Olson's evolving God

Arminian theologian Roger Olson on God's moral evolution:

Roger Olson 

Let me recommend a book I've reviewed and recommended here before: Kent Sparks' Sacred Word, Broken Word. It's a whole different look at parts of the OT. Jesus said that Moses allowed divorce for almost any reason "because of the hardness of their hearts." I'm not sure what that meant. But, apparently, God changed his mind about some of the things he commanded and allowed in "OT times." All that is to say that I really don't know 1) If God really commanded the Israelites to stone disobedient children (for example), and 2) If he did, why. I don't lose any sleep over it at my age. :) 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/05/a-step-in-the-right-direction-a-public-policy-statement-about-capital-punishment-in-america/#comment-1417471367

The zero-sum game in evolution

http://www.whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2014/06/the_zerosum_game_in_human_evol.html

Coming out videos

SBC pastor Danny Cortez is making waves:

In August of 2013, on a sunny day at the beach, I realized I no longer believed in the traditional teachings regarding homosexuality.
As I was trying to figure out what to tell my church, I was driving in the car with my 15-year-old son Drew when a song on the radio came on. I asked Drew who sang it, and he said, “Mackelmore.” And then he asked me why I was interested in it. I told him that I liked the song. He was startled and he asked me if I knew that the song’s message was gay affirming. I told him that I did know and that’s why I liked the song. I also told him that I no longer believed what I used to believe.
As we got out of the car, I could tell he was puzzled. so I asked him what he was thinking. In the parking lot, he told me in a nervous voice, “Dad, I’m gay.” My heart skipped a beat and I turned towards him and we gave one another the biggest and longest hug as we cried. And all I could tell him was that I loved him so much and that I accepted him just as he is.
I couldn’t help but think that my 15 year journey was in preparation for that moment. If it wasn’t for this 15 year journey and my change in theology, I may have destroyed my son through reparative therapy. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/johnshore/2014/05/southern-baptist-pastor-accepts-his-gay-son-changes-his-church/

It's tough to be a parent. That said, let's consider a few comparisons:

i) There are devout Christian parents who raise their kids in the faith, yet their kids leave the faith. That's heartbreaking. 

Is the proper reaction to say, "Well, I used to think it was all-important to follow Jesus, but now that my own kid turned his back on Christ, I guess it's not terribly important after all." Or is the proper reaction to continue to pray for your straying child?

ii) As a parent, you oppose cocaine and heroine. Suppose your son or daughter becomes addicted. Do you suddenly reverse your position on drugs? "Well, I used to think a heroine habit was a bad thing, but now that my daughter is a junkie, I guess it's not so bad after all."

iii) Imagine if you're the parents of Ted Bundy or Jeffrey Dahmer. Imagine what it feels like to discover that your son is a serial killer. 

Does the fact that your son has been outed, or come out of the closet, as a serial killer, change your views on serial murder? "Well, I used to think serial murder, necrophilia, and cannibalism were evil, but now that I find out that that's what my son is into, I accept him just the way he is." 

Roger Olson's made-up morality

Once again, Arminian theologian Roger Olson, who's easily the most commonly featured theologian at the Society of Evangelical Arminians, has chimed in on the subject of capital punishment:

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/05/a-step-in-the-right-direction-a-public-policy-statement-about-capital-punishment-in-america/

I now want to repeat my long-standing opinion, expressed here several times, that Christians ought to oppose capital punishment as theologically and ethically wrong. Given some recent events, it is not a stretch to say it is also barbaric—evidence of a lack of civilization (humane society).

The oft-heard claim that "civilized" societies don't execute criminals begs the question. Indeed, it's a tacit admission that the death-penalty opponent can't present a reasoned argument for his position, so he falls back on the circular, sociological appeal. 

I have given my reasons here before. I will only repeat two of them. First, it is simply not possible ever to know with absolute certainty that a person committed the crime of which he or she is accused. An individual eye witness may “know” with ninety-nine percent certainty, but it is impossible for a jury or a judge (not eyewitnesses) to know with one hundred percent certainty. 

i) It's not possible to know with absolute certainty that murderous convicts won't escape to kill again.

ii) It's not possible to know with absolute certainty that liberals can be trusted to keep their word when they offer "life without possibility of parole" as an alternative to the death penalty. It's not possible to know with absolute certainly that furloughed prisoners won't commit murder. 

And that isn't just hypothetical. For instance:

And the most controversial part of the program, the practice of giving furloughs to first-degree murderers sentenced to life without parole, was the result of a decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which held that such inmates were eligible under the 1972 law that created the program because the statute did not exclude them. 

For all of that, the Dukakis administration long supported, and at times actively defended, the practice of giving furloughs to inmates serving life terms without parole. In 1976 Mr. Dukakis refused to sign legislation that would have barred such prisoners from receiving furloughs and would have required a number of other restrictions. 

A 1984 survey by the Corrections Compendium found that 38 states offered some form of home furloughs. A survey this year found that 33 states allow some kind of community release program for prisoners serving a life sentence, according to the compendium, which is published by the Contact Center, a criminal justice information clearinghouse in Lincoln, Neb. 

But Massachusetts was the only state to permit furloughs for prisoners serving a sentence of life without parole, the penalty for first-degree murder in that state. 'Distinction Without a Difference' 

In an interview last week Mr. Dukakis called that a ''distinction without a difference.'' He said that ''premeditated murder is premeditated murder,'' adding that 23 states permit people convicted of first-degree murder to participate in furlough programs. 

http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/05/us/prison-furloughs-in-massachusetts-threaten-dukakis-record-on-crime.html?pagewanted=print

iii) Likewise, the next step, after abolishing capital punishment, is to abolish life imprisonment:

http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/07/10/2282321/top-european-human-rights-court-deems-life-in-prison-without-parole-inhuman-and-degrading/

iv) It's not possible to know without absolute certainly that a lifer won't murder a fellow inmate–or prison guard. Indeed, absent the death penalty, a lifer has nothing to lose by committing murder in prison. 

Second, from a specifically Christian perspective, unnecessary killing is simply always wrong. And capital punishment today is always unnecessary. We have prisons fully capable of keeping violent people off the streets and away from potential victims.

The "necessity" of capital punishment is not to prevent crime (although that's a fringe benefit), but to exact justice. A moral necessity. 

I will go so far as to say, as a Christian theologian, that, in my opinion, a person who participates in an execution is sinning. I do not know how God deals with that, but all sin is serious and killing especially so. (I do believe there are degrees of sin in God’s eyes and killing is certainly very serious.) I would warn a person who participates in an execution at any point in the process—from mixing the chemicals to be used to actually pushing down the plunger that sends the chemicals into the convicted person’s body—that he or she is grievously sinning and needs to repent and stop that activity.

Olson has gone into business for himself, concocting his own social morality, which he imposes on fellow Christians–without any divine warrant for his impudent moralizing and judgmentalism. 

Intersex

I'm going to comment on this post by Arminian theologian Randal Rauser:

http://randalrauser.com/2014/05/male-and-female-he-created-them-but-not-always-christianity-and-intersexuality-2/

I assume Rauser is using this as a wedge tactic to justify homosexuality and transgenderism in the church. 

i) Should we start classifying everyone with a genetic defect as a distinct identity? 

ii) If someone has an untreatable genetic defect, the church should, of course, welcome them. Take people who suffer from dwarfism. That's hardly analogous to homosexual behavior or transgenderism. 

iii) Rauser acts as if corrective surgery for hermaphroditism imposes an arbitrary sexual identity on the patient. But from what I've read, interex patients usually have a male or female chromosomal identity. 

iv) There's nothing wrong with parents making medical decisions for their babies or young children. If their child has a treatable/curable genetic defect, parents ought to act in the best interests of the child (assuming the procedure is affordable and not too risky). 

Daniel's 70-week prophecy

24 “Seventy weeks are decreed about your people and your holy city, to finish the transgression, to put an end to sin, and to atone for iniquity, to bring in everlasting righteousness, to seal both vision and prophet, and to anoint a most holy place. 25 Know therefore and understand that from the going out of the word to restore and build Jerusalem to the coming of an anointed one, a prince, there shall be seven weeks. Then for sixty-two weeks it shall be built again with squares and moat, but in a troubled time. 26 And after the sixty-two weeks, an anointed one shall be cut off and shall have nothing. And the people of the prince who is to come shall destroy the city and the sanctuary. Its end shall come with a flood, and to the end there shall be war. Desolations are decreed. 27 And he shall make a strong covenant with many for one week, and for half of the week he shall put an end to sacrifice and offering. And on the wing of abominations shall come one who makes desolate, until the decreed end is poured out on the desolator” (Dan 9:24-27).

I'm going to make a brief observation about this famous, disputed prophecy. Some scholars think this denotes a literal sequence of years. Other scholars think the numbers are symbolic. 

Certainly the number seven is a figure with symbolic connotations in Scripture. At the same time, it can be literal. Jews had a literal 6-day workweek, followed by the Sabbath. Likewise, the Jubilee was a literal cycle.

A prima facie problem with the literal interpretation is picking a terminus ad quo that yields a meaningful terminus ad quem. Although on one reckoning, the prophecy gets us remarkably close to the public ministry of Christ, that is not exact. Is that just a remarkable coincidence? 

Is a ballpark figure good enough, or is this a case in which some scholars reason back from their desired result, and cut corners to make it fit? On the face of it, this has the appearance of special pleading. And some scholars feel that mismatch justifies the symbolic approach. 

There are, however, two objections to that conclusion:

i) Our reconstruction of ancient chronology is not a sure thing. The dates may well have a certain give, considering the uncertainty of dating ancient events. It's possible that the imprecision is due, not to the actual interval, but to our rickety chronology. So we should make allowance for a bit of leeway in our calculations.

ii) More to the point, there may be a false dichotomy between literal and symbolic numbers. What if Daniel is using round numbers? Although round numbers are inexact, round numbers are real numbers. They aren't purely symbolic.

Daniel could be rounding the numbers for symbolic reasons. Yet it would still denote a genuine chronological interval, a genuine chronological sequence. 

That would explain why, on one reckoning, the terminus ad quem corresponds so closely to the public ministry of Christ, even if it's a few years off. 

When the Son of Man comes

23 When they persecute you in one town, flee to the next, for truly, I say to you, you will not have gone through all the towns of Israel before the Son of Man comes (Mt 10:23).

Liberal critics and outright unbelievers cite this as a classic case of failed prophecy. Attempts to defend the prophecy may look like special pleading. 

However, even if this appears to be a failed prophecy to the modern reader, surely Matthew didn't think this was a failed prophecy. So our interpretation should be consistent with his understanding of the prophecy. That's not special pleading. 

The liberal interpretation actually poses a dilemma for liberal critics. Liberal critics don't think Matthew was written by the apostle. They think it was written by an anonymous redactor. They date it late. Raymond Brown thinks Matthew might have been written anytime between 70-100 AD, although he favors 80-90. Finally, they don't think there's any presumption that Jesus actually spoke the words attributed to him in the Gospels. The authors exercised the literary license to invent sayings which they put on the lips of Jesus. But all these assumptions generate tensions for the liberal interpretation.

To begin with, the wording of 10:23 harkens back to the introductory verses:

5 These twelve Jesus sent out, instructing them, “Go nowhere among the Gentiles and enter no town of the Samaritans, 6 but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. 7 And proclaim as you go, saying, ‘The kingdom of heaven is at hand.’ 8 Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out demons. You received without paying; give without pay. 9 Acquire no gold or silver or copper for your belts, 10 no bag for your journey, or two tunics or sandals or a staff, for the laborer deserves his food. 11 And whatever town or village you enter, find out who is worthy in it and stay there until you depart. 12 As you enter the house, greet it. 13 And if the house is worthy, let your peace come upon it, but if it is not worthy, let your peace return to you. 14 And if anyone will not receive you or listen to your words, shake off the dust from your feet when you leave that house or town. 15 Truly, I say to you, it will be more bearable on the day of judgment for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah than for that town.

This seems to envisage a short-term mission. Something that not only took place within the lifetime of the Twelve, but within the lifetime of Jesus. Something that happened during the public ministry of Christ. 

Because Jesus can't be everywhere at once, he dispatches the Twelve as an extension of his own ministry. They are tasked to evangelize Galilee. So the context seems to be sending them out for a few weeks or months. They will rejoin him after they've completed their circuit. And, indeed, as we continue to read the narrative, the Twelve are back with Christ. 

Yet liberal critics think 10:23 envisions the Parousia. But on that view, all this happened, or failed to happen, decades before Matthew was written. The mission in 10:5ff. took place  around 30 AD. If, according to liberal dating, Matthew was written 50-60 years later (give or take), how could Matthew believe the Parousia occurred in the early 30s? How long would it take the Twelve to canvass Galilee? Not decades. Or even years. 

Conversely, if this is a failed expectation, why would Matthew record or invent a failed prophecy? 

If, however, Mt 10:23 refers to a long-range event, then when did it fail to come to pass? On the face of it, vv16-22 describes a different, more expansive mission–which includes outreach to the Gentile world. One explanation is that Matthew combined two different speeches: one about Jewish mission, the other about Gentile mission. 

That complicates the question of when v23 refers to. But it's not as if vv16-22 has a specific time-frame. It's open-ended. Assuming (ex hypothesi) that v23 denotes the Parousia, it's the return of Christ which abruptly terminates that mission. 

So this poses a dilemma for the liberal interpretation. If v23 reverts back to vv5-15, then it's too early, too self-enclosed, to fail. But if v23 takes in the more sweeping view of vv16-22, then there's nothing to limit that to a 1C Parousia.  

It isn't necessary to settle on the right interpretation to show that the liberal interpretation is wrong. That's a separate issue.

Because the "coming of the Son of Man" alludes to Dan 7:13-14, R. T. France, thinks this refers to the Ascension. Conversely, Chamblin thinks the fall of Jerusalem is a type of the final judgment. In typology, certain kinds of events are both prophet and repeatable. 

I'd also like to make a general observation on apparent cases of failed prophecy. I think many Bible readers forget that most Bible prophecies originate in visionary revelation. 

The predictive prophecy is usually based on images of the future. Sometimes figurative imagery, sometimes more literal.

Images don't contain dates. Foreseeing the future doesn't tell the seer when that will happen. There's no time-index.

It's something you may recognize after the fact, but not before.

When critics say Bible prophecies failed, they overlook the mode of revelation. Taken by itself, an image of the future can't fail, in the sense that it doesn't come with date stamp. 

Rather, it's a question of how and when the pictures of the future will align future events. That may be obvious once it happens. That's rarely obvious before it happens. 

Therefore, while it's often easy to identify a fulfilled prophecy, it's often hard to distinguish between a failed prophecy and outstanding prophecy. Considered ahead of time, an unfulfilled prophecy which has yet to transpire may look just like a failed prophecy. That's a classic case of "time will tell." 

Take this passage:

17 The seventy-two returned with joy, saying, “Lord, even the demons are subject to us in your name!” 18 And he said to them, “I saw Satan fall like lightning from heaven (Lk 11:17-18).

Commentators (e.g. J. Nolland, C. F. Evans) demonstrate that this is probably a visionary revelation. Exorcism represents the incipient defeat of Satan's kingdom. And the image of his fall from heaven symbolized that fact. 

But the image all by itself doesn't tell you when that happened. You need more context to determine what past, present, or future event that matches. 

In this case, Luke mentions the visionary source of the revelation–perhaps because it's such an arresting image. But in many cases, the visionary source may be an unstated presupposition. 

Does God have covenantal properties?

http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2014/06/what-motivates-oliphints-proposals.html

The Bar-Kokhba revolt

One of the problems I have with preterism is the way preterists selectively and arbitrarily single out the fall of Jerusalem in AD 70 as God's judgement on apostate Israel. Let's grant, for the sake of argument, that Revelation, the Olivet Discourse, and 1 Thes 2 center on God's judgment of apostate Israel. Why think those prophecies begin and end with the Great Revolt (66-70)? From what I've read, the Bar-Kokhba revolt (132-135) was at least as devastating as the Great Revolt:

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/revolt1.html

http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/2471-bar-kokba-and-bar-kokba-war

Indeed, there's a sense in which the Bar-Kokhba revolt was even more devastating. After the Great Revolt, Jews still had the optimism and resources to stage two more wars of liberation. But the Bar-Kokhba revolt crushed their nationalistic aspirations and left them dispossessed in a way the Great Revolt did not:

After 135 CE, when the rebellion was crushed, Hadrian acted even more ruthlessly and set about on a campaign to wipe away not only the remnants of the Jewish people but the memory that they had ever existed. In effect, he decided to “solve the Jewish problem” once and for all. 

He realized that the final solution to the Jewish problem lay not only in killing Jews but in destroying Judaism. As long as the Jews had their religion no one would ever really be able to eradicate them entirely. Therefore, he issued decrees that outlawed Judaism on the pain of death. The decrees of Hadrian were the most fearsome in history against the Jewish people. 

Teaching Torah was the worst “crime” a Jew could commit under these circumstances. Jewish tradition is rich with stories about the “10 Martyrs Murdered by the [Roman] Government.” It is during Hadrian’s reign that this happened. He was not content merely killing these great rabbis, but doing it in public display of brutality and torture, hoping to crush the spirit of the Jewish people. Foremost among the martyrs was Rabbi Akiva.Hadrian did not stop there. He forbade mention of the name Jerusalem and renamed the holy city, Aelia Capitolina. He also forbade Jews from living there. Most notable of all, he employed an army of slaves to plow over the Temple Mount. He simply lowered it almost 1,000 feet. When one goes to Jerusalem today, the mountains around the Temple Mount (such as the Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus) are taller. Before Hadrian, however, Mount Moriah (the mountain upon with the Temple stood) was the highest mountain there. Hadrian literally reconstructed the landscape in order to prove to the Jews that it would never be rebuilt again. 

Overall, Hadrian unleashed and eight to ten year reign of persecution after the defeat of Bar Kochba almost unmatched in Jewish history. It did not end until Hadrian died. His successor, Antoninus Pious, not only overturned his decrees but was very benevolent toward the Jews. Even so, the Jewish people after Hadrian were crushed almost beyond recognition. Bar Kochba’s defeat marked the end of any sort of Jewish autonomy in the Jewish homeland until the twentieth century. 

http://www.jewishhistory.org/bar-kochba/

On preterist assumptions, why isn't Hadrian as good a candidate for the Antichrist as Nero? 

Trust me, I'm a scientist

http://polarbearscience.com/2014/05/30/iucn-polar-bear-specialist-group-says-its-global-population-estimate-was-a-qualified-guess/

More Proof for the Religion of Peace

http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/05/the_greatest_murder_machine_in_history.html

The Hitchcock/Hanegraaff Debate On The Date Of Revelation

Earlier this week, I wrote about the date of the book of Revelation. I want to recommend a couple of resources for those who are interested in doing more research on the subject.

Are miracles less likely than not?

I'm posting something I said in recent correspondence with some friends:

I just find the whole business of probabilifying miracles nonsensical. It's said that miracles are inherently or antecedently unlikely. 

Take the miracle at Cana. By that logic, it was less likely than not (indeed, far less likely) that God would perform the miracle at Cana. But how is anyone in a position to say in advance (and after the fact it's moot) whether or not God intended to perform the miracle at Cana? How do you lay odds for that hypothetical? 

If, moreover, God did in fact perform the miracle at Cana, how is it less likely than not (indeed, far less likely) that he wouldn't do what he was going to do? If he did it, then isn't it at least more likely than not that he was going to do what he did? 

Perhaps an atheist will say the evidence for atheism renders a miracle improbable. But in that event, it's not the probability of a miracle, but the probability of a miracle-working God, that's at issue.

Since, moreover, any evidence for miracles would subtract from any (alleged) evidence for atheism, is it not viciously circular to make atheism the gauge for assigning a probability value to miracles–even if you're an atheist? 

Not to mention that it would only take one bona fide miracle to falsify atheism. The threshold for falsifying atheism is exceedingly low. 

To take a comparison, what's the probability of a royal flush? Assuming the deck is randomly shuffled, that's a straightforward mathematical calculation.

But what's the probability of a royal flush if the deck is stacked? Well, assuming the card sharp is good at his job, it's inevitable.

So that becomes a question of how probable it is that the deck is stacked, which in turn, becomes a question of how probable it is that the dealer is a card sharp.

I don't see how treating probability statistically enables us to lay odds on whether or not the deck is stacked. That's a question of what would motivate a dealer to stack the deck.

In my illustration, the uniformity of nature is analogous to randomly shuffled decks, while a miracle is analogous to a stacked deck. 

I don't mind defining a miracle as an action that inhibits the world from continuing in the way it would if left to itself.

But since a miracle involves personal agency or personal intention, overriding how the world would continue if left to itself, the question is how to assign a probability value to God's will to perform (or not perform) a miracle. I don't see how statistics or background knowledge regarding the general uniformity of nature is germane to how we anticipate or estimate God's intention to perform a miracle. 

"Troubling trends"

Arminians have seized on this article by Merritt:

http://jonathanmerritt.religionnews.com/2014/05/20/troubling-trends-americas-calvinist-revival/

Of course, Arminians don't see themselves in any of this. It's always the other who suffers from these defects.

i) I'm unpersuaded by the oft-cited distinction between "new Calvinists" and old Calvinists. For instance, what does it even mean to classify Piper, a huge fan of Jonathan Edwards, as a neo-Calvinist? 

ii) There's an obvious point of tension between Merritt's accusation that the new Calvinists are "isolationists" and his contention that more vocal and visible strain that has risen to prominence in recent years. They’ve been called the “young, restless, and reformed” or neo-Calvinists, and they are highly mobilized and increasingly influential.

iii) The new Calvinists often engage those outside their tradition. They are frequently polemical in that regard. Indeed, Merritt says that under "egotism." So that's another inconsistency on his indictment.

iv) The charge of "tribalism" posits a false comparison. For other groups are just as tribalistic. Arminians are tribalistic. Lutherans are tribalistic. Charismatics are tribalistic. Environmentalists are tribalistic. Darwinians are tribalistic. And so on and so forth. 

v) The charge of egotism reflects the false modesty of critics who refuse to acknowledge their own dogmaticism and intolerance. 

vi) Within the same section, he simultaneously accuses Calvinists of ousting Tullian Tchividjian and "closing ranks" or  “sweeping under the rug when it comes to insiders."

But both those allegations can't be equally true, for they tug in opposing directions. 

Same thing with the ousting of Bruce Waltke. Merritt pounces on that example, but how does that illustrate Calvinists closing ranks? Isn't that Spring cleaning rather than sweeping under the rug?

vii) He makes the absurd allegation that as the ego inflates, the body rises and one begins to speak from above rather than from across. This is often seen in the way neo-Calvinists speak as if they are the arbiters of the term “gospel.” Search the term “gospel” on the web site of the Reformed publisher Crossway and you’ll see what I mean. 

How would that be any different that if we went to the website of a Lutheran publisher like Concordia? Or a Baptist publisher like B&H? Or an Arminian publisher like Seedbed? 

viii) Merritt alleges that:

Because Tim Keller has become something of a prize hen for Calvinists—New York Magazine called him “the most successful Christian evangelist in the city”—you won’t likely hear other neo-Calvinists mention Keller’s views. Tribalists attempt to “clean house” when it comes to outsiders but “sweep under the rug” when it comes to insiders.
As Roger Olson, Baylor University professor and author of “Against Calvinism“, told me, “[Neo-Calvinist's are] a tribe, and they’ve closed ranks. Somehow they’ve formed a mentality that they have to support each other because they are a minority on a crusade. Any criticism hurts the cause. I’ve seen the same thing among feminists and black theologians.”
Olson says that when he speaks to Calvinist leaders, they will often critique the movement and its other leaders in private, but never in public. My experience has been identical.
“There is a fundamentalist ethos in [neo-Calvinism],” Olson says. “You get pats on the back and merits for criticizing outsiders, but not for criticizing insiders. There is a system where if you are young coming up in the ranks, you get points for criticizing or exposing those outside the movement but it’s not your place to criticize those who are above you in the movement itself.” 

That's demonstrably false. Keller is the target of relentless criticism within the Reformed community. For instance:

http://thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/review/engaging_with_keller_thinking_through_the_theology_ortlund

ix) Notice how often Merritt quotes Olson in his article, as if Olson is an impartial critic of Calvinism. Likewise, he quotes Scot McKnight, another prominent Arminian apologist. All this proves is that Arminians disapprove of Calvinism. 

Merritt's article is just an incoherent hatchet-job to disguise his leftwing agenda. 

A brief history of postmil preterism

Postmil preterism has become popular in some contemporary Reformed circles. To my knowledge, Warfield was the first postmil preterist, but it didn't catch on at the time.

Postmillennialism has a long history in Calvinism. But a synthesis of preterism and postmillennialism seems to be more innovative.

Warfield's preterism is clear from how he interprets the Johannine Antichrist (in 1 John) and the Pauline Antichrist (in 2 Thessalonians). That, in turn, commits him, in some measure, to a preterist interpretation of the Olivet Discourse. 

I don't know if Warfield arrived at his preterism independently of how he arrived at his postmillennialism. His mentor and teacher, Charles Hodge, was a postmil. Warfield began his career as a NT scholar, before succeeding A. A. Hodge at Princeton. I don't know where Warfield picked up preterism. 

I think Reformed postmillennialism was kept alive by Loraine Boettner. He's a bridge between Warfield and the resurgence of postmill preterism. He got clobbered when he contributed to The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views. If memory serves, Martin Selbrede helped him behind the scenes to shore up his case.  

To my knowledge, the resurgence of postmil preterism initially took place in theonomic circles, although I don't think Rushdoony was a preterist. I don't know if Bahnsen was the fist to recombine preterism with postmillennialism. 

A further complication was the split between the Rushdoony faction and the Tyler Texas faction. The movement spawned splitter groups, with some former members leaving the movement. It's possible that the resurgence of postmil preterism would have been abortive had it not been for the influential patronage of R. C. Sproul. 

Warfield was easily the most distinguished postmil preterist. Among the current crop, Keith Mathison and Kenneth Gentry seem to be the two best scholars. You also have hack popularizers like Gary DeMar. 

Here's a generally positive review, which–however–registers concerns:

http://www.modernreformation.org/default.php?page=printfriendly&var1=Print&var2=1089

Partial preterism is a very unstable position. If you start with partial preterism, it's hard to stop with partial preterism. In that respect, it's disturbing to see the inroads that preterism is making in some Reformed circles. Here's a glowing review from the OPC rag that's utterly oblivious to the dangers of shipwreck:

http://www.opc.org/review.html?review_id=259

And here's a review, by a hyperpreterist, which charts Mathison's drift towards the rocky shoals of hyperpreterism:

There are some very significant changes in this book from some of Mathison's previously written works on eschatology that need to be pointed out. 

The main change is that Mathison used to divided Matthew 24-25 up into two sections--with two comings of Christ: 1) one in AD 70 Mt 24:1-34, and 2) one to end time Mt 24:35ff (cf. Mathison, "DISPENSATIONALISM Rightly Dividing the People of God?" p. 138ff). He is now partially following Gary DeMar's exegesis that the OD (Olivet Discourse) is united and that the coming of Christ in Mt 25:31ff. is also a reference to Christ's return in AD 70 (380). I say "partially" because he will not admit that the "end of the age" is the end of the old covenant age in AD 70 which is contextually tied to the destruction of the temple, which DeMar boldly points out. Mathison's change is curious because he, along with other Reformed theologians in his book, "When Shall These Things Be?" condemned "hyper-preterists" for coming up with exegesis or interpretations that could not be found in the early church fathers. Question, "What early church father taught that the coming of the Son of Man in Mt 25:31 was NOT the "actual" Second Coming of Jesus connected to the general judgment and resurrection - as Mathison has attempted to pull off in "FROM AGE TO AGE?" 

Mathison takes EVERY eschatological text in 1 and 2 Thessalonians as being fulfilled in AD 70 except for 1 Thessalonians 4 (507ff., cf. Mathison, "Postmillennialism An Eschatology of Hope" pp. 225ff.). In order to establish his preterist interpretations of say 2 Thessalonians 2, he uses the parallels or analogy of Scripture hermeneutic with Matthew 24: 

2 Thess. 2:1=Matt. 24:27, 30 a coming of the Lord
2 Thess. 2:1=Matt. 24:31 a gathering together to Him
2 Thess. 2:3=Matt. 24:5, 10-12 apostasy
2 Thess. 2:7=Matt. 24:31 the mystery of lawlessness
2 Thess. 2:9-10=Matt. 24:24 satanic signs and wonders
2 Thess. 2:11=Matt. 24:5, 24 a deluding influence on unbelievers (Mathison, Postmillennialism, 230). 

BUT when the resurrection is associated with Christ's return and is the topic, he avoids the parallels that Amillennialists and Full Preterists make between Matthew 24-25 with that of 1 Thessalonians 4-5: 

1 Thess. 4:16=Matt. 24:30 from heaven
1 Thess. 4:16=Matt. 24:31 with archangelic voice
1 Thess. 4:16=Matt. 24:31 with God's trumpet
1 Thess. 4:17=Matt. 24:31 believers caught up to be with Christ
1 Thess. 4:17=Matt. 24:30 believers in "clouds"
1 Thess. 5:1-2=Matt. 24:36 exact time unknown
1 Thess. 5:2=Matt. 24:43 Christ comes like a thief
1 Thess. 5:3=Matt. 24:37-39 unbelievers caught unaware
1 Thess. 5:3=Matt. 24:8 birth pains
1 Thess. 5:4-5=Matt. 24:43 believers are not deceived
1 Thess. 5:6=Matt. 24:42 believers told to be watchful
1 Thess. 5:7=Matt. 24:49 exhortation against drunkenness
1 Thess. 5:4-8=Matt. 24:27, 36-38 the day, sons of light, sons of the day (Michael Sullivan, "House Divided Bridging the Gap in Reformed Eschatology A Preterist Response to When Shall These Things Be?,chapter 4, THE ESCHATOLOGICAL MADNESS OF MATHISON OR HOW CAN THESE THINGS BE?" pp. 107-108)" 

Due to creedal commitments (obviously not exegesis), notice how he is FORCED to violate his own parallel hermeneutical approach - with partial preterists such as Gary DeMar, Kenneth Gentry, James Jordan, and Peter Leithart all having the same problems. Mathison now claims that Jesus did not teach about His actual Second Coming, but Paul (through progressive revelation) did in 1 Thessalonians 4 and 1 Corinthians 15. But Paul tells us that what he is teaching in 1 Thess. 4:15ff. is "According to the Lord's own words..." (see above). Matthison is obviously "conflicted" between his hyper-creedalism and Full Preterism, and that is why he makes these bizarre statements and avoids the obvious Full or True Preterist interpretations.

http://www.amazon.com/review/R2MKLF21V0RP7S/ref=cm_cr_rdp_perm?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0875527450

Atheism at an impasse

Here's a striking admission by a rabid atheist, regarding the stalemate between theism and atheism:

The prospects for a simple, confined argument for atheism (or theism) that achieves widespread support or that settles the question are dim.  That is because, in part, the prospects for any argument that decisively settles a philosophical question where a great deal seems to be at stake are dim. 

The existence or non-existence of any non-observable entity in the world is not settled by any single argument or consideration.  Every premise will be based upon other concepts and principles that themselves must be justified…The question of whether or not there is a God sprawls onto related issues and positions about biology, physics, metaphysics, explanation, philosophy of science, ethics, philosophy of language, and epistemology. 

http://www.iep.utm.edu/atheism/#H6

In what sense are miracles improbable?

Atheists typically classify miracles as inherently improbable. And even some Christian philosophers assign a very low (but surmountable) prior probability to miracles. Low in what sense?

Consider two examples to illustrate my question.

Richard Feyman once said: 

You know, the most amazing thing happened to me tonight. I was coming here, on the way to the lecture, and I came in through the parking lot. And you won't believe what happened. I saw a car with the license plate ARW 357. Can you imagine? Of all the millions of license plates in the state, what was the chance that I would see that particular one tonight? Amazing!

In what sense is that improbable? 

i) Perhaps he meant, what are the odds that a license plate would have that combination of letters and numbers. Those exact letters and numbers in that exact sequence.

Let's pick a figure out of the air. Suppose the odds are one in 20 million that a license plate would have that number. 

If, however, there were 20 million license plates, then it's a dead certainty that one plate will have that number.

So even though it's astronomically unlikely that any given plate will have that number, it's certain that some plate will have that number.

ii) But maybe what he meant was not the improbability of the license plate, but the conjunction of two independent events. What are the odds that a car with that particular license in that particular lot would be there at the same time he happened to be there? 

However, as a good physicist, wouldn't he say it that conjunction was bound to happen given the antecedent conditions? That there was a causal chain of events leading up to that conjunction? It seems (to me at least) counterintuitive to say something inevitable is astronomically improbable.

But perhaps we need to distinguish between what's metaphysically improbable and what's epistemically improbable.

iii) To take another comparison, what are the odds of having B- blood type? I think the answer depends on the reference group. It's 2% for Caucasians, but 0.4% for Asians. 

Mackie on miracles

[W]e should distinguish two different contexts in which an alleged miracle might be discussed. One possible context would be where the parties in debate already both accept some general theistic doctrines, and the point at issue is whether a miracle has occurred which would enhance the authority of a specific sect or teacher. In this context supernatural intervention, though prima facie unlikely on any particular occasion, is, generally speaking, on the cards: ...But it is a very different matter if the context is that of fundamental debate about the truth of theism itself. Here one party to the debate is initially at least agnostic, and does not yet concede that there is a supernatural power at all. From this point of view the intrinsic improbability of a genuine miracle ... is very great, and one or other of the alternative explanations...will always be much more likely – that is, either that the alleged event is not miraculous, or that it did not occur, that the testimony is faulty in some way.
This entails that it is pretty well impossible that reported miracles should provide a worthwhile argument for theism addressed to those who are initially inclined to atheism or even to agnosticism.
... Not only are such reports unable to carry any rational conviction on their own, but also they are unable even to contribute independently to the kind of accumulation or battery of arguments referred to in the Introduction. To this extent Hume is right, despite the inaccuracies we have found in his statement of the case. J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (1982), 27.

So the agnostic will assign a very low prior probability to a miracle. Presumably, an atheist would assign a zero probability to a miracle. 

Here's the problem I have with that set-up: Sure, given agnosticism, a miracle has a very high burden of proof to discharge.

The question, though, is how firmly the agnostic should privilege his agnosticism as the benchmark–especially in the face of ostensible counterevidence.

Suppose the agnostic became and agnostic before he ever encountered evidence for the miraculous. But that means he became an agnostic in ignorance of the ostensible counterevidence. 

Should his agnosticism count against the probability of miracles? Or should evidence of the miraculous count against his agnostic presumption? Does it not beg the question for him to use his agnosticism to prejudge the likelihood of miracles? Shouldn't the evidence for miracles figure in case for agnosticism in the first place? Even if he comes to the issue belatedly, shouldn't he mentally go back in time and ask himself whether he'd even be an agnostic had he encountered this evidence at an earlier stage in his intellectual development? Isn't his agnosticism accidental to that degree? Why should it be a standard of comparison? What if he was starting from scratch, with the evidence for miracles at the outset? 

Put another way, when both miracles and agnosticism are in dispute, why should his agnosticism have its thumb on the scales? 

Suppose an atheist has reasons to be an atheist. He developed his reasons before he became aware of evidence for miracles.

Should he use atheism to assign a low prior probability to miracles? Why isn't the logic reversible? Why can't evidence for miracles assign a low (perhaps very low) prior probability to atheism? Why the asymmetry?

I don't see why his atheism should supply the standard of comparison for assigning prior probability values to miracles. Why is it not simply a case where he has to counterbalance the evidence for atheism against the evidence for miracles? Why would evidence for atheism set the standard? 

Shooting Fischers in a barrel

Calvinists like Hays seem to want very badly to convince everyone that Calvinists are simply smarter than those who disagree and to disagree with Calvinism is just to show how stupid you are. 

http://arminianperspectives.wordpress.com/2014/05/22/austin-fischer-responds-to-kevin-deyoungs-review-of-his-book/#comment-12656

i) Ben Henshaw has a tin-ear for sarcasm.

ii) A better question is why Arminians are so shallow and desperate that they get excited about somebody like Austin Fischer. It's fine with me if they make him the postboy for Arminianism. He's their Justin Bieber. 

Moving along:

http://bethyada.blogspot.com/2014/05/responses-to-austin-fischers-book.html

It depends on what the greater "good" is. For God to create hell and men to be placed in that hell to maximise his eternal glory may not be so "good." 

Nothing can augment God's glory. God doesn't damn anyone for his own benefit. God has nothing to gain. 

God doesn't want evil and sin to exist at all. He permits them if that is a risk in love. 

Which is a backdoor admission that the Arminian God wants sin and evil to exist as a means to an end. That's the price he must pay for true love. 

Permission is not a euphemism. Parents understand the concept.

So if bethyada knew that his (her?) teenage son would suffer paralysis by performing a dangerous stunt to impress his friends, he wouldn't intervene to stop his son. If bethyada knew his daughter would become a prostitute to support her drug habit, he wouldn't intervene to prevent her from getting hooked in the first place. LIkewise, if he knew that his son would O.D. on heroine, he wouldn't intervene to save his life.  

This is a problem that Austin identifies with Calvinism. 

Because Austin is a partisan.

It does not disprove Calvinism, nor is it universal, but the arrogance among the young Calvinists is frequent enough that they form a distinct category even alarmingly noted by other Calvinists. 

i) In my experience, "young Calvinists" are no more or less arrogant than young Arminians, young Lutherans, young Catholics, &c. 

ii) bethyada's invidious comparison, which is popular among Arminians, illustrates how their sense of spiritual superiority blinds Arminians to their own arrogance. 

Really, should a Christ follower tell a fellow traveller to become an atheist? 

Fischer said:

This got me thinking and I remembered that he has frequently admitted he thinks the hard doctrines of Calvinism render it a very offensive theology that is destined to be a minority opinion in the church. I didn’t ask him at the time (and I wouldn’t have wanted to put him in a spot), but I can’t help but think he might agree with me here. When Calvinism is preached honestly and consistently, with all of its hard edges showing instead of concealed in euphemisms, it is very difficult and offensive and it seems unlikely it would ever be as popular as it is now in western evangelicalism.

He also said:

We need to trace out our beliefs to their logical conclusions. I firmly believe that, because our beliefs shape us (whether or not we want them to or are aware of it), we need to know where our beliefs are leading us. 

http://sbctoday.com/interview-waustin-fischer-pt-1/

So I'm measuring him by his own yardstick.  

bethyada then goes off on a tangent:

Perhaps this is some sort of Galatian-type response to Judaisers: Austin is a false teacher. Consistency is hardly a false gospel. It does not cause men to abandon Christ. Or does Steve see Calvinism synonymous with salvation excluding Catholics, Orthodox, and large portions of Protestantism including Pentecostals?

bethyada substitutes imagination for information. 

Finally, Billy Birch labors to create a parallel:

Calvinism: Now, God, I summoned you to this interview to determine if you are powerful, like Thor, worthy of my worship. You can start by filling out this questionnaire to see where you rank in my rating system. If you make the first cut, I will quiz you further to see if your godlike power deserves my approbation, thus averting my disappointment. 

http://www.credendum.net/blog/steve-hays-vs-dr-roger-olson-on-the-worthiness-of-god

Some basic problems with his attempted analogy:

i) In Scripture, the question is not whether God is worthy of our worship, but whether we are worthy to worship God. Billy blows right past Olson's subversive standard. That's because Calvinists are more real to Birch than God. That's why Birch disregards my point. 

Even if he thinks I'm a hypocrite, he should still be concerned with Olson's subversive standard for its own sake. But he isn't. That's because the Calvinist opponent is more real to Birch than the God of Scripture.

ii) Olson uses his moral intuitions to sit in judgment of Scripture. I don't. 

iii) If Arminianism is true, then God did less to save a Christian than if Calvinism is true. I'm not measuring God by a Calvinistic ruler when I note that fact. Rather, I'm measuring God by an Arminian ruler when I note that fact. If Arminianism is true, Christians have less to thank God for, because God did less for us than if Calvinism is true. That makes him less praiseworthy–on Arminian grounds. If Arminianism is true, then God did no more to save the heavenbound than the hellbound. 

Sanctification and the gospel

http://gospelreformation.net/affirmations-denials-on-the-gospel-and-sanctification/