An “agnostic” has begun a running review of TID over at the TheologyWeb. Here’s my response:
“The question is whether TID will fare any better. I get the immediate impression that it will not. As Abe already pointed out in this thread, the Pascal's Wager style move (p1-3) of claiming there would be no point in questioning the existence of an afterlife if there isn't an afterlife is astonishingly bad. Why? Because it's quasi question begging.”
To say something “quasi” question-begging is a weasel word. Either something is question-begging or it’s not. In what sense can something be merely “quasi” question begging?
“It assumes the (non-universal) Christian view that this life ultimately has infinitesimal value is correct, then subtracts the Christian afterlife. Since Christianity without an afterlife would be absurd, Atheism without an afterlife must also be absurd.”
i) Actually, I presented a supporting argument for my statement, which he disregards. In addition, I responded to Abe. But he ignores that as well.
ii) In addition, I didn’t argue that if Christianity without an afterlife would be absurd, then atheism without an afterlife would be absurd. My argument wasn’t predicated on the absurdity of Christianity without an afterlife. Although that would, indeed, render the Christian faith absurd, I didn’t infer the absurdity of atheism from that reference point. My argument operates at a higher level of generality.
“”Even if atheism were 'right,' it is still a wrong turn" shows a higher interest in psychological comfort than truth seeking on Hays' part.”
Except that I already explained why “truth-seeking” is meaningless on a godless worldview. Truth-seeking lacks symmetrical value in atheism and Christian theism, for reasons I gave. Once again, he ignores the supporting argument.
“It's also worth mentioning that "moral absolutes" is not a synonym for "moral realism" (p1). You can have moral realism without moral absolutes...and moral absolutes without moral realism.”
In technical usage that’s correct, but in popular usage, reference to moral absolutes is often synonymous with objective morality or moral realism.
“Any Christian who acknowledges that the Torah included special morals for Israel and not mere civil laws is already denying moral absolutes.”
That’s both fallacious and equivocal:
i) It’s fallacious to infer that unless every injunction is a moral absolute, no injunction is a moral absolute.
ii) It also equivocates by using the word “morals” for things like the kosher laws (I assume that’s what he has mind). But I wouldn’t classify the ceremonial law under the moral law anyway. Categories of ritual purity or impurity are not intrinsically good or evil. Rather, their value is instrumental.
“Nor is something like Divine Command Theory necessarily a moral realist view.”
I didn’t ground my position in Divine Command theory. And I don’t regard Divine Command theory as a stand-alone theory of value. For instance, Divine Command Theory can be supplemented by Natural Law theory.
“Engwer points out that TCD says little about prophecy as an argument for "the Divine origin of Judaism, then Christianity" (p5). True enough from what I recall, but I'm not so sure the argument from prophecy is in vogue with Christians these days. I sure don't see Craig or Plantinga emphasize it. McDowell is the only major exception that comes to mind right now.”
The TCD isn’t mainly aimed at folks like Craig or Plantinga. Rather, its primary target is conservative evangelicals, for whom the argument from prophecy is still “in vogue.”
“While it does require some careful handling, it is possible to observe that cognitive bias has a significant effect. This wouldn't be the case if such claims were more like: "Thirty percent of what we believe is wrong and any given belief is equally under suspicion." That would be viciously self-defeating.”
But Long and Tarico fail to offer criteria which exempt their own beliefs from cognitive bias. And our “agnostic” doesn’t offer anything along those lines either.
“Sure. Atheists who point the finger at Christians for falling prey to confirmation bias had better be taking it as a lesson to watch for such bias in themselves. People who feel sure are often wrong anyway. However, there is an asymmetry between Christianity and weak Atheism (or weak Agnosticism): Christianity asks for certainty about religious answers (or something close to it) while skepticism is often close friends with uncertainty. Thus an attack on certainty is more damaging to traditional Christianity than it is to religious skepticism.”
i) ”Skepticism” is a euphemism. Skeptics have to be certain of some things to question other things. So-called “skeptics,” like the contributors to TCD, exude a high degree of self-confidence in the veracity of their own beliefs and the falsity of Christian beliefs. And the exceptions, like Tarico, quickly devolve into self-referential incoherence.
ii) Long and Tarico haven’t actually shown that Christians suffer from significant cognitive bias in relation to the Christian faith. They simply allege that to be the case.
From a Christian standpoint, we’d expect God to shield Christians from degrees of cognitive bias which impede saving faith.
“Chan mentions Plantinga's "evolutionary argument against naturalism" (p21). I consider this argument every bit an embarrassment for Christian apologetics as Dawkins' argument that there "almost certainly" isn't a God because evolution can explain the diversity of species is an embarrassment for atheism. Why? Because Plantinga's argument relies on the notion that accuracy of senses and processing of those senses would not tend to improve survival and reproduction.”
i) Accurate sensory perception doesn’t, all by itself, tend to improve survival or reproduction. For sense data must be interpreted.
ii) On the face of it, lower animals survive and reproduce without entertaining true beliefs about their environment. Does an ant have the mental capacity to form beliefs?
iii) Life in the wild doesn’t give species a chance to learn survival skills. If you don’t have survival skills, you don’t survive. On-the-job training is a recipe for early demise in the wild. Survival skills are not something you can acquire on the fly. For you’d have to survive long enough to learn how to survive.
Of course, young animals can be protected and mentored by a parent (i.e. lioness, she-bear), or the herd. But the mentor (or members of the herd) must have survival skills.
“On page 22, Chain [sic] points out that science does not give "epistemic certainty." That's correct, and that's why science has been beating religion soundly in matters of earthly knowledge.”
That’s a tendentious claim.
“Science does not claim certainty then get it wrong; science deals in degrees of justification and revisability...and gets better.”
That’s a controversial claim in the philosophy of science.
“I do agree that science does not do everything we might like it to do, but it is our wonder tool for overcoming cognitive bias by combining our gaze on the world.”
Scientists also suffer from cognitive bias.
“How does religion correct for cognitive bias? So far as I can tell, it doesn't.”
If it’s God’s will that his elect come to a saving knowledge of the faith, then God is going to correct for any cognitive bias which presents an insuperable barrier to that objective.
“Easily. Christianity claims there is a God who "desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Atheism makes no comparable claim. Christianity is thus held to a higher standard in keeping with its greater claim of an all powerful being interested in spreading Christian belief to each and every one of us.”
i) Since I’m a Calvinist, I reject the premise.
ii) Moreover, the general correlation between the religion (or irreligion) of parents and children doesn’t undercut Christian claims if that tendency is, itself, a sinful tendency. In other words, if children, including grown children, uncritically adopt whatever religion or ideology their parents observer, then that indifference reflects the fallen condition of man. That’s quite consistent with Christian anthropology.
“I suppose one may ask why Atheism isn't winning everyone to its side who tries to discover religious truth on their own initiative. This is probably because Atheism, even if true, can't make any unique claim about the world which we can point at to demonstrate the truth of Atheism. It's impossible to directly argue for Atheism using evidence. Meanwhile, some Theistic beliefs could be proven true if true (but haven't been) and other Theistic beliefs can't be proven false if false. In this situation, any intelligent and honest seeker of religious truth should conclude the answers are inconclusive. What then? If an inconclusive investigation is compatible with prior belief, the person will tend to stick to her prior belief. Such Atheists will tend to stay Atheists and such Theists will tend to stay Theists. Being raised one way or the other will tend to stick, even in the case Atheism is true.”
i) That represents an overly analytical explanation of why most folks adhere to hereditary or cultural beliefs. But I have no reason to think that most religious adherents (or unbelievers) are that intellectually self-reflective in the first place.
ii) Moreover, there’s a general asymmetry between most religions and Christianity or Evangelicalism. Most religions are more concerned with what you do than what you believe: orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy. Outward conformity rather than inward conviction.
Evangelicalism, in particular, with its emphasis on sola fide, cultivates self-examination.
“Often in debate, it's not a question of whether you can get the other guy to agree with you; it's a matter of how far you can force him to go so he can keep disagreeing with you. If a Christian must retreat to those sort of Calvinist positions, I consider it a win.”
Here he’s claiming victory without offering a single argument.
“Odd that Hays is the one who invoked Pascal's Wager style argumentation in his introduction, then totally disregards it here.”
That’s not self-explanatory. Where’s the argument?
“This is a decent point. I often think popular skeptical writers go overboard. However, I would point out that the scientific community has in-house ways of filtering out faulty science in the long run…”
Not to mention in-house ways of promoting groupthink.
“…but the religious community has no apparent in-house way of filtering out faulty religion.”
That’s too vague to merit a response. What “faulty religion” does he have in mind?
Sunday, August 08, 2010
Whale of a tale
Seasanctuary writes:
Chan mentions Plantinga's "evolutionary argument against naturalism" (p21). I consider this argument every bit an embarrassment for Christian apologetics as Dawkins' argument that there "almost certainly" isn't a God because evolution can explain the diversity of species is an embarrassment for atheism. Why? Because Plantinga's argument relies on the notion that accuracy of senses and processing of those senses would not tend to improve survival and reproduction.
1. First off, I want to thank Seasanctuary for having offered a civil response here. I appreciate it.
2. Hm, Seasanctuary hasn't said anything to undermine the EAAN here though. There's no argument against the EAAN itself.
After all, when he writes "Plantinga's argument relies on the notion that accuracy of senses and processing of those senses would not tend to improve survival and reproduction," the context is within naturalism and evolution, not within a Christian theistic framework. In other words, Plantinga's argument only "relies" on this notion insofar as this notion is a more plausible consequence given naturalism and evolution than it is given Christianity.
3. As such, I believe the point of the EAAN is, given naturalism and evolution, our cognitive faculties would be less reliable than given, say, Christianity and evolution. So, yeah, in a sense, sure, Seasanctuary could say it's "an embarrassment," but as far as I understand the EAAN would argue it's more of "an embarrassment" to those who affirm both naturalism and evolution than it would be to those who affirm Christian theism.
4. As an aside, Seasanctuary mentions "the accuracy of senses and processing of those senses." But (as a friend has pointed out elsewhere) this technically wouldn't be part of the cognitive faculties. It'd be better to say the relevant cognitive faculty here would fall under perception i.e. the beliefs produced or held on the basis of the senses.
5. In any case, since I was using the EAAN to respond to Tarico and not arguing for the EAAN myself, I don't necessarily need to defend the EAAN, per se.
On page 22, Chain [sic] points out that science does not give "epistemic certainty." That's correct, and that's why science has been beating religion soundly in matters of earthly knowledge. Science does not claim certainty then get it wrong; science deals in degrees of justification and revisability...and gets better.
1. I don't see how "science has been beating religion soundly in matters of earthly knowledge" follows from the fact that "science does not give 'epistemic certainity'"? Unfortunately, I don't think Seasanctuary connects the dots here.
2. "Science does not claim certainty then get it wrong."
But "science" isn't some monolithic entity which speaks its claims with a singular voice. Science is primarily conducted by scientists. As such, I would think some scientists might not make this claim, while others would. It'd depend on the scientist or group of scientists or scientific organization.
Now, this is just a hunch so I could be wrong, but I think it's more often than not the case that scientists do claim they know an experiment or theory or somesuch is established "fact." Sure, they'll leave a little wiggle room for the possibility that they could be wrong. Perhaps like a militant atheist such as Dawkins would say he can never certifiably prove God's non-existence. They won't publicly claim to have perfect "certainty" that scientific theory or law x is absolutely, irrevocably true. But in practice they act as if it is and often treat others as if they should fall into line as well.
Sometimes it gets so bad that, if other scientists or scholars call into question certain scientific theories, especially the scientific theory du jour, they'll be ridiculed if not worse. Just look at the internecine debates among secular scientists who subscribe to macroevolution. Let alone the debates with non-atheists such as the ID crowd. Or look at the peer review controversy with Stephen Meyer and Richard Sternberg. What's more, whatever one may think of the movie Expelled, it does testify how some ID proponents were ostracized from their respective science departments for espousing ID. (Here, you might reply that ID is not science. But then I'd think you'd have to deal with Bradley Monton's arguments in Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design, among others.) Although I know it has its problems, Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions likewise offers several relevant examples.
3. Besides, the bigger issue is what grounds science for Tarico given Tarico's beliefs.
4. But, yeah, scientific conclusions are often quite tentative. In fact, depending on what's meant exactly, I'd cautiously and tentatively agree "science deals in degrees of justification and revisability...and gets better."
5. Of course, I never said science is worse than "religion" in the acquisition of veridical knowledge. Rather, what I said is that science has its limitations. But in my chapter I never explicitly said one was better or worse than the other.
In addition I pointed out how science isn't the only means to acquire veridical knowledge about the world around us or about ourselves. There's reason, logic, philosophical inquiry. There's also mathematics - which, strictly speaking, isn't a science. After all, how do we discover, say, logical or mathematical truths from empiricism?
6. If I may, however, I think Seasanctuary should re-direct his criticism against the contributors to The Christian Delusion who place "science" on a far higher epistemological pedestal than I do.
"[S]cientific theories and laws must maintain throughout all time — past, present, and future" (p22). Otherwise, Chan claims, science would not "properly function at all." This is quite mistaken. Science is descriptive. If "the speed of light is not constant," science can adjust for that. If "gravity operates differently in the Milky Way than in other galaxies," science can adjust for that too.
The main thing to say is that this is in response to Tarico's robust view of atheism and science. That is, my point isn't that science can't readjust itself. I grant it can. Rather, the point I was trying to drive at is that science has its limitations, which runs contrary to Tarico's view of science.
I do agree that science does not do everything we might like it to do, but it is our wonder tool for overcoming cognitive bias by combining our gaze on the world. Scientific epistemology is good, but limited. However, religious epistemology does not automatically gain respect just by pointing the shortcomings of science.
1. Actually, I do think it's enough for me to point out "the shortcomings of science" to deal with Tarico's argument since Tarico takes much stronger stances than perhaps Seasanctuary would here.
2. Along similar lines, Randal Rauser points out:
1. This is a different argument, and one which I didn't explicitly mention in my critique of Tarico's chapter, but I do think Christianity better grounds science than atheism, given the metascientific issues. Regrettably, I don't have the time to get into this though.
2. But perhaps Seasanctuary might consider starting here:
To be fair, it sounds like Chan is taking a defensive stance. Even if Christianity does operate psychologically like false religious beliefs, it could still be the case that Christianity is actually true. But then, I think Tarico is largely trying to give an explanation for Christian psychology to readers who are already convinced it is false. These stances don't directly conflict. They DO conflict when TCD is touted as the book that proves Christianity wrong, so Chan's defensive response is entirely appropriate in that context.
1. As far as the neuropsychology is concerned, I'd agree with Plantinga: "To show that there are natural processes that produce religious belief does nothing, so far, to discredit it; perhaps God designed us in such a way that it is by virtue of those processes that we come to have knowledge of him."
2. I don't know whether Tarico is solely targeting "readers who are already convinced [Christianity] is false." Personally, I don't think so. After all, she's agreed to publish her chapter in a book which as you also note is frequently "touted as the book that proves Christianity wrong."
3. In fact, I think that's one of the book's main problems: "...TCD is touted as the book that proves Christianity wrong." The authors themselves as well as others who offer blurbs for the book frequently promote it as the be-all, end-all response to Christianity. They overestimate their arguments.
4. At any rate, thanks again, Seasanctuary, for a civil response.
Chan mentions Plantinga's "evolutionary argument against naturalism" (p21). I consider this argument every bit an embarrassment for Christian apologetics as Dawkins' argument that there "almost certainly" isn't a God because evolution can explain the diversity of species is an embarrassment for atheism. Why? Because Plantinga's argument relies on the notion that accuracy of senses and processing of those senses would not tend to improve survival and reproduction.
1. First off, I want to thank Seasanctuary for having offered a civil response here. I appreciate it.
2. Hm, Seasanctuary hasn't said anything to undermine the EAAN here though. There's no argument against the EAAN itself.
After all, when he writes "Plantinga's argument relies on the notion that accuracy of senses and processing of those senses would not tend to improve survival and reproduction," the context is within naturalism and evolution, not within a Christian theistic framework. In other words, Plantinga's argument only "relies" on this notion insofar as this notion is a more plausible consequence given naturalism and evolution than it is given Christianity.
3. As such, I believe the point of the EAAN is, given naturalism and evolution, our cognitive faculties would be less reliable than given, say, Christianity and evolution. So, yeah, in a sense, sure, Seasanctuary could say it's "an embarrassment," but as far as I understand the EAAN would argue it's more of "an embarrassment" to those who affirm both naturalism and evolution than it would be to those who affirm Christian theism.
4. As an aside, Seasanctuary mentions "the accuracy of senses and processing of those senses." But (as a friend has pointed out elsewhere) this technically wouldn't be part of the cognitive faculties. It'd be better to say the relevant cognitive faculty here would fall under perception i.e. the beliefs produced or held on the basis of the senses.
5. In any case, since I was using the EAAN to respond to Tarico and not arguing for the EAAN myself, I don't necessarily need to defend the EAAN, per se.
On page 22, Chain [sic] points out that science does not give "epistemic certainty." That's correct, and that's why science has been beating religion soundly in matters of earthly knowledge. Science does not claim certainty then get it wrong; science deals in degrees of justification and revisability...and gets better.
1. I don't see how "science has been beating religion soundly in matters of earthly knowledge" follows from the fact that "science does not give 'epistemic certainity'"? Unfortunately, I don't think Seasanctuary connects the dots here.
2. "Science does not claim certainty then get it wrong."
But "science" isn't some monolithic entity which speaks its claims with a singular voice. Science is primarily conducted by scientists. As such, I would think some scientists might not make this claim, while others would. It'd depend on the scientist or group of scientists or scientific organization.
Now, this is just a hunch so I could be wrong, but I think it's more often than not the case that scientists do claim they know an experiment or theory or somesuch is established "fact." Sure, they'll leave a little wiggle room for the possibility that they could be wrong. Perhaps like a militant atheist such as Dawkins would say he can never certifiably prove God's non-existence. They won't publicly claim to have perfect "certainty" that scientific theory or law x is absolutely, irrevocably true. But in practice they act as if it is and often treat others as if they should fall into line as well.
Sometimes it gets so bad that, if other scientists or scholars call into question certain scientific theories, especially the scientific theory du jour, they'll be ridiculed if not worse. Just look at the internecine debates among secular scientists who subscribe to macroevolution. Let alone the debates with non-atheists such as the ID crowd. Or look at the peer review controversy with Stephen Meyer and Richard Sternberg. What's more, whatever one may think of the movie Expelled, it does testify how some ID proponents were ostracized from their respective science departments for espousing ID. (Here, you might reply that ID is not science. But then I'd think you'd have to deal with Bradley Monton's arguments in Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design, among others.) Although I know it has its problems, Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions likewise offers several relevant examples.
3. Besides, the bigger issue is what grounds science for Tarico given Tarico's beliefs.
4. But, yeah, scientific conclusions are often quite tentative. In fact, depending on what's meant exactly, I'd cautiously and tentatively agree "science deals in degrees of justification and revisability...and gets better."
5. Of course, I never said science is worse than "religion" in the acquisition of veridical knowledge. Rather, what I said is that science has its limitations. But in my chapter I never explicitly said one was better or worse than the other.
In addition I pointed out how science isn't the only means to acquire veridical knowledge about the world around us or about ourselves. There's reason, logic, philosophical inquiry. There's also mathematics - which, strictly speaking, isn't a science. After all, how do we discover, say, logical or mathematical truths from empiricism?
6. If I may, however, I think Seasanctuary should re-direct his criticism against the contributors to The Christian Delusion who place "science" on a far higher epistemological pedestal than I do.
"[S]cientific theories and laws must maintain throughout all time — past, present, and future" (p22). Otherwise, Chan claims, science would not "properly function at all." This is quite mistaken. Science is descriptive. If "the speed of light is not constant," science can adjust for that. If "gravity operates differently in the Milky Way than in other galaxies," science can adjust for that too.
The main thing to say is that this is in response to Tarico's robust view of atheism and science. That is, my point isn't that science can't readjust itself. I grant it can. Rather, the point I was trying to drive at is that science has its limitations, which runs contrary to Tarico's view of science.
I do agree that science does not do everything we might like it to do, but it is our wonder tool for overcoming cognitive bias by combining our gaze on the world. Scientific epistemology is good, but limited. However, religious epistemology does not automatically gain respect just by pointing the shortcomings of science.
1. Actually, I do think it's enough for me to point out "the shortcomings of science" to deal with Tarico's argument since Tarico takes much stronger stances than perhaps Seasanctuary would here.
2. Along similar lines, Randal Rauser points out:
If I had written this chapter [Tarico's] I would have dropped the sweeping statements about irrationality in favor of a healthy dose of epistemic fallibilism. (This would avoid me defeating myself.) Next, I would have developed at much greater length natural accounts of certain religious phenomena (e.g. the relationship between the stimulation of the amygdala and OBEs). Finally, I would have argued that these natural accounts provide a modest undercutting defeater for religious beliefs.It could have even more shortcomings. How does religion correct for cognitive bias? So far as I can tell, it doesn't.
In fact, I don't think they do. But that would seem to be the best way to argue. As Donald McKay pointed out years ago, such nothing-buttery is always of limited probative force.
1. This is a different argument, and one which I didn't explicitly mention in my critique of Tarico's chapter, but I do think Christianity better grounds science than atheism, given the metascientific issues. Regrettably, I don't have the time to get into this though.
2. But perhaps Seasanctuary might consider starting here:
Before we can properly review the scientific evidence, we need to review our philosophy of science, and that, in turn, goes back to our underlying epistemology. Does my perception of the world resemble the world?He could then read works by Christian epistemologists like Alvin Plantinga, Paul Moser, and John Frame. But other Tbloggers could give far better thoughts and recommendations here than I can (e.g. Steve Hays, Paul Manata).
A dog or cat is a consummate realist. Fido believes that furry face staring back at him in the mirror is the real deal. But I don’t regard canine or feline epistemology as the best available theory of knowledge—unless you’re planning to catch rats or hunt chipmunks.
Like man’s best friend, many people treat the percipient as though he were a camera obscura—with a pair of holes bored into the front-end of the box to admit images, another pair drilled on either side to admit sounds, and so on. On this view, there is no filtering process. The light that passes through the opening and casts a shadow on the backside is a scaled down replica of the image that bounced off the sensible object. So there is a close, family resemblance between the input and readout.
But on a more scientific analysis, the observer or observable world is more like an enigma machine. Light bouncing off the sensible object encodes the secondary properties in the form of electromagnetic information, and when that strikes the eye, the data stream is reencoded as electrochemical information. What reaches consciousness is not a miniature image of the sensible object, but a cryptogram. It bears no more resemblance to the original than a music score is a facsimile of sound. A music score is code language. The relation between notes and tones is conventional.
But even our scientific analysis is more than a little illusory. When we try to break down the various steps involved sensory processing, we are having to describe the input in terms of the readout, as if we could retrace the process. We talk about the tree, and the light from the tree, and the eye, and the optic nerve, and neural pathways and synapses and so on. And this is described as if we were on the outside, seeing the info feed in, when—in fact—our mind is on the receiving end, and the readout is more like a little film projector. Our perception of the external world is an optical illusion, like the silver screen.
That doesn’t mean that the external world is an illusion. But it lies at several removes from immediate awareness. At an ontological level, there is a public world; but at an epistemic level, there is only a private world of my mind and your mind.
At this point, someone might ask, then how do you know that there even is an external world? Maybe it’s just that projector running in your head! And, at a philosophical level, there is no knock down argument against this objection.
But, at a theological level, there is. For the Creator of the world enjoys an intersubjectival knowledge of the world. And by virtue of revelation, we may tap into a God’s-eye view of the world. For propositions, as abstract information, are identical at either end of the transmission process—unless they come out as gibberish (garbage in/garbage out). If you understand what you read, then it was not garbled in transmission. It still must be encoded in a sensible medium, but the readout is the same as the input. Otherwise, it would be unintelligible.
At the level of basic epistemology, science can never disprove the Bible because divine revelation is our only clear window onto the world. Otherwise, we perceive the world through the stained-glass solipsism of our inescapable subjectivity.
To be fair, it sounds like Chan is taking a defensive stance. Even if Christianity does operate psychologically like false religious beliefs, it could still be the case that Christianity is actually true. But then, I think Tarico is largely trying to give an explanation for Christian psychology to readers who are already convinced it is false. These stances don't directly conflict. They DO conflict when TCD is touted as the book that proves Christianity wrong, so Chan's defensive response is entirely appropriate in that context.
1. As far as the neuropsychology is concerned, I'd agree with Plantinga: "To show that there are natural processes that produce religious belief does nothing, so far, to discredit it; perhaps God designed us in such a way that it is by virtue of those processes that we come to have knowledge of him."
2. I don't know whether Tarico is solely targeting "readers who are already convinced [Christianity] is false." Personally, I don't think so. After all, she's agreed to publish her chapter in a book which as you also note is frequently "touted as the book that proves Christianity wrong."
3. In fact, I think that's one of the book's main problems: "...TCD is touted as the book that proves Christianity wrong." The authors themselves as well as others who offer blurbs for the book frequently promote it as the be-all, end-all response to Christianity. They overestimate their arguments.
4. At any rate, thanks again, Seasanctuary, for a civil response.
Saturday, August 07, 2010
Steven Carr: Bible Answer Man
Paul Manata said...
Steven Carr said:
"CARR: Tim has not read the Bible, where Paul says Christians were persecuted on the issue of circumcision.
Apart from the logical blunder of assuming that if S is persecuted for X, this means that S cannot also be persecuted for Y, Z, etc., Steven Carr has not read his Bible:
Read Acts 4:1-20, e.g.,:
1The priests and the captain of the temple guard and the Sadducees came up to Peter and John while they were speaking to the people. 2They were greatly disturbed because the apostles were teaching the people and proclaiming in Jesus the resurrection of the dead. 3They seized Peter and John, and because it was evening, they put them in jail until the next day. 4But many who heard the message believed, and the number of men grew to about five thousand.
And read Acts ch. 23, e.g.,:
"6Then Paul, knowing that some of them were Sadducees and the others Pharisees, called out in the Sanhedrin, "My brothers, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee. I stand on trial because of my hope in the resurrection of the dead." 7When he said this, a dispute broke out between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, and the assembly was divided. 8(The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, and that there are neither angels nor spirits, but the Pharisees acknowledge them all.)"
And also Acts 17, where Paul is ridiculed by the intellectuals for preaching the resurrection.
So, Steven, you might want to read the Bible before you claim other people haven't. But it's your "rep," I guess.
August 07, 2010 4:36 PM
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2010/08/frauds-ufos-and-gospels.html#c4898536038717293606
Steven Carr said:
"CARR: Tim has not read the Bible, where Paul says Christians were persecuted on the issue of circumcision.
Apart from the logical blunder of assuming that if S is persecuted for X, this means that S cannot also be persecuted for Y, Z, etc., Steven Carr has not read his Bible:
Read Acts 4:1-20, e.g.,:
1The priests and the captain of the temple guard and the Sadducees came up to Peter and John while they were speaking to the people. 2They were greatly disturbed because the apostles were teaching the people and proclaiming in Jesus the resurrection of the dead. 3They seized Peter and John, and because it was evening, they put them in jail until the next day. 4But many who heard the message believed, and the number of men grew to about five thousand.
And read Acts ch. 23, e.g.,:
"6Then Paul, knowing that some of them were Sadducees and the others Pharisees, called out in the Sanhedrin, "My brothers, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee. I stand on trial because of my hope in the resurrection of the dead." 7When he said this, a dispute broke out between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, and the assembly was divided. 8(The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, and that there are neither angels nor spirits, but the Pharisees acknowledge them all.)"
And also Acts 17, where Paul is ridiculed by the intellectuals for preaching the resurrection.
So, Steven, you might want to read the Bible before you claim other people haven't. But it's your "rep," I guess.
August 07, 2010 4:36 PM
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2010/08/frauds-ufos-and-gospels.html#c4898536038717293606
Sola gratia
STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
“Putting on hold the issue about defining synergism for the moment... you seem to be saying we are accountable for a part of our salvation, despite the fact that we don’t cause it. But the issue with ‘saved by grace through faith’ one of accountably – God’s reason for saving by grace through faith is so we will be unable to boast. If the cause of faith doesn’t determine accountability, and accountability is the issue, then the cause of faith isn’t the real issue at hand. In short, you are not really denying one of the premises, so you are stuck with the conclusion.”
i) I’m discussing “accountability” because you’re trying to artificially reduce and shift the issue to “responsibility,” and in the process you equivocate. That obviously doesn’t mean I accept your framework. Indeed, I made it clear that I don’t accept your framework.
ii) Accountability is by no means the only issue. There’s the central issue of what it means to be saved solely by grace, which you’re attempting to divert attention away from.
iii) ”Responsibility” is a moral or legal category. It isn’t “synergistic” in the sense of “two parties working together.” You’re jumping categories again.
That’s analogous to the distinction between justification and sanctification. Justification, like responsibility, is a forensic state, not a subjective process.
“As for your statement that we do not cause faith, many Calvinists are satisfied by saying we do not cause regeneration even if we do cause faith.”
What Calvinists typically say is that faith is a gift of God. They also say monergistic regeneration causes faith. Born-again Christians exercise faith, but they don’t cause faith.
“We are saved through faith.”
I never said we're “saved through faith.” Faith is a necessary condition of salvation. And we are justified by faith (alone).
“If salvation includes coming to faith, then we come to faith through faith.”
Wrong again. We “come to” justification through faith, we “come to” faith through regeneration, and we “come to regeneration” through saving grace.
“From this it’s clear (at least to me) that in the context of saved by grace through faith, that saved is equivalent to justified, forgiven, redeemed and adopted. The grace that leads to faith is a different topic.”
”Clear to you” because you confuse and oversimplify the process.
“Faith and justification are related concepts, but the two are conceptually distinct.”
I never conflated the two. That’s just your tendentious way of first imputing to me something I never said or implied, then “correcting” my alleged mistake.
“We believe; God justifies the believer. It’s true, simple, and cleanly solves the problem you find yourself in above.”
To the contrary, that only pushes the problem back a step. What’s the source of justifying faith?
You’re doing a fine job of illustrating how little credit Arminians give to God. You want the least God you can get away with.
“To my knowledge, the reformers (Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Melanchthon, Bullinger, Knox….) didn’t use the terms monergism or synergism, nor did their Roman Catholic opponents.”
You’re back to your bad habit of committing the word=concept fallacy. The question at issue is the concept of sola gratia. Is it monergistic or synergistic?
“Likewise, when Calvinists say sanctification is synergistic, they are not denying sanctification is by grace, nor are they saying man has LFW with respect to sanctification.”
i) When using “synergism” in the technical sense, they avoid “synergism” in reference to sanctification. Instead, they use “cooperation.”
ii) The comparison with sanctification doesn’t help you, for that’s another case in which Arminianism denies sola gratia. In Calvinism, the process of sanctification is the inevitable result of monergistic regeneration. Moreover, God preserves the regenerate from committing apostasy. So the human will is not an independent variable, unlike Arminianism. Rather, we have a cause/effect relation.
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
“Putting on hold the issue about defining synergism for the moment... you seem to be saying we are accountable for a part of our salvation, despite the fact that we don’t cause it. But the issue with ‘saved by grace through faith’ one of accountably – God’s reason for saving by grace through faith is so we will be unable to boast. If the cause of faith doesn’t determine accountability, and accountability is the issue, then the cause of faith isn’t the real issue at hand. In short, you are not really denying one of the premises, so you are stuck with the conclusion.”
i) I’m discussing “accountability” because you’re trying to artificially reduce and shift the issue to “responsibility,” and in the process you equivocate. That obviously doesn’t mean I accept your framework. Indeed, I made it clear that I don’t accept your framework.
ii) Accountability is by no means the only issue. There’s the central issue of what it means to be saved solely by grace, which you’re attempting to divert attention away from.
iii) ”Responsibility” is a moral or legal category. It isn’t “synergistic” in the sense of “two parties working together.” You’re jumping categories again.
That’s analogous to the distinction between justification and sanctification. Justification, like responsibility, is a forensic state, not a subjective process.
“As for your statement that we do not cause faith, many Calvinists are satisfied by saying we do not cause regeneration even if we do cause faith.”
What Calvinists typically say is that faith is a gift of God. They also say monergistic regeneration causes faith. Born-again Christians exercise faith, but they don’t cause faith.
“We are saved through faith.”
I never said we're “saved through faith.” Faith is a necessary condition of salvation. And we are justified by faith (alone).
“If salvation includes coming to faith, then we come to faith through faith.”
Wrong again. We “come to” justification through faith, we “come to” faith through regeneration, and we “come to regeneration” through saving grace.
“From this it’s clear (at least to me) that in the context of saved by grace through faith, that saved is equivalent to justified, forgiven, redeemed and adopted. The grace that leads to faith is a different topic.”
”Clear to you” because you confuse and oversimplify the process.
“Faith and justification are related concepts, but the two are conceptually distinct.”
I never conflated the two. That’s just your tendentious way of first imputing to me something I never said or implied, then “correcting” my alleged mistake.
“We believe; God justifies the believer. It’s true, simple, and cleanly solves the problem you find yourself in above.”
To the contrary, that only pushes the problem back a step. What’s the source of justifying faith?
You’re doing a fine job of illustrating how little credit Arminians give to God. You want the least God you can get away with.
“To my knowledge, the reformers (Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Melanchthon, Bullinger, Knox….) didn’t use the terms monergism or synergism, nor did their Roman Catholic opponents.”
You’re back to your bad habit of committing the word=concept fallacy. The question at issue is the concept of sola gratia. Is it monergistic or synergistic?
“Likewise, when Calvinists say sanctification is synergistic, they are not denying sanctification is by grace, nor are they saying man has LFW with respect to sanctification.”
i) When using “synergism” in the technical sense, they avoid “synergism” in reference to sanctification. Instead, they use “cooperation.”
ii) The comparison with sanctification doesn’t help you, for that’s another case in which Arminianism denies sola gratia. In Calvinism, the process of sanctification is the inevitable result of monergistic regeneration. Moreover, God preserves the regenerate from committing apostasy. So the human will is not an independent variable, unlike Arminianism. Rather, we have a cause/effect relation.
Is God unpicturable?
I was glancing through a book by Virgil Dunbar entitled Why Christ Can’t Be Pictured. Here’s the underlying principle which seems to ground his overall position:
“Because the triune God is holy, no member of the triune Godhead can be pictured: God’s holy nature separates Him from artistic creation. The holiness of God’s nature reveals that He is a separate category of being, ontologically separate from the world, unpictureable by means of art” (111).
On the face of it, one obvious problem with this contention is the fact that Scripture contains picturesque descriptions of God. Take this example:
"As I looked,
thrones were placed,
and the Ancient of Days took his seat;
his clothing was white as snow,
and the hair of his head like pure wool;
his throne was fiery flames;
its wheels were burning fire.
(Dan 7:9)
That's not a graven image of God. It is, however, a verbal image of God: a word-picture. And it's only natural for the reader to visualize the divine self-imagery. This picturesque description appeals to the imagination of the reader.
It's also hard to tell the essential difference between the mental image which this picturesque description is designed to evoke in the mind of the reader, and an extramental (i.e. artistic) image of the same thing.
If God pictures himself, then God is picturable. Perhaps Dunbar would draw a distinction between divine self-portraits and human efforts to picture God without reference to revelatory exemplars.
Yet his metaphysical argument, which hinges on divine transcendence, seems to disallow that sort of distinction. So what are we to make of Dan 7:9 and analogous depictions in Scripture?
Keep in mind, too, that Dan 7:9 pictures God discarnate (the Father) rather than God incarnate (the Son). So the question of God’s picturability antedates the Incarnation.
“Because the triune God is holy, no member of the triune Godhead can be pictured: God’s holy nature separates Him from artistic creation. The holiness of God’s nature reveals that He is a separate category of being, ontologically separate from the world, unpictureable by means of art” (111).
On the face of it, one obvious problem with this contention is the fact that Scripture contains picturesque descriptions of God. Take this example:
"As I looked,
thrones were placed,
and the Ancient of Days took his seat;
his clothing was white as snow,
and the hair of his head like pure wool;
his throne was fiery flames;
its wheels were burning fire.
(Dan 7:9)
That's not a graven image of God. It is, however, a verbal image of God: a word-picture. And it's only natural for the reader to visualize the divine self-imagery. This picturesque description appeals to the imagination of the reader.
It's also hard to tell the essential difference between the mental image which this picturesque description is designed to evoke in the mind of the reader, and an extramental (i.e. artistic) image of the same thing.
If God pictures himself, then God is picturable. Perhaps Dunbar would draw a distinction between divine self-portraits and human efforts to picture God without reference to revelatory exemplars.
Yet his metaphysical argument, which hinges on divine transcendence, seems to disallow that sort of distinction. So what are we to make of Dan 7:9 and analogous depictions in Scripture?
Keep in mind, too, that Dan 7:9 pictures God discarnate (the Father) rather than God incarnate (the Son). So the question of God’s picturability antedates the Incarnation.
fMRI limitations
The Christian Delusion rests several key conclusions regarding religious belief formation and related phenomena on what functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging scans tell us about the brain. But many philosophers and scientists argue fMRI scans (as well as other technologies) have their limitations. Here are a few examples:
- "Over-interpreting Functional Neuroimages" (PDF) by Marc Burock (2009).
- "What we can do and what we cannot do with fMRI" by Nikos Logothetis (2008).
- "Seeing is believing: the effect of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning" (PDF) by David McCabe and Alan Castel (2008). This isn't about fMRI's limitations. Rather it's about how the scientifically untrained are prone to believe statements more strongly if they are dressed up in the guise of science. Surely a lesson for Loftus and his crew who think way too highly of the amazing superpowers of "science"!
- "Neuroscience and the Art of Single Cell Recordings" by Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart (2003).
- "What Do Brain Data Really Show?" by Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart (2002).
- "Epistemic Issues in Procuring Evidence about the Brain: The Importance of Research Instruments and Techniques" in Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader by William Bechtel (ed.) (2001).
- "Functional Neuroimages Fail to Discover Pieces of Mind in the Parts of the Brain" by Guy Van Orden and Kenneth Paap (1997).
- "PET: Exploring the Myth and the Method" by Robert Stufflebeam and William Bechtel (1997).
- Wikipedia: Issues in fMRI
Drain bamage
Many secular scientists believe the mind emerges from physical processes originating in the brain. However, there are a couple of problems with this:
- Some secular scientists argue, for example, that certain neurological disorders which impair the brain's function demonstrate that the mind reduces to the brain because, if the brain was not damaged, then the person's mind would not be likewise "damaged." They would not suffer from certain personality disorders, for instance, which are associated with brain lesions or somesuch. So these secular scientists see a causal relationship between the brain and the mind, with the brain causing the mind.
At best, I'd think this might prove the brain is necessary to mediate the mind. But I don't see how it'd prove the brain generates the mind.
It's like water flowing through pipes. If the pipes are damaged, the water can't flow through. Thus the pipes are necessary for the water to flow from one end to the other. But pipe damage doesn't somehow prove pipes generate water. - Moreover, psychiatrists often use Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) to help patients who suffer from mental disorders like Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Depending on the disorder, CBT can be quite effective. BTW, Google "neuroplasticity" here too. As such, this would seem to show that the mind has some influence on the brain, that the influence isn't necessarily unidirectional from brain effecting mind as some secular scientists might argue, but that it might involve the reverse.
- Near Death Experiences (NDEs). There have been NDE cases where the patient is clinically dead. Brain dead. After resuscitation, the same patients were able to accurately report what they saw happen to them in the emergency room or operating table. It's hard to sift the wheat from the chaff as far as NDEs are concerned, but Steve and Jason, among others, have provided helpful info in the past. For example, see this post.
Remembering Calvin
No doubt John Calvin is a controversial historical figure. Many regard him as having been an austere man. Others criticize him for his role in what happened to Michael Servetus. If memory serves me correctly, historian Will Durant went as far as to claim Calvin was a monster and ran Geneva as a police state. Even among Christians, some have exclaimed in disbelief “What love is this?” with regard to the theological system known as “Calvinism.”Others have had a much higher esteem for Calvin. B.B. Warfield believed Calvin deserved the title “the theologian of the Holy Spirit.” D. Martyn Lloyd-Jones once compared the Puritans to the Alps but Calvin (along with Luther) to the Himalayas (and Jonathan Edwards to Mt. Everest).
Speaking for myself, I think the negative charges are probably based on an overly simplistic and possibly even faulty understanding of the man and his beliefs, whereas the acclamations are at least somewhat overstated.
In any case, we don't (or shouldn't) look to Calvin in the same way, for example, as Catholics look to the Pope or the Magisterium. Calvin was merely a man of his times, warts and all - which Calvin himself would have been the first to admit. He tried to serve God and God’s people as best as he could according to the light God gave him to understand and unfold the Holy Scriptures. Calvin himself prayed: "I offer my heart to you, O Lord, eagerly and earnestly."
Personally, I find reading Calvin wonderfully sweet. He lived in harsh times and suffered quite a bit in his life—probably more so than most of us in the West have or will ever suffer. Yet, by God’s grace, his hard life made his pen flow with such beautiful words. When I read his writings (in the context of such a polemical period of history), there’s a tremendous sense of humility and love which exudes from his writing, which draws me to worship and thank the Lord our God for what he did in and through such a servant.
Perhaps the following words will seem excessive as well, but I’m tempted to say, if Luther was the bright, blazing fire which ignited the Reformation, then Calvin was the still, deep waters which settled the Reformation. If Luther burned as hot as the sun in the fight for the truth of justification by faith alone in Christ alone, then Calvin was as profoundly reflective as the moon in his philosophical and theological systematizing of these same biblical truths. If Luther was like Elijah challenging Ahab and Jezebel, calling down fire from heaven, slaying the prophets of Baal, and riding into the heavens upon a chariot of fire, then Calvin was like Elisha quietly and graciously feeding the hungry with bread, curing Naaman the Syrian of leprosy, and restoring a poor woman’s only son to life again. Perhaps the difference between the two Reformers is accentuated in each of their most famous hymns: in Luther’s case the vigorous and stalwart "A Mighty Fortress Is Our God," and in Calvin’s case the gentle and honeyed "I Greet Thee Who My Sure Redeemer Art."
Friday, August 06, 2010
Mind does really matter
Apparently, the science (if you like) runs contrary to what certain contributors in The Christian Delusion claim:
This article reviews neuroimaging studies of conscious and voluntary regulation of various emotional states (sexual arousal, sadness, negative emotion). The results of these studies show that metacognition and cognitive recontextualization selectively alters the way the brain processes and reacts to emotional stimuli. Neuroimaging studies of the effect of psychotherapy in patients suffering from diverse forms of psychopathology (obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, unipolar major depressive disorder, social phobia, spider phobia, borderline personality) are also examined. The results of these studies indicate that the mental functions and processes involved in diverse forms of psychotherapy exert a significant influence on brain activity. Neuroimaging investigations of the placebo effect in healthy individuals (placebo analgesia, psychostimulant expectation) and patients with Parkinson's disease or unipolar major depressive disorder are also reviewed. The results of these investigations demonstrate that beliefs and expectations can markedly modulate neurophysiological and neurochemical activity in brain regions involved in perception, movement, pain, and various aspects of emotion processing. Collectively, the findings of the neuroimaging studies reviewed here strongly support the view that the subjective nature and the intentional content (what they are "about" from a first-person perspective) of mental processes (e.g., thoughts, feelings, beliefs, volition) significantly influence the various levels of brain functioning (e.g., molecular, cellular, neural circuit) and brain plasticity. Furthermore, these findings indicate that mentalistic variables have to be seriously taken into account to reach a correct understanding of the neural bases of behavior in humans. An attempt is made to interpret the results of these neuroimaging studies with a new theoretical framework called the Psychoneural Translation Hypothesis.Beauregard M. (2007). "Mind does really matter: evidence from neuroimaging studies of emotional self-regulation, psychotherapy, and placebo effect." Progress in Neurobiology, Mar 81: 218-36.
"The problem with Calvinism is…"
According to Roger Olson:
Second, I am not a Calvinist because (hold on!) IF I WERE A CALVINIST I would have trouble distinguishing between God and the devil. Some Calvinists have misinterpreted this saying. They think I’m accusing them of worshiping the devil. Nothing could be farther from the truth. All I am saying is, if I were a Calvinist, being of the bent of mind that I am (striving for logical consistency as much as possible), I would have trouble clearly distinguishing between God and the devil in my own mind.
http://www.rogereolson.com/2010/08/06/the-problem-with-calvinism-is/
But if a worshiper finds it psychologically difficult to distinguish between a divine object of worship and a diabolical object of worship, then isn’t Olson, in fact, accusing the Calvinist of worshipping the devil?
To my Calvinist acquaintances who take umbrage at this...
I don’t take umbrage. But it does give the lie to the notion that Arminians are more tolerant than Calvinists.
The point is–God’s character. IF God elects people to salvation unconditionally and IF God IS love (1 John) why doesn’t he save everybody?
Of course, that oversimplifies 1 John. For one thing, John writes in very divisive terms about believers and unbelievers. If God is light and love, then a loving God hates darkness. A loving God hates the antithesis of light.
IF I could be a universalist, I could be a Calvinist. I don’t care about free will for its own sake or for any humanist reasons. Hell is the sticky issue. The Calvinist God could save everyone because his election to salvation is unconditional and his grace is irresistible. Apparently, he purposefully chooses to “pass over” some (which is in effect the same as foreordaining them to hell). Why? For his glory? Some Calvinists say hell is necessary for the full manifestation of God’s attribute of justice. I ask what that says about the cross-was it not a sufficient manifestation of God’s justice?
But it isn’t clear why the Arminian God couldn’t save everyone. Is Olson claiming that there is no possible world in which the inhabitants freely choose God?
Even in this world, there are many people who, according to Olson, freely accept Jesus. So why can’t the Arminian God create a world consisting of people like that?
The devil wants everyone to go to hell. The God of Calvinism wants many to go to hell. Is that enough of a difference of character? Not to me.
That could scarcely be more simpleminded. It’s like claiming that everyone who kills another person has identical motives. A father who shoots a house burglar who threatens his wife and kids is morally equivalent to the house burglar who shoots the family.
Assuming that the devil wants everyone to go to hell, his reasons are quite different from God’s. The devil is a sore loser. He presumably wants to take as many others down out of sheer spite (e.g. Rev 12:17).
That’s hardly equivalent to God exacting retributive justice on the wicked. What does it say about the level of Olson’s moral and theological discernment that he can’t tell the difference?
The God of Jesus Christ is absolutely, unconditionally good. The God of Calvinism, from my perspective, is not absolutely, uncondtionally good and, in fact, has a dark side that includes willing that people perish eternally (contrary to 2 Peter 3:9 and 1 Timothy 2:4).
i) Of course that’s dishonest because it disregards alternative interpretations.
ii) For that matter, it’s not even consistent with Arminianism. How is the Arminian God unwilling that people perish eternality when he deliberately and knowingly makes hellbound sinners even though it lay within his power to spare them that fate by not making them in the first place?
What I think is that Calvinists are confused insofar as they believe God is love (as Scripture clearly says) and yet hold onto their belief in unconditional election, limited atonement and irresistible grace.
It’s both patronizing and implausible to say sophisticated Calvinists are “confused,” as if they hadn’t thought through that issue before.
What really bothers me at a personal as well as professional level is the present, on-going attitude of superiority and even exclusiveness being fostered among many of the young, restless, Reformed Christians.
Doesn’t he think his own theological viewpoint is superior to another viewpoint which confuses God and Satan? Surely he regards Calvinism as decidedly and fatally inferior.
He talks about “exclusiveness,” but you have to wonder how many Reformed theologians, Reformed exegetes, and Reformed philosophers he’s personally shared his views with. He comes across is being very insular.
Second, I am not a Calvinist because (hold on!) IF I WERE A CALVINIST I would have trouble distinguishing between God and the devil. Some Calvinists have misinterpreted this saying. They think I’m accusing them of worshiping the devil. Nothing could be farther from the truth. All I am saying is, if I were a Calvinist, being of the bent of mind that I am (striving for logical consistency as much as possible), I would have trouble clearly distinguishing between God and the devil in my own mind.
http://www.rogereolson.com/2010/08/06/the-problem-with-calvinism-is/
But if a worshiper finds it psychologically difficult to distinguish between a divine object of worship and a diabolical object of worship, then isn’t Olson, in fact, accusing the Calvinist of worshipping the devil?
To my Calvinist acquaintances who take umbrage at this...
I don’t take umbrage. But it does give the lie to the notion that Arminians are more tolerant than Calvinists.
The point is–God’s character. IF God elects people to salvation unconditionally and IF God IS love (1 John) why doesn’t he save everybody?
Of course, that oversimplifies 1 John. For one thing, John writes in very divisive terms about believers and unbelievers. If God is light and love, then a loving God hates darkness. A loving God hates the antithesis of light.
IF I could be a universalist, I could be a Calvinist. I don’t care about free will for its own sake or for any humanist reasons. Hell is the sticky issue. The Calvinist God could save everyone because his election to salvation is unconditional and his grace is irresistible. Apparently, he purposefully chooses to “pass over” some (which is in effect the same as foreordaining them to hell). Why? For his glory? Some Calvinists say hell is necessary for the full manifestation of God’s attribute of justice. I ask what that says about the cross-was it not a sufficient manifestation of God’s justice?
But it isn’t clear why the Arminian God couldn’t save everyone. Is Olson claiming that there is no possible world in which the inhabitants freely choose God?
Even in this world, there are many people who, according to Olson, freely accept Jesus. So why can’t the Arminian God create a world consisting of people like that?
The devil wants everyone to go to hell. The God of Calvinism wants many to go to hell. Is that enough of a difference of character? Not to me.
That could scarcely be more simpleminded. It’s like claiming that everyone who kills another person has identical motives. A father who shoots a house burglar who threatens his wife and kids is morally equivalent to the house burglar who shoots the family.
Assuming that the devil wants everyone to go to hell, his reasons are quite different from God’s. The devil is a sore loser. He presumably wants to take as many others down out of sheer spite (e.g. Rev 12:17).
That’s hardly equivalent to God exacting retributive justice on the wicked. What does it say about the level of Olson’s moral and theological discernment that he can’t tell the difference?
The God of Jesus Christ is absolutely, unconditionally good. The God of Calvinism, from my perspective, is not absolutely, uncondtionally good and, in fact, has a dark side that includes willing that people perish eternally (contrary to 2 Peter 3:9 and 1 Timothy 2:4).
i) Of course that’s dishonest because it disregards alternative interpretations.
ii) For that matter, it’s not even consistent with Arminianism. How is the Arminian God unwilling that people perish eternality when he deliberately and knowingly makes hellbound sinners even though it lay within his power to spare them that fate by not making them in the first place?
What I think is that Calvinists are confused insofar as they believe God is love (as Scripture clearly says) and yet hold onto their belief in unconditional election, limited atonement and irresistible grace.
It’s both patronizing and implausible to say sophisticated Calvinists are “confused,” as if they hadn’t thought through that issue before.
What really bothers me at a personal as well as professional level is the present, on-going attitude of superiority and even exclusiveness being fostered among many of the young, restless, Reformed Christians.
Doesn’t he think his own theological viewpoint is superior to another viewpoint which confuses God and Satan? Surely he regards Calvinism as decidedly and fatally inferior.
He talks about “exclusiveness,” but you have to wonder how many Reformed theologians, Reformed exegetes, and Reformed philosophers he’s personally shared his views with. He comes across is being very insular.
The Web of Truth
Is Christianity fideistic? Some militant infidels quote statements like the following to prove that Christianity is fideistic:
By definition, no apparent, perceived or claimed evidence in any field, including history and chronology, can be valid if it contradicts the scriptural record. Of primary importance is the fact that evidence is always subject to interpretation by fallible people who do not possess all information.
http://www.answersingenesis.org/about/faith
We affirm that canonical Scripture should always be interpreted on the basis that it is infallible and inerrant.
http://www.spurgeon.org/~phil/creeds/chicago.htm
Does this prove their point? No.
I. Faith & Reason
To begin with, there are many different models of how faith and reason interrelate in historical theology. So it’s not possible to generalize about how Christians view the relation between faith and reason. For different Christians have different models.
II. The Heart Has Reasons
Some Christians don’t rely on theistic proofs or archaeological evidence. They may rely on things like the argument from prophecy. Of they may rely on their personal experience of God’s daily presence in their lives.
III. AIG
Is the AIG statement fideistic? Not obviously so. For that depends on why AIG believes in the definition. What evidence is feeding into the definition. For instance, AIG has lots of stuff on apologetics. So you can’t isolate their the definition their supporting material.
IV. Chicago Statement
What about the Chicago Statement? Well, consider the viewpoint of the framers. For the framers included Christian apologists like John Wenham, John Gerstner, John Warwick Montgomery, &c. But you can’t very well say these men were fideists.
V. The Web of Truth
As Quine pointed out many years ago, a belief-system is like a spider web. Some beliefs are more central than others. Some beliefs support the web in ways that others do not. Some beliefs are expendable with minor adjustments.
But every belief cannot be expendable, for you can only judge the evidence in light of certain other beliefs. For instance, it’s all well and good to appeal to scientific evidence, but that’s a nonstarter apart from certain metascientific presuppositions like the existence of the external world, the intelligibility of the physical universe, the value of induction, the applicability of abstract numbers and concrete things, the reliability of the senses, the reliability of the human mind, &c. Any attempt to prove these metascientific assumptions is bound to be circular. What kind of worldview is necessary to underwrite these metascientific assumptions?
By definition, no apparent, perceived or claimed evidence in any field, including history and chronology, can be valid if it contradicts the scriptural record. Of primary importance is the fact that evidence is always subject to interpretation by fallible people who do not possess all information.
http://www.answersingenesis.org/about/faith
We affirm that canonical Scripture should always be interpreted on the basis that it is infallible and inerrant.
http://www.spurgeon.org/~phil/creeds/chicago.htm
Does this prove their point? No.
I. Faith & Reason
To begin with, there are many different models of how faith and reason interrelate in historical theology. So it’s not possible to generalize about how Christians view the relation between faith and reason. For different Christians have different models.
II. The Heart Has Reasons
Some Christians don’t rely on theistic proofs or archaeological evidence. They may rely on things like the argument from prophecy. Of they may rely on their personal experience of God’s daily presence in their lives.
III. AIG
Is the AIG statement fideistic? Not obviously so. For that depends on why AIG believes in the definition. What evidence is feeding into the definition. For instance, AIG has lots of stuff on apologetics. So you can’t isolate their the definition their supporting material.
IV. Chicago Statement
What about the Chicago Statement? Well, consider the viewpoint of the framers. For the framers included Christian apologists like John Wenham, John Gerstner, John Warwick Montgomery, &c. But you can’t very well say these men were fideists.
V. The Web of Truth
As Quine pointed out many years ago, a belief-system is like a spider web. Some beliefs are more central than others. Some beliefs support the web in ways that others do not. Some beliefs are expendable with minor adjustments.
But every belief cannot be expendable, for you can only judge the evidence in light of certain other beliefs. For instance, it’s all well and good to appeal to scientific evidence, but that’s a nonstarter apart from certain metascientific presuppositions like the existence of the external world, the intelligibility of the physical universe, the value of induction, the applicability of abstract numbers and concrete things, the reliability of the senses, the reliability of the human mind, &c. Any attempt to prove these metascientific assumptions is bound to be circular. What kind of worldview is necessary to underwrite these metascientific assumptions?
The appeal of atheism
John Loftus is trying to discredit Christianity by drawing attention to the emotional appeal of the Christian faith. That, however, raises a number of issues:
1. The Emotional Appeal of Christianity
There’s no doubt that many Christians find Christianity emotionally appealing in various ways. However, if I were to generalize, I venture to say that atheism is more appealing to the young, while Christianity is more appealing to the old. And, of course, there are many exceptions in both directions. So Loftus’ objection cuts both ways.
Moreover, if the Christian God exists, then we’d expect Christianity to be appealing in some fundamental respects. God would be the supreme good, and the wellspring of all secondary goods. So Loftus’ objection only has teeth under the prior assumption that the Christian God does not exist. His objection has no independent value.
A final problem with this line of objection is the tacit assumption that it’s wrong to believe something for purely emotional reasons. What’s allegedly objectionable about this is that if we believe something for purely emotional reasons, then we don’t believe it because it’s true.
But the problem with this objection is that Loftus is a moral relativist. For instance, he once got into a debate with David Wood over at David’s old blog (http://www.problemofevil.org/) in which he admitted that nothing is intrinsically evil. But in that event, it’s not intrinsically wrong to believe something for purely emotional reasons.
Loftus bandies the word “delusion,” because of the stigma attaching to that word, yet this is out of sync with his moral relativism. Even if Christian faith were delusive, Loftus is in no position to say that makes it wrong.
2. Tough-Minded Atheism
Infidels also resort to emotional appeals on a regular basis. This takes two basic forms. There’s the tuff-guy atheist. He pretends to revel in the stark, unyielding purity of atheism. Yes, the worldview is utterly bleak, but that’s what separates the men from the boys. Real men can stare the abyss in the face without blinking.
Atheism is not for everyone, but that’s a good thing. Atheism is for a select few. The best and the brightest. The atheist is a breed apart. A moral and intellectual elite. On a brave and noble pursuit of truth wherever it leads, whatever the cost.
He doesn’t lean on the “crutch” of religion. He has no need for the weak-minded bromides of the Gospel. Real men don’t cry. No, he’s like a courageous soldier who volunteers for a suicide mission, to sacrifice his life for the sake of his comrades.
3. Tender-Minded Atheism
Then you have infidels who advertise the bright side of atheism. Atheism is liberating. Atheism emancipates us from the shackles of religion. From blind superstition and ignorance. From all that’s backward and primitive. Atheism stands for the stately march of science.
Christianity is a cringing, groveling, servile religion. At the beck-and-call of its jealous, overbearing God. But atheism frees us from the abject servility of religion. We can stand on our own two feet. Be the master of our destiny and captain of our soul (if we had a soul).
1. The Emotional Appeal of Christianity
There’s no doubt that many Christians find Christianity emotionally appealing in various ways. However, if I were to generalize, I venture to say that atheism is more appealing to the young, while Christianity is more appealing to the old. And, of course, there are many exceptions in both directions. So Loftus’ objection cuts both ways.
Moreover, if the Christian God exists, then we’d expect Christianity to be appealing in some fundamental respects. God would be the supreme good, and the wellspring of all secondary goods. So Loftus’ objection only has teeth under the prior assumption that the Christian God does not exist. His objection has no independent value.
A final problem with this line of objection is the tacit assumption that it’s wrong to believe something for purely emotional reasons. What’s allegedly objectionable about this is that if we believe something for purely emotional reasons, then we don’t believe it because it’s true.
But the problem with this objection is that Loftus is a moral relativist. For instance, he once got into a debate with David Wood over at David’s old blog (http://www.problemofevil.org/) in which he admitted that nothing is intrinsically evil. But in that event, it’s not intrinsically wrong to believe something for purely emotional reasons.
Loftus bandies the word “delusion,” because of the stigma attaching to that word, yet this is out of sync with his moral relativism. Even if Christian faith were delusive, Loftus is in no position to say that makes it wrong.
2. Tough-Minded Atheism
Infidels also resort to emotional appeals on a regular basis. This takes two basic forms. There’s the tuff-guy atheist. He pretends to revel in the stark, unyielding purity of atheism. Yes, the worldview is utterly bleak, but that’s what separates the men from the boys. Real men can stare the abyss in the face without blinking.
Atheism is not for everyone, but that’s a good thing. Atheism is for a select few. The best and the brightest. The atheist is a breed apart. A moral and intellectual elite. On a brave and noble pursuit of truth wherever it leads, whatever the cost.
He doesn’t lean on the “crutch” of religion. He has no need for the weak-minded bromides of the Gospel. Real men don’t cry. No, he’s like a courageous soldier who volunteers for a suicide mission, to sacrifice his life for the sake of his comrades.
3. Tender-Minded Atheism
Then you have infidels who advertise the bright side of atheism. Atheism is liberating. Atheism emancipates us from the shackles of religion. From blind superstition and ignorance. From all that’s backward and primitive. Atheism stands for the stately march of science.
Christianity is a cringing, groveling, servile religion. At the beck-and-call of its jealous, overbearing God. But atheism frees us from the abject servility of religion. We can stand on our own two feet. Be the master of our destiny and captain of our soul (if we had a soul).
Thursday, August 05, 2010
O Love that will not let me go
From George Matheson on his hymn "O Love that wilt not let me go":
My hymn was composed in the manse of Innelan [Argyleshire, Scotland] on the evening of the 6th of June, 1882, when I was 40 years of age. I was alone in the manse at that time. It was the night of my sister’s marriage, and the rest of the family were staying overnight in Glasgow. Something happened to me, which was known only to myself, and which caused me the most severe mental suffering. The hymn was the fruit of that suffering. It was the quickest bit of work I ever did in my life. I had the impression of having it dictated to me by some inward voice rather than of working it out myself. I am quite sure that the whole work was completed in five minutes, and equally sure that it never received at my hands any retouching or correction. I have no natural gift of rhythm. All the other verses I have ever written are manufactured articles; this came like a dayspring from on high.HT: Dane Ortlund.
Human flourishing
Although I wouldn't necessarily agree with everything, I do think this article is quite helpful. Especially for college students and the like.
HT: Andy Naselli.
HT: Andy Naselli.
"Neuron firings"
John Loftus said:
Neurology shows us there is an extremely close relationship between our beliefs and neuron firings, which can be drug induced, or even surgically removed. There is therefore no need for the supernatural explanation of the soul.A few points:
- I'll take Loftus at his word. Since he's referring to the rather broad field of neurology without further detail, then I'd like him to cite where in a scientific journal like Neuron or Nature or the latest editions of standard physiology textbooks like Guyton and Hall or Boron and Boulpaep that a scientist claims "neuron firings" (i.e. nerve cells generating action potentials) lead to belief formation in, say, skeletal muscle, smooth muscle, or cardiac muscle cells? After all, nerve cells, which are the predominant object of study in neurology, have a significant role in muscle contraction as well!
Okay, obviously this is a "cheeky" request. But I make the point to illustrate that in all likelihood Loftus has no idea what he's talking about here. Or is there another reason he seems, at best, clumsy in his communication of the science? For example, does he mean "beliefs" or "neuron firings" can be "drug induced"? Which one? Both? I suspect he means we can use certain drugs to induce a neuron to fire which in turn, I suppose according to Loftus, would somehow produce a belief through a series of other events which involve other aspects of the nervous system such as neurotransmitters and synapses? Of course, Loftus never spells it out for us. Or at least cites a journal article to which we can refer. Likewise, is Loftus referring to "neuron firings" when he says something can be "surgically removed"? How would he propose to "surgically remove," say, an action potential?
Rather, I think Loftus is just throwing around the authority of science without apparently understanding its content. I'm not asking him to become a scientist, but if he's going to make such sweeping, categorical pronouncements, he should at least familiarize himself with enough of the science to understand what he's trying to say in the first place. If he did, I think he'd not only phrase things better, but more importantly he'd find neuroscientists and related experts aren't all agreed (e.g. he can run a simple search on the topic via PubMed). There's hardly a scientific consensus on the topic, even among secular scientists (not to mention other scholars like philosophers). At this point, it'd behoove Loftus to cut back on the overly confident rhetoric when it's quite debatable whether the science backs him up. A more modest claim would've been the wiser way to go. - But let's say it's true our beliefs are a result of "neuron firings." So what? As Alvin Plantinga points out in Warranted Christian Belief: "To show that there are natural processes that produce religious belief does nothing, so far, to discredit it; perhaps God designed us in such a way that it is by virtue of those processes that we come to have knowledge of him."
- Also, Loftus assumes without argument that correlation establishes causation or even identity i.e. "neuron firings" = beliefs. But it'd be like someone saying since rain comes from clouds, therefore rain and clouds are the same.
(Or possibly he's saying the one supervenes upon the other. If this is what he's saying, we can cross this bridge when we get there.) - By making the claim that "Neurology shows us there is an extremely close relationship between our beliefs and neuron firings," Loftus has to assume the reliability of his cognitive faculties. So how does he know he has accurately read and remembered the scientific journal articles (or whatever) he read which presumably support his claim?
- BTW, if a person's beliefs can be reduced to "neuron firings," then is Loftus arguing against the influence of upbringing, people, and other external environmental factors on a person's beliefs? If so, then he's undermining the need for his own Outsider Test for Faith (OTF).
However, if he'd respond by saying environmental and other factors influence how neurons fire (or something along those lines), then he's not reducing beliefs to neurophysiology alone, in which case his point would likewise work against the atheist's beliefs since the atheist's "neuron firings" would be subject to similar environmental and other influences too. And, as such, the atheist ought to be subject to the OTF on these same grounds, which would contradict what he has said in the past.
Evolutionary Christology?
Liberals typically allege that the gospels reflect legendary embellishment as we proceed from the earliest gospel (Mark) through Matthew and Luke to John.
There are some obvious problems with this allegation.
i) Mark is more miracle-laden than John. And Mark already has a high Christology (as Simon Gathercole, among others, has documented).
ii) John could be dated to the 60s. And even if, ad arguendo, we go for liberal dates, it isn’t clear on what basis liberals date John later than Matthew or Luke. Basically, they use the circular argument that John is more theologically advanced.
iii) However, Larry Hurtado has furnished another argument against the facile thesis of legendary embellishment:
“The human ‘realism’ of Mark’s presentation of Jesus noted by John Donahue also furthers a connection between Jesus and intended readers…The Markan emphasis on Jesus as example explains the treatment of the Twelve, which has been so misconstrued by some scholars…In fact, this concern to make Jesus both the basis of redemption (10:45; 14:22-24) and the pattern for his followers probably gives the best explanation for the overall shape and limits of the Markan account, for what Mark does and does not include in it. We have in Mark a story of Jesus that is shaped just like the life of the disciples. In the words of Philip Davis, the Markan story is ‘a blueprint for the Christian life’: it begins with a baptism and then issues in mission, opposition, and persecution involving death, and ends with divine vindication by resurrection,” Lord Jesus Christ (Eerdmans 2003), 310-11.
“Whether Mark knew of any miraculous birth tradition we cannot say. But if he did, he had good reason for not including one in a story of Jesus shaped to serve as a paradigm for his readers. As Christians, their life too began with their baptism, and Mark emphasizes that they too are called to follow Jesus in proclaiming the gospel and with a readiness to undergo persecution, trusting that if they lose their life for the sake of Jesus and the gospel, they shall receive eschatological vindication (e.g., 8:34-38). Likewise, no resurrection appearance was necessary or even appropriate. For readers who are to live with trust in God for their own vindication, it was sufficient to affirm that God has raised Jesus, the paradigmatic figure for their lives and hopes (16:5-6),” 311.
“Of course, the empty tomb and the announcement by the ‘youth’ in 16:5-6 are to be read in light of Jesus’ prophecies of his resurrection (8:31; 9:9,31; 10:34; 14:28). For the intended Christian readers of Mark, the ending was not nearly so doubtful in meaning as it has often been made by modern scholars,” 311n138.
There are some obvious problems with this allegation.
i) Mark is more miracle-laden than John. And Mark already has a high Christology (as Simon Gathercole, among others, has documented).
ii) John could be dated to the 60s. And even if, ad arguendo, we go for liberal dates, it isn’t clear on what basis liberals date John later than Matthew or Luke. Basically, they use the circular argument that John is more theologically advanced.
iii) However, Larry Hurtado has furnished another argument against the facile thesis of legendary embellishment:
“The human ‘realism’ of Mark’s presentation of Jesus noted by John Donahue also furthers a connection between Jesus and intended readers…The Markan emphasis on Jesus as example explains the treatment of the Twelve, which has been so misconstrued by some scholars…In fact, this concern to make Jesus both the basis of redemption (10:45; 14:22-24) and the pattern for his followers probably gives the best explanation for the overall shape and limits of the Markan account, for what Mark does and does not include in it. We have in Mark a story of Jesus that is shaped just like the life of the disciples. In the words of Philip Davis, the Markan story is ‘a blueprint for the Christian life’: it begins with a baptism and then issues in mission, opposition, and persecution involving death, and ends with divine vindication by resurrection,” Lord Jesus Christ (Eerdmans 2003), 310-11.
“Whether Mark knew of any miraculous birth tradition we cannot say. But if he did, he had good reason for not including one in a story of Jesus shaped to serve as a paradigm for his readers. As Christians, their life too began with their baptism, and Mark emphasizes that they too are called to follow Jesus in proclaiming the gospel and with a readiness to undergo persecution, trusting that if they lose their life for the sake of Jesus and the gospel, they shall receive eschatological vindication (e.g., 8:34-38). Likewise, no resurrection appearance was necessary or even appropriate. For readers who are to live with trust in God for their own vindication, it was sufficient to affirm that God has raised Jesus, the paradigmatic figure for their lives and hopes (16:5-6),” 311.
“Of course, the empty tomb and the announcement by the ‘youth’ in 16:5-6 are to be read in light of Jesus’ prophecies of his resurrection (8:31; 9:9,31; 10:34; 14:28). For the intended Christian readers of Mark, the ending was not nearly so doubtful in meaning as it has often been made by modern scholars,” 311n138.
Monergism & synergism
STEVE SAID:
Dan, you're being duplicitous. If grace is only a necessary condition of salvation, and not a sufficient condition, then we aren't saved by grace alone. Rather, our libertarian consent is an additional factor, independent of God's grace, without which grace cannot save us.
STEVE SAID:
JD WALTERS SAID:
"I'm not at all familiar with these controversies, but it doesn't seem like Arminianism is a denial of salvation through grace alone. God may only give salvation to those who freely accept it by faith."
In which case, saving faith is not included in saving grace. That's not part of the package. Rather, that's something by which the package is received or rejected. Hence, salvation is not by grace alone.
"Rather, the person is sitting inside the cart and gives God permission to push it up."
If permission is a necessary condition of salvation, and saving grace does not entail permission, then permission is an independent factor. In that event, we're not saved by grace alone.
"I don't see how that's being duplicitous. In both Calvinism and Arminianism a person is still helpless to effect their own salvation. Acceptance of God's offer of salvation has always been a prerequisite of salvation."
And in Calvinism, unlike Arminianism, acceptance of God's offer of salvation is, itself, wholly the result of God's grace. Therefore, your comparison actually illustrates the difference, and reinforces my original charge.
STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
"The necessary/sufficient cause or condition distinction is unimportant in this discussion as can be seen by the fact that Calvinism affirms man is responsible despite sufficient causes."
You're jumping categories. The question at issue is not what's sufficient to render us responsible, but what's sufficient to ensure our salvation. Those are hardly convertible propositions.
"The key here is that faith does not save, God's grace does."
Faith is a necessary condition of salvation. So the question is whether or not saving faith is a necessary result of saving grace. If not, then you can't say we're saved solely by grace.
D:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
“Salvation, in the expression salvation by grace alone through faith alone) is typically referring to justification, forgiveness, redemption, and adoption. Apparently you mean something else - something that precedes faith.”
Typically, salvation by grace alone through faith alone stood in contrast to Roman Catholic synergism. And that debate certainly included the preconditions of saving faith.
“But it's not like faith is through faith alone.”
Which ducks the question of what causes saving faith.
“Again, even if faith is a necessary result of grace, man still believes, per Calvinism. That's synergistic. By couching the discussion in terms of necessary/sufficient conditions; you enter a labyrinth you can't escape from.”
You’re attempting to redefine “synergism” to suit your personal agenda, but “synergism” has a specialized meaning in historic theology. The fact that faith is a human mental act doesn’t make that relation “synergistic” in historic theological usage.
STEVE SAID:
SLW, Paul doesn't define faith in contrast to grace. Rather, Paul defines faith in contrast to works.
Unless saving faith is a gracious faith, we're not saved by grace alone.
STEVE SAID:
SLW SAID:
“That right there should tell us that faith isn't the stuff of works, which is often the argument Calvinists make against Arminians. Faith is not at odds with grace, so not contrastible.”
Actually, you just confirmed the accuracy of the charge. Faith would be a work if you decouple faith from grace.
“If salvation is likened to sunlight, faith would be the window that lets in the light. The light is what it is, the window doesn't produce it, it is merely the means for it to get inside the room.”
Your metaphor is not an argument. And it’s not exegeted from relevant prooftexts. It’s just a distraction.
“That confounds grace and faith. Faith by this reckoning is just a category of grace. In that case, the five solas should be reduced to four to avoid repetition.”
Illogical. Grace/faith is a cause/effect relationship. As such, faith isn’t reducible to grace–anymore than effects are reducible to causes.
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...
“The Protestants did not deny that men cooperate in their own conversion, taking that word in the sense in which the Romanists used the term (and the still broader term justificatio), as including the whole work of turning unto God. No one denies that the man in the synagogue cooperated in stretching out his withered arm or that the impotent one at the pool was active in obeying the command of Christ, ‘Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thine house.’ But the question is, Did they cooperate in the communication of vital power to their impotent limbs? So Protestants do not deny that the soul is active in conversion, that the ‘arbitrium a Deo motum’ freely assents.’
You’re using “cooperation” as if it were a synonym for “synergism.” That’s incorrect.
i) In historical theology, “synergism” is a technical term. It’s not equivalent to “cooperation.”
If you want to use “synergism” in a popular, modern sense (i.e. “interaction”), you’re free to do so, but don’t anachronistically substitute that innovation for historic theological usage, then accuse me of using “salvation” in “atypical” fashion.
ii) To say man is “active” in “conversion” is also equivocal. At which stage of the process? In Reformed theology, man is passive in regeneration. However, regeneration produces faith (among other things). Man is “active” in believing, but saving faith is the effect of saving grace.
So the “activity” or “cooperation” is still grounded in monergism.
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...
“This is because faith does not save us, God’s grace does.”
You keep resorting to that evasive, palpably defective formula. But in Scripture, faith in Christ is clearly a necessary condition of salvation (excluding special cases).Therefore, you can’t separate faith from salvation.
Your only out is to separate faith from grace. But since faith and salvation are inseparable (see above), if you separate faith and grace, then you deny salvation by grace alone.
“If you hold that 1) believing is our act, 2) we are responsible for our acts and 3) believing is part of salvation, then it follows that we are responsible for part of our salvation.”
That’s another one of your evasive equivocations. “Responsible” has more than one meaning. It can mean “accountable/liable,” or it can denote a causal relation, as in: “pilot error was responsible for the crash” (i.e. the pilot caused the plane to crash).
In Calvinism, we are “responsible” in the sense of having a duty to believe, and being culpable in case we shirk that obligation.
But a Christian is not the cause of saving faith. Rather, God’s grace is the cause of saving faith. So a Christian is not “responsible” for saving faith in the causal sense. And that’s what makes it monergistic rather than synergistic (in the technical sense of the terms).
“As I explained to Steve, in the phrase, ‘saved by grace through faith’ saved must be taken in the narrow sense as justification – otherwise we end up with the absurd idea that faith is through faith.”
To say that saving faith is the result of saving grace is hardly a tautologous formula. That’s not reducible to “faith is through faith.”
That’s just one of Dan’s rhetorical gimmicks. And it fails.
“He rejected the narrow sense and maintained the broad sense. In which case it follows that, per Calvinism (or at least per Steve), we end up being responsible for part of our salvation. This violates grace alone in the expression ‘saved by grace through faith’…”
The “violation” only ensues if we allow Dan to trade on conspicuous equivocations.
“Further I would define synergism in terms of two parties working together.”
Which is not what “synergism” means in the conflict with Rome.
Dan, you're being duplicitous. If grace is only a necessary condition of salvation, and not a sufficient condition, then we aren't saved by grace alone. Rather, our libertarian consent is an additional factor, independent of God's grace, without which grace cannot save us.
STEVE SAID:
JD WALTERS SAID:
"I'm not at all familiar with these controversies, but it doesn't seem like Arminianism is a denial of salvation through grace alone. God may only give salvation to those who freely accept it by faith."
In which case, saving faith is not included in saving grace. That's not part of the package. Rather, that's something by which the package is received or rejected. Hence, salvation is not by grace alone.
"Rather, the person is sitting inside the cart and gives God permission to push it up."
If permission is a necessary condition of salvation, and saving grace does not entail permission, then permission is an independent factor. In that event, we're not saved by grace alone.
"I don't see how that's being duplicitous. In both Calvinism and Arminianism a person is still helpless to effect their own salvation. Acceptance of God's offer of salvation has always been a prerequisite of salvation."
And in Calvinism, unlike Arminianism, acceptance of God's offer of salvation is, itself, wholly the result of God's grace. Therefore, your comparison actually illustrates the difference, and reinforces my original charge.
STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
"The necessary/sufficient cause or condition distinction is unimportant in this discussion as can be seen by the fact that Calvinism affirms man is responsible despite sufficient causes."
You're jumping categories. The question at issue is not what's sufficient to render us responsible, but what's sufficient to ensure our salvation. Those are hardly convertible propositions.
"The key here is that faith does not save, God's grace does."
Faith is a necessary condition of salvation. So the question is whether or not saving faith is a necessary result of saving grace. If not, then you can't say we're saved solely by grace.
D:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
“Salvation, in the expression salvation by grace alone through faith alone) is typically referring to justification, forgiveness, redemption, and adoption. Apparently you mean something else - something that precedes faith.”
Typically, salvation by grace alone through faith alone stood in contrast to Roman Catholic synergism. And that debate certainly included the preconditions of saving faith.
“But it's not like faith is through faith alone.”
Which ducks the question of what causes saving faith.
“Again, even if faith is a necessary result of grace, man still believes, per Calvinism. That's synergistic. By couching the discussion in terms of necessary/sufficient conditions; you enter a labyrinth you can't escape from.”
You’re attempting to redefine “synergism” to suit your personal agenda, but “synergism” has a specialized meaning in historic theology. The fact that faith is a human mental act doesn’t make that relation “synergistic” in historic theological usage.
STEVE SAID:
SLW, Paul doesn't define faith in contrast to grace. Rather, Paul defines faith in contrast to works.
Unless saving faith is a gracious faith, we're not saved by grace alone.
STEVE SAID:
SLW SAID:
“That right there should tell us that faith isn't the stuff of works, which is often the argument Calvinists make against Arminians. Faith is not at odds with grace, so not contrastible.”
Actually, you just confirmed the accuracy of the charge. Faith would be a work if you decouple faith from grace.
“If salvation is likened to sunlight, faith would be the window that lets in the light. The light is what it is, the window doesn't produce it, it is merely the means for it to get inside the room.”
Your metaphor is not an argument. And it’s not exegeted from relevant prooftexts. It’s just a distraction.
“That confounds grace and faith. Faith by this reckoning is just a category of grace. In that case, the five solas should be reduced to four to avoid repetition.”
Illogical. Grace/faith is a cause/effect relationship. As such, faith isn’t reducible to grace–anymore than effects are reducible to causes.
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...
“The Protestants did not deny that men cooperate in their own conversion, taking that word in the sense in which the Romanists used the term (and the still broader term justificatio), as including the whole work of turning unto God. No one denies that the man in the synagogue cooperated in stretching out his withered arm or that the impotent one at the pool was active in obeying the command of Christ, ‘Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thine house.’ But the question is, Did they cooperate in the communication of vital power to their impotent limbs? So Protestants do not deny that the soul is active in conversion, that the ‘arbitrium a Deo motum’ freely assents.’
You’re using “cooperation” as if it were a synonym for “synergism.” That’s incorrect.
i) In historical theology, “synergism” is a technical term. It’s not equivalent to “cooperation.”
If you want to use “synergism” in a popular, modern sense (i.e. “interaction”), you’re free to do so, but don’t anachronistically substitute that innovation for historic theological usage, then accuse me of using “salvation” in “atypical” fashion.
ii) To say man is “active” in “conversion” is also equivocal. At which stage of the process? In Reformed theology, man is passive in regeneration. However, regeneration produces faith (among other things). Man is “active” in believing, but saving faith is the effect of saving grace.
So the “activity” or “cooperation” is still grounded in monergism.
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...
“This is because faith does not save us, God’s grace does.”
You keep resorting to that evasive, palpably defective formula. But in Scripture, faith in Christ is clearly a necessary condition of salvation (excluding special cases).Therefore, you can’t separate faith from salvation.
Your only out is to separate faith from grace. But since faith and salvation are inseparable (see above), if you separate faith and grace, then you deny salvation by grace alone.
“If you hold that 1) believing is our act, 2) we are responsible for our acts and 3) believing is part of salvation, then it follows that we are responsible for part of our salvation.”
That’s another one of your evasive equivocations. “Responsible” has more than one meaning. It can mean “accountable/liable,” or it can denote a causal relation, as in: “pilot error was responsible for the crash” (i.e. the pilot caused the plane to crash).
In Calvinism, we are “responsible” in the sense of having a duty to believe, and being culpable in case we shirk that obligation.
But a Christian is not the cause of saving faith. Rather, God’s grace is the cause of saving faith. So a Christian is not “responsible” for saving faith in the causal sense. And that’s what makes it monergistic rather than synergistic (in the technical sense of the terms).
“As I explained to Steve, in the phrase, ‘saved by grace through faith’ saved must be taken in the narrow sense as justification – otherwise we end up with the absurd idea that faith is through faith.”
To say that saving faith is the result of saving grace is hardly a tautologous formula. That’s not reducible to “faith is through faith.”
That’s just one of Dan’s rhetorical gimmicks. And it fails.
“He rejected the narrow sense and maintained the broad sense. In which case it follows that, per Calvinism (or at least per Steve), we end up being responsible for part of our salvation. This violates grace alone in the expression ‘saved by grace through faith’…”
The “violation” only ensues if we allow Dan to trade on conspicuous equivocations.
“Further I would define synergism in terms of two parties working together.”
Which is not what “synergism” means in the conflict with Rome.
Wednesday, August 04, 2010
"The Darwinian problem of evil"
Over at DC, Neal is making life difficult for John Loftus. Too much logic gives Loftus acid indigestion.
Neal said...
I'm not sure why Loftus perceives animal pain as being a "problem". Let's look at this line of reasoning:
P1: If creatures sin, they will suffer.
P2: All creatures suffer.
C: Therefore, all creatures must be sinners.
How is Loftus not affirming the consequent?
August 4, 2010 11:15 AM
Neal said...
Very well...
(P) Any creature that sins must be aware of god's commands
(P) Animals sin
(C) Therefore, animals are aware of god's commands
Second premise is rejected by Christians.
---
(P) To be aware of god's commands, creatures must have received revelation from god
(P) Animals are aware of god's commands
(C) Therefore, animals have received revelation from god
Again, second premise is rejected by Christians.
---
(P) To not go to hell, a creature must accept Jesus as his/her personal savior
(P) All animals are creatures
(C) Animals must accept Jesus as their personal savior to not go to hell
Christians would reject the first premise since creatures who have not sinned will not go to hell.
---
(P) God created all creatures perfect and any who are not perfect (i.e. who sin) have been made so by their own free choice against god
(P) Animals are not perfect
(C) Animals have been made so by their own free choice against god (they have free will)
---
Your second premise here is ambiguous. What is meant by "not perfect"? Are you talking about moral perfection or something else? If you are talking about moral perfection, this premise is rejected by Christians as a non-sequitur. If you are talking about something else, then there is an equivocation with the way it was used in the first premise.
---
"Do you accept all of these conclusions? I see them as what follows if we go down your path. Most of the time Christians want to maintain quite the "healthy" divide between humans and animals because if evidence of consciousness, free-will, and morality were present in animals it would tend to reduce the need for a soul-hypothesis to separate us from them rather than positing a continuous transition via natural selection."
The distinction between humans and animals is in the former being God's image bearers. Animals are not moral agents. This is evident in the fact that we don't hold animals accountable for killing other animals. They're animals. They do what they do.
"Will they join us in heaven?"
I don't know, but if they do it will be based on factors other than moral accountability.
August 4, 2010 2:54 PM
Neal said...
@Hendy,
After I posted my reply, it occurred to me that you may have misunderstood my syllogism. It wasn't an argument that I was presenting as my own, I was trying to summarize Loftus' objection. The conclusion is fallacious because it affirms the consequent. I think you and I are actually on the same page here.
Now perhaps Loftus would object that this isn't the argument he was making, but that raises the question as to exactly what argument he was trying to make. He rhetorically asks a number of questions, and most Christians would agree with the answers he gave for his questions 1-3. His answer to his forth question is offered without an argument.
August 4, 2010 3:37 PM
Neal said...
"Neal, I'm tired of your pseudo-logical thinking and misrepresenting of my arguments."
Your attempt to evade logical critique is noted.
"I doubt you even know what I'm making reference here to. Unless you do you're not worth my time."
Well you're one arrogant cuss aren't you? You seem to think you can turn bad arguments into good ones by dressing them up in the scientific method.
August 4, 2010 8:05 PM
Neal said...
"The existence of the Christian God is improbable given (2)."
By what criteria? What other unstated assumptions are you working with in order to come to that conclusion? What is your justification for holding those assumptions?
August 4, 2010 9:27 PM
Neal said...
"The bottom line is that there is no justification for this massive animal suffering in any of the Christian literature, none, and I've read extensively on it."
How exactly would you know what constitutes "justification"?
"You are either interested in my arguments and will read them for yourself or it won't be worth my time here with you."
I'm interested in the ones that you make on this blog, in which you make lots of ignorant claims, then insult people who dare to criticize your arguments. You can whine all you want about people not reading your book, but why should anyone care when you aren't even competent enough to defend the arguments you make here? You like to lob molotov cocktails at Christians then you start whining when people start throwing them back at you.
But then there are plenty of sycophants here to stroke your ego, so maybe that's all this is about anyway.
August 4, 2010 9:55 PM
Neal said...
I'm not sure why Loftus perceives animal pain as being a "problem". Let's look at this line of reasoning:
P1: If creatures sin, they will suffer.
P2: All creatures suffer.
C: Therefore, all creatures must be sinners.
How is Loftus not affirming the consequent?
August 4, 2010 11:15 AM
Neal said...
Very well...
(P) Any creature that sins must be aware of god's commands
(P) Animals sin
(C) Therefore, animals are aware of god's commands
Second premise is rejected by Christians.
---
(P) To be aware of god's commands, creatures must have received revelation from god
(P) Animals are aware of god's commands
(C) Therefore, animals have received revelation from god
Again, second premise is rejected by Christians.
---
(P) To not go to hell, a creature must accept Jesus as his/her personal savior
(P) All animals are creatures
(C) Animals must accept Jesus as their personal savior to not go to hell
Christians would reject the first premise since creatures who have not sinned will not go to hell.
---
(P) God created all creatures perfect and any who are not perfect (i.e. who sin) have been made so by their own free choice against god
(P) Animals are not perfect
(C) Animals have been made so by their own free choice against god (they have free will)
---
Your second premise here is ambiguous. What is meant by "not perfect"? Are you talking about moral perfection or something else? If you are talking about moral perfection, this premise is rejected by Christians as a non-sequitur. If you are talking about something else, then there is an equivocation with the way it was used in the first premise.
---
"Do you accept all of these conclusions? I see them as what follows if we go down your path. Most of the time Christians want to maintain quite the "healthy" divide between humans and animals because if evidence of consciousness, free-will, and morality were present in animals it would tend to reduce the need for a soul-hypothesis to separate us from them rather than positing a continuous transition via natural selection."
The distinction between humans and animals is in the former being God's image bearers. Animals are not moral agents. This is evident in the fact that we don't hold animals accountable for killing other animals. They're animals. They do what they do.
"Will they join us in heaven?"
I don't know, but if they do it will be based on factors other than moral accountability.
August 4, 2010 2:54 PM
Neal said...
@Hendy,
After I posted my reply, it occurred to me that you may have misunderstood my syllogism. It wasn't an argument that I was presenting as my own, I was trying to summarize Loftus' objection. The conclusion is fallacious because it affirms the consequent. I think you and I are actually on the same page here.
Now perhaps Loftus would object that this isn't the argument he was making, but that raises the question as to exactly what argument he was trying to make. He rhetorically asks a number of questions, and most Christians would agree with the answers he gave for his questions 1-3. His answer to his forth question is offered without an argument.
August 4, 2010 3:37 PM
Neal said...
"Neal, I'm tired of your pseudo-logical thinking and misrepresenting of my arguments."
Your attempt to evade logical critique is noted.
"I doubt you even know what I'm making reference here to. Unless you do you're not worth my time."
Well you're one arrogant cuss aren't you? You seem to think you can turn bad arguments into good ones by dressing them up in the scientific method.
August 4, 2010 8:05 PM
Neal said...
"The existence of the Christian God is improbable given (2)."
By what criteria? What other unstated assumptions are you working with in order to come to that conclusion? What is your justification for holding those assumptions?
August 4, 2010 9:27 PM
Neal said...
"The bottom line is that there is no justification for this massive animal suffering in any of the Christian literature, none, and I've read extensively on it."
How exactly would you know what constitutes "justification"?
"You are either interested in my arguments and will read them for yourself or it won't be worth my time here with you."
I'm interested in the ones that you make on this blog, in which you make lots of ignorant claims, then insult people who dare to criticize your arguments. You can whine all you want about people not reading your book, but why should anyone care when you aren't even competent enough to defend the arguments you make here? You like to lob molotov cocktails at Christians then you start whining when people start throwing them back at you.
But then there are plenty of sycophants here to stroke your ego, so maybe that's all this is about anyway.
August 4, 2010 9:55 PM
Moses & the Flood
PTET SAID:
“So you cannot name one working, credible Biblical scholar who thinks that Moses wrote the Penteteuch…”
Oswald Allis, Gleason Archer, John Currid, Duane Garrett, Richard Hess, Walter Kaiser, Alec Motyer, John Oswalt, Vern Poythress, Allan Ross, John Sailhamer, Douglas Stuart, E. J. Young, to name a few.
“…or who thinks the ‘Flood account’ is actual history.”
T. D. Alexander, John Currid, John J. Davis, James Hoffmeier, Gordon Hugenberger, Kenneth Kitchen, David Livingston, Jeffrey Niehaus, Vern Poythress, Allen Ross, Ronald Youngblood, to name a few.
“So you cannot name one working, credible Biblical scholar who thinks that Moses wrote the Penteteuch…”
Oswald Allis, Gleason Archer, John Currid, Duane Garrett, Richard Hess, Walter Kaiser, Alec Motyer, John Oswalt, Vern Poythress, Allan Ross, John Sailhamer, Douglas Stuart, E. J. Young, to name a few.
“…or who thinks the ‘Flood account’ is actual history.”
T. D. Alexander, John Currid, John J. Davis, James Hoffmeier, Gordon Hugenberger, Kenneth Kitchen, David Livingston, Jeffrey Niehaus, Vern Poythress, Allen Ross, Ronald Youngblood, to name a few.
What's evidence?
Unbelievers insist on telling us that “there is no evidence for the Exodus!”
This, however, raises a number of questions. For instance, unbelievers constantly tout refereed journals. Now suppose an article in a refereed journal mentions a scientific experiment or scientific discovery. Is that evidence for the discovery or experiment in question?
Well, an article about a scientific discovery is not, itself, a scientific discovery. Likewise, an article about a scientific experiment is not, itself, a scientific experiment. Suppose we discover a new bat species in Borneo. A scientific article on a newly-discovered bat is not itself a bat.
So what the article really boils down to is reported evidence. Is reported evidence real evidence? Well, unbelievers who quote scientific journals sure act as though reported evidence is evidence. As it’s not as if the average reader can go on his own expedition to Borneo to confirm the reported finding.
If reported evidence is evidence, then that’s a case of indirect evidence rather than direct evidence. Likewise, if a book of the Bible says the Exodus happened, that’s reported evidence.
And there are other types of indirect evidence. Here’s one line for evidence for the Exodus:
i) Messianic prophecy is evidence for Jesus
ii) The teaching of Jesus is evidence for the OT
If Messianic prophecy vouches for Jesus, and Jesus vouches for the OT, then that’s evidence for the Exodus–among other things.
Of course, you might say that relocates the issue. That shifts the question from evidence for the Exodus to evidence for the Gospels.
But there’s nothing wrong with shifting the question. For the question of whether there’s evidence for the Gospels is very different from the question of whether there’s evidence for the Exodus. Yet the way we answer the former question impinges on how we answer the latter question.
This, however, raises a number of questions. For instance, unbelievers constantly tout refereed journals. Now suppose an article in a refereed journal mentions a scientific experiment or scientific discovery. Is that evidence for the discovery or experiment in question?
Well, an article about a scientific discovery is not, itself, a scientific discovery. Likewise, an article about a scientific experiment is not, itself, a scientific experiment. Suppose we discover a new bat species in Borneo. A scientific article on a newly-discovered bat is not itself a bat.
So what the article really boils down to is reported evidence. Is reported evidence real evidence? Well, unbelievers who quote scientific journals sure act as though reported evidence is evidence. As it’s not as if the average reader can go on his own expedition to Borneo to confirm the reported finding.
If reported evidence is evidence, then that’s a case of indirect evidence rather than direct evidence. Likewise, if a book of the Bible says the Exodus happened, that’s reported evidence.
And there are other types of indirect evidence. Here’s one line for evidence for the Exodus:
i) Messianic prophecy is evidence for Jesus
ii) The teaching of Jesus is evidence for the OT
If Messianic prophecy vouches for Jesus, and Jesus vouches for the OT, then that’s evidence for the Exodus–among other things.
Of course, you might say that relocates the issue. That shifts the question from evidence for the Exodus to evidence for the Gospels.
But there’s nothing wrong with shifting the question. For the question of whether there’s evidence for the Gospels is very different from the question of whether there’s evidence for the Exodus. Yet the way we answer the former question impinges on how we answer the latter question.
Prop 8
Not surprisingly, a sodomite judge overturned a constitutional amendment banning sodomite marriage.
It’s important to be clear on the real issue. The question at issue is not whether sodomite marriage should be legal or illegal. Rather, what’s at stake is whether the people control their gov’t, or their gov’t controls the people. If the citizens of a state don’t have the right to amend the state constitution, then they don’t have any rights. At that point, popular sovereignty has been abolished. In its place is a self-appointed, self-perpetuating bureaucracy answerable to no one, but holding everyone answerable to itself.
It’s important to be clear on the real issue. The question at issue is not whether sodomite marriage should be legal or illegal. Rather, what’s at stake is whether the people control their gov’t, or their gov’t controls the people. If the citizens of a state don’t have the right to amend the state constitution, then they don’t have any rights. At that point, popular sovereignty has been abolished. In its place is a self-appointed, self-perpetuating bureaucracy answerable to no one, but holding everyone answerable to itself.
What Social Science Does---And Doesn't---Know
The first section of The Christian Delusion utterly, totally, and faithfully rests and cobbled together scraps from "the social sciences." As I pointed out in my section of TID, among the many problems the authors of TCD have, one of them is that it is debated whether or not the social sciences are even a science. In any event, this piece was very apropos given TCD's fauning over the supposed findings of the social scientists:
What Social Science Does—and Doesn’t—Know: Our scientific ignorance of the human condition remains profound.
Here's the conclusion of the article:
What Social Science Does—and Doesn’t—Know: Our scientific ignorance of the human condition remains profound.
Here's the conclusion of the article:
Experiments are surely changing the way we conduct social science. The number of experiments reported in major social-science journals is growing rapidly across education, criminology, political science, economics, and other areas. In academic economics, several recent Nobel Prizes have been awarded to laboratory experimentalists, and leading indicators of future Nobelists are rife with researchers focused on RFTs.(HT: Hermonta Godwin)
It is tempting to argue that we are at the beginning of an experimental revolution in social science that will ultimately lead to unimaginable discoveries. But we should be skeptical of that argument. The experimental revolution is like a huge wave that has lost power as it has moved through topics of increasing complexity. Physics was entirely transformed. Therapeutic biology had higher causal density, but it could often rely on the assumption of uniform biological response to generalize findings reliably from randomized trials. The even higher causal densities in social sciences make generalization from even properly randomized experiments hazardous. It would likely require the reduction of social science to biology to accomplish a true revolution in our understanding of human society—and that remains, as yet, beyond the grasp of science.
At the moment, it is certain that we do not have anything remotely approaching a scientific understanding of human society. And the methods of experimental social science are not close to providing one within the foreseeable future. Science may someday allow us to predict human behavior comprehensively and reliably. Until then, we need to keep stumbling forward with trial-and-error learning as best we can.
Diacritical marks
Reaction to TID took a weird turn recently when apostate Hector Avalos channeled the shade of Francis Turretin on the Hebrew vowel points. I'm going to post the comments left by two commenters in the meta:
RANGER SAID:
In regards to the Hebrew of son-in-law and father-in-law, not only were the vowel pointings not added for thousands of years after the events the texts are meant to discuss, but holem, qames-hatuf and qames are all related and can reduce to the other in many situations.
The hilarious thing is that the first comment is by Avalos, who commends Tobin for this comment on Hebrew vowel pointings! Could Avalos have any less credibility as a scholar at this point? He's been known as a crank for years at SBL meetings, but this kind of stuff is simply ridiculous.
RANGER SAID:
Here is a visual illustration of the point about son-in-law/father-in-law made by Steve:
חֹתֵן - this is the word for "possessing a son-in-law" which makes you a father-in-law.
חָתָן - Here is the word for "daughter's husband" or son-in-law.
Even without a knowledge of Hebrew you can see that the main three characters are identical. The point Steve is making is that in the original form, the three identical characters are all that was there. Whether you were writing son-in-law or father-in-law, the word you used was חתן.
In most of the old cognates (Old Arabic, Syriac, Musnad, etc.) the word can mean either son-in-law or father-in-law.
Later scribes placed the vowel-pointings into the text and thus decided based on their own analysis of context, tradition, etc. which word was meant by the three consonants and created a way to distinguish based on adding vowel pointings.
The vowel pointings of course are not inspired, and in this regard the latter scribes that added them could have been incorrect.
This is but one of the many examples where Tobin (and Avalos) show themselves incapable (or willfully reluctant in the case of Avalos) of handling even basic grammatical/linguistic issues.
RANGER SAID:
Notice that Dr. Avalos ignores the point being made above to talk about my usage of "reduce" and other diversions from the actual point being made by us against Tobin (which deals with the usage of vowel pointings to differentiate between forms of חתן.
For those paying attention, notice how each of his "points" divert from the actual discussion, and how his citations only back up the diversions and do not deal directly with the issue at hand.
To clarify things, here is what Tobin said:
Hays suggestion – which he referenced from yet another evangelical author – that the same word is used for father-in-law or son-in-law - is simply incorrect. Anyone with a good lexicon of Biblical Hebrew[30] can check for themselves that the words are pointed differently. Although these words share the same consonant Het-Tav-Nun (Ch-T-N) the vowels use for the word for ‘father-in-law” are different from the word denoting son-in-law or bridegroom. In its most basic form, father-in-law is pointed with a holem (with an “o” sound) above the Het and a sere (with an “e” sound) below the Tav and can be written as choten. The word for son-in-law is pointed with qames (an “a” sound) below both the Het and Tav giving the word chatan.
Hector said, "Tobin is correct, and he speaks to the fact of how often Triabloggers don't have enough expertise in biblical languages to form sound exegetical and historical conclusions."
The argument we are making is that Tobin is incorrect in this assessment because the vowel pointings (which are his central means of differentiating the usage of חתן) come much, much later in the history of the text. Thus, the original words for son-in-law and father-in-law in the pre-Masoretic texts are both simply חתן, which can be interpreted either way depending on context.
In Hebrew, the later tradition differentiated by assigning vowel pointings based on their interpretation, but not every language did this as evidenced by continued non-differentiated usage in the Syriac, Old Arabic and other cognates (see any standard lexicon for evidence of this, ala Kohler Baumgartner).
There is little evidence of pre-Masoretic markers significant enough to differentiate between the holem/sere pointing for חתן, and the qames/qames pointing. It's origins are in the Akkadian ḫat(a)nu, which simply means any relative by marriage (see Huehnergard or even Tawil). For instance, the Samaritan Pentateuch uses the unspecified and unpointed חתן, which is why it remains in the indeterminate Arabic form in the Arabic version. There is nothing to indicate at this point of the textual history how a scribe would differentiate between the two terms outside of context and tradition. Since the actual differentiation in the text comes much, much later in the history of the language this brings the possibility of misinterpretation and error.
STONE SAID:
Dr. Avalos leaves out in his answer that there are many instances in which the Masoretes made decisions on what the "real" reading of the text is, called the "ketiv-qere" readings. Don't let all of the talk about vowel reduction throw you off, because there are many different ways in which vowels reduce.
I might just ask him to use his expertise to translate dalet-waw-dalet.
RANGER SAID:
In regards to the Hebrew of son-in-law and father-in-law, not only were the vowel pointings not added for thousands of years after the events the texts are meant to discuss, but holem, qames-hatuf and qames are all related and can reduce to the other in many situations.
The hilarious thing is that the first comment is by Avalos, who commends Tobin for this comment on Hebrew vowel pointings! Could Avalos have any less credibility as a scholar at this point? He's been known as a crank for years at SBL meetings, but this kind of stuff is simply ridiculous.
RANGER SAID:
Here is a visual illustration of the point about son-in-law/father-in-law made by Steve:
חֹתֵן - this is the word for "possessing a son-in-law" which makes you a father-in-law.
חָתָן - Here is the word for "daughter's husband" or son-in-law.
Even without a knowledge of Hebrew you can see that the main three characters are identical. The point Steve is making is that in the original form, the three identical characters are all that was there. Whether you were writing son-in-law or father-in-law, the word you used was חתן.
In most of the old cognates (Old Arabic, Syriac, Musnad, etc.) the word can mean either son-in-law or father-in-law.
Later scribes placed the vowel-pointings into the text and thus decided based on their own analysis of context, tradition, etc. which word was meant by the three consonants and created a way to distinguish based on adding vowel pointings.
The vowel pointings of course are not inspired, and in this regard the latter scribes that added them could have been incorrect.
This is but one of the many examples where Tobin (and Avalos) show themselves incapable (or willfully reluctant in the case of Avalos) of handling even basic grammatical/linguistic issues.
RANGER SAID:
Notice that Dr. Avalos ignores the point being made above to talk about my usage of "reduce" and other diversions from the actual point being made by us against Tobin (which deals with the usage of vowel pointings to differentiate between forms of חתן.
For those paying attention, notice how each of his "points" divert from the actual discussion, and how his citations only back up the diversions and do not deal directly with the issue at hand.
To clarify things, here is what Tobin said:
Hays suggestion – which he referenced from yet another evangelical author – that the same word is used for father-in-law or son-in-law - is simply incorrect. Anyone with a good lexicon of Biblical Hebrew[30] can check for themselves that the words are pointed differently. Although these words share the same consonant Het-Tav-Nun (Ch-T-N) the vowels use for the word for ‘father-in-law” are different from the word denoting son-in-law or bridegroom. In its most basic form, father-in-law is pointed with a holem (with an “o” sound) above the Het and a sere (with an “e” sound) below the Tav and can be written as choten. The word for son-in-law is pointed with qames (an “a” sound) below both the Het and Tav giving the word chatan.
Hector said, "Tobin is correct, and he speaks to the fact of how often Triabloggers don't have enough expertise in biblical languages to form sound exegetical and historical conclusions."
The argument we are making is that Tobin is incorrect in this assessment because the vowel pointings (which are his central means of differentiating the usage of חתן) come much, much later in the history of the text. Thus, the original words for son-in-law and father-in-law in the pre-Masoretic texts are both simply חתן, which can be interpreted either way depending on context.
In Hebrew, the later tradition differentiated by assigning vowel pointings based on their interpretation, but not every language did this as evidenced by continued non-differentiated usage in the Syriac, Old Arabic and other cognates (see any standard lexicon for evidence of this, ala Kohler Baumgartner).
There is little evidence of pre-Masoretic markers significant enough to differentiate between the holem/sere pointing for חתן, and the qames/qames pointing. It's origins are in the Akkadian ḫat(a)nu, which simply means any relative by marriage (see Huehnergard or even Tawil). For instance, the Samaritan Pentateuch uses the unspecified and unpointed חתן, which is why it remains in the indeterminate Arabic form in the Arabic version. There is nothing to indicate at this point of the textual history how a scribe would differentiate between the two terms outside of context and tradition. Since the actual differentiation in the text comes much, much later in the history of the language this brings the possibility of misinterpretation and error.
STONE SAID:
Dr. Avalos leaves out in his answer that there are many instances in which the Masoretes made decisions on what the "real" reading of the text is, called the "ketiv-qere" readings. Don't let all of the talk about vowel reduction throw you off, because there are many different ways in which vowels reduce.
I might just ask him to use his expertise to translate dalet-waw-dalet.
The celebrity circuit
Anne Rice has deconverted, after reconverting, after deconverting, after…
It’s very important that we cover this story. Why, you ask?
Well, the importance of this story ought to be self-evident. For one thing, if a single news outlet covers a story, then the fact that a story is reported is a very important reason to report the reported story.
In addition, Anne Rice is famous for being famous. By making her famous by making her famous, everything she says or does or doesn’t say or do is instantly invested with deep existential significance.
It’s like a TV celebrity who goes on the Late Show, where she talks about the time she went on the Late Late Show–then she goes on the Late Late Show, where she talks about the time she went on the Late Show–then she goes back on the Late Show to talk about…
It’s very important that we cover this story. Why, you ask?
Well, the importance of this story ought to be self-evident. For one thing, if a single news outlet covers a story, then the fact that a story is reported is a very important reason to report the reported story.
In addition, Anne Rice is famous for being famous. By making her famous by making her famous, everything she says or does or doesn’t say or do is instantly invested with deep existential significance.
It’s like a TV celebrity who goes on the Late Show, where she talks about the time she went on the Late Late Show–then she goes on the Late Late Show, where she talks about the time she went on the Late Show–then she goes back on the Late Show to talk about…
Tuesday, August 03, 2010
The Darwinian Problem of Good, Vizualized
Since The Christian Delusion has been shown to be a massive flop, John Loftus isn't trying to give actual arguments anymore, but is, instead, appealing to emotions with pictures. Dr. Seuss atheology.
If his video shows that there's an unanswerable problem of evil for the theist, then this video is just as good for showing that there's an unanswerable problem of good for the Darwinian.
Pass me a hanky, John!
If his video shows that there's an unanswerable problem of evil for the theist, then this video is just as good for showing that there's an unanswerable problem of good for the Darwinian.
Pass me a hanky, John!
"It never occurred to me"
Josh Thibodaux has written a third post, to shore up the wet cardboard playhouse of his second post, which was meant to shore up the wet cardboard playhouse of his first post.
Since he’s generally targeting suspects other than yours truly, I’ll leave that to them. For now I’ll just concentrate on one of his generic claims:
Further problems arise when God Himself refutes such a notion through the prophet Jeremiah [32:35]…God made it very clear that He not only didn’t command such a thing, but distances Himself from the concept entirely in stating it didn’t enter into His mind that they should do this abominable act – a plain denial that it was His contrivance at all.The Calvinist responses I’ve heard given this would be funny if they weren’t so desperately bad. They often try to set up a straw man “literal interpretation” of “nor did it enter my mind” meaning “I didn’t know they were going to do it”, then insist that taking the passage ‘literally’ amounts to Open Theism, so therefore one should accept their view that the passage is some sort of anthropomorphism.
How is it a straw man to point out that if something literally never entered God’s mind, then God didn’t know they were going to do it? What else could a literal construction of “It never entered my mind” amount to?
Literally speaking, that exclamation indicates the speaker was caught off guard. He didn’t see it coming. He was blindsided by the event.
Thibo can reject the propriety of the literal interpretation, but that’s what the literal interpretation conveys.
Besides there being apparently nothing conveyed by this supposed ‘anthropomorphism,’ contextually speaking…
If Yahweh attributes ignorance to himself, then unless you’re a Mormon or open theist, that’s a contextual clue of anthropomorphic discourse.
…the concept of “didn’t enter my mind” is most readily interpreted idiomatically as “I didn’t think this up”, not, “I didn’t see that coming.” This being the case, the choice of ‘Open Theism or Determinsim’ is a false dichotomy.
Of course, that's only Thibo’s convenient assertion. While the phrase is idiomatic, it doesn’t follow that it’s “more readily interpreted” to mean, “I didn’t think this up.”
Why not take it to be a hyperbolic expression of disapprobation?
Since he’s generally targeting suspects other than yours truly, I’ll leave that to them. For now I’ll just concentrate on one of his generic claims:
Further problems arise when God Himself refutes such a notion through the prophet Jeremiah [32:35]…God made it very clear that He not only didn’t command such a thing, but distances Himself from the concept entirely in stating it didn’t enter into His mind that they should do this abominable act – a plain denial that it was His contrivance at all.The Calvinist responses I’ve heard given this would be funny if they weren’t so desperately bad. They often try to set up a straw man “literal interpretation” of “nor did it enter my mind” meaning “I didn’t know they were going to do it”, then insist that taking the passage ‘literally’ amounts to Open Theism, so therefore one should accept their view that the passage is some sort of anthropomorphism.
How is it a straw man to point out that if something literally never entered God’s mind, then God didn’t know they were going to do it? What else could a literal construction of “It never entered my mind” amount to?
Literally speaking, that exclamation indicates the speaker was caught off guard. He didn’t see it coming. He was blindsided by the event.
Thibo can reject the propriety of the literal interpretation, but that’s what the literal interpretation conveys.
Besides there being apparently nothing conveyed by this supposed ‘anthropomorphism,’ contextually speaking…
If Yahweh attributes ignorance to himself, then unless you’re a Mormon or open theist, that’s a contextual clue of anthropomorphic discourse.
…the concept of “didn’t enter my mind” is most readily interpreted idiomatically as “I didn’t think this up”, not, “I didn’t see that coming.” This being the case, the choice of ‘Open Theism or Determinsim’ is a false dichotomy.
Of course, that's only Thibo’s convenient assertion. While the phrase is idiomatic, it doesn’t follow that it’s “more readily interpreted” to mean, “I didn’t think this up.”
Why not take it to be a hyperbolic expression of disapprobation?
Robert Price On Christianity And Slavery
The Christian Delusion often raises objections to Christianity based on the religion's treatment of slavery. One of the contributors to the book, Robert Price, recently discussed the issue with a Christian scholar, David Instone-Brewer, on the Unbelievable? radio program (June 19, 2010). I don't agree with every comment made during the program, and some significant issues were neglected, but both Price and Instone-Brewer make many good points. Price criticizes some of the simplistic approaches taken by his fellow skeptics, in addition to criticizing some simplistic Christian arguments. He's much more reasonable about this subject than he is about a lot of others related to Christianity.
Monday, August 02, 2010
Why Arminians say Arminians are damned
Arminian apologist and theologian Roger Olson questions the Christian faith of his fellow Arminians. As he recently observed, “I have my doubts about the authenticity of a person’s evangelicalism (to say nothing of his or her Christian faith) who blatantly and knowingly denied…salvation by grace alone through faith alone…”
http://www.rogereolson.com/2010/07/31/addendum-to-my-first-post-about-evangelicalism/
Needless to say, Arminians, including Olson, blatantly and knowingly deny salvation by grace alone in favor of synergism. For them, God meets us halfway with grace, while it’s up to us to say yes or no. Grace is a necessary condition of salvation, but salvation is also contingent on the independent variable of man’s libertarian freedom.
The fact that Olson doubts the salvation of Arminians must be unsettling to Billy Birch, whose devotion to Scripture is second only to his devotion to Olson.
http://www.rogereolson.com/2010/07/31/addendum-to-my-first-post-about-evangelicalism/
Needless to say, Arminians, including Olson, blatantly and knowingly deny salvation by grace alone in favor of synergism. For them, God meets us halfway with grace, while it’s up to us to say yes or no. Grace is a necessary condition of salvation, but salvation is also contingent on the independent variable of man’s libertarian freedom.
The fact that Olson doubts the salvation of Arminians must be unsettling to Billy Birch, whose devotion to Scripture is second only to his devotion to Olson.
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