Tuesday, April 07, 2015
Monday, April 06, 2015
Friendship and the freewill defense
According to the freewill defense, God is not responsible or blameworthy for the harmful decisions that humans make. He doesn't "cause" their choices or "determine" their choices.
Suppose I have a college roommate who's a recovering alcoholic. Suppose I take him to a bar. I place him in a tempting situation. I know he has a weakness for alcohol, but I don't know if he will succumb to temptation. Suppose there's a 50/50 chance that he will either succumb or resist.
If he does give into temptation, it's not because I "determined" the outcome. And as freewill theists define causality, I didn't cause him to drink.
Was I blameworthy for exposing him to that gratuitous temptation? Even if, on this occasion, he overcomes the temptation to drink, was I blameworthy for putting him at risk? Was I acting in his best interests? Or was I playing to his weakness, thereby exposing my roommate to harm?
Is it not my duty, as a friend, to protect him? Even if I can't do that all time, isn't that something I could and should do in this situation?
And if he does give into temptation, am I not complicit in his downfall? Was I not instrumental in his downfall?
Sunday, April 05, 2015
The new Jim Crow
After Orthodox rabbis, evangelical pastors, Christian businessmen, and Jewish delicatesseneurs refused to participate in queer weddings, Democrats moved to reinstate Jim Crow laws. After all, it was Democrats who enacted Jim Crow laws in the first place, so that had impeccable ideological precedent. These included the followed laws and signage:
Reserved for white liberal passengers
Christians of color served in rear
It shall be unlawful for a black Christian to drink from a liberal whites-only fountain.
It shall be unlawful for an orthodox Jew to swim in a liberal whites-only pool.
All persons licensed to conduct a restaurant shall serve either white liberals exclusively or Christians of color exclusively and shall not sell to the two groups within the same room.
It shall be unlawful to bury, or allow to be buried, any Christians of color upon ground set apart or used for the burial of white liberals.
It shall be unlawful for Christians of color to frequent any park owned or maintained by the city for the benefit, use and enjoyment of white liberals.
Any liberal white women who shall suffer or permit herself to be got with child by a Latino Christian or Chinese Christian shall be sentenced to a reeducation camp.
No person or corporation shall require any liberal white doctor or nurse to work in wards or rooms in hospitals, either public or private, in which Orthodox rabbis are patients.
There shall be maintained by the governing authorities of every hospital maintained by the state for treatment of white liberal and Christian patients separate entrances for white liberal and Christian patients and visitors.
Any Christian instructor caught teaching in any public or private school, college or institution where members of the liberal white establishment are enrolled shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon summary conviction thereof, shall be fired, have their teaching certificate withdrawn, and their property confiscated.
Any person who shall be guilty of printing, publishing or circulating printed, typewritten or written matter urging or presenting for public acceptance or general information, arguments or suggestions in favor of social equality between Christians, Jews, and white liberals shall be sentenced to the gulag.
Any landlord who shall rent any part of any such building to an observant Jew or Christian when such building is already in whole or in part in occupancy by a white liberal person or white liberal alternative family shall be guilty of a felony and on summary conviction thereof shall be sentenced to the gulag.
All observant Jews shall be required to wear a star of David. All evangelicals shall be required to wear a star of Bethlehem.
The Bible shall be banned as hate speech.
Occupy Democrats
I've seen some Occupy Democrats's photos on the RFRA. For instance:
I'm a nurse obligated to provide topnotch care and comfort–even to individuals with freaking swastikas tattooed on their flesh.
If I can take care of Nazi sympathizers, they can service pizza to gay people.
–Isabel Holland
Never mind florists and wedding cakes. What happens if you have a heart attack or you are in an accident and the doctor at the emergency room is one of those republican religious freaks and refuses to provide emergency care in the name of Jesus because he doesn't approve of your lifestyle?
Hitler started killing gays first then he moved onto heterosexuals. Don't be naive. The hate doesn't end with gays. It's just the beginning.
i) To begin with, employees are required to follow company policy, whatever that may be. A family-owned pizzeria isn't comparable.
ii) The pizzeria does serve homosexual customers. What it refuses to do is celebrate homosexuality by participating in a ceremony that glorifies homosexuality.
iii) So we went from not baking a wedding cake to "killing gays." Nothing like liberal logic.
iv) It was Christians who founded hospitals in the first place. We value life. We value the lives of unbelievers. We care about the fate of the lost. That's the point of evangelism.
v) Actually, I don't think doctors have a duty to treat everyone. If somebody like Pablo Escobar suffers life-threatening injuries when his motorcade is ambushed, I don't think physicians are morally obligated to patch him up and send him home so that he can order more hits. I'd say his "lifestyle" disqualifies him from receiving medical care.
In fact, I wouldn't object to their euthanizing him to harvest his organs to save innocent patients. That would be poetic justice for all the people he murdered.
I'm not saying that's practical–unfortunately. I'm just discussing this as a matter of principle.
v) The question at issue is how much gov't coercion is desirable or tolerable in a free society. Would you rather live in a police state? Although the gov't should generally avoid inequitable treatment, that doesn't apply to transactions between private citizens. I can do favors for a friend that I wouldn't do for a stranger. I can treat my wife preferentially.
Pursuing the good life with Pablo Escobar
Keith Parsons is a moralistic militant atheist. He denounces hell and OT "genocide." But, of course, moralistic atheists face a familiar dilemma: unless secular ethics can underwrite moral realism, they have no basis for their attacks on the morality of Scripture. Parsons has attempted to defend secular ethics:
It is important that an ethical theory not be gratuitously at odds with our basic ethical intuitions. For instance, an ethical theory that says that it is acceptable to rape if you can be sure that you will get away with it can hardly be acceptable. The reason that a moral theory, as opposed to a physical theory, has as one purpose the aim to show us how to live well, and to live well means, in part, to be at peace with ourselves and others. We cannot be at peace with ourselves or others if we espouse ethical principles that are in plain conflict with our deepest moral feelings.
i) An obvious problem with that appeal is the lack of universal moral intuitions. Indeed, that's a stock argument for moral skepticism. What people find morally intuitive varies from person to person, time, and place. That's why anthropologists typically espouse cultural relativism.
We can only reject that if we have an objective standard, independent of mere intuition, by which to adjudicate competing moral intuitions.
ii) To take his own illustration: throughout history, armies rape the women in the countries and cities they invade, occupy, or conquer. Was that in "plain conflict" with their "deepest moral feelings?"
What if Parsons alleges that deep down, they know that's wrong? But what's his evidence that their conduct is "gratuitously at odds with their basic ethical intuitions"? He can't infer that from their actions. And unless they confess that it's contrary to their deepest moral feelings, he has no appreciable evidence to suppose they are suppressing their basic ethical intuitions.
Objection: Facts are different from norms. You cannot derive an “ought” from an “is,” as Hume observed long ago. NAEN appeals to the facts of biology to support ethical norms, that is, facts are adduced to justify norms. Yet the facts of biology—or psychology, anthropology, and sociology—can only tell us how we do in fact act. At most, it can only tell us what we do regard as morally worthy or unworthy. What such empirical sciences cannot do is tell us what we should value. Perhaps we do in fact value the well-being of other people, but that fact fails to reveal why it is morally imperative that we do, i.e. why we should do it. Thus, NAEN fails in the most basic requirement of an ethical theory, that is, in providing a basis for moral obligation.
Reply: NAEN does indeed fail to provide a basis for moral obligation if “ought” is required to be based only on a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative is a pure ethical command that defines our duties as universal and necessary and therefore independent of fact or circumstance.
It's unclear to me why he thinks a moral obligation must be independent of fact or circumstance. That may be true of Kantian deontology in particular, but why assume that's a general condition of moral obligation?
For NAEN, ethical norms are hypothetical imperatives that have the form “If you want to actualize good G in situation C, then take steps a, b, c…n.” For instance: “If you want people to thrive, then support education.” But if moral norms are hypothetical imperatives, then we will have to start with some values that are just given, i.e. all we can say about them is that we do in fact value certain things. As Aristotle observed, I might value x because it leads to y and y because it leads to z, but at some point, unless we have an infinite regress, we have to stop with something that, in fact, is just valued for its own sake and is not made valuable by anything else. For Aristotle, that ultimate value was human well-being. For the neo-Aristotelian, it is the well-being of all sentient creatures.
All we would really have to say is that humans are adapted--by natural selection, of course--to live the lives of rational and social creatures and that we are happiest when we are doing so successfully. A person who makes rational decisions and enjoys fruitful personal relationships will--other things being even roughly equal--be much better off than one who decides irrationally and has dysfunctional personal relations. The intellectual and moral virtues should be inculcated because those are the states of mind and character that are conducive to a good life.
i) One problem with his position is that it's a pastiche of Aristotelian ethics, evolutionary ethics, and hedonism. Is there a consistent underlying principle or criterion?
ii) His definition of moral obligation reduces to doing whatever makes you happy. But doesn't the concept of moral duty mean we are sometimes obligated to do something that we don't enjoy doing, just because it's the right thing to do? If "morality" is simply the pursuit of personal happiness, why not drop the talk of morality? What does "moral obligation" add to that characterization? We don't pursue happiness because we ought to be happy, but because we like to be happy. Happiness is an end in itself. Something "we just value for its own sake." So what does duty have to do with it?
Some answer has to be given to Thrasymachus, the character in Plato’s Republic who demands to know why we should not just be unjust and enjoy the benefits of lying, cheating, stealing, and deceiving, when it is to our advantage to do so. We need to have some reason for saying that Thrasymachus was wrong when he alleged that the best way to live would be to be perfectly unjust yet to be thought perfectly just. That way we could get the benefit of being totally self-serving, and yet enjoy the honors and respect accorded to those who exhibit morality. There has to be something unreasonable about such an option.
I think Thrasymachus' question is a bit more basic than the one you mention. Thrasymachus challenges the very basis of morality. Why be good if you can get your goodies by appearing just while successfully lying, cheating, and stealing? Unless it is in some sense more rational to be good than to be bad, then morality is for suckers.
If Thrasymachus was right, and the best, most rational, most rewarding way to live is to be like Vito Corleone--a rich, powerful criminal, with the respect and honor of his community--then morality would be for cynics and chumps. Cynics would deploy moral standards to manipulate the chumps into willingly being exploited and controlled.
I don't see where he refutes cynicism. Take a Latin American drug lord who murders business rivals. Has them tortured to death. Tortures their wives and kids as a deterrent. Even if a brave man is prepared to oppose him, that man won't put his wife and kids at risk. Likewise, the drug lord has his bodyguards kidnap any pretty woman he takes a fancy to, so that he can rape her. And his product (cocaine) destroys individuals and families.
It's unclear why that's wrong on Parsons' construction. That's what the drug lord values. That's what makes him happy.
You can only say that shouldn't be what makes him happy if you have an objective standard of morality. Perhaps Parsons would counter that while that benefits the drug lord, it does so at the cost of the common good. If so, that's a different criterion. What makes one person happy or happier may not make another person happy or happier. So where's the universal standard?
Perhaps Parsons would counter that the business of a Latin American drug lord is a high-risk occupation. You make a lot of enemies. You're unlikely to have a normal lifespan. For instance, Pablo Escobar died a violent death at age 44.
But suppose the risk of a shorter life is the tradeoff for a life of unimaginable indulgence. From a secular standpoint, is it better to die of senile dementia at 80 than die younger, but live it up?
Jason Thibodeau
Morality may be for suckers but that doesn't mean that it doesn't exist.
It seems to me that the proper answer to Thrasymachus is to acknowledge that what morality requires and what self-interests commends often do come apart. Morality, as you suggest, requires impartiality, and this implies that what we are morally obligated to do will at least sometimes conflict with what is in our self-interest. So there really is no problem here once we understand the nature of moral requirements and their connection to impartiality.
So, why should we be good? Because we are morally required to.
Of course, that begs the question. Why should an atheist act contrary to his self-interest?
Saturday, April 04, 2015
Is ancestry destiny?
You shall not bow down to them or serve them, for I the Lord your God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children to the third and the fourth generation of those who hate me (Exod 20:5; par. Deut 5:9).
Does the Bible teach generational curses? This is a popular prooftext for that position.
Does this envision a fatalistic scenario in which God has hexed a family line so that every descendant is doomed to suffer misfortune?
Punishing descendants for the sins of their ancestors seems unjust. Commentators offer different interpretations of this commandment (or prohibition) to relieve the apparent injustice.
i) One question is the significance of the "third and fourth generation."
a) On one interpretation, that's an idiom for "whatever number" or "plenty of."
b) On another interpretation, it denotes extended families–children through great-grandparents. The fourth generation represents the outer limits of the normal human lifespan.
ii) There is sometimes thought to be a contradiction between this verse and Deut 24:14. However, Exod 20:5 is providential whereas Deut 24:14 is jurisprudential. Exod 20:5 is about something God does, whereas Deut 24:14 is about something human judges do. Roughly speaking, it's a difference between sins and crimes. The latter fall under the human administration of justice (i.e. the Hebrew justice system), whereas the former involves God acting directly or through ordinary providence (e.g. history).
iii) On one interpretation, this refers to remedial punishment rather than retributive punishment. That's possible. However, that distinction doesn't address examples like the collective punishment of Achan's family–which some commentators invoke (see below).
iv) On another interpretation, this involves the principle of corporate solidarity and collective responsibility. And we certainly find that principle in Scripture.
However, that amounts to a disguised description rather than an explanation. It essentially paraphrases Exod 20:5 in terms of collective guilt. But that only pushes the question back a step, for that, too, raises the specter of injustice. By itself, it doesn't give a reason for why later generations should be held accountable or liable for the misdeeds of their forebears. So, if the intention of that interpretation is to relieve the apparent injustice, it fails to solve the problem it posed for itself.
That doesn't mean corporate solidarity is necessarily unjust. But merely that invoking that category is not a solution in itself. The category itself must be defended, if that's deployed in theodicy.
v) Another interpretation is that God punishes subsequent generations who repeat the offenses of their forebears. On that interpretation, God isn't punishing the innocent. Rather, they take after their parents and grandparents.
Although that's an appealing solution, it's not without problems:
a) One issue concerns the grammatical object of "those who hate me." Does that refer back to subsequent generations, or to the fathers? I don't find commentators discussing the syntactical question. Unless subsequent generations are, indeed, the grammatical referent, that interpretation is stillborn.
b) Moreover, it seems rather trite or banal to say that God punishes those who hate him. Isn't that a given? He punishes the disobedient.
c) Furthermore, that fails to explain why it's to the "third and fourth generation"–especially in contrast to the "thousandth generation" (v6).
If God is only punishing the generations that continue to hate him, then that could end with the second generation or extend to the tenth generation. It depends on how long subsequent generations hate him. The punishment stops when the last impious generation dies off.
Likewise, why use more restrictive language for duration of punishment (to the third and fourth generation) than the duration of blessing (to the thousandth generation) if the differential factor is who loves him or hates him?
vi) A final interpretation says this refers to descendants who suffer the consequences for their forebear's misdeeds. I think that explanation is in the ballpark, but it could be made more specific.
I suggest we look to the book before Exodus, as a frame of reference. In particular, the history of the patriarchs.
God calls Abraham out of Ur. But Abraham is by no means the sole, or even primary, beneficiary of God's selection. Abraham takes his wife and father with him.
And consider all the inhabitants of Ur whom God didn't choose? They were left in darkness.
God makes Isaac rather than Ishmael the child of promise. That has generally beneficial consequences for Isaac's descendants and generally detrimental consequences for Ishmael's decedents.
Likewise, God favors Jacob over Esau. That, too, has generally beneficial consequences of Jacob's decedents and generally detrimental consequences of Esau's descendants. What happens to the ancestor impacts his descendants.
They veer off into a life apart from God. A tribe or clan that's diverted into a godless existence. They develop their own subculture. Their own social mores. Their own religious beliefs and practices. That's hard to break out of.
When groups fork off and go their separate ways, the members of each group become more alike in their outlook and behavior. For instance, endogamy makes people culturally as well as genetically ingrown.
For better or worse, that internal development becomes entrenched tradition. Consider the gypsies, with their distinctive customs and honor-codes.
In modern times, some localities are more Christian while other localities are more atheistic. What groove you are born into tends to set the pattern for your own life.
Consider the history of the Edomites. Having branched off, the Edomites become enemies of Israel.
I expect that's the sort of thing that lies in the background of Exod 20:5. The threat is tersely stated because that's tacitly illustrated by the past and future history of affected people-groups.
Of course, Scripture also bears witness to God's gracious intervention. God can, and sometimes does, break the vicious cycle. Ancestry isn't destiny.
Friday, April 03, 2015
Authorized to lie
In the course of arguing for absolutism about the wrongness of lying, Jesse Johnson comes to the question of whether a government may lie. One might have thought that, being an absolutist, he would give the same answer to this question as he gave to the others—"No, absolutely not." However, one would have been wrong. For Johnson, lying can be acceptable in this context. He writes,
First, I want to take just a moment to question the distinction Johnson draws between person qua solder and person qua civilian. Since the same person can bear both designations, let's name the person Rob (short for Roberta). Now, Johnson seems to be suggesting that Rob cannot lie when wearing her civilian hat, but Rob may lie when wearing her bureaucrat hat. On this view, there is a circumstance, C, that is morally relevant to some action, A. Thus, C partly determines the moral status of A. Now, let C be something like "Rob's being a platoon commander in a just wartime situation." Let A be "lying to the enemy in order to secure a victory." Thus, Rob's being in C is morally relevant to the wrongness of A; and in this case, it justifies A-ing. But, if we let C* be something like "Rob is at home and hiding a woman from an abusive husband" and A* be "lying to the husband as to the whereabouts of his wife," then C* is morally irrelevant to morally justifying Rob's A*-ing.
Thus, in Johnson's view, some circumstances are morally relevant to the rightness of the (course-grained) act "lying", and some are irrelevant. But this is exactly what the non-absolutist argues! Our position is that there may be some circumstance such that being in it can either justify or excuse an action—lying, in our case. So, to my mind, Johnson simply disagrees with us about the scope of the circumstances that morally bear on the permissibility of lying. We can debate the justifying circumstances, but on the reconstruction I've sketched above, this is an in-house debate between Johnson and us. I thus welcome Johnson into the non-absolutist club.
Second, I'd like to look at the structure of his argument. To my mind, Johnson's argument employs a principle like this:
AUTHO: If X is authorized by God to do Y, and doing Z is necessary to achieving Y, X may do Z.
AUTHO is really just a variant of a popular thought in political philosophy that if R is a right, then whatever is needed to secure R is also a right. A popular iteration is that innocent citizens have a right to life, thus they have a right to self-defense, thus they have a right to own a firearm. Now, I think AUTHO can stand to do with some Chisholming, but I think the general idea is at work in Johnson's argument, and I think I can make the point I want to make sans Chisholming.
So, the way AUTHO works in Johnson's argument is like this:
1. Governments are authorized by God to punish evildoers.
2. Sometimes lying is necessary to punish evildoers.
3. So governments may sometimes lie to evildoers. (1, 2, and AUTHO).
We'll grant that this argument is valid. We'll even grant that it is sound. Now look at a structurally similar argument.
4. Civilian fathers are authorized by God to protect their children from evildoers.
5. Sometimes, lying is necessary to protect your children from evildoers.
6. So civilian fathers may sometimes lie to evildoers. (4, 5, and AUTHO)
Since we granted that the argument constituted by 1–3 was valid, then so is the argument constituted by 4–6. The question that remains is whether 4–6 constitutes a sound argument. I think it does. If Johnson thinks it does not, then he must reject a premise. Premise (6) is simply the conclusion, it is true just in case (4) and (5) are true. So Johnson must challenge (4) or (5). (He may challenge AUTHO, but then I'm not clear on why he thinks governments may justifiably lie, since the Bible doesn't explicitly say that they are, and Johnson's reasoning seems to assume AUTHO. Nevertheless, that's another option, but I'll proceed on the assumption that he accepts AUTHO.) Also, it's important to note that, while I do think (4)–(5) is sound (or more properly, can be shown to be sound on an appropriately Chisholmed AUTHO), I'm mainly arguing for it conditional on the viability of Johnson's argument. That is, given that his argument is good, then this one is likewise.
Challenging (5). Will Johnson challenge the truth of (5)? It seems to me that (5) is clearly true. That is, there is some case such that in the case, the only way to protect your children from an evildoer is to lie to the evildoer. (5) does not take a stand on whether this is right or not, it just states a fact (in the interest of brevity I won't bother to give examples as I assume they're easy enough to come up with). Responding with 1 Cor 13 won't work here either. For again, (5) doesn't assert that you must lie, it just asserts that you must if you are to protect your children. Thus there is still a "way out" of lying. You don't do it and lose your children. So, (5) seems secure.
Challenging (4). That seems to leave (4). Are fathers authorized by God to protect their children? Again, this seems obvious to me. The negation seems flat-out absurd. I won't bother to defend (4), but I think it follows from natural rights as well as the general equity of the sixth commandment. So I think (4) is true.
So I think Johnson should think (4)–(6) is sound. But, I don't think I've scored an easy victory. Surely Johnson will reply that (4) is true, but is a pro tanto right. That is, the right can be defeated. Surely (4) wouldn't morally allow me to do something all-things-considered immoral. And lying is all-things-considered immoral. But this can't be his response, as we saw from the military example, Johnson doesn't think lying is all-things-considered immoral. Why? Because Johnson himself raises a consideration in which lying isn't immoral. So I'm at a loss as to the basis on which he would object to my argument. I don't think I've said all that needs to be said, there's places to push, and it'd be interesting to see where Johnson pushes back. However, I think that any pushing will also push against the example he gives of permissible lying. So it'll be a fine line he has to walk.
A note on hypotheticals.
In his blog post Johnson seems bothered by hypothetical counterexamples to absolutist principles. I have noticed this dislike of hypotheticals in many circles, mainly appearing on the interwebs. Here's a justification for using hypothetical counterexamples. Look at the logic of the absolutist. The absolutist says that moral principle M is true in all cases, there are no possible exceptions. Now, how would one show that M is false? Well, think of any easier case. What if someone said "there are no tigers." How do you show that false? You show them an example of a tiger. But that's a real tiger, not a hypothetical one. Okay, what if someone said "there are no unicorns." How do you show that that's false? You find a unicorn. There aren't any, so it's true. But now, what if someone says this: "Unicorns are impossible." Here they're saying that there couldn't be a unicorn, no matter how the world turns out. Show that this is false is different from showing that the claim "there are no unicorns" is false. Here we might say, "Well, suppose God made a unicorn. This seems like something God can do. Creating such a beast doesn't seem like creating a square circle. There is no logical incoherence in the very idea of a unicorn. Hence, unicorns are not impossible." So here I've shown that the claim "unicorns are impossible" is false, and I did so by appealing to some contrary-to-fact scenario. Similarly, then, when Johnson makes the claim that "lying is impermissible for civilian person S," he's making a similar deontic claim to the above modal claim about the status of unicorns. Saying "X is all-things-considered impermissible" enters a game where I can show that it's false by raising a consideration where our intuition is that X is permissible. In other words, all things considered includes hypothetical things. So the absolutist is saying, "You can't show me a consideration according to which my principle fails."It would be dialectically dishonest to then refuse to allow certain considerations to bear on the truth of the putative absolutely true moral principle.
As absolutist as that sounds, the Bible keeps room in its moral constructs for war time ethics. God uses countries to bear the sword and punish evil doers. It is expected that war includes both deception and violence. An army can fake left and go right, because they are bearing the sword to suppress evil. But that is fundamentally different than a person—a civilian, if you will—who lies because they have a secret moral agenda. Even if their morality is right, it is undercut by lying because (remember) God will never put you in a position where lying is right thing to do.To my mind, this sinks his case. I'll briefly explain why.
First, I want to take just a moment to question the distinction Johnson draws between person qua solder and person qua civilian. Since the same person can bear both designations, let's name the person Rob (short for Roberta). Now, Johnson seems to be suggesting that Rob cannot lie when wearing her civilian hat, but Rob may lie when wearing her bureaucrat hat. On this view, there is a circumstance, C, that is morally relevant to some action, A. Thus, C partly determines the moral status of A. Now, let C be something like "Rob's being a platoon commander in a just wartime situation." Let A be "lying to the enemy in order to secure a victory." Thus, Rob's being in C is morally relevant to the wrongness of A; and in this case, it justifies A-ing. But, if we let C* be something like "Rob is at home and hiding a woman from an abusive husband" and A* be "lying to the husband as to the whereabouts of his wife," then C* is morally irrelevant to morally justifying Rob's A*-ing.
Thus, in Johnson's view, some circumstances are morally relevant to the rightness of the (course-grained) act "lying", and some are irrelevant. But this is exactly what the non-absolutist argues! Our position is that there may be some circumstance such that being in it can either justify or excuse an action—lying, in our case. So, to my mind, Johnson simply disagrees with us about the scope of the circumstances that morally bear on the permissibility of lying. We can debate the justifying circumstances, but on the reconstruction I've sketched above, this is an in-house debate between Johnson and us. I thus welcome Johnson into the non-absolutist club.
Second, I'd like to look at the structure of his argument. To my mind, Johnson's argument employs a principle like this:
AUTHO: If X is authorized by God to do Y, and doing Z is necessary to achieving Y, X may do Z.
AUTHO is really just a variant of a popular thought in political philosophy that if R is a right, then whatever is needed to secure R is also a right. A popular iteration is that innocent citizens have a right to life, thus they have a right to self-defense, thus they have a right to own a firearm. Now, I think AUTHO can stand to do with some Chisholming, but I think the general idea is at work in Johnson's argument, and I think I can make the point I want to make sans Chisholming.
So, the way AUTHO works in Johnson's argument is like this:
1. Governments are authorized by God to punish evildoers.
2. Sometimes lying is necessary to punish evildoers.
3. So governments may sometimes lie to evildoers. (1, 2, and AUTHO).
We'll grant that this argument is valid. We'll even grant that it is sound. Now look at a structurally similar argument.
4. Civilian fathers are authorized by God to protect their children from evildoers.
5. Sometimes, lying is necessary to protect your children from evildoers.
6. So civilian fathers may sometimes lie to evildoers. (4, 5, and AUTHO)
Since we granted that the argument constituted by 1–3 was valid, then so is the argument constituted by 4–6. The question that remains is whether 4–6 constitutes a sound argument. I think it does. If Johnson thinks it does not, then he must reject a premise. Premise (6) is simply the conclusion, it is true just in case (4) and (5) are true. So Johnson must challenge (4) or (5). (He may challenge AUTHO, but then I'm not clear on why he thinks governments may justifiably lie, since the Bible doesn't explicitly say that they are, and Johnson's reasoning seems to assume AUTHO. Nevertheless, that's another option, but I'll proceed on the assumption that he accepts AUTHO.) Also, it's important to note that, while I do think (4)–(5) is sound (or more properly, can be shown to be sound on an appropriately Chisholmed AUTHO), I'm mainly arguing for it conditional on the viability of Johnson's argument. That is, given that his argument is good, then this one is likewise.
Challenging (5). Will Johnson challenge the truth of (5)? It seems to me that (5) is clearly true. That is, there is some case such that in the case, the only way to protect your children from an evildoer is to lie to the evildoer. (5) does not take a stand on whether this is right or not, it just states a fact (in the interest of brevity I won't bother to give examples as I assume they're easy enough to come up with). Responding with 1 Cor 13 won't work here either. For again, (5) doesn't assert that you must lie, it just asserts that you must if you are to protect your children. Thus there is still a "way out" of lying. You don't do it and lose your children. So, (5) seems secure.
Challenging (4). That seems to leave (4). Are fathers authorized by God to protect their children? Again, this seems obvious to me. The negation seems flat-out absurd. I won't bother to defend (4), but I think it follows from natural rights as well as the general equity of the sixth commandment. So I think (4) is true.
So I think Johnson should think (4)–(6) is sound. But, I don't think I've scored an easy victory. Surely Johnson will reply that (4) is true, but is a pro tanto right. That is, the right can be defeated. Surely (4) wouldn't morally allow me to do something all-things-considered immoral. And lying is all-things-considered immoral. But this can't be his response, as we saw from the military example, Johnson doesn't think lying is all-things-considered immoral. Why? Because Johnson himself raises a consideration in which lying isn't immoral. So I'm at a loss as to the basis on which he would object to my argument. I don't think I've said all that needs to be said, there's places to push, and it'd be interesting to see where Johnson pushes back. However, I think that any pushing will also push against the example he gives of permissible lying. So it'll be a fine line he has to walk.
A note on hypotheticals.
In his blog post Johnson seems bothered by hypothetical counterexamples to absolutist principles. I have noticed this dislike of hypotheticals in many circles, mainly appearing on the interwebs. Here's a justification for using hypothetical counterexamples. Look at the logic of the absolutist. The absolutist says that moral principle M is true in all cases, there are no possible exceptions. Now, how would one show that M is false? Well, think of any easier case. What if someone said "there are no tigers." How do you show that false? You show them an example of a tiger. But that's a real tiger, not a hypothetical one. Okay, what if someone said "there are no unicorns." How do you show that that's false? You find a unicorn. There aren't any, so it's true. But now, what if someone says this: "Unicorns are impossible." Here they're saying that there couldn't be a unicorn, no matter how the world turns out. Show that this is false is different from showing that the claim "there are no unicorns" is false. Here we might say, "Well, suppose God made a unicorn. This seems like something God can do. Creating such a beast doesn't seem like creating a square circle. There is no logical incoherence in the very idea of a unicorn. Hence, unicorns are not impossible." So here I've shown that the claim "unicorns are impossible" is false, and I did so by appealing to some contrary-to-fact scenario. Similarly, then, when Johnson makes the claim that "lying is impermissible for civilian person S," he's making a similar deontic claim to the above modal claim about the status of unicorns. Saying "X is all-things-considered impermissible" enters a game where I can show that it's false by raising a consideration where our intuition is that X is permissible. In other words, all things considered includes hypothetical things. So the absolutist is saying, "You can't show me a consideration according to which my principle fails."It would be dialectically dishonest to then refuse to allow certain considerations to bear on the truth of the putative absolutely true moral principle.
Freewill and hell
A reviewer commenting on a recent book by a philosophically sophisticated freewill theist:
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Our other criticism targets Timpe's defense of the traditional doctrine of hell -- or, what he considers a "minimal" version of the traditional doctrine (70). Timpe says he wants to defend the claim that once a person is in hell, it is not possible for her to escape, even on the assumption that those in hell retain their free will, and that God does not cease to offer them the grace necessary for salvation. As with his account of heaven, Timpe defends what has been called a "settled character theory of hell" (71). Following Jonathan Kvanvig (2011: ch. 6, 14), he proposes that "Presence in hell is a result of one's choices, and in the process of choosing in such a way as to end up there, one turns oneself into the kind of person for whom it is psychologically impossible to choose to leave" (71). The damned have become the kind of people who will never freely choose to stop resisting God's offer of grace (72). This seems a very unfortunate state of affairs, and one might wonder, if God truly cares about all creatures and wants what is best for them, why God doesn't overpower their will and make them into the kind of people they ought to be -- the kind of people fit for union with God in heaven. Timpe's response is that to be in union with God, one must love God; but love, he says, requires an act of free will; it cannot be imposed from the outside (81). However, this answer, while it may seem initially plausible, raises a number of difficulties.
First, Timpe's account of freedom does not commit him to the claim that love requires an act of free will. His view is consistent with the possibility that we might be causally determined to love. The proximal causes of such love would, presumably, be "within" us -- that is, arising from our own character. Our attractions, interests, desires and the like might draw us to someone whose personality or other features especially appeal to us, and this might be the basis of our love of them -- of our caring about them, wanting to be intimate with them, and so on. But then it is unclear why, for our attitude toward them to count as true love, the character grounding our love must be freely formed to begin with. So long as a person is motivated in the characteristic ways by appropriate feelings, beliefs, and desires, she would seem to be in love, no matter what the ultimate origin of these motivating states of mind. Furthermore, it seems that in fact we often are determined to love -- that is, to truly love -- other people in our lives, such as our family members (Pereboom 2001: 202-04).
Second, it's not clear that, on Timpe's characterization of the state of the damned, they really are free, even according to his account of freedom. In responding to one objection regarding the implausibility of thinking that anyone would eternally choose to reject God, Timpe discusses the "bondage of sin" that those in the fallen state are under, and quotes Raymond VanArragon (2011): "it may be possible for [a person] to freely make some choice . . . which has the consequence of rendering her forever unable to freely accept God. . . . Such a situation may be similar to that of a drug user who crosses the threshold into uncontrollable addiction" (80). But while someone could, through her own free choices, come to such a state of uncontrollable addiction, we think it's implausible that in that state the agent would still be free, contrary to what Timpe maintains (70). Indeed, the idea that she is in bondage to her addiction suggests the opposite: that she has freely brought herself into a state in which she lacks freedom. This is not to say that an agent must be able to do otherwise at the time of her action to count as acting freely, but only that one who is motivated to take heroin solely by an addiction is not truly the source of her action. The same might be said of an agent whose sin has left her in such a state that it is eternally impossible for her to appreciate divine goodness and desire union with God.
But suppose that Timpe is right, that it is possible for someone to eternally freely choose to remain in hell. A third question is: Why God couldn't simply momentarily take away her freedom, and then give it back to her after converting her? Here's an analogy: suppose someone, of her own free will, becomes addicted to heroin, and refuses to give it up. And suppose for it to be psychologically possible for her to see the good of maintaining her job, marriage, and other relationships and activities, she must give up the drug. Imagine, then, that her husband forcibly takes the drug away from her and commits her to therapy that rids her of her addiction. She then regains the freedom to choose to continue her relationships and activities, or to end them. Couldn't God do something similar with those who would otherwise be eternally damned -- wipe the slate clean, as it were, and give them a second chance at redemption?
Finally, even supposing that God could not take away and then give back people's freedom in this way, and supposing that, without freedom, they would not be able to enter a loving relationship with God, we wonder why God must consign them to hell, rather than permanently take away their freedom and put them in some other place -- a place where there is no sin or suffering. If, as Timpe admits, freedom is not an intrinsic good (84), but valuable mainly insofar as it makes possible the development of moral virtue (108) and the ability to be in union with God, then on the assumption that certain people will not use their freedom for these goods, but only for ill, what sense does it make for God to allow them to retain their freedom and be in such an unfortunate state?
Defending nihilism
Here are some replies I gave in response to a commenter on this post:
brownmamba:
"First, if you're willing to make the quest for truth to be a complete joke by removing a major contender, why not just deny the premise that atheism entails nihilism instead."
Your objection is hopelessly superficial. If atheism implicates moral and existential nihilism, then it's atheism that makes the quest for truth a complete joke. Indeed, a bad joke.
"In other words, instead of putting your head in the sand regarding ontological questions…"
What's wrong with putting one's head in the sand if moral and existential nihilism supply the frame of reference? Your nearsighted disapproval confirms the fact that you fail to grasp the intellectual consequences of the issue under review.
"Second, your last paragraph seems to imply that you think the quest for truth should be limited to the Bible."
In context, I'm responding to Licona. The question is whether there's a fallback to Christianity.
"The problem is that the Bible makes claims and touches upon issues that cross into scientific territory."
Which I never denied.
"For example, the order of creation found in Genesis. What happens when something like fossil evidence refutes such claims? (Which it has.)"
i) To begin with, I don't assume that the sequence in Gen 1 is strictly chronological. For instance, the relation between Day 1 and Day 4 seems to be a deliberate anachronism.
ii) In principle, the fossil record could be a part of God initiating the story in medias res–just as historical movies begin at a certain point in the ongoing history of the world, but have an implicit backstory.
"Moreover, take the doctrine of the soul. What happens if we look around and find nothing but physics?"
Evidently, you fail to grasp the hard problem of consciousness. Likewise, you're evidently ignorant of empirical evidence for the independent existence of the soul (e.g. OBEs, NDEs, apparitions).
"I can't help but feel that there's a reason as to why there is no consensus on what the Bible teaches;why when someone like Issac Newton tries to extract scientific knowledge from it, it's to no avail; why sections making predictions, such as the Book of Revelations, are so vague that even sophisticated believers, such as William Lane Craig, have no idea what it means."
Which contradicts your contention that the Bible makes claims which cross into scientific territory. Can't have it both ways. Either the Bible is too vague to clearly teach anything or else Bible teaching is clearly wrong.
"If by nihilism, you mean…"
I said what I meant by nihilism by including adjectives: "moral" and "existential." To elaborate:
Ethical nihilism or moral nihilism rejects the possibility of absolute moral or ethical values. Instead, good and evil are nebulous, and values addressing such are the product of nothing more than social and emotive pressures. Existential nihilism is the notion that life has no intrinsic meaning or value, and it is, no doubt, the most commonly used and understood sense of the word today.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/nihilism/#H1
While nihilism is often discussed in terms of extreme skepticism and relativism, for most of the 20th century it has been associated with the belief that life is meaningless. Existential nihilism begins with the notion that the world is without meaning or purpose. Given this circumstance, existence itself--all action, suffering, and feeling--is ultimately senseless and empty.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/nihilism/#H3
In his study of meaninglessness, Donald Crosby writes that the source of modern nihilism paradoxically stems from a commitment to honest intellectual openness. "Once set in motion, the process of questioning could come to but one end, the erosion of conviction and certitude and collapse into despair" (The Specter of the Absurd, 1988). When sincere inquiry is extended to moral convictions and social consensus, it can prove deadly, Crosby continues, promoting forces that ultimately destroy civilizations.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/nihilism/#H4
Back to brownmamba:
If I make my bed in hell
The Bible depicts hell as a place (and condition) to be avoided at all cost. But aside from terrifying imagery, it leaves many of the details unstated.
Pious imagination has attempted to pencil in the details. Most famously or infamously in the case of Dante.
Although Scripture is clear on the eternal duration and unmitigated dreadfulness of hell, the lack of greater specificity leaves us free to speculate on possible scenarios. This can also be useful when rebutting calumnies against the alleged injustice of everlasting damnation.
In a Star Trek episode ("Shore Leave"), the landing party beams down an alien amusement park where "you have to only imagine your fondest wishes, either old ones you wish to relive or new ones, anything at all. Battle, fear, love, triumph. Anything that pleases you can be made to happen."
Sounds like fun. However, the landing party doesn't know that when it first beams down. It's fine if they are thinking about an old flame or the talking rabbit from Alice in Wonderland. If, however, they are thinking about a tiger or samurai warrior, then it's dangerous.
The episode fudges at the end by saying the crew will have a marvelous time so long as they guard their thoughts. Problem is, that's impractical advice. We have limited ability to control our thoughts. Our imagination is a storehouse of memories and associations. Spontaneous thoughts pop into our consciousness throughout the day. It's not something we can consistently suppress.
In Voyage of the Dawn Treader, C. S. Lewis has a more realistic treatment of this theme: the Dark Island or "The Island where Dreams Come True." That sounds tantalizing, but it quickly devolves into a never-ending nightmare.
In principle, that's how God could set up hell. Each of the damned might create his own private hell out of his very own, lurid imagination. His evil mind and evil memories become the source of hellish landscape and hellish creatures which bedevil it. He is self-tormented as hidden replicators objectify the contents of his twisted mind and subconsciousness.
The more evil you are, the more you suffer–and your evil is the raw material for what you suffer. Poetic justice.
The Hope Of Worms
It's important to recognize how unexpected and objectionable Jesus' crucifixion and resurrection were to the world Christianity was born into. Critics often parallel Jesus to the dying and rising gods of paganism, but Christianity didn't originate among pagans. It came out of and agreed with a highly anti-pagan form of Judaism (Acts 17:23, Romans 1:22-3, 1 Corinthians 10:14-22, Galatians 4:8, Ephesians 2:12, etc.). And the manner in which Jesus died and rose was repulsive to most pagans, so drawing vague parallels to dying and rising gods, without further qualification, is misleading. Jews also found crucifixion revolting, and they weren't expecting anybody to be resurrected prior to the general resurrection in the end times.
But there's a more direct way of addressing this issue. What did the early Christian and non-Christian sources commenting specifically on Christianity say about crucifixion and resurrection?
But there's a more direct way of addressing this issue. What did the early Christian and non-Christian sources commenting specifically on Christianity say about crucifixion and resurrection?
Specious parallels
A reader emails in response to an earlier post on this topic:
“You guys were perfectly happy to use the government to enforce your views when you were in the majority. Live by the coercive power of the state, die by the coercive power of the state.”I don’t think this symmetry is real. A “ban” on same-sex marriage is not like, say, a ban on marijuana: No same-sex couple gets fined or goes to jail for calling themselves married, or having a ceremony marking their commitment, and anyone is free to officiate at such a ceremony. The campaign against same-sex marriage never sought to use coercion that way. It never sought to make it illegal to provide wedding cakes to same-sex couples. Even widening our focus to the culture rather than the law, it never, to my knowledge, sought to get anyone fired from a corporation for favoring same-sex marriage.
http://www.nationalreview.com/node/416376/print
Thursday, April 02, 2015
Responding to an objection
Steve Hays has already responded to this post about whether it's ever okay to lie. I wanted to quote one particular section of the original post (not Steve's response) and comment on it:
In any case, when I first read this article earlier today, it sparked something in the back of my mind that I couldn't quite put my finger on. Tonight, as I was preparing to wind down for the evening, it finally clicked into place what I was reminded of:
This passage in Judges was not included for us to emulate Jephthah's behavior. The entire book of Judges is predicated on the reality of the concluding verse: "In those days there was no king in Israel. Everyone did what was right in his own eyes" (Judges 21:25). So I think we have a circumstance here where plainly we are told that if the only options available are to sin small or to sin great, the right thing to do is to sin small. And obviously, it goes without saying that Jephthah's original vow should never have been uttered--that was the initial sinful action. But given the reality that he had set himself up in a lose/lose situation, the moral action would have been for him to have taken the punishment for breaking the vow instead of carrying out evil on his daughter.
Now, if this is the case in the circumstance where we can put some culpability upon Jephthah for his rash vow, let us keep that in mind when we think of the classic Nazis asking if you're hiding Jews. If it be a sin to lie in that circumstance, then we ought to be willing to take the punishment for the sinful lie instead of sinning by handing over those whom we have an obligation to protect.
But again, I maintain that it is not a sin to lie in such a circumstance, and it is Rahab that shows that. The article I'm responding to concludes: "Rahab is always held out as an example of faith for siding with God’s people, and is never held out as an example of lying for the glory of God." There's only one problem with that. James commends her for the actions she took, said actions being...lying: "Rahab the prostitute [was] justified by works when she received the messengers and sent them out by another way".
It is Rahab's action of sending the spies and their pursuers in different directions that is the basis for James to conclude she was justified here. While it is true that the Bible sometimes reports events without stating a moral judgment at times (Jephthah's story is an example of one such time, in fact), I cannot see any way in which it is possible to separate out Rahab's actions in saving the spies from her lie. The lie is the only reason that any of the things she did saved the spies. Without that lie, the spies would have been found and killed. There is no way around that simple, brute fact.
Again, this type of event is not going to be frequent (thank God). But when it does happen, there's no need to burden someone's conscience by making a sin out of what is actually the morally good thing to do.
But this takes us back to the Jews hiding in the living room. What then? Well, when scheming up hypothetical ethical dilemmas, you have to remember that hypotheticals are literally problematic. They are contrived precisely because they expose a supposed weakness in a person’s argument. So if you are going to play the hypothetical game, remember that God is sovereign, and with that comes his promise that every instance of temptation he will always provide a way of escape (1 Corinthians 10:13)… and that escape is NEVER going to involve sinning. God does not open your escape hatch through sin. In fact, in the context of 1 Corinthians 10, sin is the very thing that God gives you an escape from. Thus, in any hypothetical moral dilemma you need to remember that there is an unstated contingent—namely, God will give you a way out that does not involve sin.(emphasis in original)As Steve's already pointed out, this is hardly a hypothetical given that it literally happened that Nazis asked people if there were any Jews on their premises and people actually did have to decide whether to lie or give them up.
In any case, when I first read this article earlier today, it sparked something in the back of my mind that I couldn't quite put my finger on. Tonight, as I was preparing to wind down for the evening, it finally clicked into place what I was reminded of:
Then the Spirit of the Lord was upon Jephthah, and he passed through Gilead and Manasseh and passed on to Mizpah of Gilead, and from Mizpah of Gilead he passed on to the Ammonites. And Jephthah made a vow to the Lord and said, “If you will give the Ammonites into my hand, then whatever comes out from the doors of my house to meet me when I return in peace from the Ammonites shall be the Lord's, and I will offer it up for a burnt offering.” So Jephthah crossed over to the Ammonites to fight against them, and the Lord gave them into his hand. And he struck them from Aroer to the neighborhood of Minnith, twenty cities, and as far as Abel-keramim, with a great blow. So the Ammonites were subdued before the people of Israel. Then Jephthah came to his home at Mizpah. And behold, his daughter came out to meet him with tambourines and with dances. She was his only child; besides her he had neither son nor daughter. And as soon as he saw her, he tore his clothes and said, “Alas, my daughter! You have brought me very low, and you have become the cause of great trouble to me. For I have opened my mouth to the Lord, and I cannot take back my vow” (Judges 11:29-35, ESV).Now most Christians that I have corresponded with and read on this topic agree that Jephthah's vow was stupid, evil, and should have been broken. Instead, he sacrificed his daughter rather than break his vow. The reason I bring this up in this discussion, however, is because I have to ask: how exactly did God provide a way out for Jephthah here? If the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 10 being presented is correct (and I do not believe it is), then there should have been a way out for Jephthah to not have to sin by breaking his vow whilst still sparing his daughter's life. But it seems plain to me that Jephthah's only option was to either sin by breaking his vow or sin by committing murder, and obviously murder is a worse sin than breaking a vow, so the vow should have been broken.
This passage in Judges was not included for us to emulate Jephthah's behavior. The entire book of Judges is predicated on the reality of the concluding verse: "In those days there was no king in Israel. Everyone did what was right in his own eyes" (Judges 21:25). So I think we have a circumstance here where plainly we are told that if the only options available are to sin small or to sin great, the right thing to do is to sin small. And obviously, it goes without saying that Jephthah's original vow should never have been uttered--that was the initial sinful action. But given the reality that he had set himself up in a lose/lose situation, the moral action would have been for him to have taken the punishment for breaking the vow instead of carrying out evil on his daughter.
Now, if this is the case in the circumstance where we can put some culpability upon Jephthah for his rash vow, let us keep that in mind when we think of the classic Nazis asking if you're hiding Jews. If it be a sin to lie in that circumstance, then we ought to be willing to take the punishment for the sinful lie instead of sinning by handing over those whom we have an obligation to protect.
But again, I maintain that it is not a sin to lie in such a circumstance, and it is Rahab that shows that. The article I'm responding to concludes: "Rahab is always held out as an example of faith for siding with God’s people, and is never held out as an example of lying for the glory of God." There's only one problem with that. James commends her for the actions she took, said actions being...lying: "Rahab the prostitute [was] justified by works when she received the messengers and sent them out by another way".
It is Rahab's action of sending the spies and their pursuers in different directions that is the basis for James to conclude she was justified here. While it is true that the Bible sometimes reports events without stating a moral judgment at times (Jephthah's story is an example of one such time, in fact), I cannot see any way in which it is possible to separate out Rahab's actions in saving the spies from her lie. The lie is the only reason that any of the things she did saved the spies. Without that lie, the spies would have been found and killed. There is no way around that simple, brute fact.
Again, this type of event is not going to be frequent (thank God). But when it does happen, there's no need to burden someone's conscience by making a sin out of what is actually the morally good thing to do.
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