Evolving in Oz

One of the biggest problems I have with Darwinists is their tendency to take evidence that proves a trivial portion of their theory correct and assume that proves the entire theory correct. As a result, the plethora of evidence for, say, adaptation (e.g., wolves with thicker coats in cold climates, the peppered moths of England, etc.) is used to cover the paucity of evidence for large-scale evolution (i.e., species-to-species evolution, assuming “species” is ever defined by Darwinists, of course). To give an analogy, it is as if Darwinists are attempting to convict a man of first degree murder by proving beyond the shadow of a doubt that he is a jaywalker. But a bunch of adaptation doesn’t lead to evolution of species anymore than a bunch of jaywalking leads to murder.

One of the strongest arguments Darwinists use is based on the fact that many different creatures look similar to each other in some fairly foundational ways, including sometimes in the genome itself. Even Michael Behe (of Darwin’s Black Box fame) believes in common decent in part because of a broken gene that is found in both chimps and humans. The assumption is that if some feature is the same in two different population groups, they must have a common ancestor with that same feature.

It is certainly plausible to assume that common features indicate a common cause, and common decent is one possible way that that could occur (whether likely or not is a different issue). But it is by no means the only way. Indeed, a common environment could just as easily explain certain common traits. That is, suppose that a gene is mutated due to radiation in the environment, and two species have that same gene and share the same environment. There is a good possibility that the gene will be mutated identically in both populations simply because of the environment, and it has nothing to do with lineage.

Naturally, I’m not saying that’s what happened with the broken gene found in both chimps and humans. I haven’t studied that particular issue enough to know either way; but I do know enough to not assume ipso facto that commonality must require common decent. Indeed, there is a specific example of which I am familiar that demonstrates just how dangerous it is for scientists to dogmatically claim decent in such a manner.

It’s called the marsupials of Australia (they also exist here and there in South America and Asia, but they reign in Australia).

Marsupials differ from placental mammals in that marsupials will give birth to their young prematurely, and then the offspring will move into a pouch (called the “marsupium”) in females, and they be raised in that pouch until they are fully developed. In contrast, placental mammals carry their offspring to full term before birth. These differences result in some anatomical differences, mostly in soft tissue, between placental mammals and marsupial mammals.

That said, there are many marsupials that look virtually identical to placental versions of the same animal, as pointed out in this article:

In some cases, placental and marsupial mammals physically resemble each other: the pouched marsupial mouse and the harvest mouse, the marsupial mole and the common mole, the marsupial wombat and the marmot, the tasmanian wolf and the wolf.

The comparison between animals is such that, for instance, in the case of the wolf it is virtually impossible for the untrained eye to tell the difference between an Australian marsupial wolf skeleton and a European placental wolf skeleton.

Let us assume Darwinism is true for this argument. If we see a marsupial wolf that looks almost exactly like a placental wolf, we would immediately argue that this proves that marsupial and placental wolves had a common wolf ancestor that diverged into two lineages: one placental and one marsupial. And indeed, for a time, this is what Darwinists believed. Likewise with the marsupial mouse and the placental mouse: they too would have had a common mouse ancestor that diverged into two lineages.

But Darwinists must also consider the case of the wolf and the mouse together. The assumption is that since both are mammals (regardless of whether marsupial or placental animals are in view) then at some point each had a common ancestor that diverged into different lineages, one of which lead to the mouse line and one of which lead to the wolf line. Thus far, the Darwinist is not in any trouble.

The problem comes when he tries to handle both of these. The Darwinist needs to account for how both the wolf and the mouse diverged into marsupial and placental lines. It seems fairly logical to say that the differences between a marsupial wolf and a placental wolf are not as extreme as the differences between a wolf and a mouse (after all, even the untrained eye can distinguish between the skeleton of a mouse and the skeleton of a wolf despite not being able to distinguish between the marsupial and placental skeletons of a wolf). This would mean that, in order of precedence, the mammal lineage should have split into the mouse lineage and the wolf lineage before each branch then split into placental and marsupial lineages.

Yet that would mean that the marsupial split needed to happen multiple times. Not just twice, but there are about twenty such species that have marsupial members with corresponding placental members, and there are also several marsupial species that only exist as marsupials.

To make matters worse, even if we could stipulate that for some unknown reason, marsupials just happen to arise a lot in the fossil record, we also have to deal with the timeline. Australia and Antarctica broke off from Gondwanaland roughly 45-80 million years ago, according to which modern geological timeline you pick. As most of us have heard repeatedly, dinosaurs ruled the world until about 65 million years ago, and the only mammals alive at the time were small shrew-like creatures. This means if we assume Australia broke off only 45 million years ago, mammals only had 20 million years to co-evolve before those mammals on Australia were isolated from the rest of the world. If Australia broke off closer to 80 million years ago, we’d only have those shrew-like creatures to develop all the species of marsupials in Australia.

Which is it? Well, today most Darwinists on this issue believe all the marsupials in Australia have come from just one species: microbiotheria. In other words, Darwinists today believe that the marsupial/placental split only happened once. After that, placental mammals developed into the wide variety of animals that exist in Europe and North America, and the marsupial mammals developed into the wide variety of animals that exist in Australia and parts of South America. In the meantime, certain lineages just happened to evolve such that the Tasmanian wolf looks exactly like a European wolf to all but the trained observer. And the marsupial mouse looks like the placental mouse. And the placental flying squirrel looks like the marsupial flying squirrel. Etc, etc, etc.

Never fear though. Darwinists already know about this and have proposed an explanation! It’s called convergent evolution. Convergence is the idea that two organisms from separate species follow similar evolutionary paths due to identical environmental pressure. Thus, according to Darwinists, there was one species on Australia that also lived on the rest of the continents with mammal life. Because the environment was similar, the decedents of organisms on either side of the divide both evolved along similar pathways, to the point that the marsupial wolf, mouse, mole, and squirrel look almost identical to the placental wolf, mouse, mole, and squirrel.

Unfortunately, Darwinists don’t see how this undercuts their best evidence for common descent: the similarity of features. For you see, one broken gene that is the same in chimps and humans is proof of common decent, but having an entire skeleton that looks indistinguishable to another organism isn’t proof of common decent—it is proof of convergence. I would think that if the environment is sufficient to explain widespread morphologic similarities between marsupial and placental mammals, it must be sufficient to explain one broken gene.

Yet when you consider the vast difference between a mouse and a wolf, there is really no reason to think that an environment that would so alter the reproductive system of certain types of mammals—such that one becomes marsupial and one becomes placental—that that same environment would somehow “magically” zero in on the exact phenotype of the wolf or mouse. Indeed, on Darwinian principles alone, would this not actually suggest that given a shrew-like mammal on Earth, it was inevitable that wolf-like creatures would come about? Doesn’t all this suggest some kind of teleology? It certainly doesn’t seem to make sense from a process of random mutation followed by natural selection. That may get you the difference between placental and marsupial mammals, but it certainly cannot explain the existence of similar placental and marsupial wolves, given how far along the Darwinian lineage they each are from their shrew-like predecessor.

The Preening Disciple

“Arminianism has always promoted the idea that people are made in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27) and because of this, He has given man a limited freedom of the will.”

http://arminiantoday.blogspot.com/2010/06/why-you-might-find-more-charity-among.html

Notice that he doesn’t attempt to exegete this conclusion from his prooftext.

“This has led Arminians to believe that since God has created humans free creatures who are given free will then we believe that all people should be allowed to freely worship whether they be an Arminian or a Calvinist or a Baptist or a Muslim.”

Does that include the freedom to practice jihad? What about the freedom of witches to sacrifice babies as a part of their “worship”?

“This has led to Arminians being champions of freedom of religion. The history of Arminianism shows that we don't burn at the stake those who disagree with us nor do we behead those who disagree with. John Wesley led the fight against slavery as did later Methodists in the United States. They viewed humans as free creatures not bound. Ironically it was Calvinist George Whitefield argued before the state of Georgia officials for slavery being justified. In 1751 Whitefield succeeded in getting slavery legalized in the state of Georgia and though he treated his slaves fairly, he nonetheless never gave them their freedom even when he died.”

That's a classic case of confirmation bias.

i) What about Calvinists like John Newton who opposed slavery?

ii) What about the fact that the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. condemned slavery? Read the minutes: (pp401-404):

http://tinyurl.com/22vdr2n

iii) Conversely, what about Arminians who supported slavery? For instance:

Slavery continued to cause problems in mainline denominations. Methodists founded their first anti-slavery association in 1834. By 1841, Michigan Methodists grew uncomfortable with the general unwillingness to act that they withdrew to form the Wesleyan Methodist Church. Mainline Methodism faced the issue in 1844. A Baltimore Methodist minister married into a family which owned slaves. When he refused to set them free, his conference released him. At the same time, James Andrews, Georgia's bishop, also owned slaves. Northern abolitionists demanded he free them or face suspension. Southern Methodists protested but since northern Methodists saw slavery as a moral issue they demanded his expulsion. After 11 days debate, the northerners won the vote by a 2-1 margin. They won the vote but lost anyway. The southern Methodists withdrew to form the Southern Methodist Church.(1)

http://www.christianchronicler.com/history1/slavery_and_the_churches.htm

iv) What about the historical fact that the dividing lines on slavery were basically geographical rather than regional? Consider the split between Old Princeton and Southern Presbyterians?

“However, what you will find is that, in general, there is much charity among Arminians toward Calvinists.”

I doubt that Calvinists at SWBTS feel as though Paige Patterson’s Arminian regime has been distinguished by its benevolence towards Reformed faculty.

Likewise, I doubt that victims of the Arminian Archbishop Laud thought he was especially charitable in dealing with his theological opponents.

“For instance, google ‘Arminian heresy’ and see how many hits you get from Calvinist sites. Do the same with "Calvinism heresy" and see how many hits you get from Arminian sites.”

Yes, Arminians don’t generally say that Calvinism is “heretical.” Instead, they use more charitable adjectives like “diabolical” and “Satanic.”

And, as everybody knows, it’s better to be a devil-worshiper than a heretic.

“Why are Arminians more likely to be charitable?”

A better question would be: “Is there something about Arminian theology that fosters this combination of self-righteousness and self-deception?”

“We believe that the nature of God is love and we should follow His example (Ephesians 5:1-2). To follow Jesus is not to be condescending but loving (John 13:34-35 towards brothers and Matthew 5:43-48 toward our enemies).”

That’s pretty rich in the context of his über partisan hit-piece. And that’s no exception. In my experience, Arminians excuse their own, cover for their own, love their own kind. Myside bias is endemic among Arminian epologists.

Lactantius Opposed Prayer To The Dead

Lactantius condemned those involved in "prayers to dead men" and "prayers to the dead":

"They [pagans] ought therefore to have understood from the mysteries and ceremonies themselves, that they were offering prayers to dead men." (The Divine Institutes, 1:21)

"But if it appears that these religious rites are vain in so many ways as I have shown, it is manifest that those who either make prayers to the dead, or venerate the earth, or make over their souls to unclean spirits, do not act as becomes men, and that they will suffer punishment for their impiety and guilt, who, rebelling against God, the Father of the human race, have undertaken inexpiable rites, and violated every sacred law." (2:18)

One way in which advocates of praying to the deceased could attempt to dismiss these passages in Lactantius is by arguing that the dead are those who are spiritually dead, not physically dead. Thus, one can pray to those who are spiritually alive in Heaven without falling under Lactantius' condemnation. The physical death of those individuals who are in Heaven is irrelevant, since Lactantius is referring to spiritual death.

There's no evidence that Lactantius believed in prayer to people who are spiritually alive in Heaven. And scripture, which probably influenced Lactantius on this issue, condemns attempts to contact the dead in general, not just by means of prayer (Deuteronomy 18:10-12, Isaiah 8:19, 19:3). It would be absurd to suggest that such Biblical passages are condemning attempts to contact the spiritually dead. Was Moses sinning by speaking with the spiritually dead Pharaoh? Physical death is in view when attempts to contact the dead are condemned. If Lactantius was influenced by such Biblical passages, as seems likely, then he probably had physical death in mind. And though the phrases "dead men" and "the dead" can refer to those who are spiritually dead, they're more commonly used to refer to the physically dead. Those who want to propose that Lactantius had a less common definition in mind bear a heavier burden of proof.

The references to death nearest to the first passage above, 1:21, are references to physical death.

And near the beginning of 2:18, we read:

"For He has determined at the last times to pass judgment on the living and the dead, concerning which judgment I shall speak in the last book."

When people speak of God's judgment of "the living and the dead", how are they usually defining "the dead"? Normally, they're referring to God's judgment of those who had physically died prior to that point. Physical death is being referred to. That's what we see elsewhere in Lactantius:

"After these things the lower regions shall be opened, and the dead shall rise again...[quoting another source] 'Rolling along the heavens, I will open the caverns of the earth; and then I will raise the dead, loosing fate and the sting of death; and afterwards I will call them into judgment, judging the life of pious and impious men.' Not all men, however, shall then be judged by God, but those only who have been exercised in the religion of God. For they who have not known God, since sentence cannot be passed upon them for their acquittal, are already judged and condemned, since the Holy Scriptures testify that the wicked shall not arise to judgment....the dead will rise again, not after a thousand years from their death, but that, when again restored to life, they may reign with God a thousand years....Then they who shall be alive in their bodies shall not die, but during those thousand years shall produce an infinite multitude, and their offspring shall be holy, and beloved by God; but they who shall be raised from the dead shall preside over the living as judges." (7:20, 7:22, 7:24)

He's referring to redeemed individuals, people who are spiritually alive, as "dead". Thus, the opening of section 2:18 is including people who are physically deceased, even though they're spiritually alive, among "the dead".

Later in section 2:18, just before the comment on prayers to the dead, Lactantius refers to the dead again:

"I have shown that the religious rites of the gods are vain in a threefold manner: In the first place, because those images which are worshipped are representations of men who are dead; and that is a wrong and inconsistent thing, that the image of a man should be worshipped by the image of God, for that which worships is lower and weaker than that which is worshipped : then that it is an inexpiable crime to desert the living in order that you may serve memorials of the dead, who can neither give life nor light to any one, for they are themselves without it: and that there is no other God but one, to whose judgment and power every soul is subject."

Notice, first, that the pagans Lactantius is condemning for "deserting the living in order that you may serve memorials of the dead" weren't deserting spiritually alive believers. It's not as though pagans were in fellowship with Christians, then left that fellowship to tend to memorials of the spiritually dead. The likely meaning of Lactantius' comment is that he's distinguishing between the physically living and the physically dead.

Also notice that he refers to what he wrote earlier about "representations of men who are dead". Below are some examples of what Lactantius says elsewhere about images of dead men. Ask yourself whether he's referring to spiritual or physical death:

"Cicero, in his treatise concerning the Nature of the Gods, having said that three Jupiters were enumerated by theologians, adds that the third was of Crete, the son of Saturn, and that his tomb is shown in that island. How, therefore, can a god be alive in one place, and dead in another; in one place have a temple, and in another a tomb?" (1:11)

"For the plan of making likenesses was invented by men for this reason, that it might be possible to retain the memory of those who had either been removed by death or separated by absence. In which of these classes, then, shall we reckon the gods? If among the dead, who is so foolish as to worship them? If among the absent, then they are not to be worshipped, if they neither see our actions nor hear our prayers. But if the gods cannot be absent—for, since they are divine, they see and hear all things, in whatever part of the universe they are—it follows that images are superfluous, since the gods are present everywhere, and it is sufficient to invoke with prayer the names of those who hear us. But if they are present, they cannot fail to be at hand at their own images. It is entirely so, as the people imagine, that the spirits of the dead wander about the tombs and relics of their bodies. But after that the deity has begun to be near, there is no longer need of his statue....But they fear lest their religion should be altogether vain and empty if they should see nothing present which they may adore, and therefore they set up images; and since these are representations of the dead, they resemble the dead, for they are entirely destitute of perception." (2:2)

"From nothing, therefore, can it be so plainly proved and understood that those gods, since they once lived, are dead, as from their worship itself, which is altogether of the earth." (6:2)

He refers to tombs, loss of bodily senses, and the fact that those now dead were once living. Clearly, he has physical death in mind.

The next reference to the dead in section 2:18 is the comment on prayers to the dead. Thus, multiple references to "the dead" as those who have physically died come just before his comment on praying to the dead. He's condemning prayers to the physically dead.

Do Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox pray to the physically dead? Yes, they do.

In this same section of Lactantius, he tells his readers that we should:

"direct our eyes to that quarter to which the condition of their nature has directed, and that we may adore and worship nothing except the single deity of our only Creator and Father...the spirits which preside over the [pagan] religious rites themselves, being condemned and cast off by God, wallow over the earth, who not only are unable to afford any advantage to their worshippers, since the power of all things is in the hands of one alone, but even destroy them with deadly attractions and errors; since this is their daily business, to involve men in darkness, that the true God may not be sought by them."

He's not trying to direct his readers toward prayer to God and spiritually alive humans and angels. Rather, he seems to want them to pray to "nothing except the single deity of our only Creator and Father...the true God". Not only does Lactantius condemn prayer to the physically dead, but he also suggests that God alone is the proper object of prayer.

A possible objection to the interpretation I've laid out is Lactantius' comment above about "deadly" attractions. The attractions in question are spiritually deadly. Thus, when he goes on to refer to "the dead", he may be referring to the spiritually dead, not the physically dead.

There are a few problems with that argument. First, though references to death in the surrounding context are some of the evidence relevant to how we interpret Lactantius, they aren't the only line of evidence I've cited. The other factors I've mentioned above would have to be taken into account as well. Second, references to physical death are more prominent in the section of Lactantius under consideration, even though the concept of spiritual death is present to some extent. Third, "deadly" is a different term than "the dead". Fourth, the earlier reference to prayers to the dead in 1:21 has references to physical death in its nearest context and probably is referring to the physically dead. Thus, there's precedent for reading 2:18 in that manner. A reference to praying to the physically dead in 2:18 makes more sense conceptually and in light of all of the contextual factors involved.

Gibson on Craig

JAMES A. GIBSON SAID:
Steve,

Here is a slightly different angle on Craig's view (supposing everything you said about Craig's view is in fact his view).

Suppose Craig were convinced that M is false. So we have:
1. C v M v A
2. ~M
------------
3. C v A

Now C and A are mutually exclusive since each entails the falsity of the other. How should one choose between C and A? Well, it seems to me that the right thing to do, epistemically, is to consider how strong the arguments are in favor of C, against C, in favor of A, and against A.

From what I know about Craig, I find his acceptance of A over C to be strange. I would have thought that he regarded his arguments for God's existence, which is entailed by C, and which entail ~A, to be stronger than his commitment to incompatibilism. But if he *really* would rather choose A over C, then it seems that my presumption is mistaken. Worse: he finds incompatibilism so much stronger than his arguments for God *and* against A (e.g., his claim that atheism implies all things are permissible). The implication, "all things are permissible," is more absurd than would be having to switch from incompatibilism to compatibilism (or semi-compatibilism). Having recognized the preference for A over C requires the commitment, would Craig now stop using the moral argument he typically runs? I don't know.

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2010/06/craig-calvinism-and-molinism.html#4662951188378809500

An Arminian Argument for Determinism

Some Arminian epologists have been using 1 John 2:16 to argue that in no sense can the origination of a sinful action be determined by God. That is because John says those things don't come "from" the father. Now, apart from the surprising fact---not only to me, but to John as well!--that I never thought John was entering into a discussion on moral responsibility and 21st century discussions about origination, this begs the question because determinists want to say that there is an origination that is morally relevant for ascriptions of blame. So the determinist can read 1 John 2:16 (granting the eisogesis for a moment) and agree that sinful actions don't originate from the father in the morally relevant sense to ascribe moral culpability. Determinists think all people understand that there's a sense that lightning is the cause of a fire, even if the lightning didn't create itself ex nihilo. We ascribe the "blame" to the lightning, even if we recognize that it originated from past causal laws and the actual state of the world. But not only that, commentators recognize that John means that those actions are not characterized by a godly life (e.g., Yarbrough, 1-3 John, BECNT). John's speaking of what characterizes actions, they are either from the father or from the world.

However, lets leave this alone for a moment. Sticking with the Arminian eisogesis, let's see how Arminianism leads to determinism. So, for example, we can read what John says here:

John 15:5
"I am the vine; you are the branches. If a man remains in me and I in him, he will bear much fruit; apart from me you can do nothing.

And there you have it. What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The Bible teaches that God is the ultimate originator of every action. If he were not, we would be "unable" to do anything (and we all know how Arminians read universal language).

Tu es Petrus & Co.

Here's a comment that's worth posting:

TOM R SAID:

Once we start playing "Here's how the Bible would have to read for Catholicism to be consistent with its own holy book", there's the weekend gone.

You start off with, eg, "For you are Peter, and on the rock of Peter and his duly-ordained successors I will build my only (visible) church, and the gates of hell will not prevail against it for more than 20 or maybe 25 years at a time on any really important matter pertaining to faith and morals (as distinct from economic, social or political questions); and I will give you, Peter, and your successors (not anyone else) the keys to the kingdom of heaven, so that whatsoever you bind on earth (except, of course, for ordaining women), but again only in relation to faith and morals, shall be bound in heaven..." and you end up with having to re-write the Transfiguration so that when Peter suggests building three tabernacles, Jesus pats him on the head and says "Finally! We're getting there!" Meanwhile, your tax return isn't getting done.

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2010/06/dial-saint.html#6430531612970043232

"Deception" and healing

Critics object to mature creation (or “apparent age”) on the grounds that this would implicate God in a web of deception. Deceptive appearances.

YECs typically counter by citing paradigm-cases of mature creation–such as Jesus turning the water into wine.

I’d like to consider a different kind of example. Consider the healings of Jesus. These healings tend to restore the sick to state of health such that you couldn’t tell by examining them that they were ever sick.

Take the case of Jesus healing the man born blind (John 9). The blind man had some congenital defect which left him blind all his life.

When Jesus restores his sight, this doesn’t merely affect the future. It also, or so it seems to me, erases any physical trace of his past affliction. An ophthalmologist, examining the man after Jesus cured him, would be unable to detect the fact that this man ever had that particular birth defect. So it doesn’t merely change the present. It also changes the evidence of the past.

In addition, many Christians believe that God continuous to miraculously heal people throughout church history. To the extent that this actually happens, you have many instances of miniature mature creation throughout the last 2000 years of world history.

I don’t cite this as a positive argument for YEC. I merely cite this to question a facile objection to YEC.

The Messiah that failed

President Obama.

I [Gore Vidal] was all for him. I’d vote for him again if he were up for election tomorrow. But his problem is a very complicated one. It would take me a long time to explain it. He lacks imagination. He doesn’t know what a terrible country he’s president of. He doesn’t know who owns it. He doesn’t know how to talk to the military. He’s an outsider. A lot of people far less intelligent than he have managed to get the point across to the country, but he hasn’t done it...As I said, President Obama is one of the most intelligent people we’ve had in the presidential chair, and George W. Bush is certainly the stupidest by any given standard. But Obama doesn’t know what our rulers are like. He’s met them all by now. But he’s no more up on them than he was before he became president. I mean, when he’s having beers with that policeman from Cambridge, Massachusetts.

http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2009/11/qa-gore-vidal-discusses-sarah-palin-william-f-buckley-and-an-unexpected-visit-from-the-secret-service.html

Staying Focused In Discussions About Prayer To The Dead

There are many hundreds of contexts in which prayer to the dead could have been mentioned in scripture and the early patristic literature. Instead, it's absent and sometimes contradicted.

Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox will often try to make the practice seem more credible by citing references to prayers for the dead, prayers by the dead for us, prayer or alleged prayer to angels, the presence of angels or deceased humans among humans on earth, etc. But a person can pray for the dead, believe in guardian angels, or think that deceased humans sometimes intercede for people or events on earth, yet not believe in prayer to the dead.

I recently discussed the example of Origen, who held some such beliefs while, at the same time, saying that we should pray only to God and not to lesser beings. In our day, Protestants believe that angels are involved in human affairs, and thus sometimes know about our prayers or are active in God's answering of prayer, without believing in prayer to angels or prayer to the deceased. Even in a mostly Protestant nation like the United States, many people believe in concepts like guardian angels and knowledge of earthly individuals and events on the part of the deceased, yet don't believe in prayer to angels or prayer to the dead. In past articles, such as here, I've discussed why such categories should be distinguished from one another. Even if we believed that an angel or deceased human is sometimes nearby or aware of what's happening in our lives, it doesn't follow that he's always present or always aware or that we can pray to him.

We also need to be discerning about the nature of the sources that are cited, such as their dating and authorship. Catholics and Orthodox often cite late, forged, apocryphal, and heretical documents to make their beliefs seem more historically credible than they actually are. See, for example, the work Turretinfan has done to demonstrate the poor quality of some of the sources cited by the Catholic apologist Steve Ray. In a recent discussion at Beggars All, the Orthodox poster Lvka failed to demonstrate any Biblical or early patristic support for prayers to the dead, but he did appeal to some beliefs in post-Biblical Judaism and offered a highly dubious and anachronistic interpretation of a passage in Justin Martyr. Just recently at this blog, a Catholic poster by the name of Christine posted a quote from Methodius that comes from a document that most likely is inauthentic.

Think about the large amount of evidence we see for prayers to the dead in modern Catholicism and Orthodoxy. It's prominent in their church services, their conversations, their television programs, their books, their web sites, etc. Contrast that with the absence and contradictions of the practice in scripture and early patristic church history. Why do Catholics and Orthodox so often resort to changing the subject to something like prayers for the dead or rely on so many late, forged, apocryphal, and heretical sources?

You Sunk My Arminian Battleship!

How Arminianism Allows Calvinism to Escape the Charge of 'Author of Evil'

Did God allow sin to occur? Yes.
Is God committing some moral wrong by allowing sin to occur? No, God is free to allow anything He wishes (take it up with Him if you disagree).

http://arminianperspectives.wordpress.com/2010/05/19/fallacies-of-calvinist-apologetics-fallacy-8-calvinism-doesnt-charge-god-with-the-authorship-of-sin/#comment-4757

Did God determine sin to occur? Yes.

Is God committing some moral wrong by determining sin to occur? No, God is free to determine anything he wishes (take it up with him if you disagree).

How Arminianism Makes God the Author of Evil

That’s confusing different kinds of sources; I’m using ‘source’ in an originative sense. Look under ‘What is meant by ‘author of sin?’’

http://arminianperspectives.wordpress.com/2010/05/19/fallacies-of-calvinist-apologetics-fallacy-8-calvinism-doesnt-charge-god-with-the-authorship-of-sin/#comment-4754

Consider the damage caused by this tornado:



Obviously, the tornado isn't an agent with indeterministic free will. Clearly, the ultimate originator of the tornado's action is God. In fact, we can't even say the tornado caused the damage. It's like a puppet. As the Bible makes clear, the weather originates with God. He determines and controls the weather. The evil and destruction caused by tornadoes &c are not ultimately originated by some immaterial tornado self that creates its destructive path ex nihilo.

Rather:

Psalm. 148:8 lightning and hail, snow and clouds,
stormy winds that do his bidding,

Jonah 1:4 Then the LORD sent a great wind on the sea, and such a violent storm arose that the ship threatened to break up.

Psalm 42:7 in the roar of your waterfalls;
all your waves and breakers
have swept over me.

Amos 3:6 When a trumpet sounds in a city,
do not the people tremble?
When disaster comes to a city,
has not the LORD caused it?

Since Arminians consider humans on the Calvinist understanding to be similar to lightning bolts, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc., in that they lack personhood and ultimate originative abilities, as well as ability to do or think otherwise, then the Arminians must call God the author of evil since there is no doubt that children dying from starvation (every day, almost 16000 children die from hunger-related causes) due to droughts God determined is an evil:



And God is the agent who originated this (if a human had the ability to control weather and caused a drought, killing many children, he would be morally culpable) evil, and since origination of evil means author of evil, then God is the author of evil on Arminianism. On Arminian assumptions, humans are no different than the above phenomena under the assumption of what Arminians' claim Calvinism teaches about humans vis-a-vis God's providential control. So what's the morally relevant distinction between God using a impersonal "human" to create destruction and an impersonal tornado? So, there's a similar thing going on in Arminianism that they claim is going on in Calvinism. And it is that thing that Arminians claim makes God the author of evil.

Of course, Arminians can respond that God has good reasons for the evil he allows, and thus isn't the author of evil in a morally culpable way, but then he gives up the argument against Calvinism.

Or, perhaps Arminians can admit that humans-on-Calvinism are quite different than weather phenomena (i.e., they have originative powers in the morally relevant way, they are personal, they act, they intend, and they can be held responsible for it even if they have been determined to act or intend how they do, etc), but then (again!) he gives up the argument against Calvinism.

Or, I suppose they can deny what looks to be the clear biblical teaching about God's relationship of control and determiner of the weather. But apart from the ad hoc nature of this move, the demoted (even for Arminians) status of God and his providential governing, the Arminian loses his appeal to the "clear" sounding passages about God's saving love for all whoever and Jesus' death for all whoever. Much of their arguments here rest on "the clear" teaching of Scripture. Lastly, they have argued that the Bible uses common sense terms that presuppose what common man would assume about those terms. If so, the above passages read by a common man would be read that God controls the weather like a manipulator controls a marionette.

War, What is it Good For?

Absolutely nothing if you claim to be at WAR WITH ERROR while really you're just a yes man for bad atheological arguments. (Sorry this isn't a post on pacifism.)

In response to my claim that John Loftus makes incoherent remakes in explaining his outsider test, like:

* It is impossible that any religion with a non-nebulous god pass the outsider test

and,

** It is possible that a religion with a non-nebulous god pass the outsider test.

War On Error left this defense of Loftus in the combox:

It's a priori vs a posteriori. Loftus is saying, on the one hand, there is nothing a priori that prevents Christianity from passing the OTF. He's trying to show that it is a fair test and then challenging up and coming Christian thinkers to actually apply it. However, when Christians come to him and tell him they've applied it and it has passed, he compares his a posteriori conclusions to theirs. And of course, in a world full of disputes about everything at all levels, we expect disagreement there.

That's really rather ridiculous. Apart from the fact that it is lame to claim that because you didn't pass a test no one else can (I suppose megalomaniacs think that way; or perhaps third-graders who fail a math test), this "defense" supports the Mormon burning of the bosom test for faith, MBBTF.

This has been pointed out by J.P. Holding. If WAR ON ERROR meets up with a Mormon, the Mormon will tell WOE (Ben) that he needs to pray and see if it isn't revealed to him the Mormonism is true. If Ben takes the test and says it doesn't work, the Mormon simply "compares his a posteriori experience" to Ben's. The Mormon will say that Ben didn't "really" take the test, just like Loftus says to whoever claims to have passed the OTF, like Victor Reppert. Of course, the Mormon will say that it is a priori possible that the test fail, so it is a fair test.

Similarly, Word of Faith pastors will often argue that if you have enough faith then certain blessings will come. They ask you to test God's goodness. Since it is a test, then it is a priori possible to pass it; however, in experience, the pastors compare all reports to their own a posteriori experience (say, the notice their mansion, the Benz in the driveway, the Rolex on their wrist, etc) and claim that the parishioners didn't "really" have enough faith.

War on Error bet on a losing horse. If he stayed true to his moniker, he'd be pointing out the flaws rather than trying to salvage planks from a sinking and worthless vessel.

The "doer of sin"

GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

“He hasn't done that - not in the ways you are implying he has.”

That’s a sheer denial, with nothing to back it up. This is how I’ve characterized Thibo’s position: if God is responsible, then we are not responsible; if we are responsible, then God is not responsible. So he framed the issue in symmetrical terms. He did that repeatedly in response to Nemes.

Do you now deny that this is an accurate characterization of his position?

Keep in mind that this symmetrical relationship, as Thibo views it, is central to Thibo’s objection to Calvinism in his various replies to Nemes.

“There would be more to it then that. God is the source of morality (either by nature or choice). But if man was the source of morality, and had the power and knowledge to create worlds... the senario starts to look like what if this man was God - and we are back to the same problem we started with.”

i) To begin with, you’re shifting the goalpost. You originally said: “But we don't create worlds or harden sinners hearts, since we are not God.”

That’s a far cry from saying the difference lies in the fact that God is the source of morality.

ii) Moreover, your response is evasive. You know perfectly well what Nemes, Manata, and I have in mind. Examples where, if I were to allow a foreseeable and avoidable evil to occur, I’d be at least partly to blame.

iii) Furthermore, if you deny that what is intuitively blameworthy in the case of a human agent is blameless in the case of God, then you disarm Arminianism of its intuitively moralistic objections to Calvinism (a point that Manata has been making in response to you).

If our moral intuitions are unreliable or inapplicable in relation to God God, then Arminians forfeit the right to say God is culpable if he decrees a sinful event.

“Overlap, yes. But God does not perform the same act man does. God didn't throw Joseph into the pit or refuse to let Isreal go or crusify Christ. Further, God's motives were different than Joseph's brothers, or Pharaoh or the Jews and Romans.”

i) Now you’re falling back on your old ruse of drawing metaphysical distinctions as if metaphysical distinctions are equivalent to moral distinctions. But as I already pointed out, to merely draw a metaphysical distinction fails to exonerate the Arminian God. A metaphysical distinction is not ipso facto exculpatory.

You need to show how your metaphysical distinctions absolve the Arminian God of complicity in evil.

This isn’t the first time I drawn your attention to the inadequacy of maneuver. And how do you respond? By simply repeating yourself.

This suggests to me that you’ve bottomed out. You’re not advancing the argument because you have nothing in reserve.

“So there are significant differences in the acts and intentions.”

And as I’ve already pointed out, Calvinism can avail itself of the same distinctions.

You seem to have a very limited repertoire of responses. You recycle the same responses. You rearrange them a bit, but it always comes back to the same circular conversation. I say A, you say B. I say C. You say D. I say E, you say A…

Evidently, you’ve run out of arguments.

“You may have missed the point although perhaps I could have been more clear. I am not saying per Calvinism, God performs sinful acts. Just the oposit, per Calvinism God does not perform sinful acts - and that makes sense to me even from an external perspective. The point however, is that since, Calvinism, denies God is the author of sin while He predetermines sin's occurance; the most viable definition of 'author of sin', per Calvinism, seems to be 'doer of sin'.”

You repeat the same confusion. The “doer” of sin is the sinner. The “doer” is the immediate agent–not a second party (even if the second party is somehow complicit in the deed). The doer is the party who performs the actual deed.

This isn’t difficult to grasp. You may not think that distinction is morally adequate, but that’s not the point at this juncture. The point is get clear on the concept. Whether or not that conceptual distinction is sufficient for theodicean purposes is a separate issue.

Patristics and prayers to the dead

When Catholic and Orthodox apologists appeal to church fathers or ancient liturgies to establish the propriety of prayers to the dead, they illustrate the irrationality of their mindset. They’re so used to defaulting to tradition that they don’t stop to ask themselves some elementary questions, or draw some rudimentary distinction.

In matters of theology, the first question a Christian ought to ask himself is what was somebody in a position to know. Now it’s possible that some well-placed church fathers had independent information concerning certain details of NT history. That would at least involve ordinary channels of information.

But when we’re talking about prayers to the dead, we’re talking about the nature of the afterlife. Yet the only direct method of acquiring accurate information on the nature of the afterlife is to die and return from the dead. But, of course, death is normally a one-way street. None of the church fathers spent a week in heaven, hell, or “Purgatory,” then came back to tell the story.

In theory, what sources of information about the afterlife are even possible? And more to the point, what sources of information are reliable? The only reliable source of information is divine revelation.

This reminds me of a conversation I had with Philip Blosser a few years ago. He cited the testimony of Augustine to establish the perpetual virginity of Mary. In reply, I made the common sense observation that Augustine was not an eyewitness to the conjugal arrangements of Joseph and Mary. How would Augustine be privy to the details of their sex life?

But even though Blosser is a philosophy prof., it never occurred to him to consider the obvious. He is so conditioned to default to the church fathers that he doesn’t pause to ask practical questions regarding the competence of his sources.

Dial-a-saint

JASON ENGWER SAID:

“And I note, again, that if prayer to the dead had been practiced in Biblical times as it's practiced in Catholicism and Orthodoxy today, we wouldn't expect people to have to resort to the sort of argumentation we've gotten from Lvka and Christine in order to make the case.”

I’d like to piggyback on something that Jason said. We don’t have any examples of divinely sanctioned prayers to the dead in Scripture.

We do, however, see a similar practice in Scripture, although it’s forbidden rather than sanctioned. And, what is more, this practice involves different cultural assumptions regarding the accessibility of the dead.

I’m alluding to necromancy. This was an attempt to contact the dead. And, as I say, Scripture sternly prohibits this practice.

In addition, it’s instructive to see how people in Bible times thought it was possible to contact the dead. The locus classicus is 1 Sam 28.

Saul doesn’t think it’s possible contact Samuel by simply speaking to him directly. In order for Samuel to hear him, Saul deems it necessary to go to a medium to establish contact. In order for Samuel to be sensible to what Saul has to say, it’s necessary to bring Samuel back into the land of the living. You can’t reach Samuel merely by talking to him on your own.

If Christians and Jews in Bible times believed in prayers to the dead, then this would be the mechanism. In order for the “saints” to hear you, you need a living medium, and you also need the medium to bring the decedent back into the sphere of the living.

Of course, a Catholic or Orthodox apologist can reject this framework, but in so doing, he has to reject the only Biblical precedent we have for contacting the dead. And Catholic and Orthodox apologists are thereby rejecting the cultural understanding how the dead could be made aware of the living. In that case they can’t appeal to tradition. For tradition assumes continuity with the past. That you can extrapolate from the practice of Christians in the early church to Christians in the NT church or pious Jews in OT times.

If there’s a fundamental discontinuity in the way in which Catholic and Orthodox theologians deem it possible to access the dead, and the way in which people in Bible times thought it possible to access the dead, then it’s no longer reasonable to assume that Bible writers thought it possible for the saints to be conscious of the living, and available to the living, in the way that Catholics and Orthodox believe.

To the extent that people in Bible times thought it possible to reach out to the dead (and remember that even this is a forbidden practice), that required a link with a living medium. Furthermore, the medium had to bring the dead into the presence of the living.

Perry Robinson On Prayers To The Dead

Perry Robinson posted the following at Beggars All:

"Now request and intercession and thanksgiving, it is not out of place to offer even to men—the two latter, intercession and thanksgiving, not only to saintly men but also to others. But request to saints alone, should some Paul or Peter appear, to benefit us by making us worthy to obtain the authority which has been given to them to forgive sins—with this addition indeed that, even should a man not be a saint and we have wronged him, we are permitted our becoming conscious of our sin against him to make request even of such, that he extend pardon to us who have wronged him."

Origen, On Prayer, X

He posted the same passage in another forum months ago. I responded to him there, and he didn't reply. So, I'll repeat, below, what I wrote in response to Perry in that other forum.

Origen seems to be addressing relations on earth, if somebody like Paul or Peter "appears". And he doesn't limit his comments to saints, but is addressing all men. It would be unreasonable to draw the conclusion that Origen is advocating attempts to contact deceased saints, like Paul and Peter after their death, if those deceased saints don't first appear to us on earth. If you want us to think that Origen was advocating attempts to contact deceased saints who haven't appeared to us, you should explain why.

Later in the same chapter of his treatise, Origen argues that the proper recipients of prayer can be discerned by means of the examples given in scripture. There are no examples of praying to the deceased in scripture, and Origen never advocates the practice in any of his many comments on related subjects. He often discusses deceased saints and angels, including their relation to our prayers, but he never encourages attempts to contact those saints and angels in the form of what we today commonly call prayer. Just as the lack of such prayers in scripture would be unexpected if the people of Biblical times believed in praying to saints and angels, the lack of reference to such prayers in Origen's many comments on related issues is unlikely if he believed in the practice.

In his treatise Against Celsus, Origen uses a wide variety of terms, not just terms like "pray" and "prayer", when addressing such issues. He comments that angels are involved in bringing our prayers to God and bringing God's blessings to us (Against Celsus, 5:4), but goes on to say that we shouldn't "invoke" angels (5:5). He says that it's sufficient to imitate the angels' devotion to God without invoking them (5:5). Angels and other created beings are aware of our prayers to God and our moral character, for example, and they pray with us, but we shouldn't "propitiate" or "invoke" them (8:64). He repeatedly refers to the fact that only God sees our thoughts (7:51; On Prayer, 10), commenting that Christians for that reason pray only to God (4:26).

While we could reconcile such comments with prayers to the dead and angels by adding qualifiers that Origen doesn't mention, why do so? Given how often he discusses deceased saints and angels, including their relationship with our prayers (the role of angels in presenting our prayers to God, etc.), it seems unlikely that he would never advocate what we today call prayer to the saints and angels if he believed in the practice.

Zombie Pope

Truth Unites... and Divides said:

"The pope, Archbishop of Canterbury, and US Conference of Bishops would deplore discrimination against zombies."

I'd think the pope would stand up against the zombies.

I'm sorry, TUAD, but I think it may already be too late!



Of course, this is JPII.

No word on Benedict XVI's undead status . . . yet!

Zombie rights

Back in February I saw 28 Weeks Later on TV. It’s one of the better zombie flicks. A very efficient piece of filmmaking. Of course, the genre is rather limited. There’s only so much you can do with zombies. Character development isn’t their forte.

Because the Rage virus is so easily and rapidly communicable, there is almost no margin for error. The odds are already stacked against the human race.

Thankfully, this is fiction. But if this were real, the human race would be doomed in short order. Why?

Because all of the usual “human rights” organizations would pivot and swing to the defense of zombies. Rounding up zombies would be “racist.” Zombies would be entitled to Miranda rights. The ACLU would appeal to the 9th Circuit to have them released. The pope, Archbishop of Canterbury, and US Conference of Bishops would deplore discrimination against zombies. Sociologists at Stanford and Harvard would publish studies on how zombies are oppressed and misunderstood. Blue states would hasten to pass new laws criminalizing “hate speech” against zombies. The NYT would leak the classified methods and sources for containing the outbreak. And so on and so forth.

The human race wouldn’t stand a chance.

Craig, Calvinism, and Molinism

A few weeks ago, William Lane Craig unloaded on Calvinism. His performance was underwhelming inasmuch as he fell back on canned objections to Calvinism.

However, I wish to make a different point. Craig is arguably the premier Christian apologist of his generation. Yet it’s clear, to judge by the slash-n-burn rhetoric he resorted to in reference to Calvinism, that if he thought the only logical alternatives were Calvinism, Molinism, and atheism, and if he also thought Molinism was wrong, he’d rather be an atheist than a Christian.

What makes this even more remarkable, coming from a major Christian apologist, is that, by his own admission, Molinism is not a revealed truth. It doesn’t even claim to be divinely revealed.

He compares and contrasts Calvinism with Molinism, and that’s a valid exercise up to a point. But it’s also misleading, for there is a fundamental asymmetry between the two positions.

Calvinism claims to be divinely revealed–Molinism does not. And in the nature of the case, we have a higher epistemic duty to believe the word of God than we have to believe an intellectual speculation.

Of course, you might object that’s possible to mistakenly believe that something or another is revealed truth. And that is, indeed, the case. However, that preserves the underlying asymmetry. For it’s also possible to mistakenly believe that an intellectual speculation is true.

So in both cases it’s possible to be wrong, but our epistemic duties are hardly comparable in each case. Because I have a higher obligation to revealed truth, than I have to intellectual speculation, I also have a higher or obligation to what I take to be revealed truth, than I have to what I take to be a true speculation.

A Christian’s allegiance ought to be first and foremost to the word of God. To make what is admittedly an intellectual conjecture like Molinism the deal-breaker betrays a terribly misplaced sense of spiritual priorities. Especially when Craig is a seasoned believer and veteran apologist for the faith.

Desperate To Justify Prayers To The Dead

The practice of praying to the dead was brought up in a thread at Beggars All, and I linked to a post I wrote on the subject. Lvka responded:

Matthew 27:47 and Mark 15:35.

Some bystanders were attempting to explain what Jesus said, and they were mistaken. How does it follow that scripture is supporting prayer to the dead by recording what some mistaken bystanders said? Scripture also records accusations that Jesus was a sinner and was empowered by Satan.

The Bible covers thousands of years of history and a wide variety of contexts within that history. There are hundreds of passages on prayer. What should we think when people who believe in praying to the dead resort to passages like Matthew 27:47 to try to justify the practice?

And notice that Lvka doesn't even attempt to address the Biblical and patristic evidence I cited in my article. I mentioned sources like Origen and Cyprian, and others could be cited (Irenaeus, Lactantius, etc.).

Update On 10/21/23: If you're interested in more information about the history of opposition to praying to saints and angels, see the collection of posts here.

Crispy critters

slw, on June 3, 2010 at 4:18 am Said:

Jason,

How is it less problematic to believe there’s no moral problem with God creating the world knowing that sin would occur, since He can do what he wants (and whatever he does is perfect and good, and then believe that God allows (Armininians would argue cause) evil he could easily thwart for some other reason than his value for freewill. What would be his reason in your system: for his own glory, making his wrath known? How is that better? How doesn’t that make God a capricious God, arbitrarily frying ants under a magnifying glass for his own jollies?

http://arminianperspectives.wordpress.com/2010/05/19/fallacies-of-calvinist-apologetics-fallacy-8-calvinism-doesnt-charge-god-with-the-authorship-of-sin/#comment-4742

By contrast, the Arminian God merely buys a magnifying glass for the 5-year-old psychopath, then looks over his shoulder in mock horror as our junior psychopath fries the ants for his own jollies.