The days of creation

THE "DAYS" OF CREATION IN GENESIS 1:
LITERAL "DAYS" OR FIGURATIVE "PERIODS / EPOCHS" OF TIME?

Gerhard F. Hasel

Origins 21(1):5-38 (1994).


I. INTRODUCTION

The increased focus of recent decades on creationism, "creation-science,"1 "origin science,"2 and "theistic science"3 has created a climate in which old questions are raised anew with specific focus and additional sophistication. One of those questions concerns the meaning of the term "day" in Genesis 1:1 - 2:3.

The nature of the Genesis account of creation with its six "days" (Genesis 1:5-31) followed by the "seventh day" (Genesis 2:2-3) is of special interest, since it is customarily understood to mean a short time of one week. This short time in the creation account is under debate on the basis of the current naturalistic theory of evolution. The contrast is between the short time of the creation account and the long ages demanded by naturalistic evolution.

This paper will seek to accomplish several interrelated tasks: 1) to provide some methodological observations with a brief history of interpretation; 2) to cite representative recent published opinions suggesting that the "days" of creation are long epochs or periods of time and not literal twenty-four hour days; 3) to present the data in Genesis 1 in relationship with other data found in the Old Testament; and 4) to apply to the data of Genesis 1 the standard linguistic and semantic investigations requisite in sound scholarship based on the best current knowledge.

II. METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS AND THE HISTORY OF INTERPRETATION

A knowledge of some aspects in the history of interpretation of the "days" of creation in Genesis 1 may prove to be helpful from the perspective of methodology for interpretation. Historical information assists the modern interpreter to recognize that it is incorrect to suggest that only since the publication of Charles Darwin's epochal work, On the Origin of Species (1859), the Genesis creation "days" were transposed into non-literal periods of time. Earlier extra-biblical considerations led interpreters to depart from the literal meaning of creation "days."

1. Some Medieval Understandings of Creation "Days." The Alexandrian church father Origen (ca. A.D. 185 - ca. 254), an accomplished practitioner and defender of the allegorical method of interpretation,4 is credited with being the first to understand the creation "days" in an allegorical and non-literal manner.5

Augustine (A.D. 354 - 430), the most famous of the Latin Fathers, followed Origen in arguing that the creation "days" are to be understood allegorically, rather than literally.6 Augustine is understood to teach that God created the world in a single flash of a moment.

At this point it seems appropriate to reflect on some methodological matters. Neither Augustine nor Origen had any evolutionary concept in mind. They took the creation "days" as non-literal, standing for something else, because it was philosophically mandatory to assign to God creation activity which was unrelated to human time. Since the "days" of creation are related to God, it was argued, these "days" have to be representative of philosophical notions associated with God taken from their philosophical perspectives.

In Greek philosophy God is timeless. Since the creation "days" are part of divine activity, it was assumed that they also should be understood in a timeless sense. The thinking of Origen and Augustine was influenced by Greek philosophy, not by scientific speculations, which led to a reinterpretation of the creation "days."

What this approach has in common with modern attempts, which also take the creation "days" to mean something other than what the face value of the terminology seems to suggest, is that both are based on influences from outside the biblical text itself. Medieval theologians, who took the creation "days" to be non-literal, based it on non-biblical, pagan philosophical modes of thinking.

Today there is another influence from outside the biblical text that leads interpreters to change what seems to be the plain meaning of "days." At present it is a naturalistically based scientific hypothesis, the modern theory of evolution, which provides the impetus for such changes.

The thinking of medieval Catholic theologians was influenced by the Alexandrian allegorical method of interpretation. The fourfold sense of Scripture was adopted in medieval times7 and is still supported in current official Roman Catholicism.8 The three non-literal meanings of the fourfold sense of Scripture (i.e., allegory, anagogy, tropology) carried the day and held primary importance for over a millennium in Christendom, providing the hermeneutical means for the reinterpretation of the literal sense of the creation "days."

2. Reformation Understanding of Creation "Days." The sixteenth-century Reformers agreed that the fourfold sense of Scripture compromised the literal sense of the Bible, making its authority for faith and life null and void. They insisted that the single, true sense of Scripture is the literal sense, the plain meaning of the text.

One of the major achievements of the Protestant Reformation is the return to Scripture. This meant that Scripture is in no need of an external key for interpretation--whether that key be the Pope, the church councils, philosophy, or any other human authority. Scripture's clarity and perspicuity became the norm of the day; its reading from within its own context was paramount. External meaning must not be superimposed on it, as had been the practice under medieval Catholicism. The Bible was to be read in its literal and grammatical sense.9

Martin Luther, accordingly, argued for the literal interpretation of the creation account: "We assert that Moses spoke in the literal sense, not allegorically or figuratively, i.e., that the world, with all its creatures, was created within six days, as the words read."10 The other Reformers understood the creation "days" in the same way.

This literal and grammatical interpretation, known in the history of hermeneutics as the historical-grammatical method, was the norm for biblical interpretation more or less into the nineteenth century.11

3. Changes Under the Influence of Modernism. As the concept of long time periods made its way into the understanding of Earth's origins in the wake of the publications of James Hutton (1726-1797) and Charles Lyell (1797-1875), some Christian concordist interpreters started to reinterpret the Genesis "days" of creation in a non-literal manner. The impetus for this was not found in the Bible itself but in the new world view which was being developed on the basis of uniformitarianism and its concomitant understanding of origins which demanded long periods of time.

The understanding of the creation "days" as "days of restoration,"12 "days of revelation,"13 aside from taking a "day" for an "age" ("day-age" theory) or an epoch/era14 goes back to this time and the changes in time frames required by the new geology. The approach of a non-literal reinterpretation of "days" was typical of concordists who had accepted long ages for the origin of Earth.15 In view of these developments, it is unavoidable to conclude that external influences exerted by a new understanding of geological ages became the catalyst for the reinterpretation of the "days" of creation.

4. Recent Changes in Interpretation Among Broad Concordists. Broad concordists of the last ten years are increasingly attempting to interpret the "days" in the Genesis creation account in non-literal ways, in order to bring about harmony between the long ages called for by the evolutionary theory and the time implications of the biblical record of divine creation in Genesis 1.

It is an acknowledged fact that the long and checkered history of the relation between science and Scripture has had an impact on the present understanding of the Bible.16 The shift from the Ptolemaic world view to the Copernican one is probably the most celebrated example.17

The non-Christian Ptolemaic world view had been adopted by Christian medieval theologians both as the correct Christian and biblical view of Earth. Earth was conceived as the center of the solar system, and often of the universe. It became a first-class dilemma when the heliocentric Copernican world view became prominent and seemingly irrefutable.

From a methodological point of view the interpretational model at work by the scientist as interpreter of data observed in nature will predetermine to a large degree the outcome of the enterprise itself, as well as the meaning of data derived from non-natural sources, including the Bible. It is generally recognized that "scientific theories do affect biblical interpretation at least to the extent that they become the occasion for reassessing the interpretation of a few passages (Genesis 1-2; 6-8)."18 The decisive question which emerges is whether the reassessment becomes a superimposition of a meaning on the biblical text on the part of concordists and others--a meaning which is alien to the meaning found in Scripture within its own context.

At least two major options seem to present themselves: 1) A reassessment on the basis of "scientific" conclusions could lead to an interpretation of biblical texts which is permitted within the framework of the context and intention of the totality of Scripture. In such a case the reassessment does not do violence to the internal norms of cohesion and unity of Scripture. 2) The reassessment of a biblical text could likewise lead to a conclusion regarding the specific meaning of a given biblical text or a biblical passage which does not agree with what a current scientific hypothesis holds. For those who accept full biblical authority this should lead to a reassessment of the conclusion(s) drawn from the interpretation of data in nature by the scientist. The latter, in turn, may affect the scientific theory, or science broadly perceived, "at the very least by leading us to reassess whether all the conclusions drawn from a scientific theory are warranted, or in some cases to ask whether the theory as a whole is suspect."19

5. The Inherent Authority of Scripture. Some have taken the stance that a scientific theory, by its very nature and the breadth of its acceptance, has priority over Scripture.20 It is far beyond the confines of this paper to unfold the complexity of this question. Suffice it to say that if Scripture is understood to be the result of divine revelation and written under inspiration, it would have a dimension of authority not found in the so-called book of nature. Based on that higher dimension of authority, Scripture can assist in interpretation of the book of nature, providing a more comprehensive model of interpretation than might be expected from a purely naturalistic model.

Scripture, if it is to maintain its own integrity, can hardly be interpreted in such a way as to be accommodated time and again to any kind of interpretation derived from science, sociology, history, etc. Scripture, based on its own nature and authority, has its own integrity of meaning and its inherent truth claims. They emerge ever more clearly on the basis of a careful study of the Bible with sound methods of interpretation which are in harmony with and rooted in the testimony of Scripture itself. This implies that Scripture's authority resides in itself; it is based in revelation and grounded in inspiration.

The self-sufficiency of Scripture of which we have spoken does not mean that any question raised from other areas of investigation such as science, history, sociology and so on cannot be discussed with reference to Scripture. But there is a vast difference between asking new questions of Scripture and superimposing meaning on Scripture.

III. FIGURATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CREATION "DAYS"

1. Representative Arguments for Long Ages. The clearly stated purpose of current attempts to interpret the "days" of Genesis 1 in terms other than face value is often quite clearly stated. A few citations from respected scholars will speak for themselves.

John C. L. Gibson, a British scholar, argues that Genesis 1 is to be taken as a "metaphor,"21 "story," or "parable,"22 and not as a straightforward record of events of creation. He writes in his 1981 Genesis commentary as follows: "...if we understand 'day' as equivalent to 'epoch' or 'era' we can bring the sequence of Creation in the chapter into relationship with the accounts of modern evolutionary theory, and so go some way towards recovering the Bible's reputation in our scientific age....In so far as this argument begins with an attempt to go beyond the literal meaning and to take the week assigned to Creation as a parable of a much longer period, it is to be commended." 23

In 1983 the German commentator HansjöBrästates: "The creation 'day' which is described to contain 'day' and evening [sic]' is not a unit of time which can be determined with a watch. It is a divine day in which a thousand years are equal to but yesterday [Ps. 90:4 in margin]. Day one in creation is a divine day. It cannot be an earthly day since the temporal measure, the sun, is still missing. It will, therefore, do no harm to the creation account to understand creation in rhythms of millions of years.24

D. Stuart Briscoe, an American progressive creationist, addresses the issue in his commentary on Genesis as well: "The natural scientist talks convincingly in terms of millions of years and evolutionary eras while the Bible believer looks at the six -days and wonders what on earth to do....It is not at all unreasonable to believe that 'day' (Hebrew, yom), which can be translated quite literally as 'period,' refers not to literal days but to eras and ages in which God's progressive work was being accomplished.25

Explanations of this kind can be duplicated and derive typically from scholars who are in the concordist camp. More precisely they belong to the branch of "broad concordists" who in recent times are associated with progressive creationism.26

2. Analysis and Evaluation of Psalm 90:4 and 2 Peter 3:8. Psalm 90:4. Let us begin with considerations concerning Psalm 90:4. This passage has been invoked time and again to indicate that the creation "days" are to be non-literal, standing for long periods/epochs/ages of time.

Psalm 90:4 reads: "For a thousand years in Thy sight are like yesterday when it passes by, or ['and'] as a watch in the night" (New American Standard Bible).27 Of immediate interest is the comparison of the long time-period of 1,000 years with but "yesterday" and "a watch in the night." This Scripture passage contains a comparative particle in the original Hebrew to make the comparison between 1,000 years and "yesterday" and "a watch in the night." The comparative particle is rendered into English either as "like" or "as."

From the point of view of Hebrew syntax this comparative particle serves not only the expression "yesterday" but also the expression "as a watch in the night." It applies to both phrases. This demonstrates that the comparison is not between a "day" being like 1,000 years. A thousand years with God are "like" yesterday, that is, the past day, or "like" "a watch in the night," which is even a briefer period of time than "yesterday." The point is that God reckons time differently from the way humans reckon time.

Genesis 1 is not interested in depicting how God reckons time. The Genesis context of creation speaks of "days" in the sense of creation time during which God created this world and whereby He set the rhythm of the week. Genesis 1 does not explain or address how time is reckoned on God's scale, but how the creation "days" set the norm for subsequent days in the weekly cycle of time.

Furthermore, Genesis 1 lacks any comparative particle such as "like" or "as" in connection with the usage of the term "day." The lack in Genesis 1 of a Hebrew comparative expression with either the term "day," or the expression "evening and morning," indicates that no comparison is intended. Comparison is not the issue in Genesis 1. The issue is the amount of time God uses to create the world and whether this time period is identical to the seven-day week which is the rhythm of historical time.

From contextual as well as grammatical-syntactical and semantic points of view the application of Psalm 90:4 to Genesis 1 does not work. Appropriate linguistic and phraseological criteria of comparison are lacking. Those who link the two texts are insensitive to contextual, linguistic and phraseological criteria. The impression is left that those who compare the "days" of Genesis 1 with the "yesterday" and the "watch in the night" or the 1,000 years in God's scale of time compare apples with oranges.

Another type of objection has been noted in making the creation "days" into long periods of time: if one were to read the "sixth day as the sixth epoch of creation, this opens the door to some kind of pre-Adamic homo [sic] sapiens."28 In other words, the long-age substitution for a literal "day" does away with the view that Adam and Eve were the first human beings which God created on Earth.

A third difficulty relates to the fact that Psalm 90 is not a creation psalm. Contextually speaking Psalm 90 does not address the issue how God regards the "days" of creation but how humans are to regard time when compared to time in the realm of God.

Fourth, Psalm 90 does not even use the term "day" by itself. It is used in a linguistic relationship in verse 4 in which two words are syntactically joined together. The English language has one word for that linguistic relationship, "yesterday." But "yesterday" in Psalm 90:4 is in parallelism with the expression "as a watch in the night," i.e., a very short interval of time. This means that the 1,000 years are not compared simply to a day but to a short interval of time.

In short, Psalm 90:4 does not define the meaning of the designation "day" in Genesis 1. In view of the problems cited and other difficulties that exist,29 it is not surprising that many of those who currently take the "day/age theory" as a solution to the tension between science and religion refrain from referring to Psalm 90:4. This text when read on its own terms does not address the issue of the length of the creation "day."

2 Peter 3:8. Broad concordists have also used 2 Peter 3:8, "...with the Lord one day is as a thousand years," to support the day-age theory. It has been taken by some as a "biblical" mathematical equivalent "one day equals a thousand years" literally. Others take the 1,000 years to mean a long period, an age, or the like. In that case it is argued that "one day equals a long period of time" or "one day equals an age."

It should be pointed out that those who invoke this text face several major problems: 1) 2 Peter 3:8 has no creation context; 2) 2 Peter 3:8 has a comparative particle which is lacking in Genesis 1; 3) 2 Peter 3:8 is used non-literally when the 1,000 years are taken to mean an "age" or the like; 4) 2 Peter 3:8 reveals that God is not limited to time or subject to it in fulfilling His promises.

The intent of this passage is well put by Lloyd R. Bailey, a broad concordist himself: "The text of 2 Peter (3:8) has been misused by those who would bring it to bear upon the word 'day' in Genesis 1....Rather, the purpose of that text is to point out that the Lord is not slow about his promise...but is forbearing...not wishing that any should perish...' (3:9; cf v. 4). That is, God is not subject to time in the sense that humans are ("...as some count slowness," v. 9). The intent, then, is to make a statement about God's fidelity to promises, and not to define the meaning of the word 'day' as it is used in Genesis 1.30
It seems best to let 2 Peter 3:8 make its own point and not to use it for something which is topically, contextually, and linguistically unrelated.

3. "Days of Revelation"? The theory that the creation "days" are actually "days of revelation" is held by a few scholars today.
This theory was brought to prominence by the Scottish geologist Hugh Miller in the nineteenth century.31 In this century P. J. Wiseman has revived it in his 1946 publication, Creation Revealed in Six Days, which was reprinted in 1977.32

According to this interpretation God did not create the world in six days, but He "revealed" and explained in six literal days to man what He had already done over many spans of time. The recurring phrase, "and God said," is taken to support the theory that the "days" of creation are actually "days of revelation." In this theory the world does not require a relatively recent origin nor creation in six literal 24-hour days.

It has been noted incisively that the "days of revelation theory," also called the "vision theory," rests to a large degree upon a "misunderstanding of the word 'made', in Exodus 20:11" 33 for which Wiseman claims the meaning "showed."34

The meaning of "showed" is not a valid meaning for the Hebrew term 'asah. There is no Hebrew-English dictionary which supports this meaning for this Hebrew term. The Hebrew term 'asah, which is used more than 2,600 times in the Old Testament, means "to make, manufacture, produce, do, etc."35 but never once does it mean "to show" in either the Old Testament or in extra-biblical Hebrew.36 The meaning "to show" is invented for the sake of the theory. In view of this fact it is not surprising that the "days of revelation theory" has not found much support.37

In summary, current broad concordists seek to interpret Genesis 1 in some sort of "figurative, symbolic, or otherwise loose reading -- such as the idea that the 'days' of Genesis 1 may be interpreted as long periods of time."38 The purpose is to make an accommodation to current claims of the evolutionary theory for long time. Based on this time frame hypothesis, Scripture is reinterpreted to bring about some sort of harmony between the claims of the biblical creation account and naturalistic evolution. Those who seek to make adjustments in Scripture for the sake of concordism are known as broad concordists.

In contrast, strict concordists are scholars of equal erudition and skill. They are also interested in bringing about harmony between science and religion. However, they are unwilling to give the biblical text a "loose reading." They agree that a meaning of a text is to be based on the internal criteria of language and its usage according to the commonly accepted standards of linguistics. They agree that the context of Scripture is primary and that the linguistic standards need to follow sound grammatical-syntactical conventions. Thus, strict concordists are fully aware of the tensions but resist forcing a meaning on the biblical text that is not supported by sound linguistic analysis.

IV. THE LITERARY GENRE OF GENESIS 1

1. Literary Genre/Form Argument. The recent Genesis commentary by evangelical scholar Victor P. Hamilton takes the position that the "days" of Genesis 1 must be taken as non-figurative and non-metaphorical, that is, as literal, consisting of solar days of 24 hours.39 However, as a broad concordist he is already committed to long ages and remains interested in bringing about a harmony with modern naturalistic science. In order to do so he appeals to "a literary reading of Gen. 1 [which] still permits the retention of 'day' as a solar day of 24 hours."40 How is this accomplished?

Hamilton speaks of a "literary reading" of the Genesis creation account. The "literary reading" allows him to understand the "days" of creation literally but "not as a chronological account of how many hours God invested in His creating project, but as an analogy of God's creative activity."41 In this view the 24-hour "days" in Genesis 1 are but an "analogy" based on a "literary [non-historical] reading" of the Genesis creation account.

This view of a "literary reading" is dependent on Charles E. Hummel.42 Hummel argues that even if the "days" in Genesis 1 are to be meant as solar days of 24 hours, which he believes they are, "the question still remains whether the [literary] format is figurative or literal, that is, analogy of God's creative activity or a chronological account of how many hours he worked."43 Hummel believes that the "who" and "why" but not the "how" of creation is important (following Bernard Ramm) and that, therefore, the "analogy...provides a model for human work."44

The "analogy" theory consists of the understanding of the literal "day" as "a metaphor" which uses "the commonplace (or commonly understood, if you wish) meaning of a word" (viz. the word "day") "in a figurative manner."45 The analogy transfer suggested by the "analogy" theory removes the schema of six days of work and one day of rest from a chronological piece of information and makes it into a broad pattern of work-and-rest applicable to humanity.46

As appealing as this "analogy" theory seems to be, the issue is still the problem of the contextual and literary warrant within the context of Genesis 1 and the Bible as a whole for taking the time designation "day" as simply analogous for work/rest. Hummel is forced (followed by Hamilton) to redefine the literary genre of Genesis l from that of a straightforward creation account to a genre which is designated as a "semi-poetic narrative"47 which has significance. This falls under the "historical-cultural" approach to creation.48

It is evident that these broad concordist scholars are partially influenced by form-criticism and its genre method of interpretation. Form-criticism, a sub-method of the historical-critical method, was begun by Hermann Gunkel, known as the father of form criticism, at the turn of the century.49 Gunkel raised the question, "Are the narratives of Genesis history or legend?"50 His premise is that "many things reported in Genesis...go directly against our better knowledge."51 The idea of "our better knowledge" is an admission on Gunkel's part that a naturalistic evolutionary world view provides the authoritative norm of what is history or legend. Thus, he suggested that the literary genre of Genesis is not history but "legend." Gunkel was the first liberal scholar to assign to the creation account in Genesis a literary genre other than history in the sense of a factual account. He has been followed by other liberal scholars, by neo-orthodox theologians, and now also in part by neo-evangelical scholars who are broad concordists.

Although we need not attempt to be exhaustive in citing the literary genre categories which have been proposed for categorizing Genesis, some major representative examples should be cited. Karl Barth, the father of neo-orthodox theology, takes Genesis 1-2 as "saga"52 and, of course, non-historical. S.H. Hooke, the leader of the myth-and-ritual school, says that the Genesis creation account is a "cultic liturgy."53 Gordon Wenham, a neo-evangelical scholar, believes it to be a "hymn."54 Walter Brueggemann, a liberal non-concordist, suggests that it is a "poem."55 Claus Westermann, a form-critic, calls it a "narrative."56 John H. Stek, a broad concordist, names it a "metaphorical narration."57 Gerhard von Rad, a tradition critic, designates it as "doctrine."58 Others hold that it is a "myth,"59 "parable,"60 "story," "theology,"61 "allegory," etc.

There are several essential observations to be made in view of this plethora of current opinions on the nature of the literary genre of the Genesis creation account.

1) The obvious consensus is that there is no consensus on the literary genre of Genesis 1. This makes the literary genre approach for a non-literary reading of Genesis 1 suspect of special pleading.

Since there is no consensus, the careful interpreter will be rather cautious and avoid jumping on the bandwagon of literary genre identification with the aim to redefine the literal intent of Genesis 1. The intention of form-critical genre description from its beginning, the time of Gunkel to the present, has been to remove the text of Genesis 1 from being considered to be historical and factual in nature.62

2) The "literary genre" approach reveals it to be another way, at first used by non-concordists, to remove the creation account of Genesis from functioning as an authoritative, literal text which has implications for the relationship of science and the Bible. It is rightly suggested that "the way in which God revealed the history of creation must itself be justified by Scripture"63 and not by appeal to form-critical literary genre description from which historicity is removed.

3) Interpreters following the "literary genre" approach with the aim to remove the creation account from the realm of its literal intent feel free to interpret the "days" of creation in a literal and grammatical way.

The use of the "literary genre" approach is meant to restrict the meaning of Genesis 1 to a thought-form which does not demand a factual, historical reading of what took place. The "literary genre" redefinition of the creation account is intended to remove the creation account from informing modern readers on "how" and "in what manner" and in what time God created the world. It simply wishes to affirm minimalistically that God is Creator. And that affirmation is meant to be a theological, nonscientific statement which has no impact on how the world and universe came into being and developed subsequently.
The "literary genre" approach is based on a literary critical methodology,64 which is intended to assign to the creation account as a whole a function different from that of historicity or factuality. In this case it does not matter whether the creation "days" are taken as literal 24-hour days in its intent, because the account as a whole, including the creation "days," has a meaning other than a historical or factual one.

2. Genesis 1: Literal or Figurative? The question remains whether the creation account of Genesis 1 is literal or figurative as a whole.65 Often Genesis 1 is taken together as part of the larger unit of Genesis 1-11 to answer the question of its nature, purpose and function.

It is an acknowledged fact that these chapters at the beginning of the book of Genesis have singularities, that is, unrepealed, one-time events, that have no immediate analogy in present experience.

How does the modern historian handle such singularities? The standard position of modern historiography is based on the principle of analogy (cf. Ernst Troeltsch), that is, the principle that nothing in past experience can be reckoned to be historical except as it corresponds to present experience.66 This principle is based on the notion of the basic uniformity of human experience and historical events.67 The principle of analogy holds that the past is understood only by borrowing from the present and applying it to the past.

Based on the consistent application of this uniformitarian basic to the principle of analogy, there is cause to deny the historicity and facticity of most of Genesis 1-11, including the creation account of Genesis 1.

Can and should the uniformitarian principle of analogy reign as the supreme norm for understanding the past?68 "A problem arises when the uniformity [of past and present] is raised to a universal principle that makes some evidence inadmissible," writes a strong supporter of the principle of analogy and modernistic historiography.69 This admission of the problem requires great caution in the application of the uniformitarian principle of analogy.

Human beings know of experiences in present reality that are singular and without parallel in the past. For example, twenty-five years ago the first human beings were walking on the moon. This had never happened before. Another example is the use of atomic bombs for the destruction of two Japanese cities in 1945. This type of destruction has never happened before and stands unique to the present. Many other singularities could be mentioned.

As there are singularities today that are either man-made or part of another order, that is to say, there are real events and situations that have no analogy in the past, so one can recite singularities in the past which have no analogy at present. For example, R. G. Collingwood, the famed British philosopher of history, noted that the ancient Romans engaged in population control by exposing newborn infants to die. This is a singularity which has no analogy at present in population control attempts.70

With these limitations of the principle of analogy in mind,71 it is not sound to reject the creation account as non-historical and non-factual because we know of no analogy at present. Genesis 1 contains singularities that may be perceived to be just as real, historical and factual as the singularities of another kind in the present or the past.
There are good reasons for maintaining that Genesis 1 is a factual account of the origin of the livable world. This record is accurate, authentic and historical.

3. Genesis 1 and Comparative Literature of the Past. From a purely comparative approach of the literary structures, the language patterns, the syntax, the linguistic phenomena, the terminology, the sequential presentation of events in the creation account, Genesis 1 is not different from the rest of the book of Genesis72 or the Pentateuch for that matter.
Compared to the hymns in the Bible, the creation account is not a hymn; compared to the parables in the Bible, the creation account is not a parable; compared to the poetry in the Bible, the creation account is not a poem; compared to cultic liturgy, the creation account is not a cultic liturgy. Compared to various kinds of literary forms, the creation account is not a metaphor, a story, a parable, poetry, or the like.

One recent study of the literary form of Genesis 1-11 done on the basis of current comparative Near Eastern literature has concluded that "we are dealing with the genera of historical narrative-prose, interspersed with some lists, sources, sayings, and poetical lines."73 This is a fairly good description of the content of Genesis 1.

A detailed study of the literary form of Genesis 1 has concluded that we are dealing with the literary genre of "prose-genealogy."74 Even Gunkel noted long ago that Genesis is "prose." He noted also that it is "more artistic in its composition and has some sort of rhythmical construction."75 The non-poetic nature of Genesis 1 shows that its intention is to take it in its plain sense as a straightforward and accurate record of creative events.

Looking at the information provided in Genesis 1 from a perspective of comparison with other ancient Near Eastern literature, it must be concluded that "Genesis 1 has no parallel anywhere in the ancient world outside the Bible."76 Genesis 1 is the most cohesive and profound record produced in the ancient world of "how" and "when" and by "whom" and "in what manner" the world was made. There is no parallel to it from the ancient world in any type of literature. There are bits and pieces which have been compared from various cosmogonic myths and speculations, but the biblical creation account as a unit stands unique in the ancient world in its comprehensiveness and cohesiveness.77

4. The Literary Form of Genesis 1 Within Its Biblical Context. It would be helpful to analyze the literary form in distinction to the "literary genre" of form criticism discussed above.

John H. Stek suggests that the "literary type [of Genesis 1], as far as present knowledge goes, is without strict parallel; it is sui generis."78 It has already been noted that the presentation and content of Genesis 1 as a whole is unparalleled in the ancient world.79 Does this mean, however, that it is sui generis in the sense that it should not be understood to be literal in its intention? Surely as creation itself is unique so the creation account is of necessity unique. But it is hardly sui generis in an exclusive literary sense which will remove it from communication on a factual, accurate and historical level.

Based on the relationship with the remainder of Genesis (and the Bible as a whole), the creation account (Genesis 1:1 - 2:3), can be properly designated in its literary form. The creation account of Genesis 1 is a historical prose-record, written in rhythmic style, recording factually and accurately "what" took place in the creation of "the heavens and the earth," depicting the time "when" it took place, describing the processes of "how" it was done and identifying the divine Being "who" brought it forth. The result of creation week was a perfect, "very good" world with an environment suited to the utmost for created humanity to live in. This historical prose-record of creation reports correctly in specific sequences the creation events within chronological, sequential, and literal "days." These "days" inaugurate the subsequent historical process of time ordered in weekly cycles in which man and nature function under God's ultimate control. In this sense Genesis 1 is the inaugural history80 of initial beginnings which shapes from creation week onward the following flow of the history of the world and humanity.

V. LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF CREATION "DAYS"
We shall consider the usage of "day" (Hebrew yom) along major lines of current scholarship. There are liberal and non-liberal scholars who have concluded that the word "day" (Hebrew yom) in Genesis 1 must be singularly understood in a literal sense. We will review some of their reasons and provide additional ones.

1. Considerations from Commentaries. The influential Continental liberal Old Testament theologian and exegete Gerhard von Rad states, "The seven days are unquestionably to be understood as actual days and as a unique, unrepeatable lapse of time in the world."81 Gordon Wenham, a British non-concordist Old Testament scholar, concludes, "There can be little doubt that here 'day' has its basic sense of a 24-hour period."82 James Barr, renowned Semitist and Old Testament scholar, notes with vengeance against figurative interpreters that the creation "days" were six literal days of a 1 44-hour period.83 Form critic Hermann Gunkel concluded long ago, "The 'days' are of course days and nothing else."84 This refrain can be continued with many additional voices, sharing the same non-concordist position.

Victor P. Hamilton concludes, as do other broad concordist neo-evangelical scholars, "And whoever wrote Gen. l believed he was talking about literal days."85 John H. Stek, another broad concordist, makes a number of points in his support for literal "days":

Surely there is no sign or hint within the narrative [of Genesis 1]
itself that the author thought his 'days' to be irregular
designations -- first a series of undefined periods, then a series of
solar days -- or that the 'days' he bounded with
'evening and morning' could possibly be understood as long
aeons of time. His language is plain and simple, and he speaks in plain
and simple terms of one of the most common elements in humanity's
experience of the world....In his storying of God's creative acts,
the author was 'moved' to sequence them after the manner of
human acts and 'time' them after the pattern of created time
in humanity's arena of experience.86

Numerous scholars and commentators, regardless of whether they are concordist or non-concordist, have concluded that the creation "days" cannot be anything but literal 24-hour days. They are fully aware of the figurative, non-literal interpretations of the word "day" in Genesis 1 for the sake of harmonization with the long ages demanded by the evolutionary model of origins. Yet, they insist on the ground of careful investigations of the usage of "day" in Genesis 1 and elsewhere that the true meaning and intention of a creation "day" is a literal day of 24 hours.

2. Considerations from Lexicography. The most widely recognized Hebrew lexicons and dictionaries of the Hebrew language published in the twentieth century affirm that the designation "day" in Genesis 1 is meant to communicate a 24-hour day, respectively, a solar day.

A prestigious recently published lexicon refers to Genesis 1:5 as the first scriptural entry for the definition of "day of 24 hours" for the Hebrew term yom ("day").87 Holladay's Hebrew-English lexicon follows suit with "day of 24 hours."88 The Brown-Driver-Briggs lexicon, the classical Hebrew-English lexicon, also defines the creation "day" of Genesis 1 as a regular "day as defined by evening and morning."89

Lexicographers of the Hebrew languages are among the most qualified of Hebrew scholars. They are expected to give great care in their definitions and also usually indicate alternative meanings, if there is warrant to do so in given instances. None of the lexicographers have departed from the meaning of the word "day" as a literal day of 24 hours for Genesis 1.

3. Considerations from Dictionaries. Magne Saeboe writes in the acclaimed Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament that the "day" (yom) in Genesis 1 has a literal meaning in the sense of "a full day."90 He does not entertain another meaning or alternative.

Ernst Jenni, an acclaimed Hebrew scholar of the twentieth century, states in the most-widely used theological dictionary of the Hebrew language that the meaning of "day" in the Genesis creation account is to be understood in its literal meaning as a "day of 24 hours in the sense of an astronomical or calendrical unit of time."91

4. Considerations Based on Semantics. The field of semantics in linguistic study refers to what is called signification.92 It deals with the issue of "the accurate evaluation of the meaning of expressions [words, phrases, clauses, sentences, etc.] which have actually been used."93

Semantics calls for attention to the crucial question of the exact meaning of the Hebrew word yom. Could the designation "day" in Genesis 1 possibly have a figurative meaning in this chapter? Is it to be understood on the basis of the norms of semantics as a literal "day"? This matter of semantics is particularly important in view of the fact that the Hebrew term yom in the singular and plural has a large variety of meanings, including extended meanings such as "time," "life time," and so on. Is it possible to import an extended meaning from the Old Testament into Genesis 1? Could this not solve the problem of the conflict of a short creation week and the long ages called for by naturalistic evolution?

The Hebrew term yom, in its variety of forms, can mean aside from a literal "day" also a time or period of time (Judges 14:4) and in a more general sense "a month [of] time" (Genesis 29:14), "two years [of] time" (2 Samuel 13:23;14:28; Jeremiah 28:3,11), "three weeks [of] time" (Daniel 11:2, 3). In the plural form it can mean "year" (1 Samuel 27:7), a "life time" (Genesis 47:8), and so forth. Any good lexicon will provide a comprehensive listing of the various possibilities.94

It is important to keep in mind that "the semantic content of the words can be seen more clearly in their various combinations with other words and their extended semantic field."95

What are the semantic-syntactical guidelines for extended, non-literal meanings of the Hebrew term yom? The extended, non-literal meanings of the term yom are always found in connection with prepositions,96 prepositional phrases with a verb, compound constructions, formulas, technical expressions, genitive combinations, construct phrases, and the like.97 In other words, extended, non-literal meanings of this Hebrew term have special linguistic and contextual connections which indicate clearly that a non-literal meaning is intended. If such special linguistic connections are absent, the term yom does not have an extended, non-literal meaning; it has its normal meaning of a literal day of 24-hours.

In view of the wealth of usages of this Hebrew term, it is imperative to study the usage of the term yom in Genesis 1 so that it can be compared with other usages. Does this chapter contain the needed indicators by which yom can clearly be recognized to have a literal or non-literal meaning? How is this term used in Genesis 1? Is it used together with combinations of other words, prepositions, genitive relations, construct state, and the like, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, which would indicate a non-literal meaning? It is exactly these kinds of semantic-syntactical combinations which inform us about the intention of the meaning of this term.

Let us present the facts of the usage of the term yom, "day," in Genesis 1 as any scholar who knows Hebrew can describe them: _1) The term yom is always used in the singular. _2) The term yom is always joined to a numeral. In Genesis 1:5 it is a cardinal and elsewhere in Genesis 1:1 - 2:3 it is always an ordinal. We will pay attention to this below. _3) The term yom is never combined with a preposition, genitive combination, construct state, compound construction, or the like. It always appears as a plain noun. _4) The term yom is consistently defined by a temporal phrase in the preceding sentence, "and there was evening and there was morning." This clause serves in a defining function for the word "day." _5) The complementary creation account of Genesis 2:4-25 contains a non-literal, figurative meaning of the singular of the term yom, "day." When the non-literal meaning is intended the semantic-syntactical conventions known from the remainder of the Old Testament for such a meaning are employed. This is the case in the non-literal usage in Genesis 2:4.

Let us note these criteria as they are employed in Genesis 2:4. The noun yom is joined to the preposition be to read beyom. Secondly, it is used in a construct relation with the infinitive form of ‘asah, "to make." It reads literally, "in the day of making." This combination of the singular with a preposition in construct with an infinitive98 makes this combination a "temporal conjunction,"99 which serves as a "general introduction of time."100

Genesis 2:4b reads literally, "in [the] day of the Lord God making the earth and heaven. Proper English calls for the literal "in [the] day of," which is syntactically a temporal conjunction that serves as a general introduction of time, to be rendered with "when." This sentence then reads, "When the Lord God made...." This clear-cut case of an extended, non-literal use of yom in the creation account of Genesis 2:4-25 shows that the contrary usage of yom in Genesis 1, without any expected qualifier that marks it as a non-literal use, has a literal meaning. The term yom in Genesis 1 has no prepositions; it is not used in a construct relation and it has no syntactical indicator expected of an extended, non-literal meaning. Thus, in Genesis 1 yom can mean only a literal "day" of 24 hours.

In short, the semantic-syntactical usages of yom, "day," in Genesis 1 as compared with semantic-syntactical usages and linguistic connections of this term in other Old Testament passages where it has an extended meaning, does not allow it to mean a long period of time, an age, or the like. The Hebrew language, its grammar, syntax, linguistic structures as well as its semantic usage allows for only the literal meaning of "day" for the creation "days" of Genesis 1.

5. Considerations Based on Singular Usage. The Hebrew term yom appears in the Hebrew Old Testament 2,304 times101 of which 1,452 usages are in the singular.102

In the Five Books of Moses (Pentateuch) this term is used 668 times and in the book of Genesis it is employed 152 times.103 In Genesis the singular usage of "day" appears 83 times, the remainder usages are in the plural.

In the enumeration of the six "days" of creation the term "day" is used consistently in the singular. There is one plural use in the phrase "for days and years" in vs.14 which is, of course, not a creation "day." This plural usage in vs.14 hardly enters the discussion of making creation "days" long periods of time since calendrical usage of "days and years" keeps it literal itself. There is no doubt but that the literal meaning of 24-hour days are meant in vs.14 just as the "years" are likewise understood as literal years.

The additional usages of "day" in the singular in Genesis 1 are found in vss.5 and 16. "And God called the light 'day' (yom)" (vs.5) and God made the "greater light to govern the day" (vs.16). The term in vs.5 is employed in the sense of the literal daylight period of the light part of the 24-hour period of time in contrast to the night part, "the night" (vs. 16), of the same period of time.104 Both "day" and "night" make a "full day."105

We have to recognize the fact that the term yom in every one of the six days has the same connection: a) It is used as a singular; b) it has a numeral; and c) it is preceded by the phrase, "there was evening and there was morning." This triple interlocking connection of singular usage, joined by a numeral, and the temporal definition of "evening and morning," keeps the creation "day" the same throughout the creation account. It also reveals that "time is conceived as linear and events occur within it successively."106 To depart from the numerical, consecutive linkage and the "evening-morning" boundaries in such direct language would mean to take extreme liberty with the plain and direct meaning of the Hebrew language.107

6. Considerations Based on Numeral Usage. The six creation "days" are in each instance joined with a numeral in the sequence of one to six (Genesis 1:5,8,13,19,23,31). The day following the "sixth day," the "day" on which God rested, is designated "the seventh day" (Genesis 2:2 [2 times],3).

What seems of significance is the sequential emphasis of the numerals 1-7 without any break or temporal interruption. This seven-day schema, the schema of the week of six workdays followed by "the seventh day" as rest day, interlinks the creation "days" as normal days in a consecutive and non-interrupted sequence.

When the word yom, "day," is employed together with a numeral, which happens 150 times in the Old Testament, it refers in the Old Testament invariably to a literal day of 24 hours.

This rule is pervasive in the Old Testament. The only exception in numbers of 1-1,000 is found in an eschatological text in Zechariah 14:7. The Hebrew expression yô'echad employed in Zechariah 14:7 is rendered into English in a variety of ways: "for it will be a unique day" (New American Standard Bible, New International Version); "and there shall be continuous day" (New Revised Standard Version); "it will be continuous day" (Revised English Bible); or "and the day shall be one."108 The "continuous day," or "one day," of the eschatological future will be one in which the normal rhythm of evening and morning, day and night, as it is known will be changed so that in that eschatological day there shall be "light even at the evening" (vs.7). It is generally acknowledged that this is a difficult text in the Hebrew language and can hardly be used to change the plain usage in Genesis 1.109

7. Considerations Based on Article Usage. The term "day" is used in Hebrew without the article in each instance of each creation day, except in the cases of "the sixth day" (Genesis 1:31, Hebrew yom hashshish) and "the seventh day" (Genesis 2:2).110

It is noted from time to time that the first "day" of Genesis 1:5 in Hebrew reads literally "one day,"111 because we have the cardinal number "one" used with the term "day."

The lack of the definite article has been interpreted to mean that all creation "days" (except "the sixth day," which has the article) will allow "for the possibility of random or literary order as well as a rigidly chronological order."112 This is a rather shaky interpretation. It cannot be supported from semantic-syntactical points of view.

We need to understand the syntax of the Hebrew text and interpret the text accordingly without violence to the internal structure of the Hebrew language. The recent research grammar by Bruce K. Waltke and M. O'Connor points out that the indefinite noun yom with the indefinite cardinal numeral for "one" (Hebrew 'echad) in Genesis 1:5 has "an emphatic, counting force" and a "definite sense" in addition to having the force of an ordinal number which is to be rendered as "the first day."113

Based on this syntactical observation of the Hebrew language, "the first day" and "the sixth day" of the creation week are meant to be definite in the sense that they have the article by syntactical rule or by writing (not to speak of "the seventh day" which will be considered below). The first and last creation "days" are definite by syntax or writing, the first by syntactical function and the last by the usage of the article. One observation emerges -- this definite usage of the first and last day of creation forms a literary device, an inclusio, which frames the six creation "days" with definite or articular days. One of the intentions of this usage seems to be that the "days" of Genesis 1 do not permit the conclusion that random order or chronological order is an open-ended issue.114

The opposite is actually the case. Since the first and sixth days are definite, providing a clear boundary, the days are meant to be chronological and sequential, forming an uninterrupted six-day period of literal 24-hour days of creation. Thus, the definite use of the first and sixth days respectively mark and frame the six-day sequence into a coherent sequential and chronological unit of time which will be repeated in each successive week.

"The seventh day" is also written with the Hebrew article. Since "the first day" (vs.5) is definite as well as "the sixth day" (vs.31), a larger unit is formed. It is the unit of six workdays followed by "the seventh day" (Genesis 2:2,3), the day of rest. In this way the sequence of six workdays find their goal and climax chronologically and sequentially in "the seventh day," making together the weekly cycle with the day of rest being the "seventh day" of the week.

The larger unit of literal time accordingly consists of the divinely planned unit of the "six-plus-one schema" which consists of the "six" workdays followed in an uninterrupted manner and in sequence by "the seventh day" of rest. This uninterrupted sequence is divinely planned and ordained as the rhythm of the time for each successive week.

8. Considerations Based on the "Evening-Morning" Boundary. The Genesis creation account not only links each day to a sequential numeral but it also sets the time boundaries by "evening and morning" (vss.5, 8, 13, 19, 23, 31). The rhythmic boundary phrase, "and there was evening and there was morning," provides a definition of the creation "day." The creation "day" is defined as consisting of "evening" and "morning." It is a literal "day."

The term for "evening" (Hebrew 'ereb)115 covers the dark part of the day in a pars pro toto (meaning that a part, in this case the "evening," stands for the whole dark part of the day) usage (cf. "day-night" in Genesis 1:14). The corresponding term "morning" (Hebrew bqer) stands pars pro toto (meaning that a part, in this case the "morning," stands for the light part of the day) "for the entire period of daylight."116 It is to be noted that the "evening-morning" expression must be understood to have the same signification in every one of its six usages.117

"Evening and morning" is a temporal expression which defines each "day" of creation as a literal day. It cannot be made to mean anything else.

9. Considerations Based on Pentateuchal Sabbath Passages. Another kind of internal evidence provided in the Old Testament for the meaning of days derives from two Sabbath passages in the Pentateuch which refer back to the creation "days." They inform the reader how the creation "days" were understood by God.

The first passage is part of the Fourth Commandment spoken by God on Mt. Sinai and recorded recorded in Exodus 20:9-11: "Six days you shall do all your labor...but the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord your God....For in six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth...and rested on the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day and made it holy."
"These words" are spoken by Yahweh Himself (vs. 1). The linkages to creation are in wording ("seventh day," "heaven and earth," "rested," "blessed," "made it holy") and in the "six-plus-one" schema (see also Deuteronomy 5:13-14) to mention but these.118 Evidently the words used in the Ten Commandments take the creation "day" as "a regular day"119 of 24 hours and demonstrate that the weekly cycle is a temporal creation ordinance.

These words of the Lord provide an internal Pentateuch and Old Testament guideline on how God, the Giver of the "Ten Words" understands the creation "day." The divine speech which promulgates the Sabbath commandment takes the "six days" of creation to be sequential, chronological and literal.120

The argument that the relationship of the Fourth Commandment is but an "analogy" or "archetype" in the sense that man's rest on the seventh day ought to be like God's rest in creation121 is based on reductionism and an impermissible change of imagery. Terence Fretheim noted incisively that the Commandment does not use analogy or archetypal thinking but that its emphasis is "stated in terms of the imitation of God or a divine precedent that is to be followed: god worked for six days and rested on the seventh, and therefore you should do the same."122

The second Pentateuchal Sabbath passage is Exodus 31:15-17, which is again spoken by God Himself. It has several terminological linkages with Genesis 1 and is conceptually and thematically related to it. This passage has to be understood to mean that the creation "day" was a literal day and that the days were sequential and chronological. The weekly sabbath for God's people is based on imitation and example, for "in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, but on the seventh day he ceased from labor, and was refreshed" (vs. 17, New American Standard Bible).

God was refreshed because He had delight in His completed work of creation. Humankind will also be refreshed and have delight when the Sabbath as "seventh day" (vs. 15) is kept.

The "sign" nature of the Sabbath in vs. 15 reveals that the Sabbath keeper follows the divine Exemplar. He Himself kept "the seventh day" which humans who belong to Him will imitate. They will do so in the same rhythm of the literal weekly cycle of six literal workdays followed chronologically and sequentially by "the seventh day" as a day of rest and refreshment as their Creator had done during creation week.

10. Considerations Based on Sequence of Events. The creation of vegetation with seed-bearing plants and fruit trees took place on the third day (Genesis 1:11-12). Much of this vegetation seems to need insects for pollination. Insects were created on the fifth day (vs.20). If the survival of those types of plants which needed insects for pollination depended on them to generate seeds and to perpetuate themselves, then there would be a serious problem should the creation "day" consist of long ages or aeons. The type of plant life dependent on this type of pollination process without the presence of insects could not have survived for these long periods of time, if "day" were to mean "age" or "aeon." In addition, "consistency of interpretation in the day-age theory" would demand a long period of light and darkness during each of the ages. This would quickly be fatal both to plant and animal life."123

It seems that the creation "day" is expected to be understood as a literal day and not as a long period of time whether ages, periods, or aeons.

Although these arguments may not be decisive, they nevertheless point in the same direction as the decisive linguistic and semantic points which are found in the Hebrew text itself.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

This paper investigated the meaning of creation "days." It has considered key arguments in favor of a figurative, non-literal meaning of the creation "days." It found them to be wanting on the basis of genre investigation, literary considerations, grammatical study, syntactical usages, and semantic connections. The cumulative evidence, based on comparative, literary, linguistic and other considerations, converges on every level, leading to the singular conclusion that the designation yom, "day," in Genesis 1 means consistently a literal 24-hour day.

The author of Genesis 1 could not have produced more comprehensive and all-inclusive ways to express the idea of a literal "day" than the ones that were chosen. There is a complete lack of indicators from prepositions, qualifying expressions, construct phrases, semantic-syntactical connections, and so on, on the basis of which the designation "day" in the creation week could be taken to be anything different than a regular 24-hour day. The combinations of the factors of articular usage, singular gender, semantic-syntactical constructions, time boundaries, and so on, corroborated by the divine promulgations in such Pentateuchal passages as Exodus 20:8-11 and Exodus 31:12-17, suggest uniquely and consistently that the creation "day" is meant to be literal, sequential, and chronological in nature.


ENDNOTES

1. The designation "creation-science" has been defined by Louisiana law (Senate Bill No. 86, 1981) as follows: "Creation-science" means the scientific evidences for creation and inferences from those scientific evidences. A similar wording was used shortly before in the Arkansas Bill (Act 590) of March 19, 1981. For details, see: Norman L. Geisler, The Creator in the Courtroom (Milford, MI: Mott Media, 1982), 5, 224. Phillip E. Johnson (Darwin on Trial, 2d ed. [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993], 4 n. 1) states that "creation science" refers to young-earth, six-day special creation.
2. This designation is preferred and argued for by: Norman L. Geisler and J. Kerby Anderson, Origin Science: A Proposal for the Creation-Evolution Controversy (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987).
3. The significant volume of essays edited by J. P. Moreland (The Creation Hypothesis: Scientific Evidence for an Intelligent Designer [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994]) uses the designation "theistic science" as opposed to "naturalistic science," the common notion of science which rules out the God-hypothesis from the start. "Theistic science" is a "research program...that, among other things, is based on two propositions: 1. God, conceived of as a personal, transcendent agent of great power and intelligence, has through direct, primary causation and indirect secondary causation created and designed the world for a purpose and has directly intervened in the course of its development at various times....2. The commitment expressed in proposition 1 can appropriately enter into the very fabric of the practice of science and the utilization of scientific methodology" (pp. 41-42). This definition is elaborated in the remainder of the seminal essay by J. P Moreland in the above volume ("Theistic Science & Methodological Naturalism," 41-66).
4. Frederic W. Farrar, History of Interpretation (1866; reprint, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1961), 187-203.
5. The decisive section from Origen's On First Principles: Book Four (excerpt quoted in Karifried Froehlich, trans./ed., Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984], 63) noted that the days of creation cannot be understood to be literal just as it "is foolish enough to believe that, like a human farmer, God planted a garden to the east of Eden and created in it a visible, physical tree of life...." See also Terence E. Fretheim, "Were the Days of Creation Twenty-Four Hours Long?" in The Genesis Debate: Persistent Questions About Creation and the Flood, ed. Ronald R. Youngblood (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1986), 12-35.
6. Augustine, The City of God XI, iv, vi-vii.
7. The fourfold sense of Scripture consists of the following: 1) the literal sense, 2) the allegorical (spiritual-mystical) sense; 3) the anagogical (future) sense, and 4) the tropological (moral) sense. See Farrar, 205.
8. The new Catechism of the Catholic Church, published in English in 1994, states: "According to an ancient tradition, one can distinguish between two senses of Scripture: the literal and the spiritual, the latter being subdivided into the allegorical, moral [tropological], and anagogical senses. The profound concordance of the four senses guarantees all its richness to the living reading of Scripture in the Church." Later on the same page it is affirmed: "It is the task of exegetes to work, according to these rules, toward a better understanding and explanation of the meaning of Sacred Scripture..." (Catechism of the Catholic Church [Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994], 33).
9. See: (a) Robert M. Grant, A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible (New York: Macmillan, 1963),128-129; (b) Emil G. Kraeling, The Old Testament Since the Reformation (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 9-32; (c) John Rogerson, Christopher Rowland, and Barnabas Lindars, The Study and Use of the Bible, vol.2 of The History of Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1988), 77-95.
10. Martin Luther, Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 1-5, Luther's Works (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), 1:5. Later, Luther in commenting on the phrase "evening and morning" states that the creation day "consists of twenty-four hours" (1:42).
11. The development of the historical-critical method from the late seventeenth century onward until its full maturity at the end of the nineteenth century did not decisively change the interpretation of the creation "days." The reason for this is that the biblical text was now seen as an artifact of the past which has no direct relationship to the belief systems of the present.
12. The Scottish theologian Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847) is credited with being the first proponent of the view that the six creation "days" are actually "days of reconstruction," giving rise to the "ruin-reconstruction hypothesis" (see W. Hanna, ed., Select Works of Thomas Chalmers [Edinburgh: T. Constable and Co., 1855], 5: 146-150). This hypothesis has found strong defenders such as George H. Pember (Earth's Earliest Ages, 2d ed. [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1907]) and more recently A. C. Custance, Without Form and Void (Brookville, Ont: By the Author, 1970). The most detailed and scholarly critique of the "ruin-reconstruction hypothesis" has been produced by Weston W. Fields, Unformed and Unfilled: The Gap Theory (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1978). See also, Henn Blocher, In the Beginning: The Opening Chapters of Genesis (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 41-43.
13. While not the first to claim that the days of creation are actually six days of revelation, and not days of creation, the Scottish geologist Hugh Miller (1802-1856) was the foremost nineteenth-century author to proclaim this idea (Francis Haber, The Age of the World: Moses to Darwin [Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959], 236-237). In this century this view was propounded by R J. Wiseman, the father of the famous Assyriologist Donald Wiseman. More on this later.
14. The "day-age" theory originated in the eighteenth century and came to prominence in the nineteenth century through the writings of geologists James D. Dana and J. W. Dawson. See Bemard Ramm, The Christian View of Science and Scripture, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1971), 211; and Haber, 122-123, 199-200, 255.
15. For a review of these ideas, see Thomas A. McIver, "Creationism: Intellectual Origins, Cultural Context and Theoretical Diversity" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1989), 450-495.
16. Among the many studies that have gone into this, see Charles Coulston Gillispie, Genesis and Geology: A Study in the Relations of Scientific Thought, Natural Theology and Social Opinion in Great Britain, 1790-1850 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959); R. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern Science (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1972).
17. Some illuminating recent publications on this shift include Richard J. Blackwell, Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,1991);Charles E. Hummel, The Galileo Connection: Resolving Conflicts between Science and the Bible (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986); William John Hausmann, Science and the Bible in Lutheran Theology (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978).
18. Vern S. Poythress, Science and Hermeneutics: Implications of Scientific Method for Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1988), 24.
19. Ibid.
20. In the final analysis the ultimate conclusion about the final norm for scientific views and religious faith is probably made on the basis of the conviction, or presupposition, of the interpreter's stance on the authority levels of science and faith. We must also contend that science is constantly in flux and makes no absolute claims.
21. John C. L. Gibson, Genesis, The Daily Study Bible, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: The Saint Andrews Press, 1981), 56.
22. Ibid., 55.
23. Ibid.
24. Hans jouml Bumer, Das erst Buch Mose. Wuppertaler Studienbibel, Kapitel 1 - 11 (Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus Verlag, 1983), 44.
25. D. Stuart Briscoe, Genesis, The Communicator's Commentary (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), 37.
26. Note the very useful discussion of the various groups and definitions of concordism by John T. Baldwin, "Inspiration, the Natural Sciences, and a Window of Opportunity," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 5/1 (1994), 131-154, esp. 139-43; Davis A. Young, "The Discovery of Terrestrial History," Portraits of Creation: Biblical and Scientific Perspectives on the World's Formation, eds. Howard J. Van Till, Robert E. Snow, John H. Stek, and Davis A. Young (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990), 27 n. 2; Clark Pinnock, "Climbing out of a Swamp: The Evangelical Struggle to Understand the Creation Texts," Interpretation 43/2 (1989):143-155.
27. For example, Derek Kidner, Genesis: An Introduction and a Commentary, Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries (Chicago: InterVarsity Press, 1967), 56.
28. Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17, The New International Commentary of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, Ml: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990), 54.
29. For a critique of other aspects of the "day/age theory," see Lloyd R. Bailey, Genesis, Creation, and Creationism (New York/Malwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1993), 125-128.
30. Ibid., 126.
31. See above n. 13; cf. Carl F. H. Henry, God Who Stands and Stays, vol. 6 of God, Revelation and Authority (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1983), 2:112.
32. Reprinted in R J. Wiseman, Clues to Creation in Genesis, ed. Donald J. Wiseman (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1977), 109-207.
33. Kidner, 54.
34. Wiseman, 132-133.
35. William L. Holladay, Jr., A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1971),284-285; Francis Brown, S. R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs, A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 793-795; etc. See also Helmer Ringgren, "asah," in Theologisches W. des alten Testaments, eds. G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1987), 6:413-432.
36. Marcus Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature (New York: Pardes Publishing House, 1943), 2:1124-1125.
37. A recent exception is Duane Garrett, Rethinking Genesis: the Sources and Authorship of the First Book of the Pentateuch (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991), 192-194, who recognizes that Wiseman's "presentation was somewhat confused, however, and did not persuade many" (193 n. 12). Garrett seeks to bolster the idea of "days" as "seven days of divine revelation to Moses" with form-critical arguments, an attempt quite problematical in itself.
38. Davis, 27 n. 2.
39. Hamilton, 54-55.
40. Ibid., 55.
41. Ibid., 55-56.
42. Hamilton, 56 n. l, refers to C. E. Hummel, "Interpreting Genesis 1" Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 38 (1986): 175-186.
43. Hummel, The Galileo Connection, 214 (italics his).
44. Ibid., 215.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 213-216.
47. Ibid., 214.
48. Ibid, 213.
49. See the recent translations of Gunkel's major study, Hermann Gunkel, The Folktale in the Old Testament, trans. Michael D. Rutter (Sheffeld: Almond Press, 1987). Excellent analyses and critiques of form criticism are provided by Patricia G. Kirkpatrick, The Old Testament and Folklore Study (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987) and especially Carrett, 35-50.
50. Hermann Gunkel, The Legends of Genesis: The Biblical Saga and History (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 1.
51. Ibid., 7.
52. See the penetrating discussion of Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1962), 119-122.
53. S. H. Hooke, Middle Eastern Mythology (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1963), 119-121.
54. Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15, Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 1: Genesis (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), 10.
55. Walter Brueggemann, Genesis: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Atlanta GA: John Knox Press, 1982), 26.
56. Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary (London: SPCK Press, 1984), 80.
57. John H. Stek, "What Says Scripture?" Portraits of Creation, 236.
58. Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), 65.
59. At present Conrad Hyers, The Meaning of Creation: Genesis and Modern Science (Atlanta: John Knox Press,1984), 93-114; Susan Niditch,Chaos to Cosmos: Studies in Biblical Patterns of Creation (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985); and many others. Scholars have a most difficult time defining what is meant by "myth." G. B. Caird (The Language and Imagery of the Bible [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980], 219-224) has identified nine different definitions of myth, and John W. Rogerson (Myth in Old Testament Interpretation [Berlin: W. de Gruyter 1974], 274-278) has pointed to twelve aspects of myth. Genesis 1-11 is removed from the concept of myth (see Benedikt Otzen, Hans Gottlieb, and Knud Jeppesen, Myths in the Old Testament [London: SCM Press, 1980]).
60. Gibson, 55; Donald D. Evans, The Logic of Self-Involvement (London: SCM Press, 1963), 242-252.
61. J. A. Thompson, "Genesis 1-3. Science? History? Theology." Theological Review 3 (1966): 25.
62. The genre/form approach so widely used today, especially by critical scholars but also employed for other reasons by some evangelicals to Genesis 1, is formally identical or closely associated with the demythologization program of Rudolph Bultmann. He demythologizes the New Testament at any place where it does not conform to the worldview of modern man. Thus, the resurrection narrative is demythologized in such a way that the resurrection never took place in a literal sense. Evangelicals have to be aware that they cannot demythologize Genesis 1 without carrying this over to the New Testament.
63. Noel Weeks, "The Hermeneutical Problem of Genesis 1-11," Themelios 4/1 (1978): 14.
64. See Norman C. Habel, Literary Criticism of the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 69-70.
65. We do not address the question of a structural interpretation of Genesis 1 by the method of structuralism which seeks to expose the alleged deep structures of a text. The subsequent method of deconstructionism in linguistics "is an attempt to undermine the reader's expectations that a text will communicate some independently existing truth, by showing that author and reader alike are caught in the system of constraints imposed by the linguistic and literary system to which they belong, and are capable of communicating or receiving only such meanings as the system makes possible" (John Barton, "Structuralism," Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. David N. Freedman [NY: Doubleday, 1992], 6:216; cf. Jonathan D. Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981]). Just as deconstructionism denies to any text a fixed and stable meaning so in "reader-response criticism" the idea of a fixed meaning of a text is given up as well (see J. Severino Croatto, Biblical Hermeneutics: Toward a Theory of Reading as the Production of Meaning [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987]; Edgar V. McKnight, The Postmodern Use of the Bible: The Emergence of Reader-Oriented Criticism [Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1988]).
66. Paul D. Hanson, "Theology, Old Testament," Harper's Dictionary of the Bible, ed. Paul Achtemeier (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 1059: "We have already observed that every scholarly endeavor inevitably is based upon presuppositions. This is already true on the level of the descriptive task with which OT theology begins. For example, the scholar who accepts Ernst Troeltsch's 'analogy principle' (i.e. to be credible, a happening recorded in a historical source must have parallels in modern experience) will dismiss all reconstructions of the Exodus from Egypt or the resurrection of Jesus, which defy explanation within the nexus of cause and effect as understood by modern science, whereas others may not be so bound."
67. Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 43-64.
68. Edward H. Carr, What Is History? (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), 87-108.
69. Edward Krentz, The Historical-Critical Method (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 57.
70. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 240.
71. For a critique of the principle of analogy, see T Peters, "The Use of Analogy in Historical Method," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 35 (1973): 473-482; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Questions in Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970), 1:39-53.
72. See the classical study by William Henry Green, The Unity of the Book of Genesis (1895; reprint, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1979).
73. Walter C. Kaiser, "The Literary Form of Genesis 1-11," New Perspectives on the Old Testament, ed. J. Barton Payne (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1970), 61.
74. Jacques B. Doukhan, The Genesis Creation Story: Its Literary Structure, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1978), 5:182.
75. Gunkel, Legends, 38.
76. Garrett, 192.
77. Gerhard F. Hasel, "The Polemical Nature of the Genesis Cosmology," Evangelical Quarterly 46 (1974), 81-102, pointed out that there are a number of explicit and implicit polemical emphases in Genesis 1. This fact does not diminish in the least the biblical author's intention to write an account that has a literal intent to provide factual and historical information.
78. Stek, 241.
79. Hummel, The Galileo Connection, 216: "Genesis 1 contrasts sharply with the cyclical, recurring creations described by Israel's pagan neighbors."
80. It is neither "metahistory" which is removed from real history, nor "salvation history" which never happened in the way it is written in the Old Testament. Cf. Robert Gnuse, Heilsgeschichte as a Model for Biblical Theology (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989).
81. von Rad, 65.
82. Wenham, 19.
83. James Barr, Fundamentalism (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1978), 40-43.
84. Hermann Gunkel, Genesis üund erklärt (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1901), 97.
85. Hamilton,
53. 86. Stek, 237-238.
87. Benedickt Hartmann, Philippe Reymond, and Johann Jakob Stamm, Hebräund AramäWöder HebräSprache (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 382. Hereafter cited as HAL. Its predecessor, i.e., by Ludwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner, Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), 372, reads "day (of 24 hours)" for the creation day.
88. William H. Holladay, A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1971), 130.
89. Brown, Driver and Briggs, 398.
90. Magne Saeboe, "yom," in Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, eds. G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990), 6:23.
91. Ernst Jenni, "jom Tag," Theologisches Handwözum Alten Testament, eds. Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann (Zurich/Munich: Theologischer Verlag, 1971) 1:709.
92. James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, 3rd ed. (London: SCM Press, 1991), 1.
93. Ibid.
94. HAL, 382-384: Brown, Driver and Briggs, 398-401.
95. Saeboe, 14.
96. Ibid., 15,: "...in the Hebrew OT, 1,057 (45.9%) involve a preposition (esp. with the singular)." 97. Ibid., 14-20. 98. E. Kautzsch and A. E. Cowley, eds., Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 2d. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 347 §114e: "This use of the infinitive construct is especially frequent in connection with be or ke to express time-determinations (in English resolved into a temporal clause,...)...."
99. Westermann, 198.
100. Saeboe, 15.
101. Ibid., 13; Jenni, 708.
102. Jenni, 707, notes that there are only four nouns used more often in the Old Testament.
103. Ibid., 708.
104. Stek, 237, is correct in noting that each "day" of creation has to be the same since the "evening and morning" time expression and the numeral is in each instance identical. In other words, each creation "day" is of equal length. From this he shows that it is not defensible to argue that the first three "days" were long periods of time while the remaining "days" were 24-hour days. The latter position was argued by Edward J. Young, Studies in Genesis One (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing House, 1964), 104, and has found a recent supporter in R. Clyde McCone, "Were the Days of Creation Twenty-four Hours Long?" The Genesis Debate, 24.
Young and followers are inclined to separate the lengths of creation days because they claim that the sun and moon had not been created yet until the fourth day. The question really is whether this is the case. It seems likely that on the fourth day God appointed the sun and moon to rule the day and night respectively. This appointment to the ruling function does not negate that the sun and moon were in existence before. It is possible that they were not visible to the human eye before the fourth day. Some have for this reason suggested that there may have been a vapor or cloud cover before the fourth day.

105. Saeboe, 22-23.
106. Bruce K. Waltke, "yom, day, time, year," Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, ed. R. Laird Harris (Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), 371.
107. Hamilton, 54.
108. Ralph L. Smith, Micah-Malachi, Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1984), 277.
109. The other exception is with numbers above 1,000 in the apocalyptic text of Daniel 12:11-12 with the reference to 1,290 "days" and the 1,335 "days." There are some differences from Genesis 1. In both instances in Daniel 12 the plural form of "days" is employed in contrast to Genesis 1. In Genesis 1 the "day" refers to what has happened in the past; in Daniel 12 "days" refer to a prophetic time in the future. The context of all other prophetic time predictions in the book of Daniel makes it clear that in prophetic perspective each time element whether "times" (4: 16, 23,25,32), "time, times and half a time" (7:25), "evening[s and] morning[s]" (8:14), "weeks" (9:24), and respectively "days" (12:11-12) stands for another reality in real historical time. In other words in Daniel the year/day principle is at work each time a time prophecy is provided. The Danielic apocalyptic context is different from the creation context of Genesis 1. Time at the beginning, in creation, is not identical with predictive time which finds its fulfillment in the historical future. There is nothing predictive in Genesis 1. The latter is a prose-record of the past and not apocalyptic prophecy of the future. These content and contextual perspectives do not warrant a departure from the plain meaning in the Genesis creation account.
110. In Genesis 1:31 the Hebrew has an article both before yom and the numeral. In Genesis 2:3 the article is only before the numeral following the noun yom. According to Hebrew syntax the article in the latter case makes the word which the numeral qualifies articular.
111. Ronald E Youngblood, The Book of Genesis, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991), 26. Westermann, 76, actually translates "one day."
112. Youngblood, Genesis, 26.
113. Bruce K. Waltke and M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 274. The translation "day one" is syntactically not correct, even though the cardinal is used here. In clauses of the type of Genesis 1:5 the cardinal serves effectively as an ordinal number (Nahum M. Sarna, Genesis, The JPS Torah Commentary [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989], 8, 353).
114. Youngblood, Genesis, 26.
115. See Herbert Niehr, "ereb," Theologisches Woumlzum Alten Testament, 6:359-366.
116. M. Barth, "boqer," Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, 2:225.
117. Werner H. Schmidt, Die Schouml der Priesterschrift, 2d ed. (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1967), 68.
118. See Niels-Erik A. Andreasen, The Old Testament Sabbath: A Tradition-Historical Interpretation, SBL Dissertation Series No. 7 (Missoula, MT: Society of Biblical Literature, 1972), 174-202; Gerhard F. Hasel, "The Sabbath in the Pentateuch," The Sabbath in Scripture and History, ed. Kenneth A. Strand (Washington, DC: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1982), 21-43; idem, "Sabbath," The Anchor Bible Dictionary, 849-856; Gnana Robinson, The Origin and Development of the Old Testament Sabbath: A Comprehensive Exegetical Approach (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1988), 139-142, 296-301.
119. Schmidt, 68 n. 5.
120. See also Weeks, 18: "The commandment loses completely its cogency if they [the 'days'] are not taken literally."
121. Blocher, 48; see also Henricus Renckens, Israel's Concept of the Beginning: The Theology of Genesis 1-3 (New York: Herder
& Herder, 1964), 98-100.
122. Fretheim, 20.
123. Bailey, 126.

http://www.ldolphin.org/haseldays.html

Apparent age

TOUCHSTONE SAID:

***QUOTE***

In 1987 a fantastic supernova appeared in the sky. Astronomy's trigonometric measurements determined that the star that went supernova was approximately 167,000 light years away from the earth.

I'm saying that that supernova is as old as it appears, based on the astronomic measurements, and the attendant physics. It looks 167,000 years old because it actually was that old (the event actually happened 170,000 years ago, according to the astronomical assessment).

So, no funny business need for me here. The answer fits right in line with our observation.

***END-QUOTE***

i) No, what you’re doing is to equivocate over the meaning of “appearance.”

It only “looks” its actual age to an observer if he happens to be living on the surface of the supernova. But it doesn’t look its actual age to an earthbound observer.

What you’ve done is to adjust for the time-lag in the transmission of light. Nothing inherently wrong with that.

But your adjustment doesn’t change the chronological appearance of a distant star, as seen by an earthbound observer, either through a telescope or using naked-eye astronomy.

Likewise, we can distinction between relative and absolute magnitude, but that doesn’t change the appearance of the object relative to the observer.

ii) And you allow for a TE what you disallow for a YEC.

A YEC can also adjust for the difference between appearance and reality.

Just as a TE will say that certain objects are actually older than they appear to be, and harmonize appearance with reality by invoking a particular modality (light speed), a YCE will say that certain objects are actually younger than they appear to be, and harmonize appearance with reality by invoking a particular modality (creation ex nihilo).

***QUOTE***

Now, from a YEC perspective. Your claim is that you can affirm that "things are as old as they appear". So, in the case of SN1987A, which appears to be an event from 170,000 years ago, how does creation ex nihilo or conventionalism or any other "-ism" help you affirm 170,000 years old for this event?

***END-QUOTE***

i) To begin with, I deny that objects have any intrinsic appearance of age. That is simply a contingent, external relation.

ii) I do not claim that everything is as old as it seems to be. I don’t claim that a one-day old Adam (made on day six) was as old as he seemed to be.

I don’t claim that the instantaneous wine which Jesus created at Cana was as old as it tasted.

I don’t claim that when God changed the rod of Moses into a snake, the snake was as old as it seemed to be.

I don’t claim that when Jesus multiplied the loaves and fish, the instantaneous food was as old as it seemed to be (ditto the miracles of Elijah and Elisha with food and oil).

I don’t claim that when Jesus restored sight to the blind, you could tell the true age of the new/renewed eyeballs.

I don’t claim that when God planted a garden in Eden, the trees or topsoil were as old as they seemed to be.

iii) I don’t affirm that the nova is 170,000 years old.

a) For one thing, that may be an accurate measurement, but the measurement of time is an artifact of whatever metric we impose on time.

b) If, likewise, the nova is the product of creation ex nihilo, then it didn’t pass through the ordinary process of stellar formation.

One of the fundamental problems with your position is the way in which you implicitly secularize the universe.

***QUOTE***

And if you *can* do that, haven't you disproven YEC ideas?

Saying it's *not* 170,000 years old doesnt' qualify, nor that it's merely an "illusion" dessed up in meta-scientific decoration. You've just said YECs can affirm that "things are as old as they appear".

So how do *you* affirm the 170,000 year history of supernova SN1987A?

***END-QUOTE***

No, what I did was to construct a parallel argument, trading on the same equivocation as you used.

If you qualify “appearance” by invoking some harmonistic device, then the YEC can to the same thing.

Both you and he affirm it with a parenthetical rider. If you can adjust your definition, so can he.

As usual, you fail to grasp the ramifications of either position—TE or YEC.

Double-tongued theistic evolution

TOUCHSTONE SAID

Out of one side of his mouth:

“To my knowledge, TEs do not appeal to supernatural mechanisms in scientific questions. For instance, I believe God created the universe, but I don't have any scientific evidence at hand that conclusively establishes that.”

“There's no honest way around this but to say that YEC interpretations as *science* are a complete joke.”

Out of the other side of his mouth:

God *does* intervene miraculously at some point, elevating proto-human to human by virtue of the endowment of a soul and th image dei. Before elvating Adam (and Eve) in this way, proto-humans were just animals. Their shared ancestry with other species isn't a problem at all.

Out of one side of his mouth:

“Thinking that the ancient Hebrews understood ‘yom’ to be a claim for a solar day just makes no sense to me. It's post-enlightenment reductionist thinking superimposed on a tribe of ancient Hebrews.”

Out of the other side of his mouth:

“I'm sure YEC subscribers can be found all along the timeline (Josephus was a YEC I think).”

Out of one side of his mouth,

“Well, YEC views are totally discredited, scientifically. As Christians, I think it's patently dishonest to present this any other way than that. YEC believers are welcome to say that they think God created the entire universe recently by in such a way as to an exquisite illusion -- it looks and behaves like it was billions of years old.”

But, out of the other side of his mouth, doesn’t a TE believe that God positioned the stars so that stars appear to be newer than they really are—due to the time-lag in the transmission of light?

So I guess TE believers are welcome to say that they think God created the entire universe ages ago in such a way as to an exquisite illusion -- it looks and behaves like it’s much younger than it actually is.

The faith of an Evangelutionist

Before I weigh in, I should note that the stylish, intellectually agile, and clear-minded Patrick Chan has added his own lucid commentary to this ongoing thread.

TOUCHSTONE SAID:

“I didn't see any complaints, or even mention of common ancestry in Steve's original post ("Adam and Evolution"). In fact, common ancestors would put man and gorilla together. He clearly believes Gorillas have the minimum resources for survival -- they are offered as the example of what man is *not*. If we superimpose common ancestry on the picture, then Steve's point becomes hopelessly confused: you have a man-ape creature to assess for survivability. Was the man-ape ancestor a viable species? How do we know? Steve is keeping his magic formula to himself, so we can't say on our own.”

i) You have to wonder what the problem is? Is the source of the problem that the Evangelutionist is really too obtuse to grasp the position of the opposition side, however often that is stated and explicated?

Or is the problem that he does understand it, but he can’t deal with it?

The conundrum facing the Evangelutionist is that he is a man who suffers from divided intellectual commitments. On the one hand, he finds the case for evolution to be convincing.

On the other hand, he wants to cling to some semblance of Christian orthodoxy. And theistic evolution is the only mediating position available to him.

The best explanation I can offer for his systematic inability or unwillingness to accurately reproduce the opposing position—whether it’s YEC, or OEC, or ID—is that if he allowed himself to even acknowledge the opposing position, that would place unbearable pressure on the rickety compromise of theistic evolution.

So his only refuge is to repeatedly caricature the opposing position, or ignore the repeated answers to the questions he asked, or ignore repeated distinctions, or demand “more.”

ii) As I have explained, from the first post in this continuing thread and onwards from there, I am comparing and contrasting the implications of Gen 1-3 with the implications of evolution.

a) On my own view, as I already stated, Adam had no ancestors. There were no pre-Adamites of hominids.

b) But, of the sake of argument, I am also mounting an internal critique of evolution.

“I think Steve must be supposing some model that has early man "unprotected" as part of his evolutionary past, and thus man can't be here? I admit, I responded to that post simply because it seems inchoate on the face of it. It the present implies the past, and we believe there is a causal chain at work, then it seems one would need a pretty strong rationale to tell us that what we see in front of -- lots of humans surviving to the present day -- didn't really happen.”

This is only the latest example of how impervious the Evangelutionist is to interacting with the opposing position. Once again, I can only attribute his incapacity to absorb a counterargument.

All he’s done here is to reiterate his original fallacy, although I pointed out the fallacious character of his appeal. He does nothing to interact with what I said.

Instead, he chooses to play dumb, as if his opponent has denied “that what we see in front of -- lots of humans surviving to the present day -- didn't really happen.”

I walked in through the fallacies of this inference once before. No one denies the present. No one denies the past. No one denies a causal chain.

But the general fact of the present does nothing whatsoever to validate a specific theory of the past.

One of his problems, aside from his state of denial, is a failure to distinguish between consistency and implication.

The fact that human beings survived is logically consistent with YEC, OEC, theistic evolution, naturalistic evolution, and panspermia.

The present implies the past. The present is consistent with more than one theory of the past.

“Evolution didn't happen according to his particular interpretation of Genesis, and that's all the rigor he needs.”

As I’ve had to explain throughout the course of this thread, I’m operating with a two-track argument:

i) How did man survive, given Genesis?

ii) How did man survive, given evolution?

In this course of this thread, my criticisms concerning the evolution of man were never based on Genesis. Rather, my criticisms were internal to evolution itself.

It’s quite true that, as a Christian, I regard divine revelation as more than sufficient to tell us, in broad strokes, what really happened.

But there can be more than one reason to find evolutionary theory wanting.

“To make anything but silly guesses about the survival dynamics of a particular species half a billion years ago, one would need an *enormous* evidential base, and some sort of calibrated model for running the numbers. Did (proto-)humans reproduce fast enough to compensate for all the predator attrition? We don't know. No PhD I've read could say with any certainty what the reproductive rates were a million years ago. If you can find some scientific evidence for that number, I'd be glad to know that -- it would be useful to the question at hand.”

So, by his own admission, evolutionary theory is radically underdetermined by the evidence.

“Does Steve have this number? He better! How else could he determine that the predator attrition rate was sufficient to make man non-viable?”

Notice how the Evangelutionist has the burden of proof upside down:

i) At a minimum, his evidentiary demand cuts both ways. Why does he think the opponent of evolution has to come up with this number?

Why does it not occur to him that the proponent of evolution has to come up with this number? Why the double standard?

ii) But it’s worse than that. He is acting as if evolution is a given. An unquestionable datum.

Hence, the burden of proof is not to verify evolution, but to falsify evolution.

But by his own admission, evolutionary theory is radically underdetermined by the evidence: ““To make anything but silly guesses about the survival dynamics of a particular species half a billion years ago, one would need an *enormous* evidential base, and some sort of calibrated model for running the numbers. Did (proto-)humans reproduce fast enough to compensate for all the predator attrition? We don't know. No PhD I've read could say with any certainty what the reproductive rates were a million years ago.”

Oh, and this isn’t just a question of “certainty,” but probability. Absent an “enormous evidential base” about the “survival dynamics of a particular species half a billion years ago,” what way is there for him to even probabilify the chances?

His only fallback argument is his fallacious appeal to the fact of survival, as if the *bare* fact of survival *entails* the *specific* claim of an *evolutionary* survival mechanism.

“No one is suggesting that evolution has fossil evidence or some other kind of forensic proof for every part of every species' history. It's frankly remarkable that we have as much fossil evidence as we have, and what we have leaves long periods of time wide open.”

And that’s one of the fundamental problems. When you leave “long periods of time wide open”:

i) You can’t establish lineal descent from the fossil record, in which case:

ii) You can’t establish encephalization. What is more:

iii) You can’t establish that early man had a viable, evolutionary defense mechanism during those long, undocumented intervals.

“That said, I guess you will have to tell me what problems he's pointed out with evolutionary theory that need to be addressed. Saying you need an intact fossil skeleton for every 20 year period (generation) back for a million years is completely unreasonable, if that's what you (or he) is demanding. We wouldn't expect to find that kind of evidence whether evolution was true or not.”

I may be unreasonable to expect continuous fossil evidence, but it is not unreasonable to demand evidence commensurate with the claim. If you claim an evolutionary series without serial evidence, especially when, by your own admission, the data points are widely separated in time and place, then your theory is severely underdetermined by the actual state of the record.

The Evangelutionist can only find the evidence for evolution probative because evolutionary theory is rearranging the isolated data points in an evolutionary is rearranging the isolated data points to form an evolutionary trajectory, and filling the gaps with more evolutionary theory.

But if you take away the evolutionary scaffolding, then they date points do not line up in any particular direction. Once you remove all of the evolutionary interpolations, you’re left with a high proportion of gaps to a low proportion of data-points.

Keep in mind that this isn’t merely my take on the fossil record. The Evangelutionist actually appeals to the extremely fragmentary state of the record as if that were a problem for my position rather than his own. In his desperation, he tries to make a virtue of necessity by treating the absence of evidence if that were a positive asset for his position.

His argument has now degenerated to the point where all he can say is, “You can’t beat me because you don’t have enough evidence to the contrary!”

But absence of counterevidence assumes the absence of supporting evidence. When you can only defend a scientific theory by invoking the paucity of the evidence, then the lack of evidence undercuts your own theory.

I can’t disprove the existence of blue-nosed fairies. Does that make fairyism a rational belief?

Suppose a DA were to prosecute a suspect for a 50-year-old crime. Suppose, using the logic of the Evangelutionist, this was the gist of his closing statement:

“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. We have a murder victim. A murder victim implies a killer. So we can reason back from the murder to the killer. Therefore, you must find the suspect guilty of murder. Sure, we don’t have any probative evidence connecting the accused to the murder. But you can’t expect that kind of evidence 50 years after the fact. The trail went cold a long time ago. The witnesses, if there were any, all died without leaving any depositions. We didn’t find his fingerprints on the gun. We have no record that he ever owed the gun. The other forensic evidence is lost due to the ravages of time. No forensic pathologist could say beyond a reasonable doubt, or even from a preponderance of the evidence, that the suspect murdered the victim. But to expect that sort of evidence at this stage of the game is completely unreasonable. Therefore, it’s your civic duty to convict the accused.”

Now, if I were a member of the jury, I’d vote to acquit the accused. Yes, *someone* did it. But there’s no compelling evidence that *he* did it. Indeed, there may even be exculpatory evidence.

But I realize that my rules of evidence reflect the warping bias of my fundy presuppositions. Any juror in his right mind would vote with the Evangelutionist.

“OK, so you said this time around you don't have a problem with my math.”

I said nothing of the kind. The Evangelutionist is becoming delusional.

“I will accept that you are simply unwilling to provide this information. If so, just let me know. We can draw the appropriate inferences one way or the other then as to why you will not. As it is, you're just leaving things hanging.”

And I will accept the fact that the Evangelutionist is unable to interact with my arguments. If so, just let me know. We can draw the appropriate inferences one way or the other then as to why he will not. As it is, he’s just leaving things hanging.

The Cosmic Authority Problem:

From Academic Integration and the Christian Scholar by J.P. Moreland:

In my view, Christian complementarians give up too much intellectual ground too quickly in light of the pressures of philosophical naturalism. I am neither a sociologist nor the son of one, but I still opine that philosophical naturalism is sustained in the academy and broader culture by sociological, and not distinctly rational factors. In my discipline of philosophy, signs indicate that important figures are finally acknowledging this. For example, naturalist Thomas Nagel has recently written:

"In speaking of the fear of religion, . . . , I am talking about . . . the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself. . . . I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that. . . . My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind." [6]

6. Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 130-131.

To be or not to be

TOUCHSTONE SAID:

“OK, so I've given my rationale, "showed my math". If you want more details, there are thousands of papers and scholarly sources we can look at.”

The problem this time around wasn’t with the details, but the logical structure of the argument.

Your basic argument was fundamentally fallacious. Adding a lot of factual detail doesn’t validate an invalid inference.

***QUOTE***

Perhaps I misunderstood your original argument. Maybe you can verify for me whether you think man *did* have the minimum resources to survive the last million years, or whether he did not. If he *did* have the minimum resources necessary, I don't see a particular point of protest -- and I don't think your local anthropologist would either.

My understanding from your "Adam and evolution" post was that man did *not* have the minimum assets necessary to survive the last million years (and even farther back, depending on where you draw the (proto-)human line). I'd be surprised to hear you say now that man *did* have the minimum assets, after all. But if that's the case, so be it. All the better.

***END-QUOTE***

Throughout this thread you’ve demonstrated an inability to distinguish between an internal argument (arguing on the grounds of the opposing position) and an external argument (arguing on the grounds of your own position).

I already drew that distinction in my original post.

My position, both now and then, is that:

i) Assuming Genesis to be true, man did have the wherewithal to survive;

ii) Assuming evolution to be true, man did not have the wherewithal to survive.

I’d add that, under (i), man hasn’t been around for a million years.

***QUOTE***

Now, assuming that you remain convinced that man *did* not have the minimum assets to survice, can I ask for your "math", your rationale? Specifically:

+ What are the minimum assets needed for man to survive?

***END-QUOTE***

I’ve already been over this ground with you numerous times.

The answer depends on which proposition we are assuming for discussion purposes.

i) If we’re assuming evolution, then the identity of man is fluid. He ceased to be what he used to be.

One discontinuity is the eventual loss of his natural defense mechanisms—chiefly an arboreal lifestyle.

At a minimum, he would need a compensatory adaptation, such as weaponry.

This would involve the ability to invent suitable weapons, the actual invention of suitable weapons, and the ability to use them effectively.

And the timing of this development would need to be such that there wasn’t a chink in his armor during the transitional phase.

ii) If we’re assuming Genesis, then his identity is continuous rather than discontinuous. The first man (Adam) already had the same basic body and brainpower as modern man.

And weaponry existed in the first generation of man. That’s how Cain was able to kill and butcher a sacrificial animal (Gen 4:4).

Assuming Genesis (0n the traditional reading), there was an environmental transition from life inside the garden to life outside the garden, but there was no anthropological transition in the basic physiology or psychology of man from Adam to you and me.

Since you view Genesis in the trick mirror of theistic evolution, you don’t look to Genesis for answers to questions like these. But the resources are inherent in the text.

“In any case, if one is to dismiss the inference of the past based on the present, there has to be a criterion in place to make the assessment of man -- or coelacanth, if you were to look at that -- as implausible.”

i) I don’t dismiss an inference from the present to the past. On the contrary, I can also reason back from the present to the past as. Indeed, I can do so with far more confidence that you can since I don’t interject a radical discontinuity into the biological history of man.

ii) But illustrating, once more, your constitutional inability to accurately reproduce the stated position of your opponent, I drew an explicit distinction between the level at which such as inference was either valid or invalid.

“I don't suppose you would say that a coelacanth is any match for a shark. If that's the case, how did these guys survive for so many millions of years? Yet, it's not a match for a shark, or any number of other aquatic predators with bigger size, more speed, bigger teeth, etc. Given that, I believe we would suppose that the coelacanth couldn't have made it, either. The little coelacanth can't even point to its emerging technology, organizational skills, or enlarging brain. It's just the humble coelacanth, surviving all these hundreds of millions of years.”

If you do a little research on the coelacanth, you’ll find that it does have a number of natural defense mechanisms. So your analogy between a man and a coelacanth falls apart at the critical point of comparison.

“Instead, it reasons from the present to the past. We have living coelacanth specimens caught by fishermen, and we have coelacanth fossils that date back to something like 400Mya (Devonian period, for most of our coelacanth fossils, I believe).”

Of course, I happen to deny your chronology. But, for purposes of this thread, it’s unnecessary for me to challenge the evolutionary timeline.

I only raise the issue when you raise the issue in your attack YEC chronology.

“Assuming of course, that the speed of light hasn't changed by thousands of orders of magnitude, which might mess with our dating techniques.”

If you weren’t such a slow learner, or so chronically forgetful, you’d know by now that those are not the grounds on which I’d challenge your chronology.

Racism @ the Laugh Factory

First, allow me to preface this with a statement: Racism is deplorable. It remains a great stain on the Southern Baptist Convention's conscience that it supported slavery. Christ says "There is neither Jew or Greek..." in the church.

That said, we are also told to let "no unwholesome word proceed from our mouths."

So, what's the problem @ the Laugh Factory? As I write this, I am watching the news conference about "Kramer's racist rant" at this comedy club. It's inexcusable. However, the Laugh Factory regularly allows its comedians to utter all manner of, how shall we say, in the words of Spock in Star Trek IV, colorful metaphors, from its microphone. So, we have here persons upset (and rightly so) about what Mr. Richards stated, but they refuse to censor their microphone; they allow all manner of unseemly conversation to be uttered. Isn't this just a tad arbitrary? Why the one speech and not the other? What is their non-arbitrary epistemic warrant for their objections?

Suggestion: They should clean up their act...all of it.

Backwards reasoning

TOUCHSTONE SAID:

“The rationale science uses is completely different than the one you've used. They note that humans exist now, and work backwards. Since humans come from earlier humans -- their parents -- they like all living things form a chain back into history.”

No one denies that. Both YEC and OEC affirm that.

“Evolutionary theory supposes that this back chaining leads to convergence, if you go back a long ways, were humans were less evolved, and had a shared developmental path with other species - primates most recently, others in the more distant past.”

Yes, we understand that.

“Some closely-related hominids *didn't* make it. There are no more Neanderthals around any more, so they obviously didn't have what it takes to survive in some regard.”

Once again, we already understand that aspect of the theory.

“This paradigm gives a means for understanding man's history on earth. So far, the dirt evidence that we have fits nicely with the model.”

That’s a matter of interpretation.

“The only way I can see that one would suppose we got here without a biological history…”

That's a straw man argument. No one denies that we (human beings) have a biological history. Both YEC and OEC affirm that we have a biological history.

“Is a scenario in which something happens that goes against the physics, the natural processes in place for God's creation. That's where YEC ideas come into the picture.”

I don’t know what this is supposed to mean. Fiat creation doesn’t go “against” physics or natural processes.

Rather, fiat creation is what puts the cycle of natural forces and processes in place.

“In their view, man's organizational and commercial skills provided the selective advantage that pushed the Neanderthals out of the picture.”

Two problems:

i) To my knowledge, YEC (and OEC) classifies Neanderthals as a subspecies of modern man. Hence, Neanderthal would have a full complement of human faculties.

ii) According to evolutionary theory, this stage is very late in the game. The fact that Cro-Magnon man had various survival skills doesn’t explain how he survived prior to the evolution of those survival skills.

“Your argument is different, though. You are making a claim that man *could* not possibly have survived.”

No, my claim is not that strong. My claim points out major obstacles to the survival of early man, given evolution, and then demands corresponding evidence for how he overcame those obstacles.

Now the Evangelutionist plays his trump card:

***QUOTE***

The rationale science uses is completely different than the one you've used. They note that humans exist now, and work backwards.

Man *did* survive, because, well, we're here, and in large numbers. That's very strong evidence that we've had what it takes to make it thus far. If we didn't have what it takes, how did we get here?

But the basic assumption of evolutionary theory is sufficiency for survival by implication: we know we were able to survive because we did survive.

So, in a nutshell, here's the rationale from evolutionary theory, which I think is the best one available:

Man had what it takes to survive because he *did* survive.

That's the rationale you seek. It should have been obvious, it's basic evolutionary theory.

***END-QUOTE***

Thanks for clearly stating the primary argument for evolution. That helps to show how utterly vacuous the argument for evolution really is.

It’s true that the actual implies the possible. It’s also true that the present implies the past.

But that does absolutely nothing to prove a particular theory how we survived.

An atheist could use your logic to prove atheism, viz. a secular scientist observes that the universe exists as of now, and works backwards. It did arrive at this point because, well, it’s here. That’s very strong evidence that the universe had what it takes to make it this far. If it didn’t have what it takes, how did it get here?

Thus, the basic assumption of secular cosmology is sufficiency for existence by implication: we know that the universe did exist because it does exist; thus, it had whatever it needed to make it this far.

So, in a nutshell, here’s the rationale from secular cosmology: the universe had what it takes to get here because it did!

That’s the rationale you seek. It should have been obvious since it’s basic secular cosmology.

We could apply the very same reasoning to prove naturalistic evolution. Evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary ethics.

Yet the inference is completely invalid. Yes, you can infer the possible from the actual or the past from the present.

But all you can infer is the generic truth *that* whatever is actual is possible, or *that* the past is real given the reality of the present.

This in no way implicates a specific theory of *what* the past was like, or *how* the possibility of the past renders the present possible.

And, what is worse—not only is the inference invalid, but it can also be just plain wrong.

For example, we all use logic. Logic is undeniable.

But someone may propose a reductionistic ontology that ends up removing thevery truth-conditions which make logic possible—much less necessary and universal.

The necessity of logic doesn’t retroactively warrant just any ontological theory of logic.

A particular ontology may completely undercut the necessity and universality of logic—in which case the theory is self-refuting.

Same problem with eliminative materialism.

So, yes, you can reason from the present to the past, or the actual to the possible. But that only satisfies a necessary condition of any existential proposition. It is hardly a sufficient condition.

The fact that we are here today, in which case it was possible for us to make it this far, does nothing whatsoever to justify the inference or assumption that it was possible for us to survive according to a set of evolutionary postulates.

To the contrary, evolution may stipulate such restrictive conditions that survival either impossible or highly unlikely. And one would need very specific evidence to overturn that presumption.

Sneak-n-retreat

***QUOTE***

Hawking, speaking in the quote you provided, was stressing the importance of observational consistency and predictive performance. He's specifically *not* concerned with the existential anxieties you're expressing, and said so in the paragraph you quoted from him in expressing your anxieties.

***END-QUOTE***

i) I didn’t know I was suffering from existential anxieties.

ii)”Positivism,” as Hawking employs the term, still belongs to the antirealist side of the realist/antirealism continuum in the philosophy of science.

For example, David Deutsch classifies positivism as an extreme form of instrumentalism, which he describes thusly:

“Yet some philosophers, and even some scientists, disparage the role of explanation in science. To them, the basic purpose of a scientific theory is not to explain anything, but to predict the outcomes of experiments: its entire content lies in its predictive formulae. They consider any consistent explanation that a theory may give for its predictions to be as good as any other, or as good as no explanation at all, so long as the predictions are true. This view is called instrumentalism (because it says that a theory is no more than an "instrument" for making predictions). To instrumentalists, the idea that science can enable us to understand the underlying reality that accounts for our observations, is a fallacy and a conceit.”

http://www.qubit.org/people/david/FabricOfReality/FoRExtract.html

That dovetails perfectly with what Hawking said. It also dovetails perfectly with indirect realism.

“Indirect realism. I maintain that your insistence on shifting the conversation away from the archaeological evidence to the question of ‘what is 'evidence', really, when you get down to it?’ is all the reader need realize from this exchange.”

No, I didn’t change the subject. You’re the one who can’t stick to the issue. Instead, you choose to broaden the debate so that you can replay your boilerplate speech about the evils of YEC.

When you choose in inveigh against the epistemology of YEC, that is when it becomes germane for me to discuss the philosopher of science. I simply follow you wherever you choose to go.

“When you start wondering what the meaning of ‘is’ is, your fundamental opposition to the conventional epistemology of science is proved.”

Science doesn’t have a “conventional” epistemology. That’s why science has all these intramural debates over the philosophy of science.

And your cutesy attempt to trivialize the debate by alluding to Clinton merely illustrates your own intellectual frivolity.

“I understand you are interested in escalating the question here to a "philosophy of science" discussion: What is reality? Do we know what reality really is? How do we know what "is" is? Etc.”

Once again, y0u’re trying to rewrite the history of this thread. When you choose to talk about the religious neutrality of methodological naturalism, then I comment accordingly.

You have a habit, throughout this thread, of making claims, which I challenge, which you then back away from, complaining about the irrelevance of the issue you yourself chose to raise, to which I merely responded.

“If I bring up skulls or spears or cleavers, and you want wax philosophical in response about metrical conventionalism, be my guest. That makes my point about your orientation here nicely.”

No, the only point it makes is the way you keep shifting gears throughout the course of this thread.

Moving along:

***QUOTE***
That's nothing but begging the question, Steve. What do you mean by "big enough"? How can I know if the evidence I present resents man as "big enough"? How do you determine at what point man becomes "brainy enough"? How soon is "soon enough"?

Without substantive answers to these questions, you're no better off than you were before. We *know* you don't think it's "enough". The whole dispute is about what constitutes enough. This is what happens in scientific debates when one scientist makes a claim and the other says, "OK, show your math!".

So Steve, it's time to show your math. You've claimed you have insight beyond the science community on this issue. I'm asking for the criterion you use to determine "enough". Saying it's "not enough" doesn't help anything. Showing what enough is, and why that measure and not something more or less, does.

***END-QUOTE***

Nice attempt to shift the burden of proof. Putting to one side your tendentious sophistries about the “science community,” the onus is not on me to disprove evolution. Rather, the onus is on you to support specific claims with specific evidence.

Evolution itself lays down a number of conditions which must be met. I’ve already discussed the specifications in far more detail than you ever did in your counterclaims.

It’s not my job to argue both sides of the issue. It isn’t my job to spoonfeed you all the answers to all the questions inherent in evolutionary theory. If you want to be spoon fed, buy your own spoon.

You’re just looking for another excuse to duck all the tough questions you don’t have the answers for.

It isn’t just me who brought this up. You brought up weaponry as well. You brought up rudimentary language to account for team work. You brought up encephalization to account for all of the above. You brought up relative dating, not just me.

And you’re the one who believes in evolution, not me. It’s not my duty to do all the spadework for you. Show me *your* math for a change.

Try answering your own questions with specific evidence.

“Lastly, I believe you misunderstood me with regard to philosophy of science. I've got no problem with philosophy of science, or metrical conventionalism. That's all good stuff, and interesting in its own right.”

First it’s “mumbo-jumbo,” far removed from “from the main body of scientific knowledge and inquiry.”

Then, why I call your hand, it’s “all good stuff.”

You should try hooking yourself up to a polygraph the next time you reply.

“I now understand you are fully capable of doing a Google search for 'metrical conventionalism'.”

Oh, I got all this from doing a Google search, did I?

Perhaps you’d like to document your allegation by showing us the urls for the online versions of Le Poidevin’s book, or Dainton’s book, or Sklar’s article, or Grünbaum’s book, or Lucas’ book, or Reichenbach’s book, or Poincare’s book.

It should only take you a few minutes to do this since you already know that I got all this info off the net.

How or whether they would apply metrical conventionalism to this particular debate is beside the point. They’re not debating this particular issue.

Newton saw things in Kepler that Kepler didn’t see. Einstein found an application in Riemann that Riemann didn’t employ.

The secular suicide cult

***QUOTE***

MASTER ZAP SAID:
[Quoting me] If the truth does us no good, then why should we care?

Because it's the truth, perhaps?

I, like Dawkins, care about the truth.

The problem with theism is that they are too afraid to face the truth. The truth is big, ugly, scary, and doesn't fit into the cartoon universe they want. So they invent the cartoon universe variant of it, and live happily in this imagined falsehood.

Does the truth scare ya? To quote Dawkins; "Well, that's just tought."

[Quoting me] So, as soon as we learn enough to find out that certain positions are losers, we can safely ignore them and redirect our attention to positions which are more promising—which would be beneficial if they were true.

I.e. wishful thinking.

Yet another post in the triablogue series of "we obliquely admit our worldview is nothing but wishful thinking".

Guys, we knew that already.

ANONYMOUS SAID:

You have tipped your hand once again.

Your anti-science rants are amusing and give a window into the compartmentized mind of a fundie calvanist and therefore worth the occasional read. However, engaging any effort into real substantial give and take with you is futile. There is no give, only take. You are exactly a representative of what you rail against, an arguer full of claims that offers no return on the inevestment, if your investment is looking for someone who is engaging you in an intellectually honest manner.

The fact that you only wish to "invest" your time on claims that give you a feel-goody answer highlight your bias and your inability to search for truth. Your arguments, while full of sophistry, are nothing more than you propping up your hopes and desires.

pffft.

***END-QUOTE***

One of the striking things about unbelievers is how some of the act like kids who colluded to cheat on the exam. Only, when they hacked into their teacher’s computer, they pulled the wrong test key.

So, instead of getting all the same answers right, they get all the same answers wrong. Corroborative error.

Reading the above, notice how “free thinkers” with their “critical thinking skills” are indistinguishable from groupthink?

As was clear from my original post, I’m not talking about known truths, but about known truth-claims.

Opposing positions make various truth-claims. So, in principle, there’s a two-step process:

i) Learn the truth-claims, then:

ii) Learn which truth-claims are true (or false).

My point, which went over the heads of the nullifidian commenters, is that where certain truth-claims are concerned, once you complete the first step, you can skip the second step.

When Dawkins comes to a blind alley, he counts the bricks.

When I come to a blind alley, I turn around and look for another way out.

When Dawkins is diagnosed with terminal cancer, he writes a book on The Cancer Cure Delusion.

When I’m diagnosed with terminal cancer, I get a second opinion or explore experimental therapies.

When the prison guards tell Dawkins that escape is futile, he measures the gas chambers for new drapes.

When the prison guards tell me that escape is futile, I go right ahead and look for a hole in the fence.

If Dawkins were counseling a five-year-old dying of leukemia, he’d tell the kid:

“You’re a lucky accident, a colony of bacteria, a host for DNA parasites. There are all sorts of things that would be comforting. I expect an injection of morphine would be comforting—it might be more comforting, for all I know. Wouldn't it be lovely to believe in an imaginary friend who listens to your thoughts, listens to your prayers, comforts you, consoles you, gives you life after death. But the universe doesn't owe you condolence or consolation; it doesn't owe you a nice warm feeling inside. So you'd better live with it, because there is nothing after it!"

At least, that’s what he’d sat if he didn’t lose his nerve at the last moment.

As for me, I pray with the child and share the gospel with him.

One of the ironies about so many unbelievers is how dutiful they are. How loyal they remain to the Grim Reaper of Darwinism.

If the Darwinian Reaper orders them to march off a cliff, they salute smartly and go marching right off the cliff, with drums rolling and flags flying.

If someone speaks slightingly of him, they rush in to defend the honor of the Darwinian Reaper.

They will volunteer for any suicide mission the Darwinian Reaper proposes. They will swell with pride at the privilege of being cannon fodder for the Darwinian Reaper.

On a related note, one of the oddities of human nature is that many people will kill themselves en mass who would never kill themselves one-by-one. The sense of camaraderie is what makes mass suicide possible.

The mob psychology of the Darwinian community is interchangeable with a suicide cult. Before he finally died, Bertrand Russell was the cult leader.

His passing left the cult without an inspirational—or, should I say, expirational?—leader to rally around. But after their dark night of the soul, the Darwinian faithful have found a new leader in Dawkins.

At the time of writing, Dawkins is making a nation wide tour to plug his new book, The God Delusion.

He only plays to a sympathetic audience in carefully selected venues. He plays to the galleries with finger-waging oratory—like a graying father-figure who trades on the appetite of the young for parental approval.

A suicide cult is a shame culture in miniature. Loss of face is the social glue.

That is why, if a member chooses to leave the cult, his defection is treated as an act of betrayal. For the only thing which gives the members the courage to kill themselves is the sense of solidarity. Who is any individual to let the team down?

And this is why Dawkins constantly resorts to emotive rhetoric which is intended to either shame outsiders into joining the movement or shaming insiders from leaving.

In the Darwinian game of chicken, anyone who refuses to down the Hemlock is a scaredy cat.

Like cult members generally, Darwinians feel like the righteous minority. They wear the social stigma of atheism (as they imagine it) as a badge of honor.

They may be despised by the majority (as they imagine it), but they are despised for their virtues, not their vices. They live for a back pat, and die for an epitaph.

Dodging the bullet

TOUCHSTONE SAID:

“Grammatico-historical exegesis. Steve, it's the 'historical' part of grammatico-historical exegesis that wreaks havoc with YEC interpretations. If we look at literary forms and devices, then work in our historical knowledge -- WHOOPS! that's where the YEC train jumps the tracks, as the overwhelming witness of God's creation paints a picture that invalidates a YEC view as sound grammatico-historical exegesis…I endorse a TE interpretation of Genesis precise because it honors scripture in view of the witness of God's creation. The stars out your night time window are sufficient historical testimony to dismiss YEC views in the historical context.”

1.Working in “our” historical knowledge is precisely the opposite of the GHM.

The point of the GHM is to work our back to the background knowledge of the original author and audience. To interpret the text in light of what the text would mean to the original author—given his historical horizon—not what a modern reader would like the text to mean, given his historical horizon.

What you are doing is to indulge in blatantly anachronistic exegesis.

2.In addition, you continue resorting to the unprincipled tactic of equating the traditional interpretation of Gen 1-3 with YEC.

As I pointed out, James Barr is not YEC—or OEC—or TE.

Continuing:

***QUOTE***

Indirect realism. Let me guess, this the card you're playing here. That's fine, I'm an indirect realist myself. Everything comes to mind through an interpretive layer. But it's a naive understanding of indirect realism that denies the underlying reality sensed through our interpretive filters. If that's your approach -- and it sounds like you're committed to it here but unwilling to just state it outright -- then you're mistaking indirect realism for *anti-realism*, which is what you are actually pleading for. If that's where you're at -- anti-realism -- well then fire up the sitar and pass the LSD, there's no point in talking this over any further. It's a magic carpet ride, baby!

If you're avoid an anti-realist stance, and standing on indirect realism, then it doesn't get you off the hook like you think it does. Saying that the tree out the window doesn't exist because I'm looking at at through a distortive filter -- the glass of the window, oh and the tinted glass of my sunglasses too -- doesn't mess with the existential reality of the tree. It's simply a distortive layer that has to be incorporated into the knowledge base. I can't see the tree on the other side of the solid wall beside me, but this opaque visual filter doesn't make the tree disappear in an existential sense.

Saying that all we experience comes by way of sensory input, and is mediated through an interpretive filter changes naught in this discussion. Methodological materialism doesn't make metaphysical assumptions about sensory indirection. If anything, a tour of quantum physics makes a good case that observation *does* reify probabilistic abstract realities -- an observed photon's wave function collapse and it "appears" when the observation demands.

All of which to say, firing of flares of "indirect realism" or anti-realism (!) or some such doesn't change the process for inquiry via methodological materialism. Mechanisms exhibit symmetry and orderliness (per God's design!) in such a way that observations and predictions can be made, measured and assessed, in spite of (or because of) any interpretive layers that separate the mind from the mass.

***END-QUOTE***

You’re the one who’s failing to draw some elementary distinctions here. In particular, you are mashing together ontological antirealism (e.g. idealism, phenomenalism; social constructivism) with a branch of epistemic antirealism.

The fact that the tree I perceive is a real tree, which enjoys an extramental existence, is irrelevant to the question of whether the tree-in-itself resembles my perception of the tree.

You are tacitly operating with a philosophy of scientific realism, according to which scientific theories are descriptive of reality.

That makes sense if you also subscribe to direct realism. But there’s a mismatch between scientific realism and indirect realism.

Indirect realism affirms the extramental reality of the external world—that there is an external world.

But what the real world is really like is inaccessible to direct inspection.

What you need to underwrite your scientific realism is a direct correspondence between your mental representation and the world it allegedly resembles.

But, ironically enough, a scientific analysis of sensory perception puts the real world at several removes from the mind of the percipient.

So, yes, Virginia, there is a real world. And there is clearly a correlation between what we perceive and what there is—otherwise we couldn’t navigate our environment.

But you need more than a functional correlation—you need descriptive correspondence.

Continuing:

“As for Hawking, I strongly suspect you don't know much about Hawking, or you'd realize the bassackwards nature of invoking Hawking as you have here. You've performed a classic "quote-mine" on Hawking here.”

I realize that you’re new to my blog, and so it’s only natural for you to impute your ignorance to me.

On this very blog I’ve quoted Hawking before, in context, in full.

Continuing:

“Hawking is making a positivist statement here -- he explicit declares it when you grab the whole paragraph, not just the single line. Worries and apprehensions about indirection and interpretive filters don't matter to Hawking here -- what matters is empirical performance. He specifically points at the realist/anti-realist conundrums posed by quantum theory as being irrelevant -- all that counts is predictive performance.”

Which supports my case, not yours—since positivism is a version of scientific antirealism.

“This officially brings us *way* off the beaten path we started talking about -- your assertion that early man was incapable of surviving to the modern day…Somewhere along the way we got waylaid from looking at the facts related to the original idea: early man's survival skills.”

i) As usual, you can’t keep track of your own argument. You are the one who continues to bash YEC by claiming that YEC flies in the face of the natural record.

Since you keep appealing to the evidence as if we had direct access to the evidence, it is not way off the beaten path for me to point out that according to science itself, the human mind does not enjoy immediate access to the way the world really is.

ii) In addition, your end of the thread has been by no means limited to “early man's survival skills.”

No, you have also devoted a lot of time to making sweeping claims about the metaphysical neutrality of science.

Once again, I’m arguing on your own grounds. You have yet to grasp the nature of an internal critique.

“If not, then what can I make of the links and ‘dissenters’ you are offering here?”

Yet again, you’re unable to keep track of your own argument. I didn’t volunteer this material.

Remember what you said? I always have to remind you of what you said because you have a habit of forgetting what you said from one post to the next. Here it is again:

“Science is agnostic with regards to metaphysics. It doesn't affirm the existence of God. It doesn't deny the existence of God. If you doubt this, then I'd ask you to produce some scholarly work that suggests that science includes any assertions, or even guesses about metaphysical truths.”

So that’s exactly what I did, in compliance with a very specific request from you.

But when I do as you ask, you’re reaction is to engage in evasive maneuvers.

“It just means you are standing there going on about the illusory nature of reality.”

I never said anything about the “illusory nature of reality.” That’s just so much spin on your part.

“Readers who are sympathetic with your hostility toward science will nod and see the wisdom and truth of your position.”

i) Is Stephen Hawking hostile to science because he’s an antirealist?

ii) More to the point, you are equating “science” with a commitment to methodological naturalism, which is a euphemism for functional atheism.

It’s quite true that I don’t surrender to the effort by unbelievers to hijack the scientific enterprise and redefine science to thereby evict the Creator from his own creation.

“But my assertions don't settle the question of who stands in the right here, but just that you are standing quite a ways from the experts in the relevant scientific fields (anthropology, geology, physics, paleontology, etc.).”

So none of the ID folks are “experts in the relevant scientific fields.” Would you like to compare your resume with theirs?

“And it's true; in general, I do defer to the experts when considering questions of anthropology. I'm not a PhD in the field, and am happy to rely on those who are in areas that I can't decide for myself (which is a lot!).”

To the contrary, you cherry-pick what authorities you defer to. You only defer to authorities whose views happen to mesh with TE, while you repudiate authorities whose views are either to the left or the right of TE.

“I'd ask why you've wasted so much time focusing on James Barr, Dembski, William Lane Craig, and all their attendant complaints about science's ‘metaphysical assumptions’?”

Both (i) because you have defended your commitment to TE by appeal to the metaphysical neutrality of science, and (ii) because you asked me to provide you would scholarly opinion to the contrary.

When, however, I answer you at your own level, you look for the exit sign. An excellent example of how you “dismiss” major positions” out of hand.

“I offered another reference in my previous post concerning skulls, axes and cleavers found in Ethiopia dated to be 1M years old. Let me ask you to address that, as that pushes back the "tool-equipped" factor far beyond the 400,000 year mark previously suggested by the German spears. What are the implications of axes and spears for man in terms of hunting prowess and self-defense?”

Several issues:

i) Is this a sincere question? Are you genuinely interested in my answer?

Or do you plan to automatically dismiss any answer I give unless I blindly submit to every sentence in the article?

ii) Forgive me in advance for actually quoting from the article itself, but according to the article you referred to me, it’s clear that hand-axes and cleavers were a pretty ineffective means of self-defense:

“White was disappointed to find that the lower face was gone. Because of peculiar scratches on the skull, he thinks the individual may have been killed by a large lion or hyena, which probably ate the face and gnawed on the skull in an attempt to extract the brain.”

http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2002-03/uoc--efs031802.php

So this Stone Age weaponry was no match for a natural predator like a lion or hyena.

Looks like the article supports my contention rather than yours:

a) It supports my contention that there were natural predators who posed a mortal threat to early man, and;

b) It also supports my contention that hand-axes and cleavers were ineffectual in warding off attacks from major predators.

iii) Depending on the design, there’s an obvious difference between the utility of spears and hatchets as defensive weapons.

The obvious problem with a hand-ax or cleaver—or even a club—is that, in order to use it against a predator, you must come within striking distance of the predator.

Even if you have a chance to do some damage to the predator, it can more than return the favor. One bite or swipe and the man will be mortally wounded from infection, blood loss, or a broken neck.

At best, man and beast are likely to inflict mortal injuries on one another.

The potential advantage of a spear is that you don’t have to come within easy reach of fangs and claws to use it.

You can throw it, although that’s a high-risk gambit. Throwing a spear will only bring down predator if you aim well and hurl it hard enough to penetrate a vital organ.

The ease with which it penetrates the skin and tissue also depends on the design of the spearhead.

Teamwork is clearly an advantage. Throwing several spears at once.

Or you can try to keep the beast at bay by holding onto the spear and poking or stabbing the animal until it retreats.

“What kind of skills/technology/organization would have to be present for you to say your hypothesis has been falsified?”

That depends on whether we’re arguing on your grounds or mind.

i) On my grounds, the historicity of Adam is not a hypothesis. On my grounds, human identity, from the first man (Adam) to modern man is not a hypothesis. For a Christian, these are non-negotiable.

ii) I can explain the survival of Adam’s posterity in a way that you cannot:

a) Adam did not acquire his intelligence through a long evolutionary process. Rather, he was endowed with intelligence by divine fiat. And that endowment was then transmitted to his posterity by ordinary means.

b) Adam did not acquire language through a long evolutionary process. Rather, he was endowed with a linguistic capacity (indeed, with a working language) by divine fiat, which he also transmitted to his posterity.

Therefore, Adam and his posterity had the wherewithal to invent weapons and coordinate defensive or offensive tactics from the get-go.

“This is a crucial positive statement you can make: here's the minimum early man would have needed to make it, and here's how I came up with the criteria.... Without that, then I would have to wonder how you went about deciding that early man was insufficiently resourced in the first place.”

Now we’re back to the internal critique:

i) A specific claim demands specific evidence.

ii) The natural defense mechanism for hominids would be an arboreal lifestyle—which, for the most part, puts them out of reach of terrestrial predators.

As I’ve said before, some simians, like baboons and mandrills are basically land animals. But they have compensatory defense-mechanisms. They move in packs and have their own set of fangs.

iii) However, (ii) needs to be qualified. Up-to-a-point, there are one or two predators who can follow their simian quarry up the tree, like leopards and pythons.

How far up the tree you can go depends on the ability of the upper branches to support your body weight. If the prey is lighter than the predator, than the prey can escape the leopard by climbing higher than the leopard can safely follow.

Another possible means of escape is jumping from one tree to another. But that is also affected by the body weight of the prey.

This maybe why Orangutans don’t occupy the same habitat as leopards. The Orangutan is the largest tree-dwelling simian, and it probably represents the upper limit of an arboreal lifestyle.

Depending on the sex and age of the individual, an Orangutan weighs as more or more than a leopard. So it’s arboreal lifestyle is an ineffective defense mechanism against a predator that can exploit the same environment.

Pythons are less of a threat because they move slowly and eat less often. It also depends on the size of the python vis-à-vis the Orangutan.

The larger specimens are generally ambush predators, whereas the smaller specimens are hunters.

iv) Not only is body weight a threshold condition for some natural defense-mechanisms, but it’s also a threshold condition for some artificial defense-mechanisms.

You can arm a ten-year-old boy with a spear, but will that make him a match for a cave bear?

A spear is only as lethal as the amount of force you can apply to the spear. How hard can you throw it? How much weight can you put behind it?

It isn’t enough to arm early man with spears. Early man must be big enough to have the sheer strength (for throwing) or body weight (for stabbing) to make effective use of the spear.

v) In addition, there is also some correlation in the ratio of bodyweight to brain size. Bigger brains go with bigger bodies. The correlation is inexact, but that’s the general trend.

When you appeal to the brainpower of hominids to compensate for the loss of their natural defense-mechanisms, that is contingent on other evolutionary developments.

vi) And, as I’ve also pointed out, not all tools are effective weapons. A hatchet or a cleaver won’t keep a lion or leopard from killing you.

So what’s the minimum that early man would need to survive?

To make your case, you would need (i) *archeological* evidence to actually (ii) *show* that when he came down from the trees, early man became (iii) *big* enough and (iv) *brainy* enough to develop (v) *effective* weapons and (vi) *communication* skills (vii) *soon* enough to compensate for the loss of his natural defense mechanisms.

“Dating, creation ex nihilo, and the ‘intrinsic metric’ of time. Ugh. The last part of your post is worth saving as a classic example of the mumbo jumbo that gets put up as a smokescreen by anti-scientists. A veritable ‘Monster's Ball’ of exotic challenges to scientific epistemology.”

I see. So although two top philosophers (Craig and Copan) have written a complete book in defense of creation ex nihilo, with chapters on “Philosophical Arguments for Creatio ex Nihilo" (chap. 6) and “Scientific Evidence for Creatio ex Nihilo” (chap. 7), that just so much “mumbo jumbo.”

Nice to see you last-ditch retreat into obscurantism and anti-intellectualism as you dismiss out of hand any line of evidence which is inconvenient for your faith in theistic evolution.

“As I said above, your protestations about ‘metrical conventional[ism]’ just emphasize the distance separating you from the main body of scientific knowledge and inquiry. You're donning a Rasputin's robe, and suggesting we *really* ought to be asking 'what is time?', and what the meaning if 'is' is.”

I see. So when Robin Le Poidevin publishes a book by Oxford University Press in which he considers metrical conventionalism, he’s muttering “mumbo-jumbo,” and separating himself from the “main body” of scientific knowledge and inquiry.

Likewise, when Barry Dainton, in Time & Space (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), considers metrical conventionalism, he’s muttering “mumbo-jumbo,” and separating himself from the “main body” of scientific knowledge and inquiry.

Likewise, when Lawrence Sklar considers metrical conventionalism in Blackwell’s Companion to the Philosophy of Science, he (along with his editor, W. H. Newton-Smith) is muttering “mumbo-jumbo,” and separating himself from the “main body” of scientific knowledge and inquiry.

Likewise, when Adolf Grünbaum, Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy of Science, Chairman of the Center for Philosophy of Science, and Research Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pittsburgh considers metrical conventionalism, he’s muttering “mumbo-jumbo,” and separating himself from the “main body” of scientific knowledge and inquiry.

Likewise, when John Lucas, Oxford Don, Fellow of the British Academy, and past President of British Society for the Philosophy of Science considers metrical conventionalism, he’s muttering “mumbo-jumbo,” and separating himself from the “main body” of scientific knowledge and inquiry.

Likewise, when Hans Reichenbach, student of David Hilbert, Max Planck, Max Born and Albert Einstein, as well as teacher of Hilary Putnam, and the man who put UCLA on the map considers metrical conventionalism, he’s muttering “mumbo-jumbo,” and separating himself from the “main body” of scientific knowledge and inquiry.

Likewise, when Henri Poincaré, merely the greatest mathematician of his generation, as well as a leading physicist, considers metrical conventionalism, he’s muttering “mumbo-jumbo,” and separating himself from the “main body” of scientific knowledge and inquiry.

Good to be reminded of how “deferential” you are to experts outside your own field of study.

Why Are The Infancy Narratives So Different?

Robert Stein lists eleven points of agreement between the infancy narratives of Matthew and Luke (The New American Commentary: Luke [Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 2003], n. 9 on pp. 70-71). Darrell Bock lists nineteen (Luke, Volume 1, 1:1-9:50 [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 1994], pp. 71-72). We can arrive at a lower or higher number, depending on how many details we include. Critics make much of the differences between the two gospels, but there's a lot of overlap, and the differences can be harmonized:

"But the stories [in the infancy narratives] have long been shown to be compatible (Machen), even mutually complementary. Moreover literary independence of Matthew and Luke at this point does not demand the conclusion that the two evangelists were ignorant of the other's content. Yet if they were, their differences suggest to some the strength of mutual compatibility without collusion. Matthew focuses largely on Joseph, Luke on Mary. R.E. Brown (Birth of Messiah, p. 35) does not accept this because he finds it inconceivable that Joseph could have told his story without mentioning the Annunciation or that Mary could have passed on her story without mentioning the flight to Egypt. True enough, though it does not follow that the evangelists were bound to include all they knew. It is hard to imagine how the Annunciation would have fit in very well with Matthew's themes. Moreover we have already observed that Matthew was prepared to omit things he knew in order to present his chosen themes coherently and concisely." (D.A. Carson, The Expositor's Bible Commentary: Matthew, Chapters 1 Through 12 [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1995], p. 71)

Mark would have known of some of Jesus' resurrection appearances (Mark 16:7, 1 Corinthians 15:5-8), yet he chose not to include them in his gospel. John's gospel closes with a reference to other material that could have been included, but wasn't (John 21:25). Matthew and Luke, covering months or years of events surrounding Jesus' birth, and doing so with different sources and different objectives, can plausibly differ to a significant degree. One of Luke's objectives in writing his gospel was to supplement what was already available (Luke 1:1-4).

As I've mentioned in previous articles (here and here), the gospels of Matthew and Luke were widely accepted and interpreted as giving harmonious historical accounts early on. A small minority of sources, such as Marcion and his followers, would reject one or both of the two gospels on other grounds (not because of inconsistencies in the infancy accounts), but the large majority of professing Christians accepted both. Not only were Matthew and Luke accepted across the Christian mainstream, but Irenaeus comments that they were widely accepted among heretical groups as well (Against Heresies, 3:11:7, 3:12:12).

It can't be argued that the early Christians accepted both gospels and interpreted them as harmonious historical accounts because they were unaware of the differences. Gospel harmonies such as Tatian's wouldn't have existed if there was no awareness of the differences among the gospels. Eusebius refers to how "every believer" offered an explanation for the differences between the genealogies of Jesus in Matthew and Luke (Church History, 1:7:1). The early Christians were willing to dispute the canonicity of books like 2 Peter and Revelation, so it doesn't seem that they accepted the canonical books, like the gospels, uncritically. If Matthew and Luke were giving radically contradictory accounts of the events surrounding Jesus' infancy, as modern critics often allege, the earliest Christians, including contemporaries of the apostles and people who lived just after their time, don't seem to have been aware of it. There doesn't seem to have been any separation between a Matthean community and a Lukan community that's left any traces in the historical record. Rather, the two gospels were accepted together as harmonious from as far back as we can trace the issue. Given Luke's apostolic ties and his positive portrayal of the apostles and other early church leaders in Luke and Acts, it makes sense that he and Matthew would hold similar views.

To keep the differences between the infancy narratives in perspective, let's consider what sort of contradictions could have existed. If the gospel authors were as unconcerned with evidence and as isolated from other Christians as modern critics often suggest, then why don't we see something like one gospel describing a virgin birth while the other describes conception by sexual intercourse? Why doesn't one gospel have Jesus come to earth as a grown man around 20 B.C. while the other has Jesus born into a family around 10 A.D.? Why do they even mention Nazareth, if the gospel authors were as unconcerned with historical accuracy as some critics suggest? Why not just have Jesus in Bethlehem throughout His pre-ministry life? Etc. More reasonable critics will acknowledge that there's a significant core of agreement between Matthew and Luke and that there was some significant concern about historical accuracy by both authors.

Harmonization is commonplace in historical research. Different sources will often focus on different issues. A biographer of John F. Kennedy who wants to focus on Kennedy's foreign policy will differ significantly from another biographer who's focusing on Kennedy's influence on the civil rights movement. When discussing the role of religion in the founding of America, an atheist web site might focus on the anti-religious and unorthodox sentiments of men like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, while a Christian web site might focus on their pro-religious and orthodox beliefs. Most of the time, both representations of the men are accurate, but in different contexts. The same man who speaks negatively of religion in the context of discussing state churches might speak positively of the influence of religious principles on society. Quotes that may seem significantly different on the surface can be harmonized upon closer analysis.

Matthew was a Jew writing largely for a Jewish audience, whereas Luke was a Gentile writing largely for a Gentile audience. Matthew begins his genealogy with Abraham, the father of the Jewish people, whereas Luke traces Jesus' genealogy back to Adam. That's a difference, but not a contradiction, and it's a difference on an issue about which all would agree that both authors knew the relevant facts. Nobody would argue that Matthew was unaware that the human race can be traced back further than Abraham. Similarly, Matthew and Luke would have known that Joseph and Mary both needed an explanation for Mary's pregnancy. Matthew chooses to focus on how Joseph came to the conclusion that God was involved, and Luke focuses on Mary. But it would be ridiculous to suggest that Matthew thought that Mary didn't need any explanation and that she never discussed the issue with Joseph or anybody else. Matthew had to have known about and thought about more than what he writes about. Matthew would have known that Jesus was circumcised and that He and His parents went through other traditional Jewish practices, even though he doesn't discuss such issues as Luke does. Similarly, Luke decides to discuss John the Baptist's background and to parallel it with the background of Jesus, whereas Matthew doesn't. Yet, as the remainder of Matthew's gospel shows, Matthew was aware that Jesus and John were around the same age and had close ties (Matthew 3:14). There are many events and themes surrounding the infancy of Jesus, and it makes sense for two authors to make some different choices about what to address and in what manner. If they could differ when discussing issues where both are known to have been aware of the relevant facts, such as in the examples discussed above, then we should be cautious in reaching the conclusion that they contradicted each other in areas where we have less information.

To make an accurate assessment of the consistency of the birth narratives, we have to know what to compare. Instead of comparing Matthew 1-2 to Luke 1-2 and the genealogy in Luke 3, it makes more sense to compare Matthew 1 to Luke's material. In other words, the events of Matthew 2 seem to postdate the events Luke addresses. Matthew 2:16 suggests that a significant amount of time may have passed ("two years old and under"). Luke is concerned with addressing the family's submission to the Jewish law, and so he concludes his account of Jesus' infancy there and mentions that the family settled in Nazareth afterward (Luke 2:39). If the proper comparison is primarily between Matthew 1 and Luke's material (Matthew 2 has some relevance, but is from a later timeframe), then there isn't much to explain. The material in Matthew 1 is of a general nature and is consistent with what Luke records. The most significant difference would be between the genealogies, and it was common practice in ancient times to arrange genealogies according to numerical patterns, to follow legal rather than biological relationships, to leave out some generations, etc.:

"In general, people map out genealogies to accomplish political, social, or religious purposes such as to explain how peoples are related to one another or to legitimate a political union of groups and peoples or to authenticate leadership status for certain families. They often begin with a common ancestor, finish with the immediate ancestors of the person making the genealogy, and are abbreviated or have variations in the middle." (Anthony J. Saldarini, in James D.G. Dunn and John W. Rogerson, ed., Eerdmans Commentary On The Bible [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2003], p. 1006)

There are multiple ways to harmonize the genealogies of Matthew and Luke (see, for example, here and Steve Hays' comments on pages 155-158 of his e-book This Joyful Eastertide). The primary issue here, when considering historicity, ought to be the upfront plausibility of the gospel writers’ composing reliable genealogies. We know that at least some sources kept genealogical records during the timeframe in question, and we know that Matthew and Luke were early sources living at a time when many relatives of Jesus were still alive and in prominent places in the church. The availability of such sources is more significant than the differences between the genealogies, since it was commonplace for genealogies to be rendered in different ways according to different principles.

What about the geographical setting of Matthew 1? Critics make much of the reference to Bethlehem in Matthew 2:1 by suggesting that it justifies an assumption that everything that occurred in chapter 1 occurred in Bethlehem, which would contradict Luke's account. But Matthew 2:1 only places the birth itself there, which agrees with Luke. Rather than creating a problem, Matthew 2:1 is further evidence of agreement between the two accounts, particularly given the fact that Matthew refrains from mentioning a location earlier:

"In the larger shape of Matthew's narrative it is a little surprising to have the location and timing of Jesus' birth introduced for the first time here [in Matthew 2:1] and not at the point where Mary, Joseph, and Jesus first enter the narrative...Matthew offers no comment on how it is that the birth happened to take place in Bethlehem." (John Nolland, The Gospel Of Matthew [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2005], p. 107)

Contrast Matthew's initial silence on the location of the events with his emphasis on locations in chapter 2 (verses 1, 3, 5-6, 8, 13-16, 20-23). Matthew may have had more information on locations for the later events, so that he refrained from commenting on locations earlier, associating Bethlehem with the birth itself, not the earlier events.

Issues like these have been addressed in many places by conservative scholarship, such as in Craig Keener's commentary on Matthew (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1999) and Darrell Bock's commentary on Luke (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 1994). Even if we were to conclude that there are some inconsistencies between the accounts in Matthew and Luke, we'd still have to address the historicity of the material. The accounts could have some errors and inconsistencies, yet still be largely historical. Many people, such as Raymond Brown, have accepted some significant portions of the infancy narratives as historically plausible or probable while rejecting inerrancy. Some people accept the historicity of something like the virgin birth or Jesus' resurrection without believing in the inerrancy of scripture. As I've said before, though I don't consider such a position the best option, it is more reasonable than the radical skepticism of naturalists and some other critics of Christianity.

However, we don't have any good reason to conclude that the infancy accounts are inconsistent. As the large number of events discussed in both gospels illustrates, and as the timeframe referred to in Matthew 2:16 suggests, Matthew and Luke would have had many issues, themes, and angles to choose from in compiling an account. They agree in the general outlines of their narratives, and they differ in much of what they include and don't include. The differences aren't sufficient to justify the conclusion that either account is erroneous, much less that both accounts are as unhistorical as some critics claim.