Hillary and the UMC

"Progressive Christians" predictably attack Trump but don't attack Hillary. To a great extent, there's been a similar asymmetry among evangelicals and conservatives. That's because evangelicals/conservatives take Trump's candidacy personally in a way they don't take Hillary's candidacy.  No one's liable to mistake Hillary for a representative of the conservative movement. So evangelicals/conservatives don't feel the need to explicitly disassociate themselves from Hillary, since that's taken for granted. Likewise, the conservative movement has had a voice in the GOP, whereas it has no voice in the Democrat Party. So, once again, evangelicals/conservatives are more alarmed by what is happening under their own roof (relatively speaking). For evangelicals/conservatives, Trump's candidacy ignites an in-house debate in a way that Hillary's does not. Trump's candidacy triggers an identity crisis regarding the future of the GOP and the future of the conservative movement, in a way that Hillary's does not. That's one reason many conservative pundits have neglected to make the case against Hillary.

There is, however, an interesting parallel. Hillary is a United Methodist. So is Ben Witherington and Bill Arnold. They represent the conservative wing (by Methodist standards) of the UMC. 

To my knowledge, conservative spokesmen for the UMC like Witherington and Arnold haven't distanced themselves from Hillary in the way that many evangelicals have distanced themselves from Trump. Why is that? Witherington has distanced himself from Trump, so why not Hillary? Why not publicly repudiate her as an authentic representative of the Methodist tradition? 

Vlad

I got into an impromptu Facebook debate over this quote:

To vote for Trump as the lesser of two evils is as much to say as there are circumstances under which you would vote for Hillary. She is an utterly corrupt politician, true enough, but anyone who thinks we couldn’t get a worse set of choices hasn’t read very much history. How about Hillary vs. Vlad the Impaler? We have gotten down to this atrocious choice because we have been following the “lesser of two evils” strategy for more than a generation.  

https://dougwils.com/s7-engaging-the-culture/20-hungry-mongrels.html

Some NeverTrumpers are making the same mistake as Trumpkins in reverse. Just as Trumpkins redefine principles to support Trump, some NeverTrumpers are now at risk of redefining principles to oppose Trump.  

It's one thing to argue that choosing Trump over Hillary represents a misapplication of the lesser-evil principle, another thing to reject the principle altogether. To repudiate the lesser of two evils in principle leads to moral paralysis. Leads to positions like pacifism.

Steve Hays Actually, Vlad the Impaler saved his country from Muslim conquest and subjugation.

Christopher Wood That's like saying Dubya saved America from Muslim terrorists.

Steve Hays Your reply is an argument from analogy minus the supporting argument. What do you actually know about the history of Rumania in relation to Islam? Do you deny that Vlad repelled the Muslim invaders?

In what sense did Vlad "stir" them up? He didn't provoke them to invade Rumania. The Ottoman Turks were aggressors. Anyway, you're using my comment as a pretext to attack Bush's foreign policy, That has precisely nothing to do with my original comment. And, no, I don't agree that America stirs up terrorism. I do think the Iraq war was a miscalculation, and while the Afghanistan war was just reprisal, the nation-building component was a boondoggle. Again, though, that's all irrelevant to my original comment.

"It's not irrelevant, it reveals your position. You seem to think that 'they started it' is a reasonable defense."

A reasonable defense of what? If Ottoman Turks attack Europe, Europeans have the right to counterattack. Yes, it does matter who started an unprovoked war of aggression. 

If an armed burglar breaks into my house, I have the right to kill him. Yes, it makes a difference who started it. Sorry if that rudimentary moral distinction eludes you.

Perhaps you think the Ottoman Turks were peacenik vegans who wore love beads and Nehru jackets until Europeans "stirred them up."

"'Miscalculation' is a great euphemism for something that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians."

Since I'm not defending the Iraq war, I have no need for euphemisms. Of course, prior to the Iraq war, there were constant complaints about how the UN sanctions were killing innocent Iraqis. 

From what I've read, most of the civilian causalities in Iraq were inflicted by the "insurgents," not Coalition forces.

Speaking of which, it wasn't just an American operation. For instance, British forces made significant contributions to the war effort. Is it chauvinism that prevents you from making Tony Blair share some of the blame?

"And I suppose you think the regular drone bombings with their associated 'collateral damage' are also justified?"

That's obtuse. Since I said at the outset that I don't support the Iraq war, it follows that I don't think drone bombings in relation to the Iraq war are justified. 

Or were you referring to drone attacks in general? Just about every war has collateral damage. Drone attacks didn't create collateral damage for the first time in military history. So unless your a pacifist, what precisely is your objection? 

Collateral damage is justified if the war is justified, and collateral damage is a necessary side-effect of prosecuting a justifiable war. So the real issue take us a step back to whether the war in question is justifiable, and not the incidental, but inevitable consequences of said war.

"I'm sorry if the rudimentary moral distinction between self-defence and war eludes you."

That's simple-minded. Try to wrap your head around the principle of a common defense. Self-defense often requires people to pool their resources. So to posit a disjunction between war and self-defense is a false dichotomy. Any other logical fallacies I can help you with?

"Yes drone attacks in general, the US has been striking many countries in addition to Iraq."

So you're actually not talking about drone attacks in general, but US drone attacks in particular. 

"but so far as I know, bombing civilian targets has never been shown to be an effective strategy."

Tell that to the Japanese.

Moreover, you somehow treat collateral damage as synonymous with targeting civilians. Thanks for illustrating your basic conceptual confusions.

"Bombing military installations, airfields, and production is quite different to assassinating families or bombing schools and hospitals."

That overlooks the use of schools and hospitals as human shields. Something Muslims in Israel routinely do (to take one example).

"Are you really saying Vlad's violence was all justified, incidental and inevitable?"

If that's what I was really saying, you could simply quote me saying that. If you have to ask, then the question answers itself.

"War is simply common self-defence only in ideals, not the real world."

Except that you deny that you're a pacifist. So where does your dichotomy between self-defense and common defense leave you? Are you saying self-defense is moral, but common defense is immoral? Yet you apparently grant the necessity of common defense in some situations.

"US is just the most prolific example (by far)."

You still don't get it. The question at issue is whether you reject drone attacks in principle. 

"There is little doubt that Japan was going to surrender even without the city bombing."

What was the incentive to surrender? Fear of invasion from the US or Russia? That would have resulted in massive civilian casualties.

"Granted it may have taken slightly longer, but that doesn't justify the massive loss of life."

You suffer from persistent inability to keep track of the argument. I didn't comment on the morality of nuking Japan one way or the other. Rather, I responded to your allegation that "so far as I know, bombing civilian targets has never been shown to be an effective strategy."

Whether or not nuking Japan was justifiable is a separate question from whether that was an effective strategy. You need to acquire the mental discipline to follow the argument and stick with one issue at a time. 

From what I've read, Nagaskii was a secondary target. The primary target was Kokura, which had greater military significance. However, it was cloudy over Kokura when the bomber arrived at the site, so they fell back on Nagasaki.

"No, targeting civilians is often called 'collateral damage'"

Often called by whom? By people who don't know the conceptual distinction? 

"Whether a case of 'we bombed these houses because we thought a target was in them' or rules of engagement that encourage firing on non-combatants."

Typically, an ethical distinction is drawn between intended harm and foreseen harm as an indirect, but unavoidable effect of doing good. 

"So if someone uses your family as human shields, you think it's simply justified to kill them?"

Try to keep more than one idea in your mind at a time. The answer depends in part on which side of the conflict is in the wrong.

"Then you should take back your statement about 'the incidental, but inevitable consequences of said war."

Which, once again, illustrates your failure to grasp the distinction between targeting civilians and collateral damage. "Targeting" civilians is a term of art. Pay attention to the ethical distinction I drew a few sentences above.

Just war theory maintains a distinction between combatants and non-combatants. I was talking about the loss of life of Japanese civilians."

i) I haven't framed the issue in terms of just-war theory. I haven't used just-war terminology. Rather, I've talked about what's "justified" or "justifiable". 

ii) Since I'm not Roman Catholic, I don't regard just-war theory as morally authoritative. It makes sense for Catholics like Elizabeth Anscombe and Germain Grisez to espouse nuclear pacifism because they treat just-war theory as dogma, but that's not my framework. I'm Protestant. 

iii) The distinction between combatants and noncombatants is often ad hoc. Is the guy who flies bombers fair game, but they guy who builds bombers off-limits? Just defaulting to the combatant/non-combatant false dichotomy is morally frivolous. We need a more fine-grained analysis.

On the face of it, your position is morally incoherent. On the one hand you deny that your'e a pacifist. On the other hand, you seem to repudiate the permissibility of collateral damage.

i) There are situations where harming the innocent is unavoidable regardless of what you do or refrain from doing. Either you will harm them or you will permit the enemy to harm them, because you refuse to intervene.

ii) Given that forced option, it is permissible to harm some innocents with a view to saving other innocents. 

iii) You should minimize the harm done consistent with doing good. 

Put another way, There are situations where an agent performs an action that has two effects: one good and one bad. Moreover, inaction on the agent's part will have a bad effect, without the compensatory good effect.

The action may still be licit provided that the intended effect desired by the agent is good while the bad effect is merely foreseen, and not intended.

An advantage of inflicting harm yourself, rather than leaving it to the enemy to inflict harm, is that you have more control over how, where, when, and to whom the harm is inflicted. You can be more discriminating than the enemy, and minimize the harm, or mitigate the harm the enemy would do.

If you reject that principle, you need to explain why you're not a pacifist.

Is “Pope Francis” going to Celebrate St. Martin Luther?

“Pope Francis” in the shadow of Martin Luther

Is “Pope Francis” using the power of “the papacy” to dismantle “the papacy”?

The traditionalist Roman Catholic website Rorate-Caeli recently asked the question, “To which Church does Pope Bergoglio belong?”

Already on the books for “Pope Francis” is a scheduled trip to Lund, Sweden, to commemorate the 500th anniversary of the Reformation (October 31, 2017).

Two anniversaries overlap each other in 2017: the 100 years of the Fatima apparitions, occurring between May 13th and October 13th 1917, and the 500 years of Luther’s revolt, beginning in Wittenberg, Germany, October 31st 1517….

The start of the centenary of the Fatima apparitions on October 13th 2016 was buried under a blanket of silence. That same day, Pope Francis received in the Paul VI Audience Hall, a thousand Lutheran “pilgrims” and in the Vatican a statue of Martin Luther was honoured, as appears in the images Antonio Socci published on his Facebook page. Next October 31st, moreover, Pope Francis will go to Lund in Sweden, where he will take part in a joint Catholic-Lutheran ceremony commemorating the 500th anniversary of the Reformation. As can be read in the communiqué drawn up by the World Lutheran Federation and the Papal Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity, the aim of the event is “to express the gifts of the Reform and ask forgiveness for the division perpetuated by Christians of the two traditions.”

The Valdese theologian and pastor, Paolo Ricca, involved for decades in ecumenical dialogue, voiced his satisfaction “seeing as it is the first time a Pope commemorates the Reform … By taking part in the commemoration, as the highest representative of the Catholic Church is prepared to do, means, in my view, to consider the Reform as a positive event in the history of the Church which also did some good for Catholicism...

Earlier I’ve noticed that “Pope Francis” intends to be cleaning house. In that article, I noted that “it seems, at the very least, that this pope is going to move in the direction of conciliarism, and as he indicated once before, in the direction of the the Ravenna document,” an unofficial document prepared in conjunction with some Eastern Orthodox writers that suggests possible ways for a return to the “conciliarity” of the first nine centuries of church history.

This interview with Ricca also suggests that there may be some radical changes afoot:

According to Ricca, the main contribution offered by Pope Francis is “his effort to reinvent the papacy, that is, the search for a new and different way of understanding and living the ministry of the Bishop of Rome. This search – presuming my interpretation somewhat hits the mark - might take us a long way, since the papacy – because of the way it has been understood and lived over the last 1000 years – is one of the great obstacles to Christian Unity. It seems to me Pope Francis is moving towards a model of the papacy different to the traditional one, with respect to which the other Christian Churches might take on new positions. If it were so, this theme might be completely reconsidered in ecumenical circles.”

The fact that this interview was published on October 9th by Vatican Insider, considered a semi-official Vatican site, makes one think that this interpretation of the Lund trip as well as the papal intentions, have been authorized and are agreeable to Pope Francis [italics in original, bold emphasis is mine].

In his “cleaning house”, just how far does pope Bergoglio intend to go?

Tossing virgins into the volcano

Arminian Randal Rauser recently posed an attack on penal substitution: 

Some Christians (advocates of penal substitution) believe that Jesus’ atoning death satisfies the wrath of the Father against sin, and thus that Jesus’ death provides the culmination and completion of the temple sacrificial system.

The difference can be illustrated with the standard story of the South Pacific islanders who believe an innocent virgin must be tossed into the mouth of the volcano to satisfy the Volcano God so that he will not erupt and thereby smite the people for their sins.

The advocate of penal substitution offers a view of divine wrath and justice which is in continuity with the framework of divine/human relations that is assumed by the South Pacific islanders. To be sure, the advocate of penal substitution does not commend the act, but he does share the logic: God is wrathful against sin and that wrath can be satisfied by an appropriate substitutionary sacrifice.

http://randalrauser.com/2016/10/jesus-vs-volcano-christians-disagree-atonement-matters/

i) Tossing virgins into a volcano is a scurrilous comparison. Now, Rauser may feign that he's not directly comparing penal substitution to tossing virgins into a volcano, but he's clearly trading on the lurid connotations of pagan sacrifice to tarnish penal substitution by association. 

ii) Penal substitution doesn't mean the Father's "wrath" is satisfied. Even if we operate with the "wrathful" framework, it's not as if the Father is wrathful about sin, while the Son (and Spirit) are not wrathful about sin. It's not as if an unwrathful Son placates the Father's wrath. Rather, it would be a case of placating divine wrath. It's not as if one member of the Trinity can be wrathful while the other two are not. If there is such a thing as divine wrath, the Trinity would be wrathful. 

iii) Divine wrath is not a presupposition of penal substitution. Penal substitution concerns the satisfaction (through vicarious atonement) of divine justice, not divine wrath. Even if God wasn't wrathful, that wouldn't eliminate penal substitution. In fact, wrath cannot be satisfied. That's a category mistake. Wrath is not a forensic category. By contrast, justice can be satisfied. Justice and satisfaction are both forensic categories. 

iv) I don't think God is literally enraged by sin. I think that's a colorful, anthropomorphic way of depicting God's disapprobation regarding sin. 

Perhaps Rauser would say he's commenting on popular presentations of penal substitution. If so, that hardly disproves more precise formulations. 

v) The OT, which provides the typology of penal substitution or vicarious atonement, forbad human sacrifice. 

vi) Mere human sacrifice cannot atone for sin. Putting a sinner to death would fail to atone for even his own sin.

vii) Jesus is innocent in a way that no sinner is. Moreover, Jesus isn't merely human.  

Another round on "consequentialism"

Yesterday, Christian philosophy prof. Paul Franks posted a critique of Wayne Grudem's recent article:

https://tyndalephilosophy.com/2016/10/21/wayne-grudems-deplorable-argument-for-trump/

In some respects I agree with both of them and disagree with both of them. I agree with Grudem's case against Hillary. I disagree with his support for Trump, although I don't think his argument is "deplorable". 

Conversely, I agree with Franks' opposition to Trump, but I disagree with his central objection to Grudem's article. Today, Franks and I had an email exchange. I'm posting my side of the exchange:

I. First reply

Dear Dr. Franks,

Regarding your recent post on Grudem:

https://tyndalephilosophy.com/2016/10/21/wayne-grudems-deplorable-argument-for-trump/

As a trained philosopher, I'm surprised to see you mischaracterize Grudem's framework. You repeatedly accuse Grudem of "consequentialism". Yet Grudem denies that consequences are the sole consideration. In responding to the (3) objection that “When faced with the lesser of two evils, choose neither one,” Grudem says:

Answer: I agree with this principle when facing a choice between doing two evil actions. For example, when faced with a choice between stealing and telling a lie, I should choose neither one. But this is not that kind of situation. We are not talking about doing something evil. We are talking about voting.

So Grudem clearly thinks some actions are intrinsically wrong. Consequences alone could never warrant those actions. He just doesn't think voting for Trump is one of those actions. 

Now, what Grudem says in that regard is very brief. It may not be an adequate counterargument to the objection, but he clearly rejects the position that consequences are a sufficient criterion in moral valuation. 

In addition, why do you seem to absolutize "conscience"? Conscience is not infallible. 

II. Second Reply

Thanks for your reply. Actually, I'm operating with standard definitions of consequentialism. For instance:

Consequentialism is the view that morality is all about producing the right kinds of overall consequences.   

http://www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/

Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. This general approach can be applied at different levels to different normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most prominent example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.  

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/

Consequentialism assesses the rightness or wrongness of actions in terms of the value of their consequences. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), 2:603. 

But that's clearly not his framework. He cites two examples (stealing, lying) which he considers to be morally wrong regardless of the consequences. Hence, he doesn't think consequences are sufficient to justify every action. 

The question at issue isn't whether his argument is successful, but whether he's a consequentialist. His argument for voting for Trump may be an abject failure. That doesn't make him a consequentialist.

Suppose I'm about to drive home from work. The freeway is congested. At that time of day, a side street will get me home quicker than the freeway, so I choose the side street. Surely that doesn't commit me to consequentialism. 

Moreover, I don't know why you treat following one's conscience as the logical alternative to consequentialism. For instance, deontology isn't based on appeal to conscience. 

III. Third Reply

This is what I take you to be saying. Your position appears to be that although someone may not be a consequentialist, yet if in particular case he only take results into account in making his decision, then he is, in that instance, guilty of "consequentialist-based reasoning". If that's what you are saying, I think that's demonstrably false. 

Consequentialism is the position that, as a matter of principle, "morality is all about producing the right kinds of overall consequences," "whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act," or "the value of their consequences."

i) Now, to recur to my first example, in choosing which route to take home, I only care about the results (i.e. getting home by the fastest route). That, however, doesn't mean I think that, as a matter of principle, the value of the results is the only consideration in decision-making.

Rather, it means that, all other things being equal, the desired result is the deal-breaker. Put another way, in a choice between two morally neutral options, consequences may be all that matter. That's the decisive consideration. 

Again, though, that's different than saying, as a matter of principle, that consequences are the only consideration. Rather, it just means that in this particular case, there happen to be no other morally salient factors or countervailing factors. So, by process of elimination, preferred results are the only remaining differential factor. 

ii) Take another example: suppose I have a teenage son with cancer. With treatment, he has a 95% of survival. Without treatment, he has a 95% chance of dying. Given those options, I have him undergo cancer therapy. All I care about is effective treatment. That, however, isn't consequentialist-based reasoning. Rather, it means there are no other countervailing factors to consider in this instance. To bring that into relief, let's compare it to some different examples:

iii) Suppose two patients need a heart transplant to survive. One is 15 and the other is 75. Here the age of the patient introduces an additional moral consideration. It's not that the life of the 75-year-old patient is intrinsically less valuable than the life of the 15-year-old patient. And it's certainly not that the elderly are not entitled to good medical care.

But the 75-year-old patient has already had an additional 60 years of life, compared to the 15-year-old patient. And with a heart transplant, suppose that extends his life for another 10 years. It's unfair that he should have an extra 70 years to live at the cost of the teenager dying at 15. 

iv) Suppose I'm a ruthless military dictator. I discover that my teenage son has a congenital heart defect. He needs a heart transplant to survive. Without it he could drop dead at anytime.

I have my goons round up 50 heathy young men. I have them subjected to genetic testing to isolate the most compatible donor. I then have the donor euthanized to harvest his heart to save my son.

Now that truly is consequentialist-based reasoning. That's only concerned with the results–to the exclusion of countervailing moral considerations. 

v) Let's finish with a different kind of example. Suppose I believe that all other things being equal, a candidate's character is a morally germane consideration in choosing who to vote for.

Suppose, however, there are only two viable candidates, and both of them share the same morally disqualifying character. In that event, they cancel out the character criterion. 

It's not that I think character, per se, is irrelevant. But that criterion has been mooted by the two candidates. So I focus on their respective policies. 

Do Democrat social programs lower abortion?

Some people say that if you're truly prolife, you should vote for Hillary because Democrat social programs lower the abortion rate. For a corrective:

http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/there-is-no-pro-life-case-for-planned-parenthood/

Is Lewis's fiction allegorical?

C. S. Lewis denied that his Christian fiction was allegorical. Some people find that puzzling, because, on one definition, some of his fiction is allegorical. Clearly he was operating with a specialized definition of allegory. In a letter to a correspondent, he gives a fairly detailed explanation of what he means:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

By an allegory I mean a composition (whether pictorial or literary) in which immaterial realities are represented by feigned physical objects e.g. a pictured Cupid allegorically represents erotic love (which in reality is an experience, not an object occupying a given area of space) or, in Bunyan, a giant that represents Despair.

If Aslan represented the immaterial Deity in the same way in which Giant Despair represents despair, he would be an allegorical figure. In reality however he is an invention giving an imaginary answer to the question, "What might Christ become like if there really were a world like Narnia, and He chose to be incarnate and die and rise again in that world as He actually has done in ours?" This is not an allegory at all So in Perelandra. This also works out a supposition. ("Suppose, even now, in some other planet there were a first couple undergoing the same that Adam and Eve underwent here, but successfully.")

Allegory and such supposals differ because they mix the real and the unreal in different ways. Bunyan's picture of Giant Despair does not start from a supposal at all. It is not a supposition but a fact that despair can capture and imprison a human soul. What is unreal or (fictional) is the giant, the castle, and the dungeon. The Incarnation of Christ in another world is mere supposal: but granted the supposition, He would really have been a physical object in that world as He was in Palestine and His death on the Stone Table would have been a physical event no less than his death on Calvary.

Similarly, if the angels (who I believe to be real beings in the actual universe) have that relation to the Pagan gods which they are assumed to have in Perelandra, they might really manifest themselves in real form as they did to Ransom. 

Again, Ransom (to some extent) plays the role of Christ not because he allegorically represents him (as Cupid represents falling in love) but because in reality every real Christian is really called upon in some measure to enact Christ. Of course Ransom does this rather more spectacularly than most. But that does not mean that he does it allegorically. It only means that fiction (at any rate my kind of fiction) choose extreme cases. The Collected Letters of C. S. Lewis, Volume lll: Narnia, Cambridge, and Joy 1950-1963 (HarperOne, 2007),1004-05.

Joy Davidman's miraculous remission

In this post I'm going to quote some firsthand accounts concerning the miraculous remission of Joy Davidman's bone cancer. She became Lewis's wife. I'll be quoting from The Collected Letters of C. S. Lewis, Volume lll: Narnia, Cambridge, and Joy 1950-1963 (HarperOne, 2007). I will begin by quoting from the editor's (Walter Hooper) biographical sketch of Peter Bide. Bide was a former student of Lewis's, who became an Anglican priest. I will then quote from some of Lewis's letters. 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

During the years of the war Bide had kept up with Lewis, visiting him whenever he passed through Oxford. In the spring of 1954 there was a terrible polio epidemic in the area [of Sussex], and numerous sufferers were moved by ambulances to the "fever hospital" where Bide was chaplain. One young boy named Michael Gallagher was seriously ill of cerebral meningitis and believed to be dying. Bide went on his knees beside the boy's bed, laid his hands on him, and prayed for his recovery. Michael did recover, and after being told about it Lewis was one of those who believed a miracle had been worked. 

Lewis remembered this when, in 1957, Joy was in the Wingfield-Morris Hostpital (now the Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre), dying of cancer. He asked Bide to come up and lay hands on her. Although it was not expected that she would recover, Lewis would not consider moving Joy to The Kilns unless they were married in a Christian ceremony in addition to the civil marriage they had already contracted, but when Lewis asked the Bishop of Oxford for permission to marry he was refused on the grounds that her previous marriage was still valid. Bide arrived in Oxford on 20 March. As he later explained:

When Joy was diagnosed as having a sarcoma, Jack wrote to me and asked for me to come up and lay hands on her. I hesitated. The Michael case had mercifully made little or no noise but I had been aware of how easy it would have been for me to assume the role of "a priest with a gift of healing", so I made no attempt to exploit the gift, if gift it was…But Jack was a special case. Not only did I owe a considerable intellectual debt but the ordinary demands of friendship would have made it churlish to say no. So I went, and that was the beginning. 

In the end there seemed only one Court of Appeal. I asked myself what He would have done and that somehow finished the argument. The following morning I married them in the hospital ward with the Ward Sister and Warnie Lewis as witnesses. I laid hands on Joy and she lived for another three years (ibid. 1650-51).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Magdalene College,

Cambridge,

November 27, 1957

My dear Arthur,

Our news is all very good. Joy's improvement has gone beyond anything we dared to hope and she can now (limping, of course, and with a stick) get about the house and into the garden.

Yours

Jack

(ibid. 900) 

Magdalen College,

Cambridge,

November 27, 1957

My dear Van Auken,

My own news continues better than we ever dared to hope. The cancerous bones have rebuilt themselves in a way quite unusual and Joy can now walk: on a stick and with a limp, it is true, but it is a walk–and far less than a year ago it took three people to move her in bed and we often hurt her. He general health, and spirits, seem excellent. Of course the sword of Damocles hangs over us. Or should I say that circumstances have opened our eyes to see the sword which really hangs always over everyone.

Yours

C. S. Lewis

(ibid. 901)

The Kilns, Kiln Lane,

Headington Quarry,

Oxford,

December 13 1957

My dear Allens,

How every kind of you both to remember us at this season, and how very grateful my wife and I are for your prayers–prayers which have indeed been answered, for my wife is almost miraculously better. She will, alas, always been an invalid, but X-Ray photos show beyond any shadow of doubt that the diseased bone is healing; and now she can walk about the house, and even in the garden, with the aid of a stick. When I remember that this time last year she was under sentence of death, I have indeed much to be thankful for.

Yours ever,

C. S. Lewis

(ibid. 905-06)

Magdalene College,

Cambridge

27th, April, 1959

Dear Sister Madelva,

Thank you for your kind words about my wife. She was given a few weeks to live. A good man laid his hands on her and prayed. Now, two years later, she is walking about our wood pigeon shooting. At her last X-Ray check the doctor used the word "miraculous" -tho' I don't suppose he meant it quite as you or I would.

Yours sincerely

C. S. Lewis

(ibid. 1041)

Arminians can't love everybody

So why can't Arminians love everybody? I thought you'd never ask! Here's a simple syllogism:

i) In Johannine usage, kosmos means "everybody"

ii) 1 Jn 2:15 says "Love not the kosmos...If anyone loves the kosmos, the Father's love is not in him"

iii) Hence, Scripture forbids Christians to love everybody

Looks like a valid syllogism to me. The minor premise carries over the definition of kosmos from the major premise. And the conclusion seems to derive by logical implication from the major and minor premises.

What is more, it looks like a sound syllogism from an Arminian standpoint. Arminians routinely define kosmos in Johannine usage as "everybody" (or "everyone" or "all mankind"). 

So Arminians affirm the major premise. And everything follows from that. 

Hence, Arminians can only love everybody on pain for defying this Biblical prohibition. Worse that that: if they love everybody, the means the Father's love is not in them. Consistent Arminians can only love some people. 

Of course, I'm not Arminian, so I reject the major premise. Hence, I can be far more loving than Arminians, what with their heartless, exclusionary, narrow-minded interpretation of 1 Jn 2:15!

Grudem reverts to Trump

Wayne Grudem has published a third post on Donald Trump:

http://townhall.com/columnists/waynegrudem/2016/10/19/if-you-dont-like-either-candidate-then-vote-for-trumps-policies-n2234187

It's easy to make fun of Grudem's careening views, but this is an example of a conscientious man struggling with a difficult choice. Grudem's article is very thorough, although it suffers from overconfidence in Trump's campaign promises. To begin with, Trump's campaign promises are a moving target. And he shows precious little commitment to his campaign promises. 

The best argument for Trump goes like this:

i) Principle: if push comes to shove, a bad man who does good things is better than a good man who does bad things.

ii) We have two vile candidates. One of them (Hillary) will undoubtedly strive to do terrible things. The other (Trump) may do a few good things, or at least not consistently do so many bad things. 

Put another way, Hillary is an ideologue in a way that Trump is not. The very fact that Trump has no considered political philosophy means he doesn't have an agenda in the way Hillary does. 

iii) However, that slight advantage is potentially offset by the additional consideration that Trump warps the conservative movement. We already see many erstwhile conservatives bending their ideology to conform to Trump. 

If Trump is elected, will there be a viable conservative movement to revert to after the dust settles? Will the GOP be a meaningful alternative to the Democrats? Or will we be stuck with two liberal parties? Will a Trump presidency further adulterate the GOP, and marginalize the conservative movement? 

That's what makes it difficult to tally the pros and cons. Fact is, the future is unpredictable. And we don't know for sure if the alternatives would have turned out any better, because we can't run multiple timelines, compare them, then pick the best. 

Medical miracles

http://www.premierchristianity.com/Blog/Derren-Brown-wants-to-see-objective-evidence-for-miracles-Challenge-accepted

HT: James Anderson

My Dad, the ER, and the Culture of Death in Colorado

"My Dad, the ER, and the Culture of Death in Colorado"

Dreams of Jesus

I'd like to comment on this post by atheist philosophy prof. Eric Sotnak:

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2016/10/18/dream-a-little-dream-of-me/

To put this in context, Sotnak mentions this claim:

Leventhal, professor of church missions and ministries and director of the graduate school of ministry program at Southern Evangelical Seminary, told those gathered at SES' 23rd annual National Conference on Christian apologetics in Charlotte, North Carolina, on Friday that Jesus even appeared to people during the Holocaust.
As an example, Leventhal shared the testimony of a Jewish man named Joseph who during the Holocaust was forced to work in a Nazi labor camp. 

Joseph had sworn vengeance against his Lutheran neighbors who refused to help him and his family. 

"He made a vow, a vow of only one thing: He would never stop hating his so-called Christian neighbors. He would always hate their Christian God; their Jesus would be his enemy as long as he lived," said Leventhal. 

"His hatred for Christians and their Jesus grew with each passing day until one dark evening in his bunk, a night that would change Joseph's life forever, Jesus appeared to Joseph." 

Quoting from Joseph's testimony, Leventhal recounted that on that night: "Jesus appeared to me. In the darkness of my hatred for Christians and their Jesus, Jesus appeared to me. I recognized Him in a split second, I knew who He was and His first words to me were 'Joseph, I love you. I died for you. You will survive.'" 

http://www.christianpost.com/news/jesus-still-appears-to-people-in-dreams-even-god-haters-christian-apologist-says-170855/

That's Sotnak's immediate frame of reference. Now for Sotnak's comments.

His claim isn’t that people have dreams in which Jesus figures as part of the dream, but rather that Jesus, himself, appears in the dream. I suspect that Leventhal does not think that every dream involving Jesus counts as an appearance of him, though...Leventhal claims that there have been cases where people have converted to Christianity as a result of dreaming of Jesus. This may be true (though one story he tells of such a conversion has the ring of legend, I think), but it is not clear why Leventhal thinks these are cases of genuine appearance.

Speaking for myself, I find the testimony credible. But I have a different plausibility structure than an atheist like Sotnak. He doesn't bother to explain why he thinks that story has a legendary ring. The Holocaust is a central research interest of Leventhal's, so it's reasonable to think he relies on good sources. Admittedly, it would be helpful to know the source of this particular anecdote. Perhaps he cited his source at the apologetics conference, referenced in the article. 

There is also something very strange about the whole idea of someone appearing in a dream. The whole notion treats dreams as having a real space within which actual existing things and people come and go.

I have no idea why Sotnak conceptualizes the relationship in those terms. Here's a different model: the character in the dream isn't Jesus directly; rather, the character represents or simulates Jesus. If Jesus wishes to communicate with someone in a dream, he produces a character who represents him. 

To take a comparison, when I see someone on TV, is that a real person? Strictly speaking, the electronic image isn't a real person. Rather, the image represents or simulates a real person. As a philosophy prof., Sotnak ought to be able to come up with models like that.  

There is also the question of how I would know that the person appearing was, in fact, Jesus. It won’t do to say, “well, it obviously was Jesus – after all, it looked like him.” 

That's a very good question. It's a question that charismatic Christians need to ponder, since many of them lack critical discernment. 

i) One possible explanation is subliminal telepathic communication. If Jesus is who he says he is, surely he has the ability to plant in the dreamer's subconscious the idea that this is Jesus. 

ii) Or in some cases a dream might be veridical because it contains information that the dreamer didn't know, which he can corroborate after he awakens. 

iii) However, it also depends on the purpose of the dream. Suppose the value of the dream isn't evidentiary. Rather, suppose the dream functions as a stimulus to prompt someone who's indifferent or antipathetic to Christianity to seriously consider it for the first time, and to do so in a receptive frame of mind. Suppose the dreamer undergoes Christian conversion as a result of that process. His warrant for Christian faith isn't the dream itself, but the whole process that precipitating incident set in motion. In that case, it isn't necessary to verify that Jesus appeared to the dreamer. 

iii) There's also the question about why someone would dream about Jesus in the first place. How often does Sotnak dream about Jesus? If that happens out of the blue, with no preparation, then that may require a special explanation. To take Leventhal's example, why would a Jew in a Nazi concentration camp, who hates Christians, have a dream like that?

Am I to think that Jesus didn’t appear to me as he likely would have looked in life, but rather as he is depicted in popular iconography (with strongly Caucasian features – perhaps with blue eyes?

i) To begin with, Sotnak seems to be pretty ignorant regarding artistic representations of Jesus. Sure, you have Aryan depictions. However, the Jesus in El Greco paintings is not a blue-eyed Jesus. Rather, he's a Spanish Jesus. Does the Jesus in Byzantine icons have blue eyes? What about Italian Renaissance paintings of Jesus? Unsurprisingly, they look…Italian! The iconography of Jesus varies from country to country. Artistic depictions of Jesus often take on the ethnic features of the country in question. Doesn't Sotnak know that? If not, shouldn't he bother to inform himself? For instance:

https://churchpop.com/2016/02/02/japanese-christian-art/

https://churchpop.com/2015/07/02/jesus-black-man-depictions/

https://churchpop.com/2015/06/15/if-jesus-had-been-korean-20-rare-paintings-of-the-life-of-christ/

ii) More to the point, what would be the point of Jesus appearing to someone in a dream if he was unrecognizable to the dreamer? If Jesus does appear to people in dreams and visions, we'd expect him to do so in culturally identifiable forms. Sotnak's disdain for Christianity blinds him from considering the implications of the claim on its own terms. Sure, he doesn't believe that Jesus really appears to anyone, but considered as a hypothetical proposition, if Jesus were to appear to someone, it would be counterproductive to look like he did in the 1C–in the event that would be unrecognizable to the dreamer. A philosophy prof. should be able to consider the internal logic of the position, even if he rejects the position. 

Then there is the question of why, if someone wanted to communicate with me, they would choose to attempt doing so in a dream, especially if we have reason to think they could do so in other, much less ambiguous ways. It is too easy to chalk a dream up to imagination. 

It's odd that a philosophy prof. is unable to consider obvious counterexamples. For instance, if a culture puts great stock in oneiromancy, it might make sense of Jesus to exploit that entrée. If dreams are significant to some people, God might use that medium. 

By analogy, if I were to find a note taped to my door that read: “You shall carve exactly six pumpkins this Halloween. Sincerely, Jesus” I would surmise that it had been written by a prankster.

But the problem with that analogy is that a prankster doesn't have access to our minds. That's quite different from the ability to insert yourself into somebody's dream. 

Reforming drug enforcement

https://thearcmag.com/the-cold-war-on-drugs-61ccb5ecd396#.it0v9rb0y

Wrestling Jacob

Gen 32 records a very evocative and enigmatic incident. I'd like to scrutinize the liberal interpretation. 

1. On the liberal interpretation (e.g. Gunkel, von Rad, Westermann, Robert Alter, Bill Arnold, H. W. F. Saggs) , Jacob's adversary reflects two different traditions. One tradition concerns trolls that guard crossing-points at rivers. The other tradition concerns nocturnal demons who lose their powers between dawn and dusk. That would explain the riverine setting, as well as why his adversary seeks to break off the attack as dawn approaches. So it has a certain prima facie appeal. There are, however, serious problems with that interpretation:

2. It assumes the redactor combined elements from two different tales or traditions. The troll-motif and the nocturnal demon-motif. Either two different sources or at least two different archetypal characters (trolls and nocturnal demons). These don't normally go together. But the redactor allegedly fused the two characters into one. 

In addition, the redactor expunged the overtly pagan elements. In the redacted version, Jacob's adversary turns out to be a theophanic angelophany. 

That, however, is a very convoluted editorial process. If, moreover, the narrator is writing pious fiction, why bother with such unpromising material in the first place? Why not write something from scratch, rather than engage in this cumbersome scissors-and-paste procedure?

3. Moreover, Jacob's adversary doesn't play the role of a troll. Jacob crosses the river without opposition at least twice: first to lead his caravan across the river, then to recross the river so that his caravan is on one side while he's alone on the other side (22-24). Indeed, he may have to crisscross the river several times to conduct his entire caravan to the other side. There is no trollish agent that blocks his entree. 

As for nocturnal demons, from what I've read (Sarna), the tradition depicts them like Proteus in Ovid's Metamorphosis. But Jacob's adversary is not a shapeshifter. He retains a humanoid form throughout the wrestling match. 

4. Furthermore, even though trolls are mythological agents, they may have a basis in fact. Historically, people do guard fords and bridges to collect tolls from travelers. Likewise, fords and bridges would be natural settings for bandits to lie in wait. Travelers on foot bottleneck at that juncture, because that's the only crossing-point within miles up or down the river. So that's an opportune location for bandits to lurk. As such, the mythology of trolls may represent the legendary embellishment of bandits or toll collectors at fords and bridges. 

Likewise, traditions of night hags may have a basis in fact. Occultic entities do exist. I don't think that figures in Gen 32. I'm just challenging secular assumptions. 

5. If, however, we reject the nocturnal demon identification, then why is Jacob's adversary eager to leave before the break of dawn? Maimonides construed the account as a "prophetic vision" (Guide for the Perplexed, Part 2, chap 62). I assume he means a supernatural dream. It can't merely be a night vision, because the experience is interactive. A tangible as well as visual experience. 

Up to a point, that's an appealing interpretation. It's not the first time Jacob had a supernatural dream. Moreover, his first supernatural dream, about angels, took place when he was leaving Palestine (Gen 29). So it would form a nice inclusio if he had another dream, about angels, upon reentering Palestine. It would also explain the urgent distinction between night and day. If his adversary is a character in a dream, it would vanish the moment he awoke.

However, an impediment to that interpretation is the fact that Jacob is injured during is wrestling match. While it's possible to experience pain while dreaming, or have a simulated injury while dreaming, that only exists in the dream. It disappears when you awaken. Yet Jacob was objective injured. 

Mind you, it's possible to injure yourself while you sleep, if you thrash about. And it's possible that hurting yourself when you're in bed prompts you to dream about hurting yourself. But as far as Gen 32 is concerned, that's backwards. 

6. There's a bit of playacting on the part of Jacob's adversary. He pretends that Jacob is a well-matched opponent. He lets him feel that Jacob has the upper hand. But then, with a mere touch, he injures Jacob, demonstrating that in reality he was just toying with Jacob. All along, he could effortlessly overpower Jacob if he wanted to. 

7. It may well be that Jacob's adversary chose a night-time setting to conceal his true identity under cover of darkness. The initial anonymity creates suspense, preparing for the last-minute recognition scene.

8. In addition, you have the familiar theme that seeing God face-to-face is potentially fatal to humans. The night-time setting would prevent that lethal exposure. 

To be sure, that's a somewhat puzzling or paradoxical hazard, since the Pentateuch does have examples of men who "see" God and survive to tell the tale. I think that tension trades on degrees of exposure. In this case, the divine encounter is mediated by the Angel of the Lord. To see God in the person of the theophanic angel.  

In what sense is it potentially fatal to see God? Two possibilities suggest themselves. One is cultic holiness, like touching a ritually pure object (e.g. the ark of the covenant). It's not that the object is intrinsically toxic. Rather, God strikes the person dead as a warning. The other possibility involves a vision so terrifying that it triggers a heart attack. It's possible to be literally scared to death. 

Society of Biblical Literature

The SBL is essentially taking the position that you can only belong to the SBL if you don't believe in the Bible. Only secular scholars are allowed to be members. If, by contrast, you believe the Bible to be what it claims to be, then you can't belong to the SBL. If you believe the Bible and act on its teachings, you will be expelled from the SBL. That's the logic of their position. We'll see how far they take it.

Respecting IVP and IVCF, views held employees of a religious organization regarding homosexuality will naturally impact the editorial viewpoint of that organization in publishing, campus ministry, &c. It's quite germane to their mission.

Liberalism poisons everything

http://rightlyconsidered.org/2016/10/19/the-left-injects-its-poison-into-everything-else-so-why-not-sports/

Correction Of My Response To Annette Merz

I want to correct something I was wrong about in my latest response to Merz. I've come to the conclusion that I misunderstood her argument about which Herod Jesus was born under. Instead of questioning which Herod Matthew is referring to, Merz seems to be questioning which Herod a possible pre-Matthean source was referring to, a source she thinks may have been behind both Matthew and Luke. I apologize for the error. I've revised the post. The section on Luke's census remains the same, but I've rewritten the section on which Herod Jesus was born under. If anybody wants to see my original text, which is now removed from the post, I've added it to the comments section of the thread.

Blindsight

I'm going to discuss a subset of reported NDEs and OBEs. Let's put this in context. According to physicalism, mental events are neurological events, so all cognition is located inside the skull. Hence, the brain can't perceive the external world apart from the five senses. If so, then knowledge of our physical environment must be mediated by one or more of the five senses. If, however, there's evidence that some people born blind have near-death or out-of-body experiences in which they perceive their concrete surroundings, then that falsifies physicalism. 

And that's significant because atheism typically rejects dualism in favor of physicalism. I think that's because, if physicalism is true, then at one stroke that rules out the existence of minds that are, or can be, independent of brains. In other words, it rules out God, angels, demons, and immortal souls. A very economical way to disprove Christianity.

Although some atheists make allowance for platonic realism, they generally labor to avoid that. Moreover, even if platonic realism were true, that's a different kind of dualism than brain-independent minds. So it lacks the same polemical value for atheism. 

I have read efforts to explain this away. For instance:

[These cases] may be inspired by accounts of other people's NDEs that have been widely disseminated in various forms of the media. That is, might a blind person have heard that people see certain things in a near-death encounter and unconsciously generated a fantasy that conformed to this belief? 

http://infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/HNDEs.html#blind

Light enhances brain activity during a cognitive task even in some people who are totally blind, according to a study conducted by researchers at the University of Montreal and Boston's Brigham and Women's Hospital. The findings contribute to scientists' understanding of everyone's brains, as they also revealed how quickly light impacts on cognition. "We were stunned to discover that the brain still respond significantly to light in these rare three completely blind patients despite having absolutely no conscious vision at all," said senior co-author Steven Lockley. 

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/10/131028090408.htm

There are, however, problems with that appeal to discount reported NDEs and OBEs of people born blind (or the functional equivalent). It is, of course, true, that the brain (or mind) can play tricks on us. And the brain (or mind) may have the capacity to simulate abstract images like migraine auras. 

But how could the brain simulate representational images that correspond to the sensible world? I've read that congenitally blind people dream, but their dreams are auditory or tactile rather than visual. That's because the imagery of dreams derives from sensory perception. Because our memory is stocked with mental representations of what we've seen, that supplies raw material for the imagination. The mind can reproduce or modify that information. But imagination needs something to work with. It can't operate in a vacuum. 

Finally, a last-ditch response is to dismiss the reliability of testimonial evidence. That, however, commits the atheist to a devouring skepticism that atheism cannot afford inasmuch as atheists depend on the general reliability of testimonial evidence for much of what they believe. 

I'm going to quote from an article that gives some case-studies. It would be useful if researchers were to investigate additional cases. I'm a bit wary about the the risk of overreliance on a single study. In fairness, it isn't easy to isolate and identify people born blind (or the functional equivalent) who've had NDEs and OBEs. That's a subset of a subset of a very select group to begin with.