Blunderbuss

 

But Pruss didn't "leave it at that!"  If one investigates the link provided by Mr. Hays they can see that Pruss indeed explained further:

 

“The other example is that of theodicy. God never causes an evil.  However, in order to draw a greater good out of it, He sometimes permits evils. The greatest and clearest example of this was the crucifixion. God did not cause Judas to betray Jesus and Pilate to condemn Him, but He permitted it, in order to bring a greater good out of it. It is essential to the way that sexual union as one body is constituted that while willing the union one not simultaneously unwill the end (reproduction) the biophysiological striving towards which constitutes the union. However, it is not necessary that one explicitly will this end, only that one not will anything contradictory to it. The implicit willing of the unitive meaning of the sexual act, in the absence of a contradictory willing, suffices to make the teleological striving that constitutes the union be a willed striving—and hence a striving of the person, and not merely of the body, thereby effecting a willed personal union.”

 

It is a bit disingenuous of Hays to say Pruss left it "at that."  Hays even quotes that Pruss says there are "at least two other examples" and then only quotes one of them - and has the audacity to accuse him of "leaving it at that."

http://cathapol.blogspot.com/2011/08/nfp-and-false-logic.html

i) As usual, this illustrates Scott Windsor’s chronic inability to follow an argument. When I said Pruss “left it at that,” what was I referring to? Was I referring to the fact that he didn’t give examples to illustrate his contention? No.

I spelled out what I was referring to. After saying “It’s odd that someone as astute as Pruss would leave it at that.” I immediately explained what I referring to. As I went on to say: “It’s of course true that the distinction between causing and permitting can sometimes be morally relevant or exculpatory. But it’s easy to come up with counterexamples where that distinction is morally irrelevant or culpable.”

Pruss’s two illustrations fail to distinguish between culpable permission and inculpable permission.  I then went on to give an example of culpable permission, to illustrate my point.

ii) Indeed, it’s ironic that Pruss would cite euthanasia as a case in point, since euthanasia can be permissive rather than casual.

For Pruss to make good on his argument, he’d need to do two things:

a) Distinguish culpable from inculpable permission;

b) Show how natural family planning is a case in inculpable rather than culpable permission.

ii) I also didn’t bother to discuss Pruss’s other example because that would involve me in an irrelevant digression.  But as a matter of fact, his example fails on its own terms.

a) God didn’t merely “permit” the Crucifixion. For one thing, God created Judas foreknowing that Judas would be instrumental in the Crucifixion. Therefore, God intended that result.

b) According to Acts 2:23 and 4:28, God predestined the Crucifixion.

Sorry, but ‘withholding medicine’ which is not an extra-ordinary means of keeping someone alive DOES CAUSE HER HUSBAND TO DIE!

Once again, Windsor can’t follow the argument. What he’s just done is to erase Pruss’s distinction between permission and causation. As Pruss defines it, causation involves a positive action to bring about the result whereas permission allows nature to take its course by refraining from intervention. The difference between action and inaction.

Windsor can redefine causation if he likes, but in that case he’s now in the counterproductive position of defending Pruss’s argument by repudiating Pruss’s argument.

Certainly ‘the cause’ is the underlying heart condition - but if one willfully withholds the medicine from another against his will - that would be murder.  A clearer example of this would be a mother refusing to feed her newborn infant... that is negligence and murder for the mother has caused the death of her baby.  No rational human being with any sense of charity or concern for the helpless/innocent would simply say the baby died of starvation and leave the mother's culpability out of the picture.

This is yet another example of Windsor’s chronic intellectual confusions. The question at issue, as Pruss framed the issue, isn’t murder, per se, but causation as a precondition of murder (or other culpable actions).

Sure, we may rightly say the mother in this hypothetical is culpable, but that doesn’t follow from Pruss’s distinction. To the contrary, that runs counter to Pruss’s distinction. As Pruss defines it, the mother didn’t “cause” the death of her baby.

Windsor can, of course, say that distinction is morally irrelevant, but the moment he does so he nullifies the very distinction that Pruss deployed to exculpate natural family planning.

Windsor is such a blunderbuss.

Clearly in The Little Foxes, Regina does kill her sickly husband by withholding his medicine, which IS Hays' point here - but the point Hays misses is the fact that "planning" to participate in "the marriage act" during infertile times is not the same as "doing it" during fertile times and then killing the seed by some chemical or physical barrier.

Windsor is asserting what he needs to prove. He fails to show how his distinction is morally germane to the issue at hand.

I'm sure that those who condone contraception believe this to be the case, but if the intent is contraception then the couple is in mortal sin.

Catholic couples who practice natural family planning do so with a contraceptive intent: their objective is to preempt conception.

Medieval genetics

Catholic epologists often make a big deal about the (alleged) fact that it wasn’t until the 20C that Protestants began to support contraception. Of course, even if that’s true, there’s an obvious reason for that: the availability of safe, effective birth control is contingent on advances in medical science.

By the same token, Catholic epologists have a habit of defaulting to traditional conclusions regarding birth control while ignoring the obsolete “science” that underlay traditional conclusions. For instance, consider the understanding of genetics reflected in Aquinas, who is summarizing various traditional positions, before stating his own:

Reply to the Ninth Objection. There are several opinions about the life of the embryo. According to some in human generation the soul, like the human body, is subject to stages of progression, so that as the human body is virtually in the semen, yet has not actually the perfection of a human body by having distinct members, but gradually reaches this perfection through the force of the semen, so at the beginning of the generation the soul is there having virtually all the perfection which subsequently is to be seen in the perfect human being, yet it has not this perfection actually, since there is no sign of the soul’s activity, but attains thereto by degrees: so that at first there are indications of the action of the vegetal soul, then of the sensitive soul, and lastly of the rational soul. Gregory of Nyssa mentions this opinion (De Homine): but it cannot be admitted. It means either that the soul in its species is in the semen from the very . outset, deprived however of its perfect activity through lack of organs, or that from the beginning there is in the semen some energy or form not having as yet the species of a soul (just as the semen has not as yet the appearance of a human body) but by the action of nature gradually transformed into a soul at first vegetal, then sensitive and lastly rational. The former alternative is rebutted first by the authority of the Philosopher. He says, in fact (De Anima ii, i), that when we say that the soul is the act of a physico-organic body which has life potentially we do not exclude the soul, as we exclude it from the semen and the fruit. Hence we gather that the semen is animated potentially in that the soul is not therein. Secondly, because as the semen has no definite likeness to the members of the human body (else its resolution would be a kind of corruption) but is the residue of the final digestion (De Gener. Anim. i, 19), it was not yet while in the body of the begetter perfected by the soul, so that in the first instant of its separation it could not have a soul. Thirdly, granted that it was animated when it was separated, this cannot refer to the rational soul: because since it is not the act of a particular part of the body, it cannot be sundered when the body is sundered.

 

The second alternative is also clearly false. For seeing that a substantial form is brought into act not continuously or by degrees but instantaneously (else movement would needs be in the genus of substance just as it is in that of quality) the force which from the outset is in the semen cannot by degrees advance to the various degrees of soul. Thus the form of fire is not produced in the air so as gradually to advance from imperfection to perfection, since no substantial form is subject to increase and decrease, but it is the matter alone that is changed by the previous alteration so as to be more or less disposed to receive the form: and the form does not begin to be in the matter until the last instant of this alteration.

 

Others say that in the semen there is at first the vegetal soul and that afterwards while this remains the sensitive soul is introduced by the power of the generator, and that lastly the rational soul is introduced by creation. So that they posit in man three essentially different souls. Against this, however, is the authority of the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus (xv): “Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated and which is mingled with the blood, the other spiritual, which obeys the reason.” Moreover, it is impossible for one and the same thing to have several substantial forms ! because, since the substantial form makes a thing to be, not in this or that way, but simply, and establishes this or that thing in the genus of substance; if the first form, does this, the second form at its advent will find the subject already established with substantial being and consequently win accrue to it accidentally: and thus it would follow that the sensitive and rational souls in man would be united accidentally to the body, Nor can it be said that the vegetal soul which is the substantial form in a plant is not the substantial form in a man, but a mere disposition to the form, since that which is in the genus of substance cannot be an accident of anything.

 

Hence others say that the vegetative soul is potentially sensitive and that the sensitive soul is its act: so that the vegetative soul which at first is in the semen is raised to the perfection of the sensitive soul by the action of nature; and further that the rational soul is the act and perfection of the sensitive soul, so that the sensitive soul is brought to its perfection consisting in the rational soul, not by the action of the generator but by that of the Creator. Hence they hold that the rational soul is in man partly from within, namely as regards its intellectual nature, and partly from without as regards its vegetative and sensitive nature. Now this is altogether impossible, because either it means that the intellectual nature is distinct from the vegetal and sensitive souls, and thus we return to the second opinion, or it means that these three natures constitute the substance of the soul wherein the intellectual nature will be the form as it were, and the sensitive and vegetative natures, matter. From, this it would follow, as the sensitive and vegetative natures are corruptible through being educed from matter, that the substance of the rational soul would not be immortal. Moreover, this opinion is involved in the same impossibility as we have shown to be implicated in the first opinion, namely that a substantial form be brought into act by degrees.

 

Others say that there is no soul in the embryo until it is perfected by the rational soul, and that the vital functions to be observed therein proceed from the soul of the mother. But this also is impossible: because living and non-living things differ in that living things are self-moving in respect of vital functions, whereas non-living things are not. Wherefore nutrition and growth which are the functions proper to a living being cannot result in the embryo from an extrinsic principle such as the mother’s soul. Moreover, the mother’s nutritive power would assimilate food to the mother’s body and not to the body of the embryo: ‘since nutrition serves the individual just as generation serves the species. Further, sensation cannot be caused in the embryo by the mother’s soul. Wherefore others say that there is no soul in the embryo before the infusion of the rational soul, but that there is a formative force that exercises these vital f~nctions in the embryo. This again is impossible, because before the embryo attains to its ultimate complement it shows signs of various vital functions; and these cannot be exercised by one power: so that there must needs be a soul there having various powers.

 

We must therefore say differently that from the moment of its severance the semen contains not a soul but a soul power: and this power is based on the spirit contained in the semen which by nature is spumy and consequently contains corporeal spirit. Now this spirit acts by disposing matter and forming it for the reception of the soul. And we must observe a difference between the process of generation in men and animals and in air or water. The generation of air is simple, since therein only two substantial forms appear, one that is voided and one that is induced, and all this takes place together in one instant, so that the form of water remains during the whole period preceding the induction of the form of air; without any previous dispositions to the form of air. On the other hand in the generation of an animal various substantial forms appear: first the semen, then blood and so on until we find the form of an animal or of a man. Consequently this kind of generation is not simple, but consists of a series of generations and corruptions: for it is not possible, as we have proved above, that one and the same substantial form be educed into act by degrees. Thus, then, by the formative force that is in the semen from the beginning, the form of the semen is set aside and another form induced, and when this has been set aside yet another comes on the scene, and thus the vegetal form makes its first appearance: and this being set aside, a soul both vegetal and sensitive is induced; and this being set aside a soul at once vegetal, sensitive and rational is induced, not by the aforesaid force but by the Creator. According to this opinion the embryo before having a rational soul is a living being having a soul, which being set aside, a rational soul is induced: so that it does not follow that two souls are together in the same body, nor that the rational soul is transmitted together with the body.

 

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Before the advent of the rational soul the embryo is not a perfect being but is on the way to perfection: and therefore it is not in a genus or species save by reduction, just as the incomplete is reduced to the genus or species of the complete.

 

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the soul is not in the semen from the beginning, the soul-force is there, as stated above, which force is based on the spirit contained in the semen; and is called a soul-force because it comes from the soul of the generator.

 

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Before the advent of the rational soul the semen is a living and animate being, as stated above; wherefore we grant this argument.

 

The same answer applies to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Objections.

 

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The formative force that is from the outset in the semen remains even after the advent of the rational soul; just as the animal spirits remain into which nearly the whole substance of the semen is changed. This force, which at first served to form the body, afterwards regulates the body. Thus heat which at first disposes matter to the form of fire remains after the advent of the form of fire as an instrument of the latter’s activity.

http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#3:9

"Two Kingdoms, Natural Law, and Moral Theory Pt. 1"

http://analytictheologye4c5.wordpress.com/2011/08/10/two-kingdoms-natural-law-and-moral-theory-pt-1/

A local look at the Wisconsin recall elections

http://www.catholicvote.org/discuss/index.php?p=19689

"God, in His ordinary providence, makes use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at His pleasure"

http://scienceblogs.com/startswithabang/upload/2011/08/weekend_diversion_opening_up_a/FarSideGodComputerSmall-thumb-500x609-68177.jpeg

Warrant and Proper Function

Two seminal books by Plantinga, now available online:

http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPWAPF&Volume=0&Issue=0&TOC=TRUE

http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPWTCD&Volume=0&Issue=0&TOC=TRUE

HT: Greg Welty

Free-range kids

All three come down pretty hard on the birth-control pill because of its abortifacient potential, though Wilson doesn’t mention the pill by name, he does refer to the command against destroying life as prohibiting the use of birth-control methods that work by abortifacient means. For those unfamiliar with the issue, the pill works by making the womb inhospitable to a pregnancy. If conception does take place, it becomes very difficult for the brand new baby to attach to the walls of the uterus and begin its gestation. In essence, the baby, only a few cells big, would starve to death.

There is no solid medical evidence that this does actually happen, but the manufacturers of the pill acknowledge it as a possibility in the instructions that come with the drugs. But even if the chance is remote, Christians have no place putting the lives of their children in jeopardy and I applaud these Reformed pastors for taking a stand against it for that reason.

http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/07/contraception/

I’ve commented on this once before, but I’ll approach it from another angle. Fact is, most parents, including most devout Catholics, put their children’s lives in harm’s way on a regular basis. What is more, this involves unnecessary risks.

Consider parents, including devout Catholics, who allow their kids to go hiking, camping, surfing, swimming, skating, skiing, kayaking, bicycling, motorbiking, horseback riding; play football, hockey–not to mention wrestling, boxing, gymnastics, or martial arts, etc.

All these activities carry the potential for irreparable injury or death. So many things can go wrong, even if the risk is statistically low. And if enough kids do it often enough, it’s inevitable that the worst-case scenario will eventuate every now and then.

Before Catholic epologists presume to be so judgmental, they need to knuckle down and think through the implications of their own position and practice.

Lecherous popes

cathmom5 said...

It just seems to me that the attempt to compare NFP--used with the correct intent--and contraception is just an excuse to justify the fact that they want to use contraceptions [sic]. Those "christians" who use contraception, I believe, know deep down they are morally wrong...Those "christians" must find a way to justify their disobedience of God's will by "taking down" the Church's moral stance--like the bully on the playground making himself feel better by making the others feel bad. Why else would this ignorant (in the dictionary sense!) argument keep coming up?

http://cathapol.blogspot.com/2011/08/nfp-and-false-logic.html?showComment=1312897997305#c3988272024286355688

Well, if that’s what motivates Protestants, then by parity of logic, it just seems to me that the attempt by popes to defend “natural family planning” is just an excuse to justify the fact that they want to fornicate with nuns and hookers without wearing a condom or fathering a kid out of wedlock. Popes who defend “natural family planning,” I believe, know deep down they are morally wrong. Lascivious popes must find a loophole to excuse their lechery. Why else would they concoct so many ad hoc distinctions? 

Losing faith in theories

As a young Christian, when I was presented with the view that Christians must believe in a young-earth and global flood, I went along willingly...One also finds erosional canyons buried in the earth. These canyons would require time to excavate, just like the time it takes to erode the Grand Canyon...And being through with creationism, I very nearly became through with Christianity.  I was on the very verge of becoming an atheist.

http://home.entouch.net/dmd/gstory.htm  

This is a stereotypical narrative for many apostates. When they lose faith in creationism, or some particular claim thereof, they lose faith in Scripture.

At the risk of stating the obvious, Genesis never mentions the Grand Canyon. Genesis doesn’t say the Grand Canyon was formed by the flood. Genesis doesn’t say anything about the origin of the Grand Canyon one way or the other.

Morton is like a man who views a painting through tinted glasses, then when he decides the color scheme is off, throws the painting away rather than the glasses.

It’s important to distinguish what the Bible actually say from theoretical constructs. Losing faith in some theory about the formation of the Grand Canyon is not logically equivalent to losing faith in Scripture.

I’m not debating the pros and cons of flood geology right now. And I’m not qualified to debate that issue in any case.

Rather, I’m drawing attention to a common confusion among apostates.

With sufficient ingenuity, you can come up with scientific theories to explain just about anything. You can start with the same data and come up with competing theories which are empirically equivalent.

Don’t confuse rejecting a theory with rejecting the Bible, especially when the theory is far more specific than the Bible. When the theory talks about things on which the Bible is silent. 

Dinosaurs from outer space!

On the one hand, there are folks who think fossilized dinosaurs constitute evidence for evolution. On the other hand, there are folks who think aliens have been to planet earth.

The obvious solution is staring us in the face: dinosaurs are aliens!

After all, we’ve all seen reptilian aliens in movies. So this clearly represents a Jungian racial memory of cave men encountering hostile saurian alien species. What could be simpler? That's Exopaleontology 101, dude! 

How to be a philospher

http://msuphilosophyclub.blogspot.com/2008/03/tips-for-top-how-to-be-philosopher-by.html

Embrace doubt!

Or, as John Loftus is wont to say, "Doubt is an adult attitude."

http://sacredsandwich.com/archives/8533

HT: Greg Welty

Captain America and Superhero Worldviews, Part 2

http://reflectionsbyken.wordpress.com/2011/08/09/captain-america-and-superhero-worldviews-part-2/

The Resurrection of Jesus A Fact of History

http://paulbarnett.info/2011/04/the-resurrection-of-jesus-a-fact-of-history/

The Mystery of Christian Origins

http://paulbarnett.info/2011/04/the-mystery-of-christian-origins/

Resurrected Messiah – evidence from Paul

http://paulbarnett.info/2011/04/resurrected-messiah-evidence-from-paul/

The corpse that stood up

http://paulbarnett.info/2011/04/the-corpse-that-stood-up/

Why Jesus is Remembered

http://paulbarnett.info/2011/06/why-jesus-is-remembered/

Now may be a good time to buy stock

Please don’t misconstrue this as investing advice. I don’t have any money now, nor have I ever had any money. But I remember a day not so long ago – in the mid 1990’s – when Apple Computer stock was at $25.00 per share. Don’t we all wish we had bought some of that?

Today, after a 600+ point drop, stocks are at a very low point, and gold is as high as it’s ever been. If your goal is to maximize the gains on your investments, to “buy low and sell high,” this is the time to get rid of your gold and buy stock.

I tend greatly to discount those who are saying that “a double-dip recession is coming”. The WSJ today has a good article today on why that’s so.

There are three fundamental differences between the financial crisis of three years ago and today's events.

Starting from the most obvious: The two crises had completely different origins.

The older one spread from the bottom up. It began among over-optimistic home buyers, rose through the Wall Street securitization machine, with more than a little help from credit-rating firms, and ended up infecting the global economy. It was the financial sector's breakdown that caused the recession.

The current predicament, by contrast, is a top-down affair. Governments around the world, unable to stimulate their economies and get their houses in order, have gradually lost the trust of the business and financial communities.

That, in turn, has caused a sharp reduction in private sector spending and investing, causing a vicious circle that leads to high unemployment and sluggish growth. Markets and banks, in this case, are victims, not perpetrators.

The second difference is perhaps the most important: Financial companies and households had feasted on cheap credit in the run-up to 2007-2008.

When the bubble burst, the resulting crash diet of deleveraging caused a massive recessionary shock.

This time around, the problem is the opposite. The economic doldrums are prompting companies and individuals to stash their cash away and steer clear of debt, resulting in anemic consumption and investment growth.

The final distinction is a direct consequence of the first two. Given its genesis, the 2008 financial catastrophe had a simple, if painful, solution: Governments had to step in to provide liquidity in droves through low interest rates, bank bailouts and injections of cash into the economy.

A Federal Reserve official at the time called it "shock and awe." Another summed it up thus: "We will backstop everything."

The policy didn't come cheap as governments world-wide poured around $1 trillion into the system. Nor was it fair to the tax-paying citizens who had to pick up the tab for other people's sins. But it eventually succeeded in avoiding a global Depression.

Today, such a response isn't on the menu. The present strains aren't caused by a lack of liquidity—U.S. companies, for one, are sitting on record cash piles—or too much leverage. Both corporate and personal balance sheets are no longer bloated with debt.

The real issue is a chronic lack of confidence by financial actors in one another and their governments' ability to kick-start economic growth.

And there’s one more thing. Crude oil prices have fallen to about $81 a barrel. When they were $112, we had $4.00 per gallon gas. The inflationary effects of that increase rippled through the economy, and I believe, with gasoline prices going the other way, we’ll see a similar easing.

No, it’s not the best of times right now. But it’s not the worst of times, either. And as our friend Rhology says, “Our God is in the heavens; he does all that he pleases.” Ultimately, we can trust Him.

Pruss on natural family planning

In fact, the biological union does not even require the couple consciously to will the striving towards reproduction. The biophysiologically united man-woman organism instinctively and automatically on a biological level strives toward that end. What is required is only that the couple should not place an obstacle in its way, because the act of placing the obstacle is an act of disturbing the union. The act of contracepting is opposed to the end of the teleological process by which union is constituted. A distinction between permitting and causing is relevant here.

 

The couple that contracepts is the intentional cause of their infertility. The NFP-using couple, when infertile, is not the cause of the infertility: the natural cycles of the female body are the cause of the infertility, which cycles are independent of the couple’s decision to use NFP. The couple permits the infertility, and draw good from it, even though it would be wrong for them  directly to will this infertility. That the distinction between permitting and causing is a significant one can be seen in at least two other examples. One is the distinction between letting die and killing, often discussed in the context of euthanasia.

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/264/Pruss.pdf

It’s odd that someone as astute as Pruss would leave it at that. It’s of course true that the distinction between causing and permitting can sometimes be morally relevant or exculpatory. But it’s easy to come up with counterexamples where that distinction is morally irrelevant or culpable.

In The Little Foxes, Regina doesn’t cause her husband to die from a heart attack. Rather, she permits him to die by withholding his heart medication.

In that situation, letting him to die is morally equivalent to murder, even though she didn't positively bring about his demise.

Natural family planning has a contraceptive intent, and–where successful–a contraceptive effect.

This illustrates the problem with Catholics who use natural law to ratify a conclusion they arrived at by other means.

Strapped in the backseat

Watching the debt debacle, you feel like a passenger in the backseat of a van that’s headed over the cliff. The doors are locked, so you’re trapped inside as the driver heads straight for the cliff.

It’s easy to blame the GOP for not doing more, but I heard a poll a short while back awarding Congressional Republicans a 70% disapproval rating for being too obstructionist. And I’ve also heard the Ryan plan is massively unpopular.

Assuming the stats are true, we can’t expect Republicans to do more without public support. Indeed, to do even more in the face of public opposition. Why should they commit political suicide? The electorate would simply vote them out of office, vote more Democrats back into office, who will then reverse whatever debt reductions the GOP managed to push through.

Ultimately, politicians are no better or worse than the voters who put them in office and keep them in office.

Cosmic saviors

Watching liberal reaction to Obama’s political self-destruction is like one of those SF movies in which an alien Redeemer comes to earth, promising to save us from our hapless selves. This is our last chance.

But we blind, thankless humanoids mistreat the alien Redeemer. We fail him. We fail to vest in him our unconditional faith and submission.

So the alien Redeemer climbs back into his flying saucer and returns to Alpha Centuri, leaving us to our hideous fate.

There follows the usual recriminations. How could we be so blind and thankless? How could we fumble our last chance at cosmic redemption? Now the alien Redeemer is gone…gone…gone!

He was too good for us. Too noble. Too pure. Too enlightened. Too advanced.

We let him down, and now it’s too late to make amends. We proved ourselves unworthy to the superior alien race.

Liberals constantly mock Christianity, yet they create a mock religion of their own, with mock Redeemers, mock sinners, mock heretics, mock apostates. 

How we failed Obama

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903366504576490194186182566.html

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904007304576496210107745664.html

The Absolute Basics of the History of Textual Criticism

I've subscribed to Koinonia's "Mondays with Mounce", a series by William Mounce, author of "The Basics of Biblical Greek". Mounce is on vacation, and Koinonia is republishing some of his past installments.

This afternoon I came across one, discussing the "disappearance" of John 5:4 from modern translations, and in the process, Mounce gives one of the best five-cent overviews of Textual Criticism I've seen:

Here is the basic reconstruction.

1. The writers wrote their gospels and epistles and sent them to their churches.

2. These documents were copied so they could be shared. In the process of copying, changes were introduced. (By the way, this is not academic conjecture; we have these different manuscripts and can see the differences for themselves.)

Some changes were accidental but others appeared to be intentional, but not always for nefarious reasons. It is often to add an explanation, or substitute an easier word to understand, or to harmonize the gospels, etc.

In John 5:4, most believe that a scribe (the person doing the copying) thought it was puzzling why the man would lie there for 38 years. Perhaps he knew a tradition that said the angel periodically came down to stir up the waters and the first person in was healed, and so he added in the verse. (Others would argue that for some reason the verse was dropped off.)

3. As time progressed (and as we can tell from archaeology), biblical manuscripts were collected in five different geographical areas. Since the center of the church was in Rome, this area had the greatest number of copies.

4. Erasmus (1500s) created a Greek text based on two manuscripts from the 12th century (Matthew through Jude) and another 12th century manuscript for all but the last 6 verses of Revelation. He went from the Latin back into Greek to get those last 6. His work became the basis of the King James translation.

5. 150 years ago we started digging up new manuscripts that were in fact [much] older (by centuries). They came from a different geographical area than the majority of the texts we currently had, and they were different in places. For example, they did not have John 5:4.

And so the science of textual criticism was born, which is the science of determining which of the different “readings” is most likely original.

The general preference is to see scribes as adding verses, not removing them. For that reason, and others, most feel that John 5:4 was added after the fact; there is no good reason why it would have been omitted.

But God in his sovereign love made sure that the differences among the manuscripts would not hinder our faith.

Joisey for Jesus

http://www.jesusbibleinstitute.org/locations/newjersey/north-new-jersey/

Evicting the Canaanites

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=q_and_a

Chow time

I see from his “updates” that poor ol’ Dave has clean forgotten the nature of a dilemma. Even if he succeeds in extricating himself from one horn of the dilemma, he will only impale himself on the other horn in the process. Either way he pays a price.

The smart thing to do would be to cut his losses. He should admit that D’Souza is a high-profile defector from Rome. By admitting that, Catholic apologetics would still take a hit, but it wouldn’t be a mortal wound. Pop Catholic epologists would have to drop the Home-Sweet-Rome, Surprised-by-Truth biopics since our converts cancel out their converts. I’ll call your Francis Beckwith and raise you Dinesh D’Souza.

But, instead, he shortsightedly defends the fatal alternative by throwing D’Souza over the back of the sled. And the problem with that strategy is that by making D’Souza wolf chow, he also makes the papacy wolf chow. If D’Souza wasn’t pious enough to be a bona fide Catholic, then several popes weren’t real Catholics either. And we’re not talking about antipopes, either.

He discounts D’Souza because D’Souza was never a pious Catholic, which–according to Armstrong–made him a merely “nominal” Catholic “at best.” In name only.

But what does that make some of the popes, who were positively impious (by Catholics standards)?

If even the pope doesn’t have to be Catholic to be pope, why should anyone else be Catholic?

Yet I do wish to thank poor ol’ Dave for doing the kind of damage to Catholicism that only a blinkered zealous can inflict.

The no-true-Roman fallacy

The Latest Hays tactic / ruse, is to cynically try to turn my words back upon me.

http://socrates58.blogspot.com/2011/07/is-dinesh-dsouza-high-profile-fallen.html

Ah, yes. It’s “cynical,” nay, a “cynical ruse” (twice as bad!) to hold a man to his own words.

I’m not perfect. I can admit when I am wrong; I have no problem with that.

That would be a mighty long list. I don’t know if his blog has the bandwidth to accommodate the sheer volume of necessary retractions. But better late than never. I look forward to the installments.

On second thought, wouldn’t it be more efficient if he just deleted his blog?

This is not rocket science, folks.  At that time, I had not looked into D'Souza's Catholicism in any depth. I understood that he was a Catholic (and that was all that was relevant to my particular argument in that paper). I didn't know that he was not actually a "devout" one, and so that constituted my momentous, earth-shaking mistake (an unverified description).

Translation: D’Souza was a real, honest-ta-goodness Catholic as long as he was a feather in our cap, but when he defected, he retroactively ceased to have ever been a real, honest-ta-goodness Catholic. Kinda like the Grandfather paradox. 

The Nemes Nemesis

Steven Nemes has responded to a post of mine. Before I delve into the specifics, I’d like to make a general observation:

I actually don’t object to natural law arguments, per se. Aside from the potential for common ground arguments in the public square, a more principled argument for natural law ethics is to ground certain divine injunctions. To go beyond the bare injunction itself to discuss the underlying rationale. 

The problem, though, is that Catholics aren’t beginning with natural law ethics, then taking that wherever it logically leads them. Rather, they begin with Vatican policy, then try to use natural law to retroactively justify Vatican policy.

And this, in turn, generates a dilemma. Pop Catholic epologists use very crude natural law arguments to justify Vatican policy. However, such crude arguments invite easy, obvious counterexamples. At that point the Catholic has to introduce qualifications to his natural law appeal. But that creates two additional problems: (i) the qualifications are often ad hoc; (ii) Protestants can help themselves to the same qualifications. For the qualifications simply invite a new set of easy, obvious counterexamples.

Put another way, Catholic natural law arguments either prove too much or too little. On the one hand, if they draw the principles too broadly, then that either allows both the Catholic and Protestant positions alike, or else it disallows both.

On the other hand, if they draw the principles too narrowly, then (i) this leads to ad hoc restrictions which compromise the underlying principle as well as (ii) inviting a new set of counterexamples.  

They need an argument that’s general enough to let their own position slip through the net, but specific enough to screen out the Protestant position. But natural law ethics doesn’t strike that balance since their position isn’t really based on natural law in the first place. That’s just an afterthought to rubberstamp a preexisting policy–a policy that’s a historical accident. A preexisting policy that, to some extent, has to develop internally along traditional lines.

Back to Nemes

The first problem with Steve's argument here is that there is a confusion here in the use of the word "nature" and "natural." Ed Feser is helpful on this count:

 

"Natural" for Aquinas does not mean merely "statistically common," "in accordance with the laws of physics," "having a genetic basis," or any other of the readings that a mechanistic view of nature might suggest. It has instead to do with the final causes inherent in a thing by virtue of its essence, and which it possesses whether or not it ever realizes them or consciously wants to realize them (Aquinas [Oneworld, 2009], pp. 179-180, my emphasis).

 

In other words, "natural law" means that what is good/bad for a thing is a matter of the nature or kind of thing we are speaking about. What is good or bad for humans depends upon the nature of humans and the final cause of humanity as such. The irrelevance, therefore, of Steve's comment that there is an abundance of precedent in nature of infanticide is clear: natural law ethics is not the view that nature, as in the world out there in the jungles, seas, etc., determines what is good for us and bad for us, but rather that our natures (in a technical metaphysical sense) determine what is good for us and bad for us.

 

So it is clear that there is no argument from the practices of other species of animals to the goodness of those practices for us.

 

http://snemes.blogspot.com/2011/08/natural-law-argument-for-infanticide.html

1) It’s a relief to have an intelligent critic for a change.

2) Paul Manata already anticipated some of my responses, and no doubt put it better than I could.

3) I wouldn’t expect Aquinas to define “natural” as “having a genetic basis,” since Aquinas was writing before the advent of modern genetics. But I don’t see how that precludes a modern natural law theorist from defining what’s “natural” in genetic terms.

4) I’m also puzzled by Feser’s apparently derogatory characterization regarding a “mechanistic” view of nature, in relation to genetics. Presumably Feser believes in genetics.

5) There is also his false dichotomy between a “genetic” or “mechanical” definition of “natural,” on the one hand, and “final causes” grounded in the “essence” of a thing, on the other.

On the face of it, why couldn’t the essence of an organism be genetic? Likewise, why couldn’t the entelechy of an organism be genetic? Take a caterpillar turning into a butterfly, or an acorn turning into an oak? Why couldn’t that outcome or goal be genetically programmed? Indeed, isn’t that actually the case? It was genetically programmed to mature?

I’m not stating my own position at the moment. Simply bouncing off of Feser’s disjunctions.

6) Nemes then extrapolates from Feser’s statement to the claim that we can’t analogize from animal behavior to human behavior.

i) Offhand, I don’t see how that’s an implication of Feser’s statement. Did Nemes infer that from Feser’s statement?

ii) Or does Nemes simply use Feser’s statement to establish one point, then adds another point of his own?

7) It isn’t quite clear to me what he means by contrasting natural law with the law of the jungle. After all, the jungle is the native state for many human beings.

8) Apropos (7), isn’t it arbitrary to drive a wedge between the “essence” or entelechy of an organism and its natural habitant? Isn’t an organism adapted to its environment? Doesn’t that, to some extent, figure in the essence of an organism? Can we treat the essence as an airtight compartment, sealed away from the natural habitant of the organism?

9) In addition, Aquinas was pre-Darwinian. But many Catholics, like Michael Behe, Karl Rahner, and Alexander Pruss, subscribe to theistic evolution. They generally accept universal common descent. So that posits extensive continuity between man and the animal kingdom. Consider the following:

While there is little consensus among scientists about how the origin of this first microscopic life is to be explained, there is general agreement among them that the first organism dwelt on this planet about 3.5-4 billion years ago. Since it has been demonstrated that all living organisms on earth are genetically related, it is virtually certain that all living organisms have descended from this first organism. Converging evidence from many studies in the physical and biological sciences furnishes mounting support for some theory of evolution to account for the development and diversification of life on earth, while controversy continues over the pace and mechanisms of evolution. While the story of human origins is complex and subject to revision, physical anthropology and molecular biology combine to make a convincing case for the origin of the human species in Africa about 150,000 years ago in a humanoid population of common genetic lineage. However it is to be explained, the decisive factor in human origins was a continually increasing brain size, culminating in that of homo sapiens. With the development of the human brain, the nature and rate of evolution were permanently altered: with the introduction of the uniquely human factors of consciousness, intentionality, freedom and creativity, biological evolution was recast as social and cultural evolution [paragraph #63].

 

The present text was approved in forma specifica, by the written ballots of the International Theological Commission. It was then submitted to Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, the President of the Commission, who has give his permission for its publication.

 

http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040723_communion-stewardship_en.html

10) This is reinforced by the fact that Aquinas was a hylomorphic dualist rather than a Cartesian dualist or substance dualist (in the usual sense of the term). Hylomorphism is basically a type of physicalism.

And, indeed, you have Catholic physicalists like Peter van Inwagen.

Body and soul are distinguished the way we can distinguish between the form and substance of a wax figure.

11) As a Christian theologian, Aquinas must make room for the intermediate state, but there are two problems with that:

i) This seems to be a makeshift modification of hylomorphism.

ii) Even if it were tenable, that goes beyond natural revelation. That requires input from special revelation, it which case it’s no longer a natural law argument.

12) But in that event, a Catholic natural law theorist can’t drive a wedge between an organism’s essence or telos and it’s natural environment, for its habitant exerts adaptive pressures on the organism which modify the organism.

And, of course, that also accentuates various commonalities between man and best. To be sure, man has more in common with some animals than others. But on Catholic natural law assumptions, man is not a class apart from the animal kingdom.

Catholic dogma may reserve some unique distinctives for man, but that, once against, goes outside the bounds of natural law. That’s an argument from religious authority rather than an appeal to reason.

13) Likewise, if a Catholic accepts theistic macroevolution, then that includes encephalization, body-plans, etc. Surely that goes to the essence and/or entelechy of the organism.

14) Those are metaphysical considerations. Then we have the epistemic considerations. How do we ascertain the essence or entelechy of an organism? Why are genetic predeterminants or statistical commonalities irrelevant to that identification? What else do you have to go by within the confines of natural law reasoning? You can’t invoke dogma without moving outside the natural law framework.

15) Furthermore, there’s no reason to confine natural law theory to Thomism. For that matter, there are secular natural law theories.

Eugenix

In 2141, the global climate control system was beginning to fail, due to computer malfunction. The GCCS had been installed in 2103 to forestall natural disasters, filter airborne pathogens, screen out cosmic radiation, and make many hitherto inhospitable regions habitable. A planetary botanical garden with many ecozones and microclimates, as well as urban centers.

While this enhanced the quality of life, one downside is that humans were now so adapted to the GCCS that their immune systems were compromised. Their melanogenetic function was also impaired. Simply put, the human race couldn’t survive without the GCCS.

So the computer needed to be repaired–at all cost. But there was a problem. The man who designed the firewall was dead. He was a polymath, with a side interest in comparative mythology. He designed the firewall as a videogame, combining plants, animals, characters, buildings, landscapes, plot motifs, type scenes, and riddles from the Pentateuch, Ecclesiastes, Ezekiel, Daniel, Zechariah, John, and Revelation.

The firewall was part wargame, stealth game, and 4X. Before you could fix the computer, you had to hack the firewall. To hack the firewall, you had to win the videogame.

But this was complicated by the fact that the Commissariat outlawed Christianity in 2117. The Bible was banned.

Classified copies were stored in the archives of the Commissariat, to which only high-ranking commissars had access.

The Commissariat regulated all aspects of social life, beginning with population control. Reprogenetics. Mandatory sterilization. The state awarded one child per couple, from Eugenix.

There was, however, an underground church. Knowledge of Scripture was preserved by word-of-mouth as well as encrypted copies of Scripture. The underground church included Christian hackers who attempted to disable the police-state apparatus.

“Theoterrorists,” as the Commissariat labeled them, were normally executed, but some of them had invaluable computer skills. These few were incarcerated at a supermax facility, where their troubleshooting skills were sometimes tapped.

It was a tight wire act. The hackers were both dangerous, yet indispensable to the state.

When the GCCS began to fail, the Commissariat turned to Peter Neureich for help. Peter was their most brilliant prisoner.

The Commissariat tried to limit his computer access to the GCCS firewall. But once inside, Peter hacked his way into other systems. He deleted the database for the Ministry of State Security. He fried the Eugenix mainframe. And he reprogrammed the GCCS to phase out over three generations, allowing the human race time to readjust.

All this led to a popular uprising. Civilization reverted to indigenous social and religious institutions. 

"A tourniquet upon the neck of Christianity"

Here's something I wrote to someone else in an email this morning:

I don't care if the Lutherans and the Reformed argue about certain doctrines. There are two billion Christians in the world, they are going to disagree on a lot of things. So I don't care if there are multiple Presbyterian denominations. That is the least of Christianity's problems.

I've said it many times, and they just don't get it. Rome (specifically its claims to authority), is historically, and by a huge degree, the greatest problem in the history of Christianity. It has done the most harm, and Christianity most needs its removal. Once the papal claims to ultimate authority are out of the way, many other avenues of discussion will be opened up. I know there are other problems, but the mere (and continuing) existence of the Roman papacy is the one thing that causes the most harm, and prevents any good from being accomplished. It is a tourniquet upon the neck of Christianity. Yes, there are other problems, but until you get that tourniquet off, it's not much use talking about the other problems.