evil people who get away with their evil in this life? Hitler died the way he wanted to die, by suicide, without ever having to answer for his evils. Stalin and Mao got away in the end too. As Dawkins points out: "In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference."

Gott Mit Uns which is emblazoned on the SS emblem translates to God With Us. Strange thing for an atheist to attach to his death squads.

1. By that logic, we put "In God We Trust" on our money. Hence the United States is (or should be) a Christian nation. Is that what you're arguing?

2. Besides, as Goebbels points out, Hitler was "religious" but "anti-Christian" and anti-Jewish. So whatever "god" this was, it wasn't the God of the Bible.

3. Plus, the Nazis often co-opted religious symbols for their own propaganda. After all, the swastika was originally from Hinduism. Hence, by your logic, the Nazis were Hindu.

horrible people throughout history have co-opted religion to strengthen their power. It’s almost like political leaders understand that having a god around helps keep people in line. Any coincidence that ancient cultures often had church and government so closely entwined. Makes you think doesn’t it. Can’t get the peasants to listen, threaten them with a fate worse than death. A savvy political move.

1. Thanks for conceding my point. Yes, Hitler and the Nazis were "horrible people" who co-opted religion. They were not Christians like you've been ignorantly alleging.

2. If anything, Hitler was driven by a Nietzschean vision mixed with various myths and religious symbols. (This included Norse, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and related myths, which JRR Tolkien even criticized the Nazis for misunderstanding at the time.) If anything, Hitler was driven by an atheistic and nihilistic vision. God is dead. The will to power. The German and Aryan peoples are Übermensch. That's one reason why Hitler thought Germans could weather the freezing Russian winter wearing lighter and/or less clothing than the Russians since the Germans are Übermensch! That's one reason why Hitler refused to allow his troops to make strategic retreats to fight another day (such as at Stalingrad) since the Übermensch have the will to overcome their enemies and other obstacles. In short, if anything, Hitler was driven by atheistic and nihilistic philosophies.

3. How "kept in line" to Pharoah and the gods of Egypt were Moses and the Israelites? See John Currid's book Against the Gods: The Polemical Theology of the Old Testament for a start.

4. Most importantly, given atheism, why isn't nihilism the logical conclusion to your atheism? That's what many atheist philosophers even argue (e.g. Alex Rosenberg). Hence, the question is, given your atheism, how would you ground moral realism? Given your atheism, how would you ground objective moral values and duties? So far, you haven't been able to.

Edit: I added more of the debate below.

The last days of John Allen Chau

"The Last Days of John Allen Chau"

The flood waters

John Walton makes the following remarks in The NIV Application Commentary: Genesis:

The main questions, however, concern what is demanded by the language of the text. Four textual issues contribute to the discussion and require investigation: universal scope of the language (7:21–23), covering the mountains (7:19), fifteen cubits above (7:20), and the tops of the mountains becoming visible (8:5). If an interpreter maintains the support of the authority of the text but does not believe in a global flood, how can these four issues be handled?

Universal language. It may sound strange to say, but the word "all" is not always absolute in biblical usage. Look, for instance, at Deuteronomy 2:25, where the Lord says, "This very day I will begin to put the terror and fear of you on all the nations under heaven." This verse even uses "under heaven" in the same way that Genesis 7:19 does. Yet in context, few would contend that this refers to more than the nations of Canaan and perhaps a few others. In Genesis 41:57, Joseph opens the storehouses of Egypt and "all the countries came to Egypt to buy grain from Joseph, because the famine was severe in all the world." I do not know of anyone who contends that therefore the Eskimos must have been included.

Similar use of language can be seen in Akkadian texts. Most instructional is a text called the Sargon Geography, which names the lands of the known world one by one and concludes that "Sargon, King of the Universe, conquered the totality of the land under heaven."34 Based on such examples, it becomes clear that it was perfectly acceptable, and not at all deceptive, to use the word "all" to encompass all those of a more regionally delineated area. Such usage does not violate biblical authority because the Bible does not intend to claim more than regional impact.

Covering the mountains. When 7:19 refers to the mountains being covered, it uses the Pual form of the verb ksh. This verb is used for a wide variety of "covering" possibilities. A people or weeds can be so vast that it covers the land (Num. 22:11; Prov. 24:31); a blanket or clothing covers someone (Ex. 28:42; 1 Kings 1:1). Something can be covered in the sense of being overshadowed (cherubim wings covering the ark, 2 Chron. 5:8; clouds covering the sky, Ps. 147:8).

What about being covered with water? Aside from the two occurrences in 7:19–20, thirteen references have water as the explicit or implicit subject of this verb. Of those thirteen, five refer to the Red Sea covering the Egyptian army at the time of the Exodus (Ex. 14:28; 15:5, 10; Ps. 78:53; 106:11); four refer to the waters in creation and nature (Ps. 104:6, 9; Isa. 11:9; Hab. 2:14); one is metaphorical for judgment (Job 22:11). It is the remaining three that are of most significance to this discussion: Job 38:34; Jeremiah 46:8; and Malachi 2:13. In these three passages it appears that water does not cover by submerging as much as by drenching. Even today when someone walks in from a downpour we might say, "You’re covered with water!"

If Genesis 7:19 is taken the same way, it suggests that the mountains were drenched with water or coursing with flash floods, but it does not demand that they were totally submerged under water. One can certainly argue that the context does not favor this latter usage, and I am not inclined to adopt it. The point is that it is not as easy as sometimes imagined to claim that the Bible demands that all the mountains were submerged.

Fifteen cubits above. In 7:20 this phrase is difficult to decipher, largely because of the word that the NIV renders "depth." The Hebrew text says, "Fifteen cubits from above [milma'la] rose the waters, and the mountains were covered." It is therefore not at all clear that it is suggesting the waters rose fifteen cubits higher than the mountains.35

The word under discussion occurs twenty-three times in a number of different syntactical situations. Its most common use is to delineate the position of one object relative to another. In this kind of context the preposition al is consistently attached to the one noun with milma'la connected to the object that is being located.36 It can also mean "above" when it is used as an adjective (Jer. 31:37, "heavens above"). When it is used as an adverb without a preposition to relate it to another noun, translations such as "upward" (Ezek. 1:11, "spread upward") or "upstream" (Josh. 3:13, 16) are better choices. It is this last category to which Genesis 7:20 belongs. As an adverb modifying the verb "rose," it suggests that the water reached fifteen cubits upward from the plain, covering at least some part of the mountains.

Tops of the mountains visible. This is the most difficult statement to explain for those arguing that the text does not require a global flood. In saying that the tops of the mountains became visible, this verse conveys that the tops, not just the flanks of the mountains, had been obscured. This still leaves two possibilities: They have been obscured by the horizon and this represented the sighting of land,37 or they have been obscured by (i.e., submerged under) water. The latter appears to be the necessary conclusion in that the ark stops moving in verse 4 on the seventeenth day of the seventh month and that the tops of the mountains do not become visible until two and a half months later, the first day of the tenth month.

Most interpreters have inferred that the ark became lodged on the tops of one of these mountains that was still under water and that the mountains did not become visible for ten more weeks. If this were a proper inference, the observation in the text would be a matter of experience, not perception. Noah did not just assume that all the mountains were under water; he was in the mountains and they were under water.

Sunday, August 04, 2019

30,000 denominations redux

I'd like to revisit a mindless but ever-popular Catholic trope about the Protestant faith. And that's the claim that sola scriptura spawned "30,000" denominations. The figures varies depending on the Catholic apologist. This is related to the Catholic objection that Protestants can't agree on anything. 

Here's why I say that's a mindless trope: if you think the Protestant movement is so disunited that it doesn't stand for anything, then why classify all these groups as Protestant? Put another way, if you can't say what the opposing position represents, then you have no target to aim at. 

If there's no such thing as a core Protestant theology, then there's nothing to critique. At best, a Catholic apologist could say the basic problem with the Protestant faith is that there is not Protestant faith. That would be catchy, and you could put it in one pithy sentence. 

But of course, Catholic apologists offer detailed critiques of Protestant theology. They write whole books on the subject. And Catholic attacks on the Protestant faith bear an uncanny family resemblance. 

In practice, a Catholic apologist takes one of two approaches. One line of attack is to critique generic Protestant theology. He attacks typical, representative Protestant doctrines. But that's a roundabout admission that Protestant faith does have a common, identifiable core theology.

The other line of attack is to pick a particular expression of the Protestant movement like Baptists, Presbyterians, Lutherans, or Calvinists. Although these have distinctive positions that distinguish them from one another, they are representative Protestant schools of thought. 

So both in principle and practice, Catholic apologists think there are recognizable Protestant doctrines. If they didn't think that, they couldn't write entire books attacking the Protestant faith. 

Institutional infidelity

1. Hypothetically, what would the magisterium have to do for devout Catholics (or Catholic apologists) to conclude that the Roman Catholic church never was the one true church founded by Jesus Christ? Can the magisterium ever do anything, in principle or practice, to discredit Roman Catholicism? 

Put another way, how do we distinguish between a faithful church and a faithless church? What's the standard of fidelity? 

2. In my observation, Catholics take the position that the pope can't change dogma. The pope can't change the deposit of faith. The pope can't elevate a heresy to the status of dogma. The pope can't make a moral teaching that contradicts natural law de fide doctrine. However, the hierarchy can say or do anything short of that without discrediting Roman Catholicism. 

So in theory, if the pope, speaking ex cathedra, were to change doctrine, change the deposit of faith, dogmatize heresy, teach contrary to natural law, his action would show that the Roman Catholic church was never the church founded by Jesus Christ.

However, that's paradoxical, and a tenacious Catholic apologist might find a loophole by saying that if a pope were to do that, it wouldn't disprove Catholicism; rather, it would disprove the claim that he was speaking ex cathedra. But there are two related problems with that defense:

i) If a pope cannot change dogma even when he intends to speak ex cathedra, even when he uses ex cathedra formulas, then it's impossible to verify when or if a pope is speaking ex cathedra. If papal intent and ex cathedra formulas are insufficient criteria, then there's no way to verify an ex cathedra pronouncement.

ii) It renders Catholicism unfalsifiable, which means that even if Catholicism is actually wrong, Catholics are never be in a position to know it's wrong. In that event, they have an unshakable commitment to a false religion.  

3. In addition, this defines fidelity or infidelity in exclusively abstract, impersonal terms. Fidelity or infidelity is restricted to propositions. The members of the magisterium can say or to anything consistent with institutional fidelity so long as the dogmatic statements are faithful to the deposit of faith. It reduces fidelity to verbal formulas.  If every pope taught heresy, but not formally or officially (i.e. dogma, de fide, ex cathedra), the Catholic church would still be a faithful church. If every pope, cardinal, bishop, and priest was an active sodomite, the Catholic church would still be a faithful church. 

But a fundamental problem with that restrictive concept of fidelity is that, of necessity, fidelity has a personal dimension. It isn't just words on a page. To be faithful is to be obedient in thought word and deed. Fidelity in what we believe as well as fidelity in how we live. Fidelity to God. A living relationship of life and mind between Christians and their God. If members of a church are overwhelmingly faithless in what they believe and how they act, then that's a faithless church. 

For instance, a creed is at best a standard of fidelity, not a substitute for fidelity. A benchmark for what to believe and how to behave. 

Assuming a creed is true, if a denomination refuses to enforce the creed, constantly teaches contrary to the creed, constantly disregards the creed in practice, then the creed is insufficient to make that a faithful denomination. There must be a living connection between what's on paper and what's in the heart. Otherwise, it's like saying a church is faithful so long as it has an infallible creed in a safe, that no one has ever read. 

Saturday, August 03, 2019

Sink your feet in concrete

Around the 4-6 min. mark: 


Reformed convert to Eastern Orthodoxy Josiah Trenham gives this reason (one of two) for switching to Eastern Orthodoxy:

A deep sense that my tradition in which I had been raised was unstable, that the winds of the secular culture were blowing very hard and the church was not standing firm…That sense–that the Protestant Reformed movement and even evangelicalism in general did not have a stake, an immovable stake for the faith that was competent to resist the blowing of the winds of unbelief in our own culture deeply–affected me, and I was very impressed by holy orthodoxy that has a 2000-year track record of resisting the opposition of the world…I remember telling my wife…I can't imagine investing my life in a church and raising my children in that church, knowing that my children will not have that church when they become adults. And in fact all of this investment will be for naught.  

1. Before getting to the main issue, is it true that EO has a track record of resisting the opposition of the world?

i) What about the alliance between the Russian Orthodox church and Tsarism? What about the alliance between the Russian Orthodox church and Vladimir Putin?

ii) What about socially liberal politicians like Michael Dukakis, John Podesta, and Paul Tslongas, or anchorman George Stephanopoulos? Have they been excommunicated by the Greek Orthodox church? 

iii) What about prayers to the dead? Isn't that baptized polytheism? Replacing patron gods with patron saints, who are functionally equivalent? 

iv) Historically, issues like the LGBT agenda weren't on the radar. It remains to be seen if the Orthodox church will hold out. And from what I've read, St. Vladimir's Seminary has already capitulated on theistic evolution and the historical-critical method.

2. Regarding the main issue, his objection reflects divergent theological paradigms:

i) He fails to distinguish between denominations and faith-traditions. Protestant faith-traditions (e.g. Calvinism, Arminianism, Lutheranism, Presbyterianism, Anglicanism, Baptists, &c.) are quite stable. Denominations exemplify faith-traditions. Denominations are temporary vehicles, but the faith-traditions they embody endure from one generation to the next. Protestant faith-traditions are self-renewing in that respect. 

ii) It's fine for an individual to put down stakes in a denomination if that's a solid denomination. But he should also be prepared to pull up stakes and move on if the denomination loses fidelity to biblical revelation. Christians are pilgrims. We should keep our bags packed and travel light. Like Abraham, we live in tents. 

iii) It's bad parenting for a Christian parent to cultivate loyalty to the denomination he belongs to. Christian children should be taught that what was a good denomination for their parents may become a bad denomination for the next generation. Many professing believers are too attached to a particular denomination, and hang on when they ought to let go. The torch Christian parents are supposed to hand off to their kids is not a denomination but the Christian faith. 

iv) This involves a different ecclesiology than Eastern Orthodoxy. Like Roman Catholics, Trenham views the church as a single, historically continuous denomination (of course, he doesn't call his own sect a denomination). For him, there's a one-to-one relation between Christianity and "the church". Trenham ecclesiology is like sinking your feet in concrete until it dries. 

This stands in contrast to an evangelical model, where there's a one-to-many relation between Christianity and "the church". The church is multiply-exemplified in time and space, in a variety of different denominations. Christian denominations and independent churches are samples of the one church. The Spirit is present in different denominations and independent churches because the Spirit is present in Christians. The Spirit is present wherever Christians are present.

To take a comparison, there's a one-to-many relation between the color red and red objects. Two different roses may both be red. Or they made be different shades of red, where one is redder than the other, although both roses recognizably belong to the reddish band of the spectrum. 

There are, of course, heretical or apostate denominations and independent churches. The Spirit may be present in a denomination at one time, but like the glory departing the temple (Ezk 10), be absent at a later date. Without the Shekinah, the inner sanctum was a hollow shell. 

To take another comparison from Scripture, the spiritual menorah may be present in a church at one time and place, but be removed at a later date (Rev 1-2). The Spirit isn't chained to any particular denomination or local church. 

Inside China's thought transformation camps

Starting at approximately 8 minutes, the logic is basically the same as the pre-crime division in the film Minority Report. If someone shows signs they're capable of committing crime (as judged by the Chinese Communist Party), then they should be prevented from committing crime by being interred in a "re-education" or "thought transformation" camp before they commit crime. That's supposed to be for their own good too. In short, thought-crimes are punishable, though "punishment" in communist China is described as rehabilitation. Basically it's George Orwell's 1984 come to life.

Friday, August 02, 2019

Genesis as CGI

On Facebook I got into a debate with Michael Jones (Inspiring Philosophy). The experience left me less than inspired about his competence. 

Hays
Why did Jonathan pick a YouTube starlet to address the historicity of Gen 1-11 rather than a scholar with real expertise on the topic like John Currid, Richard Hess, or Andrew Steinmann? What makes Michael Jones any different than Alex O'Connor (the "Cosmic Skeptic")?

Jones
"See how condescending this guy is. I think I’ll just block him so I don’t have to see he comments anymore. Not worth my time. One of the most judgmental and condescending people I talked to, judges based on titles not arguments."

Hays
Like whether a cancer patient should prefer an oncologist with bona fide medical degrees rather than a Chinese herbalist? 

A lifetime at the movies

1. A Christian cliché is that we should interpret every notable experience through the lens of Christianity. What's the significance of that experience from a Christian perspective? Sometimes this can lead to overinterpreting experience, by trying to find something Christian in something that's not. But as a rule, it's a cliché we should live by. 

Movies (inclusive of TV dramas) are good candidates. Movies are the major art form of our time. In terms of mass appeal they displaced the novel. And not just for the hoi polloi. Movies are often a serious art form for talented directors, cameramen, screenwriters, and actors. Just imagine what a genius like Dante or da Vinci could do with the film medium?

I don't mean that movies ought to replace paintings or novels. But in our own day and age, movies are the dominate artistic frame of reference. 

2. Reading Pauline Kael reviews, I'm struck by her all-consuming passion for film, and how personally she takes movies. For her, it's not simply a case or watching or reviewing a movie, but a tense, suspenseful confrontation. 

I suspect that's in large part because, as a secular Jew, she was wholly invested in this world. This is the only life we get. So movies were her religion. That's what she lived for. 

That presents a paradoxical contrast to a Christian perspective. I think movies are both more important and less important than an atheist. On the one hand, it's just a movie. Usually fiction–although some movies have their basis in a "true story" (as the saying goes). So it's not all-important the way it was to Kael.

On the other hand, everything is equally and ultimately worthless in a godless universe. By contrast, everything has a purpose in a Christian universe. Good or great movies have a larger, more enduring significance than the (usually secular) director intended. I view movies with more detachment than Kael, but at the same time, good things in this life have a value that carries over into eternity.  

3. As I reflect on all the movies and TV dramas I've seen over the course of a lifetime (those I consciously recall), I'm struck by how few movies had an indelible impact on me. I can only think of two: The Last Picture Show and The Garden of the Finzi-Continis–both of which I saw when I was coming of age. I think that's in part because that's a more impressionable time of life, and there comes a point in life where it's harder for any experience to make an indelible impression. 

During our formative years, certain experiences become a reference point for the rest of our lives. That can be good or bad. Take apostates who use the folk theology of their Sunday school pedagogy as the standard of comparison for Christianity. 

On the one hand there are movies and TV dramas we outgrow. At least, we ought to outgrow some of that fare. On the other hand, there are movies and TV dramas we grow into. We weren't ready for it when we were younger. It went over our heads. Or we didn't have the personal, corresponding experience to make it resonate at the time.

This goes to a dynamic, dialectical relationship between the movie and the movie viewer. What we bring to the movie.

I first saw Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy with my late parents in my childhood home. At the time, they weren't my late parents. Watching it now has an added layer of poignancy. A split-personalty experience where I watch it again from my current situation, but remembering and comparing that with the viewing experience of my younger self. 

4. This also goes to the complicated question of what makes a movie a favorite. I might admire a movie. I might regard it as a great movie–without liking it. I think The Last Picture Show is a great movie of its kind, and it has some scenes I like, but it's not a film I'd recommend, exactly–and it has other scenes I dislike. 

Here's one way I might gauge a favorite movie. In the Star Trek episode "All Our Yesterdays," the planetary inhabitants are threatened with extinction when their sun goes supernova. But they have time-travel technology, so they survive by escaping into the past.

In terms of what makes a movie a favorite, one question I ask myself is if I'd to step into the world of the film. Would I like to live at that time and place? Would the characters (played by the same actors) be enjoyable friends and neighbors to be around?

To take a comparison, I think what makes Perelandra or The Adventures of Tom Sawyer so appealing is that the reader wishes he could be there. It would be fun to visit or even live there. If you're a boy reading The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, it would be fun to hang out with Sam Clemens and his playmates on his uncle's farm, the mighty Mississippi (before locks and dams domesticated the wild river), and the caves around Hannibal. 

Likewise, how many readers wish they could step into the exotic world of Perelandra and experience the floating islands? Or the Silver Sea in The Voyage of the Dawn Treader? 

By the same token, there are films we admire at a distance, and then there are films that evoke a yearning to go there. Certain films and novels tap into that. You may call it escapist fantasy, but many people long to escape this life and take refuge a better world. A fallen world is unsatisfying. 

5. Some movies have an intriguing dramatic premise, but lack the imagination or worldview to give a satisfying answer to the question it raises. Take Tuck Everlasting (2002). It raises good questions about mortality and immortality, using the fountain of youth as a plot device. From a secular standpoint, mortality and immortality are both unsatisfying. And that's why the ending of the movie is a cheat. By refusing to consider the Christian alternative, the message of the film ("Don't fear death but the life unloved") isn't up to the challenge. That's trite and superficial. 

6. It's puzzling why some movies are popular while similar movies, as good or better, are less popular. Why is The Butterfly Effect so much better-known than Mr. Nobody? 

Some films bomb because they sail over the heads of the average viewer. Take the remake (or reboot) of The Prisoner (2009). The original has a cult following. One problem is if we assess the remake by comparing it to the original, rather than judging it on its own terms, as an independent reinterpretation of the same dramatic premise.

Although the reboot lacks the verve and clarity of the original, the studied ambiguity makes it more profound. Like a mystery novel, the viewer slowly discovers the truth behind the illusion. But it overtaxes the attention span of impatient viewers. It's too subtle, too cerebral, for the average viewer.   

Tristan & Isolde (2006) is another example of a film that's too good for its audience. Too classy and highbrow. No competition for a schlock-fest like Twilight franchise or The Hunger Games franchise. In This House of Brede is even more of a connoisseur film. There are lots of moviegoers who have no taste for truly grown-up fare. 

7. Some films are perfect from start to Finish. Take House of Flying Daggers. 

But others are memorable for particular scenes, or the physical setting. Take the starkly isolated house in Giant (1956), exposed and vulnerable on the windswept plain, with the mountain range on the horizon. 

There's also a nice scene between Dean and Taylor in his house. In general, his performance is mannered. And Taylor had some bad luck with costars. In one film, her costar (Newman) is a straight actor who plays a closeted queer character while in two other films her were costarts are queer actors (Hudson, Clift) who play straight characters. By contrast, there's natural sexual magnetism between Dean and Taylor. 

Ridley Scott's Kingdom of Heaven has some arresting scenes, but I dislike the propagandistic quality of the film. The opening scene in Mulholland Drive, with its tragic fateful ambience, is the highpoint of the movie. The coda to Tinker, Tailer, Soldier, Spy–a melancholic setting of the Nunc Dimittis, with the innocent timbre of the tremble soloist–lingers in the mind.

Into the Wild has some memorable scenes: Christopher paddling down the Colorado River. A deceptively optimistic scene with Eddie Vedder's "No Ceiling" playing in the background. A desperate telephone call in which an old man is trying to talk his way back into the graces of his estranged wife. He's burned through too many lost opportunities. He can never come home.  

8. If you think about it, there's a foreboding sensation when you watch an older movie in which all the actors are now deceased. From a secular standpoint, all that's left of the once living, feeling, passionate, embodied agents is a digital simulacrum, two steps removed from the real person. A celluloid record or analogy recording, remastered. 

Hell: against universalism

An excerpt from Hell: against universalism by Ioanna-Maria Patsalidou.

Thursday, August 01, 2019

Modern Catholicism on hell

Here's a good example of how post-Vatican II theology struggles to make the transition from traditional Catholic exclusivism to modern Catholic inclusivism. How to straddle two diametrically opposed positions. This is euphemistically dubbed the development of doctrine. 

Old age app

https://p2c.com/students/articles/what-we-can-learn-from-faceapps-oldage-challenge/

Progressive demagogues

I'm going to comment on a post by progressive/Arminian theologian Randal Rauser:


In passing, compare his response to my original post:


Notice how little of my argument he attempts to engage. And not simply the OP, but the more detailed explanations I provide in the combox in response to a commenter.

I am not surprised that Hays posted a comment like that, but wow is it revealing of his utter inability to understand the Gospel. Hays presumably thinks it is good news that Christ’s atoning work extends to him and his crowd, but he is deeply offended at the notion that it should extend to these other sinners as well, presumably the really bad ones.

So apparently, it isn’t offensive that God should mercifully save medium-sinful Steve Hays but it is beyond the pale that he should save a really bad sinner like Mao, Stalin, or an ISIS soldier.

i) To begin with, notice the psychological imputation. Does Rauser sincerely believe that you must be "deeply offended" by a notion to disagree with it? Is every philosopher who disagrees with a notion motivated by finding the notion deeply offensive? Rauser can't honestly believe that. That's just a polemical ploy that demagogues resort to. 

ii) In addition, he recast what I said. He swaps out what I actually said, swaps in something quite different, pretends that his substitution represents what I said, then revels in moral backpatting. That, too, is the standard tactic of demagogues. If you can't refute the actual argument, replace it with something easier to attack.  

That's actually the most charitable interpretation of his behavior. A less charitable interpretation is that Rauser is so consumed by his animosity towards Christian conservatives that he's incapable of hearing what they actually say. He automatically assumes the worst about them, and caricatures what they say because his antipathy blocks his ability to distinguish their real position from his imputations of malevolence. 

iii) If you compare my original post with his response, there's a complete mismatch. Nowhere do I use myself as the yardstick. I didn't contrast "midlevel" sinners" with "mega" sinners. Rather, I used the victims of horrendous evil as the yardstick. From their perspective, is it the "best possible news" that their assailants will evade divine retribution for their crimes? 

Consider Jewish Nazi hunters and survivors of the Shoah who hounded Nazi fugitives who escaped to Latin America. Does Rauser have the same contemptuous attitude for them? 

Then we're treated to a fallacious argument from authority:

Steve Hays could learn something from J.I. Packer. Though Packer is a Calvinist who believes that those who die outside Christ suffer eternal conscious torment, he also wrote this:

“No evangelical, I think, need hesitate to admit that in his heart of hearts he would like universalism to be true. Who can take pleasure in the thought of people being eternally lost? If you want to see folk damned, there is something wrong with you!”

i) How does Packer's opinion prove anything? Is it supposed to be true simply because Packer said it? 

ii) In addition, there's the false dichotomy. It isn't necessary to take "pleasure" in retributive justice to think that's a good thing. 

iii) Finally, it's incoherent to wish that universalism is true if you think it's false. If, in the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God, he doesn't save everyone, then it's best that everyone not be saved.