The Assumption Of Mary In Later Sources

Like the ante-Nicene sources, writers in later centuries often discuss subjects such as bodily assumptions and what happened to men like Enoch and Elijah without mentioning a bodily assumption of Mary (Apostolic Constitutions, 5:7; Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechetical Lectures, 3:6; John Chrysostom, Homilies On John, 75; Jerome, To Pammachius Against John Of Jerusalem, 29, 32; etc.). An opponent of Augustine summarized Augustine’s beliefs on this subject:

"Besides that, it is not only Elias, but Moses and Enoch you believe to be immortal, and to have been taken up with their bodies to heaven." (cited in Augustine, Reply To Faustus The Manichaean, 26:1)

Why no mention of Mary? On another occasion, Augustine mentions that people sometimes ask where humans who have been bodily removed from earth would go (On The Grace Of Christ, And On Original Sin, 2:27). He mentions that people ask about Enoch, Elijah, and Paul, but, once again, Mary isn’t mentioned. The same is true of John Chrysostom when he discusses the same issue Augustine addressed (Homilies On Hebrews, 22).

Epiphanius, a bishop of the fourth and fifth centuries, writes of how nobody knows what happened at the end of Mary's life. The Roman Catholic scholar Michael O'Carroll comments:

"In a later passage, he [Epiphanius] says that she [Mary] may have died and been buried, or been killed - as a martyr. 'Or she remained alive, since nothing is impossible with God and he can do whatever he desires; for her end no one knows.'...A Palestinian with opportunity for some research, E. does not speak of a bodily resurrection and remains noncommittal on the way Mary's life ended. He nowhere denies the Assumption, or admits the possibility of Assumption without death, for he has found no sign of death or burial. He suggests several different hypotheses and draws no firm conclusion." (Theotokos [Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1988], p. 135)

It should be noted that Roman Catholic apologists sometimes misrepresent what Epiphanius believed on this subject. Some Catholics claim that when Epiphanius refers to nobody knowing Mary’s end, he’s only saying that it’s unknown whether Mary died prior to being assumed, not that it’s unknown whether she was assumed. But Epiphanius refers to the end of Mary’s life in general. He doesn’t qualify his comments by saying that he’s only referring to whether she died. To the contrary, he mentions the possibility of her being taken from the earth, and he discusses whether she traveled with the apostle John and the possibility of her being buried, so he isn’t just addressing whether she died. Rather, Epiphanius is denying that anybody knows what happened at the end of Mary’s life in general, not just with regard to the issue of whether she died. He was denying that anybody knew what the Roman Catholic Church claims to know today.

Here are some comments on the history of this doctrine:

"It [the concept of an assumption of Mary] rests, however, on a purely apocryphal foundation. The entire silence of the apostles and the primitive church teachers respecting the departure of Mary stirred idle curiosity to all sorts of inventions, until a translation like Enoch's and Elijah's was attributed to her. In the time of Origen some were inferring from Luke ii. 35, that she had suffered martyrdom. Epiphanius will not decide whether she died and was buried, or not. Two apocryphal Greek writings de transitu Mariae, of the end of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century, and afterward pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory of Tours († 595), for the first time contain the legend that the soul of the mother of God was transported to the heavenly paradise by Christ and His angels in presence of all the apostles, and on the following morning her body also was translated thither on a cloud and there united with the soul. Subsequently the legend was still further embellished, and, besides the apostles, the angels and patriarchs also, even Adam and Eve, were made witnesses of the wonderful spectacle." (Philip Schaff, section 83 here)

"Epiphanius's approach suggests strongly the absence of a fixed tradition on Mary's final lot....Isidore of Seville (d. 636) breaks the general silence, but only to attest profound ignorance on the way Mary left this earth. A century later, the English Bede confessed his ignorance of the final disposition of Mary's body." (Everett Ferguson, editor, Encyclopedia Of Early Christianity [New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999], pp. 134-135)

"The genesis of the Transitus Mariae [apocryphal] accounts is unclear. They apparently originated before the close of the fifth century, perhaps in Egypt or Syria, in consequence of the stimulus given Marian devotion by the definition of Mary as 'mother of God' at the Council of Ephesus (431). At least a score of such accounts are extant in Coptic, Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, and Armenian. All recount the death of Mary. All postulate some kind of divine intervention: a translation of Mary's body to a presumably earthly paradise, where it is preserved incorrupt under the Tree of Life; or a genuine assumption, a reunion of soul and body that entails Mary's entrance into heaven....The more ancient accounts exercised a perceptible influence on the establishment of the eastern feast of the Dormition or of the Migration of the Mother of God....The first express witness to a genuine assumption occurs in the (possibly sixth-century) apocryphal Transitus of Pseudo-Melito." (Everett Ferguson, editor, Encyclopedia Of Early Christianity [New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999], pp. 134-135)

"As historical accounts, the Transitus literature [where the concept of a bodily assumption of Mary is first mentioned] is valueless." (Everett Ferguson, editor, Encyclopedia Of Early Christianity [New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999], p. 134)

"With this background, it is not surprising to find the first orators on the feast of August 15 in the west consistently wary of pronouncing on Mary's corporeal resurrection; not surprising to find in Spain, as the eighth century closes, some Asturians denying Mary's assumption (perhaps the first to do so); not surprising to see develop in the ninth century, beside the tradition favorable to an assumption represented by Pseudo-Augustine, another current of thought represented by Pseudo-Jerome and hostile, if not to the doctrine, at least to its unequivocal affirmation as somehow binding." (Everett Ferguson, editor, Encyclopedia Of Early Christianity [New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999], p. 135)

"It is now generally agreed that the belief [Assumption of Mary] was unknown in the earliest ages of the Church. St Ambrose (Exposit. Evan. sec. Luc. 2. 35; PL 15. 1574) and St Epiphanius (Haer. 79. 11; PG 42. 716) were apparently still ignorant of it. It is first met with in certain NT apocrypha dating from the later 4th cent. onwards, some of them Gnostic in sympathy....It appears that one such work was condemned in the Decretum Gelasianum, though the condemnation may have been directed against its Gnostic teachings rather than specifically against the doctrine of the corporal assumption. A homily attributed in most MSS to Timothy of Jerusalem (prob. 4th-5th cent.) may imply the alternative belief that the BVM was assumed in body and soul during her natural life. The doctrine of the corporal assumption was first formulated in orthodox circles in the W. by St Gregory of Tours (d. 594), who accepted as historical the account attributed [falsely] in MSS to Melito." (F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone, editors, The Oxford Dictionary Of The Christian Church [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], p. 117)

"The doctrine first emerged in various New Testament apocrypha of the 4th cent., and on the strength of a passage in pseudo-Dionysius became accepted in orthodox circles by the 7th cent. Finally in 1950 Pope Pius XII, in the decree Munificentissimus Deus, defined it as a divinely revealed dogma, making claims that have little historical support: 'This truth is based on Sacred Scripture,...it has received the approval of liturgical worship from the earliest times, it is perfectly in keeping with the rest of revealed truth.' What is clearly true is the recognition that it is 'deeply embedded in the minds of the faithful' (or at least many of them), and on this basis it was declared and defined as a dogma revealed by God" (John Bowker, editor, The Oxford Dictionary Of World Religions [Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1999], p. 101)

Every which way but true

JC: The fact of the matter is, we humans are often in a position to say what didn't happen without knowing what actually happened.”

SH: Yes, that’s true. But unfortunately for you, you need to go beyond a general truism to show how the Resurrection is such a case.

We can sometimes know that something didn’t happen, without knowing what did happen, if we have independent evidence to the contrary.

And how is that analogous to the Resurrection? Where is your argument?

JC: I may be lying or I may be delusional. You may never be sure. But there is one thing you can know with confidence. I really didn't go up into a space ship yesterday.”

SH: And you can only say that because you think such a scenario is near to being impossible. And where is the parallel argument against the Resurrection?

JC: I know you don't like this illustration because you think it is absurd. And of course it is.”

SH: I don’t feel one way or the other about the illustration. That’s beside the point. The issue is not with the cogency of the illustration, per se, but with the cogency of the analogy.

It could be terrific illustration, on its own terms, but fail to illustrate the point at issue.

JC: But it still illustrates the flaws in your reasoning.”

SH: Unfortunately for you, it does no such thing. You are suggesting an argument from analogy minus the argument.

Is the Resurrection on an epistemic par with alien abductions? If so, where’s the argument? If no, the comparison is fallacious.

JC: You are making general statements about how we know things, such as what I've quoted above. I'm taking that general statement and applying it to an absurd situation and showing that it results in absurd conclusions. So your reasoning is flawed. It is absolutely true that you can in some cases know what didn't happen even if you don't know exactly what did happen. I think that's pretty obvious.

SH: You’re attempting to universalize my comments beyond their immediate context, and then disprove my contention by coming up with some counterexamples.

That’s’ beside the point.

I was quite specifically talking about the contributors to The Empty Tomb. About what they were in a position to know.

They have no independent evidence to support an alternative explanation.

JC: You have no reason to assert this. It's not true. They are recognizing that the miraculous explanation for the facts concerning the resurrection is one of many possible explanations.

SH: Now you’re being disingenuous. They do not regard a miraculous explanation as one possible explanation.

Their position is driven by metaphysical naturalism. They don’t believe for one moment that a miraculous return from the dead was ever in the cards.

Hence, for them, any alternative theory, however otherwise unlikely, is more probable than an impossible explanation.

JC: Your view is a lot like the Roman Catholic claim that Protestants prove themselves false by virtue of the variety of opinions among them.

SH:

1.Another flawed analogy. Notice that Jon likes to change the subject. Instead of actually discussing the evidence for the Resurrection, he fishes around for distracting analogies.

The contributors to the ET don’t disagree because they differ over the interpretation of Scripture. Rather, they deny the accuracy or historicity of the Biblical record, and then disagree because they don’t have any documentary alternative, so all they’re left with is boundless conjecture.

Let’s keep our eye on the ball, Jon.

2.What are the contributors to the Empty Tomb in a position to know? They don’t believe in the Resurrection, but they don’t know it didn’t happen.

They don’t have any direct evidence against the Resurrection. And they don’t have any independent evidence for their alternative theories.

They have alternative theories without alternatives lines of evidence.

3.What they think they have is evidence of metaphysical naturalism. And that, if probative, would indirectly count against the Resurrection.

However, they offer no evidence for metaphysical naturalism. They take it for granted. Given that assumption, they then assume that any other explanation, however otherwise implausible, is more plausible than the sheer impossibility of a Resurrection.

JC: What Catholics don't realize is that they in fact are just one denomination among many. Anybody can put himself on one side of the fence and everyone else on the other and say that everyone else is wrong because they disagree amongst themselves. Suppose I think the body was stolen. I can put all other theories on one side of the fence (swoon, space alien, miraculous explanation) and say that they are all wrong and this proves I'm right. That doesn't work for Catholics or for my theory that the body was stolen.

SH: Except that you’re doing what you fault the Catholics for. You are putting the Resurrection on one side of the fence, and every alternative theory on the other side of the fence, as if they add up to an argument against the Resurrection rather than an argument against each other.

JC: It's a rare supernaturally occuring process. Regardless, it is very rare. Therefore any miraculous claim must start with a presumption against it.

SH: How does the rarity of an event create any presumption against its occurrence?

1.I attended my 10th high school anniversary back in 1988. That’s a very rare event for me. Indeed, it’s a unique and unrepeatable event. I had a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to attend my 10th high school anniversary. I will never have another chance to do so. Other anniversaries, yes. Other But not the 10-year anniversary. Other high schools, but not my high school.

So is there a presumption against my having attended my high school reunion? Must I come up with extraordinary evidence to overcome the crushing presumption that I didn’t go to my high school reunion?

2.You act as if rarity were equivalent to positive evidence against the occurrence of a rare event. These are hardly convertible claims.

3.The underlying issue is one of expectations. What makes a given event frequent or infrequent?

It is the kind of event which, if it happened at all, would happen more often?

Or is it the kind of event which, were it to happen, would be rare or even unique?

4.The Resurrection is supposed to be very specific in its timing and orientation. It serves a particular purpose, at a particular time and place in human history.

It’s a purposeful event, with a strategically targeted position in the history of redemption.

JC: Really? So if a friend of yours claimed to have flown in a space ship and your experience with your friend leads you to conclude that he's neither a liar nor delusional you'd just believe it? You can't conclude that he's been put up to it because a threat that would induce such behavior would be a strange occurrence.

SH: Notice, once again, that Jon is changing the subject. He was originally asking about ESP. Now he reverts to alien abductions.

I have a number of reasons for believing that ufology is false.

I don’t have any comparable reasons for believing that ESP is false. And, indeed, there’s some evidence that ESP is true.

Now, we need to distinguish between evidence for the general phenomenon and evidence for any particular claim.

But for Curry to swap out ESP for alien abductions assumes an equivalence that I deny.

JC: The only point I'm making is that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. That's a pretty obvious point I think.

SH: No, it’s not obvious.

1.To begin with, it depends on how you define “extraordinary.” To judge by your above usage, you define extraordinary as “rare.”

Does it require extraordinary evidence to prove that I have a rare blood type?

2.You’re also confounding cause and effect. The primary question is not, in the first place, whether we have evidence of an “extraordinary” event qua extraordinary, but whether we have evidence of an event qua event which happens to be extraordinary.

The evidence for the event itself, and the evidence for the classification of the event are distinguishable. We don’t need to classify an event as ordinary or extraordinary before we can identify its occurrence. The interpretation of the event is subsequent to the identification of its occurrence.

Maybe a given event has a supernatural cause. But I don’t have to identify the cause before I identify the effect.

3.In what sense is the Resurrection extraordinary? Christ was alive, then he was dead, then he was alive again.

What we have is an extraordinary relation between ordinary events. Does it require extraordinary evidence to establish life and death?

JC: Not at all. You've asserted that it is irrational to suggest contradictory explanations for an extraordinary claim. My illustration shows you to be wrong. I apply your general principle to a specific circumstance and show that the resulting conclusion is absurd. This means your claim is mistaken.

SH:

1.You’re the one who likes to smuggle in these qualifiers like “extraordinary.” I did not frame my objection in those terms.

2.All your illustration shows is that a silly illustration will illustrate a silly claim.

That doesn’t go any distance towards showing that the Resurrection is silly.

JC: That has nothing to do with it. You didn't say "Contradictory explanations don't make sense when the claim violates a shared assumption." You (and Gene) are saying that contradictory explanations never make sense. But they do as I've shown.

SH:

1.That’s because you’re not being forthcoming about your presuppositions, so we have to smoke you out into the open.

I am answering you at your own level. You chose an illustration that you knew most folks would regard as ridiculous.

Needless to say, it’s easy to contend that an explanation which isn’t ridiculous may be preferable to an explanation which is.

But these diversionary comparisons continue to dodge the Resurrection. You haven’t created any presumption against the Resurrection.

2.Moreover, it doesn’t follow that even if the given explanation is absurd, an alternative explanation is any better.

The alternative may escape the charge of absurdity, but that doesn’t make it plausible or probable.

We can dream up multiply alternative explanations for any event. And we can so do without a shred of evidence that any of them is true or likely to be true.

JC: Really, I'm not trying to prove anything about Bayes' Theorem. I raised it, but my purpose is not to get into a debate about the validity of it.

SH: Be sure to file Jon’s disclaimer for future reference.

JC: I'm simply pointing out a simple fact. It makes sense to have multiple mutually exclusive explanations for events that initially seem improbable. And the fact of the matter is, you should initially be skeptical of any miraculous claim.

SH: That is not a “simple fact.” Rather, it’s simply begging the question.

Why should I be initially sceptical about any miraculous claim?

JC: We both should be able to agree thar miraculous events are rare. I think they are so rare that they've never happened. You think they are a little less rare, but still rare nonetheless.

SH: Once again, this turns on how you define “improbable” and what makes a given event improbable. To say that a miracle is unlikely to happen because a miracle is infrequent is a category mistake.

A miracle is not the kind of event that, if it happened at all, would happen all by itself, or happen on a regular basis.

Rather, a miracle would be the result of personal agency. A personal cause, involving purposeful timing and placement, according to the rational discretion of the agent.

Miracles aren’t more or less likely to happen. They are not that kind of event.

The Son of God wasn’t born to the Virgin Mary in Bethlehem rather than Rome because he was more likely to be born in Bethlehem rather than Rome. He wasn’t born in the 1C rather than the 21C because one date was more likely than another.

You need to bone up on your theology of miracles.

JC: Yes, it does. If I went out and defended the swoon theory, and asserted that everyone else was wrong and I'm right, then other plausible alternatives (twin, stolen body, myth, miracle) all tend to reduce the likelihood that I'm right.

SH:

1.In that event, you admit that contradictory theories undermine each other. So how do they count as evidence against any particular position? Why should we believe any of them?

2.At the same time, not all explanations enjoy the same evidentiary value. The Resurrection is the only actual evidence we have for the empty tomb. There is no rival record of event.

3.Or are you leaving yourself an escape route by suggesting that your conclusion only follows if you actually committed yourself to one alternative theory, but as long as your noncommittal, the conclusion fails to obtain?

But unless we have some reason to believe that one or another of the alternatives is true or likely to be true, then how do they count against the Resurrection?

JC: Because that's my goal. If my goal were to prove that the twin theory was false, I would array all of the alternatives (stolen body, myth, miracle) against it. This is why I keep pointing out the fact that the authors of the book The Empty Tomb have as their goal to prove the Christian explanation false. So it makes sense for them to offer multiple alternative esplanations. Do you really not understand this point?

SH: It makes a lot of sense if they’re intellectually desperate and dishonest, in consequence of which they cobble together a congeries of absurd and mutually destructive alternatives to throw at the Resurrection.

JC: Which is why I said that generally multiple different plausible alternatives tends to reduce the likelihood of any other particular alternative. The alternatives you offered are so unlikely that they wouldn't move the result much. But they might move it ever so slightly.

SH: And what makes the alternatives plausible? Plausible in relation to what? Not in relation to each other, for they undermine each other. They can’t be equally plausible if they equally negate each other.

Plausible in relation to the Resurrection? This assumes that the Resurrection is the most implausible explanation, such that any alternative theory is more plausible. But, for that, you need a separate argument.

Plausible in relation to the evidence? But there is no independent evidence for the alternatives.

And if there were such evidence, how could the same evidence be evidence for one alternative as well as a contrary alternative?

How is the same evidence picking out the swoon theory and the stolen body and the wrong tomb, &c.

But if, in fact, the evidence can’t point in opposing directions, then the alternatives are equally implausible for lack of evidentiary support or corroboration. Unbridled speculation is not a form of evidence.

The Assumption Of Mary In The Earliest Sources

Many people are aware of the evidence pertaining to the assumption of Mary in the later centuries of the patristic era. They've heard of the apocryphal literature in which the concept first appears, they've heard of Epiphanius' comments about how nobody knows what happened at the end of Mary's life, etc. I'll be addressing that later evidence in a future post, but in this post I want to address the earlier evidence, including some that isn't often discussed.

The conservative Roman Catholic theologian Ludwig Ott, when discussing the concept of Mary's bodily assumption, acknowledged that "Direct and express scriptural proofs are not to be had." (Fundamentals Of Catholic Dogma [Rockford, Illinois: Tan Books and Publishers, Inc., 1974], p. 208) Passages like Psalm 132:8 and Revelation 11:19 are sometimes cited in support of the doctrine, but the ark in both passages can reasonably be seen as some entity other than Mary, and neither passage would require a first century bodily assumption of Mary even if we did conclude that the ark is Mary. If Mary is spiritually in Heaven, her presence there wouldn’t prove that she was bodily assumed in the first century. Even if Psalm 132 and Revelation 11 were referring to Mary being bodily in Heaven, how would we know when it occurred? No Evangelical denies that Mary is currently spiritually in Heaven and that she’ll someday have a resurrected physical body. There isn’t any way to arrive at a first century bodily assumption of Mary as a probable conclusion to any passage of scripture.

A group of some of the leading Roman Catholic and Lutheran scholars in the world concluded:

"Furthermore, the notion of Mary's assumption into heaven has left no trace in the literature of the third, much less of the second century. M. Jugie, the foremost authority on this question, concluded in his monumental study: 'The patristic tradition prior to the Council of Nicaea does not furnish us with any witness about the Assumption.'" (Raymond Brown, et al., Mary In The New Testament [Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1978], p. 266)

People often argue that we would know where Mary's bodily remains are, and that early sources would have claimed more Marian relics, if she had remained in the grave, since she's such an important person. But did the earliest Christians think Mary was as important as some people suggest? David Farmer comments:

"in the early church, as in Christ's ministry, she [Mary] remained so much in the background that it is difficult to know where she lived or even where she died. Both Ephesus and Jerusalem claimed to be the place of her death, with the Eastern Fathers generally supporting Jerusalem." (Oxford Dictionary Of Saints [New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], p. 336)

And the claim that early sources would surely have discussed Mary's grave and relics if she hadn't been bodily assumed is dubious. There are many well known Biblical figures and figures of later church history whose graves and relics aren't discussed much or aren't discussed at all in the earliest sources. Concern over such issues increased over time, as concepts such as the veneration of relics developed into their later forms, but even somebody living as late as John Chrysostom could comment:

"Tell me, are not the bones of Moses himself laid in a strange land? And those of Aaron, of Daniel, of Jeremiah? And as to those of the Apostles we do not know where those of most of them are laid. For of Peter indeed, and Paul, and John, and Thomas, the sepulchers are well known; but those of the rest, being so many, have nowhere become known. Let us not therefore lament at all about this, nor be so little-minded. For where-ever we may be buried, 'the earth is the Lord's and all that therein is.'[Psalm 24:1]" (Homilies On Hebrews, 26:2, v. 22)

It doesn't seem that John Chrysostom thought that every significant figure of Christianity had a known grave site and known relics. It's understandable that people would refrain from making claims about Marian relics in later centuries, when the concept of a bodily assumption began circulating. A bodily assumption would be one possible explanation for a lack of claims about Marian relics, but other explanations are plausible, and the other evidence involved is contrary to the concept of an apostolic tradition of a bodily assumption.

If the early sources were refraining from mentioning Marian relics because they thought she was bodily assumed to Heaven, then why didn't they ever mention that bodily assumption? Wouldn't they be likely to mention such an unusual occurrence, especially if they held as high a view of Mary as the groups arguing for her assumption tend to?

Dionysius of Alexandria, a bishop of the third century, wrote:

"Chaeremon, who was very old, was bishop of the city called Nilus. He fled with his wife to the Arabian mountain and did not return. And though the brethren searched diligently they could not find either them or their bodies." (cited in Eusebius, Church History, 6:42:3)

This passage illustrates some points relevant to an assumption of Mary. First, it's an illustration of the absurdity of the idea that Christians for hundreds of years would have known about a bodily assumption of Mary, yet would never have said anything about it in their extant writings, even when they're commenting on Mary. If both Dionysius and Eusebius thought it significant that this bishop and his wife couldn't be found, that their bodies were missing, don't you think a bodily assumption of Mary would have seemed even more significant to them? Don't you think it would be mentioned sometime in these early centuries?

Secondly, this passage from Dionysius illustrates the absurdity of concluding that a bodily assumption has occurred just because the whereabouts of a person's body aren't known. What if we were to conclude that Mary's remains weren't kept by the early Christians, that her tomb was empty, etc.? Would such evidence, by itself, prove that an assumption occurred? No. It would be consistent with an assumption, but it wouldn't, by itself, prove an assumption.

The church fathers of the earliest centuries repeatedly cite Enoch and Elijah as examples of people who didn’t die, were translated to Heaven, etc. (Clement of Rome, First Clement, 9; Tertullian, A Treatise On The Soul, 50; Tertullian, On The Resurrection Of The Flesh, 58; Tertullian, Against Marcion, 5:12; Methodius, From The Discourse On The Resurrection, 3:2:14), yet they never say any such thing about Mary or include her as an example. Irenaeus, for instance, writes about the power of God to deliver people from death, and he cites Enoch, Elijah, and Paul (2 Corinthians 12:2) as illustrations of people who were "assumed" and "translated", but he says nothing of Mary (Against Heresies, 5:5).

People claim to see references to an assumption of Mary in Biblical passages like Revelation 12. Yet, Hippolytus, Methodius, and other early fathers comment on such passages without saying anything of an assumption.

How likely is it that all of these writers, commenting in so many different contexts, would all refrain from mentioning Mary’s assumption, even though they knew of it? Though Roman Catholics give Mary so much attention and claim that Mary is God’s greatest creation, the apocryphal assumption of Moses receives more attention among the ante-Nicene fathers than Mary’s assumption (which isn’t mentioned at all).

The Calvinometer

Anonymous said:

“How do we measure certainty, and what level of certainty is a necessary condition of eternal life? What precisely does a person need to have certainty about to have saving faith?”

By using the Calvinometer.

Simply go to the online catalog at Geneva.com for a full line of models, including a couple of newer models to accessorize your iPod or cellphone with the high-speed access to the assurance of salvation.

Warning: the catalogue is only available to the frozen chosen. You’ll need a password issued to the elect by the angel Gabriel.

Honorary passwords are occasionally issued to Christians who, through no fault of their own, are invincibly ignorant of the horrible decree, but the company's firewall is impervious to reprobate hackers.

The threshold for saving assurance is 112.6 creds, while absolute assurance levels out at 177.2 creds.

Calvinists generally clock in around 153.8 creds, and Lutherans at 133.5 creds, while Anglicans, who like to split the difference (that via media, ya know), normally hover around 88.6 creds, although the ordination of Vicki Gene Robinson pushed some of them to an elevated reading of 88.7 creds.

Thankfully, this immoderately allergic reaction can be controlled by anaphylactic shock medication, restoring them to their normal state of somnambulance.

If the Calvinometer registers an anemic level of assurance, this can be remedied by a daily aspiration of Foxe’s Book of Martyrs.

For your convenience, the venerable text has now been vaporized and is currently available in the form of a nasal inhalant. Truly “inspirational” literature!

For best results, use just before going to bed and right after you get up.

BTW, John Owen’s classic commentary on Hebrews was recently reissued in this very same format, but due to the original page count, it is only sold in the ultra fine mist.

Whisky Calvinism

The question of 4-point “Calvinism” has come up. Gene Bridges has already made some apt remarks in the combox.

The definition of 4-point “Calvinism” is slippery. The original frame of reference was the Amyraldin heresy. As Roger Nicole summarizes that position:

***QUOTE***

In this book [by Amyraut] the following positions were espoused:

1.Sin is he result of the darkening of the understanding.

2.God moved by an earnest desire to save all mankind, decided to give in ransom His Son Jesus Christ, who died “equally for all men” and to make a universal offer of salvation to all men.

3.God has predestined all men and every man unto salvation, provided they believe; and in nature there is a sufficient presentation of truth so that men may exercise faith if they only will do so.

4.Although man is not precluded from believing by any external constraint, his corruption has rendered him morally unable to accept God’s offer. It is therefore necessary that God himself should produce faith in the hearts of those whom he has chosen to redeem.

5.This he does only for the elect.

E. Palmer, ed. The Encyclopedia of Christianity (NFCE 1964), 1:186.

***END-QUOTE***

The original motivation for this position was ecumenical: “Amyraut intended to soften the edges of the traditional orthodox Reformed view and thus to relieve difficulties in the controversy with Roman Catholics and facilitate a reunion of Protestants in which Reformed and Lutheran could join ranks,” S. Ferguson & D. Wright, eds. New Dictionary of Theology (IVP 1988), 17.

Continuing with Nicole, the Scriptural prooftexts for this position are interchangeable with the Arminian position:

***QUOTE***

1.Passages which are construed to teach that there is a universal saving will of God toward all men and every man (Ezk 18:23; 33:11; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Pet 3:9; Jn 3:16).

2.Passages which are construed to teach that some men for whom Christ died may ultimately perish (Rom 14:15; 1 Cor 8:11; Heb 10:29; 2 Pet 2:1).

3.Passages which are construed to teach that the saving work of Christ is intended for all (Isa 53:6; Rom 5:18; 8:21; 2 Cor 5:14; 1 Tim 2:6; Tit 2:11), for everyone (Heb 2:9), for the world (Jn 3:16; 1 Jn 2:2).

Ibid. 1:189.

***END-QUOTE***

By way of reply:

1. In myself have blogged on these verses at various times.

2.Even non-Calvinist commentators have offered interpretations consistent with Calvinism on a number of the key verses, viz. Bock on Ezk 18:23; Lincoln on Jn 3:16; Bruce on 2 Cor 5:14; Towner on 1 Tim 2:4; Bauckham on 2 Pet 3:9.

3.It’s misleading to multiply prooftexts when they can be grouped by kind. For example, you don’t need to separately explain every Johannine “cosmic” passage. Since the usage is the same, they count as one.

Same thing with the Pauline “universalistic” passages.

4.Any theological tradition short of universalism is going to qualify the force of these passages.

Several logical arguments are also given:

***QUOTE***

A universal propitiation and intention to save is necessary, if:

1.we are to maintain a well-meant offer of the gospel to all men;

2.there is to be any propriety in the command to believe addressed to men indiscriminately;

3. there is to be any justice in condemning one for not believing;

4. the strict fairness of God’s justice.

Ibid. 1:189-90.

***END-QUOTE***

By way of reply:

1. If universal provision is a precondition for a well-meant offer, then the fact that even under Amyraldism only the elect are regenerated directly undercuts the Amyraldin version of the well-meant offer.

2.Since the universal offer of the gospel is a conditional offer, contingent on faith and repentance, what makes it a bona fide offer is that it’s true: if you meet the conditions, the promise is yours.

3.The unregenerate suffer from a moral inability to believe the gospel, not a natural inability. So they are blameworthy for their unbelief.

4.To believe in Christ, according to Scripture, is not—in the first place—to believe that he died for me, but that he died for sinners, of which I’m one. To believe in who he is and what he did on behalf of sinners.

As Paul Helm points out:

“Saving faith is not a person’s belief that he has been saved by Christ nor even that Christ has died for him in particular. It cannot be this because until he trusts in Christ in order to be saved he has no reason to think that Christ has died for him in particular or that Christ has saved him,” The Beginnings: Word & Spirit in Conversion (Banner of Truth 1986), 69.

Be definition, only a believer is in a position to believe that Christ died for him. And if, in fact, I do exercise saving faith in him, then he did die for me.

5.No one is damned for failing to believe in a Gospel he never heard. The lost are hell-bound because they are sinners. Disbelief in Christ is simply an aggravating circumstance. As Warfield points out:

“The Scriptures teach that no man can be saved without a knowledge of Jesus Christ in his saving work. This is transmuted into its opposite that no man can be lost without a knowledge of Christ in his saving work; and then in the interest of this proposition provision is made for every man to be brought face to face with the offer of the gospel under favorable circumstances, if not in this world, the in the next,” The Plan of Salvation (Eerdmans 1984), 83.

6. It is only unjust to be unfair (i.e. inequitable) if you deny someone his rights. But sinners are not entitled to the mercy of God.

7.As Owen pointed out a long time ago in his classic objection (double jeopardy) to unlimited atonement, if penal substitution is universal, then everyone ought be saved. Their sins have been atoned. Justice has been exacted in the person of the Redeemer.

8.The Amyraldin compromise has the persons of the Trinity working at cross-purposes. Redemption is made for everyone, but the universality of the atonement is undercut by the particularity of election and regeneration. So the scope of the cross is broader than the work of the Father in election or the Spirit in renewal.

9.In what sense did Christ die for all? Did he die with the intention of saving everyone? But if you deny universal salvation, then universal atonement is vacuous. He cannot die with the intention of saving everyone unless everyone is saved by his death.

10.In what sense is the work of Christ sufficient for all, but efficient for the elect?

Sufficient for whom and for what? Unless everyone is saved, then it is clearly insufficient to save anyone in particular.

More recently, we have what is called 4-point Calvinism. This is even fuzzier than Amyraldism.

The implication is that 4-pointers subscribe to everything in TULIP except for limited atonement. But on closer inspection, they redefine the remaining points.

Total Depravity.

In 5-point Calvinism, depravity implies spiritual inability. The unregenerate are unable to repent of their sins and believe the gospel apart from monergistic grace.

In 4-point “Calvinism,” the unregenerate retain the freedom of the will to repent and believe the gospel.

Unconditional Election

In 5-point Calvinism, election is not contingent on the potential response of the elect. Indeed, apart from irresistible grace, the sinner is unresponsive at best, and, at worst, the knowledge of the gospel hardens his heart even further.

In 4-point “Calvinism,” election is contingent on foreseen faith. It’s the Arminian version of election.

Limited Atonement.

In 5-point Calvinism, Christ made penal substitution for the elect alone.

In 4-point “Calvinism,” Christ died for everyone.

Irresistible Grace

In 5-point Calvinism, the elect are passive in regeneration. They do not cooperate in the work of regeneration.

Likewise, regeneration is prior to saving faith. Regeneration creates a predisposition to believe the gospel. It makes the mind and heart receptive to the gospel.

In 4-point “Calvinism,” grace is sufficient and prevenient rather than irresistible. God still takes the initiative, but the sinner must consent to the overture of grace. The grace of God liberates the will to do otherwise: to believe or disbelieve (the power of contrary choice).

Likewise, faith is prior to regeneration.

Perseverance

In 5-point Calvinism, the Holy Spirit preserves the regenerate in faith and fidelity. They can backslide, but they can never commit apostasy. They can fall into sin or suffer a crisis of faith, but their spiritual restoration is assured.

In 4-point “Calvinism,” you can die an impenitent unbeliever and still be saved. In 4-point Calvinism, grace is essentially objective rather than objective and subjective alike.

It is limited to what God has done for you in Christ, rather than what God also does within you by the Spirit. It deals with guilt, but not with corruption.

Justification without sanctification. Good Friday without Pentecost.

Christianity: The pros & cons

THE CASE FOR CHRISTIANITY:

G. Archer. Encyclopedia of Bible Difficulties

P. Barnett. Jesus & the Logic of History

F. Beckwith. David Hume's Argument Against Miracles: A Critical Analysis

C. Blomberg. The Historical Reliability of the Gospels

G. Clark. A Christian View of Men and Things

W. Corduin. Without a Doubt

W. L. Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics

_____. and J. P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview

W. Dembski. The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design

_____. and Jay Wesley Richards. Unapologetic Apologetics: Meeting the Challenges of Theological Studies

J. Frame. Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction.

D. Geivitt, & Gary R. Habermas. In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God's Action in History

G. Habermas & M. Licona The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus

K. A. Kitchen. On the Reliability of the Old Testament

J. W. Montgomery. Tractatus Logico-Theologicus

J. P. Moreland. Scaling the Secular City: A Defense of Christianity

R. Nash. Faith & Reason

A. Plantinga, Alvin. God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God

_____. Warranted Christian Belief

I. Provan et al. A Biblical History of Israel

V. Reppert. The Argument from Reason

L. Strobel. The Case for Christ

THE CASE FOR ATHEISM:

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn!

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn I: The Prequel

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn II: The Sequel

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn III

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn IV

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn V

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn VI

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn VII

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn VIII

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn IX

R.E.M. Nod. Yawn X

F.O.R.T. Winks, ed. Yawn for Idiots

C.A.T. Nap, ed. Zzzzz Essential Yawn

I.M.A. Somnambulist, ed. Zzzzz Wit & Wisdom of Nod

U.R. Morpheus, ed. Nod: Zzzzz Collected Works

U. Snooze, ed. Secular Narcolepsy: A Festschrift in Honor of Nod

Auricular confession

“When Jesus says to the apostles, "whose sins you forgive will be forgiven," is he giving men the power to forgive sin? It seems like this verse supports verbal confession of sins to a person: how else would the apostles know which sins to forgive and which ones to retain?”

If your using this verse (Jn 20:23) as a prooftext for auricular confession, then it won’t get you where you want to go. As one commentator explains:

“In this Gospel’s discourse sin is primarily failing to acknowledge the revelation of God in Jesus (cf. 8:24; 9:39-41; 15:22,24). Jesus’ words and works have been depicted as bringing about a judgment which the recipients make on themselves, as they either respond in belief or expose their sinful state of unbelief. The same holds for the future work of the Spirit, about whom Jesus has said that ‘when he comes, he will convict the world of sin…because they do not believe in me’ (16:8-9). Similarly, as the disciples, accompanied by the Spirit, witness to God’s verdict accomplished in Jesus, the lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world (cf. 1:29), and press home its implications, they will be pronouncing forgiveness for those who receive their witness but will be retaining the sins of those who reject it,” A. Lincoln, The Gospel According to St. John (Hendrickson 2005), 499.

“The response of the recipients of the message is decisive for whether their sins are forgiven ore retained, but the formulation of the two subordinate clauses makes this an active effect of the disciples’ witness…Just as Jesus’ mission constituted a realized judgment of either salvation or condemnation, so the disciples’ witness to that mission will entail a realized judgment of either forgiveness or retention of sins,” ibid. 500.

“The saying about forgiving or retaining sins in 20:23 has some similarities with the authorization of the disciples to bind or loose in Mt 18:18 (cf. Also 16:19), but the Fourth Gospel broadens the notion from teaching authority in the church to mission in general, and the commissioning of the disciples thereby has its closest conceptual links with Lk 24:46-9. There, before his ascension, Jesus speaks of repentance and forgiveness of sins being preached in his name to all nations, of the disciples being witnesses, which, as has been noted, is implicit in Jn 20:21, and of the promise of the Father being sent on them, which will entail being clothed with power,” ibid. 500.

Probabilifying probability

Jon Curry said:

“What evidentiary value? What do you mean? I’m simply saying that Gene’s is misguided to think that the contributors would agree on what actually happened with Jesus, or that the contributors should not be expected to offer a variety of opinions. The purpose of the book is not to show what actually happened with Jesus, but to show that in fact a miracle did not occur.”

How is Gene’s criticism misguided? If the contributors don’t know what really happened, then how are they in any position to say what didn’t happen?

They are assuming that the Resurrection didn’t occur, and then proposing alternative explanations. This assumes that we need an alternative explanation in the first place.

But if they best they can do is to offer a grab-bag of mutually exclusive alternatives, then they clearly have no idea what really happened, in which case they have no idea of what didn’t happen.

So the procedure is viciously circle. They assume the Resurrection didn’t occur. They justify their assumption by appeal to a variety of contradictory explanations. But their alternative explanations would only be needed on the prior assumption that the Resurrection did not occur.

“I suppose it is. Do you disagree with assigning a low initial value?”

Yes, I do.

1.To begin with, I don’t regard miracles as either probable or improbable. A miracle is not like a rare, but naturally occurring process (e.g. Halley’s Comet).

2.In addition, BT does not prove or prejudge the relative reliability of a historical witness, but, to the contrary, is simply a mathematical formulism into which we plug prior probability assignments that are independent of BT itself. As one philosopher explains:

“What this seems to show is that Bayesian theory can help us with the consistency of our commitments, and perhaps with clarification of what they are, but it is ill-placed to prove any sort of criterion for the acceptability of astonishing reports,” C. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Clarendon (1994), 192.

“In the context of our present inquiry this conclusion is reinforced by the consideration that, even if we don’t know anything much about the witness…our broad philosophical assumptions about testimony and its epistemological significance will feed into the scales we use for the Bayesian operation or for any related probabilistic acceptability device. If we view testimony as a very weak evidential reed and our follow observers as by nature grossly credulous we will come to very different conclusions from those whose fundamental epistemic outlook is more trusting. There is a continuum of attitudes to reports possible here. Let us call those at the end of the continuum, respectively, the Sceptic and the gull. No one is consistently a Sceptic or a gull and I have argued that no o0ne could be consistently a Sceptic. For one thing, as I argued in earlier chapters, a consistent scepticism about testimony would deprive one of any content to the contrasting notion of experience—what Locke called ‘common observation in like cases.’ In the context of Bayesian considerations it is tantamount to depriving oneself of any secure grasp on the background facts,” ibid. 192-93.

Continuing with Curry:

“Do you agree that if someone claims they have ESP we should initially be skeptical, or should we assume that they probably do have it?”

1. Neither. My worldview is open to the paranormal. Therefore, I don’t come to the claim with any prior expectation one way or the other.

2.Rather, I’d judge it on a case-by-case basis. Is the claimant a credible witness? Is his claim verifiable? E.g. Does it involved privileged information which he would be in no ordinary position to know?

So I’d assess a claim like this based on a (i) general assumption of what’s possible along with a (ii) specific consideration of the particulars in this individual case.

“Very easily. If I claim that I flew around today in a space ship there are many explanations for my claim that do not require that I actually flew in a space ship. Perhaps I’m lying, or I’m delusional, or someone put me up to it. These are all contradictory, but as we come up with more and more alternative explanations acceptance of my claim becomes less and less rational. That’s the way Bayes’ Theorem works.”

1.This is deceptively simple. It has nothing to do with BT, per se. Rather, the irrationality of the claim and superior rationality of the alternative is a conjuring trick generated by the choice of one’s illustration.

Curry has done nothing whatsoever to prove that this claim is irrational. Rather, he has deliberately selected an example that he regards as ridiculous, and which he assumes his reader will regard as ridiculous as well. Given their shared assumption, then many alternative explanations are more plausible than the original claim.

So he’s assuming what he needs to prove. BT doesn’t show that ufology is improbable.

If he were to get into an argument with a savvy ufologist, an appeal to BT would beg the question of prior probabilities.

To make his case, Curry would have to bracket BT, and establish the prior improbability of alien abductions by raising a number of direct objections to ufology.

Only then would he be entitled to assign a prior probability value to the claim, and generate a posterior probability.

2.Curry is also glossing over a number of internal difficulties with BT. To take a few examples:

***QUOTE***

The assumption of logical omniscience.

The assumption that degrees of belief satisfy the probability laws implies omniscience about deductive logic, because the probability laws require that all deductive logical truths have probability one, all deductive inconsistencies have probability zero, and the probability of any conjunction of sentences be no greater than any of its deductive consequences. This seems to be an unrealistic standard for human beings. Hacking and Garber have made proposals to relax the assumption of logical omniscience. Because relaxing that assumption would block the derivation of almost all the important results in Bayesian epistemology, most Bayesians maintain the assumption of logical omniscience and treat it as an ideal to which human beings can only more or less approximate.

The problem of the priors.

Are there constraints on prior probabilities other than the probability laws? Consider Goodman's "new riddle of induction": In the past all observed emeralds have been green. Do those observations provide any more support for the generalization that all emeralds are green than they do for the generalization that all emeralds are grue (green if observed before now; blue if observed later); or do they provide any more support for the prediction that the next emerald observed will be green than for the prediction that the next emerald observed will be grue (i.e., blue)? This question divides Bayesians into two categories:

(a) Objective Bayesians (e.g., Rosenkrantz) hold that there are rational constraints on prior probabilities that require that observations support the green-generalization and the green-prediction much more strongly than the grue-generalization and the grue-prediction. Objective Bayesians are the intellectual heirs of the advocates of a Principle of Indifference for probability. Rosenkrantz builds his account on the maximum entropy rule proposed by E.T. Jaynes. The difficulties in formulating an acceptable Principle of Indifference have led most Bayesians to abandon Objective Bayesianism.

(b) Subjective Bayesians (e.g., de Finetti) do not believe that rationality alone places enough constraints on one's prior probabilities to make them objective. For Subjective Bayesians, it is up to our own free choice or to evolution or to socialization or some other non-rational process to determine one's prior probabilities. Rationality only requires that the prior probabilities satisfy relatively modest synchronic coherence conditions.

Subjective Bayesians believe that their position is not objectionably subjective, because of results (e.g., Doob or Gaifman and Snir) proving that even subjects beginning with very different prior probabilities will tend to converge in their final probabilities, given a suitably long series of shared observations. These convergence results are not completely reassuring, however, because they only apply to agents who already have significant agreement in their priors and they do not assure convergence in any reasonable amount of time. Also, they typically only guarantee convergence on the probability of predictions, not on the probability of theoretical hypotheses. For example, Carnap favored prior probabilities that would never raise above zero the probability of a generalization over a potentially infinite number of instances (e.g., that all crows are black), no matter how many observations of positive instances (e.g., black crows) one might make without finding any negative instances (i.e., non-black crows). In addition, the convergence results depend on the assumption that the only changes in probabilities that occur are those that are the non-inferential results of observation on evidential statements and those that result from conditionalization on such evidential statements.

Objective Bayesianism and Subjective Bayesianism are two opposite extremes. There is plenty of room for a compromise position that there are further rationality constraints on prior probabilities that can be added to the Bayesian framework, without supposing that the additional constraints will determine a uniquely rational prior. For some examples of some additional rationality constraints, see the next section. However, because there is no generally agreed upon solution to the Problem of the Priors, it is an open question whether Bayesian Confirmation Theory has inductive content, or whether it merely translates the framework for rational belief provided by deductive logic into a corresponding framework for rational degrees of belief.

The problem of rigid conditional probabilities.

When one conditionalizes, one applies the initial conditional probabilities to determine final unconditional probabilities. Throughout, the conditional probabilities themselves do not change; they remain rigid. Examples of the Problem of Old Evidence are but one of a variety of cases in which it seems that it can be rational to change one's initial conditional probabilities. Thus, many Bayesians reject the Simple Principle of Conditionalization in favor of a qualified principle, limited to situations in which one does not change one's initial conditional probabilities. There is no generally accepted account of when it is rational to maintain rigid initial conditional probabilities and when it is not.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/

***END-QUOTE***

Continuing with Curry:

“So it becomes more and more likely that I flew in a spaceship if you come up with a variety of plausible alternatives? Generally speaking you would expect the opposite to be the case.”

1.Once again, the persuasiveness of this retort is an artifact of his chosen illustration, and not of BT, as such.

If we don’t believe in alien abductions, then many other explanations are more plausible than the prima facie claim.

What makes them at all plausible or more plausible than something else is entirely relative to the plausibility of the contrasting claim.

2.But there’s another fundamental flaw in his reasoning:

Why should we isolate one explanation out of many, then bundle the remaining explanations and oppose them to that particular explanation?

Take the following theories of the empty tomb:

a) Resurrection
b) Swoon theory
c) Stolen body (by friends or enemies?)
d) Reburial/wrong tomb
e) Mass hallucination
f) Jesus’ identical twin
g) Jesus as space alien

Why should (b)-(g) count against (a)?

By the same logic, (a) & (c-g) count against (b); (a)-(b) & (d-g) count against (c); (a-c) & (e-g) count against (d), and so on.

Each theory is inconsistent with the other theories; each theory has its own burden of proof; each theory has its own advocates.

So why single out one theory (Resurrection), and deploy all of the alternative explanations against that one theory, rather than bundle the competing theories in a rotating one-to-many estimate?

Since each theory is inconsistent with every other theory, considered separately or collectively, it’s quite arbitrary to group one particular set of explanations and limit their explanatory power to an isolated target instead of allowing them to target each other in various combinations.

3.Apropos 1-2, suppose we were apply Curry’s reasoning to a different illustration:

A rich man is murdered. The police indict the wife. She has no alibi. She recently found out that her hubby was having an affair. Traces of his blood were found in her bathroom sink.

Ah, but the defense attorney has a number of alternative explanations:

1.He was murdered by a business rival. The evidence was planted to frame the wife and thereby divert attention away from the real killer.

2.He was murdered by vampires.

3.He was murdered by space aliens.

4.He was murdered by the Feds because he discovered the truth about Roswell.

5.He was murdered by members of the International Jewish Conspiracy.

6.He was murdered by members of Opus Dei.

7.He was murdered by members of the Illuminati.

8. He was murdered by Rosicrucians.

9.He was murdered by house-burglars, who washed their hands in the sink.

10.He was murdered by O.J.

11.He was murdered by jihadis.

12.He was murdered by…(fill in the blank).

Does the multiplication of imaginative scenarios really count as cumulative exculpatory evidence?

Scripturalism and 2 Peter 1:19

Late Friday, I responded to this post @ Reformed Philosophy.com. My initial response was admittedly flawed, as I was on the fly w/o the text of Scripture before me. This will detail my second response. Here is the initial post at RP:

Though I don’t imagine many people will read this, I must write something on my recent thoughts about 2 Peter 1:19. Upon reading this the other night in the ESV, I was overjoyed to see how the Scriptures continue to witness to their superiority over sense experience and their monopoly on knowledge and truth.

In the ESV, 2 Peter 1:19a reads “And we have something more sure, the prophetic word, to which you will do well to pay attention as to a lamp shining in a dark place. . .”

To better understand why I have come to my conclusion, let me provide the context:

For we did not follow cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty. For when he received honor and glory from God the Father, and the voice was borne to him by the Majestic Glory, “This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased,” we ourselves heard this very voice borne from heaven, for we were with him on the holy mountain.
(2 Pe 1.16-18)

Peter begins his letter with exhortations to live holy lives, and concludes with his revealing statement that Christ revealed to him that he will soon be put to death (”I know that the putting off my body will be soon” v.14). After this he comforts his audience by letting them know that he will provide a means for them to be able to recall “these things”, which are the ways of “making your calling and election sure” (v. 10) found in vs. 5-7. Following this is the passage I have previously quoted. The connection between the two seems to be that of Peter giving reasons, justification, for why his audience should believe the things he is teaching. So, Peter states that they were not deceived by some clever myth, but rather they were eyewitnesses. They were not just going off hearsay, but they were there. They were on the mount when Christ was transfigured before them and the Father spoke from Heaven; they saw and heard.

Now, it is at this point that non-Scripturalists will most likely ask how this fits into the Scripturalist system since we deny that anything can be known by sense experience and often speak of the unreliability of the senses. After all, is not Peter here implicitly giving credence to the senses? Is he not using his experiences as an argument for his trustworthiness? My reply: no. Peter seems to be using his experiences in an ad hominem fashion because he then moves on to say that the Scriptures are a “more sure” witness. (This, of course, has more force when viewed along with the other arguments found in Scripture for the Scripturalist position, but this post is not meant to be comprehensive.) The Scriptures are the “more sure. . . lamp shining in the darkness,” and our experiences, though not trustworthy enough to be considered knowledge, add insult to injury. One is entitled to believe, out of habit, his experiences to be trustworthy; he just cannot make a claim to knowledge based upon experience. This is an a fortiori argument, from the weaker to the stronger. To paraphrase Peter, “Believe what I teach, not only because I was there and saw it all happen, but even more so because the Scriptures teach thus.”

What is interesting, however, is how so many other versions render the first part of v. 19:

NASV “So we have ^{the prophetic word made more sure. . .”}

^{NKJV “And so we have the prophetic word confirmed . . . ” (with an alternate translation in a footnote similar to that of the ESV’s)}

^{NIV “And we have the word of the prophets made more certain. . .”}

^{KJV “We have also a more sure word of prophecy. . . “}

^{I find it interesting that there are two main translations. One being that of the prophetic word being “confirmed” or “made more sure/certain”; the other saying that the prophetic word is more certain. Unless I’m missing something, I see a significant difference between the two. Indeed, the way one translates this verse could very well have a significant impact upon the very issue at hand (which is obviously why I am dealing with it).}

^{Now, although I technically only took two semesters of Greek (101 and 202), I do believe that the proper translation is that of the ESV (”we have the more sure prophetic word”). Why is that? Well, the Greek reads (roughly transliterated for lack of Greek font) “kai echomen bebaioteron ton prophaetikon logon.” That reads, literally “and we have the more sure prophetic word.” There is no complex grammar to this phrase at all. In fact, it’s all stuff you would learn in a first semester Greek class. “Echomen” is the first person plural, active, indicative of the verb “to have”; “bebaioteron” is a comparative adjective coming from “bebaios” meaning “sure/steady/firm” (the superlative form would be “bebaiotatos”, if I’m not mistaken); and then we have “ton prophaetikon logon”, being “the prophetic word.” It is clear that “bebaioteron” is modifying “ton prophaetikon logon” being that it’s in the same number, case, and gender, not to mention the flow of the sentence and argument as a whole. So where do the translators get “make” from? I am led to believe that a latent empiricism has caused some translators to miss the mark here and import a word “make” and concept that is not there.}

^{“Let God be true, though everyone were a liar . . .” (Rom. 3.4)}

His response to my rejoiner is here.

By way of reply:

First, it seems to me that if I were to mention, say, Gordon Clark’s commentary on 2 Peter, you would simply assert that it is not a “standard commentary,” so let’s not resort to such tactics.

I will take this as a “No.” The very commentary you did cite you noted did not agree with your assertion.

Do you deny that the hearing of a voice and the seeing of the transfiguration involve the senses?

No, but by the same token, we are not Apostles. We are not on the mount of Transfiguration. We have not met Peter, James, and John personally or heard them speak. We are not living at a time when the Protestant rule of faith did not apply, personal revelation from God was ongoing, and the church was not in its normative state. Are you arguing that the Apostles practiced Sola Scriptura? Do you deny that you know the Scriptures by your senses, or do you receive private revelation from God? Is Scripture itself an object of knowledge?

The text is clear that Peter stresses his experience from the Mount, but then compares that to the written word, as v. 19 declares.

No, it is not clear. The translation of the text here is disputed, and even if your rendering is correct, it does not lead to the conclusion you draw. See Kistemaker.

Literally, he recounts his experience and says “ and we have more firm the prophetic word...” That word does confirm his experience, but it is not a statement that it is a necessary validation of that experience at the time of its occurrence, based off the alleged fact that experience was a sensory experience and is unreliable on its own, due to the global unreliability of the senses. You’re the one conflating ideas here, namely what is applicable to Peter’s readers to whom he addresses his letter and what is applicable to Peter at the actual time he and his two friends saw the Transfiguration.

As for the rest:

My apologies for the Gk. grammar errors, I wrote that last night on the fly without that text in front of me. The prophetic word made sure refers to the Scriptures, but my point was, and remains, that you are positing this as a statement about sense experience to validate your theory of knowledge. However, that's a blatant misuse of this text if ever there was, and I stand by my contention that this is nothing more than eisegesis on your part.

First, related to vs. 19 The term “prophetic witness” is comprehensive enough to include, beside the predictions concerning Christ’s Second Coming, all the numerous prophecies fulfilled in connection with His earthly life. We find these, obviously, in Scripture.

However, where does Peter connect to this as a validation of his actual personal experience on the Mt. of Transfiguration as a necessary truth condition due to the unreliable nature of sense experience? That's not in this text. Rather, he connects this to a testimony that is supreme over the false teachings/teachers of the day as an enduring and infallible witness that will outlive him in view of his impending death.

"The morning star rising" likely refers to the Second Coming. So, Peter's focus here isn't on the authority of Scripture apart from its endurance as a witness, given that Christ's return may be close or far off, nobody knows for sure anything except He will return (chapter 3). The connection he makes to the confirming authority of Scripture is not to his experience on the Mt. of Transfiguration, but the situation of his audience in view of his impending death. It is about the absolute sufficiency and authority of Scripture because it outlives the personal, eyewitness, living, testimony of the Apostles, not the necessity of Scripture to adjudicate truth claims related to sensory experiences in a global manner.

He is not saying that he used Scripture to adjudicate what God the Father Himself said to him on the Mount of Transfiguration or what He saw or that Scripture validates his actual experience in a Scripturalist sense. He never once makes this connection. Yes, it does validate his experience, but you have extrapolated that into a statement about the theory of knowledge applicable to a time when the Protestant rule of faith was not in effect, namely the time when Peter witnessed this event, and then you are reading that back into the text..

This is the era of inscripturation. A literal voice from God was valid at this point in history, because God Himself was the one speaking. Please tell us what Scriptures Abraham consulted when God spoke to him in like manner in Gen. 12 or in his dream/vision in Gen. 15 or in theophany of Gen. 17. Did Gideon consult the Scriptures when he was commissioned? Did Isaiah record going to Scripture to validate his experience in Isa. 6? Peter was an Apostle. He ranks, by definition, with the prophets.

Now, if Peter needed a written witness to confirm what God told him, could he have found it? I'd argue that he could, for example, by comparing his experience to the theophanic passages of the OT or finding similar words to those he heard in Scripture, but in doing so, he would be assuming that what he heard was real, that he remembered them accurately, and that Scripture is an object of knowledge.

The questions you must answer here are: Where does Peter make this specific connection for this text? Where do we ever find a record of him looking to Scripture to validate that experience? Besides, the fact that he could have found validation in Scripture is not the question at hand; rather the question is whether he actually needed to do so, because his senses were unreliable by themselves at the time of the event and whether or not that is the nature of his appeal to the Scriptures here, not to mention whether or not that is the connection Peter is making here with reference to the situation of his readers.

Peter saw Jesus in His glory with Moses and Elijah chatting with him, along with two of his best friends, James and John, and all of them heard the voice of the Father speak to them. Are seriously going to argue that he needed to validate that experience with Scripture? Is the testimony of the Father heard by his own ears and those of James and John not valid apart from Scripture during the time of inscripturation itself, in the presence of Jesus in a glorified state? I would argue that this text actually disproves Scripturalism on this basis. If you are going to argue this, perhaps you can point us to the text Saul of Tarsus consulted to validate the Damascus Road experience. The text indicates he believed on the spot. Ananias did not run off to find a scroll validate the Holy Spirit’s instructions to find Saul and baptize him did he?

Now, I will grant this much: that Peter is a Jew, and his audience appears to be as well, since we have references to the OT in chapter 2. So, Peter could be invoking the idea that the testimony of one is not enough to establish the truth in a court of law. Very likely, in appealing to “we” in vs. 16, he is doing so, since James and John are the other witness to the event. However, in that event, then James and John are confirming witnesses of Peter’s testimony.

His audience already knew Peter, and they had the OT. Peter invokes the OT here as the second witness, and not only that, it is the enduring witness in view of his impending death. Together, these two, the apostolic testimony (which includes the Transfiguration) which Peter personally vouches for since he is there, and Scripture are the two witnesses that testify to the validity of the Apostolic message as a whole and which are inclusive of the promise of the Second Coming; and of these witnesses, Scripture will endure when the Apostle Peter himself has departed.

But what is Scripture here verifying? The Transfiguration event and Peter’s sense experience due to the unreliability of his senses? No, Peter links it to the apostolic testimony that contains the prophetic promise of Christ’s return (mentioned in vs. 16 and 19). That too, is a prophetic word found in the OT. Peter calls on this event which was witnessed by Peter, James, and John at the Transfiguration. James is dead, Peter is on his way, and John, according to tradition is somewhere in Asia Minor. What then is left for his readers? Scripture. Scripture, in the absence of the Apostles, is a sure, enduring, infallible testimony, and, as we know, it includes the testimony of the Transfiguration and the OT itself testifies to it; we need not even resort to the NT for this promise.

It does not, however, stand to reason that this is a proof text for Scripture’s use in validating sense experience in the way in which Scripturalism asserts. I know you are not claiming to be an Apostle who has seen the Transfiguration and that the Patriarchs, prophets, judges, etc. But do you affirm that they themselves needed to confirm their direct experiences of God with Scripture? If so, to which ones did they appeal?

Why does Peter invoke it for his readers? To find out, let's work through this text one more time.

2 Peter opens with commendations and exhortations concerning promises and virtues (1-11). Then @ v. 12, not vs. 16, he starts discussing divine revelation. This comes in 3 stages. The first relates to the memory of his readers. The second is his eyewitness account. This section we are discussing is the third part of that discussion.

In vs. 14, he speaks of casting aside an earthly garment. This is a reference to his death. This, he says, was made clear to him. How? Scripture? No, he simply says that Christ himself made it clear to him in some manner. Apparently, this was a private revelation for him. If your thesis is correct, then he required Scripture to validate this experience. So, where is Peter's appeal to Scripture for validation for this private experience? For that matter, to what Scripture could he appeal? Do you deny that Peter is calling on a personal experience here and expecting his audience to think that is a true statement?

Ah, but Peter is writing Scripture, so, ironically Scripture validates it. That’s true, but that, however, is a vicious circle for the Scripturalist, because Peter himself does not say that any Scripture at all validated this private revelation from Christ, nor does he appeal to his own inspiration here to validate it. Moreover, even if that is the case, we are not Apostles writing Scripture. Moreover, the references to Scriptures in validation of testimony in this text are applied by Peter in this text, not the revelation he was about to die, but, at most, to another experience earlier in his life according to your own yardstick, and these are together placed in contrast to the false teachings of the day and are the source from which his readers may derive certainty about Christ’s promises.

He knows he is soon to die. Jesus told him so. That said, what, in his absence, and that of all the Apostles, can his audience do to persevere in the exhortations and hold to the promises of 1:1 – 11 and the apostolic witness? How can they be confident in the apostolic witness about the Second Coming?

Vs. 16 - 21 is not an apologetic for the validity of Scripture over sense experience itself. Rather, it is Peter's justification/apologetic intended to address the confidence of his audience after Peter (and presumably the other Apostles) die. They (the Apostles) will no longer be physically present to write, visit, preach, etc.

Of all his recollections of Jesus’ ministry, why has Peter selected the transfiguration scene for his discourse in this epistle? The transfiguration of Jesus provides Peter with the knowledge that Jesus Christ will give every believer “a rich welcome into His eternal kingdom” (v. 11). Peter emphasizes the main points of the experience: the power and coming of Jesus Christ, the heavenly honor and glory given to Jesus, and his confirmation by God the Father’s own voice. As human witnesses, these 3 Apostles were permitted to see a glimpse of heaven in which Jesus rules with power, honor, and glory, where Christ is the Son of God, standing in the Father’s personal love and approval. Though it’s not mentioned, I think it’s valid to say that there is a third witness here, the Holy Spirit. More on that later.

Peter chooses to focus on the transfiguration to show that he can personally vouch for the veracity of Christ’s teachings. He asserts that a glorious entry into Christ’s kingdom awaits the believer, and that everyone must “be all the more eager to make calling and election sure” (v. 10).

At the time of the Transfiguration, they 3 heard the voice of the Father. So, the Apostolic testimony on the Second Coming was not derived from an apotheosis myth, but from the personal experience of directly hearing God's voice and seeing Christ in this manner. What’s more it was a shared experience with James and John. These two facts alone validate the message they preached and the validity of their experience. The problem for the readers, however, is that Peter is about to die. What Peter says is thus written in view of this fact.

You said:

I believe you are getting ahead of yourself and conflating two separate ideas. The myths or fables of 1:16 are not the same as the heresies of 2:1, or so I believe. For in 1:12-15 Peter speaks of attempting to remind his audience of the Gospel message he brought to them, and then moves in to his apologetic for it in verses 16-21, concluding with the primacy of the Scriptures as the witness to Christ’s majesty, for he advises them that they would “do well to heed [the Scriptures] as a light that shines in a dark place” (v. 19).

Then, in 2:1ff, he introduces false teachers/prophets, clearly in contrast to vs. 20-21. For in vs. 20-21, we have Peter asserting the divine origin of the Scriptures, stating that the Scriptures were born of God, not of men (true prophecy). Then in 2:1 he brings in the contrasting idea of false prophets/teachers (false prophecy), which leads him into discussing the problem at that time: those denying “the Lord who bought them” and mocking the idea of the Second Coming.

The invocation of the Transfiguration also addresses the content of the false teachers' message. Peter directly alludes to this in vs. 16. It reads, "We did not follow cleverly devised fables when we made known the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty." The Transfiguration prefigures the Second Coming. Peter does not divulge the content of all the myths and fables he has in mind, but he may have apotheosis myths in view or Gnostic myths that denied a real body (and thus a real return) of Christ. Regardless, he does place them in contrast to the apostolic testimony of the Second Coming, and then, later, he will proceed to discuss the content of the false teachers' teaching. The myths and fables in view, to be persuasive to an audience of the composition as this one, could well be Ebionite or early Elkeasite teachings.

Peter also chooses a particular event that parallels and refutes the false teachers’ denial of Christ's return, not a myth or fable or false tale, so, yes, the heresies of the subsequent chapters are somehow related to what Peter mentions. In chapter 2, he characterizes the teachers in terms of OT examples, and then in chapter 3, he discusses the content of their mockeries and teachings, connecting directly to vs. 16. The implication of 2:1 is that these myths in 1:16 were being circulated by the false teachers, the same false teachers who denied the Second Coming. So, yes, the tales in vs. 16 are highly relevant to what we find in chapter 2, since Peter contrasts those tales in v. 16 with his experience in vs. 17 – 18 and then Scripture, which in turn is directly related to the denial of the Second Coming on the part of the false teachers and their claim to the prophetic office.

Does Scripture validate the experience of Peter on the Mt. of Transfiguration? Yes, in that it serves as the infallible and enduring testimony of the Second Coming on which every believer can depend for the veracity of the promise. That included Peter, but what Peter saw was not the promise heard the way his audience had heard from Peter, but the promise made actual in his sight and validated by the Father’s own voice and witnessed by James and John as well. In fact, what Peter saw was also later validated by Christ’s words.

In the trajectory of the Gospel narratives, Jesus transfiguration occurs before he teaches about the Second Coming. In chapter 3, it looks as if Peter is appealing to the Olivet Discourse, at least in part. The Olivet Discourse also contains a word about the enduring nature of Jesus’ words. They would endure, even though heaven and earth pass away. I would suggest, that’s the gist of what Peter is trying to say here about the promises of the Second Coming.

Now, it’s true that that discourse is in Scripture, but tell us, when Peter himself heard Jesus preach the Olivet Discourse, was it a valid sensory experience for Peter or not? Was it true because Jesus said so when Peter heard Him, or because Scripture at that time confirmed what Jesus said? Nobody denies that Scripture did confirm it or that it is true for us because it is contained in Scripture, but the question is whether or not Peter himself could have relied on what he heard Jesus Himself say independently from Scripture. The point is whether or not Peter’s own experience of Jesus’ teaching was valid at that time he heard it. Yes, it’s true Jesus promised the Spirit to the Apostles to bring to mind His teachings, and the Apostolic message was empowered by this, particularly when they wrote the Scriptures, but you and I are not Apostles.

It is true that the origin of Scripture validates the meaning of Peter’s experience and the apostolic message. That message includes the Second Coming, over and against the falsehoods around them. However, Peter does not state that Scripture was a necessary truth condition to validate his experience on the Mt. of Transfiguration at the time he experienced it or his revelation of his impending death.. On the contrary, he relates Scripture’s authority not to adjudicate what happened to him and his friends on the mountain at the time it happened but for his readers to confirm the veracity of the apostolic testimony given that (a) Christ has not yet returned and (b) Peter is about to die. The text is not about Scripture’s adjudication of sense knowledge (Peter’s experience when it happened on the mountain); rather it is about Scripture’s supreme authority to adjudicate the truth of the apostolic testimony over and against the teachings of false teachers and as a means of confidence for his readers to be certain Christ’s promise to return is true, to persevere in the faith, especially in view of Peter’s impending death. Once again, you are conflating the question of Peter’s sensory experience at the time it actually occurred and the reason that he appeals to Scripture's authority for his readers, in view of his impending death.

We are, at this point, in stage 2 of Peter’s argument. Peter declares that the preaching of the Apostles is absolutely trustworthy because they speak as eyewitnesses of the person and words of Jesus Christ. They personally saw Jesus’ glory and honor. Peter’s version of events here is closest to Matthew’s account but differs from in minor details (in the Greek). Peter did not have a need to rely on written accounts, and we can likely assume that his memory served him well.

The wording of this statement by God has its source in Isaiah 42:1, “Here is my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen one in whom I delight.” So, did Scripture affirm this experience? Certainly, but his experience at the time this event happened is valid not because Scripture affirms it and the OT validated it at that time or upon Peter's retrospective analysis, but because God the Father Himself said it to Peter and He (God) authored them both, and, on top of this, we have no record of Peter consulting Scripture to validate his experience here. At most, we have his memory. But how could his memory be accurate if he didn’t consult the relevant scrolls? Isn’t your thinking in some manner perceived by you? Do you “hear” words when you speak?

Here’s my point: unless the Bible is an object of knowledge, the Spirit cannot witness to the Word of God. How can, if sense knowledge is denied, the Bible be an object of knowledge for Peter? Yes, he writes under the inspiration of the Spirit, but that's not what Scripturalism argues. Scripturalism argues that sensory experience is globally unreliable. Scripture itself never says that sensory perception is a systematically unreliable source of knowledge. You are imposing on Scripture an extra-Scriptural frame of reference, and you’re reading that back into this text. Yours is a classic exercise in anachronistic eisegesis in that it suffers from overspecification, for you place a more specific construction on a verse of Scripture than the Scripture will bear, especially within the trajectory of Peter’s discussion. The very fact that you said originally that this had to be propped up by other arguments should be enough to send up a red flag for you. Scripturalism is not an issue in Reformed Baptist circles. Moreover, I have no anti-Clarkian agenda here. My concern is that for you is that you are torturing the text of Scripture.

Hearing God the Father’s own voice while standing in Jesus’ own presence in His glorified state is most certainly on epistemic parity with Scripture itself during the era of inscripturation, my friend. Tell us, to what Scriptures would Peter appeal for his earlier revelation that he was to die? What Scriptures did Isaiah appeal to validate his vision in Isa. 6? What Scriptures did Noah consult? What about Abraham? What Scripture could or did Ananias consult when the Holy Spirit told him to find and baptize Saul of Tarsus?

Vs. 19. Carrying on to what I have already written on vs. 19, in the preceding section... Peter focused on the spoken word of God the Father in the previous section (Vs. 17 – 18) Now, we are at stage 3 of his argument.. In this verse, he concentrates on the written Word of prophecy, namely, the Old Testament Scriptures. The point at issue in this verse is whether the Old Testament Scripture is confirmed by the teaching of the Apostles or the Apostles’ message is confirmed by the Old Testament. I’ve already discussed this. It is the latter, not the former. “And we have the word of the prophets made more certain” is I think an accurate translation here in vs. 19.. If so, then what we have is a progression of thought asserting that the apostolic message is confirmed by the transfiguration and by the Old Testament Scripture.

Regardless of translational variances, the focus is not, however, on Peter’s own experience on the mountain (vs. 17 – 18), but on the apostolic testimony as a whole. Peter refers to it, not to make an affirmation about a theory of knowledge, but as an enduring and sure witness in the absence of the actual Apostles’ themselves. Now from this point forward, the story of the Transfiguration will join the collective witness of Scripture, which will endure after the Apostles’ death.

The Transfiguration experience was witnessed by Peter, but Peter was now about to die. What will endure after Peter has left? Answer: Scripture, and Scripture is the result of God the Spirit’s spiration of it, not private ruminations of its writers (Vs. 20 – 21). So, it will stand not to validate Peter's personal experience and eyewitness testimony at the mount of Transfiguration, though it certainly does, but to ground the confidence of Peter's audience in the apostolic testimony that they have received and to which he exhorts them to hold fast in his absence. Peter is not saying that Scripture is supreme over his experience on the Mountain as a necessary truth condition because of his unreliable sensory experience; rather he is saying that it is also a valid testimony, in fact, it is “more sure,” because though the Apostolic witness is dying out, God has not abandoned His people. On the contrary, He has given them the Scriptures, which alone are theopneustos (to borrow from Paul). His audience can depend on the Scriptures, because the Scriptures include the promise of the Second Coming, and thus what they have already heard and received and which he exhorts them to remember (v.15).

The text isn't about the supremacy of Scripture over sense experiences and a theory of knowledge, it is about being in possession of a sure, enduring, infallible, and divine witness to the apostolic message (indeed, as we know, the apostolic message is contained on its pages), in view of the death of Peter. James was already dead, and we're unsure when John died. His readers, after Peter has departed, can be secure in the Scriptures in view of the falsehoods and false teachers of the day and the uncertainty they may feel.

The problem you have here is that you are appealing to the Protestant rule of faith and applying it an event (the transfiguration) that occurred the time of inscripturation and private revelation itself. So, you’re grafting a rationalist epistemology onto the Protestant rule of faith, and then applying to a time in which the Protestant rule of faith itself did not apply. The Apostles did not practice Sola Scriptura, because Sola Scriptura is only applicable to the normative condition of the church, not to times of inscripturation.

There were still Apostles at this time. When the Transfiguration had occurred, they were in Jesus’ own presence. Revelation had not ceased. Peter, James, and John were in Jesus glorified presence, standing with Moses on one side, and Elijah on the other, with God the Father speaking to them. Yes, Peter’s immediate readers and, by extension, we need Scripture to adjudicate the truth of that account. However, you are misapplying vs. 19 to refer to that particular experience on the mountain itself at the time it actually happened to the 3 of them. This is nowhere in view, and though Scripture did and does confirm its historicity and its meaning, for Peter, James, and John, during the time of inscripturation, they did not need Scripture in order to validate such an experience.

So, in conclusion, Peter employs its supremacy not over sensory experience (Epistemological Scripturalism) but as an enduring, sure, infallible, divine, written witness that would stand in place of the Apostles themselves. You're stretching the text to speak to issues to which it does not speak. You're pulling vs. 19 out without a consideration of the overall trajectory of Peter's discourse here.

What we have here is a progression of thought: Christ's teachings, the gospel (etc). were witnessed personally and then preached by Peter and the Apostles. They, James in particular, are dead or dying at the time Peter is writing or shortly to die (Peter has his own death in view). He wishes his audience to persevere in those teachings, but they are surrounded by fables and tales, and false teachers are mocking the Second Coming. Peter knows this. He has just given them a laundry list of exhortations and told them to be certain about their calling an election, not to stumble, and look forward to their entrance into the kingdom of Christ.

So, he selects an event from that portion of the Apostolic witness about the Second Coming to which he was a personal witness as well and for which he can vouch (vs. 16). He saw Christ transfigured (a visual witness; let’s call this the “Voice/Vision” of the Son) The voice of the Father confirmed that witness to him (an audible witness, so we have the Voice of Father as witness). Not only this, Moses and Elijah are validating witnesses in that they are there, representing the Law on one side and the Prophets on the other. That is enough to validate his message and his certainty of veracity, just as the revelation of his death by Christ is enough to give him reason to write this letter, particularly since he was not alone, but had James and John with him.

Now, note the position of Moses and Elijah in the vision itself. This text does not cite it, but I mention it, because Scripture contains what? The Law and the Prophets, which these men represent. So, what these 3 men are seeing and hearing on the mountain is not only the Voice of the Father and the Vision of the Son, but a representation of the witness of Scripture, the very prophets that the Holy Spirit carried along to write the Scriptures that Peter has in mind as he writes 2 Peter So, yes, Scripture did confirm the experience these 3 men had on the mountain, in that Scripture is the Voice of the Holy Spirit speaking to and through the Law and the Prophets, but it comes to Peter on the mountain in visual and auditory, historically real experience, in which he hears and sees Moses and Elijah chatting with the glorified Christ. These 3 men do not consult written Scripture to validate this vision; rather the Godhead is reveals this directly to these three men, and the actual confirmatory word itself is spoken directly to them by the Father, not written to them by the Holy Spirit, and thus heard, not read. So, yes, there is a witness from God, but Scripturalism is arguing not for the reliability of the hearing of this event, but for the epistemic necessity of Scripture to validate the event because the senses are systematically unreliable.

Peter, James, and John (the “we” of vs. 16) had all of that direct revelation, and that was enough. However, in view of his death, on what can Peter’s readers rely over and against false teaching so that they can persevere in the faith and have confidence that Christ will return? They don't have this visual and auditory privilege, and they are shortly no longer to receive any more material from Peter. His answer: the Scriptures, which are the result of the work of the Holy Spirit will serve in their (the Apostles’) place.

So, we have a Trinitarian witness, and Peter had invoked the Trinity in his salutation. He does not appeal to the Scriptures to validate his experience of seeing the transfigured Christ and hearing the Father’s voice from heaven due to the unreliability of sensory expereince, but to validate the apostolic testimony to which he is exorting his audience to persevere, not over and against sense experience itself, but because it is just as reliable as the Voice of the Father and the Vision of Christ were for Peter, James, and John, and it will endure to the end, whereas Peter was about to die. Like Christ, it is of divine origin. Like the Voice of The Father, it is of divine origin. Like the Apostolic message; it is of divine origin. Why? Because it is the “voice” not of men, but of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, it is more extensive, for it contains more than the promises of the Second Coming. Thus is more sure. Christ is in heaven with the Father, innscripturation (from our perspective) was ending. Peter is on his way to glory himself. What then is left? The Scriptures, the Voice of the Spirit, written down and enduring to the end.. His audience in the Scriptures finds a witness that is of the same authority for them (especially in view of the false teachers and their “claim” to the prophetic office) as the Vision of Christ and the Voice of the Father and the representation of the Spirit through the presence of Moses and Elijah were for Peter, James, and John when they saw and heard it. Of course, it had been of that authority all along, and, yes it validated the Apostolic testimony too, but not in the Scripturalist sense. That is not in view here. Of course, the supreme irony here is that Peter himself writes all this under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, so it comes to them as Scripture.

Now, in the long run, Scripture does outweigh personal experience in matters of faith and practice. Nobody in the Reformed tradition disagrees, for it supplies an objective, written, God-breathed witness that is inerrant and infallible. That about which they disagree is the reliability of the senses in a global manner and its relation to Scripture. However, the Transfiguration was not a normative sensory event; moreover, even if you classify it in that manner, it did not happen during the normative state of the church. It was a revelatory event during the time of inscripturation. Yes, it involved the senses, but it wasn’t on a par with general revelation or our situation today. This text does not support the notion that Peter is affirming that Scripture’s witness is a necessary truth condition to validate his own globally unreliable sensory experience of the Transfiguration at the time it occurred or even in retrospect. Yes, it does those things, but the event itself at that time was enough to validate it. Why? Because God the Father spoke, in the Presence of the glorified Son, with Moses and Elijah, representing the Voice of the Spirit standing by, and witnessed also by James and John. It was Trinitarian revelation of Christ's glory, a visual experience, and an audible experience, a shared experience. It is thus, as valid as Scripture itself for Peter, James, and John on that mountain. If anything, it affirms the reliability of those senses at the time the event in question occurred.