Monday, December 15, 2008
Inerrancy or universalism?
In the latitudinarian climate of contemporary Evangelicalism, universalism is becoming an acceptable option. And among modern proponents of universalism, Richard Bell may be the most erudite. Here are two summaries of his position:
“Richard Bell, a New Testament scholar and priest formed in the evangelical Anglican tradition, has developed his earlier Pauline studies to argue in a recent paper on Romans 5:18-19 that since Paul believes all human beings participate both in Adam’s sin and Christ’s ‘righteous act,’ a universal salvation is affirmed there. This is, claims Bell, ‘the natural reading of the text and the context supports it.’ Indeed, Bell goes on to suggest that these two verses do not bear an isolated witness to universalism: as he puts it, ‘2 Cor 5:19 speaks of God being in Christ, reconciling the world to himself [and] Phil 2:11 says every tongue will confess that Jesus Christ is Lord.’ Bell concedes, however, that such universalist teaching is ‘clearly at variance’ with other parts of Romans—most notably 11:25-32, which implies the condemnation of at least some Gentiles, even while affirming a full salvation of Jews,” R. Parry & Christopher Partridge, eds. Universal Salvation? The Current Debate (Eerdmans 2004), 236-37.
“Bell concludes regarding Israel that ‘the whole nation, including every single member’ will be saved by faith in Jesus at his second coming (261-65). Moreover, he argues that ‘Israelites from every age will believe in the Christ when they see him coming again in his glory’ (265).”
“As for material that appears to contradict his conclusion, Bell argues that ‘the views expressed in 1 Thes. 2.13-16 on the Jews cannot be reconciled with Romans 9-11’ (61), that Paul changed his mind on Israel between Galatians and Romans (176 n. 95) ‘from a substitution model to one where Israel’s election remains firm’ (315), that Galatians implies ‘a substitution model . . . that the Church of Jews and Gentiles replaces Israel’ (179), that ‘2 Corinthians, like Philippians, does not seem to put forward an explicit substitution model’ (184), that Romans 2:25–29 does not support a ‘substitution model’ because ‘Paul is not concerned with Christians but with pious Jews and Gentiles’ (196), that while ‘Most of the New Testament seems to support a substitution model’ (313) this is not the ‘mature’ (315) view presented in Romans 9–11, ‘But after Romans the tradition history “degenerates.” So Ephesians is clearly a development of Pauline theology…But on the Israel question there appears to be a regression’ (317)...In response to the progression-regression he sees in the Pauline materials, Bell writes, ‘some form of Sachkritik (theological criticism) is going to be inevitable’ (320).”
http://jimhamilton.wordpress.com/2008/05/19/review-of-bell-the-irrevocable-call-of-god/
This is noteworthy in several respects:
i) If this is the best case that such an erudite scholar can make for universalism, then what does that tell you about the fortunes of universalism?
ii )Apropos (i), he can only make his case by admittedly pitting one set of verses against another. Put another way, he can only affirm universalism by denying the inerrancy of Scripture.
But that’s a pretty pyrrhic victory. If you can only argue for universalism from Scripture by rejecting the inspiration of Scripture, then universalism cannot claim to be a revealed truth. It’s merely Paul’s opinion, and not even a consistent opinion at that.
iii) That said, “Evangelical” universalists are unwittingly performing a service to the truth. And that’s because they’re edging out the Arminian option. Arminians have their prooftexts for universal atonement, but they can only quote their prooftexts by driving an artificial wedge between universal atonement and universal salvation.
Arminian exegesis represents a mediating position, an intellectual compromise, and universalism is putting the squeeze on that unstable halfway measure. The Arminian is the only one without a chair when the music stops.
“Richard Bell, a New Testament scholar and priest formed in the evangelical Anglican tradition, has developed his earlier Pauline studies to argue in a recent paper on Romans 5:18-19 that since Paul believes all human beings participate both in Adam’s sin and Christ’s ‘righteous act,’ a universal salvation is affirmed there. This is, claims Bell, ‘the natural reading of the text and the context supports it.’ Indeed, Bell goes on to suggest that these two verses do not bear an isolated witness to universalism: as he puts it, ‘2 Cor 5:19 speaks of God being in Christ, reconciling the world to himself [and] Phil 2:11 says every tongue will confess that Jesus Christ is Lord.’ Bell concedes, however, that such universalist teaching is ‘clearly at variance’ with other parts of Romans—most notably 11:25-32, which implies the condemnation of at least some Gentiles, even while affirming a full salvation of Jews,” R. Parry & Christopher Partridge, eds. Universal Salvation? The Current Debate (Eerdmans 2004), 236-37.
“Bell concludes regarding Israel that ‘the whole nation, including every single member’ will be saved by faith in Jesus at his second coming (261-65). Moreover, he argues that ‘Israelites from every age will believe in the Christ when they see him coming again in his glory’ (265).”
“As for material that appears to contradict his conclusion, Bell argues that ‘the views expressed in 1 Thes. 2.13-16 on the Jews cannot be reconciled with Romans 9-11’ (61), that Paul changed his mind on Israel between Galatians and Romans (176 n. 95) ‘from a substitution model to one where Israel’s election remains firm’ (315), that Galatians implies ‘a substitution model . . . that the Church of Jews and Gentiles replaces Israel’ (179), that ‘2 Corinthians, like Philippians, does not seem to put forward an explicit substitution model’ (184), that Romans 2:25–29 does not support a ‘substitution model’ because ‘Paul is not concerned with Christians but with pious Jews and Gentiles’ (196), that while ‘Most of the New Testament seems to support a substitution model’ (313) this is not the ‘mature’ (315) view presented in Romans 9–11, ‘But after Romans the tradition history “degenerates.” So Ephesians is clearly a development of Pauline theology…But on the Israel question there appears to be a regression’ (317)...In response to the progression-regression he sees in the Pauline materials, Bell writes, ‘some form of Sachkritik (theological criticism) is going to be inevitable’ (320).”
http://jimhamilton.wordpress.com/2008/05/19/review-of-bell-the-irrevocable-call-of-god/
This is noteworthy in several respects:
i) If this is the best case that such an erudite scholar can make for universalism, then what does that tell you about the fortunes of universalism?
ii )Apropos (i), he can only make his case by admittedly pitting one set of verses against another. Put another way, he can only affirm universalism by denying the inerrancy of Scripture.
But that’s a pretty pyrrhic victory. If you can only argue for universalism from Scripture by rejecting the inspiration of Scripture, then universalism cannot claim to be a revealed truth. It’s merely Paul’s opinion, and not even a consistent opinion at that.
iii) That said, “Evangelical” universalists are unwittingly performing a service to the truth. And that’s because they’re edging out the Arminian option. Arminians have their prooftexts for universal atonement, but they can only quote their prooftexts by driving an artificial wedge between universal atonement and universal salvation.
Arminian exegesis represents a mediating position, an intellectual compromise, and universalism is putting the squeeze on that unstable halfway measure. The Arminian is the only one without a chair when the music stops.
Sunday, December 14, 2008
1 Timothy 2:4 - An Exegesis
“First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all people, (2) for kings and all who are in high positions, that we may lead a peaceful and quiet life, godly and dignified in every way. (3) This is good, and it is pleasing in the sight of God our Savior, (4) who desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. (5) For there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, (6) who gave himself as a ransom for all, which is the testimony given at the proper time. (7) For this I was appointed a preacher and an apostle ( I am telling the truth, I am not lying), a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and truth. ” - 1Tim 2:1-7
Preface
I need to say a few words about how Arminians approach this text before I provide an exegesis. Next to 2 Peter 3:9, 1 Timothy 2:4 is by far the most cited verse that Arminians use against Calvinists. The intention behind quoting, “who desires all people to be saved,” is to throw water on any idea that God has elected individuals to be saved, and to deny a particular intention in the atonement, as well as deny any notion that God has a special salvific love for his children.
Arminians start with the human-centered assumption that if God does not love all people undifferentiated, then he would be unjust to love some more than others. The Calvinist begins with the Biblical principle that because man is unworthy of grace and deserving only of death, God in his holiness, wisdom, and freedom chooses to love and elect any creature he desires. I often ask Arminians whether God is just to destroy all the people in the world. The answer is usually “yes.” Then I ask, if so, can God be merciful and choose to elect some to be saved? Here is where they balk.
Why do they commit this inconsistency? Arminians believe that “grace” is only grace if it’s given to all people. Yes, I know what you are thinking, “But that defeats the very meaning of grace.” Exactly, grace is undeserved. If God in his freedom chooses to give one person electing grace, he is not required to give someone else this same grace. “But that’s not fair!” someone may object. That’s right, it’s not fair—it’s called grace. We don’t want God to be fair. We want him to be merciful. If God were fair with us, we would all get our just due: to perish eternally in our sins.
Two Wills of God? (Piper)
I also need to note how some Reformed theologians have attempted to reconcile this verse. One thinker, John Piper, whom I respect, has made an appeal to a theological principle that God has two basic wills: “what God would like to see happen and what he actually does will to happen.” [The Pleasure of God, Revised and Expanded, Appendix: “Are There Two Wills in God? Divine Election and God’s Desire for All to Be Saved” p. 317].
This concept of “two wills” is nothing new of course in Reformed thinking, which Piper notes. And I do agree that it is essential to distinguish between different aspects of God’s will in his decrees, laws, character, etc. But there are important disagreements in how God’s will is understood in particular texts. It is paramount that we first allow the immediate context to have priority before we choose to interact with the theological principle of God’s “two wills.”
Concerning 1 Timothy 2:4, Piper says,
It is possible that careful exegesis of 1 Timothy 2:4 would lead us to believe that God’s willing “all men to be saved” does not refer to every individual person in the world, but rather to all sorts of persons, since the “all men” in verse 1 may well mean groups like “kings and all who are in authority” (v. 2). [p. 314, emphasis his. He notes John Gill affirming this interpretation.]This is my understanding of the text as well, and the exegesis in which I will defend below. However, he continues by saying something uncharacteristic,
Nevertheless, the case for this limitation on God’s universal saving will has never been convincing to Arminians and likely will not become convincing, especially since Ezekiel 18:23, 18:32, and 33:11 are even less tolerant of restriction. Therefore, as a hearty believer in unconditional, individual election, I rejoice to affirm that God does not delight in the perishing of the impenitent and that he has compassion on all people. My aim is to show that this is not double talk [p. 315].A couple of comments are necessary. The impression that I am given is that though Piper has first admitted that for him 1 Timothy 2:4 has the possible meaning that God desires “all sorts of persons” and not every individual in the world to be saved, he says that this exegetical argument will not be “convincing to Arminians,” therefore he feels the need to appeal to another argument (i.e. “two wills”).
He then says, “Nevertheless, I will try to make a credible case that while the Arminian pillar texts [1 Timothy 2:4, 2 Peter 3:9, and Ezekiel 18:23] may indeed be pillars for universal love, they are not weapons against unconditional election” (p. 315). But I have to disagree that these particular texts teach God’s universal love. Often it is Arminians who lump these three verses together to mean this; yet, each of these verses are addressing different subjects. 1 Timothy 2:4 concerns God’s desire that those in authority are not excluded from his saving grace; 2 Peter 3:9 notes that God is not willing that his people perish; Ezekiel 18:23 informs us that God is not diabolical in that he takes pleasure in the death of the wicked in itself. None of these three texts are intended to teach a universal love or desire to save every single individual.
I agree with Piper that in many Biblical instances, “what God would like to see happen and what he actually does will to happen,” but this conclusion should be justified by the priority of the context in question. And in the 1 Timothy 2:4 passage there is no basis to apply such a principle because the context and exegesis is sufficient to learn Paul’s meaning. Further, whether or not an argument is convincing to an Arminian is irrelevant. God is glorified when his truth is upheld, regardless of anyone being convinced of the truth, which I am sure Piper would agree. If Arminians cannot accept the exegesis of Scripture, there is no reason to concede to their interpretation and then try to appeal to something outside of the text in the hopes that they will affirm our theology. It is also important to note that the refusal to agree with Calvinistic interpretation is not so much an intellectual issue, as it is a matter of the heart.
Exegesis of 1 Timothy 2:4
The context has already been touched on above, but let me give it flesh. Arminians are fond of citing only part of verse 4, “who desires all people to be saved.” The default meaning for them is “every single individual on this planet.” I often hear them say, “all means all.” Well of course it does, but the question is “all of what?” This is where context must determine what “all” is referring to. So let us examine it by looking at the couple of verses that precede verse 4,
(1) First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all people, (2) for kings and all who are in high positions, that we may lead a peaceful and quiet life, godly and dignified in every way. (3) This is good, and it is pleasing in the sight of God our Savior, (4) who desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.We could work backwards from verse 4 to 1, or forward from verse 1 to 4; either way, it is all connected. But let us work backwards to see the flow of Paul’s thinking. Notice verse 4 begins with “who”; the antecedent is obviously “God” in verse 3, which begins by saying that there is something good and pleasing to our God. What is “This” that Paul is referring to? Here we need to view verses 1 and 2 together as a unit. Paul is urging Timothy the importance of prayers and other spiritual disciplines to be made for all kinds of classes of people.
Paul gives the key statement by noting that the regal class of kings and the higher social class of those in authority should be included in prayer and other disciplines. Why does Paul urge this command? So we may, “lead a peaceful and quiet life, godly and dignified in every way.” Is Paul simply urging them to pray that the authority ruling powers will be mollified? No! Paul has something more eternally hoped for than temporal appeasement from the oppression of rulers; he would like to see them be saved. Hence, Paul immediately follows up by saying, “ (3) This is good, and it is pleasing in the sight of God our Savior, (4) who desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” Paul has in mind that God does not intend to save only one particular social class of people, but all social classes, including kings and those in authority. To read “all people” as “every single person in the world” is not warranted by the context and reveals a reading of one’s tradition and false notions into Paul’s important message to Timothy.
Arminians have wrongly interpreted this verse from a horizontal perspective. That is, they have read into this text the idea that all individuals in the world are in view. But Paul is giving us a vertical point of view of particular social classes. Therefore it is correct to say that Paul is speaking of all “kinds” or “sorts” of people, i.e., it is God’s desire that the social class of those in higher authority are not excluded from his saving grace.
In addition, if we are to grasp the full force of the meaning behind Paul’s statement “all people” in verse 4, it is necessary to briefly look at the historical context behind 1Timothy. Paul is writing Timothy who is in Ephesus and urging him to stay and fulfill teaching and ministerial duties (1 Tim. 1:2). Try to imagine yourself as a Jewish convert being commanded to pray for, not just kings and those in authority, but Gentile kings and those in authority. This command obviously affects Gentile and Jewish listeners differently, but for the latter it would have been much more shocking to be exhorted to pray for not just heathens, but heathen authorities! God wants “all people” to be saved, those of the social class of kings and those in authority, which included Gentile authorities.
Another point that requires attention are the couple of verses that follow verse 4. It reads, “(5) For there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, (6) who gave himself as a ransom for all, which is the testimony given at the proper time.”
In verse 5, Paul uses the important connecting word “For” to give us the causal reason for what came before it. Paul is introducing sacrificial language in which he ties together the mediation of Christ with his atonement. And in verse 6, once again, we find the word “all” in which Christ gave himself as a ransom. It would be absurd to state that Christ gave himself as a ransom for every single person on this planet, for if he did, every individual would be saved, not to mention that God would have no basis to judge any man for his sins (Cf. Matt. 20:28).
Incidentally, it would be silly to read the following verses that contain the phrase “all people” or “all” with it meaning “every single individual on the planet” (Col. 3:11, Gal. 3:28, Mark 13:13, Acts 21:28, Acts 22:15). Others could be cited, but this sampling demonstrates clearly that it is an exegetical fallacy to use the default meaning “every single individual on the planet” when approaching these texts. Context is king.
Finally, it is key that we recognize that Paul in verse 7 connects his Gentile mission to the second use of “all” found in verse 6. This is often overlooked in many treatments of this text. Paul says in verse 7, “For this I was appointed a preacher and an apostle ( I am telling the truth, I am not lying), a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and truth.” In the clearest of terms, Paul is affirming that God has included the Gentiles in his plan of salvation by Christ giving himself as a ransom for “all” not just for the Jews; hence, the reason he immediately follows by saying, “For this I was appointed a preacher and an apostle...of the Gentiles.” Given this context, we can begin to appreciate the ethnic dynamics of the Pauline gospel message.
In summary, Paul uses “all people” in verse 4 to refer to all social classes (in this case, inclusion of kings and those in authority); then in his second use of “all” in verse 6 he refers to all ethnic classes (in this case, inclusion of Gentiles). With these contextual and historical dimensions of the text, we can value why it is essential that we are careful not to import our 21st century modern American cultural assumptions back into a 2,000-year-old Jewish letter. It is imperative that we listen to the historical context, as well as the immediate context to learn its intended meaning, rather than force our preconceived ideas of what we think the text should mean.
My friends, I ask you. Have you prayed for your authorities today? Or do you keep your prayers limited to only your social group? Have you prayed for other ethnic groups, or only your own? Heed the command of the apostle Paul and pray for them, for he says that this is good, and it is pleasing in the sight of God our Savior.
When love is stronger than death
Roger Ebert once said something to the effect that teenagers used to go to movies to watch adults make love, but nowadays adults go to movies to watch teenagers make love. I’ve often commented on how modern movies suffer from the dominance of the youth culture. This goes back to the Sixties, but it’s also driven by the buying power of today’s youth market.
Not that there’s anything wrong with movies about teenagers falling in love. But high school shouldn’t become the final paradigm of love and romance.
The 2006 film, Tristan & Isolde was a refreshing return to a grown-up love story. Unfortunately, it also illustrates why grown-up love stories are an endangered species.
It was panned by most critics, and bombed at the box office. I think one source of the problem is that many film critics suffer from a cultivated cynicism, which they confound with wisdom, that makes it impossible for them to appreciate a good love story.
They want to remind the reader that they themselves are far too sophisticated to be taken in by that sort of thing. But that misses the point. For example, the film Tristan & Isolde is implausible in various respects. Too many coincidental events.
But it’s meant to be a bit implausible. For a love story is idealistic rather than realistic. It’s not about the way things are, but about the way we’d like things to be. A love story is a romantic fantasy in which we mentally rearrange events in the way we’d like them to be if we were omnipotent. The popular, hunky quarterback loses out to the shy, nerdy sophomore. Against all odds, he gets to take the homecoming queen to the prom. That sort of thing. Escapism, but in a good sense.
If anything, the 2006 movie is much more realistic than its medieval exemplar: Tristan and Iseult.
Some critics also complained about the leisurely pacing of the film. They can’t allow a story to unfold in a quiet, unrushed rhythm. If it doesn’t have lots of explosions, shoot-outs, and car chases, it’s boring.
The excellence of the 2006 film derives, in part, from the director and the producer. Kevin Reynolds previous directed The Count of Monte Cristo, another wonderfully photographed love story with emotionally conflicted characters.
Ridley Scott is a producer and director who likes to dabble in a variety of genres. In films like Legend and Kingdom of Heaven, he reveals a painterly eye. And the latter film was another love story about characters torn between duty and passion.
The 2006 film also benefits from a discreet, bell-like accompaniment.
A dominant visual motif of the 2006 film is the use of fluent, shifting imagery: moving shadows and moving water. Oceans and rivers. The play of light and dark.
This includes the blurred image of a river, which foreshadows the death of Tristan. The recurrence of this optical leitmotif functions both as a unifying theme as well as a visual device to advance the action. It lends continuity to the narrative while also nudging it forward in anticipation of the denouement.
The river is an ancient symbol of time’s passage. The apparent flow of time. And, with it, the evanescent quality of life.
The river is a paradoxical emblem of linear time as well as cyclical time. The current moves downstream, but the river itself is the constant. A symbol of mutability and immutability alike. The sameness of change.
As a metaphor for life, the life goes on in the sense that the lifecycle repeats itself, but the individual does not. And, intentionally or not, this becomes a metaphor for the love story. The story centers on the conflict between passion and duty. Adultery and loyalty.
And it illustrates the conundrum of a secular worldview. Tristan and Isolde betray a good man (Lord Marke) because, from their viewpoint, this life is all there is. Honor and duty are great, and they feel guilty when they betray his kindness, but the desperation of their mundane outlook drives them to bask in a few flickering moments of candlelight before the inexorable winds of death and dissolution extinguish them for good.
It’s a world without good choices. Do wrong and be happy or do right and be miserable. The story is fringed by touches of Christianity, but that doesn’t take hold.
Isolde quotes bits of love poetry from Scripture (Canticles) as well as John Donne—a charming anachronism. It lends intensity and urgency to the moment, since life is so momentary. Of course, when time has snuffed them out, how they lived and loved and died will be irreverent. Whether they died sooner or later will be irrelevant. Choose your futility.
It’s like senile dementia, in which you forget all your fond memories. It erases everything you did before, for good or evil. The senile philanthropist and the senile misanthropist might as well trade roles for all the difference it makes.
And there’s a truth to this dilemma, but a half-truth. Life doesn’t invariably or even ordinarily reward virtue and punish vice. Just as often, virtue is punished while vice is rewarded. If this is it, then the prospects are pretty bleak.
From an evolutionary viewpoint, it’s even worse. We mate for the same reason Mayflies mate: blind, irrepressible instinct. Reproduction for its own sake.
Human Mayflies, programmed by natural selection to value the illusory value of love—romantic love, parental love, filial love, brotherly love—when it’s all reducible to C-fibers firing on cue. Chemistry. Plumbing. Nothing more.
In this case, the Mayflies can write love poems, compose operas, and make movies. Eloquent pawns of natural selection.
Many people find these triste, bittersweet love-stories more appealing than love-stories happy endings. Tragedy is poignant in a way that comedy is not. It sticks with you.
And, from a Christian standpoint, there’s some truth to this as well. Happiness without a touch of sadness is shallow while sadness without a hope of happiness is grim.
Time as a river. Why do we turn natural objects and events into metaphors? From a secular standpoint, nature doesn’t represent anything. It’s only from the Christian perspective that shadows and rivers are finite symbols of something infinite and intangible.
Without meaning, there can be no tragedy. That’s the Christian paradox.
If you eliminate meaning, you eliminate tragedy, and if you eliminate God, you eliminate meaning. Without God, nothing is meaningful—whether life or death, happiness or sadness. Tragedy makes life harder to bear, but a meaningless life is truly unbearable.
Better happiness with a note of sadness than sadness without a note of happiness. By God’s grace, sadness deepens happiness. But without God’s grace, our joys are few, fleeting, elusive, and delusive.
Not that there’s anything wrong with movies about teenagers falling in love. But high school shouldn’t become the final paradigm of love and romance.
The 2006 film, Tristan & Isolde was a refreshing return to a grown-up love story. Unfortunately, it also illustrates why grown-up love stories are an endangered species.
It was panned by most critics, and bombed at the box office. I think one source of the problem is that many film critics suffer from a cultivated cynicism, which they confound with wisdom, that makes it impossible for them to appreciate a good love story.
They want to remind the reader that they themselves are far too sophisticated to be taken in by that sort of thing. But that misses the point. For example, the film Tristan & Isolde is implausible in various respects. Too many coincidental events.
But it’s meant to be a bit implausible. For a love story is idealistic rather than realistic. It’s not about the way things are, but about the way we’d like things to be. A love story is a romantic fantasy in which we mentally rearrange events in the way we’d like them to be if we were omnipotent. The popular, hunky quarterback loses out to the shy, nerdy sophomore. Against all odds, he gets to take the homecoming queen to the prom. That sort of thing. Escapism, but in a good sense.
If anything, the 2006 movie is much more realistic than its medieval exemplar: Tristan and Iseult.
Some critics also complained about the leisurely pacing of the film. They can’t allow a story to unfold in a quiet, unrushed rhythm. If it doesn’t have lots of explosions, shoot-outs, and car chases, it’s boring.
The excellence of the 2006 film derives, in part, from the director and the producer. Kevin Reynolds previous directed The Count of Monte Cristo, another wonderfully photographed love story with emotionally conflicted characters.
Ridley Scott is a producer and director who likes to dabble in a variety of genres. In films like Legend and Kingdom of Heaven, he reveals a painterly eye. And the latter film was another love story about characters torn between duty and passion.
The 2006 film also benefits from a discreet, bell-like accompaniment.
A dominant visual motif of the 2006 film is the use of fluent, shifting imagery: moving shadows and moving water. Oceans and rivers. The play of light and dark.
This includes the blurred image of a river, which foreshadows the death of Tristan. The recurrence of this optical leitmotif functions both as a unifying theme as well as a visual device to advance the action. It lends continuity to the narrative while also nudging it forward in anticipation of the denouement.
The river is an ancient symbol of time’s passage. The apparent flow of time. And, with it, the evanescent quality of life.
The river is a paradoxical emblem of linear time as well as cyclical time. The current moves downstream, but the river itself is the constant. A symbol of mutability and immutability alike. The sameness of change.
As a metaphor for life, the life goes on in the sense that the lifecycle repeats itself, but the individual does not. And, intentionally or not, this becomes a metaphor for the love story. The story centers on the conflict between passion and duty. Adultery and loyalty.
And it illustrates the conundrum of a secular worldview. Tristan and Isolde betray a good man (Lord Marke) because, from their viewpoint, this life is all there is. Honor and duty are great, and they feel guilty when they betray his kindness, but the desperation of their mundane outlook drives them to bask in a few flickering moments of candlelight before the inexorable winds of death and dissolution extinguish them for good.
It’s a world without good choices. Do wrong and be happy or do right and be miserable. The story is fringed by touches of Christianity, but that doesn’t take hold.
Isolde quotes bits of love poetry from Scripture (Canticles) as well as John Donne—a charming anachronism. It lends intensity and urgency to the moment, since life is so momentary. Of course, when time has snuffed them out, how they lived and loved and died will be irreverent. Whether they died sooner or later will be irrelevant. Choose your futility.
It’s like senile dementia, in which you forget all your fond memories. It erases everything you did before, for good or evil. The senile philanthropist and the senile misanthropist might as well trade roles for all the difference it makes.
And there’s a truth to this dilemma, but a half-truth. Life doesn’t invariably or even ordinarily reward virtue and punish vice. Just as often, virtue is punished while vice is rewarded. If this is it, then the prospects are pretty bleak.
From an evolutionary viewpoint, it’s even worse. We mate for the same reason Mayflies mate: blind, irrepressible instinct. Reproduction for its own sake.
Human Mayflies, programmed by natural selection to value the illusory value of love—romantic love, parental love, filial love, brotherly love—when it’s all reducible to C-fibers firing on cue. Chemistry. Plumbing. Nothing more.
In this case, the Mayflies can write love poems, compose operas, and make movies. Eloquent pawns of natural selection.
Many people find these triste, bittersweet love-stories more appealing than love-stories happy endings. Tragedy is poignant in a way that comedy is not. It sticks with you.
And, from a Christian standpoint, there’s some truth to this as well. Happiness without a touch of sadness is shallow while sadness without a hope of happiness is grim.
Time as a river. Why do we turn natural objects and events into metaphors? From a secular standpoint, nature doesn’t represent anything. It’s only from the Christian perspective that shadows and rivers are finite symbols of something infinite and intangible.
Without meaning, there can be no tragedy. That’s the Christian paradox.
If you eliminate meaning, you eliminate tragedy, and if you eliminate God, you eliminate meaning. Without God, nothing is meaningful—whether life or death, happiness or sadness. Tragedy makes life harder to bear, but a meaningless life is truly unbearable.
Better happiness with a note of sadness than sadness without a note of happiness. By God’s grace, sadness deepens happiness. But without God’s grace, our joys are few, fleeting, elusive, and delusive.
Saturday, December 13, 2008
More "torture" at GITMO
If you thought waterboarding was barbaric, it gets even worse:
"Ultimately, though, the most overused torture song is I Love You by Barney the Purple Dinosaur. On the face of it, the lyrics may seem deeply inappropriate: 'I love you, you love me - we're a happy family./With a great big hug and a kiss from me to you,/Won't you say you love me too?', but anyone whose child watches the television programme will know how grating
it is. In the torture trade, this is called 'futility music', designed to convince the prisoner of the futility of maintaining his position."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/19/usa.guantanamo
Thankfully, Obama has promised to sign an Executive order banning the use of any music other than Mozart.
"Ultimately, though, the most overused torture song is I Love You by Barney the Purple Dinosaur. On the face of it, the lyrics may seem deeply inappropriate: 'I love you, you love me - we're a happy family./With a great big hug and a kiss from me to you,/Won't you say you love me too?', but anyone whose child watches the television programme will know how grating
it is. In the torture trade, this is called 'futility music', designed to convince the prisoner of the futility of maintaining his position."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/19/usa.guantanamo
Thankfully, Obama has promised to sign an Executive order banning the use of any music other than Mozart.
Family Reunion
-i-
John Shepard was driving to his sister’s house for Thanksgiving. He and his ex-wife broke up before having any kids of their own. It was a bitter divorce, so he celebrated Thanksgiving with his sister and her current boyfriend Daryl. Or was it Darin?
It was a clear, sunny day. Shepard’s mind drifted as the car radio droned. He didn’t notice when a big-rig in the opposing lane began to cross the median. By the time he saw that hulking thing bear down on him at 90 miles per hour, it was too late to avert a head-on collision. Or so it seemed. He blacked out.
After he came to, he found himself on the side of the road. The car was undamaged. How he avoided the collision was a mystery.
He pulled back onto the road and continued his journey. The landscape was oddly deserted. And, except for the occasional car, coming or going, the highway was oddly deserted.
Was he lost? How could he be lost? It had to be the very same road. He hadn’t made a wrong turn—or any turn at all.
Was he going in the wrong direction? But his internal compass told he that he was headed in the same direction.
In this no man’s land, all he could do was to keep driving until he saw a cafe or gas station. After hours of driving, the traffic began to bunch up as he approached a checkpoint. It resembled a border crossing—which made no sense. He was nowhere near the border.
There was an express lane for drivers with an E-ZPass tag, but he didn’t have one of those. Instead, a border guard motioned him into a parking lot. From there, signs directed him to a spacious waiting room. There he was handed a clipboard.
This all seemed surreal. Maybe he had been injured in the accident. He didn’t look like he’d been injured in the accident. He didn’t feel like he’d been injured in the accident. But maybe that was an effect of the accident. An effect of head trauma. Perhaps, right now, he was really lying on a hospital bed, in a coma—with tubes coming out of him.
Still, it seemed real enough. He didn’t want anyone there to think he was crazy, especially since the border guards were well-armed, so he might as well play along with the situation, even if it was a figment of his delirium.
Assuming he was delirious. He just couldn’t tell. After all, if he really were delirious, he’d be the last man to know, right?
After he filled out the application form, they took his picture and issued him a passport. From there he continued his journey. After a few more miles he saw a metropolis on the horizon. It was overshadowed by a thick, clingy layer of smog. The gilded sunlight gave way to slate-gray daylight.
-ii-
John Shepard had been living in the Underground, as locals called it, for about two months now. As we speak, he was having lunch at the hamburger joint on the first floor of his apartment complex. Outside, it was...gray.
A slatternly waitress took his order. Coffee, black, and a hamburger, hold the mustard. He always ordered the same thing, and the hamburger was always burned.
The Underground was a bit like living in Havana under the Castro regime—but without the sunshine, palm trees, or beaches. You had that damn smog hanging over the city every single day.
Most of the cars were relicts from the Eisenhower era. Newcomers brought newer cars, but if you left a new car parked overnight on the street, by morning it was stripped down to the axel rods for spare parts—as Shepard found out on his first night in the Underground.
The air inside the hamburger joint was heavy with cigarette smoke. A jukebox was playing in the background. It only played one song.
Nothing worked in the Underground. Like the vending machine, which only dispensed Tijuana Smalls.
The ceiling in his apartment was leaky. And when the ceiling wasn’t adrip, the faucet was. The wallpaper was peeling. The dog in the next-door apartment was constantly barking. And with a three-headed dog, it made quite a racket.
At first, Shepard tried to complain to the landlord, but the management was an absentee landlord. He sent a guy around every month to collect the rent—a tall, beefy dude with bad breath, brass knuckles, and glowing red eyes.
It was a serious letdown. Not that Shepard ever expected to find himself standing at the pearly gates. He was never that pious. But he was hoping that the alternative would be a wee bit more interesting. Something out of those Gustave Doré illustrations in his parents family Bible—with vast caverns lit by flickering flames. Majestic! An orgy of naked bodies. Thrilling! Sorry to say, the grim reality didn’t measure up to the glossy ads.
Upstairs, his TV—the old-fashioned kind with rabbit-ears, only played reruns from the “Golden Age” of television—Lassie, Flipper, Lawrence Welk, Bewitched, Romper Room, Room 222, Peyton Place, the Brady Bunch, the Patty Duke Show, Mr. Ed, the Monkees, the Mickey Mouse Club, the Flying Nun.
As a diversion, Shepard would take weekend furloughs to see his old stomping grounds. At first, he didn’t think that was allowed. Once you made it here, there was no way out, right?
But as his neighbor explained—the neighbor with the noisy canine—ghosts and demons were free to frequent the land of the living—until the Day of Judgment, after which the exits would all be welded shut.
Even then, Shepard didn’t find it much a relief to watch his sister change the flowers on his grave. And it wasn’t long before she got tired of making the weekly rounds, and stuck some plastic flowers in his vase.
The landlord also made trips outside the Metro—on a Harley-Davidson, license plate NED666—to check on all his loyal employees at the New York Times.
At this point, Shepard was sorry that when his parents took him to church as a kid, he paid so little attention to the preacher and so much attention to the pretty girl in the front row. The Underground was a place where everyone regretted something, but repented of nothing.
But it was too late to learn from his mistakes—unless, of course, he really was in a hospital bed, waiting to wake up some day.
Assuming they wouldn’t pull the plug, in which case...
-iii-
John Shepard was driving to his sister’s house for Thanksgiving. He and his ex-wife...
John Shepard was driving to his sister’s house for Thanksgiving. He and his ex-wife broke up before having any kids of their own. It was a bitter divorce, so he celebrated Thanksgiving with his sister and her current boyfriend Daryl. Or was it Darin?
It was a clear, sunny day. Shepard’s mind drifted as the car radio droned. He didn’t notice when a big-rig in the opposing lane began to cross the median. By the time he saw that hulking thing bear down on him at 90 miles per hour, it was too late to avert a head-on collision. Or so it seemed. He blacked out.
After he came to, he found himself on the side of the road. The car was undamaged. How he avoided the collision was a mystery.
He pulled back onto the road and continued his journey. The landscape was oddly deserted. And, except for the occasional car, coming or going, the highway was oddly deserted.
Was he lost? How could he be lost? It had to be the very same road. He hadn’t made a wrong turn—or any turn at all.
Was he going in the wrong direction? But his internal compass told he that he was headed in the same direction.
In this no man’s land, all he could do was to keep driving until he saw a cafe or gas station. After hours of driving, the traffic began to bunch up as he approached a checkpoint. It resembled a border crossing—which made no sense. He was nowhere near the border.
There was an express lane for drivers with an E-ZPass tag, but he didn’t have one of those. Instead, a border guard motioned him into a parking lot. From there, signs directed him to a spacious waiting room. There he was handed a clipboard.
This all seemed surreal. Maybe he had been injured in the accident. He didn’t look like he’d been injured in the accident. He didn’t feel like he’d been injured in the accident. But maybe that was an effect of the accident. An effect of head trauma. Perhaps, right now, he was really lying on a hospital bed, in a coma—with tubes coming out of him.
Still, it seemed real enough. He didn’t want anyone there to think he was crazy, especially since the border guards were well-armed, so he might as well play along with the situation, even if it was a figment of his delirium.
Assuming he was delirious. He just couldn’t tell. After all, if he really were delirious, he’d be the last man to know, right?
After he filled out the application form, they took his picture and issued him a passport. From there he continued his journey. After a few more miles he saw a metropolis on the horizon. It was overshadowed by a thick, clingy layer of smog. The gilded sunlight gave way to slate-gray daylight.
-ii-
John Shepard had been living in the Underground, as locals called it, for about two months now. As we speak, he was having lunch at the hamburger joint on the first floor of his apartment complex. Outside, it was...gray.
A slatternly waitress took his order. Coffee, black, and a hamburger, hold the mustard. He always ordered the same thing, and the hamburger was always burned.
The Underground was a bit like living in Havana under the Castro regime—but without the sunshine, palm trees, or beaches. You had that damn smog hanging over the city every single day.
Most of the cars were relicts from the Eisenhower era. Newcomers brought newer cars, but if you left a new car parked overnight on the street, by morning it was stripped down to the axel rods for spare parts—as Shepard found out on his first night in the Underground.
The air inside the hamburger joint was heavy with cigarette smoke. A jukebox was playing in the background. It only played one song.
Nothing worked in the Underground. Like the vending machine, which only dispensed Tijuana Smalls.
The ceiling in his apartment was leaky. And when the ceiling wasn’t adrip, the faucet was. The wallpaper was peeling. The dog in the next-door apartment was constantly barking. And with a three-headed dog, it made quite a racket.
At first, Shepard tried to complain to the landlord, but the management was an absentee landlord. He sent a guy around every month to collect the rent—a tall, beefy dude with bad breath, brass knuckles, and glowing red eyes.
It was a serious letdown. Not that Shepard ever expected to find himself standing at the pearly gates. He was never that pious. But he was hoping that the alternative would be a wee bit more interesting. Something out of those Gustave Doré illustrations in his parents family Bible—with vast caverns lit by flickering flames. Majestic! An orgy of naked bodies. Thrilling! Sorry to say, the grim reality didn’t measure up to the glossy ads.
Upstairs, his TV—the old-fashioned kind with rabbit-ears, only played reruns from the “Golden Age” of television—Lassie, Flipper, Lawrence Welk, Bewitched, Romper Room, Room 222, Peyton Place, the Brady Bunch, the Patty Duke Show, Mr. Ed, the Monkees, the Mickey Mouse Club, the Flying Nun.
As a diversion, Shepard would take weekend furloughs to see his old stomping grounds. At first, he didn’t think that was allowed. Once you made it here, there was no way out, right?
But as his neighbor explained—the neighbor with the noisy canine—ghosts and demons were free to frequent the land of the living—until the Day of Judgment, after which the exits would all be welded shut.
Even then, Shepard didn’t find it much a relief to watch his sister change the flowers on his grave. And it wasn’t long before she got tired of making the weekly rounds, and stuck some plastic flowers in his vase.
The landlord also made trips outside the Metro—on a Harley-Davidson, license plate NED666—to check on all his loyal employees at the New York Times.
At this point, Shepard was sorry that when his parents took him to church as a kid, he paid so little attention to the preacher and so much attention to the pretty girl in the front row. The Underground was a place where everyone regretted something, but repented of nothing.
But it was too late to learn from his mistakes—unless, of course, he really was in a hospital bed, waiting to wake up some day.
Assuming they wouldn’t pull the plug, in which case...
-iii-
John Shepard was driving to his sister’s house for Thanksgiving. He and his ex-wife...
Friday, December 12, 2008
Culture Warrior Atheists
Not that I'm a fan of plopping nativity scenes down at Legislative buildings, and there's been plenty of critiques leveled at that expression of evangelicalism, I'm also not a fan of pompous atheists pretending they're so much more intellectually superior than everyone else. The above sign was placed by the Freedom From Religious Foundation. Their president is Dan Barker. I debated Barker. Most people - atheist and theist alike - don't think the debate showed off the superior intellectual skills allegedly possessed by atheists. Anyway, these kinds of stunts are just as silly - perhaps more so - as when theists do it. Plastering your car with Christian bumper stickers as a means of evangelism (as if fellow road travelers will be converted ex opere operato) looks just as silly as plastering your car with that fish-with-legs transitional fossil. Both sides imbue that American value of ubiquitous microwaving. Thinking hard is substituted for bumper sticker slogans. Make sure you offer your platitudes as a catchy jingle so as to get the consumers to buy your product or ideas. Cogent and rigorous argumentation is a faux pas. So both sides - atheists and Christians - have exhibited an anti-intellectual spirit. We should expect this with Christians given all that atheists have told us about religious adherents. We should expect those who "sacrifice reason for blind faith" to act in anti-intellectual ways. But what excuse does the atheist have? So, the "New Atheist," the "Village Atheist," the RRS, the FFR, etc., is just the other side of the anti-intellectual coin. I think this is because most of them are former fundies and have taken their confused view of Christianity - marketing Jesus for mass consumption in order to make it palpable to American consumerism - right on over to their atheism. They still read the Bible like their former fundie selves, and they still "preach" the good news of atheism, making it "culturally relevant," just as they preached (or were preached to) as fundies. They even use their own version of hell fire and brimstone preaching: "Religious adherents are going to destroy the world with nukes!! Repent and bow down to the goddess Reason, now!" But to argue for all of thiscultural analysis is beyond the scope of this post. All I aim to do here is look at the atheists' sign.
i) What is meant by "reason?" And, how can it "prevail?" Didn't Barker tell me in our debate that I "reified" logic? Talk about reification! Anyway, Barker thinks "reason" is the way your neurons fire. So, the opening of the sign should read: "At this season of the Winter Solstice may c-fibers fire in a prevailing way."
ii) Haven't these atheists excluded other atheists? The sign is a sign for strong atheism. How exclusive! Maybe weak atheists should complain to the Governor?
iii) Anyway, how can "reason" tell us something like this: "There are no gods, no devils, no angels, no heaven or hell?" How much would you have to know to know something like that? Has anyone ever proved such a strong claim? Indeed, it is an assault on "reason" and an expression of faith! So, the atheists who constructed the sign stuck their foot in their mouth within two sentences!
iv) The next statement is "There is only our natural world."
a) But then how is there "reason?" Does this happen in a physical brain? How so? A mind? How's that?
Fillet of a fenny snake,
In the cauldron boil & bake;
Eye of newt and toe of frog,
Wool of bat and tongue of dog,
Adder's fork and blind-worm's sting
Lizard's leg & howlet's wing,
For a charm of powerful trouble,
Like a hell broth boil and bubble.
Macbeth Act IV, Scene 1
The crone throws the wing of a bat and the eye of a newt into the cauldron, mixes it up, and voilà, you have the emergence of some mystical and immaterial "protection" or "love" or "safe trip" or "powerful trouble" spell or charm.
Likewise, take the physicalist. That crone, Mammy Nature, mixes a few billions neurons, synapses, and some firing c-fibers, into that cauldron called your noggin, and voilà, you have the emergence of some mystical and immaterial mind with beliefs and intentionality and thoughts.
When appeals to the "mustbebraindidit" argument are made, I'm going to point out that this has a name: The bat wing and eye of newt fallacy.
b) How are there any norms? What about "morality?" Didn't the naturalist J.L. Makcie teach us that, "If their were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we are aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty or moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing anything else" (J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 1977, p.38).
But this brings up another issue. Why object to the stealing of the sign as if it were really wrong (this really happened, apparently some Christians stole the sign. Perhaps they wouldn't have if they had placed a monument of the ten commandments at the Legislation building ;-). If the consistent answer as that which agrees with Mackie is given, how can you object to the stealing of the sign?
c) Has "reason" proved that "there is only the natural world?" Again, this is a metaphysical presupposition.
v) The last statement is that "Religion is but myth and superstition that hardens hearts and enslaves minds." Again, talk about a "reification fallacy."
a) Of course, one wonders what is meant by "minds." And what does it mean to say one is "enslaved?"
b) And, does "myth and superstition" mean "not true?" One would assume so. But why think our minds are aimed at producing true beliefs?
"The idea that one species of organism is, unlike all the others, oriented not just toward its own increated prosperity but toward Truth, is as un-Darwinian as the idea that every human being has a built-in moral compass--a conscience that swings free of both social history and individual luck." (Richard Rorty, "Untruth and Consequences," The New Republic, July 31, 1995, pp. 32-36.)
Or atheist Pat Churchland:
"Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival [Churchland's emphasis]. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost."
Do these guys get to put a sign next to their atheist friends? Belief in naturalism and Darwinism may just be a "useful" myth that helps us survive. We don't believe it because it is true, rather, it has survival value - just like religous beliefs once had.
c) Of course, with these scientifically precise atheists, they must really mean that religion makes that muscle which pumps blood throughout the body, "hard." If not, so much for their critiques against the Bible when it uses phenomenological or metaphorical language.
d) Of course, there's nothing objectionable about "hard hearts" and "enslaved minds." It's not as if moral or epistemic norms are being violated.
So, not only have these atheists violated their own touted strengths, "protectors of Reason," they have made themselves just as forgettable, sad products of American consumerism as the theists they want to do battle with.
Delusions that Kill
According to this article, Dawkin’s book The God Delusion is responsible for at least one suicide. In this instance, 22-year-old Jesse Kilgore was reading The God Delusion because a biology professor had challenged him to do so. Independent witnesses confirmed to Jesse’s father that the book had had a devastating effect on Jesse, causing him to question his faith, and led to him shooting himself in the woods near his home in October.
There are a couple of things to note from the story. First, Dawkins in no way intended that his book would cause people to commit suicide. Be that as it may, The God Delusion offers no reason for someone who deconverts from Christianity not to kill himself. That is, the philosophical justifications that Dawkins uses (poorly, I might add) logically lead to concepts of nihilism and despair. There is no reason, purpose, or value in life under Dawkins’ view. In fact, any humanistic worldview can only provide a useful fiction for atheists to pretend is real; nothing more. Reality itself does not contain these values or any purpose whatsoever. Therefore, whether you invent a God or invent a feeling of universal brotherhood, it’s still just your own mental invention. It doesn’t extend into reality at all, and as such Dawkins’ worldview is just as delusional as the religious worldview he abhors.
This is not as much of a danger to someone who is already a nonbeliever. Nonbelievers who read Dawkins’ books only gain reaffirmation of their beliefs. Since they’ve already suppressed the negative aspects of their worldview and blinded themselves to the nihilistic aspects of their presuppositions, reading Dawkins won’t affect them. A believer, however, who comes from a radically different worldview will be more prone to falling into that nihilistic despair if he deconverts because he has not yet deluded himself with false hope for a destitute world.
Since Jesse apparently did some apologetics work on-line, he may very well have been caught in such a quandary here. It could have been something as simple as the fact that Jesse couldn’t believe in Dawkins’ worldview because his apologetic was strong enough to show Dawkins’ false humanistic optimism to be bunk; but at the same time Jesse’s understanding of Christianity was weak to Dawkins’ attack. The result would be that Dawkins’ book would convince him Christianity is wrong, but not that Dawkins was right, and that left him with nowhere to turn to.
This brings us to the second point from the story. Christians need to have a strong understanding of Christian beliefs. One of the aspects I’ve found (and it is obvious from such folks as the Debunkers) is that most former Christians have no concept at all of Christian theism. Most apostates illustrate that they cannot even properly read a verse of Scripture at all; they have no understanding of basic exegesis; they do not even make an attempt to read the Bible in context. The former Christians that I run into, to a man (or woman), attack Fundamentalist caricatures of Christianity and assume that they are actually critiquing Christianity in that process! Look no further than those who complain about talking snakes and donkeys in the comments for evidence of this. (Granted, that’s personal experience, which is merely anecdotal evidence. But on this issue, I think the case is quite strong since it’s consistent anecdotal evidence and not only my experience on the matter.)
If atheists attack a straw man, it doesn’t affect Christianity. The God Delusion is nothing but burning straw and tilting at windmills. The unfortunate thing is that those types of errors can be very subtle and hard to spot. Fallacies are not always blatant; that’s why you need to study them. Sadly, Dawkins has been responded to by many people online and through books, yet Jesse apparently never discovered how shoddy Dawkins’ arguments are.
This brings us to a third point. I do think Keith (Jesse’s father) was a bit too hard on himself regarding how he should have been there for his son. Jesse wasn’t a ten-year-old; he was twenty-two years old. He was an adult. Keith didn’t put Jesse in danger by allowing Jesse to go off to college. Jesse should have been able to discover these resources by himself.
Keith’s other points regarding secular education are valid though. It is the case that public education is anti-Christian. Christians do need to take the effort to educate their children with this in mind. Public education is not an ally (even if they weren’t anti-Christian, public education is so dismal you still couldn’t consider it an ally). Parents need to teach their children the basics of logic so their children can spot logical fallacies. Parents need to ensure their children do understand what Christianity is so they can defend it against atheism.
But this requires that the parents understand logic and Christianity too. And that requires the Church to understand what she teaches. But this takes hard working. Critical thinking isn’t easy. Weighing arguments takes effort. We, as Christians, must be willing to do that footwork. If nothing else, this story shows us that lives are on the line.
There are a couple of things to note from the story. First, Dawkins in no way intended that his book would cause people to commit suicide. Be that as it may, The God Delusion offers no reason for someone who deconverts from Christianity not to kill himself. That is, the philosophical justifications that Dawkins uses (poorly, I might add) logically lead to concepts of nihilism and despair. There is no reason, purpose, or value in life under Dawkins’ view. In fact, any humanistic worldview can only provide a useful fiction for atheists to pretend is real; nothing more. Reality itself does not contain these values or any purpose whatsoever. Therefore, whether you invent a God or invent a feeling of universal brotherhood, it’s still just your own mental invention. It doesn’t extend into reality at all, and as such Dawkins’ worldview is just as delusional as the religious worldview he abhors.
This is not as much of a danger to someone who is already a nonbeliever. Nonbelievers who read Dawkins’ books only gain reaffirmation of their beliefs. Since they’ve already suppressed the negative aspects of their worldview and blinded themselves to the nihilistic aspects of their presuppositions, reading Dawkins won’t affect them. A believer, however, who comes from a radically different worldview will be more prone to falling into that nihilistic despair if he deconverts because he has not yet deluded himself with false hope for a destitute world.
Since Jesse apparently did some apologetics work on-line, he may very well have been caught in such a quandary here. It could have been something as simple as the fact that Jesse couldn’t believe in Dawkins’ worldview because his apologetic was strong enough to show Dawkins’ false humanistic optimism to be bunk; but at the same time Jesse’s understanding of Christianity was weak to Dawkins’ attack. The result would be that Dawkins’ book would convince him Christianity is wrong, but not that Dawkins was right, and that left him with nowhere to turn to.
This brings us to the second point from the story. Christians need to have a strong understanding of Christian beliefs. One of the aspects I’ve found (and it is obvious from such folks as the Debunkers) is that most former Christians have no concept at all of Christian theism. Most apostates illustrate that they cannot even properly read a verse of Scripture at all; they have no understanding of basic exegesis; they do not even make an attempt to read the Bible in context. The former Christians that I run into, to a man (or woman), attack Fundamentalist caricatures of Christianity and assume that they are actually critiquing Christianity in that process! Look no further than those who complain about talking snakes and donkeys in the comments for evidence of this. (Granted, that’s personal experience, which is merely anecdotal evidence. But on this issue, I think the case is quite strong since it’s consistent anecdotal evidence and not only my experience on the matter.)
If atheists attack a straw man, it doesn’t affect Christianity. The God Delusion is nothing but burning straw and tilting at windmills. The unfortunate thing is that those types of errors can be very subtle and hard to spot. Fallacies are not always blatant; that’s why you need to study them. Sadly, Dawkins has been responded to by many people online and through books, yet Jesse apparently never discovered how shoddy Dawkins’ arguments are.
This brings us to a third point. I do think Keith (Jesse’s father) was a bit too hard on himself regarding how he should have been there for his son. Jesse wasn’t a ten-year-old; he was twenty-two years old. He was an adult. Keith didn’t put Jesse in danger by allowing Jesse to go off to college. Jesse should have been able to discover these resources by himself.
Keith’s other points regarding secular education are valid though. It is the case that public education is anti-Christian. Christians do need to take the effort to educate their children with this in mind. Public education is not an ally (even if they weren’t anti-Christian, public education is so dismal you still couldn’t consider it an ally). Parents need to teach their children the basics of logic so their children can spot logical fallacies. Parents need to ensure their children do understand what Christianity is so they can defend it against atheism.
But this requires that the parents understand logic and Christianity too. And that requires the Church to understand what she teaches. But this takes hard working. Critical thinking isn’t easy. Weighing arguments takes effort. We, as Christians, must be willing to do that footwork. If nothing else, this story shows us that lives are on the line.
The Christian Understanding of History
(Posted on behalf of Steve Hays.)
There are some theological deficiencies in Latourette's outlook. Still, if you make allowance for his limitations, this draws a useful contrast between secular historiography and Christian historiography.
There are some theological deficiencies in Latourette's outlook. Still, if you make allowance for his limitations, this draws a useful contrast between secular historiography and Christian historiography.
The Bible, Rocks and Time
Davis Young & Ralph Stearley have just published a book entitled The Bible, Rocks and Time (IVP 2008).
1.According to the authors, “this book is addressed primarily to Christian pastors, theologians, biblical scholars, students and lay people with some interest in scientific questions, but we extend an open invitation to non-Christians to read the book as well because we not only seek to persuade Christians to abandon any idea that the Bible demands belief in God’s creation of the world only a few thousand years ago but also to show non-Christians that acceptance of modern geological conclusions regarding an ancient Earth is by no means incompatible with biblical Christianity” (10-11).
Two things stand out in this statement:
i) Since this book is pitched at a semipopular level, the implication is that a non-specialist is competent to evaluate their arguments for the antiquity of the earth. You don’t have to be a geologist to weigh the evidence which they present.
ii) Their statement is somewhat misleading. Neither of the two authors is an OT scholar. And this book is not primarily about Biblical hermeneutics generally or the exegesis of Genesis 1-8 in particular. Rather, it marshals conventional evidence for the antiquity of the earth. At that level, there’s nothing distinctive about this material. You could find the same material in just about any secular textbook on geology.
The only difference is that our authors take specific aim at flood geology or young-earth creationism.
2.Before I proceed any further, I should lay my own cards on the table:
i) My personal concern is not so much to stake out a particular position on the extent of the flood or the antiquity of the earth. I don’t have a preconceived agenda in that respect.
Rather, my personal concern is to make room for whatever the Bible prescribes, proscribes, or permits on those topics.
ii) Since I’m not a geologist, I’m not going to comment on the technicalities of the geological evidence. Instead, I’m going to raise certain methological questions about the authors’ use of evidence.
3.The authors devote several pages to Henry Morris. I don’t see the point of this. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that flood geology is a genuine science, we’d expect the formulation of flood geology to undergo various modifications over time, just as we’d expect the formulation of cosmology to undergo various modifications over time. Imagine if you were to critique modern cosmology by devoting a number of pages to the very dated theories of Fred Hoyle.
I can only think of two reasons for this emphasis:
i) Because Davis Young came of age when Henry Morris’ version of flood theology was the reigning paradigm, and because, in fact, he’s written books and articles in the past interacting with that particular model, he can’t let go of that target. It’s like a middle-aged pastor who’s never done much additional study since he attended seminary some 30 years ago.
ii) It’s an attempt to prejudice the reader against flood geology by attacking a dated version of flood geology.
4. On an ironic note, there’s a single reference to Howard Van Till, under the general heading of “Christians in the Natural Sciences” (156-57). But from what I’ve read, Van Till recently defected from the Christian faith. So he’s not a terribly encouraging example of concordism.
5.The authors also devote several pages to Walt Brown. But there’s a very selective, piecemeal quality to their criticisms. They leave most of Brown’s case for flood geology untouched.
6.They devote even more pages to a critique of Steven Austin. That makes sense. If you’re going to attack flood geology, then he’s a major exponent.
And, as you might expect, they raise a number of reasonable sounding objections to Austin. I say that’s to be expected since you’re only reading their side of the argument.
But their critique would be more convincing if they had initiated a correspondence with Austin, then published the correspondence. That way, the reader could see how Austin attempts to respond to their criticisms.
As it stands, they control the flow of evidence. They present the evidence they think supports their position. They present the evidence they think undercuts the opposing position.
Nothing wrong with that, of course. But as a reader, I’m naturally thinking to myself that they have no incentive to present any evidence that supports the opposing position or undercuts their own position. So I have to withhold judgment.
7.For a book on dating, they don’t address the old, ongoing debate between temporal metrical objectivism and temporal metrical conventionalism. But, as I understand it, that debate raises the question of whether anything has an absolute date. That transcends the issue of dating techniques.
8.They cite Paul Seeley on the accommodation of OT cosmography to ANE mythology (182n18; 206n25). This appeal disregards scholarly literature which is critical of his approach, cf. G. Beale, The Erosion of Inerrancy in Evangelicalism (Crossway 2008); V. Poythress, Redeeming Science (Crossway 2006), 96n8; D. Tsumura, The Earth and the Waters in Genesis 1 and 2 (Sheffield 1989); N. Weeks, "Cosmology in Historical Context," WTJ 68.2 (Fall 2006): 283-293.
9.They say “We suspect that most Christians would agree, as we would too, with the historical Christian doctrine that the initial act of creation that brought into existence the material from which God formed the habitable, orderly cosmos, was an ex nihilo creative act, a sheer, totally supernatural miracle that could not have entailed God’s use of any secondary means or natural processes whatsoever because secondary means and natural processes had not yet been created and did not yet exist. The beginning of God’s work of creation had to be a miracle of the purest kind. The question before us, however, is whether the subsequent creative work of the six days mentioned in Genesis 1 involved purely supernatural, miraculous acts” (186-187).
i) But it seems to me that the admission of creation ex nihilo throws a monkey wrench into geochronology. They want to limit creation ex nihilo to the raw material which God then uses to form the universe. But once you admit that some of the stuff composing the universe was brought about by an instantaneous divine fiat rather than a natural process, then I don’t see, in general, how you could date anything since, on that assumption, I don’t see, in general, how you could distinguish an ex nihilo artifact from a providential artifact.
ii) There might be situations where you could draw that distinction on a case-by-case basis. A providential process of weathering or erosion or sedimentation might better account for a particular effect than creation ex nihilo. But there are other cases in which different causes (providential or ex nihilo) could yield the same effect. For example, could you tell whether the sun was created by a natural process rather than an instantaneous divine fiat?
iii) The authors also confound the issue of fiat creation with instantaneous creation. The question at issue is not whether God created each item instantaneously in the span of six days. The issue, rather, is whether each item was created within the timeframe of the day to which it's assigned. And whether that, in turn, laid the foundation for the next creative stage.
10.The authors say: “One of the earliest arguments for the antiquity of the Earth stemmed from the evidence contained within accumulations of sedimentary rock…Sediments are transported by running water, wind, and glacial ice…By comparing modern processes of sedimentation with the evidences in the sedimentary rock record, geologists have concluded that Earth must be far older than was assumed three hundred years ago. The physical evidence contained within sedimentary rocks provides a powerful argument that Earth is much older than just a few thousand years ago” (217-19).
i) But the problem I have with that argument is this: if you’re going to invoke sedimentation rates to date a rock formation, then don’t you have to know the rate of the processes involved?
If it involves glaciation, don’t you have to know the rate of cooling, the rate of snowfall, the rate of subsequent warming, &c.?
If it involves wind, don’t you need to know the wind speed? As well as fluctuations in wind speed over thousands and millions of years?
If it involves water, don’t you need to know the rate of precipitation or the rate of runoff to calculate the rate of deposition? Don’t you also need to know the original gradient? As well as the presence or absence of groundcover? Can a geologist infer all these variables from the surviving trace evidence?
ii) Moreover, or so it seems to me, sedimentation involves erosion; but aren’t there natural forces that counteract erosion? Forces of accretion as well as depletion? Indeed, can’t the same process yield both effects (e.g. longshore drift)?
Take coastal erosion. A one-day storm surge may rapidly erode the shoreline. How does a geologist infer the occurrence of a one-day storm surge a million years ago?
The authors spend a lot of time criticizing Austin’s explanation of the Grand Canyon. They think the geological phenomena are too varied to be the product of a one-time event (Noah’s flood). Maybe they’re right. Since I think the Scriptural data is noncommittal on the extent of the flood, I have no personal stake in that debate.
However, for reasons just given, their own analysis raises a number of methodological questions which they fail to address. Maybe there are good answers, but you won’t find those answers, if they exist, in this book.
11.The authors say: “Here he [Woodmorappe] criticized geochronologists for attempting to account for poor results by appealing to unusual geological circumstances. Well, exactly! It’s the complexities of geology that make the assessment of analytical results both challenging and fun. It is the business of geochronologists to evaluate their own work and to discard problematic ages…All three of Woodmorappe’s alleged fallacies essentially amount to the same thing, namely, that radiometric dating methods should be discredited and thrown out because bad or meaningless ages are sometimes obtain. But the reason that bad, discrepant, meaningless, puzzling or unexpected ages are obtained has nothing to do with the established physics and mathematics of radioactive decay. Such unusable ages come about because of geologic factors, pure and simple (unless the analyst did a bad job)…Sometimes, a ‘bad’ age for a rock can alert the geologist to a geologic process or event that otherwise might have been overlooked” (401-02).
i) I don’t see how that really addresses the problem. Why go through the motions of dating an object if you’re going to discount the results in case they conflict with your preconception of the “correct” date? If the experimental results don’t matter, then what’s the basis of your expectation? And if absolute dating techniques sometimes yield “discrepant,” “unexpected,” “unusable,” or “meaningless” dates, then why doesn’t that call into question the reliability of the underlying methods?
ii) Also, I don’t deny that other factors could “contaminate” the result, but isn’t that a backdoor admission that assigning the correct age involves a number of other, often imponderable, variables? It is possible to reconstruct all of the salient variables from the trace evidence?
12. As an outsider reading their book, I get the impression that Young and Stearley are so immersed in their field as to be blind to their own assumptions.
1.According to the authors, “this book is addressed primarily to Christian pastors, theologians, biblical scholars, students and lay people with some interest in scientific questions, but we extend an open invitation to non-Christians to read the book as well because we not only seek to persuade Christians to abandon any idea that the Bible demands belief in God’s creation of the world only a few thousand years ago but also to show non-Christians that acceptance of modern geological conclusions regarding an ancient Earth is by no means incompatible with biblical Christianity” (10-11).
Two things stand out in this statement:
i) Since this book is pitched at a semipopular level, the implication is that a non-specialist is competent to evaluate their arguments for the antiquity of the earth. You don’t have to be a geologist to weigh the evidence which they present.
ii) Their statement is somewhat misleading. Neither of the two authors is an OT scholar. And this book is not primarily about Biblical hermeneutics generally or the exegesis of Genesis 1-8 in particular. Rather, it marshals conventional evidence for the antiquity of the earth. At that level, there’s nothing distinctive about this material. You could find the same material in just about any secular textbook on geology.
The only difference is that our authors take specific aim at flood geology or young-earth creationism.
2.Before I proceed any further, I should lay my own cards on the table:
i) My personal concern is not so much to stake out a particular position on the extent of the flood or the antiquity of the earth. I don’t have a preconceived agenda in that respect.
Rather, my personal concern is to make room for whatever the Bible prescribes, proscribes, or permits on those topics.
ii) Since I’m not a geologist, I’m not going to comment on the technicalities of the geological evidence. Instead, I’m going to raise certain methological questions about the authors’ use of evidence.
3.The authors devote several pages to Henry Morris. I don’t see the point of this. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that flood geology is a genuine science, we’d expect the formulation of flood geology to undergo various modifications over time, just as we’d expect the formulation of cosmology to undergo various modifications over time. Imagine if you were to critique modern cosmology by devoting a number of pages to the very dated theories of Fred Hoyle.
I can only think of two reasons for this emphasis:
i) Because Davis Young came of age when Henry Morris’ version of flood theology was the reigning paradigm, and because, in fact, he’s written books and articles in the past interacting with that particular model, he can’t let go of that target. It’s like a middle-aged pastor who’s never done much additional study since he attended seminary some 30 years ago.
ii) It’s an attempt to prejudice the reader against flood geology by attacking a dated version of flood geology.
4. On an ironic note, there’s a single reference to Howard Van Till, under the general heading of “Christians in the Natural Sciences” (156-57). But from what I’ve read, Van Till recently defected from the Christian faith. So he’s not a terribly encouraging example of concordism.
5.The authors also devote several pages to Walt Brown. But there’s a very selective, piecemeal quality to their criticisms. They leave most of Brown’s case for flood geology untouched.
6.They devote even more pages to a critique of Steven Austin. That makes sense. If you’re going to attack flood geology, then he’s a major exponent.
And, as you might expect, they raise a number of reasonable sounding objections to Austin. I say that’s to be expected since you’re only reading their side of the argument.
But their critique would be more convincing if they had initiated a correspondence with Austin, then published the correspondence. That way, the reader could see how Austin attempts to respond to their criticisms.
As it stands, they control the flow of evidence. They present the evidence they think supports their position. They present the evidence they think undercuts the opposing position.
Nothing wrong with that, of course. But as a reader, I’m naturally thinking to myself that they have no incentive to present any evidence that supports the opposing position or undercuts their own position. So I have to withhold judgment.
7.For a book on dating, they don’t address the old, ongoing debate between temporal metrical objectivism and temporal metrical conventionalism. But, as I understand it, that debate raises the question of whether anything has an absolute date. That transcends the issue of dating techniques.
8.They cite Paul Seeley on the accommodation of OT cosmography to ANE mythology (182n18; 206n25). This appeal disregards scholarly literature which is critical of his approach, cf. G. Beale, The Erosion of Inerrancy in Evangelicalism (Crossway 2008); V. Poythress, Redeeming Science (Crossway 2006), 96n8; D. Tsumura, The Earth and the Waters in Genesis 1 and 2 (Sheffield 1989); N. Weeks, "Cosmology in Historical Context," WTJ 68.2 (Fall 2006): 283-293.
9.They say “We suspect that most Christians would agree, as we would too, with the historical Christian doctrine that the initial act of creation that brought into existence the material from which God formed the habitable, orderly cosmos, was an ex nihilo creative act, a sheer, totally supernatural miracle that could not have entailed God’s use of any secondary means or natural processes whatsoever because secondary means and natural processes had not yet been created and did not yet exist. The beginning of God’s work of creation had to be a miracle of the purest kind. The question before us, however, is whether the subsequent creative work of the six days mentioned in Genesis 1 involved purely supernatural, miraculous acts” (186-187).
i) But it seems to me that the admission of creation ex nihilo throws a monkey wrench into geochronology. They want to limit creation ex nihilo to the raw material which God then uses to form the universe. But once you admit that some of the stuff composing the universe was brought about by an instantaneous divine fiat rather than a natural process, then I don’t see, in general, how you could date anything since, on that assumption, I don’t see, in general, how you could distinguish an ex nihilo artifact from a providential artifact.
ii) There might be situations where you could draw that distinction on a case-by-case basis. A providential process of weathering or erosion or sedimentation might better account for a particular effect than creation ex nihilo. But there are other cases in which different causes (providential or ex nihilo) could yield the same effect. For example, could you tell whether the sun was created by a natural process rather than an instantaneous divine fiat?
iii) The authors also confound the issue of fiat creation with instantaneous creation. The question at issue is not whether God created each item instantaneously in the span of six days. The issue, rather, is whether each item was created within the timeframe of the day to which it's assigned. And whether that, in turn, laid the foundation for the next creative stage.
10.The authors say: “One of the earliest arguments for the antiquity of the Earth stemmed from the evidence contained within accumulations of sedimentary rock…Sediments are transported by running water, wind, and glacial ice…By comparing modern processes of sedimentation with the evidences in the sedimentary rock record, geologists have concluded that Earth must be far older than was assumed three hundred years ago. The physical evidence contained within sedimentary rocks provides a powerful argument that Earth is much older than just a few thousand years ago” (217-19).
i) But the problem I have with that argument is this: if you’re going to invoke sedimentation rates to date a rock formation, then don’t you have to know the rate of the processes involved?
If it involves glaciation, don’t you have to know the rate of cooling, the rate of snowfall, the rate of subsequent warming, &c.?
If it involves wind, don’t you need to know the wind speed? As well as fluctuations in wind speed over thousands and millions of years?
If it involves water, don’t you need to know the rate of precipitation or the rate of runoff to calculate the rate of deposition? Don’t you also need to know the original gradient? As well as the presence or absence of groundcover? Can a geologist infer all these variables from the surviving trace evidence?
ii) Moreover, or so it seems to me, sedimentation involves erosion; but aren’t there natural forces that counteract erosion? Forces of accretion as well as depletion? Indeed, can’t the same process yield both effects (e.g. longshore drift)?
Take coastal erosion. A one-day storm surge may rapidly erode the shoreline. How does a geologist infer the occurrence of a one-day storm surge a million years ago?
The authors spend a lot of time criticizing Austin’s explanation of the Grand Canyon. They think the geological phenomena are too varied to be the product of a one-time event (Noah’s flood). Maybe they’re right. Since I think the Scriptural data is noncommittal on the extent of the flood, I have no personal stake in that debate.
However, for reasons just given, their own analysis raises a number of methodological questions which they fail to address. Maybe there are good answers, but you won’t find those answers, if they exist, in this book.
11.The authors say: “Here he [Woodmorappe] criticized geochronologists for attempting to account for poor results by appealing to unusual geological circumstances. Well, exactly! It’s the complexities of geology that make the assessment of analytical results both challenging and fun. It is the business of geochronologists to evaluate their own work and to discard problematic ages…All three of Woodmorappe’s alleged fallacies essentially amount to the same thing, namely, that radiometric dating methods should be discredited and thrown out because bad or meaningless ages are sometimes obtain. But the reason that bad, discrepant, meaningless, puzzling or unexpected ages are obtained has nothing to do with the established physics and mathematics of radioactive decay. Such unusable ages come about because of geologic factors, pure and simple (unless the analyst did a bad job)…Sometimes, a ‘bad’ age for a rock can alert the geologist to a geologic process or event that otherwise might have been overlooked” (401-02).
i) I don’t see how that really addresses the problem. Why go through the motions of dating an object if you’re going to discount the results in case they conflict with your preconception of the “correct” date? If the experimental results don’t matter, then what’s the basis of your expectation? And if absolute dating techniques sometimes yield “discrepant,” “unexpected,” “unusable,” or “meaningless” dates, then why doesn’t that call into question the reliability of the underlying methods?
ii) Also, I don’t deny that other factors could “contaminate” the result, but isn’t that a backdoor admission that assigning the correct age involves a number of other, often imponderable, variables? It is possible to reconstruct all of the salient variables from the trace evidence?
12. As an outsider reading their book, I get the impression that Young and Stearley are so immersed in their field as to be blind to their own assumptions.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Fallacious Fallacies
In his book (mostly) on informal fallacies, Attacking Faulty Reasoning, T. Edward Damer uses (a caricature of) one particular pro-life argument as fodder to expose fallacious reasoning.
This example takes place in his section on "attacking the fallacy," where advice is given on how to attack fallacious arguments. One of his "attacks" is to employ the standard attack by counter-example. This method uses the same form of argumentation as the argument you're attacking while making sure to argue for an obviously absurd conclusion.
An example of refutation by logical counter-example would be:
Now, after explaining a useful way to deal with bad arguments, Damer uses as an example what he takes to be a somewhat popular pro-life argument. Damer names this the "fallacy of the continuum," and shows how it is made by the pro-lifer:
Damer "demonstrates the faulty character of this kind of reasoning" by constructing this counter-example:
I think Damer is guilty of a straw man fallacy here. He is also guilty of violating one of his principles as to what constitutes a good argument - the rebuttal principle. Damer rightly claims that, "An argument is not a good one of it does not anticipate and effectively rebut, or successfully blunt the force of, criticisms of the argument and of the position that it supports" (p.30). And Damer is clearly making an argument. It can be expressed thus:
Now, in one sense Damer's conclusion does go through, but that's only because the pro-life argument that he's trying to represent isn't properly stated. And it would be charitable to assume that Damer wants to attack proper representations of arguments. Having qualified, we need to object to a premise so that the conclusion doesn't go through. The only one left to reject is premise 2.2. And so that's what we'll do.
I propose to challenge 2.2 in three ways: (i) A brief, correct statement of the pro-life argument being addressed; (ii) relevant disanalogies between the pro-life argument and the pro-heat counter-argument; and (iii) some possible objections.
A Brief, Correct Statement of the Pro-Life Argument
"Given the facts of embryology and fetal development, at conception, a whole human being, with its own genome, comes into existence, needing only food, water, shelter, and oxygen, and a congenial environment in which to interact, to grow and develop itself to maturity in accordance with her own intrinsically ordered nature. Like the infant, the child, and the adolescent, the conceptus is a being who is in the process of unfolding its potential, that is, the potential to grow and develop itself but not to change what it is. This being, because of its nature, is actively disposed to develop into a mature version of herself, though never ceasing to be herself. Thus, the same human being that begins as a zygote continues to exist to its birth and through its adulthood unless disease or violence stops it from doing so. For there is no decisive break in this physical organism's continuous development from conception until death from which one can infer that the being undergoes a substantial change and literally ceases to exist and a new being comes into existence (like the substantial change that the sperm and ovum undergo when they cease to exist and a new being comes into existence). This is why it makes perfect sense for any one of us to say, "When I was conceived..." (Beckwith, Defending Life, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 72-73).
It is evident that this is the type of argument Damer intended to attack in his example. It is obviously stronger than Damer let on. Once stated, the flaws in Damer's counter-example should be self-evident. But, we will make a few explicit.
Relevant Disanalogies Between the Pro-life Argument and the Pro-heat Counter-argument
a) It is obvious the pro-life argument is talking about essential features that obtain in all possible worlds. In all possible worlds, a human being is, say, made in the image of God. Any world where S is human, S is made in the image of God. If S is not an image bearer of God at W1, then S is not human at W1. We can substitute something like "rational animal" for "image bearer" if you insist. But, with "regarding something as hot," this is not the case. For beings that have lived their whole life on Mercury, 100 F is regarded very cold. For beings that have lived their whole life on Neptune, 0 F is regarded very hot. This applies to humans to a lesser degree. So, with respect to qualia, 0 F can be "just as hot" to some being S as 100 F is to S*. This seems to be Damer's understanding with the use of the word "regard." But pro-lifers don't just "regard" a fetus as human. That's the only way 100 F is "regarded" as hot.
b) Putting aside the subjective elements of the counter-example, the language is misleading. Temperature is a number that is related to the average kinetic energy of the molecules of a substance. Heat is a measurement of the total energy in a substance, both kinetic and potential. All this means is that temperature of 100 F implies a certain amount of kinetic energy. It doesn't have this energy when it is one, five, or ten degrees cooler. It may be regarded as hot, but it certainly did "suddenly" possess the amount of kinetic energy at 100 F that it did not have at 90 F. Thus one could "rationally say" that at some particular point the object had more kinetic energy than it previously did. Damer's counter-example hinges upon equivocations. Between subjective "regardings" and objective "measurements" of energy. This is why steaks objectively "keep" in the freezer and not in the hot sun. Something kept "hot" doesn't freeze. What are the relevant differences between the various stages from conception to birth to infancy to adolescence, then? Is it just that one has "more" of something that the other? The pro-life argument claims that there is no relevant point where the fetus "becomes" human. The pro-life position clearly doesn't believe that "more" of something makes for humanness.
c) So, understood as qualia, the argument proves too much. There is no essential, fixed characteristic that can demarcate human from non-human, thus racist laws that concluded that blacks were 2/3 human were not in error. Understood as objective, the argument proves too much. For I can point demonstrate that 0 F is not "just as hot" as 100 F. But where is this relevant difference between the birthed human and the human 1 minute before and 1 month before, etc.? So the objective "heat" argument tells us that we can point out when something has more internal kinetic energy than something else. But if this is how we demonstrate who is and who isn't human - by who has "more" of some quality - then we're right back at blacks as 2/3 human!
Some Possible Objections
Damer may claim that his counter works just fine because there is no relevant difference between when something is regarded as hot and cold. But considered subjectively, this is false. People can clearly regard when something is not hot anymore. To claim that they cannot pin point exactly when this is, is pedantic and commits the "beard fallacy." Considered objectively, this is false because all we need to do is look at the amount of internal energy. I argued that both views are disanalogous with the pro-life argument. Pro-lifers do not merely "regard" something as human based on subjective qualia, and they do not count something as human based on it have "more" stuff than other things. If so, they would logically claim that infants are "less" human than adults.
The pro-life argument asks what relevant or non-arbitrary difference can be pointed to that shows that the conception of two human parents' gametes is not human while it is human three, six, or nine months down the road. A handy acronym developed by pro-lifers to demonstrate this has been called the SLED test:
Size: Is it that one is bigger than the other, then are infants "less" human than adults?
Level of development: Is it that one is "more" developed than the other, then are down syndrome kids "less" human than geniuses?
Environment: Is it your environment? One is located "outside" the womb while the other is located "inside?" Then when people are located in Africa, may we take them as slaves? Is location a "relevant, non-arbitrary" distinction?
Degree of Dependency: Is it that the 12 week old fetus is more dependant upon the mother than the newborn? Is the preemie in the NICU "less" human than the healthy one down the hall, then?
Conclusion
So it would appear that Damer's counter is totally disanalogous to the pro-life argument he wants to critique. There are relevant differences between when something has more internal energy than something else. But this is disanalogous to how pro-lifers understand human and non-human, i.e., it's not that one has "more stuff" than the other. Even considered subjectively, humans can easily "regard" something as hot or cold. But beyond that, "regarding" is subjective and thus not a "relevant, non-arbitrary" difference, which is what the pro-life argument asks for when claiming that x is not human but y "suddenly" becomes human. So I conclude that Damer's example of a fallacy is fallacious.
This example takes place in his section on "attacking the fallacy," where advice is given on how to attack fallacious arguments. One of his "attacks" is to employ the standard attack by counter-example. This method uses the same form of argumentation as the argument you're attacking while making sure to argue for an obviously absurd conclusion.
An example of refutation by logical counter-example would be:
- All religious adherents are irrational and self-deluded.
- John is irrational and self-deluded.
- Therefore, John is a religious adherent.
- 1. All dogs are mammals.
- 1. Flipper is a mammal.
- 1. Therefore, Flipper is a dog.
Now, after explaining a useful way to deal with bad arguments, Damer uses as an example what he takes to be a somewhat popular pro-life argument. Damer names this the "fallacy of the continuum," and shows how it is made by the pro-lifer:
"Suppose that an opponent argued in the following manner: The fetus is a human
being at birth. Right? And it certainly did not suddenly become a human being at
delivery. In other words, it would be silly t say that the fetus is a human
being at birth and not a human being a minute earlier or an hour before that or
a day or a month before that. At no time would you be able to say rationally
that the fetus suddenly becomes a human being. So the fetus has to be just as
much a human being at conception as it is at delivery." (p.48-49)
Damer "demonstrates the faulty character of this kind of reasoning" by constructing this counter-example:
"An atmospheric temperature of 100 F is regarded hot. Right? And it certainly
did not suddenly become hot at 100 F. In other words, it would be silly to
insist that a temperature that is one degree, or five, or ten degrees less that
100 F is not hot. And at no time would you be able to say rationally that at
some particular point during a period in which the temperature moves from 0 F to
100 F that the temperature suddenly becomes hot, one could conclude that at 0 F
it is just as hot as it is at 100 F. " (p.49)
I think Damer is guilty of a straw man fallacy here. He is also guilty of violating one of his principles as to what constitutes a good argument - the rebuttal principle. Damer rightly claims that, "An argument is not a good one of it does not anticipate and effectively rebut, or successfully blunt the force of, criticisms of the argument and of the position that it supports" (p.30). And Damer is clearly making an argument. It can be expressed thus:
- 2. All arguments that commit the fallacy of continuum are poor arguments.
- 2. The no-difference-from-birth-to-conception pro-life argument commits this fallacy.
- 2. Therefore, this pro-life argument is a poor argument.
Now, in one sense Damer's conclusion does go through, but that's only because the pro-life argument that he's trying to represent isn't properly stated. And it would be charitable to assume that Damer wants to attack proper representations of arguments. Having qualified, we need to object to a premise so that the conclusion doesn't go through. The only one left to reject is premise 2.2. And so that's what we'll do.
I propose to challenge 2.2 in three ways: (i) A brief, correct statement of the pro-life argument being addressed; (ii) relevant disanalogies between the pro-life argument and the pro-heat counter-argument; and (iii) some possible objections.
A Brief, Correct Statement of the Pro-Life Argument
"Given the facts of embryology and fetal development, at conception, a whole human being, with its own genome, comes into existence, needing only food, water, shelter, and oxygen, and a congenial environment in which to interact, to grow and develop itself to maturity in accordance with her own intrinsically ordered nature. Like the infant, the child, and the adolescent, the conceptus is a being who is in the process of unfolding its potential, that is, the potential to grow and develop itself but not to change what it is. This being, because of its nature, is actively disposed to develop into a mature version of herself, though never ceasing to be herself. Thus, the same human being that begins as a zygote continues to exist to its birth and through its adulthood unless disease or violence stops it from doing so. For there is no decisive break in this physical organism's continuous development from conception until death from which one can infer that the being undergoes a substantial change and literally ceases to exist and a new being comes into existence (like the substantial change that the sperm and ovum undergo when they cease to exist and a new being comes into existence). This is why it makes perfect sense for any one of us to say, "When I was conceived..." (Beckwith, Defending Life, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 72-73).
It is evident that this is the type of argument Damer intended to attack in his example. It is obviously stronger than Damer let on. Once stated, the flaws in Damer's counter-example should be self-evident. But, we will make a few explicit.
Relevant Disanalogies Between the Pro-life Argument and the Pro-heat Counter-argument
a) It is obvious the pro-life argument is talking about essential features that obtain in all possible worlds. In all possible worlds, a human being is, say, made in the image of God. Any world where S is human, S is made in the image of God. If S is not an image bearer of God at W1, then S is not human at W1. We can substitute something like "rational animal" for "image bearer" if you insist. But, with "regarding something as hot," this is not the case. For beings that have lived their whole life on Mercury, 100 F is regarded very cold. For beings that have lived their whole life on Neptune, 0 F is regarded very hot. This applies to humans to a lesser degree. So, with respect to qualia, 0 F can be "just as hot" to some being S as 100 F is to S*. This seems to be Damer's understanding with the use of the word "regard." But pro-lifers don't just "regard" a fetus as human. That's the only way 100 F is "regarded" as hot.
b) Putting aside the subjective elements of the counter-example, the language is misleading. Temperature is a number that is related to the average kinetic energy of the molecules of a substance. Heat is a measurement of the total energy in a substance, both kinetic and potential. All this means is that temperature of 100 F implies a certain amount of kinetic energy. It doesn't have this energy when it is one, five, or ten degrees cooler. It may be regarded as hot, but it certainly did "suddenly" possess the amount of kinetic energy at 100 F that it did not have at 90 F. Thus one could "rationally say" that at some particular point the object had more kinetic energy than it previously did. Damer's counter-example hinges upon equivocations. Between subjective "regardings" and objective "measurements" of energy. This is why steaks objectively "keep" in the freezer and not in the hot sun. Something kept "hot" doesn't freeze. What are the relevant differences between the various stages from conception to birth to infancy to adolescence, then? Is it just that one has "more" of something that the other? The pro-life argument claims that there is no relevant point where the fetus "becomes" human. The pro-life position clearly doesn't believe that "more" of something makes for humanness.
c) So, understood as qualia, the argument proves too much. There is no essential, fixed characteristic that can demarcate human from non-human, thus racist laws that concluded that blacks were 2/3 human were not in error. Understood as objective, the argument proves too much. For I can point demonstrate that 0 F is not "just as hot" as 100 F. But where is this relevant difference between the birthed human and the human 1 minute before and 1 month before, etc.? So the objective "heat" argument tells us that we can point out when something has more internal kinetic energy than something else. But if this is how we demonstrate who is and who isn't human - by who has "more" of some quality - then we're right back at blacks as 2/3 human!
Some Possible Objections
Damer may claim that his counter works just fine because there is no relevant difference between when something is regarded as hot and cold. But considered subjectively, this is false. People can clearly regard when something is not hot anymore. To claim that they cannot pin point exactly when this is, is pedantic and commits the "beard fallacy." Considered objectively, this is false because all we need to do is look at the amount of internal energy. I argued that both views are disanalogous with the pro-life argument. Pro-lifers do not merely "regard" something as human based on subjective qualia, and they do not count something as human based on it have "more" stuff than other things. If so, they would logically claim that infants are "less" human than adults.
The pro-life argument asks what relevant or non-arbitrary difference can be pointed to that shows that the conception of two human parents' gametes is not human while it is human three, six, or nine months down the road. A handy acronym developed by pro-lifers to demonstrate this has been called the SLED test:
Size: Is it that one is bigger than the other, then are infants "less" human than adults?
Level of development: Is it that one is "more" developed than the other, then are down syndrome kids "less" human than geniuses?
Environment: Is it your environment? One is located "outside" the womb while the other is located "inside?" Then when people are located in Africa, may we take them as slaves? Is location a "relevant, non-arbitrary" distinction?
Degree of Dependency: Is it that the 12 week old fetus is more dependant upon the mother than the newborn? Is the preemie in the NICU "less" human than the healthy one down the hall, then?
Conclusion
So it would appear that Damer's counter is totally disanalogous to the pro-life argument he wants to critique. There are relevant differences between when something has more internal energy than something else. But this is disanalogous to how pro-lifers understand human and non-human, i.e., it's not that one has "more stuff" than the other. Even considered subjectively, humans can easily "regard" something as hot or cold. But beyond that, "regarding" is subjective and thus not a "relevant, non-arbitrary" difference, which is what the pro-life argument asks for when claiming that x is not human but y "suddenly" becomes human. So I conclude that Damer's example of a fallacy is fallacious.
Loving and committed pederasty
FEETXXXL SAID:
“The first problem is that scripture never declared homosexuality a sin, it is erroneous to label homosexuals as non christian.”
Both the OT and the NT classify homosexual behavior as a sin. And, in Rom 1, Paul goes beyond that to classify homosexual desire (as well as homosexual behavior) a sin.
Moreover, some sins are worse than others, just as some crimes are worse than others. Not every crime in the OT was capital offense. But sodomy was. That tells you something about the moral gravity of the offense.
“Homosexuals have never been found wanting in any sector of society compared to heterosexuals.”
You could say the same thing about the criminal element.
“They are not less a brother, friend, attorney, teacher, counselor ,doctor,neighbor,father, etc so what evidence do have that being foster parents is somewhat different.”
Several problems:
i) You’re confounding biological relations with social roles. By definition, one can’t be more or less a biological father or brother. That’s hardwired.
ii) Apropos (i), we don’t choose our biological parents or biological siblings. For better or worse, we’re stuck with them. So, frankly, the standard is lower.
But we can and should have a higher standard when placing children in the custody of strangers.
iii) Being a biological father doesn’t automatically qualify you to be a good father. Being a doctor, lawyer, teacher, counselor, &c. doesn’t automatically qualify you to be a good parent. So your argument is illogical.
Moreover, one could be a brilliant doctor or lawyer, and also be a dreadful parent. Excellence in one field doesn’t carry over to excellence in another field. So, once again, your argument is illogical.
“Homosexuals bond out of the same spirit as heterosexuals, which is out of mutual love, respect,affection,devotion, and trust for a shared committed life together.”
That’s a silly statement at several levels:
i) It isn’t even a true statement with respect to heterosexual bonding. You can’t say, as a rule, that heterosexuals bond “out of mutual love, respect,affection,devotion, and trust for a shared committed life together.”
Some do and some don’t. Ever heard of prostitution? Adultery? Hook-ups? One-night stands? Womanizers? Nymphomaniacs? Prenups?
Left to their own devices, a lot of men prefer a no-strings-attached relationship.
ii) Moreover, the sexes are wired differently. Normal men and women don’t necessarily bond for the very same reasons. Isn’t that obvious?
Take the case of the rich old geezer with the twenty-something bombshell wife or girlfriend. Do you really think the old geezer and the young woman are bonding for the same reasons? And is it really out of mutual respect, devotion, and lifelong commitment?
Or is it more like he marries (or shacks up with) her for sex while she marries (or shacks up with) him for money?
I'm not saying that men and women can't marry for better reasons (and often do). I'm just noting some really obvious counterexamples to your bubble-gummy claims.
iii) And this carries over into homosexual “bonding.” You can’t claim that homosexual men and homosexual women have the very same motives.
“What part of that committed love do you feel is offensive to a child.”
How is your definition distinguishable from pederasty—or is it?
“The truth is that children because they are children have less a problem with homosexuality than adults.”
Likewise, the son of a Klansman is more likely to grow up to be a Klansman—just like his old man. Like father/like son. Due to his emotional bond with a dad who's a Klansman, he has less of a problem with the KKK than some adults.
“What part of the spirit of this bonding process mitigates providing a loving nurturing home for raising children?”
A higher incidence of disease, domestic violence, suicide, rampant promiscuity, as well as unnatural role-modeling. They are also at higher risk of sexual molestation when they hit adolescence.
“Fine, then explain romans 1:24-27 how do the words of these verses say homosexuality is a sin. do you propose to transpose the word "homosexuals for all the personal pronouns?”
The question at issue is not the use of the word, but the use of the concept. In Rom 1, Paul both describes and condemns homosexual desire and conduct alike.
“The first problem is that scripture never declared homosexuality a sin, it is erroneous to label homosexuals as non christian.”
Both the OT and the NT classify homosexual behavior as a sin. And, in Rom 1, Paul goes beyond that to classify homosexual desire (as well as homosexual behavior) a sin.
Moreover, some sins are worse than others, just as some crimes are worse than others. Not every crime in the OT was capital offense. But sodomy was. That tells you something about the moral gravity of the offense.
“Homosexuals have never been found wanting in any sector of society compared to heterosexuals.”
You could say the same thing about the criminal element.
“They are not less a brother, friend, attorney, teacher, counselor ,doctor,neighbor,father, etc so what evidence do have that being foster parents is somewhat different.”
Several problems:
i) You’re confounding biological relations with social roles. By definition, one can’t be more or less a biological father or brother. That’s hardwired.
ii) Apropos (i), we don’t choose our biological parents or biological siblings. For better or worse, we’re stuck with them. So, frankly, the standard is lower.
But we can and should have a higher standard when placing children in the custody of strangers.
iii) Being a biological father doesn’t automatically qualify you to be a good father. Being a doctor, lawyer, teacher, counselor, &c. doesn’t automatically qualify you to be a good parent. So your argument is illogical.
Moreover, one could be a brilliant doctor or lawyer, and also be a dreadful parent. Excellence in one field doesn’t carry over to excellence in another field. So, once again, your argument is illogical.
“Homosexuals bond out of the same spirit as heterosexuals, which is out of mutual love, respect,affection,devotion, and trust for a shared committed life together.”
That’s a silly statement at several levels:
i) It isn’t even a true statement with respect to heterosexual bonding. You can’t say, as a rule, that heterosexuals bond “out of mutual love, respect,affection,devotion, and trust for a shared committed life together.”
Some do and some don’t. Ever heard of prostitution? Adultery? Hook-ups? One-night stands? Womanizers? Nymphomaniacs? Prenups?
Left to their own devices, a lot of men prefer a no-strings-attached relationship.
ii) Moreover, the sexes are wired differently. Normal men and women don’t necessarily bond for the very same reasons. Isn’t that obvious?
Take the case of the rich old geezer with the twenty-something bombshell wife or girlfriend. Do you really think the old geezer and the young woman are bonding for the same reasons? And is it really out of mutual respect, devotion, and lifelong commitment?
Or is it more like he marries (or shacks up with) her for sex while she marries (or shacks up with) him for money?
I'm not saying that men and women can't marry for better reasons (and often do). I'm just noting some really obvious counterexamples to your bubble-gummy claims.
iii) And this carries over into homosexual “bonding.” You can’t claim that homosexual men and homosexual women have the very same motives.
“What part of that committed love do you feel is offensive to a child.”
How is your definition distinguishable from pederasty—or is it?
“The truth is that children because they are children have less a problem with homosexuality than adults.”
Likewise, the son of a Klansman is more likely to grow up to be a Klansman—just like his old man. Like father/like son. Due to his emotional bond with a dad who's a Klansman, he has less of a problem with the KKK than some adults.
“What part of the spirit of this bonding process mitigates providing a loving nurturing home for raising children?”
A higher incidence of disease, domestic violence, suicide, rampant promiscuity, as well as unnatural role-modeling. They are also at higher risk of sexual molestation when they hit adolescence.
“Fine, then explain romans 1:24-27 how do the words of these verses say homosexuality is a sin. do you propose to transpose the word "homosexuals for all the personal pronouns?”
The question at issue is not the use of the word, but the use of the concept. In Rom 1, Paul both describes and condemns homosexual desire and conduct alike.
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Pest control
Since a commenter is complaining about the alleged inscrutability of our rules for banning trolls, I shall, in the interests of blogospheric transparency, declassify the computus by which we calculate when a troll has crossed the line of no return.
Definition: A troll shall be banned if and only if his comment falls on or before the leap-day of an embolismic month, between an ecclesiastical new moon and a nominal full moon (which ever comes first) of a 28-day lunation, on the vernal equinox of the 3rd tropical year of the Metonic cycle of the saltus lunae of the calendarium—provided that the Golden Number is larger than 11 (unless, of course, said sequence happens to fall on a synodic month with a Dominical Letter, in which case one must subtract the tithi from the Lilian epact).
Definition: A troll shall be banned if and only if his comment falls on or before the leap-day of an embolismic month, between an ecclesiastical new moon and a nominal full moon (which ever comes first) of a 28-day lunation, on the vernal equinox of the 3rd tropical year of the Metonic cycle of the saltus lunae of the calendarium—provided that the Golden Number is larger than 11 (unless, of course, said sequence happens to fall on a synodic month with a Dominical Letter, in which case one must subtract the tithi from the Lilian epact).
The Road to Hell
Hell is situated five miles west of Pinckney via Patterson Lake Road. The community is served by the Pinckney post office with ZIP Code 48169. The unofficial population is 266.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hell,_Michigan
The real Hell — located 60 miles west of Detroit — has a population of about 250 and no elected government.
“My only concern is that people will think Hell is an evil place,” he said.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8886096/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hell,_Michigan
The real Hell — located 60 miles west of Detroit — has a population of about 250 and no elected government.
“My only concern is that people will think Hell is an evil place,” he said.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8886096/
The Virgin Birth
Here's a post I wrote a couple of years ago concerning some issues relevant to the virgin birth and objections to its historicity.
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