I've been watching a lot of physics videos lately, and I noticed that the multiverse is being used more frequently to explain away the "apparent" fine-tuning of the universe. This fine-tuning is most obvious in the cosmological constant, which one of the videos explained could be viewed in the following manner. Suppose all the grains of sand on all the beaches of the world represented the value of the cosmological constant. Every single grain of sand is necessary here, because if you change just one grain of sand, the universe could not exist. That's how precise the cosmological constant needs to be.
Clearly, such precision screams that there must have been a designer. The way physicists get around this is to say that there are trillions and trillions of universes--perhaps even an infinite number of universes--in the multiverse, and when you have that many universes then it's no surprise that at least one of them just randomly has the value of the cosmological constant being what we need it to be to exist.
I have to wonder though. How is it that intelligent physicists do not have any problem with stipulating the existence of literally trillions of universes just so we can explain the existence of our own universe? At what point does it require less faith to believe in God than to believe in the existence of more universes than there are stars in the sky, none of which are even possible to see?
Thursday, May 21, 2015
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Teaching, preaching, and authority
This got some buzz on the Internet:
I hold Piper and Schreiner in high regard, but I think their argument is confused. In fairness, I think Andrew Wilson miscast the argument.
i) One question is what "authority" meant in the ancient world. To my knowledge, authority meant the power to command or forbid. The wherewithal to enforce compliance.
The ancient world had a muscular conception of authority. Authority was coercive. The power to impose your will on another. To punish noncompliance. Forcing others to do your bidding. To do things against their will.
ii) In addition, this text is bound up with the related issue of "submission." Submission and authority are correlative. Submission is the counterpart to authority.
Submission can be voluntary or involuntary. That's where authority comes into play. Having the clout to make someone submit to your demands. Take the power of Roman masters over slaves. And that was ultimately backed up by the Roman army.
iii) In that context, I don't see how teaching is ipso facto wielding authority over another. For instance, I read lots of books and articles by atheists. I do so to critique their arguments.
Do I put myself in submission to an atheist by exposing myself to what he says? How could a Christian philosopher or apologist ever refute an atheist if merely reading or listening to an atheist is equivalent to submitting to an atheist?
An atheist may wish to wield authority over the reader, but that's not real authority. He hopes to influence what the reader believes. But I'm a very "insubordinate" reader.
iv) Perhaps Piper or Schreiner would say a congregation is a captive audience, so that makes it more coercive. If so:
a) That goes beyond the text. The text doesn't specify that setting.
b) If I don't like what I'm hearing, I can up and leave in the middle of the sermon. Or I can refuse to return to that church.
c) Presumably, they don't think a parishioner should submit to whatever a preacher says. Presumably, they think we should exercise critical judgment when we hear a sermon. Evaluate what we hear.
v) Piper and Schreiner use the word "regularly," but isn't that a weasel word? That modifies the issue to a question of degree rather than kind.
vi) I think Paul was probably dealing with a house-church situation in which upper class women hosted Christian gatherings. They had authority by dint of their social class and the fact that it took place under their roof.
Again, I'm not saying it's just culturally conditioned. Paul's discussion includes the cross-cultural principle of male headship.
In addition, even the culturally-conditioned aspect can have cross-cultural analogues. There can certainly be modern situations that are comparable to what Paul is discussing. There can be women in authority, to whom men are subordinate–in business, government, and academia. (Whether that ought to be the case is debatable.)
But it's not analogous to, say, a supply preacher in a modern American church. A preacher is not an authority-figure in that sense. At best, a preacher has moral authority, or the authority of an expert witness. It's a matter of rational persuasion rather than dictatorial power.
I don't see that inviting Lydia McGrew to do a talk on the Resurrection or the reliability of the Gospels is what Paul had in mind. I don't see that inviting Karen Jobes to do a series on 1 Peter or 1 John is what Paul had in mind. I think that requires Piper and Schreiner to operate with a very diluted concept of authority which is not recognizably authoritative in the ancient sense of the concept.
Remember, the question at issue isn't women in the pastorate. The question was framed in terms of an all-male church board. It's just a question of a woman addressing a mixed audience.
vii) Catholic apologists routinely cast the issue in terms of "interpretive authority," as if what matters is who said it and not the quality of the evidence or the supporting arguments. But evangelicals need to resist that tendentious framework.
Likewise, charismatic personality cults elevate the "anointed" speaker to the status of lofty authority-figure. But, once again, evangelicals need to resist that paradigm.
viii) There's a tension in Schreiner's position. He himself has reviewed books by "evangelical feminists." He must read women to review women. He must read egalitarians to refute egalitarians. Does that mean he's learning from a woman?
Same thing with the JBMW, which reviews "evangelical feminist" literature from a complementarian perspective. Does that mean women are teaching them? There's a sense in which the women are teaching them what the women think Scripture means. Are they bowing down to a woman by reading egalitarian literature to critique it?
What about countercult ministries that scrutinize the theology of Joyce Meyers or Paula White. They must listen to these women preach to evaluate their theology. Are they submitting to their authority by hearing them preach? How could they critique them without hearing them?
What about conservative pundits who critique the legal opinions of Ruth Bader Ginsburg or Elena Kagan. Are they in submission to a woman when they examine their legal philosophy?
viii) There's a tension in Schreiner's position. He himself has reviewed books by "evangelical feminists." He must read women to review women. He must read egalitarians to refute egalitarians. Does that mean he's learning from a woman?
Same thing with the JBMW, which reviews "evangelical feminist" literature from a complementarian perspective. Does that mean women are teaching them? There's a sense in which the women are teaching them what the women think Scripture means. Are they bowing down to a woman by reading egalitarian literature to critique it?
What about countercult ministries that scrutinize the theology of Joyce Meyers or Paula White. They must listen to these women preach to evaluate their theology. Are they submitting to their authority by hearing them preach? How could they critique them without hearing them?
What about conservative pundits who critique the legal opinions of Ruth Bader Ginsburg or Elena Kagan. Are they in submission to a woman when they examine their legal philosophy?
xi) I'd add that "teaching" is ambiguous, because it's a two-party transaction. To say a woman taught men or a man was taught by a woman can refer to what the woman did, or it can refer to how the student or listener responded.
On the one hand it can mean a man learned from a female teacher.
On the other hand, it can mean a woman expressed her opinion, but the man disagreed.
A listener may be unreceptive to what the teacher has to say.
xii) Paul commended older Christian women for counseling younger Christian women (Tit 2:3-4). And he commended Lois and Eunice for indoctrinating their grandson Timothy (2 Tim 1:5; 3:15).
On the one hand it can mean a man learned from a female teacher.
On the other hand, it can mean a woman expressed her opinion, but the man disagreed.
A listener may be unreceptive to what the teacher has to say.
xii) Paul commended older Christian women for counseling younger Christian women (Tit 2:3-4). And he commended Lois and Eunice for indoctrinating their grandson Timothy (2 Tim 1:5; 3:15).
So Paul doesn't object to women teaching, or even to women teaching males. Hence, I infer that his underlying objection is to women wielding authority over men. In their capacity as authority-figures (e.g. a Roman noblewoman), he objects to women teaching men. That's the only consistent position I can make out of his varied statements. Merely hearing a woman express her views doesn't subjugate a male listener.
Tuesday, May 19, 2015
Amalekites and abolitionists
God said that Saul turned his back from following Him, and that he had not performed His commandments. What does this tell us about God’s expectations for obedience in our fight against injustice? Does God honor obeying some of His commandments?
This is supposed to be an argument from analogy. However, Reasnor never develops the alleged analogy.
i) For starters, he never quotes the command. Here's what it says:
Now go and strike Amalek and devote to destruction all that they have. Do not spare them, but kill both man and woman, child and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey (1 Sam 15:3).
ii) For his argument from analogy to work, Reasnor needs to show how prolifers are disobeying a divine command (or commands) in way that's comparable to Saul. Yet Reasnor never fills in the gaps.
iii) To begin with, AHA typically accuses prolifers, not of failing to do what God commands, but doing what God forbids. They allege that incremental tactics are morally impermissible. So Reasnor needs to translate the command into a prohibition.
iv) He also needs to show how that's comparable to incremental tactics. Saul was given a very precise command. No loopholes. It was intentionally exceptionless.
But how does Reasnor justify universalizing that principle? On what basis does he extrapolate from this particular command to to the claim that all divine commands are universal? That all divine commands are exceptionless? For instance, here's a divine command:
“Go into the village in front of you, and immediately you will find a donkey tied, and a colt with her. Untie them and bring them to me. 3 If anyone says anything to you, you shall say, ‘The Lord needs them,’ and he will send them at once” (Mt 21:2).
Is every Christian supposed to obey that command?
v) What Biblical prohibition forbids a Christian from mitigating evil? What Biblical prohibition says that if Christians can't pass a law to save every baby, they are forbidden to pass a law to save as many babies as they can (for the time being)? What Biblical command says that's morally impermissible?
Where is there a prohibition, whose specificity is comparable to 1 Sam 15:3, that's on the same topic as incremental legislation to limit evil–when that's the most Christians can do at that particular time and place?
Why doesn't Reasnor quote a Biblical command or prohibition that's truly parallel to prolife tactics? Because there isn't any!
So we're treated instead to loose illustrations involving Moses, Josiah, and Saul. But his illustrations presume rather than demonstrate a relevant parallel.
vi) Reasnor says:
Did Moses take what he could get? The political reality was that Pharaoh was an autocrat with all temporal power. Moses most certainly did not have the votes.
But he also talks about "Laws supported and written by immediatists…"
Yet the legislative process is inherently cooperative. It requires the cooperation of enough like-minded lawmakers to pass a mutually agreeable bill.
Social isolation
There are different kinds of social isolation:
i) Two people may live together, but be emotionally estranged. That generates a paradox: physical proximity with psychological distance.
A textbook example is a dying marriage. The couple may have been madly in love at the time they tied the knot. But now the relationship is apathetic at best or antipathetic at worst. Aloof or disdainful.
ii) Then there's physical separation. Separation in space. Grown children who live out of state. An elderly parent in a nursing home. A father or son serving overseas in the military.
Often, though, there's a hopeful element to physical separation. In principle, the loved one is just a car ride or plane ride away. They are still available. Accessible. Either you can visit them or they can visit you.
iii) Finally, there's separation in time. A loved one dies. That's more oppressive than separation in space. In case of physical separation, that's often something under our control. It's within our power to see them if we need to or really want to. Hop in the car. Hop on a plane.
But separation in time leaves the survivor, the bereaved, powerless to do anything about it. Their loved one is inaccessible. They may despair of seeing their lost loved one any time soon. The loneliness is harder to take, because there's no end in sight. There's nothing they can do to hasten reunion. Every morning they must start all over again. The interminable routine. Alienated from their surroundings. Its very familiarity is painful. A constant reminder of what they lost.
There is no me!
However, it was clear when I began studying Zen that in my existing mindfulness practice I was running straight into phenomena highly salient to Buddhism: the impermanence of things, including the complex and fluid nature of “the self,” my attachments, and also how suffering or lack of satisfaction was rooted in attachments. Ultimately, I saw that “the self” that I thought was here is a fiction. In fact, there is no “me” at the center of my life; indeed, there is no “me” and there is no “center.” We can use these words of course, but in fact there’s just life happening, and there’s really not even that.
http://michaelsudduth.com/helen-de-cruz-interview-at-prosblogion/
So who is the "I" that studies this nonexistent self? Michael must assume a viewpoint which his conclusion denies. A self-conscious nonentity. An observer who simultaneously examines and denies his own reflection. He can't really be seeing himself in the mirror-for there is no self!
Take it from me–there is no me!
From Krishna to Buddha
Michael Sudduth has now abandoned Hare Krishna for Buddhism:
But isn't philosophical Buddhism atheistic? Indeed, wasn't Buddhism a reform movement that broke with Hinduism? So what became of Michael's devotion to "Lord Krishna"?
Having left Christianity behind, Michael has no frame of reference. So he just bounces from one thing to another–like a racquet ball.
Is incrementalism incompatible with Scripture?
I'm going to comment on Reasnor's opening statement:
Abortion is sin. Everywhere and always sin.
That's largely true, although I think there are rare exceptions like ectopic pregnancies.
And as sin, the answer to abortion is The Gospel of Jesus Christ. That is why it is of utmost importance to soberly and clearly look to Scripture to see how God views sin, and corporate repentance of sin. We must not be fooled into thinking we can go about this however we see fit. If the Gospel is the answer to abortion, which it emphatically is, then how we seek corporate repentance from this sin is vital.
That's unbiblically reductionistic. Just as laws are no substitute for evangelism, evangelism is no substitute for laws. We need both. As Paul says:
9 understanding this, that the law is not laid down for the just but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and sinners, for the unholy and profane, for those who strike their fathers and mothers, for murderers, 10 the sexually immoral, men who practice homosexuality, enslavers, liars, perjurers, and whatever else is contrary to sound doctrine (1 Tim 1:9-10).
Even if you could evangelize everybody, everybody won't believe the Gospel. So that's not the answer. That's not the answer for people who know and despise the Gospel.
The context of this debate is important. We are not talking simply about laws or ideas changing over time versus change happening over night. We are not talking about changes of ANY sort of laws.
Both on its own terms as well as in connection with the previous statement, that sounds anarchistic. As if the objective of AHA is not a national ban on abortion, but convincing everyone to refrain from abortion by spreading the Gospel.
Does AHA seek a legal remedy or not? Is it the goal of AHA to outlaw abortion? Or is this about persuading people not to perform or undergo abortions by converting them to Christianity?
Immediatists supported state based total abolition as well as national based total abolition.
After Roe v. Wade, prolifers attempted a national ban on abortion. But lacking the votes, they had to fall back on less ambitious measures.
By these examples it is clearly shown that one significant difference between immediatists and incrementalists is the type of legislation they support, not that one supports legislation and one does not.
So what's the answer? The Gospel? Or legislation? Reasoner seems to talk out of both sides of his mouth.
Laws supported and written by immediatists call for the total abolition of abortion in whichever jurisdiction the law is written for.
i) That's stated in the present indicative as if that's happening as of now. But to my knowledge, no abolitionist bills have been sponsored in state legislatures, much less Congress, since AHA was founded.
ii) In addition, there's a crucial difference between "laws" and "bills." Even if abolitionists succeed in getting a state lawmaker or Congressman to sponsor a "bill" calling for the abolition of abortion, that's a worthless piece of paper unless it is passed and signed into law.
Incrementalists of abortion are epitomized by those that support laws that only protect some of the unborn, laws regulating the facilities where abortions are conducted in, laws banning specific procedures, and laws requiring waiting time periods.
Roughly speaking, there are two ways to win a war. If you have overwhelming force at your disposal, you can defeat the opposition by a swift imposition of the rule of law.
If, however, you are outgunned, then you fight a war of attrition. You resort to guerilla tactics to wear down the opposition. That's what the prolife movement is doing.
Simply put, incrementalism supports unjust laws as a means towards justice…Scripture says a great deal about partial obedience and justifying your means by your ends.
i) To begin with, that's simplistic. Sometimes the ends do justify the means. Not always, but sometimes.
For instance, is it wrong to break into someone's house when the homeowners are away, and snatch a baby from the upstairs nursery?
Well, under normal circumstances, trespassing on private property, breaking and entering, and kidnapping are wrong.
But what if you notice the second floor is on fire, and you hear a baby crying from an open window? Well, in that case it would be wrong for you not to bust the door down and snatch the baby from the nursery.
ii) As I also discuss in a recent post of mine, this is like a human shield situation:
Does God command advocating for incremental regulation of sin in order to maybe someday pass a just law, or does God command the immediate and uncompromising repentance of sin?
Let's take a few examples:
i) What about this?
The times of ignorance God overlooked, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent (Act 17:30).
Looks "incrementalistic" to me.
ii) Or this?
Because of your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so (Mt 19:8).
Looks "incrementalistic" to me.
iii) Although the OT clearly regards prostitution as immoral, it doesn't ban prostitution across the board. It forbids cultic prostitution (Lev 21; Deut 23:17-18). It forbids a Jewess from becoming a prostitute (Lev 19:29). It forbids the use of proceeds from prostitution to support the religious establishment (Deut 23:19). In addition, prohibitions against sodomy overlap with one form of prostitution.
Yet there's a legal loophole. Ancient Israel had a number of resident foreign nationals. Although it was immortal, it was not illegal for a Jewish bachelor to pay for the sexual services of a (female) pagan prostitute. That's sinful, but not unlawful.
Likewise, to my knowledge, is wasn't illegal for a Jewish husband to pay for the sexual services of a (female) pagan prostitute. That's sinful, but not unlawful.
That's because the Mosaic law typically defines adultery in terms of extramarital relations where both parties are members of the covenant community.
In the Mosaic law, not all sins are crimes. Even though prostitution is evil, the Mosaic law doesn't criminalize all forms of prostitution. Rather, it greatly curtails that particular evil. It limits the evil of prostitution, but doesn't abolish prostitution in toto.
iv) The Mosaic law permits the purchase of foreign slaves (Lev 22:44-46). Although the slave trade was an evil, that evil preexisted the state of Israel. Israel didn't introduce that evil into the ANE. Given that foreign slaves will be sold anyway, they are better off with Jewish masters, since they enjoy legal protections under the Mosaic law which would not be afforded to them under pagan ANE law codes.
That's another case of the Mosaic law mitigating evil rather than abolishing evil.
v) By the same token, even though the Pentateuch regards polygamy as a moral aberration, the Mosaic law doesn't ban polygamy. Once again, not all sins are crimes.
Did Moses take what he could get? The political reality was that Pharaoh was an autocrat with all temporal power. Moses most certainly did not have the votes. It is safe to say that Moses had less than no votes. Moses would not compromise justice, he would not compromise God’s commandments.
That's a preposterous comparison. Moses had overwhelming military might at his disposal. The 10 plagues. If God empowered prolifers with that kind of clout, we could easily ban abortion. But we don't have that kind of leverage at our fingertips.
In Amos, Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, and other books, the call for total repentance is obvious. This theme can be followed throughout all the Prophets. They called for repentance and obedience, and not just for a decrease of sin.
As I pointed out in another post, that appeal is misguided, for the prophets call wayward Israel to obey the law of Moses. However, as I just noted, the law of Moses frequently limits or mitigates evil rather than banning all forms of misconduct.
Some incrementalists today have taken to calling themselves “moral absolutists”, but “incremental strategists”. They hold what appears to be a righteous standard personally, but their bills, actions, and oftentimes even their rhetoric abandon those conceived in rape, abandon those too young, and abandon those that can be murdered less gruesomely.
On the one hand, prolifers can't "abandon" babies they were never in a position to save in the first place.
On the other hand, abolitionists abandon babies who are legally savable right here and now.
Name it and claim it!
In a previous post I noted some striking parallels between pacifism and abolitionism. In addition, there's a striking parallel between abolitionism and the Word of Faith movement–specifically: name-in-and-claim-it theology.
Word of Faith healers "bind" that "demon of cancer." They "take authority" over that "demon of drug abuse."
If you're not cured, that's not because the faith-healer was a charlatan, but because you didn't have enough faith.
By the same token, AHA "demands" the immediate and total abolition of abortion. It accuses evangelical prolifers of lacking faith in God's providence.
"Abolition relies upon the Providence and Sovereignty God: All we must seek to do is be faithful and follow Him as we leave the results in His hands. (We walk in line with Providence)."
An obvious problem with this claim is that, according to Scripture, trust in God isn't defined by faith in what God is able to do, but by what God promised to do.
God has the power to put an end to warfare tomorrow. God has the power to stop murderers in their tracks.
Does this mean a Christian should believe that murder will end tomorrow? Does this mean a Christian should believe that warfare will end tomorrow?
What God can do and what God will do are often two very different things. Do I lack faith in God if I doubt that there will be no more murder tomorrow? Do I distrust God if I doubt that there will be no more war tomorrow? Hardly!
God hasn't promised to exercise his omnipotence in that regard. You can't predict the future from God's sovereignty.
Where Are The Female Witnesses In Acts?
It's often noted that the gospels' claim that Jesus' tomb was found empty by some of his female followers is unlikely to have been fabricated. The culture of that day held the testimony of women in much lesser esteem than the testimony of men, and the male disciples are made to look bad in contrast to the women.
Notice that the reasoning here doesn't just apply to the empty tomb accounts. The women also are prominent in the accounts of the crucifixion and burial, and they're sometimes referred to as the first witnesses of the risen Jesus. The prominence of women in all four contexts (death, burial, empty tomb, and resurrection) is highly unlikely to have been made up.
But I want to focus on something else. Luke gives us our earliest church history, covering roughly the first three decades. In that church history, he gives a lot of attention to male witnesses (Peter, John, Stephen, Philip, Paul, Apollos, James, etc.). Where are the female witnesses? They're in his gospel, so why aren't they in Acts?
Notice that the reasoning here doesn't just apply to the empty tomb accounts. The women also are prominent in the accounts of the crucifixion and burial, and they're sometimes referred to as the first witnesses of the risen Jesus. The prominence of women in all four contexts (death, burial, empty tomb, and resurrection) is highly unlikely to have been made up.
But I want to focus on something else. Luke gives us our earliest church history, covering roughly the first three decades. In that church history, he gives a lot of attention to male witnesses (Peter, John, Stephen, Philip, Paul, Apollos, James, etc.). Where are the female witnesses? They're in his gospel, so why aren't they in Acts?
Monday, May 18, 2015
Was there an Ur-cat?
For example, I absolutely agree with Osborn that lions tearing off bark for food is silly. But which scientifically informed creationist actually holds to such a ludicrous position?
The firs thing that must be said is there were no "lions" in Eden. There was only the first animal type of the various created kinds, or barmaids. Since lions belong to the cat kind, there was probably some primordial cat that is the ancestor of all the cats we have today…In fact, I would venture to say that many of the animals we see today probably did not exist in the primordial world.
http://www.angelfire.com/falcon/ddd_chc82/articles/DeathBeforeFall_review.pdf
I agree with much of what Daniel says here. However, I don't see that creationism is logically, exegetically, or scientifically committed to the proposition that all modern cats descend from a single exemplar.
Must we say that Siberian Tigers and caracals all descend from one exemplar? Why could there not be a primordial kind for the big cats and another primordial kind for small cats?
Must weasels and sea otters all derive from a single mustela? What about God making an aquatic mustela kind from which modern river otters and sea otters derive?
Likewise, must turtles and tortoises all derive from a single Chelonian exemplar? Why not a primordial kind for turtles and another primordial kind for tortoises–given that one is terrestrial and the other aquatic?
Currently, some bats are insectivorous, some bats are frugivorous, and some bats are hematophagous. According to creationism, these might represent adaptations. They all descend from a single exemplar.
But I don't see that creationism precludes an insectivorous Ur-bat in distinction to a frugivorous Ur-bat. I don't see that creationism demands an Ur-cat, Ur-bat, &c. The main thing is fiat creation or special creation of natural kinds, and not creation of singular kinds–where everything of a kind must branch out from one trunk. Why not an Ur-turtle and an Ur-tortoise?
Similar terrestrial and aquatic or marine species needn't derive from one exemplar. Rather, you can have original diversity along with subsequent diversification within terrestrial types and aquatic (or marine) types.
I see no reason why, even on creationist grounds, oviparous snakes, viviparous, land snakes, sea snakes, venomous snakes, and constrictors must all be derived from a single generic exemplar.
Oviparous snakes can be one kind of snake, which descend from an oviparous exemplar. Sea snakes can be another kind of snake, which descend from a marine exemplar. And so on and so forth.
Oviparous snakes can be one kind of snake, which descend from an oviparous exemplar. Sea snakes can be another kind of snake, which descend from a marine exemplar. And so on and so forth.
Seems to me that Daniel is mixing creationism with a conventional taxonomy, where you classify organisms from general to specific. But the notion of fiat natural kinds is compatible with some basic varieties from the get-go.
Let's contaminate blood banks
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/05/12/obama-and-fda-let-gay-men-donate-blood/
Notice how political correctness as corrupted the AMA on this issue. It has catastrophic implications for major surgery. Arthur Ashe and Isaac Asimov both died of AIDS from contaminated blood transfusions.
Notice how political correctness as corrupted the AMA on this issue. It has catastrophic implications for major surgery. Arthur Ashe and Isaac Asimov both died of AIDS from contaminated blood transfusions.
Atheist Clichés to Avoid
“Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”. The problem with invoking this phrase to dismiss religious claims is that it implies that the claim in question has “ordinary” evidence going for it, but simply lacks “extraordinary” evidence. But that’s FAR too generous when it comes to most religious claims, which typically fail to meet even “ordinary” standards of evidence (and in many cases lack any evidence whatsoever beyond an unsupportable claim of divine revelation).
I disagree with where he takes this. He's an atheist, after all, so he will naturally take it in the wrong direction. But Vic Wang does draw attention to an amusing irony, for that statement, which goes back to Sagan, popularizing Hume, is a tacit admission that there's evidence for miracles. In the face of that evidence, the best an atheist can do is to up the ante. The statement is actually an unwitting concession to Christianity. A move to preemptively discount the evidence for miracles. But why would an atheist do that unless he was insecure? Afraid of having his bluff called? To dismiss the evidence in advance is a sign of weakness.
“The Self-Contained Fullness of God”
Evidently, then, our first priority in trying to understand Van Til’s metaphysics of knowledge is to explore his doctrine of God. On the first page of his Introduction to Systematic Theology, he says, “Fundamental to everything orthodox is the presupposition of the antecedent self-existence of God and his infallible revelation of himself to man in the Bible”.
“Self-existence,” sometimes called aseity, refers to the fact “that God is in no sense correlative to or dependent upon anything besides his own being. God is the source of his own being, or rather the term source cannot be applied to God. God is absolute. He is sufficient unto himself.” Often Van Til summarizes this concept by referring to the “self-contained God.”
He quotes favorably a passage from Bavinck to the effect that all of the other virtues of God are included in his aseity. Thus, when Van Til goes on to discuss God’s immutability, he bases that doctrine on the divine aseity: “Naturally God does not and cannot change since there is nothing besides his own eternal Being upon which he depends (Mal 3:6; James 1:7).” Since God’s immutability is based upon his “self-contained fullness,” it is quite opposite to the immutability of Aristotle’s unmoved mover, an abstract thought [which is] thinking itself.
Notice how [Van Til] moves here from “self-contained” to “self-contained fullness.” That is important…
(From John Frame, “Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought”, Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, ©1995, pgs 53-54.)
Reading this, I was struck by the comparative use of the term “fullness” by Rome. Rome says it has “the fullness of the faith”.
Consider that term in juxtaposition with another account of what can be called the “self-contained fullness of God”. Here is the account by Scott Oliphint:
The first thing that is necessary to grasp about the attributes, properties, or perfections (which I use as synonyms) of God, therefore, is that a basic distinction must be made between God as he is and exists in himself and God as he condescends. The theological (i.e. biblical) reason for this distinction is that it is obvious that before anything was created, there was and has always been God. That is, God himself is not essentially subject to time; he does not, according to his essential character, live, move, and have his being in a temporal context. He has no beginning and will have no end. Not only so, but before there was anything created, there was only God. It is not as though things existed—ideas, concepts, properties, and so forth-alongside God prior to creation. Before creation, there was nothing but God. To put it more starkly, before God created, there was not even nothing. There was God and only God.
(K. Scott Oliphint, “God With Us: Divine Condescension and the Attributes of God”, Wheaton IL: Crossway, 2012, from the Introduction, pg 13.)
Consider, for a moment, “the self-contained fullness of God”, compared with what Rome calls “the fullness of the faith”. Let that thought sink in for a few moments.
Sunday, May 17, 2015
Is it arrogant to claim to know God?
"Is It Arrogant to Claim to Know God?" by Prof. James Anderson.
Falsifying naturalism
The threshold for disproving naturalism is exceedingly low. That's because naturalism is a universal negative. It only takes one good counterexample to blow it to smithereens.
Consider physicalism. If cognition is reducible to brain events, and all mental activity is located inside the head, then the mind can't possible act at a distance or know things at a distance (in time or space). Hence, it only takes a few well-attested counterexamples to falsify physicalism.
Technically, naturalism isn't synonymous with physicalism. It's possible for a naturalist to be a Platonic realist, Cartesian dualist, idealist, or panpsychic. But physicalism is the default position of most naturalists. Most naturalists fight tooth and nail for physicalism. And there's a reason for that. They appreciate what a threat to naturalism it would be to make allowance for knowledge or action at a distance. If the mind can know things or effect things apart from a chain of physical causes, then there's no presumption against God, angels, demons, discarnate souls, miracles, heaven, or hell. They can't afford to make that concession.
There's an abstract atheism that infidel apologists like to project. That atheism is merely nonbelief in God or gods. By the same token, Jeff Lowder likes to compartmentalize things as much as possible, carefully partitioning atheism, naturalism, and physicalism.
That's prudent from a tactical standpoint. Exposing as little of your flank as possible. Making yourself a small target.
But that kind of abstract atheism is like an experimental lifeform that can't exist outside laboratory conditions. It's very artificial.
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