Friday, April 03, 2015

Specious parallels

A reader emails in response to an earlier post on this topic: 
“You guys were perfectly happy to use the government to enforce your views when you were in the majority. Live by the coercive power of the state, die by the coercive power of the state.” 
I don’t think this symmetry is real. A “ban” on same-sex marriage is not like, say, a ban on marijuana: No same-sex couple gets fined or goes to jail for calling themselves married, or having a ceremony marking their commitment, and anyone is free to officiate at such a ceremony. The campaign against same-sex marriage never sought to use coercion that way. It never sought to make it illegal to provide wedding cakes to same-sex couples. Even widening our focus to the culture rather than the law, it never, to my knowledge, sought to get anyone fired from a corporation for favoring same-sex marriage. 
http://www.nationalreview.com/node/416376/print

Ed Whelan on RFRA

http://www.nationalreview.com/node/416377/print

Thursday, April 02, 2015

Responding to an objection

Steve Hays has already responded to this post about whether it's ever okay to lie. I wanted to quote one particular section of the original post (not Steve's response) and comment on it:
But this takes us back to the Jews hiding in the living room. What then? Well, when scheming up hypothetical ethical dilemmas, you have to remember that hypotheticals are literally problematic. They are contrived precisely because they expose a supposed weakness in a person’s argument. So if you are going to play the hypothetical game, remember that God is sovereign, and with that comes his promise that every instance of temptation he will always provide a way of escape (1 Corinthians 10:13)… and that escape is NEVER going to involve sinning. God does not open your escape hatch through sin. In fact, in the context of 1 Corinthians 10, sin is the very thing that God gives you an escape from. Thus, in any hypothetical moral dilemma you need to remember that there is an unstated contingent—namely, God will give you a way out that does not involve sin.(emphasis in original)
As Steve's already pointed out, this is hardly a hypothetical given that it literally happened that Nazis asked people if there were any Jews on their premises and people actually did have to decide whether to lie or give them up.

 In any case, when I first read this article earlier today, it sparked something in the back of my mind that I couldn't quite put my finger on. Tonight, as I was preparing to wind down for the evening, it finally clicked into place what I was reminded of:
Then the Spirit of the Lord was upon Jephthah, and he passed through Gilead and Manasseh and passed on to Mizpah of Gilead, and from Mizpah of Gilead he passed on to the Ammonites. And Jephthah made a vow to the Lord and said, “If you will give the Ammonites into my hand, then whatever comes out from the doors of my house to meet me when I return in peace from the Ammonites shall be the Lord's, and I will offer it up for a burnt offering.” So Jephthah crossed over to the Ammonites to fight against them, and the Lord gave them into his hand. And he struck them from Aroer to the neighborhood of Minnith, twenty cities, and as far as Abel-keramim, with a great blow. So the Ammonites were subdued before the people of Israel. Then Jephthah came to his home at Mizpah. And behold, his daughter came out to meet him with tambourines and with dances. She was his only child; besides her he had neither son nor daughter. And as soon as he saw her, he tore his clothes and said, “Alas, my daughter! You have brought me very low, and you have become the cause of great trouble to me. For I have opened my mouth to the Lord, and I cannot take back my vow” (Judges 11:29-35, ESV).
Now most Christians that I have corresponded with and read on this topic agree that Jephthah's vow was stupid, evil, and should have been broken. Instead, he sacrificed his daughter rather than break his vow. The reason I bring this up in this discussion, however, is because I have to ask: how exactly did God provide a way out for Jephthah here? If the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 10 being presented is correct (and I do not believe it is), then there should have been a way out for Jephthah to not have to sin by breaking his vow whilst still sparing his daughter's life. But it seems plain to me that Jephthah's only option was to either sin by breaking his vow or sin by committing murder, and obviously murder is a worse sin than breaking a vow, so the vow should have been broken.

This passage in Judges was not included for us to emulate Jephthah's behavior. The entire book of Judges is predicated on the reality of the concluding verse: "In those days there was no king in Israel. Everyone did what was right in his own eyes" (Judges 21:25). So I think we have a circumstance here where plainly we are told that if the only options available are to sin small or to sin great, the right thing to do is to sin small. And obviously, it goes without saying that Jephthah's original vow should never have been uttered--that was the initial sinful action. But given the reality that he had set himself up in a lose/lose situation, the moral action would have been for him to have taken the punishment for breaking the vow instead of carrying out evil on his daughter.

Now, if this is the case in the circumstance where we can put some culpability upon Jephthah for his rash vow, let us keep that in mind when we think of the classic Nazis asking if you're hiding Jews. If it be a sin to lie in that circumstance, then we ought to be willing to take the punishment for the sinful lie instead of sinning by handing over those whom we have an obligation to protect.

But again, I maintain that it is not a sin to lie in such a circumstance, and it is Rahab that shows that. The article I'm responding to concludes: "Rahab is always held out as an example of faith for siding with God’s people, and is never held out as an example of lying for the glory of God." There's only one problem with that. James commends her for the actions she took, said actions being...lying: "Rahab the prostitute [was] justified by works when she received the messengers and sent them out by another way".

It is Rahab's action of sending the spies and their pursuers in different directions that is the basis for James to conclude she was justified here. While it is true that the Bible sometimes reports events without stating a moral judgment at times (Jephthah's story is an example of one such time, in fact), I cannot see any way in which it is possible to separate out Rahab's actions in saving the spies from her lie. The lie is the only reason that any of the things she did saved the spies. Without that lie, the spies would have been found and killed. There is no way around that simple, brute fact.

Again, this type of event is not going to be frequent (thank God). But when it does happen, there's no need to burden someone's conscience by making a sin out of what is actually the morally good thing to do.

How would a Hebrew have pictured Genesis 1?

http://bnonn.com/how-would-a-hebrew-have-pictured-genesis-1/

Christian business ethics


I'm posting an answer I gave to a correspondent, on the religious liberty issue:
i) I don't think it's necessary to cast the issue in double effect terms. Although that's a useful principle, it can become unnecessarily complicated.

I think a simpler argument would involve conflicting duties. Take prior obligations, like dependents. You have a duty to protect and provide for your dependents. That may come into conflict with a prima facie or ceteris paribus obligation to avoid complicity in evil. 

In cases like that, a higher obligation overrides a lower obligation. 

ii) Complicity in evil is tricky since, in a fallen world, complicity in evil is unavoidable. It's a matter of degree:

9 I wrote to you in my letter not to associate with sexually immoral people— 10 not at all meaning the sexually immoral of this world, or the greedy and swindlers, or idolaters, since then you would need to go out of the world. 11 But now I am writing to you not to associate with anyone who bears the name of brother if he is guilty of sexual immorality or greed, or is an idolater, reviler, drunkard, or swindler—not even to eat with such a one (1 Cor 5:9-11).

We have to pick our battles:

Of course, there are complications here, as well. For example, we can distinguish between permissible involvement in someone else's transgression and impermissible involvement in someone else's transgression, and we can ask whether both or only one of these ways of being involved undermines one's standing to blame. Patrick Todd (2012) argues that only impermissible involvement undermines one's standing to blame, and to illustrate his point he imagines two Nazi commanders, one of whom is committed to the Nazi cause and the other of whom is using his position of power as an attempt to undermine the regime. If, in order to keep up appearances, the latter commander issues an order for a subordinate to perform an action that is morally impermissible, does he lose his standing to blame the subordinate? Todd claims that he doesn't, and thus that there is an important distinction between complicity that undermines standing and complicity that doesn't. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/blame/#Com

Gregory Mellema (2006) provides a very useful way of assessing different levels of individual contribution by distinguishing between six different ways in which individuals can be complicit in wrong-doing. According to Mellema, individuals can induce or command others to produce harm. They can counsel others to produce harm. They can give consent to the production of harm by others. They can praise these others when they produce the harm. They can fail to stop them from producing it. 
A second way of tackling the distribution question in this context that does not seem to violate the principle of individual freedom is to look, not just at the particular role that individuals played in their community's production of harm, but at how much freedom the individuals had to distance themselves from the community that has done wrong. Here we might want to use voluntariness of membership as a criterion of responsibility. Jan Narveson (2002) does so himself in his generally skeptical work on collective responsibility. Narveson argues that in thinking about the responsibility of individuals for group harms we need to be careful to distinguish between four different kinds of groups, namely: those that are fully voluntary; those that are involuntary in entrance but voluntary in exit; those that are voluntary in entrance but involuntary in exit; and those that are voluntary in neither respect. As Narveson makes clear, responsibility is diminished, if not eradicated, as we go down this list. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-responsibility/#4

iii) As I've indicated elsewhere, I think it's permissible for a Christian small businessman to lie in situations like this. I think that's a morally permissible form of civil resistance to unjust or immoral demands. That doesn't necessarily mean it's obligatory in those situations.

iv) I think some Christians or organizations have a greater responsibility to resist tyranny than others. Some people have less to lose than others. To take an extreme example, a Christian with terminal cancer. Not much the gov't can do to him. 

Some people have fewer prior obligations or social responsibilities (e.g. dependents) than others. They can assume a greater personal risk without harming others in the process. 

Some individuals or institutions have the wealth, popularity, and or legal authority to put up a more effective resistance than the easy marks that gay/trans lobby picks on, viz. Alabama Supreme Court, Duck Dynasty, Chick-fil-A. 

Is it ever ok to lie?


A commenter referred me to this post:
I'll make a few observations:
On the other hand, those that hold to absolute ethics (like me, Moses, and Jesus) say that all commands from God are binding, and it is never ok to set aside any of them. God doesn’t grade on a curve, so  we shouldn’t view his commands in some kind of order of importance.
That commits the fallacy of a hasty generalization. The existence of moral absolutes doesn't mean all actions reduce to a choice between what's intrinsically right and what's intrinsically wrong. In some cases, the morality of the action is affected by circumstances or consequences. 
Not all obligations are equally obligatory. In case of conflict, a higher obligation overrides a lower obligation.
The simple problem with the graded-ethics approach is that it is not taught by the Bible—verses like Mark 12:31 notwithstanding.
Except that we do see a priority structure in Scripture. For instance, preserving life takes precedence over Sabbath-keeping. Sabbath-keeping is a means to an end, not an end in itself. 
But this takes us back to the Jews hiding in the living room. What then? Well, when scheming up hypothetical ethical dilemmas, you have to remember that hypotheticals are literally problematic. They are contrived precisely because they expose a supposed weakness in a person’s argument.
Sheltering Jews from Nazis isn't merely a hypothetical case. During WWII, many Gentiles sheltered Jews. And some of them had to deal with Nazis barging in to question the homeowner, search the premises, &c. 
So if you are going to play the hypothetical game, remember that God is sovereign, and with that comes his promise that every instance of temptation he will always provide a way of escape (1 Corinthians 10:13)… and that escape is NEVER going to involve sinning. God does not open your escape hatch through sin. In fact, in the context of 1 Corinthians 10, sin is the very thing that God gives you an escape from.
Thus, in any hypothetical moral dilemma you need to remember that there is an unstated contingent—namely, God will give you a way out that does not involve sin.
That begs the question. Here's the implicit argument:
i) Lying is always sinful. 
ii) God will never put you in a position where sinning is unavoidable.
iii) Therefore, God will never put you in a position where lying is unavoidable.
But premise #1 assumes the very issue in dispute! So his argument is viciously circular. 
Well, this decision is really made before you took the Jews in. When you gave them refuge in your house, you did so while taking responsibility for their safety. If you are brave enough to hide them, then you better be brave enough to protect them.  How can you hide them but not be willing to physically defend them? If the guards knock on your door, respond by telling them that they have no right to enter your house, and that what they are doing is morally reprehensible—but that Jesus offers forgiveness for their sins, and they need to repent. Then slam the door, and take the hypothetical from there. A person who is brave enough to lie but not brave enough to be a martyr, isn’t brave at all.
This is incoherent. You can't protect the Jews you're hiding by informing the Gestapo that "they have no right to enter your house" and slamming the door in their face. 
In fact, Jesse concedes the ineffectuality of that tactic by admitting that it will lead to martyrdom. So he has no workable alternative.

Unwitting sins


Someone asked me about "unwitting sins." My reply:
i) Not all sins are crimes. The Mosaic law tends of focus on sins that are socially disruptive. It has a communal emphasis.
Conversely, not all crimes are sins. Some crimes are technicalities. Laws of utility rather than morality.
ii) In Leviticus, the focus is generally on ritual purity and impurity. That's fairly artificial. More about symbolic holiness or unholiness than actual holiness or unholiness. 
In that respect, the offender may not have done anything intrinsically evil, so long as it was committed through ignorance or inattentiveness. 
iii) Ps 19:12-13 is ambiguous. Ross thinks it refers back to the Pentateuchal distinction between unwitting sins and the highhanded sin. But Goldingay thinks it refers to conspiracies, secret plots, covert unauthorized worship–which subverts true worship–by "willful" agents. Hard to choose between these competing in interpretations, since the wording isn't that specific.
iv) The key interpretive text is Num 15:27-30. Unwitting sin is defined, not in isolation, or on its own terms, but in contrast to highhanded sin.  
The highhanded sin is less about personal ethics–although that's included–than social ethics. It has a communal dimension. An act of open rebellion. 
If allowed to go unchecked, that has a demoralizing effect on the religious community. The more people get away with it, the social fabric begins to unravel. Unless it's nipped in the bud, impudent disobedience becomes an incitement to national apostasy.  
People can sin with impunity. There is no fear of God. God's law is held in contempt. The people revert to heathenism. 
There is no sacrifice for this sin because the defiant attitude is intentionally impenitent. 
The wording of the punishment is ambiguous. Harrison thinks it alludes to capital punishment, but Currid thinks it alludes to banishment.
I incline to Currid's interpretation. If so, the nature of the punishment illuminates the nature of the offense. 
It is not, strictly speaking, an unforgivable or damnable offense–although that may often be the case–but an excommunicable offense. And that's because the rebellious behavior is detrimental to communal norms. Implicitly seditious. 

Wednesday, April 01, 2015

Vaccines: One of the Greatest Medical Advances

http://blog.drwile.com/?p=8

Tthe Faithful Won’t Yield on Religious Liberty

One tactic of radical activists is to create an air of inevitability for their agenda. Resistance is futile. But there's a difference between not winning and not losing:

http://www.nationalreview.com/node/416284/print


Vaccines: The Real Story

http://www.drwile.com/vaccines_real.pdf

Christophobia in America

http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2015/march-web-only/what-christianophobia-looks-like-in-america.html

Doomsday machine


These are some comments I made at Facebook discussions. 

There's always a problem when a policy is quoted to defend the policy. If the rationality of the policy (e.g. no anonymous comments) is, itself, the very thing in dispute, then defending the policy to quote the policy is circular. Moreover, there's a problem when we absolutize our little manmade rules, as if we're suddenly handcuffed by the rules we make. Once we make them, we're bound to follow them without exception. But the handcuffs are imaginary.

There can be value in having a general policy, like "Don't drive on the wrong side of the road."

If, however, a hurricane is heading your way, it makes sense for authorities to suspend the policy and open all lanes to outbound traffic.

Even if it's a good general policy to forbid anonymous comments to weed out irresponsible commenters who hide behind anonymity to take potshots, TFan is a known quantity. It's unintelligent to treat all anonymous (or pseudonymous) commenters alike when, in fact, they are known to be unalike.

Moral and rational discrimination requires discretion. Treating everyone alike without regard to the fact that individuals are unalike is morally and intellectually lazy. Why punish smart people for the misdeeds of dumb people?

Some people allow themselves to be trapped inside their made-up rules. The rule becomes a doomsday machine. It has an on-switch, but no off-switch. Once the doomsday machine goes online, you can't shut if off. You're now at the mercy of the machine you made. 

The rule becomes the master. The rule tells the rulemaker what he's allowed to do or not to do. I don't understand people who permit themselves to be dictated to by their made-up rules. Rules that aren't moral imperatives. Rules that outlive their usefulness. 

The Amyraldin heresy

http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2015/04/amyraut-one-more-time.html

To go where no little green man has gone before

http://www.reasons.org/articles/aliens-from-another-world-getting-here-from-there

http://www.reasons.org/articles/alien-encounters-fail-the-test

Tuesday, March 31, 2015

Keener on the historical Jesus

http://www.craigkeener.com/one-hour-on-the-historical-jesus-video/

Deception

One asect of Scripture that can sometimes cause a bit of confusion for believers involves deception. Part of this is because we're often reminded of the Ten Commandments, specifically Exodus 20:16, which in the ESV says: "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor." It seems pretty straightforward that we are not to lie, but then as we read more of Scripture we discover many passages that seem to run contradictory to that axiom that we ought not to deceive. Even more critical is when we find passages like the following (all are in ESV):
"And the Lord said to him, ‘By what means?’ And he said, ‘I will go out, and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.’ And he said, ‘You are to entice him, and you shall succeed; go out and do so’" (1 Kings 22:22).

"O Lord, you have deceived me, and I was deceived" (Jeremiah 20:7a).

"And if the prophet is deceived and speaks a word, I, the Lord, have deceived that prophet, and I will stretch out my hand against him and will destroy him from the midst of my people Israel" (Ezekiel 14:9).

"Therefore God sends them a strong delusion, so that they may believe what is false" (2 Thessalonians 2:11).

"And in the same way was not also Rahab the prostitute justified by works when she received the messengers and sent them out by another way?" (James 2:25). [And to understand the context of this passage: "Then the king of Jericho sent to Rahab, saying, 'Bring out the men who have come to you, who entered your house, for they have come to search out all the land.' But the woman had taken the two men and hidden them. And she said, 'True, the men came to me, but I did not know where they were from. And when the gate was about to be closed at dark, the men went out. I do not know where the men went. Pursue them quickly, for you will overtake them.' But she had brought them up to the roof and hid them with the stalks of flax that she had laid in order on the roof" (Joshua 2:3-6).]
In addition to the Scriptural texts, there is the commonly used hypothetical of a family in occupied France who is hiding Jews from the Nazis. When the Nazis come and ask, "Are you hiding Jews?" is it permissible to lie?

Now it is certainly understandable why someone seeking to live Biblically would have a bit of a struggle with this, but I think there is a way to resolve the tension. First, let us examine what Jesus Himself said is the greatest commandment:
But when the Pharisees heard that he had silenced the Sadducees, they gathered together. And one of them, a lawyer, asked him a question to test him. “Teacher, which is the great commandment in the Law?” And he said to him, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend all the Law and the Prophets.” (Matthew 22:34-40)
The key aspect I think is found in the fact that "On these two commandments depend all the Law and the Prophets." Thus, the purpose of the law to not bear false witness is so that A) we can love God with all our heart, soul, and mind; and B) we can love our neighbor as ourselves.

Now in a perfect world, all laws would be in balance in every single situation. But we live in a fallen world with very clever, evil people. Since the rest of the law hinges upon these two greatest commands, then logically if there is a conflict between a law and the greatest law, we must obey the greatest law.

So given this principle, we can think once again of the Nazi test. Is it loving our neighbor as ourselves if we tell the Nazis where the Jews are hiding? Clearly, it is not loving the Jews we are hiding if we do that. But it is not loving the Nazis either, for if we tell them the truth we are in fact giving them the means by which they will commit a great evil by their sinning against the Jews. So clearly, lying to the Nazis, while breaking the command not to lie, is actually obeying the command to love our neighbor as ourselves, which means we would be obeying the greater commandment. I think this helps us understand the situation with Rahab as well, since Rahab's position is virtually identical to the Nazi hypothetical.

Now as I mentioned earlier, men are evil and like nothing more than to find loopholes for everything, so we have to be clear here: the situations where one of God's "lesser" commands will come into conflict with the great commandment are going to be few and far between. In fact, I daresay the majority of us will probably never find ourselves in a position where they will be in conflict. So this is not a license to pretend that we can sin as much as we want "to love our neighbor" because for this to be valid it really has to be in obedience to the great commandment (which begins with loving God with all our heart, soul, and mind).

Of course, we are still left with the question of God deceiving people by either putting the lying spirit in the mouths of the prophets or in sending a delusion. Each of these instances appear to be aspects of divine judgment upon wicked and evil people, and I think that perhaps Romans 1 helps us resolve this a little:
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. ...And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a debased mind to do what ought not to be done (Romans 1:18, 28).
If men suppress the truth, God's punishment is to give them over to their delusions. This certainly seems to be an aspect of "the punishment fitting the crime."

With this, I find all the tension in Scripture resolved...except for the verse in Jeremiah. Jeremiah, after all, was a good prophet who obeyed God. He was not one of the evil prophets in the land. He was a righteous, godly man and believed God deceived him.

It could be that Jeremiah's complaint was completely unjust, that God didn't really deceive him at all. More likely I think that Jeremiah assumed something and that assumption was wrong and God did not correct the assumption and Jeremiah felt that was deception. (Still, this aspect is admittedly speculation and I don't think the Bible is clear enough to make a firm statement as regards Jeremiah's complaint.)

But while the issue of Jeremiah's complaint is interesting, ultimately I can live with that curiosity not being answered :-)

Cheap forgiveness


I'm going to comment on a post by a Barthian universalist:


I happen to think universalism is quite morally demanding, and requires a kind of strength that the ordinary person does not have. 

Like Josef Mengele. Apparently, Nemeș is talking about how morally demanding universalism is for universalists. It requires "extraordinary strength."

Problem is, if universalism is true, then it's true for everyone–yet everyone is not a universalist. Only an infinitesimal elite. 

Clearly, then, universalism isn't morally demanding on Mengele, even though universalism, if true, is equally beneficial to everyone.  It makes no moral demands on anyone in particular. 

But this conception of the world is morally demanding, because it requires that we conform ourselves to God's image.

No, it means God will conform everyone to himself, resorting to coercive remedial punishment when necessary. 

Universalism is hardly wimpy; it demands an ethic of unilateral goodness which is beyond the strength of those who fancy themselves harder, stronger, in touch with reality because they believe some will be deservedly damned forever. They care about themselves and their "justified" sentiments of resentment and moral condemnation too much to open themselves to the demand of forgiving the wicked, of praying for bastards like the ISIS decapitators, to feel for the pain of those who deserve punishment. 

Why should I "feel for the pain" of ISIS decapitators?

This is an excuse for them to be unforgiving and mean, for them not to make efforts and sacrifices for the sake of reconciliation and forgiveness. 

What heroic sacrifices is Nemeș making?

It's just like rich liberals who consider themselves virtuous because they seize money from one group and give it to another, while they have tax shelters for their own fortune.

All I'm getting from Nemeș is self-congratulatory rhetoric. What does he actually have to show for his high-sounding words?

The entire post is larded with self-deceptive self-flattery. Nothing is easier than forgiving perpetrators for atrocities they committed long ago and far away. Suppose I say: "I forgive Attila the Hun."

See how easy that was? He died 1500 years ago. His victims weren't friends or family of mine. He did nothing to me personally. Forgiving people in history books. Abstract victims of abstract perpetrators. That's morally demanding? That requires a kind of strength which the ordinary person doesn't have? 

Likewise, suppose I say "I forgive Pablo Escobar" (of the Medellín Cartel). How hard is that? He didn't order the torture and/or murder of any relatives of mine. The victims pay the price for my cheap forgiveness. Didn't cost me a thing. To the contrary, it's self-congratulatory.

Notice, too, how Nemeș has cast the universalist in the role of a Nietzschean Übermensch. A spiritual superman. Unlike mere Christian mortals. 

It's revealing how some people can work themselves into this moral posturing. It's very tempting to think better of ourselves than we ought to.

Nothing doing


I'm reposting some comments I left in response to an Arminian on James White's Facebook wall:

Perry Fernandes:
"So correct me if I am wrong, but according to Calvinism theology God preordained the choices of every human being before the foundation of the world which includes every evil act: rape, murder, molestation, terrorism, etc…..????"

According to Biblical Calvinism, God predestined every event. 

"God preordained that you would post that comment. We are just a bunch of pre-programmed robots….."

Well, Perry, if you think predestination reduces humans to robots, then what's wrong with robots "murdering" other robots? How can robots even be murdered? 

"That means Arminian theology was preordained by God too…"

Yes, God predestined Arminians to be a foil for Calvinists. One way of illustrating the truth (Calvinism) is to contrast the truth with something false (the errors of Arminianism). 

"Great question. My answer would be no God is not in any way responsible for the evil of man because God in His sovereignty chose to create mankind with free will/free choice and through allowing human beings to do evil God has a glorious ultimate plan that will be accomplished through it all."

Lots of internal problems with that claim:

i) Take the story last summer about a man who died when he fell into a woodchipper. He didn't choose to kill himself. It wasn't suicide. And his coworkers didn't choose to kill him. It wasn't homicide. Moreover, the woodchipper didn't choose to kill him. So how does your freewill defense explain accidental evils?

ii) If God knows that somebody will murder somebody else if he creates a world with that foreseeable future, then God causes that murder by creating a world with that foreseeable future. So how is the God of classical Arminianism "not in any way responsible" for that evil outcome? 

iii) As for "allowing human beings to do evil," years ago, where I was living, some teenagers were kidding around on a train trestle over a river. One boy pushed another boy into the river. But the boy didn't know how to swim. He splashed around and cried for help, but none of the other teenagers dove in to rescue him, so he drowned. 

Now, only one of the boys pushed him. However, by their inaction, all the boys ensured his death. The other boys didn't have to do anything to guarantee that he would drown. Their nonintervention rendered his drowning inevitable. 

Do you think they had no responsibility to save him, even if they didn't push him off the trestle? 

"God did not foreordain in some secret decree that these parents would BURN their sons in fire as offerings to Baal. No He said it didn't even cross His mind…."

Does that mean you're an open theist? Moreover, how does that let God off the hook? Even if God can't anticipate child sacrifice, he can step in at the last moment to prevent it. 

Bad karma


1. Suppose my parents are indifferent to religion. Not especially religious or especially irreligious. They just don't care. It doesn't figure in my upbringing one way or the other. 

As I hit the teens, I begin to ask the "meaning of life" questions. In a few years I will leave home. Decide what to do with my life. I have my whole life ahead of me. Is this all there is? If so, is that enough? 

To simplify, let's say the philosophical options boil down to atheism and Christian theism. Should I investigate both options? 

As I've often said, investigating atheism is a waste of time. But people object: what if atheism is true? Don't the facts matter?

2. Let's explore that question. Do the facts matter? In what respect do the facts matter? Let's draw a few distinctions:

i) Do the facts matter? 

ii) Does knowing the facts matter?

To break this down a bit further: 

i) Do the facts make a difference

ii) Does knowing the facts make a difference? 

Let's consider a few examples:

3. Suppose I consider the best college to apply to. What's the best college for me? For my needs?

Makes sense for me to investigate different colleges. Compare and contrast what they offer. 

Or does it? Depends on how early or late into the process I begin my investigation. Suppose the application deadline has passed. 

In that event, it's pointless for me to even begin my investigation.  Because it's too late for me to be admitted, there is no point in doing something pointless. 

In a sense, the facts matter. But they matter in the sense that at that juncture, it makes no difference. The outcome is a foregone conclusion.

4. Suppose a teenager is gravely injured in an accident. He's rushed to the ER. He's fast-tracked to the OR. The surgeons patch him up as best they can. Stop the internal bleeding. Stabilize his condition.

However, he suffered irreparable damage to one or more vital organs. He will succumb to his injuries in a few hours.

Moreover, the hospital has been unable to reach his parents. His only "family" at that point is the nurse or attending physician.

Suppose he regains consciousness after the anesthetic wears off. He begins to ask questions. Will he be alright? 

Should they level with him? Should they tell him that he's going to die in a few hours? Or should they lie to him so that he will die happy? In a few minutes he will slip into a coma and never regain consciousness. 

From a Christian perspective, it would be good to pray with him and for him. Prepare him mentally and spiritually for death. But, of course, that's not an atheistic consideration.

Do the facts matter? They matter in the sense that he's dying. But does knowing that matter? There's nothing he can do with that information. His fate is sealed. 

5. Suppose you live in Nebraska. Suppose you're bitten by a rattlesnake. Do the facts matter?

Depends. Whether or not you're bitten by a bullsnake or a rattlesnake makes a difference in the sense that a rattlesnake is venomous and a bullsnake is nonvenomous. One is life-threatening, the other is not.

By the same token, knowing the species can make a difference. You know if you need to seek medical intervention. And you are able to identify the species. It can be the difference between life and death.

But suppose you're an exotic snake collector. You were bitten by a Bullmaster. 

Do the facts matter? In one sense yes, in another sense no. 

The Nebraska ER carries antivenon for local rattlesnakes, but not for Latin American vipers. So you're out of luck. You will die. 

This isn't just a question of place, but period. The same holds true if you were bitten by a rattlesnake in 19C Nebraska. No antivenom back then. 

6. To vary the illustration, suppose you're bitten by a Taipan in the Outback. You're too far from civilization to get back in time. Do the facts matter?

You are going to die whether or not you know that you were bitten by a Taipan. Even if you do know, there's nothing you can do to change the end-result. 

7. These examples are fatalistic, in the classical sense. Suppose you do something, perhaps unwittingly, to offend fate. Break a secret taboo. Trespass an invisible line. As a consequence, you are fated to die on the Ides of March.

Do the facts matter? They matter in the sense that you are doomed. But because you are doomed, because that's a fact, then many other facts don't matter. That one fact nullifies other facts which would otherwise be salient absent that particular fact.

There are lots of different things you can do between now and the Ides of March, but nothing you do will change the outcome. That fact makes other facts irrelevant.

If you're not fated to die on the Ides of March, you needn't take special precautions to avert it–and if you are fated to die on the ides of March, no special precautions will avert it. 

Indeed, you might be better off not knowing that you're a marked man. If you know that you are going to die, come what may, on the Ides of Marsh, you will be a nervous wreck for your remaining time. 

Or suppose, for the sake of argument, that the date isn't etched in stone. You can resort to stalling tactics which may delay the day of reckoning. Evasive maneuvers may buy you a bit of extra time. 

Does that make a difference? In a sense. But the end-result will be the same. Fate has so many creative ways of killing you. Every alternate route is booby-trapped. 

You won't be able to enjoy the extra time, because you will spend every waking moment on the lookout for the hidden dangers that lie in wait around every corner. 

8. At most, it would make sense to investigate the question of whether atheism entails moral and/or existential nihilism. If that's the case, then it would be irrational for you to continue your investigations even if–or especially if–it turns out, on further investigation, that atheism is true. If you find out that something is pointless, then there's no point in learning more about it. Atheism is like those fatalistic scenarios I just ran through. 

9. I use this as a limiting case. I don't think atheism is true. Indeed, atheism leads to alethic relativism. 

The least government is the best government


i) From what I've read, I think Christian pundits defending the RFRA are fumbling the debate. They are casting the issue as a "religious liberty" issue. 
Now, up to a point, I don't think there's anything wrong with that. However, what "religion" connotes for Christians and what "religion" connotes are many Americans are two very different things. The impression that many Americans have of religion–or Christianity in particular–is based on Bill Maher, Jon Stewart, Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, PZ Myers, &c. 
When, therefore, they hear the word "religion," or "religious liberty," that has instantly negative connotations. Given the hostile caricature of Christianity which constitutes their frame of reference, they think the suppression of religion is a good thing. 
As such, I think Christian pundits need to adjust their strategy. Casting the issue in terms of religious liberty is counterproductive if opponents think religion is the source of the problem. You need to consider the pop cultural connotations of "religion." 
That doesn't mean we should avoid discussing religious liberty. But the defense has been too one-sided in that regard. We need to place the issue in a larger context:

i) We should discuss the principle of limited government. The least gov't is the best gov't. We should restrict gov't to things that only gov't can do and ought to do.

A lot of people think that so long as something is a good idea, if, in their mind, that would improve society, then gov't has a mandate to do it. Problem is, the more you empower the state, the more you disempower the public. You are ceded power to gov't officials. That means they have power over you, which they will exercise at their discretion, not yours. 

It's not just a "religious liberty" issue. It comes down to the question of whether we want to live in a police state. Do we want police, prosecutors, and judges constantly monitoring the transactions of private citizens? Must we submit a daily itinerary for their approval? Should we constantly have to give an account of our actions to the authorities? What about the fundamental right to be let alone? 

It's not as if we're talking about the denial of essential goods and services. The "discrimination" in question is hardly a life or death matter.

ii) This argument has the practical advantage of exploiting the gender gap. Many men across the political spectrum are temperamentally libertarian. Because the system is stacked against men, they are very sensitive to gov't overreach.   

iii) Apropos (i-ii), the freakout over the Indiana law reflects the same mindset as the education establishment gulag, where the speech, beliefs, and behavior of students is constantly policed to ensure unquestioning conformity to the ruling class. Speech codes. Trigger warnings. Microaggressions. White privilege. Male privilege. 

It's extremely stifling. What is more, the same totalitarian mindset spills over into off-campus thought-policing. What students say or do at home, on Facebook, in off-campus housing, is subject to the same surveillance and disciplinary measures. 

The reaction to the Indiana law is an extension of that totalitarian impulse. Is that the culture we want to live in? Where dissent is punished. You are not allowed to express disagreement, or even remain silent. You must verbally affirm the current liberal orthodoxy. You must enthusiastically participate in activities endorsed by the current liberal orthodoxy. Your livelihood depends on it.

iv) We also need to educate people on what the alternative to religion–or Christianity in particular–amounts to. What was life like before missionaries introduced Christianity into the world? It was a world by and for the strong. Women, children, the elderly, the sick, the developmentally disabled, were the losers. 

v) Likewise, what are the consequences of atheism in principle and practice? We need to start quoting atheists in their own words on moral and existential nihilism.

In addition, we need to remind people of what secular regimes do, viz, Maoism, Stalinism, North Korea, the Khmer Rouge, the Red Terror. And in our own time, consider abortion, "after-birth" abortion, involuntary euthanasia, &c. 

Secularism creates a very dangerous society for everyone except the ruling class. 

Monday, March 30, 2015

Catholic Acknowledgment Of The Solas Before The Reformation

James Swan has a good post citing a Catholic Answers broadcast in which "Steve Weidenkopf, a lecturer of Church History at the Notre Dame Graduate School of Christendom College", acknowledges that the concepts of sola fide and sola scriptura were advocated prior to the Reformation. The post recommends some other resources on the subject, and so does one of the commenters. Here's a post I've written on the subject of sola fide before the Reformation, and here's my archive of posts on Evangelical doctrines in general prior to the Reformation.

Hysterical anti-Christian bigotry

http://www.nationalreview.com/node/416176/print

The Cary Grant syndrome


Cary Grant was five times married and four times divorce. When asked why, he said his ex-wives thought they married Cary Grant. They were in for a rude surprise.  
They married the image, not the man. They wed Cary Grant, but woke up to Archie Leach.
Catholics, especially converts to Rome, reflect this mentality. They don't convert to the church of Rome; rather, rather, they convert to an idea. They don't convert to the Roman Catholic church; rather, they convert to Roman Catholic theology.
They begin and end with an idea. And they stay inside their idea. That's why Catholicism is appealing to philosophically-minded types like Bryan Cross, Philip Blosser, and Michael Liccione. 
By the same token, that's why they're impervious to factual disconfirmation. Philosophy is all about ideas. Abstract ideas. They superimpose their idea on the institution. 
It makes no difference how great the mismatch between the ideal and the real, for the idea always matches the ideal, and it's the idea of Catholicism that's etched on their spectacles. They don't go to church; they go to their concept of church. They attend their mental construct.

The Pink Mafia


I will be quoting from Alberto Cutié's exposé: Dilemma (Celebra 2011). "Padre Cutié" was a celebrity priest who left the Roman church to marry a woman:

------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

The rigorous academic discipline wasn't the only new thing for me. This was also the very first time I ever had to share a room with other men. I grew up with two sisters, but since I was the only boy at home, I'd never had to share a room. My first roommate at the seminary was a man twice my age. He had lived with a girlfriend for yeas before having a conversion experience at a spiritual retreat, which caused him to decide the priesthood was his calling. He often spoke to me like a father giving advice to his inexperienced son, and I learned to appreciate his authentic concern for me.

One morning, my roommate saw me shaving at the sink we shared in our common room. I was wearing my boxers and considered it natural to shave dressed that way.  He said, "What are you doing?"

I was startled by the alarm in his voice. "Why, what's the matter?"

"In this room, you can dress like that with no problem, but don't get used to it," my roommate warned. You have to take care of yourself with the environment around here."

I had no idea what he meant. It was only later in the year that I realized my roommate was referring to the presence of a number of promiscuous gay men in the seminary.

The first time I ever heard any of these young gay seminarians use slang words and expressions of a homosexual nature, I had to ask around to find out what they meant. I really had no clue! I soon discovered that they had nicknames for everything and everyone, including a bishop who was sexually involved with some of his seminarians. Years later, that bishop would be removed and sent to live quietly in a monastery after Church officials couldn't hide his behavior any more. That was all very awkward for me. 

It isn't difficult for homosexual men in seminaries and religious houses to act out sexually. For one thing, it's easy to hide your relationship in these all-male environments; for another, they have role models in priests who have been getting away with it for a long time, when the institution at all levels turns a blind eye to it. 

I used to hear stories about priests and seminarians and their sexual conduct, both homosexual and heterosexual, but I never really believed them–or maybe I just did not want to believe it was possible. It probably would have been too painful for me, an idealistic eighteen-year-old convinced that the institution was all about God, to admit that the Church could ever engage in or protect such dishonesty. At that stage of my life, I had a very romantic concept of the institutional Church. 

Yet, as time went on, I began to realize that a lot of what I did not believe was possible was actually true. A number of people I had come to know and trust were actually very involved in that inappropriate stuff. 

Among all of the outrageous things I heard in my seminary days, I will never forget the day that our rector looked up from a newspaper article and said to a group of us nearby, "I wonder what cardinal this guy f-ed to get there."

We were standing in front of the community board right in the main hallway of our seminary building…One of the recent postings stood out like a sore thumb. It announced the new position of a former seminarian who had been thrown out a couple of years earlier for sexual misconduct. He had found a way of being accepted to another seminary, in another country, and was now ordained. That young man had become a priest–and a prominent one.

How did this happen? I wondered. Information about seminarians usually follows them from place to place, and the reasons for dismissal from a seminary are usually part of a required report, in case you apply to a new diocese or seminary. In this case, not only did the candidate get ordained, but he was actually tapped for an important job at the highest levels of the Vatican. 

There is, of course, no way of knowing exactly how many gay priests are working worldwide or how many of them actually observe celibacy. In his book The Changing Face of the Priesthood, Father Donald Cozzens suggests that at least 60 percent of all American priests are gay. Whatever the exact numbers, a significant number of active homosexual priests continue to be ordained, but they are forced to be cautious, repressed and mostly closeted homosexuals–unless, of course, those priests are in Rome. One recent article in the Italian weekly magazine Panorama points out that the sight of courting priests is hardly an anomaly; for that particular investigative piece, a reporter posed as the boyfriend of a man running in gay clerical circles, and caught the sexual escapades of priests on tape. He also discovered that male escorts and transsexual prostitutes in Rome regularly rely on priests as regular customers.

Those Roman Catholics who do not want to accept homosexuals among their clergy are way too late. There are so many homosexuals, both active and celibate, at all levels of the clergy and Church hierarchy that the Church would never be able to function if they were really to exclude all of them from ministry. As one of the most prominent pastors in a parish near where I grew up used to say in jest, "If they get rid of us queens, they won't have too many people left to do the work!"

The oldest seminary in the country, St. Mary's in Baltimore, was at one time called "the Pink Palace" by a number of priests, seminarians, and laypeople associated with it. In the 1980s, promiscuous homosexual activity was actually very commonplace in seminaries…

At my own seminary, at least one of the rectors and a number of priests on staff had been involved with seminarians in totally inappropriate relationships, but many of those men went on to big, wealthy parishes, positions in the Curia, or professorships. They all continued in ministry with few repercussions for their well-known promiscuous behavior. A group of laypeople once wrote a novel to try to expose their pastor and others in the hierarchy, but he was well protected by the powers that be.

The question remains: How can the Church condemn homosexuality so forcefully in public, yet continue to cover it up in a number of its own leaders? 

A young Franciscan friar I once worked with…used to tell me, "I live with a bunch of gay guys who don't really understand me."

I'm just pointing out that the Church speaks out of both sides of its mouth. The institution that calls homosexual activity intrinsically disordered…is the same one that ordains, promotes, and places closeted homosexuals in positions of power. That's no secret to those of us who have dealt with the institution at every level, from the local parishes to the Vatican. 

I knew one young seminarian in Latin America who was called into the cardinal's office because he was "spending too much time" talking to a young novice (a religious sister in training)…When the young man explained that he and the young sister were just friends, the cardinal said, "If you were to have that type of relationship with a man, it would be easier to hide and we could avoid criticism, but we cannot protect you if you are involved with a girl." 

The John Jay Study report, as well as my own anecdotal evidence, leads me to believe that many of the priests accused of being child abusers are in fact closeted gay men. A great majority of their "abuses" were homosexually oriented, with boys in their late teens.

Priests will tell you that there is a sort of Pink Mafia in the Roman Catholic Church; this is the term describing the significant number of closeted homosexuals who live within the Church and occupy the hierarchy at every level of this institution. Those in the Pink Mafia actively promote their own, regardless of ability or credentials, though many prove to be very resourceful and know how to work the system.

I was aware of a great number of gay priests and bishops who appeared to be pretty open about it–and had partners–some even living promiscuous lives. 

In response to the Church's sex abuse crisis, the Vatican put out an official "instruction," basically stating that homosexuals would not be allowed in seminaries…What makes this rule even more impossibly hypocritical is that the very office in Rome that issued that document is staffed by some of the most flamboyantly homosexual clergy. One day, while filming a documentary on the Vatican, I visited several offices in the Curia in Rome. I'll never forget how I was taken off guard when some of the members of the crew asked me, "Father, who are these guys?" referring to the number of visibly effeminate men in Roman collars and long cassocks walking around. 

Sunday, March 29, 2015

“Pope Francis”: Business as Usual in the Sex Abuse Scandal

Look at the fine print beneath the photo. This time, some editor at Patrick Buchanan’s “The American Conservative” let that one slide for use with this pope. For Buchanan, “the 1950’s were ‘The Catholic Moment’”

This time, it’s Rod Dreher who’s sounding the alarm on this particular “moment”. Buchanan’s age has certainly passed. But here Dreher, a convert to Roman Catholicism some years ago, who converted back out of it (to Orthodoxy) some years ago (because he couldn’t stomach defending the sexual abuse scandal), cited an AP article at length:

Several members of Pope Francis’ sex abuse advisory board are expressing concern and incredulity over his decision to appoint a Chilean bishop to a diocese despite allegations that he covered up for Chile’s most notorious pedophile.

In interviews and emails with The Associated Press, the experts have questioned Francis’ pledge to hold bishops accountable and keep children safe, given the record of Bishop Juan Barros in the case of the Rev. Fernando Karadima.

[Here comes the ever present Roman Catholic disclaimer]: The five commission members spoke to the AP in their personal and professional capacity and stressed that they were not speaking on behalf of the commission, which Francis formed in late 2013 and named Boston Cardinal Sean O’Malley to head.

“I am very worried,” said commission member Dr. Catherine Bonnet, a French child psychiatrist and author on child sex abuse. “Although the commission members cannot intervene with individual cases, I would like to meet with Cardinal O’Malley and other members of the commission to discuss a way to pass over our concerns to Pope Françis.”

Another commission member, Marie Collins, herself a survivor of abuse, said she couldn’t understand how Barros could have been appointed given the concerns about his behavior.

“It goes completely against what he (Francis) has said in the past about those who protect abusers,” Collins told AP. “The voice of the survivors is being ignored, the concerns of the people and many clergy in Chile are being ignored and the safety of children in this diocese is being left in the hands of a bishop about whom there are grave concerns for his commitment to child protection.”

Dreher’s payoff: “The AP story goes on to say that as archbishop of Buenos Aires in neighboring Argentina, Francis would have known well the Karadima scandal when it broke in 2010. This is not a case in which a remote pontiff knows next to nothing about a local problem, and is getting advice from people who are misleading him. He can’t possibly not know what’s going on.”

The point: This pope knows, and he’s not worried about it.

Biogeography


One of the stock challenges to a global flood is biogeography. How did animals disperse from Armenia to their present locations? I'd simply point out that that's not a problem unique to young-earth creationism. It's a problem for secular science as well:

And don't even get me started on the weird history of biogeography.  The weird thing in biogeography are the disjunctions - places where very similar species are separated by an ocean.  Sometimes the species are on islands, and sometimes on separate continents.  One explanation was vicariance - animals and plants got their modern distribution on land masses that are no longer there.  In Darwin's day, this was the favorite explanation of a guy named Edward Forbes.  He speculated that land bridges used to connect continents (like Europe and North America) so that species now separated by oceans used to have a much larger range on land that sank into the ocean.  Then Darwin argued that Forbes was wrong and instead championed the occasional lucky dispersal across oceans to account for these disjunctions.  Darwin even did experiments like floating seeds in saltwater to see how long they could go and still germinate.  Then came plate tectonics and suddenly vicariance got some new life.  There weren't land bridges, but the continents used to be all connected.  Then plate tectonics and biogeography developed to the point where scientists decided that many disjunctions were much younger than the continental split, and so we're back to the occasional lucky dispersal as Darwin hypothesized.  Today it's sort of a mix.  Vicariance and dispersal are both invoked depending on the situation.  I could go on and on.  Madagascar is fascinating case study.  You should look it up some time. 
http://toddcwood.blogspot.com/2015/03/biologoss-brad-kramer-weighs-in-on-war.html 

Nephilim sighting!


Michael Heiser's identification of the Nephilim has received scientific confirmation! Although David slew Goliath, there's astronomical evidence that Nephilim still exist!

Roman bishop buckles to the homosexual lobby

Good thing the One True Church® is a bulwark against the vandals at the gates. Well, maybe not...

http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/patricia-jannuzzi-catholic-future/?print=1