Wednesday, November 02, 2016

Dembski drops out of the ID movement



I had noticed some odd omissions. He hadn't updated his online bibliography for several years. The Discovery Institute has been feting Behe and Denton, but strangely silent about Dembski's contributions, even though he's one of the founders of the movement. I've also seen Evolution News & Views showcasing newer talent (e.g. Doug Axe, Stephen Meyer). 

One reason might be that as an aging mathematician, he may feel his best work is behind him. To be clear, he hasn't recanted his position. 

There is, though, some bitterness. I think, not without reason, that he suffers from burnout because he's been burned so many times. He was run out of town on a rail at Baylor. Then he got a job at SBTS, only to resign a year later. Then he landed a job at SWBTS, only to get into hot water with Paige Patterson. 

He's been frozen out by naturalistic evolutionists, theistic evolutionists, and young-earth creationists. His statement that "the camaraderie I once experienced with colleagues and friends in the movement has largely dwindled" is striking. He feels pretty alienated. Sad, but understandable. For more background on his motivations:

http://www.thebestschools.org/features/william-dembski-interview/#disillusion_with_fundamentalism

This speck of dust

I was listening to Richard Dawkins debate John Lennox. Dawkins said it's "petty and small-minded" to think the creator of the cosmos (if he existed) would come to this speck of dust to rid the world of sin. That fails to do justice to the grandeur of the universe. 

That's a revealing window into the mind of Dawkins. It reminds me of a distinction I've drawn between two kinds of painters: there are artists who like to paint people and artists who like to paint landscapes. Evidently, Dawkins is more interested in the spectacle of the natural world than human beings. 

Certainly humans are physically insignificant compared to the scale of the universe, or even mountains, canyons, and the like. It is, however, a false dichotomy for Dawkins to intuit that a God who's big enough to design the universe would take no interest in little creatures like humans. If anything, it's a mark of divine greatness to be mindful of each and every detail. Where everything happens for a reason. No plot holes. Is a God who only cares about the big picture, but can't be bothered with the details, really superior to a God who's cognizant of the fine details as well as the big picture? Isn't that a hallmark of quality craftsmanship? 

You also have creative writers who are fond of certain characters. They have favorite characters. 

I'm not suggesting that's directly analogous to God. I'm just saying there's nothing incongruous about the notion of a creator who takes a personal interest in the people (or characters) he makes. 

What if the House decides the election?

At the moment, the state of the presidential race is in flux, although that could solidify very fast. One possible scenario is that due to third-party candidates, Hillary and Trump will both fail to secure 270 electoral votes, in which case the election will be thrown into the House. I asked a friend who knows more about the mechanics than me what the procedure would be in that event. He said:

Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 of the Constitution lays out the rules in such a scenario. That language is a bit confusing, but the gist is: 

The House gets to elect the President and must choose from the from the 3 nominees who got the most Electoral votes (Trump, Hillary, or McMullin). Each state gets one vote (presumably the party with the most Reps gets to decide) so 26 states are needed to win.  

The Senate would elect the Vice President from the 2 Vice Presidential candidates with the most Electoral votes (Pence or Kaine, but not Finn). Each Senator gets one vote. 

If the House can't decide on a President by Inauguration Day, the Vice-President Elect (Kaine or Pence) serves as acting President until the deadlock is resolved. 

Evolutionary altruism

Darwinians often argue that natural selection fosters altruism. For instance: 

In evolutionary biology, an organism is said to behave altruistically when its behaviour benefits other organisms, at a cost to itself. The costs and benefits are measured in terms of reproductive fitness, or expected number of offspring. So by behaving altruistically, an organism reduces the number of offspring it is likely to produce itself, but boosts the number that other organisms are likely to produce.  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/altruism-biological/

On this view, social ethics is based on empathy or compassion, which is based on evolutionary psychology. 

On the face of it, there's a problem with that explanation. It's easy to imagine hominids who cooperate out of perceived self-interest rather than altruism. To take a comparison, consider military alliances. Heads-of-state who despise each other, or neighboring countries whose citizens despise each other, may pool their collective resources to combat a common enemy. That doesn't require a capacity for empathy or compassion. Indeed, they can to right back to killing each other once the more pressing threat has been eliminated. 

‘Tis Better to Lie than to Deceive

https://thearcmag.com/tis-better-to-lie-than-to-deceive-1e294331dd2#.dg3pvp8tn

“Pope Francis” reins in his tongue; issues no controversial statements in meeting with Lutherans in “Reformation Day” commemorations

“Pope Francis” with Lutheran Rev. Martin Junge,
the general secretary of the World Lutheran Federation,
and “Archbishop” Antje Jackelen,
Lutheran Archbishop of Uppsala and
“the Primate of the Church of Sweden”
Over the last few days, there have been several articles regarding the “Pope Francis” trip to Lund, Sweden, to meet with the female Lutheran bishop. Uncharacteristically for him, there doesn’t seem to be any controversial statements that came out of the trip.

LUND AND MALMO, SWEDEN -- At a first-of-its-kind ecumenical event marking 500 years of separation between Lutherans and Catholics after the Protestant Reformation, Pope Francis on Monday urged members of the two faith communities to "mend a critical moment of our history" by forging new common paths together.

Speaking in a 12th-century cathedral here that was once Catholic and is now Lutheran, the pontiff also praised some of the reforms called for by Martin Luther, whose famous writing of 95 theses led to a fracturing of Christianity across Western Europe.

"We have a new opportunity to accept a common path," Francis told Lutherans and Catholics during a joint ecumenical prayer service at Lund's cathedral with representatives of the Church of Sweden and the Lutheran World Federation.

"We have the opportunity to mend a critical moment of our history by moving beyond the controversies and disagreements that have often prevented us from understanding one another," he continued.

The pope later added that the half a millennia of separation between the two faith groups has "enabled us to understand better some aspects of our faith," noting specifically: "With gratitude we acknowledge that the Reformation helped give greater centrality to sacred Scripture in the church's life."

Mystery lady

https://rockingwithhawking.blogspot.com/2016/11/mystery-lady.html

Tuesday, November 01, 2016

British scientists dislike Dawkins

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/richard-dawkins-atheism-criticism-atheist-study-rice-university-science-scientists-a7389396.html

Burned by the Bern

https://thearcmag.com/bernie-sanders-was-never-going-to-be-the-evangelical-savior-be76ae68564c#.kaj6s26x6

Unmasking civic totalism

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/euangelion/2016/11/make-change-religion-unmasking-civic-totalism/

Child mortality

Childhood morality is a difficult issue, both in theodicy and pastoral ministry. Why doesn't God stop it? A few quick observations:

i) Sometimes kids turn out badly. Their life ends in disaster. Suppose a child goes to haven when he dies. Then he doesn't go offtrack. 

ii) Some kids turn out well, but their life may adversely impact other lives through no fault of their own. Let's say Stalin's mother was a wonderful person. But indirectly, her life caused untold suffering for tens of millions of Russians under Stalinism. 

iii) It might seem like a child who dies in infancy (or by miscarriage) is a wasted life. There is, however, an all-important difference between existence and nonexistence. Once conceived, the person will live forever. In relation to this life, they were snuffed out tragically early, but in relation to eternity, that's infinitesimal. What ruler are we using: this life or the afterlife?  

iv) Child mortality makes room for other children. Additional lives. Although that may sound like a cruel way to put it, they aren't simply squeezed out to free up a slot. For death is not the end, but a new beginning. 

Spontaneous remission

https://rockingwithhawking.blogspot.com/2016/11/spontaneous-remission.html

Pets aren't your kids

http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/10/pets-are-not-children-so-stop-calling-them-that.html?mid=fb-share-thecut

Assisted suicide

Why is there such a push for assisted suicide? Why the urgency? You can be sure that Democrats will spearhead this fundamental "right". Let's grant for the sake of argument that suicide is a right. Let's further grant that some people need to commit suicide. Let's be very lax and say that if you don't think your life is worth living, that's sufficient reason to kill yourself.

Even if we grant all those assumptions for discussion purposes, what makes assisted suicided a cause to lobby for? The reason I frame the issue this way is because most people already have the ability to kill themselves if they wish to. So why is it necessary to make provision for someone else to kill you when you can do it yourself? After all, how-to tips on suicide are readily available. You can find them on the internet. You can find them at your public library. Moreover, people do kill themselves with some frequency. So why the demand that someone else kill you?

Perhaps the argument is that you have cases where people are incapacitated due to accident or dementia. Mind you, if you're diagnosed with mild dementia or a degenerative illness, you still have the presence of mind and physical wherewithal to kill yourself before you become incapacitated. If you procrastinate until it's too late to do it yourself, why think you're entitled to force someone else do it? And make no mistake, it's about requiring "health professionals" to do it.

Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant the legitimacy of assisted suicide, that's only "necessary" in a fraction of cases (i.e. incapacitating accidents). Yet euthanasia is applied far more broadly. And notice how quickly it goes from voluntary to involuntary euthanasia. 

The real reason is that assisted suicide is a pretext for government to expand its authority to kill people. It uses the guise of "compassion" and "death with dignity" and "mercy killing" as an excuse to assume the role of public executioner, become the arbiter of life and death. It's really about the absolute power of the state. And not coincidentally, this dovetails with nationalized healthcare. The apotheosis of the state. Physicians as public employees who kill at the behest of the state.

There's also something undeniably diabolical behind it all. The devil hates humans. The devil is a murderer for the beginning (Jn 8:44). The devil is the unseen architect of genocide. How else do we account for self-loathing humanism?  

Monday, October 31, 2016

Little green men of the gaps

1. I recently linked to the debate between Michael Shermer and David Wood. Now I will comment on the debate. 

i) A mistake many people make in evaluating a debate is to award winners and losers based on which position they agree with. For them, it's not about the actual performance. It's not about who made the best case in the course of the debate. Rather, it's about prior agreement or disagreement. What side the viewer is on coming into the debate frequently dictates who they perceive to be the winner or loser. Their own position affects what they hear. Often, they are poor listeners. They don't analyze arguments. They perceive the winner or loser, not based on the quality of the intellectual performance, but prior agreement or disagreement with the position under debate. Of course, that's the wrong way to assess a debate. Your side could be right, but still do a bad job of arguing for its position. 

ii) There are roughly two kinds of spokesmen for a position: popularizers and high-level thinkers. Ideally, when assessing a position, we should judge it by the high-level thinkers and scholars. Indeed, good philosophers go the extra mile by improving on the arguments of the opposing position. That way, when they attack the opposing position, they attack the strongest case that can be made for the opposing position.

iii) However, there's value in attacking popularizers. In general, they have a much wider audience then the high-level thinkers and scholars. They are more directly influential. Their followers find their bad arguments convincing. Their follows fail to recognize what bad arguments these are.

iv) Wood won the debate hands down. He won on points. He's very focussed. Very analytical. Although he has a wicked sense of humor which he deploys in his satirical videos about Islam, in this debate he was pretty matter-of-fact. 

Shermer is a practiced debater. He has his spiel. In this debate he seems to have mellowed since he debated John Lennox 6 years ago. Maybe he was just in a different mood that night. In this debate he often adopts a folksy, avuncular tone. However, that's a facade, because that's punctured by snide or bitter comments. Although his demeanor is initially somewhat winsome, it gets to be tiresome. In addition, he meanders. Jumps back and forth.

BTW, in comparing his debate with Wood to his debate with Lennox, I notice that Shermer recycles the same bad arguments, even after he's been corrected. 

Italic text will be me quoting Shermer or summarizing Shermer. 

The “Protestant” Reformation

Today, October 31, 2016, is the 499th anniversary of the start of what is known as “the Protestant Reformation”. As Alister McGrath explains, however, the use of the word “Protestant” regarding the events of October 31, 1517 is anachronistic:

The term “Protestant” … requires comment. It derives from the aftermath of the Second Diet of Speyer (February 1529), which voted to end the toleration of Lutheranism in Germany. In April of the same year, six German princes and 14 cities protested against this oppressive measure, defending freedom of conscience and the rights of religious minorities. The term “Protestant” derives from this protest.

It is therefore not strictly correct to apply the term “Protestant” to individuals prior to April 1529 or to speak of events prior to that date as constituting “the Protestant Reformation.” The term “evangelical” is often used in the literature to refer to the reforming factions at Wittenberg and elsewhere (e.g., in France and Switzerland) prior to this date. Although the word “Protestant” is often used to refer to this earlier period, this use is, strictly speaking, an anachronism.

McGrath, Alister E.. Reformation Thought: An Introduction (p. 6). Wiley. Kindle Edition.

Sunday, October 30, 2016

Self-hating atheism

In the pecking order of spokesmen for atheism, or secular philosophers in particular, Paul Draper is one of the better representatives. So this is a window into the mind of a prominent atheist thinker:

More importantly, if theism is true, then God is not only morally perfect, he is omnipotent and so could make many different sorts of intelligent life, probably infinitely many, including intelligent beings that are much more impressive than human beings. On single-universe naturalism, by contrast, one would expect that, if there is intelligent life, it will be relatively unimpressive. I want to emphasize the word "relatively" here, because I am not denying that human beings are impressive in many ways. But examined from the perspective of what is possible for an omnipotent being, we are, in terms of intelligence, a hair's breadth away from monkeys. Again, one would expect this on single-universe naturalism because the more intelligent the life, the less likely it is that naturalistic processes would produce it. Of course, if one believes in God and, looking around, finds nothing more impressive than human beings, one will be forced to conclude that God wanted to make beings with very limited intelligence. But surely one would not have predicted this beforehand. There are indefinitely many different kinds of creatures that an omnipotent being would have the power to create and that, other things being equal, would be more valuable to create than humans. Antecedently, a God would be more likely to create these more impressive creatures than to create us.
One might object, however, that a good God would not be obligated to create the best and that a loving God might very well want to create and love inferior beings like us, especially since that doesn't preclude his also creating other more impressive beings. I don't deny that a God might create beings like us--that is certainly possible. Similarly, Collins admits that fine-tuning is possible even if single-universe naturalism is true. The issue, however, is what is antecedently likely--what a reasonable person would expect beforehand. And human beings have many features that make them an unlikely choice, no matter how many other sorts of beings God creates. This is especially true, if we take the term "human" not merely in the biological sense but in a fuller sense that implies some of our most notable and notorious characteristics. In this sense of the term "human," the sense intended when someone says "I'm only human," being human implies being naturally selfish (not to mention territorial and aggressive), which greatly limits our potential for developing morally, especially given our limited life span. It also includes the fact that we are profoundly ignorant beings, especially when it comes to moral and religious matters, as is obvious from the fact that we disagree or are uncertain about many important moral and religious issues. We also naturally identify with others that we perceive to be like ourselves, leading, if not always to prejudice and intolerance, at least to isolation for those different from the norm. (I could go on and on, but it's too depressing.) 
http://infidels.org/library/modern/paul_draper/no-design.html

i) Draper is like a grown child who complains that his parents wronged him by conceiving him. He didn't consent to exist. He didn't give his parents permission to conceive him! Draper is a self-hating atheist. The existence of unimpressive humans like Draper is evidence that God doesn't exist. 

Of course, that's a bit of a paradox. If God made more impressive creatures instead of humans, then humans like Draper would be in no position to complain about how unimpressive they are, since they wouldn't exist in the first place.  

ii) Then there's the standard of comparison. Impressive to whom? Valuable to whom? Since any creature God made, however great, would be infinitely inferior to God's surpassing greatness, God can't be impressed by any creature. It's nonsensical to say a creature could be impressive in relation to God. 

Valuable to whom? Well, most humans value their own existence. Most humans value other humans. 

iii) Apparently, Draper means impressive relative to some hypothetically greater creature. Even so, why should God care about that? Since any creature will be unimpressive by God's standards, we're talking about a pecking order of unimpressive creatures, where, at best, one unimpressive creature is more unimpressive or less unimpressive than another. Hard to see how degrees of unimpressiveness would single out any candidate for existence. "Sure, I'm unimpressive, but you're even more unimpressive!"

iv) Draper's objection is equivocal. A creature can be more impressive in one or more respects than another creature, but less impressive in one or more respects. In some respects, many major predators are more impressive than humans, but they lack our intelligence. Likewise, many creatures have sensory aptitudes or acuities that we lack, but we're far smarter than they are. How disadvantages in one respect are offset by advantages in another respect is part of what makes animals interesting. Humans are very weak creatures compared to so many other animals, yet we're the dominant species. 

v) This also goes to the issue of tradeoffs. No one creature can combine every superlative excellence. Some abilities exclude other abilities. Take the ability to fly. 

Or consider the human brain. It's already so big that it makes childbirth difficult. Moreover, the size of the brain must be balanced out by other physical requirements, like blood supply. If we had larger lungs, we could run faster for longer, but that would require other compensatory adjustments. And so on and so forth.

Moreover, humans are a package. To do what we do requires a combination of brainpower, bipedalism to free up hands with fine-motor abilities, and front-facing eyes to coordinate eye-to-hand calibration. If we were quadrupeds, we'd be faster, but our superior intelligence would be frustrated by a body ill-suited to our intellectual abilities. 

vi) In addition, humans are earthlings. We share a planet with many other creatures. It would be incongruous to have a world in which one species is incomparably more impressive than all the others. 

vii) Draper's criterion is atomistic. The standard of impressiveness isn't simply individual organisms, considered in isolation, but the sheer variety of creative strategies on display. 

viii) Draper fails to distinguish between creation and the Fall. 

ix) Draper commits a common mistake with respect to omnipotence. If an omnipotent God uses natural means, then that limits what he can do. That doesn't mean he's limited to natural means. He can often bypass natural processes to produce a particular result directly (although even that's not true in the case of second-order effects), but if he's making physical organisms, if he's making a physical world in which things usually operate by a natural process of cause and effect, then that's a self-imposed restriction on his field of action. 

x) It's possible that our far-flung universe does contain more impressive creatures than humans. 

Rogue cops

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/02/18/a-plague-of-professional-courtesy/

The Mind of God

10 these things God has revealed to us through the Spirit. For the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. 11 For who knows a person's thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him? (1 Cor 2:10-11).

i) The word "spirit" and "spiritual" are conventional theological jargon in English usage. Problem is, in popular English usage, these words have vague or opaque connotations. What does "spirit" mean? What does "spiritual" mean? I assume this convention comes to us via Latin theology or the Vulgate in particular. "Spiritus". 

ii) In 1 Cor 2:11, Paul uses an implicit body/soul analogy. The Spirit's relationship to God is analogous to the soul's relationship to the body. Outsiders can't read your mind. Only you have direct access to your own mind. According to the analogy, the God's Spirit is akin to God's soul (if God had a soul). 

There's the additional principle that "like knows like" (a point made by Fitzmyer). Only God can truly reveal God. 

In this passage, Paul uses "spirit" for both the divine and human referents for linguistic continuity in the comparison. In addition, the "Spirit [pneuma] of God" is a conventional designation, via the LXX. 

But conventional designations aside, it's clear that he's comparing the human mind to the divine mind. He's using "spirit" as a synonym for "mind" (or intellect). 

iii) If, instead of the "Spirit of God," we used the "Mind of God" to designate the third person of the Trinity, that would instantly dissolve the ambiguity of the linguistic convention. There's no doubt that the "mind of God" must be both personal and divine. 

iv) But how can the third person of the Trinity be the mind of God? Surely the Father and the Son aren't mindless individuals. 

To some degree, we need to make allowance of the limitations of Paul's analogy. However, even though it sounds paradoxical, a mind can engage in self-reflection. Paul is trading on the human experience of introspection. A mind can be the object of its own consideration. A mind can be both subject and object. Like when we search our memories. And Paul is saying God is like that.

v) The thought in v11 underscores the thought in v10. Because only God can know his own mind, so only God can reveal what's on his mind. 

vi) On this analysis, "spiritual" means, at least in part, "mental" (or psychological), in contrast to physical or material. In biblical usage, I'd also say it has connotations of sanctity or holiness. "Spiritual" stands in contrast to sinful.

Indeed, the two go together inasmuch as the mind is the primary theater for sin. Sin begins with sinful thoughts and impulses. In some cases the sinner acts on his thoughts and impulses. In that event, the action takes place in the world of space. 

Friday, October 28, 2016

How evangelicals can help fix the Supreme Court

https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/how-evangelicals-can-help-fix-the-supreme-court

Michael Shermer v. David Wood

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PMWKm40-dnM

Irreducible complexity

It's been a long time since I read Behe's paradigm-examples of irreducible complexity, so I don't have a considered opinion on the cogency of his examples. Instead, I'd like to comment on this objection:

Keith Parsons 
Behe defines "irreducible complexity" as follows (from Darwin's Black Box):
“By irreducibly complex I mean a single system composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning. An irreducibly complex system cannot be produced directly (that is, by by continuously improving the natural function, which continues to work by the same mechanism) by slight, successive modifications of a precursor system, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing a part is by definition nonfunctional.”
The key argument here is this: There are complex systems such that the removal of any one of many interconnected parts renders the whole system nonfunctional. Therefore, no such system could have been built up incrementally by successive modifications of a previously functional system, but had to be created as a functioning whole.
We know, however, that, in general, this conclusion simply does not follow. Electrical grids are instances of systems that meet Behe's definition of irreducible complexity. They are complex systems constituted of interacting parts, each contributing to the function of the whole such that the removal or disabling of one part of that system can render the whole nonfunctional.
Consider the great blackout in the N.E. United States and Canada that occurred on August 14, 2003. At 4:10 PM ET, twenty one power plants shut down in three minutes, affecting fifty million people, and disrupting everything from trains and elevators to cell phones. The cause was traced to a single power plant in Ohio which shut down unexpectedly when overgrown trees contacted power lines.
Using Behe’s reasoning we would have to conclude that the power grid did not come into existence incrementally, but was produced all at once in a stupendous feat of simultaneous creation. This, of course, is absurd.
Perhaps the reply would be that power grids are obvious examples of intelligent design (design, yes, but the “intelligent” part might be questioned) since they are made by us. Intelligent agents can build up such complex systems incrementally, but nature cannot. Ah, but this is a very different kind of argument, and one much harder to support. The whole intuitive appeal of “irreducible complexity” is that it appears to confront us with a stark choice: EITHER complex biological systems are built up slowly and incrementally (i.e. by Darwinian evolution) OR they are made all at once by the activity of an intelligent Creator (God says “Let there be…”).
But to concede that “irreducibly complex” systems are not, after all, irreducible, and can indeed be built up incrementally from functional precursors, means that a much different and much heavier burden of proof is placed on the intelligent design advocate. They can no longer deploy “how possibly” arguments, since they have conceded “yes, possibly.” They can no longer point to instances of alleged irreducible complexity, such as the bacterial flagellum, and embarrass evolutionists by demanding that they show how possibly such systems could gradually develop. They have conceded that such systems could gradually develop, but now have to argue that it could not have been by natural means, and it is not at all clear how they could show this. 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2016/10/27/behes-continues-to-ignore-his-strongest-philosophical-critic/#comment-2973316326

Let's consider a simpler illustration: I plug an appliance into the wall. The appliance works!

I move the appliance, requiring me to plug the appliance into an extension cord, which I plug into the wall. The appliance works!

I move the appliance yet again, requiring me to use a second extension cord. (The fire inspector might not approve!).

If I unplug any of the three cords, the appliance won't work. The functionality of the appliance now depends on serial connections. 

Point being: there are cases in which it's possible to incrementally construct something that's functional at each stage that's dysfunctional if you subsequently remove an element. The challenge, though, is considering analogues in nature. It took an external agent to plug the appliance into the first extension cord, then plug the first extension cord into the second extension cord, then plug the second extension cord into the electrical outlet. That's not the result of internal development, but intervention from outside the process. 

Is the final state feasible?

I'd like to consider some potential objections to the Christian doctrine of the final state, then consider how to field those objections. 

Generally stated, are there aspects of the final state that are naturally impossible? There are things that even an omnipotent God can't naturally do. That doesn't mean he can't do them; just that he can't naturally do them. God would have to circumvent natural processes to make it happen. 

Let's take one example: Is biological immortality naturally possible? I don't think we know the answer to that as of yet. To my knowledge, scientists haven't figured out why humans (and other organisms) age. Yet the Bible promises that we will have immortal bodies. 

One question is whether aging is caused by a master switch. Is there one mechanism that triggers a cascade effect. Assuming that's the case, then if that switch were improved, renewed, or replaced, the organism wouldn't age. The human body already has some capacity to regenerate itself. Just not systematically and permanently. 

Perhaps, though, there is no single mechanism of senescence. Perhaps organs and body parts individually age, independent of each other. The whole body wears out, and there's no discrete solution. 

In that event, how would God preserve the body from aging? The answer depends in part on whether senescence is naturally inevitable. If so, then God must supernaturally preserve the body. 

How might God do so? Of course, the answer is speculative, but let's speculate. We might begin by asking what's a body? A body is a specific organization of matter. Of atoms and molecules, in various combinations, combinations in various scales of magnitude. Highly structured patterns of particles and fields of energy. If aging means organs and body parts lose the structural pattern necessary to function, God could repair that by bringing the atoms and molecules back into alignment. 

Another possibility is replacement. God replaces aging parts, organs, body systems. In principle, God could instantly replace the entire body with a duplicate body. 

Suppose aging is naturally inevitable. Suppose your physical prime is between 18-28. Suppose every ten years, God gives you a brand-new, 18-year-old body. God replicates the pattern of atoms and molecules that compose your body. 

That isn't pure speculation. After all, how is the resurrection of the body going to occur? In many cases, there is no extant corpse to work from. Our bodies disintegrated. The body would need to be recreated from scratch. The way to resurrect our bodies is for God to replicate the specific organization of matter that constituted our distinctive bodies. At least, that's my preferred explanation. 

Let's consider another potential objection. The sun will exhaust its fuel. Moreover, to sustain life on earth, the sun must maintain a very specific output. Long before the sun is a spent force, its output will be at the wrong level to sustain life on earth, which has very narrow, very exacting parameters. 

Moreover, the problem isn't confined to the sun. There's the distant specter of cosmic heat death. Stars have natural lifecycles. 

Once again, we might evoke the replacement model. God instantly replaces an aging sun with a new sun the right age to sustain life on earth. 

Here's another potential objection: 

Large moon with right planetary rotation period (which stabilizes a planet’s tilt and contributes to tides). In the case of the Earth, the gravitational pull of its moon stabilizes the angle of its axis at a nearly constant 23.5 degrees. This ensures relatively temperate seasonal changes, and the only climate in the solar system mild enough to sustain complex living organisms. 
A few, large Jupiter-mass planetary neighbors in large circular orbits (which protects the habitable zone from too many comet bombardments). If the Earth were not protected by the gravitational pulls of Jupiter and Saturn, it would be far more susceptible to collisions with devastating comets that would cause mass extinctions. As it is, the larger planets in our solar system provide significant protection to the Earth from the most dangerous comets. 
http://www.discovery.org/f/11011

Problem is that over time the relative position of planets and satellites in the solar system changes. For instance, due to tidal friction, the moon is moving incrementally away from the earth. A solution would be for God to restore the configuration necessary to maintain life on earth. 

Now let's consider an objection from Leibniz:

Newton and his followers also have a very odd opinion regarding God’s workmanship. According to them, God’s watch—the universe—would stop working if he didn’t rewind it from time to time! He didn’t have enough foresight to give it perpetual motion. This machine that he has made is so imperfect that from time to time he has to clean it by a miraculous intervention, and even has to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work. 
The oftener a clockmaker has to adjust his machine and set it right, the clumsier he must be as a clockmaker! In my view, the world always contains the same amount of force and energy, which changes only by passing from one material thing to another in accordance with the laws of nature and the beautiful order that God has preestablished. And I hold that when God works miracles, he does it not to meet the needs of nature but to meet the needs of grace. Anyone who thinks differently must have a very mean notion of the wisdom and power of God. 
A final point: If God has to mend the course of nature from time to time, he must do it either supernaturally or naturally. If supernaturally, this is appealing to miracles in order to explain natural things; and that amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of this hypothesis, for once you let in miracles anything can be ‘explained’ with no trouble at all. And if God’s mending is done naturally, then rather than being intelligentia supramundana he is included in the nature of things—i.e. is the soul of the world. 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/leibniz1715_1.pdf

His objection has some merit. Newton postulated divine intervention to shore up gaps in his theory. That's ad hoc. 

However, the Leibnizian objection is overstated. It's not a design flaw that when nature is left to take its course, stars burn out and planetary configurations shift. That's what's supposed to happen. That's the natural outcome of a natural process. The Leibnizian objection has less to do with his philosophy of miracle than his philosophy of nature. Perpetual motion is an artificial abstraction. 

There's nothing intrinsically wrong with the lifecycle of stars or the realignment of planets and satellites in the solar system. (In fairness, Leibniz wasn't commenting on these specific examples). Rather, it's only a problem relative to the conditions necessary to sustain life on earth. A particular configuration of the planets and satellites isn't absolutely required, but only required for life on earth. 

In addition, divine intervention needn't mean God is jumping in to make last-minute adjustments. Rather, those midcourse corrections were foreseen. They were part of God's master plan for the world all along. If God makes a world that normally operates according to second causes, but in addition, certain desirable events exceed the productive power of nature to effect their eventuation, it's not makeshift to invoke supernatural agency in such cases. 

Ironically, the proposed alternative of preestablished harmony is just as ad hoc as Newton's stopgap invocation of miracles to salvage his theory. There's a difference between invoking miracles to make a scientific theory hang together, and invoking miracles to account for an outcome that isn't naturally feasible. 

The argument from consciousness

https://appearedtoblogly.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/the-argument-from-consciousness.pdf

Yahoo in bed with FBI, NSA

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-nsa-exclusive-idUSKCN1241YT

Three cheers for Dante's Inferno!

I've often said I think the torture chamber model of hell is an overgeneralization. I doubt hell is uniform. I expect the punishments are customized. 

That said, there are situations in which an eternal torture chamber would be poetic justice. Assuming this report is true,


I don't have any problem with God consigning the killers to an eternal torture chamber. It's something to keep in mind when sentimentalists object in principle to everlasting "torture". 

The evil-Santa challenge

Peter Millican has a version of the evil-god argument, subsequently popularized by Stephen Law. In Millican's version, the two candidates are dubbed God and Antigod. 

Let's consider a variant on the evil-god argument: namely, the evil-Santa argument. Daniel Dennett looks just like Father Christmas. Right out of Norman Rockwell. Yet Dennett is the Antisanta. While Santa is a generous soul who gives gifts, the Antisanta is a misanthrope who steals gifts by robbing people of Gospel hope. Dennett is the evil Santa!

Mind-traps

1. I'd like to say a bit more about the "evil-god" challenge. It's been popularized by Stephen Law, but he didn't originate the argument. Other atheists like Peter Millican, Christopher New, Edward Stein, and Charles Daniels have toyed with that argument. 

The basic idea is for an atheist to concoct a thought-experiment in which he postulates an evil god that has the same explanatory power as the Christian God (or the equivalent). Millican dubs the two candidates God and Antigod respectively. 

If successful, the idea is to neutralize theistic proofs, for even if theistic proofs are otherwise strong arguments for God's existence, because Antigod mimics God, the theistic proofs are equally consistent with the existence of an evil God. An atheist doesn't even have to directly evaluate or critique theistic proofs. He can concede, for discussion purposes, that these are good arguments. But unless they can discriminate between God and Antigod, they don't count as arguments for God.

2. There are two ways of responding to the evil-god challenge. One way is to demonstrate a flaw in the argument. To show that the evil-god hypothetical doesn't have the same explanatory value as Christian theism. The two positions are not systematically symmetrical. 

3. However, I don't think the onus is on Christians to disprove the hypothetical. We can just shrug it off. 

i) For one thing, there's a difference between paper doubts and real doubts. Just because you can imagine a delusive scenario isn't a rational basis to be skeptical. Humans have the ability to devise mind-traps. Concoct imaginative scenarios in which an illusion is indistinguishable from reality. But other than illustrating the limits of what's provable or disprovable, I don't see the point of thought-experiments which propose scenarios in which we cant know what reality is like. Suppose the thought-experiment is successful? What does that accomplish?

ii) In addition, global skeptical hypotheticals are paradoxical. An atheist is implicated in the same hypothetical. If Antigod exists, then the atheist is just as deluded as the Christian. Indeed, the evil-god argument is, in itself, part of the global illusion, foisted upon us by Antigod. It keeps us off-balance. Keeps us guessing. 

iii) If reality is unknowable, what are we supposed to do about it? What purpose does the hypothetical serve? It has no affect on anything one way or the other. What you believe or disbelieve makes no difference. It's a kind of epistemic fatalism. 

I'm mean, the thrust of these hypotheticals is not, "How can you know that you're not a brain-in-a-vat, trapped in the Matrix, or deluded by the Cartesian demon?" but, "You can't know that you're not a brain-in-a-vat, trapped in the Matrix, or deluded by the Cartesian demon!"

Suppose we dream up a radically skeptical thought-experiment that we can't disprove. Where do we go from there? Nowhere! 

It's like being told that you're caught in a time warp. But if you are caught in a time warp, there's nothing you can do to break the vicious cycle. You don't remember the last time warp, so you can't do anything different this time around to break out. Indeed, each time the cycle repeats itself, you're told that you're caught in a time warp. That, in itself, is factored into the time warp. 

iv) What does Law think his challenge is supposed to achieve? He's generated a self-dilemma. If his argument is successful, then there's nothing we can do in response to his argument since we can't outwit Antigod. 

On the face of it, the purpose of his argument is to make people doubt Christian theism. He deploys the argument to influence belief. To change what people believe about Christian theism. To dissuade them from believing Christian theism. 

But his argument is self-defeating. If his argument is flawed, it proves nothing. If his argument is sound, it changes nothing. For it puts us at the mercy of Antigod. There's nothing we can do to overcome the illusion. We can't even recognize the illusion. 

An atheist believes there is no deity, but if the argument propounded by the atheist is sound, the atheist is hopelessly deluded! Both he and the Christian are in the same boat to nowhere.  

Paul’s Preaching and Postmodern Skepticism

Paul’s Preaching and Postmodern Skepticism by Vern Poythress

Mass surveillance

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/441366/surveillance-license-plates-faces

Thursday, October 27, 2016

What's a Trumpkin?

I'd like to make a brief point about my own usage. I sometimes use the term "Trumpkin". And I used that as a term of disparagement. That's intentional.

However, I don't use "Trumpkin" as a synonym for Trump voters in general. I don't use it for people who opposed Trump during the primaries, but reluctantly support him in the general election.

There are conservatives who will vote for Trump to block Hillary. It's not so much a vote for Trump as a vote against Hillary. I don't call them Trumpkins. 

Rather, I reserve that epithet for Trump primary voters, or for general election voters who minimize his faults, or praise his imaginary virtues. Who make delusional claims about his campaign promises. Things like that. 

Not voting for Trump is a vote for Hillary

i) Trump supporters routinely say not voting for Trump is a vote for Hillary. I've seen a lot of NeverTrumpers rankle at that charge. As a NeverTrumper myself, I'm not bothered by the charge.

Given certain assumptions, there's an obvious sense in which the equation is true. It doesn't mean NeverTrumpers are voting for Hillary in the sense of going into the voting booth and pushing the button next to Hillary's name. They're not casting a vote for Hillary in that direct sense. Rather, the point of the claim is that by declining to vote for the only candidate who can defeat Hillary, the side-effect is to help elect Hillary. And up to a point, that's a logical inference. 

ii) Mind you, that depends on certain conditions. It presumes that Trump is competitive with Hillary. If he's too far behind, then not voting for Trump doesn't make a difference. 

Likewise, if you live in a blue state, then even if you vote for Trump, that will be swamped by Democrat voters. 

iii) I think NeverTrumpers are too defensive on this point. It sounds bad to say not voting for Trump is a vote for Hillary because it's taken out of context. Considered in isolation, it sounds culpable to do anything that would contribute to Hillary's election. But there's more to it than that. The problem is that Trump primary voters backed the rest of us into a corner. 

To take a comparison, it's normally wrong to embezzle bank funds. But suppose bank robbers kidnap the family of the CEO or CFO of Citicorp, using the hostages as leverage to coerce the CEO or CFO to set up a Cayman account just for them, then transfer $10 billion from the City Corp account into the Cayman account, to secure release of the hostages. 

Indeed, you have movies with a dramatic premise like that. Take Harrison Ford's Firewall. (I haven't seen it, just read reviews.)

That puts embezzlement in a different light. The audience is supposed to be sympathetic to the CEO or CFO because the robbers put a gun to his head. That forces him to do things he wouldn't ordinarily do. There are attenuating circumstances that exculpate his actions. 

By the same token, NeverTrumpers feel they've been maneuvered into a situation where the acceptable options were taken away from them. It's not their fault that they refuse to choose between the remaining, unacceptable options. The chance for a good outcome was already nixed during the primaries. They aren't responsible for the dire consequences which irresponsible voters set in motion. The results of the NeverTrump position is mitigated by the situation into which they've been thrust, against their will. 

It's like someone pulling the pin on a grenade. Once he does that, it may be too late to prevent the ensuing damage. The only way to prevent the damage would be by not pulling the pin in the first place. But if that happens, there's no going back to the options you had before he pulled the pin. 

Blaming the GOP Are they a symptom or the cause of the mess we’re in?

https://thearcmag.com/blaming-the-gop-f47310a47aa8#.7y2j827xi

Apologist for evil

I'm going to comment on this:


I'm primarily commenting on the article. Sometimes I supplement the article by listening to his lecture (available on YouTube).  

It was through relatives, students and former students who were gay, as well as people in committed, same-sex relationships, that Wolterstorff was drawn to more closely consider the traditional views he’d grown up believing.

i) That's such a cliche. 

ii) "Committed, sex-same relationships". Even many homosexuals admit that they are wildly promiscuous. 

iii) Naturally, the way they present themselves in public often puts the best face on homosexuality. It's gullible to presume that's representative of what happens behind closed doors. Not only rampant promiscuity but the high incidence of domestic abuse.

To take a comparison, consider straight couples whose marriage is on the rocks, yet they appear to be the happy married couple in social settings. No one suspects that they are on the verge of divorce. 

iv) However, that's really beside the point. Even if they were committed to each other, that's an immoral commitment. Take a committed incestuous couple, or a committed adulterous couple. From what I can tell, Eva Braun was deeply committed to the Führer. Members of the Mafia may be deeply committed to each other. Absolute family loyalty. A committed relationship is morally neutral. It can be virtuous or vicious, depending on the nature of the commitment. 

I’ve listened to these people. To their agony. To their feelings of exclusion and oppression. To their longings. To their expressions of love. To their commitments. To their faith. So listening has changed me.

i) "Feelings" of exclusion and oppression. Not reality, but "feelings".

ii) Moreover, this completely overlooks how empowering homosexuals leads to the oppression and exclusion of normal people. Indoctrinating school kids. Teachers and administrators who bully normal kids to affirm perversion. It overlooks how homosexuals exploit and oppress other homosexuals. 

iii) Not doubt homosexuals generally have the same emotional needs as everyone else. But that isn't satisfied by a drastic deviation from the natural sources in which we were made to find emotional fulfillment. 

iv) I say "generally," because homosexuals can become extremely hardened and sadistic or masochistic. 

He first established the commonplace view that sexuality is a continuum, and people may fall anywhere between homosexual and heterosexual in their sexual orientation. 

That's very misleading.

i) To begin with, it might be taken to imply that sexuality is essentially fluid. There is no normal, much less normative, frame of reference. 

ii) In addition, although there's a "continuum" of sorts from homosexuality through bisexuality to heterosexuality, the general public is overwhelmingly heterosexual. Even the politically correct CDC acknowledges that fact. The homosexual and bisexual part of the "continuum" represents the fringe end of the spectrum. 

He says homosexual "orientation" isn't chosen. That's simplistic. Even if the inclination is involuntary, the deveopment can be an acquired taste, Or an appetite that can become addictive and insatiable. For instance, some people don't choose to enjoy alcohol. They just do. For other people, it's an acquired taste. And for some people, it becomes addictive. 

He says there's no therapy. Of course, that piggybacks on his assumption that it's not chosen. Indeed, it's a "creational variance". So his conclusion is no better than the underlying assumptions. 

He cited the Classis Grand Rapids East study report on “Biblical and Theological Support Currently Offered by Christian Proponents of Same-Sex Marriage,” in which a non-heterosexual identity on the sexuality continuum is considered a creational variance, an aspect of one’s nature.

The CRC has been on the skids for decades. Wolterstorff is building on a false premise. An illicit argument from authority. 

Almost everybody agrees that no one is to be blamed for being on the homosexual end of that continuum. 

Well, that says a lot about the social circles in which he moves. Like the quip attributed to Pauline Kael: "I can't believe Nixon won! I don't know anyone who voted for him."

Homosexual attraction is blameworthy. That doesn't mean it's ipso facto damnable. But Wolterstorff is talking about proudly, defiantly impenitent sinners. Sinners who flaunt their sin. Who call evil good. 

For the homosexual person it matters a great deal — a very great deal — whether you say to him or her that their orientation is a disorder, a mark of the fallenness of creation, or whether you say that their location on that spectrum is a creational variance, like any other location on that spectrum.

You could say the same thing about a pedophile or psychopath. 

This stance veers away from the 1973 report of Synod on homosexuality, which defines same-sex orientation as a disorder.

Should have stuck with that. 

Wolterstorff then observed that a same-sex orientation does not break the love command, thus is not morally blameable. 

Does a consensual incestuous relationship between a mother and her teenage son, or father and his teenage daughter break the love command? Even if there's genuine affection, the fact (if it is a fact) that it's loving doesn't make it virtuous. People can be in love with evil. That takes many forms. 

Having established that same-sex orientation is neither a disorder nor morally blameable, he asked, “If accordingly members of the church are to accept such people as they are, then why is it wrong for people with that orientation to act on their desires?

There's a certain logic to that conclusion. But it's predicated on a false premise.

Wolterstorff minimizes the Biblical condemnation by commenting how rarely it's discussed. One problem that overlooks is how something is rarely discussed because it's rightness or wrongness is taken for granted. How often does Scripture forbid matricide or patricide? 

Likewise, the issue arises in occasional documents. Most of the time it isn't necessary to discuss it because there's a standing presumption against it. 

But what does Scripture say? Wolterstorff briefly examined each of the seven Biblical passages which concern homosexual activity. He stressed above all that these passages should be interpreted in context.
He quickly dismissed passages in Genesis 19 and Judges 19, which are about gang rape and, he argued, therefore irrelevant to a discussion of committed, covenantal same-sex relationships. 

i) Those aren't the first passages I'd turn to. However, they're not just about gay rape, but homosexual attraction. The original audience is supposed to be horrified by their homosexual attraction. To find that unnatural and repellent. In Scripture, homosexual activity is a hallmark of pagan immorality.  

ii) In addition, Wolterstorff skips over the paradigmatic case of Gen 1-2, which establishes the heteronormative standard of comparison. 

iii) "covenantal same-sex relationships" is a euphemism for covenantal anal sex, covenantal fisting, covenantal rimming, covenantal scat, covenantal golden showers.  

He similarly put aside Leviticus 18 and 20, where the holiness code has been cherry-picked and it would be “unfair to universalize that condemnation while ignoring everything else that’s forbidden.

i) That's contemptibly superficial. The relationship between Christian theology and OT theology is complex. At one heretical extreme is Marcion. That's the backstop against which orthodox alternatives operate. Any orthodox view of the relationship between Christian theology and the OT will acknowledge both continuity and discontinuity. Different theological traditions parse that differently. But it's not "cherry-picking". Much painstaking theological analysis goes into considering how the OT is fulfilled in the NT. 

And not just broad-based theological traditions. We also have closely-reasoned monographs on OT ethics by meticulous Christian scholars like Gordon Wenham, Richard Bauckham, James Hoffmeier, and Christopher Wright. Not to mention the definitive studies by Robert Gagnon. 

ii) The Mosaic code contains different kinds of laws. Some laws concern ritual purity. Those are somewhat artificial. They aren't grounded in nature. Rather, they're concerned with symbolic holiness. And from a NT standpoint, they've been superseded. 

You also have some laws that are tied to the socioeconomic structures of ancient Israel. An agrarian economy. Common property belonging to one's clan.

But you also have laws regarding social duties and social offenses that are grounded in our God-given nature. Does Wolterstorff really think it's just "cherry-picking" to treat murder as a different kind of law than the cultic sanctity of tabernacle furniture?

iii) Furthermore, Wolterstorff is the one who's guilty of artificially isolating the Levitical prohibitions from Biblical anthropology in general. These aren't atomistic data-points. Rather, there's a continuity of witness throughout the OT and the NT. 

iv) Finally, Judaism is not a dead religion. There are Orthodox Jews who take the kosher laws and other purity codes quite seriously. If it was politically feasible, they'd rebuild the temple and restore animal sacrifice. Now, I think that's defunct, but my point is that Wolterstorff's dismissive treatment acts as though the Mosaic code is obviously passé. Yet there are modern-day Jews who don't relegate that to the past. If Wolterstorff was speaking in an Orthodox synagogue, instead of playing to a sympathetic audience, would he be so flippant and cavalier? 

Wolterstorff quoted Levitical prohibitions about "uncovering nakedness" as if that's obsolete. He seems oblivious to the fact that, in context, that's a euphemism for incest. 

As for 1 Corinthians 6:9 and 1 Timothy 1:10, he claimed that translational disagreements make the passages too ambiguous for an authoritative claim about same-sex relationships.

It's demonstrable that the terminology is a Greek counterpart to the Levitical terminology. So that represents carryover from  OT sexual ethics to NT sexual ethics in this respect. 

He spent the most time dissecting Romans 1:24–31, which describes a “truly, appallingly wicked group” from which we cannot generalize. “There is night and day difference between the people that Paul describes and the committed same-sex couples that I know.

Wolterstorff refuses to permit Rom 1 to apply to his homosexual students and relatives. He filters Rom 1 through his homosexual students and relatives, uses that to screen out the sweeping indictment of Rom 1 on homosexual attraction and homosexual activity. 

Wolterstorff denies that homosexual "orientation" is unnatural. But that begs the question. And it flies in the face of Paul's argument. Moreover, Rom 1 alludes to Gen 1. So Rom 1 is grounded in God's design for human nature. 

Wolterstorff appeals to Paul's statement that it's unnatural for men to wear long hair. But Paul's argument in Rom 1 doesn't turn on one word, just as Paul's argument in 1 Cor 11 doesn't turn on one word. 

Once one says that a homosexual orientation is no more culpable or disordered than a heterosexual orientation, and once one observes that Scripture does not teach that God says that homosexual activity is always wrong, I think we’ve left to conclude that justice requires that the church offer the great good of marriage both to heterosexual couples committed to a loving, covenantal relationship, and to homosexual couples so committed.

The conclusion of cumulative errors every step of the way. He's a sweet, softheaded old duffer who's easily manipulated and conned. 

Wolterstorff extrapolates from Biblical concerns about widows, orphans, and the poor to homosexuals. Homosexuals are analogous to the most vulnerable members of ancient Israel. They have been treated unjustly and dishonorably. So goes the argument. 

But the homosexual lobby is far from weak and defenseless. To the contrary, the homosexual lobby is powerful and punitive. The homosexual lobby is oppressive. These aren't victims, but aggressors.