Why debate Calvinism?

Since your salvation doesn't hinge on whether or not you believe in Calvinism, what's the point of debating Calvinism? What practical difference does it make whether you're a freewill theist or Calvinist?

As a matter of fact, it is possible to become obsessed with this debate to the exclusion of other important issues. It shouldn't be all about Calvinism all the time. That said, the difference has practical consequences:

1. Theological positions tend to develop internally to the point of taking their assumptions to their logical extreme:

i) Open theism resolves the tension between freewill and foreknowledge by ditching foreknowledge. But how can you trust a God who's in the dark about the future? How can you trust a God who gambles with human lives? 

ii) There's often a shift from exclusivism to inclusivism. If God loves everyone, wants everyone to be saved, made provision for everyone to be saved, how's that consistent with restricted opportunities to take advantage of that provision? What about those who never heard the Gospel? Inclusivism logically demotes the urgency of missions and evangelism. 

iii) Apropos (ii), this life isn't an even playing field. Spiritual opportunities vary drastically. That nudges freewill theism towards postmortem evangelism/conversion. And that, again, logically demotes the urgency of missions and evangelism. 

2. Freewill theists sometimes alleged the predestination negates petitionary prayer. If true, that's a very practical issue. Conversely, open theists argue that divine foreknowledge is providentially useless because it's too late for God to intervene. If so, that would negate petitionary prayer. 

3. Calvinism and freewill theism will give some different answers to the problem of evil. And that's a pastoral issue as well as a philosophical issue. Some theodicies can be adapted to Calvinism and freewill theism alike, but other theodicies pair off with Calvinism or freewill theism.

4. Freewill theism may erode inerrancy and commitment to biblical authority by appealing to moral intuitions that trump the witness of Scripture in case of conflict. There are freewill theists who admit that if Scripture taught Calvinism, then they choose their moral intuitions over Scripture. They repudiate the God of Scripture in that event. 

Another example is that some freewill theists reject OT theism for the same reason they reject Reformed theism: they think the Calvinist God is too harsh, and they think Yahweh is too harsh.  

5. Apropos (4), some freewill theists seem to think Calvinism is worse than atheism. So what's their fallback if they lose confidence in freewill theism? Since Calvinism is not an option, do they land in atheism?

6. Views on the necessary preconditions of moral responsibility can impact law and social policy:

i) If homosexuals don't actually choose their "orientation," then that's exculpatory in case libertarian freedom is a necessary precondition for moral responsibility. So it would be unfair to discriminate against homosexuals in any respect. 

Same with gender dysphoria. They ought to be accommodated if they didn't choose it.

ii) The insanity defense takes libertarian freedom for granted. If you're too evil to know the difference between good and evil, that's exculpatory. If you can't help yourself because the urges are overpowering, that's exculpatory. 

7. A common objection to Calvinism is that a Calvinist can't tell everyone "God loves you!" But does everyone need to think that God loves them, or is that presumptuous? There are hardened sinners who believe God loves them because they have such a high opinion of themselves. How could God not love such a wonderful person as themselves! They'd benefit from being told that maybe God doesn't love them. They need to be shaken out of their complacency.

8. Freewill theists are more likely to reject penal substitution. That impacts how we preach the Gospel. 

9. Although all classic Protestants subscribe to sola fide, Calvinists have a way of unpacking the concept in terms of a threefold imputation. That has more explanatory power than a bare affirmation of sola fide. 

10. Traditional Catholicism has radically different views of how God saves people. Saving grace is mediated by the sacraments, which are mediated by the priesthood. Likewise, the intercession of the saints. That's a different theological paradigm than Calvinism. Are you putting your faith in Jesus for salvation-or Mary? Or a wafer? Or priestly absolution? If you're wrong, that makes a practical difference. Conversely, post-Vatican II theology is edging towards universalism. That, too, is a different theological paradigm than Calvinism. If you're wrong, that makes a practical difference. 

11. When a Calvinism debates a classical Arminian or Lutheran, they take Protestant essentials for granted. But when a Calvinist debates a Catholic, then the contrast involves divergent views on a wider range of issues, like the locus of interpretation. 

12. Christians have to believe something. They can't leave all the blanks unfilled. Although they can suspend judgment on some controversies, they must takes sides on some issues. Otherwise, their faith is a cipher. So the debate over Calvinism is part of that larger demand. 

God and good

I watched a recent debate between Peter Singer and Andy Bannister. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JiM8ul3oRxE

A few general observations:

1. The debate was somewhat frustrating inasmuch as the underlying issue is the difference between atheism and Christianity. The difference between Christian bioethics and secular bioethics is parasitic on that underlying division. In a way it would be more useful to debate atheism directly. However, exposing the serrated austerity of secular bioethics is useful. When the consequences of atheism are spotlighted, that's a reason to reevaluate atheism itself.

2. Singer has certain cards in his deck. He's an atheist. This life is all you get. Life has no ultimate purpose. Humans monkeys with big brains. (He didn't say that in the debate, but that's his Darwinian viewpoint.) The brain produces the mind. Although human intelligence overtakes animal intelligence, human babies are less intelligent than adult chimpanzees. 

Given the hand he dealt himself, there are only so many ways he can play it. I expect he regards complaints about the harshness of his position as childish and irrelevant. No point complaining about the barbed consequences of his position if that's the reality of the situation. If God doesn't exist, then that takes best options off the table. Raising idealistic objections to his position ignores the bleak, unyielding facts of our evanescent existence in a Godless universe. As with captives in a concentration camp, the razor wire is a fixture of our existence, whether we like it or not. 

3. Up to a point, Singer is right–if atheism is right. But even on his own grounds, Singer's own position is an ad hoc compromise between idealism and nihilism. It's more consistent for an atheist to be a hedonistic nihilist. If there's no God, no afterlife, then it boils down to naked power and ruthless self-interest. 

Singer never provided an adequate explanation for his claim that he's not a naturalist when it comes to ethics. And his philanthropy is a sugar-coated cyanide capsulate to make the toxic philosophy more palatable and go down smoother. 

One can't help noticing that Singer is now an old man. By his own standards, he's siphoning off scarce medical resources that could better be spent on the younger generation who have so much more to live for.

4. Singer repeats the same blunder as Hitchens regarding the atonement. The purpose of the atonement is not to eradicate evil or suffering but to make it possible for God to justly forgive sin. The eradication of evil and suffering awaits the Parousia. 

5. Regarding the Euthyphro dilemma, That's is a challenge to divine command theory. Of course, divine command theorists have responses.

However, a Christian can sidestep that objection by shifting to natural law theory. Human duties are grounded in how God made us. The same rules don't apply to lions, not because the rules are arbitrary, but because lions are different kinds of creatures. 

Human duties correspond to human nature. And a human nature that's designed. The notion that some actions are contrary to how things are supposed to be is a teleological principle. But atheism banishes teleological explanations from nature. The Blind Watchmaker and all that. No ultimate purpose for anything.

Atheist bingo redux

(Likewise see Steve's previous "Atheist bingo" post.)

What is the God-of-the-gaps?

Atheists frequently accuse Christians of committing the God-of-the-gaps fallacy (hereafter GOG). But what is the God-of-the-gaps fallacy, and what makes it fallacious? From what I can tell, there are at least two different GOG allegations.

1. GOG short-circuits the search for natural mechanisms. For instance, prescientific people don't know about viruses and bacteria, so they explain epidemics in terms of divine displeasure. 

i) There may well be examples of that. However, Christian theism doesn't regard direct divine agency as a general substitute for natural mechanisms. Rather, the role of God is one step removed. God created the natural mechanisms. 

ii) This is not to deny that divine agency is often invoked to explain certain events within the ongoing history of the world. Miracles are a classic example. 

But that's not GOG reasoning, for atheists are the first to admit that certain kinds of events are naturally impossible. If they happened, they'd require supernatural agency. Atheists generally respond to reported miracles, not by crediting the report while attributing the cause to an undiscovered natural mechanism, but by denying the accuracy of the report. 

2. Another version goes something like this: GOG is fallacious because naturalism is the standard of comparison. To say "God did it" is unscientific because physical causes are the only admissible explanation. On that view, any appeal to supernatural agency is by definition a fallacy. It's sufficient to identify the explanation as theistic or supernatural, then slap the "fallacy" label on the explanation. Nothing more is required to refute it. 

But that's a transparent rhetorical ploy. Concoct a tendentious fallacy, then apply it to the position you oppose. 

Yet that begs the question of whether it really is a fallacy and why. That's a shortcut that endeavors to win the argument without having to even present an argument. 

To make naturalism the standard of comparison begs the question. The very issue in dispute is whether there is supernatural agency. That can't be settled at the outset by prejudicial stipulation. 

Christian voter guide

Political Repercussions of the LGBTQ Agenda – Robert A. J. Gagnon

ROBERT A. J. GAGNON·MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2018

 

Every time Democrats are in political power, these are the kinds of things that Christians and others face with increasing intensity from a Party given over wholly to the LGBTQ agenda. The list is not exhaustive. A vote for Democrats is a vote to imperil your greatest liberties.

1) Children coercively indoctrinated by schools into the belief that anyone who does not support the LGBTQ agenda is a bigot akin to the most virulent racist; children made more confused as to their own sexuality, taught to disconnect gender from biological sex, with the increased risk of harm that attends increased “LGBTQ” identification.

2) Grant males who claim that they are females (many of whom remain sexually attracted to women) complete access to the private spaces of women (restrooms, locker rooms, changing rooms, showers, women's shelters) and to female sporting events (regardless of the mismatch) and prosecute anyone who attempts to stop them from doing so to the fullest extent of the law as a "civil rights" violation.

3) Colleges and universities become places for punishing free discourse among faculty, staff, and students about the subject on the claim that anything other makes pro-“LGBTQ” fanatics “unsafe”; Christian groups derecognized for not allowing leaders that defy the orthodox Christian position on sexual ethics; and Christian schools lose their accreditation if they do not foster such ungodliness.

4) Lose one’s job if in the workplace (or even on social media in some cases) one speaks critically of “gay marriage” or fails to use the “preferred pronoun” and name of a “transgender” person who denies his or her biological sex; and experience in the workplace, like schools, heavy-handed indoctrination (brainwashing) into the ideology of homosexualism and transgenderism; mandating that companies institute affirmative-action policies for immorality or otherwise be denied contracts or grants from the federal government.

5) Prosecute business owners connected with weddings (photographers, bakers, caterers, florists) and even some that are not (like T-shirt designers) who do not use their artistic talents to promote, or even  do not write messages that express approval for, homosexual unions; being fined tens of thousands of dollars and losing their businesses and even life savings; prosecute also business owners who do not accommodate male employees who want to come to work dressed up as women, with a female hair-style and make-up.

6) Require that bed-and-breakfast places in a private residence must accept persons having "gay" sex under their roof irrespective of personal religious beliefs; and that churches let out their facilities for "gay weddings" or any "gay" or "transgender" celebration if they allow their facilities to be rented by anyone else.

7) Put out of business Christian adoption agencies unless they are willing to place orphans in "gay" and "transgender" homes, not just as a last resort but on equal grounds with a stable heterosexual union.

8) Forbid children being placed for adoption or foster care with prospective parents who do not agree to encourage any possible homosexual or transgender self-identity that the child may grow into at a future date; and require that state Social Services remove one's own natural child from the home if the parents attempt to thwart their child's homosexual or transgender self-identification and behavior, including not allowing one’s child to attend a "gay student alliance" group at school or even to receive "puberty blockers" or sexual "reassignment" surgery.

9) Make it a violation of the law to promote sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) or even change of homosexual or transgender behavior, so long as there is an exchange of funds, possibly including even the sale of books; and this not just by professional therapists but also by church officials.

https://www.facebook.com/notes/robert-a-j-gagnon/political-repercussions-of-the-lgbtq-agenda-robert-a-j-gagnon/2290843874320045/

Does Calvinism commit the No True Scotsman fallacy?

The question at issue is whether somebody can believe in Christianity even though they have no experience of God's saving grace in their lives. Put another way, is Calvinism guilty of the No True Scotsman fallacy by saying they were never saved in the first place? Is that a position you'd only take because your theology requires it?

Suppose we broach the question sociologically. Is this a special case of a general phenomenon regarding the sociology of belief?

I think it's irrefutable that many beliefs held by many people are the product of social conditioning. Because we're social creatures, our beliefs tend to align with the beliefs of our peer group. People raised as Muslims, Baptists, Catholics, Hindus, Lutherans, Buddhists, Democrats, atheists, &c., are far more likely to be...Muslims, Baptists, Catholics, Hindus, Lutherans, Buddhists, Democrats, atheists, &c.

That general correlation applies to religious and nonreligious beliefs alike. That also explains why many people who go to college change their beliefs. When they change their peer group, they change their beliefs to align with their new peer group.

Given that demonstrable social dynamic, somebody can believe in Christianity due to social conditioning and not because they've had any experience of saving grace. That's a very thin belief, which is why they can lose it so easily.

If that's the source of their faith, and they lose their faith, then they were never saved in the first place. That's not unique to Reformed theology. That's not an ad hoc explanation to save appearances. Rather, that applies to the particular case of Reformed theology a very general, well-documented phenomenon regarding the sociology of belief-formation.

You could debate if all apostates fit that profile, but for now I'm addressing the question of whether, in principle, it is special pleading for Calvinism to say an apostate was never saved in the first place. I've presented a very broad counterexample to that allegation.

If it's good to euthanize a dog, why not humans?

One argument for euthanasia goes like this: why euthanize dogs but not humans? Why is it good to put a dog out of its misery but not a human being?

That's an a fortiori argument: If it's good to be merciful in the lesser case of suffering dogs, is it not good (or better) to be merciful in the greater case of suffering humans?

1. From a Christian standpoint, one reason is that killing a dog isn't murder whereas killing a human being is murder absent overriding considerations. 

Of course, that pushes the question back a step. Are there overriding considerations that sometimes warrant euthanasia? The immediate point, though, is that there's a prima facie presumption against taking human life that's disanalogous to the case of dogs. Take Asian cultures where dogs are a food stuff. 

2. Not all candidates for euthanasia are suffering. Proponents of euthanasia extend mercy-killing to an ever-wider range of individuals who are said to lack the relevant quality of life.

3. Some deontologists are absolutists about suicide and euthanasia. I'm not. I think there are extreme cases in which that may be permissible. But you can't extrapolate from extreme cases to other cases where the same overriding considerations are absent.

4. Caring for people in extremis is good for both the patient and the caregiver. Take a grown child who cares for a bedridden parent who's becoming senile. 

Ideally, that forces the child to prioritize. Be less self-absorbed and focus on the needs of someone else. It requires the child to tap into all their inner resources to meet the challenge as best they can. That's good for character. Good for sanctification. Develop greater patience, sympathy, and sensitivity. 

It's good when things come full circle. The parent who cared for dependent children is now dependent on grown children to care for them. The quality of life includes a moral quality of life. It's easy to be kind when it's easy. The acid test is when it's hard.

Conversely, many patients are acutely sensitive to whether people still care about them now that they can't help out or help themselves. Now that everything must be done for them. That's a test of whether they were ever really loved in the first place. Did people only love them when it was convenient? That's pretty shallow. 

Psychologically, humans live in the past, present, and future. Memory and anticipation as well as present awareness. Animals lack that viewpoint. They live in the moment.  

Of course, humans can suffer from cognitive impairment, sometimes severe. But we can't get inside their minds to know how much they register. What's the effect of holding their hand or stroking their hair? 

What is time?

Ever since Einstein, we're used to referring to the space-time continuum. It's often said that Relativity spatialized time. 

On the face of it, space seems physical in a way that time does not. Take an enclosed space like a basketball. Not to mention that finite space has measurable dimensions. Likewise, we move through space. So space seems to be very concrete. 

Mind you, pure geometry deals with abstract spaces. Likewise, dreams and video games have simulated space. 

But we don't move through time the way we move through space. In one respect, time appears to be physical. Physical states and objects undergo change. A temporal process. So it seems like time is a mode of the universe. 

Likewise, it's often said that God created time when he made the universe. He made the universe with time rather than in time. There was no preexistent time. 

However, human mental states are temporally successive. But if thoughts aren't physical, then the temporality of the mental process can't be physical, either. 

And even at the level of physics, there are theories of a cyclic or oscillating universe, where there's a series of cosmic births and deaths and rebirths. Even if those theories are false, it doesn't seem incoherent in principle to say that one universe would be earlier while another universe would be later. 

If so, then time can't just be a mode of the universe, since on that view it ceases to exist when the current universe ceases to exist, then starts anew when a new universe comes into being. But to speak of a temporal series of universes assumes an overarching timeline or relative chronology that transcends any particular universe, and carries through the changes. That's what makes the model sequential. 

However, it's possible to think of time as abstract. Take a novel or script. That has a plot. One thing happens after another. But unless it's enacted, the plot remains static. 

Perhaps, then, we should say a mental process exemplifies time, a physical process exemplifies time. On that view, time isn't essentially physical, but physical states and processes represent time or temporal relations (precedence, simultaneity, succession). 

Reflections on reincarnation

1. I rarely write about Hinduism and Buddhism because it's fairly specialized. Reincarnation is neglected in Christian apologetics because most Christian apologetics is focussed on challenges to Christianity in the West. 

2. Before addressing the specifics, I'd like to make a general observation. Not all paranormal claims are mutually consistent. Compare reincarnation with crisis apparitions. There are reports of dead relatives appearing to a loved one to warn them or give them encouragement during a crisis. But if that's true, then how can reincarnation be true? According to a standard paradigm, reincarnation involves a memory wipe. When a person is reborn, they forget their past lives. Start all over again. 

That rules out crisis apparitions. The dead relative has moved on. Been reincarnated. Started from scratch in a new body, as a baby. Immersed in a new life history. 

They don't remember their loved ones from past lives. At this point they are younger than their children. Reincarnation resets the lifecycle. Your late mother can't appear to you as your late mother. She's now a little girl. 

Reincarnation and crisis apparitions can both be false, but they can't both be true. And I think there's unambiguous evidence for crisis apparitions, whereas the evidence for reincarnation is ambiguous at best. 

3. To my knowledge, apologists for reincarnation offer three lines of empirical evidence: déjà vu, transgenerational birthmarks, and memories of a past life. 

4. Déjà vu

i) I think this is the weakest evidence. Not just weak evidence for reincarnation, but weak evidence that it's even paranormal. 

In my own life I've had déjà vu experiences. One time, sitting at a fast food joint, years ago, I suddenly had the intensive feeling that I'd done this before. I'm pretty sure that I hadn't done it before in this life. But since the establishment was built in my lifetime, it wasn't even possible for me to have been there in a past life. So whatever the explanation, it can't be reincarnation.

Likewise, I've lived in at least two consecutive locations where I had déjà vu experiences. But both of them were built in my lifetime, so that can't be chalked up to a past life. And even if they hadn't been constructed in my lifetime, what are the odds that in a past life I lived in both places–not to mention both places in succession?

iii) Moreover, the sensation I've had is more like a time loop than remembering a past life. It's not the sensation that I was in the same place in a different life, but that this life is repeating itself. 

iv) Sometimes our minds play tricks on us. That's my explanation. 

But assuming for argument's sake that déjà vu demands a paranormal explanation, telepathy is a simpler explanation. What if one person's memories occasionally leak into another person's mind? 

5. Transgenerational birthmarks

i) The claim is that babies sometimes reproduce the unique birthmark of a dead person, like an ancestor. In fact, this has become a TV trope:

https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/ReincarnationIdentifyingTrait

ii) I haven't studied the literature in sufficient depth to know if such a phenomenon actually exists. Of course, the appeal is circular. If some babies reproduce the birthmarks of a dead person, then those aren't unique birthmarks.

iii) However, let's stipulate for discussion purposes that the phenomenon exists and demands a paranormal explanation. How would reincarnation be an explanation for replicated birthmarks? On a standard paradigm of reincarnation, the soul (mind, consciousness) transfers from the dead body to a new body. A body-swap scenario. But how would that cause any physical traces? 

iv) Why would reincarnation duplicate birthmarks rather than duplicating the body? If the body is not a double, why the same birthmarks? 

v) What reincarnation have to do with heredity? Why would someone be reborn in the body of a lineal descendent? Isn't reincarnation just the idea that the same soul is reembodied? But that's not a genetic or genealogical relation–as if, to be reincarnated, you must be a reincarnated ancestor. Assuming (ex hypothesi) that reincarnation is true, why can't the soul transfer to a body in a different family tree? To my knowledge, reincarnation is usually treated as independent of lineage. 

vi) It would be interesting to know if there's a history of witchcraft or necromancy in these families. If a baby has the birthmarks of a dead ancestor, is that a family curse? Was the baby hexed? Are the dead (damned) casting a malevolent influence on the living? 

6. Past life memories

i) Suppose for argument's sake that reincarnation is true. Suppose someone underwent 100 past lives. In fact, that's a conservative estimate. How would they remember 100 life histories? Wouldn't their recollection be hopelessly scrambled? How would they remember what they did in each life? Who they knew in each life? 

Memory has a sense of relative chronology. You remember childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, middle age, &c. You remember that some things happened to you before other things. 

But if you underwent 100 past lives, how could you possibly keep the timelines straight? Assuming that some people remember events before they were born, that would actually constitute prima facie evidence that reincarnation is false, since it's hard to see how you could keep all those life histories separate in your mind.

ii) An alternative explanation is that those aren't your memories. You're tapping into someone else's memories. They are invading your mind. That doesn't require all the machinery of reincarnation, so it's a simpler explanation. 

iii) To my knowledge, Hinduism has a dualist anthropology while Buddhism has a physicalist anthropology. In Buddhism, humans have no perduring soul. So how is reincarnation even possible? Who's the you that's reincarnated? Weren't you extinguished at the moment of death? A new brain and body won't be you, but a blank slate. 

Atheist bingo

The Rise of the Brazilian Evangelicals

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/the-evangelical-takeover-of-brazilian-politics/551423/

Biblical hyperbole

This is how you are to make it: the length of the ark 300 cubits, its breadth 50 cubits, and its height 30 cubits (Gen 6:15).

i) I'd like to revisit two issues I've discussed before. One objection to the historicity of Noah's flood is the claim that a wooden ship that big wouldn't be seaworthy. It would lack structure integrity.

But as I've noted in the past, we don't even know for sure that the ark was made of wood. Although that's sometimes how the word is translated, if you read commentaries you see that scholars don't know what they word means. They assume it refers to some kind of tree, but that's just a guess.

ii) Why does the flood account even state the dimensions of the ark? It could tell the same story without including that detail. One explanation is to stress the scale of the impending deluge. A big evacuation vessel for a big flood. 

However, that's also consistent with a hyperbolic interpretation. On that view, it states the dimensions of the ark in the same way that it uses other comparisons to indicate the scale of the deluge. Yet some of those phrases are used elsewhere hyperbolically. So it's possible that the ark, while a wooden vessel, was actually smaller and seaworthy. 

Every eye shall see him (Rev 1:7). 

i) Critics say that reflects a flat-earth cosmography. But as I've noted in the past, if the sign of the Son of Man hovered for one rotation period, everyone would see it over the course of 24 hours. 

ii) But another possibility is that the statement is hyperbolic. A way of saying this is a public event. There will be many eyewitnesses, but not necessarily that every human being will see it. 

iii) Actually, the "sign of the Son of Man" comes from Mt 24:30. One question is whether the sign is distinct from Jesus or if Jesus is the sign. Does it refer to seeing Jesus in the sky or a symbolic celestial harbinger that heralds his impending approach?

iv) Even if everyone doesn't see Jesus at the moment of his arrival, everyone might eventually see Jesus after he arrives. Although the Parousia refers to the physical, bodily return of Christ, it's possible for Jesus to simultaneously appear in multiple locations as a visionary Christophany. In that mode, he could even be visible to the blind. 

Is God a postulate?

Oppy is arguably the smartest philosophical atheist of his generation, so he's a useful foil:

Theoretical virtues:

Simplicity: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities.

It is clear that Naturalism is simpler than Theism: it postulates fewer kinds of entities…According to Theism, there are two kinds of entities–natural and supernatural-whereas according to Naturalism there is only one kind. Graham Oppy, The Best Argument Against God (Palgrave 2013), 7,19.

Several problems with that argument:

i) I'm not sure what he means by "primitive entities," but I assume he means something other things derive from, that's not derived from other things. If so, then Christian theism has just one primitive entity: God. But in that event, Christian theism meets the condition of simplicity. You can't get much simpler than only one primitive entity.

ii) What makes less complex primitive entities a theoretical virtue? A violin is simpler than a violinmaker. A toy is simpler than a toymaker. 

Perhaps Oppy is operating with the notion that complicated things are composed of parts. That complexity is reducible to simpler and ultimately simple constituents. A planetary biosphere is more complex than the early stages of the universe. A body is composed of parts, composed of molecules, composed of atoms, composed of elementary particles. That's a bottom-up model of reality. Reality constructed from the smallest or simplest building blocks.

But what about topdown models of creativity? Da Vinci's mind is more complex than his paintings. Bach's mind is more complex than his music. Dante's mind is more complex than his fiction. On that view, artifacts are simpler exemplifications of mentality. Instances of something more complex. 

Or take an abstract object like the Mandelbrot set. Infinitely complex, although it can be represented in finite instances. 

iii) I don't know what in particular he has in mind by supernatural entities. Plausible candidates include God, angels, demons, and ghosts. If so, his methodology is eccentric. The way we usually establish if something exists is not by whether that satisfies a theoretical virtue like simplicity, but whether there's any direct evidence, indirect evidence, or counterevidence. 

iv) Apropos (iii), supernatural entities aren't necessarily or even generally postulates. Although they can sometimes by invoked for their explanatory value, in many cases, people say that supernatural entities exist because they claim to experience supernatural entities. Not a postulate but a direct encounter. Not a posit but an observation. Now, Oppy can dispute the credibility of such reports, but it's a different category than a theoretical postulate. Realty is something we generally discover rather than intuit. 

Literacies in the Roman World

This is germane to Bart Ehrman's contention that the traditional authorship of the NT is false due to widespread illiteracy:

https://larryhurtado.wordpress.com/2018/11/01/literacies-in-the-roman-world/

Unfriended

http://www.craigkeener.com/a-sad-day-in-reformation-history/

If sola scriptura is the problem, is the magisterium the solution?

Perhaps the major Catholic objection to the Protestant faith is that sola Scriptura "fails" to secure unanimity. It spawns "30,000" denominations. It's a "blueprint for anarchy". An infallible book is pointless without an infallible interpreter. 

Here's one way to formulate the objection: Calvinists don't find Arminian interpretations convincing while Arminians don't find Calvinist interpretations convincing. Paedobaptistis don't find credobaptist interpretations convincing while credobaptists don't find pedobaptist interpretations convincing. Zwinglians don't find sacramental interpretations convincing while sacramentalists don't find Zwinglian interpretations convincing. Amils don't find premil interpretations convincing while premils don't find amil interpretations convincing. Charismatics don't find cessationist interpretations convincing while cessationists don't find charismatic interpretation convincing. And so on and so forth. 

Therefore, we need an authoritative tiebreaker to cast the winning vote. A referee to say which side is right. 

But if that's the problem, is the Roman Magisterium the solution? No, because the magisterium simply relocates the same problem. The magisterium has failed to secure unanimity. It failed to forestall the Photian schism. It failed to forestall the Protestant Reformation. It failed to forestall the Jansenist movement. It failed to forestall the rise of modernism in the Catholic church. It failed to forestall the RadTrad backlash. 

And for the same reason: Protestants don't find the purported evidence for the magisterium convincing. They don't find the biblical prooftexts and patristic prooftexts convincing. What is more, they don't find the answers provided by the magisterium to be convincing. And not just Protestants, but Eastern Orthodox. And not just outsiders, but insiders (e.g. Jansenists, modernists, RadTrads). 

If God intended the magisterium to be the solution, why didn't he provide convincing evidence? Evidence sufficient so that everyone is persuaded by the "solution"? Just as rival Protestant groups find each others interpretations unconvincing, ever so many people both inside and outside the Roman communion find Magisterial interpretations unconvincing. 

So the Catholic answer fails to resolve the problem it posed for itself. And that's worse for Catholics since Protestants don't concede that sola Scriptura is a disqualifying objection to begin with. If, however, you're going to say that sola Scriptura is fundamentally unsatisfactory because it fails to secure unanimity, then the onus is on you to solve the perceived problem. Catholic apologists fail to discharge their own burden of proof because their alternative merely repackages the perceived problem. So they failed on their own grounds. There's no failsafe. The magisterium is just another "answer" that lots of people find unpersuasive–like answers in general. 

Conversion continuum

I'd like to make a general observation about conversions to Catholicism. Conversions range along a continuum. Theological identities are packages. Some packages have far more in common than others. 

Some conversions involve a minor adjustment in the convert's theology. Suppose a paedobaptist becomes a credobaptist or vice versa. That changes one variable, leaving pretty much the rest of his theology intact. 

Suppose a Baptist becomes a Lutheran. He has to make many more adjustments to his overall theology. 

But depending on the theological package, some variables are more central than others. The prophethood of Muhammad and Joseph Smith are cornerstones of Islam and Mormonism. If they were false prophets, then that falsifies the whole package. For the contents of the package depend on the authority of Muhammad or Joseph Smith.

A further consideration is that conversion often involves, not merely changing one or more of your theological positions, but changing your supporting arguments for or against the positions in question. 

Take the case of Luis Dizon, who recently switched back to Roman Catholicism. I believe he was a Reformed Baptist. Moreover, he's a Christian apologist, so I assume he was used to arguing for his Reformed Baptist beliefs and arguing against Roman Catholicism. Let's compare some of the contents of each package. 

I. Reformed Baptist

1. Sola Scriptura

2. The Protestant canon

3. Absolute predestination, unconditional election, reprobation

4. Definite atonement

5. Spiritual inability

6. Monergistic regeneration

7. Sola fide

8. Imputing Adam's demerit to his posterity, imputing the demerit of the elect to Christ, imputing the merit of Christ to the elect

9. Perseverance of the saints

10. Penal substitution

11. Believer's baptism

12. Exclusivism

II. Roman Catholicism

1. Apostolic succession

2. The pope as Christ's vicar on earth

3. The Magisterium as the authoritative interpreter of Scripture

4. The Catholic canon

5. Infused merit, congruent merit, supererogatory merit.

6. The priesthood

7. Seven sacraments

8. Baptismal regeneration/justification

9. Transubstantiation

10. Penace, auricular confession, absolution, indulgences

11. Indissolubility of marriage

12. Purgatory

13. Intercession and veneration of saints

14. Immaculate Conception

15. Assumption of Mary

16. Perpetual virginity of Mary (including in partu virginity)

17. Mary as Queen of Heaven, Mother of the Church, and Mediatrix

18. The Rosary

19. Renuciation of capital punishment

20. Inclusivism (Vatican II)

In each case, that's a sample. Compare the two packages. To convert from one to the other, he most now repudiate all the positions he use to believe and defend as a Reformed Baptist. Conversely, he must now believe and defend all the positions he used to repudiate. 

What is more, he must now renounce all the arguments he used to deploy in defending the Reformed Baptist position and opposing Roman Catholicism. Conversely, he must now adopt most-all of the Catholic arguments he used to view as bogus. 

Consider how artificial that is. Has he really vacated all the former arguments at one stroke? Did he eliminate them one by one? Did all the arguments he used to find convincing become unconvincing while most-all of the arguments he used to find unconvincing become convincing? Is it like reversing the domino effect, where all the dominos used to fall in one direction but now they all fall in the opposite direction? 

Surely it must feel schizophrenic to change sides so that you find yourself arguing with your mirror image. You're now resorting the same arguments whose weaknesses you used to recognize. Has your perception really undergone a complete gestalt shift? 

BTW, these aren't symmetrical alternatives. An intellectual conversion from Catholicism to evangelicalism is a lot simpler because there was no direct evidence for many Catholic dogmas. Rather, that was contingent on the authority of the Magisterium to promulgate dogma. All it takes to drop out of Catholicism is to lose your conviction in the authority of the Magisterium. Pull that one cornerstone and the entire edifice crumbles in a heap of dust. 

The Old Covenant Is Over. The Old Testament Is Authoritative.

https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/old-covenant-response-andy-stanley/

Egypt and the flood

Every serious student of the Bible knows that there are other flood stories from the ancient Near East, particularly from ancient Sumer, Babylon, and Assyria. One brief account from Ugarit, but interestingly, none from Egypt. T. Longman & J. Walton, The Lost World of the Flood (IVP 2018), 53.

If Noah's flood happened, why are there no Egyptian accounts? Even if it was a regional rather than global flood, should we expect a notice in Egyptian records? 

i)  We only have a random sampling from Egypt. Most records never survived. And even if some records survived, there's a lot that has yet to be discovered, excavated, deciphered, and published. 

ii) Egypt is located in Africa, separated from Western Asia by the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Perhaps the flood didn't reach Egypt. And if it happened in prehistoric times, traditions might only be passed down by survivors and their descendants in affected areas–assuming a local flood.  

ii) It might also depend on when Egyptians think it happened. The ancients have a poor sense of relative chronology. If they thought it happened in Pharaonic times, royal historians might not record it because an ecological disaster like that would reflect a failure on the part of the "divine" Pharaoh to protect his country. 

Did the Nile turn to blood?

Commentators are divided on whether the plague of blood has reference to literal blood. Stuart points out that the same Hebrew word is a synonym for the color red.

Duane Garrett has a 5-point argument that it isn't actually hemoglobin. For instance, he points out that the Egyptians used sand as a filtration device to make the river water drinkable. But that would be futile if it was hemoglobin. I agree with most of his arguments. But here's one I find more dubious:

Had the whole river turned to literal blood, it would have been a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. The Nile in Egypt is almost 600 miles long. If it had all become literal blood under the Egyptian sun, the whole river would have become a thick, decaying sludge of biological waste. No potable water would  have been available for the entire population for months or even years. It is difficult to calculate how long it would have taken waters from the sources of the Nile far to the south in Ethiopia to wash away the tens of millions of gallons of blood as well as the coagulated and decomposing remains of that blood. D. Garrett, A Commentary on Exodus (Kregel 2014), 284-5. 

Although I agree with Stuart and Garrett that the miracle probably didn't mean God changed the water into hemoglobin, I don't think that's a good objection:

i) Does the account require the Nile, throughout the length of Egypt, to be affected? Contextually, the description is centered on a stretch of the Nile near the palace and thereabouts. Pharaoh and his entourage are the primary audience for this plague. To be sure, 7:20-21 describes the plague in comprehensive terms, but that's hyperbolic since most of Egypt is desert. 

ii) Even if it was more extensive, why assume that the plague is supernaturally produced but naturally resolved? If God supernaturally changes the water to hemoglobin (or whatever), the cessation of the plague might just as well or better involve God supernaturally changing it back to water. Miraculous contamination followed by miraculous restoration.

iii) Even if we grant for argument's sake that it wasn't supernaturally restored, the Nile is a dynamic system, not a self-enclosed lake. Not only is it flushed into the ocean from upstream, but I assume that in the Delta region the Nile is to some degree a tidal river, subject to coastal intrusion. So the "blood" would be diluted or replaced from both ends–provided that the affected area was fairly confined (i).