Thursday, September 20, 2007
What Love Is This?
Arminians like Dave Hunt love to assume a humanistic philosophy of love, and then when the Calvinist's biblical argumentation undermines that very humanism, they say, "See, how horrible! What love is this?"
Let's look at how God, in Christ Jesus, expresses his love:
John 15:13 Greater love has no one than this, that someone lay down his life for his friends.
Obviously, not all mankind are friends of Jesus:
vv. 14, 15 You are my friends if you do what I command you. No longer do I call you servants, for the servant does not know what his master is doing; but I have called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you.
So, Jesus says that the greatest expression of his love for people is that he lays down his life for his friends, and not all men are his friends.
But, this does not prove limited atonement, says the universalist. You see, Christ doesn't say that he lays down his life for only his friends.
Well then, "what love is this!?"
Jesus attempts to show how what kind of love this is by making a claim about great love. That kind of love demonstrates itself in the laying down of one's life for his friends.
The Arminian would have us believe that Jesus also lays down his life for his non-friends too! Our enemies. Those who seek to devour us.
"What kind of a slap in the face is this?"
I've told my son how much I love him by telling him that I give up a lot of things I would personally like to do, that I spend long hours working so as to provide for him, not out of mere duty, but because I love him. I tell him that he gets food, medical care, a home, pets, toys, etc., with the money I earn because I love him and want to give him good gifts. Would my son think me a liar if I also showered those things on kids who, say, hated me? Hated him? If I spent time away from him working so that I could provide for those who were not my children, giving them everything I gave him, would my claims about doing the above out of love just for him seem hallow? Similarly, I sometimes buy my wife roses that cost over $100. I tell her that I love her. How would she feel if I bought every woman in the world roses too? If I wanted to spend the night with them? What would distinguish my actions that I say show her my love for her, from those I did for them? Greater marital love has no one than this, that a man would buy his wife roses (just stick with the anology, I obviously don't think the buying of roses is the greatest way for a husband to show how he loves his wife)... and every other women in the world roses too! Could my wife (and child(ren)) rightly ask: "What love is this?"
It is the Arminian that makes a mockery out of the love of God, not the Calvinist.
Let's look at how God, in Christ Jesus, expresses his love:
John 15:13 Greater love has no one than this, that someone lay down his life for his friends.
Obviously, not all mankind are friends of Jesus:
vv. 14, 15 You are my friends if you do what I command you. No longer do I call you servants, for the servant does not know what his master is doing; but I have called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you.
So, Jesus says that the greatest expression of his love for people is that he lays down his life for his friends, and not all men are his friends.
But, this does not prove limited atonement, says the universalist. You see, Christ doesn't say that he lays down his life for only his friends.
Well then, "what love is this!?"
Jesus attempts to show how what kind of love this is by making a claim about great love. That kind of love demonstrates itself in the laying down of one's life for his friends.
The Arminian would have us believe that Jesus also lays down his life for his non-friends too! Our enemies. Those who seek to devour us.
"What kind of a slap in the face is this?"
I've told my son how much I love him by telling him that I give up a lot of things I would personally like to do, that I spend long hours working so as to provide for him, not out of mere duty, but because I love him. I tell him that he gets food, medical care, a home, pets, toys, etc., with the money I earn because I love him and want to give him good gifts. Would my son think me a liar if I also showered those things on kids who, say, hated me? Hated him? If I spent time away from him working so that I could provide for those who were not my children, giving them everything I gave him, would my claims about doing the above out of love just for him seem hallow? Similarly, I sometimes buy my wife roses that cost over $100. I tell her that I love her. How would she feel if I bought every woman in the world roses too? If I wanted to spend the night with them? What would distinguish my actions that I say show her my love for her, from those I did for them? Greater marital love has no one than this, that a man would buy his wife roses (just stick with the anology, I obviously don't think the buying of roses is the greatest way for a husband to show how he loves his wife)... and every other women in the world roses too! Could my wife (and child(ren)) rightly ask: "What love is this?"
It is the Arminian that makes a mockery out of the love of God, not the Calvinist.
Personal Agenda Pushing
Roberthenrytheanonymous lurker said this:
I don't think he understands. See, he also says things like this:
He refers me to these libertarian philosophers:
I assume J.P. Moreland is one of the "etc. etc's?"
So let’s go to some of his favorite libertarian thinkers. Let's look at what Craig and Moreland have to say about why Calvinists accept some form of compatibilism:
"This is not to say that all compatibilists are naturalists. Many Christians embrace compatibilism for a number of reasons, including certain views of election and predestination." -- Moreland & Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 2003, p280, emphasis supplied.
So, yes, all men have biases. Moreland and Craig do. But, they do not butcher the facts and aim to impute the worst motives onto others - so as to make your job of arguing a more easier one. Moreland and Craig, libertarians Roberthenrytheanonymous lurker cites, are honest enough, even with their biases, to admit that the Calvinist sees his position in Scripture, and this is what determines his motivations elsewhere. They are not "personal agenda pushers," Roberthenrytheanonymous is. Dialogue would be beneficial with them, but not with Roberthenrytheanonymous. Roberthenrytheanonymous is useful for fodder. For showing the absurdities of Arminianism. For making an example of. He wonders why he gets a sarcastic attitude. It's because he, like a Loftus or a Babinski, brings it upon himself. Now, I'm not saying that he is an atheist, that takes my analogy too far. But, it does show that we are equal opportunity advocates here. Acting disingenuous, refusing to answer arguments, repeating refuted arguments, and ignoring some basic context required to not attack a straw man gets you the T-blog red carpet treatment.
"Regarding pushing agenda’s you are extremely naïve if you do not know that every body has got agendas, no one is neutral."
I don't think he understands. See, he also says things like this:
So I find it interesting that you would claim that he is the most intelligent defender of semi-compatibilism which you take to be the Calvinist position [...] Which goes to show that Calvinism is determinism, a non-Christian philosophy read into scripture by persons like yourself.
He refers me to these libertarian philosophers:
e.g., Plantinga, Craig, Hunt, Timpe, etc. etc
I assume J.P. Moreland is one of the "etc. etc's?"
So let’s go to some of his favorite libertarian thinkers. Let's look at what Craig and Moreland have to say about why Calvinists accept some form of compatibilism:
"This is not to say that all compatibilists are naturalists. Many Christians embrace compatibilism for a number of reasons, including certain views of election and predestination." -- Moreland & Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 2003, p280, emphasis supplied.
So, yes, all men have biases. Moreland and Craig do. But, they do not butcher the facts and aim to impute the worst motives onto others - so as to make your job of arguing a more easier one. Moreland and Craig, libertarians Roberthenrytheanonymous lurker cites, are honest enough, even with their biases, to admit that the Calvinist sees his position in Scripture, and this is what determines his motivations elsewhere. They are not "personal agenda pushers," Roberthenrytheanonymous is. Dialogue would be beneficial with them, but not with Roberthenrytheanonymous. Roberthenrytheanonymous is useful for fodder. For showing the absurdities of Arminianism. For making an example of. He wonders why he gets a sarcastic attitude. It's because he, like a Loftus or a Babinski, brings it upon himself. Now, I'm not saying that he is an atheist, that takes my analogy too far. But, it does show that we are equal opportunity advocates here. Acting disingenuous, refusing to answer arguments, repeating refuted arguments, and ignoring some basic context required to not attack a straw man gets you the T-blog red carpet treatment.
The Sabbati Sevi Parallel
People often argue against Christianity by paralleling Jesus with other historical figures or early Christianity with other historical movements. The significance of the parallel depends on what the person drawing the parallel is attempting to prove. Often, vague parallels are made without much of an explanation of what the parallels are supposed to demonstrate. Or the point being made is so undisputed as to be of little significance. Most likely, many of the skeptics who use these arguments haven't given them much thought. By beginning with vague parallels, they can suggest major implications, but only defend minor implications if challenged. They can adjust their argument to criticisms along the way, then act as if some conclusion of minor significance that results from the discussion is what they intended all along.
One of the most often cited parallels is Sabbati Sevi or the movement surrounding him. As with other parallels, the significance of the Sevi parallel depends on what argument accompanies it. Different people use it in different contexts, but there are major differences between the early Sevi movement and early Christianity. Gary Habermas discusses some of the differences here. J.P. Holding addresses the subject here. I've discussed it several times, such as here and here. In their recent book, The Jesus Legend (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2007), Paul Rhodes Eddy and Gregory Boyd address Sevi and his early followers. They don't make all of the points I would make, but here are some of the points they make in the context they're addressing:
One of the most often cited parallels is Sabbati Sevi or the movement surrounding him. As with other parallels, the significance of the Sevi parallel depends on what argument accompanies it. Different people use it in different contexts, but there are major differences between the early Sevi movement and early Christianity. Gary Habermas discusses some of the differences here. J.P. Holding addresses the subject here. I've discussed it several times, such as here and here. In their recent book, The Jesus Legend (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2007), Paul Rhodes Eddy and Gregory Boyd address Sevi and his early followers. They don't make all of the points I would make, but here are some of the points they make in the context they're addressing:
First, and most tellingly, it appears that the teachings and actions of Svi (and his prophet, Nathan of Gaza) were significantly influenced by elements of the Jesus tradition itself. In the most exhaustive contemporary study of Svi, Gershom Scholem notes the following aspects that seem to reflect the influence of the Christian tradition: the revealing of a "new law," characteristic exegesis and vocabulary, the choosing of twelve to represent a new Israel, and seeing the messiah as in some sense divine. In fact Scholem concludes that Svi "may even have meditated on the possibility of a mysterious connection between Jesus and himself."...
Second, Svi's life was characterized by chronic depression, hypochondria, and mental illness - so much so that, as Scholem notes, he was "known as a sick man" who exhibited "strange behavior" during his manic phases. Among other episodes, he once purchased a large fish, dressed it up as a baby, and kept it in a cradle. Scholem points out that, quite unlike Jesus, Svi was unable to attract a permanent circle of followers, "obviously because of his psychopathological traits."
Third, the miracle tradition associated with Svi is unimpressive. While certain miracle stories were attached to him, his own prophet claimed that Svi was a messiah by whom God would test Israel to see whether they would "believe without any sign or miracle." When Svi himself was interrogated by a sultan's physician as to whether he could do miracles, he denied any such ability. Sometime after Svi's death, rumors began to circulate that he had been delivered from death and taken to heaven. Unlike the Jesus tradition, there are no reports of anyone actually having seen Svi after his death, and the reports that are available appear to be shrouded in myth (i.e., a dragon supposedly guarded the way to his tomb).
Fourth, when Svi was arrested by the sultan and offered the choice of either being martyred or converting to the Muslim faith, he chose to save his own life, renounce his Judaism, and convert to Islam. The contrast of Jesus's willingness to go to the cross for his convictions is instructive.
Finally, though Svi was widely regarded as the Messiah, he was never worshipped as divine. By contrast, from early on Jesus was worshipped alongside Yahweh, and this by people who were raised in a strictly monotheistic environment that strongly opposed any blurring of the lines between the Creator God and humans, as we saw in the previous chapter....
Robert Price has suggested that the religious phenomenon associated with Svi demonstrates that legends about miracle working messiahs can arise "virtually overnight," thus providing a plausible explanatory parallel to the Jesus legend; Incredible Shrinking Son of Man, 29. Price's analogy, however, misses the really serious differences. Given the surrounding Christian context, the Svi movement had the Jesus model to draw from - a messiah figure who did miracles, was viewed as divine, etc. Such a model could catalyze a similar interpretation of Svi almost overnight. As we have noted in chap. 2, however, the first generation Jewish Christians had no such culturally available and attractive messianic model waiting for them - and yet they settled upon just such a one shortly after Jesus's death. This is the type of rapid development that requires an explanation. (pp. 154-155 and n. 68 on p. 155)
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
"Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the 'Grounding Objection'"
http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2007/09/william-lane-craigs-middle-knowledge.html
Guest blogger, Turretinfan, has graciously allowed me to post this review on his behalf. It can also be found on his blog at the above link.
Comments are welcome @ either blog.
"Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the 'Grounding Objection'"
A Reformed Critique
The present author is in the process of responding to William Lane Craig's (WLC's) book, "The Only Wise God." In the process, however, it seems as though it would be useful to focus on the topic of the final chapter of that book, Middle Knowledge, and particularly on another of WLC's writings on the subject, specifically his article, "Middle knowledge, Truth Makers, and the 'Grounding Objection.'" This topic is doubly timely due to the present author's on-going discussion in the comments section of a treatment of another of WLC's related articles, on Newcomb's Paradox, in which the topic of truth-makers came up.
Presently, a copy of WLC's article is available here (link).
WLC's article purports to address a critical problem for any theory of Middle Knowledge, which he phrases as there being no true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, because there is nothing to make them true, but which might more aptly be described as there being no way for God to have "free" knowledge (including knowledge based on the (actual or hypothetical) exercise of creaturely freedom) prior to the divine decree.
As WLC admits, the objection is not an undercutting, but a rebutting rejection of Molinism, because if God does not have "middle knowledge," there can be no Molinism, and one must accept either Thomism/Calvinism (which states that God has "free knowledge" posterior to the divine decree) or Open Theism (which denies that God has "free knowledge" at least with respect to creatures).
It is worthwhile to point out, before we begin a detailed analysis of WLC's article, what middle knowledge is alleged to be. It is alleged to be God's knowledge of what "would" happen if a free creature were in a particular circumstance. Thus, it is God's knowledge of what state of affairs "would" result from the exercise of man's (or other free creature's) "free will" in a particular circumstance. Accordingly, this knowledge is a special kind of "free" knowledge, namely knowledge that depends on the creature's exercise of "free will," as constrasted with what Molinists (and most philosophers) refer to as God's "free knowledge," namely the knowledge that God has as a result of the exercise of his own free will.
WLC begins by setting forth the alleged warrant for the Molinist assumption (WLC himself calls it an "assumption").
The first alleged warrant is that "we ourselves often appear to know such counterfactuals." This warrant, however, can be readily dismissed. Our knowledge of "counterfactuals" generally falls into one of two categories, neither of which is consistent with the Molinistic assumption. The first category are counterfactuals that are true by virtue of the law of the excluded middle (i.e. we know that it is true that if President Fox were held by terrorists, the
The second alleged warrant is that "it is plausable that the Law of the Conditional Excluded Middle (LCEM) holds for counterfactuals of a certain special form." As noted above, however, this is simply an example of the first category of counterfactuals that are true because they are just restatements of the law of the excluded middle. They do not assist Molinism in any way, because they do not depend at all on the exercise of a free will, and do not correspond to anything more than the application of a logical rule to a hypothetical scenario. Thus, this alleged warrant is also insufficient.
The third alleged warrant is that Scriptures are "replete with counterfactual statements." Scriptures, however, do not identify any creaturely acts as "free" in the Molinist (Libertarian) sense, and Scriptures also include counterfactual statements describing God's own actions. Finally, all such Scriptural statements are made posterior to the divine decree. Thus, such statements cannot possibly be a warrant for the Molinist assumption.
WLC implicitly notes at least some of these objections and suggests that "anti-Molinists" retreat to asserting that counterfactuals have no ground prior to the divine decree. WLC's only two responses are that "there seems to be no more ground now for many counterfactuals about creaturely free acts than there is logically prior to God's decree," and if "it is God who decrees which counterfactuals about creaturely free acts are true" then this seems to "make God the author of sin and obliterate human freedom."
The former of these objections ignores the obvious: posterior to the divine decree we have reality - the world that exists and operates according to the laws of Ordinary Providence. Thus, counterfactuals become grounded in reality.
The latter of these objections is wrong for enough reasons to occupy a major treatise (and Jonathan Edwards has written one that fully rebuts it). To briefly summarize, God is not the "author" of sin because he does not do sin: he is not a voluntary agent that performs a sinful act. Furthermore, God is not the "author" of sin because no one who sins is coerced into sin contrary to their will by God. If WLC means something else by "author of sin" we can respond with Vincent Cheung that we will simply grant the objection, and ask why that should be a problem. Used outside the first two items listed above, it is simply pejorative rhetoric, not a meaningful objection. Additionally, it is "libertarian" (not compatible) freedom that obliterates human responsibility, because it necessarily denies that man determines what man does. Or, to take a hint from WLC, we could simply deny the charge of obliteration of human responsibility and ask WLC to provide evidence. Nevertheless, as noted above Jonathan Edwards' "Freedom of the Will," has already thoroughly disabused any serious reader of the truth of either of the charges above, though (of course) WLC neither recognizes nor responds to Edwards' detailed and famous rebuttals.
Although we have seen that the Molinist assumption is philosophically warrantless, let us proceed to see what kind of response WLC is able to provide to the grounding objection.
WLC begins by explaining an alleged relationship between the grounding objection and a theory of "truth-makers." Theory, in essence, states that in addition to truth bearers (sentences, thoughts, or propositions) there are entities by virtue of which the truth bearers are true. Someimtes these truth-makers are labelled as "facts" or "states of affairs."
WLC recognizes what is intuitively obvious that the term "truth maker" suggests a causal relationship between the truth-maker and the truth of the truth bearer. (This same problem for the Molinist position had been observed by Dan in the comments section of the post linked-to above.) WLC's response is bafflingly off-base:
First, WLC responds that the truth-maker is usually conceived to be "such abstract entities as facts or states of affairs" and asserts that consequently a causal relation is not at issue here. This objection is bizarre, to say the least. While the terms "facts" and "states of affairs" are abstract, "facts" and "states of affairs" are categories of things that (mostly) have (or had or will have) tangible existence. Individual facts are not "abstract."
Second, WLC attempts to show that "negative existential statements" do not have truth-makers. If this were not presented as an attempted rebuttal, we would assume it were a poor play on words, for "do not have" with respect to statements of "negative existence" is fully consistent with a theory of truth-makers. The fact is that negative existential statements can be rephrased quasi-positively. Thus, "Baal does not exist" can be rephrased as "Everything that exists is a non-Baal," or more simply "All gods are non-Baals," since it is alleged that Baal is a god. Negative existential statements, therefore, can be converted to quasi-positive statements, for which there is an obvious truth-maker.
WLC then asserts that the various phrasing of the grounding objection are "crude construal[s]" of the problem. We have demonstrated, however, that WLC does not have an answer to the question variously phrased, but which amounts to:
Counterfactuals are supposedly true but not caused to be true by God, who then causes them to be true?
(A similar general question remains unanswered in the discussion thread identified above.)
The result of WLC's failure to answer this question is that WLC cannot provide an explanation for the truth of counterfactuals, and consequently can provide only an incomplete epistonomy.
Instead of identifying a cause, WLC simply calls the call for a cause (the request for grounding) "inept" and states that the objector must set forth some kind of "very special causal theory of truth-makers" in order to counter the "customary truth-maker theories." As we noted above, however, WLC has failed properly to analyze the customary truth-maker theories. Furthermore, no special theory of causality is required: everything external to God cannot be self-existent, and therefore requires a cause. The truth of counterfactuals is alleged to be external to God. Therefore, the Molinist should identify the cause, or acknowledge that the truth of counterfactuals is simply special pleading for Molinists.
WLC then identifies seven proposition that allegedly do not have "truth-makers." These include:
1) No physical objects exist.
(Which is not true, but if it were true the truth maker would be readily seen from the fact that "all things that exist are non-phsical things" has the truth-maker "all things that exist."
2) Dinosaurs are exitinct today.
(Which may be true, and if it is true today then the truth maker is a combination of the dinosaurs that once were (as to the implication of previous non-extinct status for the class of dinosaurs) and the status of all things as being members of the class "not-dinosaurs."
3) All ravens are black.
(If this were true, the truth-maker would be the color of all ravens.)
4) Torturing a child is wrong.
(If this is true, then the truth-maker is the standard of wrong, the moral law.)
5) Napolean lost the battle of
(The truth maker here could variously be ascribed to historians, Napolean's blunder, British genius, or God's providence.)
6) The president of the
(If this is true, the truth-maker is inter alia God's decree.)
7) If a rigid rod were placed in uniform motion through the aether, it would suffer a FitzGerald-Lorentz contraction.
(Which has as its truth-maker the definitions of certain theories of 19th century mechanics and/or causal inference therefrom.)
In short, WLC presents seven propositions that he believes there is no truth-maker to be found for, and implicitly asserts that consequently there is no problem if no truth-maker can be found for counterfactual statements. But WLC, fortunately, does not rest on that idea (which has been demonstrated wrong above by provision of relevant truthmakers).
Instead, WLC continues with a section entitled "Do Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom Need Truth-Makers?" Of course, if WLC can answer this question negatively, then the problem would appear to be solved - regardless of the merit of any of the seven examples identified above.
WLC's contention appears to revolve around first, asserting that truth-maker theory is a minority philosophical position; second, some truth-maker philosophers permit some true statements to lack a truth-maker; and third, WLC has not found an explanation as to why counterfactuals should not be permitted to be without a truth-maker. None of these, of course, provide an excuse for counterfactuals to avoid the need for a truth-maker.
WLC's next question is whether such counterfactuals have truth-makers. WLC notes that Fredodoso has attempted to provide a truth-maker, namely the state of affairs that the propisition will have a truth-maker or that the proposition would have a truth-maker under the relevant condition. WLC recognizes that this alleged truth-maker creates the obvious, immediate, and insoluable problem of infinite regress, but seems to think that it is not so. WLC asserts that facts do not have to have truth-makers. That assertion may be true generally, to wit that ordinarily facts do not require truth-makers. This particular alleged fact, however, makes reference to another truth-maker, and thus creates the self-referential problem.
The problem is that WLC is taking shelter in the use of a similar technique to that used by philosphers who deny present grounding of future tense statements. Thus, WLC takes comfort in the fact that some explanatiosn of the grounding of future tense statements also suffer from infinite regress. WLC, however, seems to have overlooked the fact that many future tense statements can have other forms of grounding.
For example, the statement "tomorrow will be another day" is grounded in causal inference from the succession of time (and/or the definition of the word "tomorrow"), and "tomorrow will be rainy or not" is grounded in the law of the excluded middle. Finally, with respect to human perspective future tense statements that are not based on laws of logic or causal inference, such statements very rarely have grounding, and consequently are not "true" if, for a statement to be true, it must have grounds of truth. Note that what is being implied (but not stated) is that the statement must have grounds of truth for the speaker. In other words, the speaker must have a basis for the statement. The statement "a woman will be president of the U.S. in 2070" may turn out to be a correct statement of the state of affairs that transpires in 2070, but an ordinary human cannot have grounds for that statement - and, thus, while we might label the statement "true" after the fact, at the time the statement was made it was simply a guess.
This is not so with respect to divine omniprescience. God knows the future with the positive grounding of the divine decree. Thus, God's beliefs about the future are not guesses, but instead have the ground of the divine decree. Furthermore, God's beliefs about the hypothetical future are most readily grounded in causal inference, just as are ours - but God knows all the factors and thus has perfect knowledge of all hypotheticals posterior to the divine decree.
In contrast, for the Molinist, there is nothing that could ground God's knowledge of "counterfactuals" prior to the divine decree. Thus, God could not "know" such counterfactuals, and if God could not know such counterfactuals, then Molinism is dead.
WLC suggests that the ground of truth for a conditional "if A were in C, A would do S" is the hypothetical state of affairs described in the statement. This is somewhat similar to the non-predestinarian alleged grounding of future tense statements. The problem with that assertion, however, is that the hypothetical state of affairs does not exist, and (if it is really a counterfactual) will never exist. In other words, unlike future tense statements, there will never have been a corresponding state of affairs in which A is in C and does S, and the fact there will never have been a corresponding state of affairs in which A is in C and does S would "falsify" the future tense statement. Thus, WLC is relying for truth grounding on the very thing that would falsify a future tense statement, and a conditional statement does not purport to convey negative, but positive, information. Accordingly, even under a non-predestinarian analysis, WLC's basis for grounding is all wet.
Elsewhere, such as in "The Only Wise God," WLC has proposed an alternative basis for grounding. That basis is the fact that God knows all true counterfactuals. The problem with this attempted grounding should be immediately obvious. First, there is no reason to suppose that God knows all true counterfactuals prior to the divine decree, and perhaps even more plainly, it itself cannot have adequate grounding, unless we are to suggest that it is in God's nature to know all true counterfactuals. But if so, then true counterfactuals are part of God's natural knowledge, which both creates a paradox with respect to God himself, imposes necessity on counterfactuals, and takes out the "middle" from "middle knowledge." In short, an assertion that God's natural knowledge encompasses counterfactuals as much destroys Molinism as an assertion that God's free knowledge encompasses counterfactuals. Both scenarios destroy Molinism utterly.
WLC recognizes that the way that we treat normal hypotheticals (if I fire a shotgun at a pane of ordinary glass from a distance of 5 feet, the glass will break) is by identifying the causal inference. WLC, however, does not want to apply this to creaturely free acts, because he recognizes that doing so would destroy their libertarian freedom.
WLC even goes so far as to state that asking the question, "Why is F a fact?" or "What makes F a fact?" is to deny libertarian freedom, if F is a libertarian free act. The result is that WLC is unable to provide an account for the existence of F, and WLC is unable to handle Scriptural assertions that there are reasons why F is a fact (for example, there is a reason why Thomas believed). In short, WLC's philosophy falls prey to all the objections raised at great length and depth by Jonathan Edwards centuries ago.
Thus, when we arrive at WLC's conclusion that "anti-Molinists have not even begun to do the necessary homework," we are left with precisely the opposite impression. Specifically, we left with the impression that there is no warrant for accepting the Molinist assumptions, we are left with the impression that Molinism's assumption ends up contradicting Molinism, and we are left with the impression that Molinism fails to provide a complete epistemology: Molinism asserts that there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and that they were known by God prior to the divine decree, but cannot give any account of them.
Finally, we may simply point out that the primary criticism raised against the Reformed view is essentially transitive to the Molinist viewpoint (in debate terms it is a "non-unique" criticism). That is to say, that while Molinists may deny that God makes the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom true, nevertheless, God's selection of a particular world from all possible worlds (in Molinism) makes God in essence as much the cause of the evil that will be, as does God's selection of a particular world from all possible worlds in Calvinism or Thomism, because God recognizes that the consequence "If A is in C, A will do S," attaches just as certainly to C whether the link between C and S is causal (Calvinism/Thomism) or mysterious/unexplainable/impenetrable (Molinism/Arminianism). Thus, either way, C => S, and God's selection of C implies God's selection of S. In short, it is only the obviously mistaken position of Open Theism that an escape the charge that WLC attempts to level.
Thus, we may safely conclude that WLC has been unable to withstand the grounding objection proposed against Molinism, and the reader has no reason to believe in such a philosophical position. Instead, the reader should believe in the God who knows all hypotheticals on the basis of His infinite wisdom in combination with the Divine decree.
-Turretinfan
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
Will The Real Limited Atonement Please Stand Up
According to Arminianism (the majority Governmental theory), Christ didn't actually die for anyone in particular - whether it was every human in particular, or just the elect in particular.
Christ died as a substitute for the punishment people's sin deserved, but not for people, as such. (It is not clear why an innocent God-man was needed for this.)
Christ not dying for anyone seems, to me, to limit the atonement. But maybe I'm off on my math.
But why did he die for those nanosecond old fetuses that God knew would die the nanosecond they were conceived?
Since God knew they would die immediately, then there should be no need of atonement for them. How did they sin? Jesus' death, for them, seems superfluous. They never needed to take out the payment deposited for their sins since they never sinned.
So perhaps the atonement wasn't made for them (or their sin) in mind. But this is limited atonement.
But perhaps they deserved punishment and were guilty of for Adam's sin?
If so, then they are held morally responsible for something they had no control over. But this denies the libertarian's precious "ought-implies-can" principle foundational for an Arminian libertarian free-will theorist's conception of moral responsibility.
But what of infants who die in infancy? Some Arminians hold that they are innocent and so go to heaven. Thus they had no need of the atonement. Wasted suffering. Less money could have been put into the pot. These people never needed it. If I knew that my son would never need to pay off any debts, why would I leave money for him to do so? If they are not innocent, then they are guilty. Guilty of what? Adam's sin. We saw that this poses problems for libertarian conceptions of moral responsibility.
Perhaps nanosecond old fetuses are not human, and thus not in need of atonement? Is this a serious option? I think not.
Furthermore, what about those people in hell when Jesus made his atonement? What if they "wanted in" on the pot? Could they have grabbed some of that? If not, then it seems false that the atonement was made as an example of the punishment reserved for people, and they could take some of the action for themselves if they wanted it. The Arminian says that the atonement was for all people in the sense that it made it possible for anyone whoever to take the benefits for themselves. Okay, here's a test case: how was it "possible" for someone who was in hell to take the benefits of the atonement for themselves? The Arminian says that they rejected Christ's atonement for them in the sense that they rejected "the light" God provided for them. But this is Poltergeist theology. There are others in hell besides Carol Anne.
It looks like the Arminian view of atonement is on the horns of a quintlemma. Either (a) the atonement for nanosecond old fetuses who God knew would die in infancy is superfluous and not even technically for anyone - thus they limit the atonement for humans to 0, (b) is not made for them and thus the Arminian holds to limited atonement, (c) is for them to pay for the sin incurred from Adam which ends up posing problems for the treasured "ought-implies-can" principle, (d) nanosecond old fetuses are not humans, and (e) just what about all those people who were in hell already? Did Jesus die for them too? The Arminian often solves this little riddle with the argument that men can be saved by whatever light they have. But this poses another problem: (e1) Why bother with the gospel at all? Why not just leave them to the light of natural revelation?
But I’m sure the above will be challenged. Nailing down the Arminian free will theorist is like nailing jell-o to the wall. They are very confused when it comes to the issue of the atonement. This is the result of imposing tradition onto Scripture.
Christ died as a substitute for the punishment people's sin deserved, but not for people, as such. (It is not clear why an innocent God-man was needed for this.)
Christ not dying for anyone seems, to me, to limit the atonement. But maybe I'm off on my math.
But why did he die for those nanosecond old fetuses that God knew would die the nanosecond they were conceived?
Since God knew they would die immediately, then there should be no need of atonement for them. How did they sin? Jesus' death, for them, seems superfluous. They never needed to take out the payment deposited for their sins since they never sinned.
So perhaps the atonement wasn't made for them (or their sin) in mind. But this is limited atonement.
But perhaps they deserved punishment and were guilty of for Adam's sin?
If so, then they are held morally responsible for something they had no control over. But this denies the libertarian's precious "ought-implies-can" principle foundational for an Arminian libertarian free-will theorist's conception of moral responsibility.
But what of infants who die in infancy? Some Arminians hold that they are innocent and so go to heaven. Thus they had no need of the atonement. Wasted suffering. Less money could have been put into the pot. These people never needed it. If I knew that my son would never need to pay off any debts, why would I leave money for him to do so? If they are not innocent, then they are guilty. Guilty of what? Adam's sin. We saw that this poses problems for libertarian conceptions of moral responsibility.
Perhaps nanosecond old fetuses are not human, and thus not in need of atonement? Is this a serious option? I think not.
Furthermore, what about those people in hell when Jesus made his atonement? What if they "wanted in" on the pot? Could they have grabbed some of that? If not, then it seems false that the atonement was made as an example of the punishment reserved for people, and they could take some of the action for themselves if they wanted it. The Arminian says that the atonement was for all people in the sense that it made it possible for anyone whoever to take the benefits for themselves. Okay, here's a test case: how was it "possible" for someone who was in hell to take the benefits of the atonement for themselves? The Arminian says that they rejected Christ's atonement for them in the sense that they rejected "the light" God provided for them. But this is Poltergeist theology. There are others in hell besides Carol Anne.
It looks like the Arminian view of atonement is on the horns of a quintlemma. Either (a) the atonement for nanosecond old fetuses who God knew would die in infancy is superfluous and not even technically for anyone - thus they limit the atonement for humans to 0, (b) is not made for them and thus the Arminian holds to limited atonement, (c) is for them to pay for the sin incurred from Adam which ends up posing problems for the treasured "ought-implies-can" principle, (d) nanosecond old fetuses are not humans, and (e) just what about all those people who were in hell already? Did Jesus die for them too? The Arminian often solves this little riddle with the argument that men can be saved by whatever light they have. But this poses another problem: (e1) Why bother with the gospel at all? Why not just leave them to the light of natural revelation?
But I’m sure the above will be challenged. Nailing down the Arminian free will theorist is like nailing jell-o to the wall. They are very confused when it comes to the issue of the atonement. This is the result of imposing tradition onto Scripture.
Anthropomorphism
In answer to a correspondent:
This is a complicated question to answer. In my opinion, many of the issues that devolve on God-talk aren’t distinctive to God-talk. Rather, these are questions and answers we bring to the issue of God-talk from our general philosophy of language, and related metaphysical or epistemic commitments. Let’s take some examples:
i) If you’re a materialist, you reject the existence of abstract objects, in the sense of objects that exist outside of space and time.
In that case, you would regard divine attributes like spirituality and timeless eternality as meaningless. They take positive concepts like time and space, and simply negate these concepts.
So these attributes have no positive content. They are vacuous linguistic placeholders that don’t refer to anything real.
If you take that view, then the position of Ayer or Nielsen on metaphysics generally and God-talk in particular makes sense.
If, on the other hand, you’re a realist like Penrose or Gödel, you do believe in abstract objects. You also believe that abstract objects are objects of knowledge.
ii) Likewise, if you’re an empiricist, you believe that we form all our concepts by abstraction from concrete particulars. Therefore, we have to “stretch” these mundane concepts when we apply them to God.
If, on the other hand, you subscribe to Innatism, you will take the position that sensory experience illustrates, activates, and refines our tacit knowledge of certain fundamental categories. It isn’t the source of our ideas. Rather, it’s a stimulus that makes us more self-aware of what we already understand at a subliminal level, and helps to furnish these generic, hardwired ideas with a more specific and detailed content.
iii) BTW, even if you were a doctrinaire empiricist, I’m not sure that that’s especially problematic for God-talk, because I think that we could make the mental adjustment as we adapt our mundane ideas to God.
iv) I believe that God-talk is analogical, but in that respect, God-talk is a special case of language in general. Language is always analogical.
And that’s because we have a one-to-many rather than one-to-one correspondence between word and object. When we use nouns to denote objects, they don’t pair off in terms of one noun per object. We don’t have as many words as we have objects to name.
Rather, we use a set of fairly generic nouns to denote a variety of concrete particulars. (You can extend this to verbs, adverbs, adjectives, &c.)
Now, we can do this in large part because we class objects by natural kinds, so we don’t need a separate word for every object. As such, we’re using a common word to denote a particular kind of object: a particular that belongs to a specific class of objects.
But that is still analogical, for there are many variations within a given class. No oak tree is identical with another oak tree.
iv) This brings me to another point: I object to theories of knowledge which stipulate that an analogy degenerates into equivocation unless we can isolate a point of identity between A and B.
For, as a matter of experience, we are able to recognize and classify objects at a glance without running through a process of analysis by which we isolate a common core.
Put another way, I reject theories of knowledge that lack psychological realism. Theories of knowledge that ignore the way we actually function in the world.
It’s clear that we are able to successfully communicate with each other despite the vagaries and ambiguities of language. It’s clear that we’re able to group concrete particulars as natural kinds, even though it would be very difficult to rigorously pinpoint what, exactly, they have in common.
v) It also important to keep in mind the relation between analogy, literality, and metaphor. For example, some theologians take the position that God-talk can only be figurative, never literal.
But a metaphor is, itself, an analogy. And sound analogies have a literal element. Analogies are figurative to the extent that every analogy involves an element of disanalogy. You’re saying that X is like Y—which means that X is both similar and dissimilar to X, but you are choosing to focus on their similarity.
For example, if I compare a sundial to a digital clock, these two objects are more unlike than alike in many respects. But they share the same chronometric function.
vi) Some theological traditions are apophatic. So, for them, it’s hard for God-talk to avoid equivocation. In a sense, they make a virtue of equivocation.
They operate under the assumption that God is so transcendent that he doesn’t correspond to anything we ever encounter in human experience. We have no frame of reference or standard of comparison. As such, God is unknowable and even ineffable—for God is incomparable in every respect.
To some extent this also goes back to empiricism, where experience is the source and standard of knowledge. And extreme denies that we can experience God due to his utter transcendence.
a) At the same time, apophaticism is paradoxical. How do you know what something is not unless you know what it is? Otherwise, on what basis do you contrast A and B?
b) Moreover, alterity is a form of univocal predication. It’s just a negative predication.
vii) But my own philosophical and theological commitments are such that, for me, apophaticism is predicated on too many false assumptions.
As a realist, I believe that we do have an intuitive grasp of abstract objects. And we can use abstract objects to model God’s own mode of subsistence, viz. simplicity, spirituality (incorporeity), infinitude (e.g. omniscience), and (timeless) eternality.
Indeed, I believe that abstract objects inhere in God. So it’s more than just a theological model.
This still leaves plenty of room for mystery, just as the Mandelbrot set is both apprehensible and inexhaustible.
As a dualist, I also believe that we have a direct experience of the incorporeal. Indeed, our experience of matter is mediated by our experience of mind. At an epistemic level, knowledge of the incorporeal is prior to knowledge of the corporeal.
I also think that we are endowed with innate moral intuitions (although these can be distorted by sin). But even if I were an empiricist, I don’t have any inherent problem with extrapolating our ethical categories to God.
Sure, we have to make some mental adjustments when we apply human examples to God. But I don’t see that this presents any great difficulty—especially when revelation (i.e. Scripture) supplies us with a lot of specific information about the difference between divine goodness and human virtue.
ix) Divine accommodation can mean (at least) two different things:
1. Epistemic accommodation
It can refer to Biblical God-talk. How does Scripture represent God? It is inherently anthropomorphic or figurative?
2. Ontological accommodation
How does God (apparently) interact with human beings?
I affirm (2), but deny (1).
Take the case of divine-human dialogue, God conversing with Abraham or Moses. The give and take appears to take place in real time. What are we to make of this?
i) This is a genuine accommodation in the sense that God must adapt to our finitude when communicating with us. Since human beings are timebound creatures, an actual dialogue must be sequential in time.
So I think the conversation takes place in real time. And that's a necessary accommodating to the human conversation partner.
ii) On the other hand, this doesn't mean that the divine conversation-partner literally enters into Abraham's timeframe.
Rather, God *effects* a dialogue in real time—whether telepathically or by simulating speech. *God* is not responding to Abraham in real time. But he is *effecting* a response to Abraham in real time.
viii) The upshot is that I don’t have much use for a theory of accommodation in the epistemic sense—if by this we mean that God is so different from us that he cannot reveal to us what he is really like, but must resort to fictive metaphors.
I think Scripture uses anthropomorphic descriptions, but not for that reason. To begin with, not all God-talk is anthropomorphic. And where it is anthropomorphic, this is not because there is no other way of representing God in human language.
Bible writers also employ many metaphors to depict human beings. Consider the Song of Solomon. They don’t do this because human beings are ineffable or incomprehensible.
Rather, I think Bible writers use anthropomorphisms for the same reason that poets use metaphors. Poets don’t resort to metaphors because an object is literally indescribable. Rather, poets use metaphors because metaphors are very economical ways of expressing an idea.
It would take a page of prosaic exposition to spell out the connotations of a well-chosen metaphor. And we should decrypt anthropomorphic language in the same way we decrypt the figurative imagery of a poet.
Take an anthropopathetic expression like divine jealousy. That’s a quick, graphic, memorable way to pack several ideas into a small space.
Or, to take another example—in discussing predestination, Bible writers explain that God elected us before the foundation of the world (and equivalent expressions). Within the limits of popular language, this is a prosaic description of God’s timeless eternality.
On the other hand, you have passages in Ps 90 and 102 that express divine eternality under the figure of time’s passage. The first set of passages is literal, whereas the second set illustrates the same idea though picture-language.
Biblical God-talk isn’t systematically anthropomorphic or systematically literal. Rather, the Bible alternates between poetic and prosaic descriptions of God. This is good pedagogy.
This is a complicated question to answer. In my opinion, many of the issues that devolve on God-talk aren’t distinctive to God-talk. Rather, these are questions and answers we bring to the issue of God-talk from our general philosophy of language, and related metaphysical or epistemic commitments. Let’s take some examples:
i) If you’re a materialist, you reject the existence of abstract objects, in the sense of objects that exist outside of space and time.
In that case, you would regard divine attributes like spirituality and timeless eternality as meaningless. They take positive concepts like time and space, and simply negate these concepts.
So these attributes have no positive content. They are vacuous linguistic placeholders that don’t refer to anything real.
If you take that view, then the position of Ayer or Nielsen on metaphysics generally and God-talk in particular makes sense.
If, on the other hand, you’re a realist like Penrose or Gödel, you do believe in abstract objects. You also believe that abstract objects are objects of knowledge.
ii) Likewise, if you’re an empiricist, you believe that we form all our concepts by abstraction from concrete particulars. Therefore, we have to “stretch” these mundane concepts when we apply them to God.
If, on the other hand, you subscribe to Innatism, you will take the position that sensory experience illustrates, activates, and refines our tacit knowledge of certain fundamental categories. It isn’t the source of our ideas. Rather, it’s a stimulus that makes us more self-aware of what we already understand at a subliminal level, and helps to furnish these generic, hardwired ideas with a more specific and detailed content.
iii) BTW, even if you were a doctrinaire empiricist, I’m not sure that that’s especially problematic for God-talk, because I think that we could make the mental adjustment as we adapt our mundane ideas to God.
iv) I believe that God-talk is analogical, but in that respect, God-talk is a special case of language in general. Language is always analogical.
And that’s because we have a one-to-many rather than one-to-one correspondence between word and object. When we use nouns to denote objects, they don’t pair off in terms of one noun per object. We don’t have as many words as we have objects to name.
Rather, we use a set of fairly generic nouns to denote a variety of concrete particulars. (You can extend this to verbs, adverbs, adjectives, &c.)
Now, we can do this in large part because we class objects by natural kinds, so we don’t need a separate word for every object. As such, we’re using a common word to denote a particular kind of object: a particular that belongs to a specific class of objects.
But that is still analogical, for there are many variations within a given class. No oak tree is identical with another oak tree.
iv) This brings me to another point: I object to theories of knowledge which stipulate that an analogy degenerates into equivocation unless we can isolate a point of identity between A and B.
For, as a matter of experience, we are able to recognize and classify objects at a glance without running through a process of analysis by which we isolate a common core.
Put another way, I reject theories of knowledge that lack psychological realism. Theories of knowledge that ignore the way we actually function in the world.
It’s clear that we are able to successfully communicate with each other despite the vagaries and ambiguities of language. It’s clear that we’re able to group concrete particulars as natural kinds, even though it would be very difficult to rigorously pinpoint what, exactly, they have in common.
v) It also important to keep in mind the relation between analogy, literality, and metaphor. For example, some theologians take the position that God-talk can only be figurative, never literal.
But a metaphor is, itself, an analogy. And sound analogies have a literal element. Analogies are figurative to the extent that every analogy involves an element of disanalogy. You’re saying that X is like Y—which means that X is both similar and dissimilar to X, but you are choosing to focus on their similarity.
For example, if I compare a sundial to a digital clock, these two objects are more unlike than alike in many respects. But they share the same chronometric function.
vi) Some theological traditions are apophatic. So, for them, it’s hard for God-talk to avoid equivocation. In a sense, they make a virtue of equivocation.
They operate under the assumption that God is so transcendent that he doesn’t correspond to anything we ever encounter in human experience. We have no frame of reference or standard of comparison. As such, God is unknowable and even ineffable—for God is incomparable in every respect.
To some extent this also goes back to empiricism, where experience is the source and standard of knowledge. And extreme denies that we can experience God due to his utter transcendence.
a) At the same time, apophaticism is paradoxical. How do you know what something is not unless you know what it is? Otherwise, on what basis do you contrast A and B?
b) Moreover, alterity is a form of univocal predication. It’s just a negative predication.
vii) But my own philosophical and theological commitments are such that, for me, apophaticism is predicated on too many false assumptions.
As a realist, I believe that we do have an intuitive grasp of abstract objects. And we can use abstract objects to model God’s own mode of subsistence, viz. simplicity, spirituality (incorporeity), infinitude (e.g. omniscience), and (timeless) eternality.
Indeed, I believe that abstract objects inhere in God. So it’s more than just a theological model.
This still leaves plenty of room for mystery, just as the Mandelbrot set is both apprehensible and inexhaustible.
As a dualist, I also believe that we have a direct experience of the incorporeal. Indeed, our experience of matter is mediated by our experience of mind. At an epistemic level, knowledge of the incorporeal is prior to knowledge of the corporeal.
I also think that we are endowed with innate moral intuitions (although these can be distorted by sin). But even if I were an empiricist, I don’t have any inherent problem with extrapolating our ethical categories to God.
Sure, we have to make some mental adjustments when we apply human examples to God. But I don’t see that this presents any great difficulty—especially when revelation (i.e. Scripture) supplies us with a lot of specific information about the difference between divine goodness and human virtue.
ix) Divine accommodation can mean (at least) two different things:
1. Epistemic accommodation
It can refer to Biblical God-talk. How does Scripture represent God? It is inherently anthropomorphic or figurative?
2. Ontological accommodation
How does God (apparently) interact with human beings?
I affirm (2), but deny (1).
Take the case of divine-human dialogue, God conversing with Abraham or Moses. The give and take appears to take place in real time. What are we to make of this?
i) This is a genuine accommodation in the sense that God must adapt to our finitude when communicating with us. Since human beings are timebound creatures, an actual dialogue must be sequential in time.
So I think the conversation takes place in real time. And that's a necessary accommodating to the human conversation partner.
ii) On the other hand, this doesn't mean that the divine conversation-partner literally enters into Abraham's timeframe.
Rather, God *effects* a dialogue in real time—whether telepathically or by simulating speech. *God* is not responding to Abraham in real time. But he is *effecting* a response to Abraham in real time.
viii) The upshot is that I don’t have much use for a theory of accommodation in the epistemic sense—if by this we mean that God is so different from us that he cannot reveal to us what he is really like, but must resort to fictive metaphors.
I think Scripture uses anthropomorphic descriptions, but not for that reason. To begin with, not all God-talk is anthropomorphic. And where it is anthropomorphic, this is not because there is no other way of representing God in human language.
Bible writers also employ many metaphors to depict human beings. Consider the Song of Solomon. They don’t do this because human beings are ineffable or incomprehensible.
Rather, I think Bible writers use anthropomorphisms for the same reason that poets use metaphors. Poets don’t resort to metaphors because an object is literally indescribable. Rather, poets use metaphors because metaphors are very economical ways of expressing an idea.
It would take a page of prosaic exposition to spell out the connotations of a well-chosen metaphor. And we should decrypt anthropomorphic language in the same way we decrypt the figurative imagery of a poet.
Take an anthropopathetic expression like divine jealousy. That’s a quick, graphic, memorable way to pack several ideas into a small space.
Or, to take another example—in discussing predestination, Bible writers explain that God elected us before the foundation of the world (and equivalent expressions). Within the limits of popular language, this is a prosaic description of God’s timeless eternality.
On the other hand, you have passages in Ps 90 and 102 that express divine eternality under the figure of time’s passage. The first set of passages is literal, whereas the second set illustrates the same idea though picture-language.
Biblical God-talk isn’t systematically anthropomorphic or systematically literal. Rather, the Bible alternates between poetic and prosaic descriptions of God. This is good pedagogy.
When All Means "Some"
When all means "some."
Ever get tired of these statements and those like it?:
The author of Proverbs declares that, “The lot is cast into the lap, but its every decision is from the Lord” (Prov. 16:33).
“Our God is in heaven; he does whatever pleases him” (Ps. 115:3).
God said to Isaiah that “From the east I summon a bird of prey. . . to fulfill my purpose” (46:11) showing that even birds are controlled by him.
Jesus said that “not one [sparrow] will fall to the ground apart from the will of your Father” (Mt. 10:29), meaning that something even as insignificant as the death of a sparrow is predetermined by God.
God is even the ultimate cause of calamity and disaster. He interrogated Moses from the burning bush, “Who makes [a man] deaf or mute? Who gives him sight or makes him blind? Is it not I, the Lord?” (Ex. 4:11). As God shapes a child in its mother’s womb, he forms some with physical and mental disabilities, and others he makes healthy. He is free to do with us as he chooses, since we are merely clay in his hands (Rom. 9:21). And only the impious would dare challenge his authority by quipping, “why did you make me like this?” (Rom. 9:20). Earthquakes, famine, pestilence and storm all befall a city because of God. Amos asked the rhetorical question, “When disaster comes to a city, has not the Lord caused it?” (Am. 3:6).
Does an offer of choice imply the freedom and ability to choose contracausally, that is does command to do a thing prove the ability to do it? E.g. God would not command us to do what we cannot do? Frequently Arminians will appeal to Deuteronomy where Moses says, "choose life in order that you may live,..." to say that this proves men must have contracausal freedom, but Moses said that the reason the Israelites were a stiff-necked people who refused to stop sinning was because, “to this day the Lord has not given you a mind that understands or eyes that see or ears that hear” (Deut. 29:4). The answer is, "No," nothing can be deduced about ability from such statements.
“I form the light and create darkness, I bring prosperity and create disaster; I, the Lord, do all these things” (Isa. 45:7). The darkness of night and plague is from God. And the wealth and peace of the nations is in his hands. It is easy to suppose that men are somehow exempt from the sphere of God’s sovereign control. But this is not the case. If Isaiah can say that God controls birds, it is just as certain that he controls men: “From the east I summon a bird of prey; from a far-off land, a man to fulfill my purpose” (Isa. 46:11).
Proverbs 21 declares, "The heart of the king is like channels of water in the hands of the Lord, He turns it wherever He wishes." God even causes a man to say every word that comes from his mouth: “from the Lord comes the reply of [a person’s] tongue” (Prov. 16:1). And the Lord ordains every course of action a man takes for Scripture says, “the Lord determines [a man’s] steps” (Prov. 16:9). David said, "All the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them came to be." (Ps. 139:16).
Proverbs declares, “The Lord works out everything for his own ends – even the wicked for a day of disaster” (Prov. 16:4). Paul asserts, like Isaiah, that, “God has bound all men over to disobedience” (Rom. 11:32). This teaching pervades all of Scripture. The Psalmist declared, “The Lord made his people very fruitful; he made them too numerous for their foes, whose hearts he turned to hate his people, to conspire against his servants” (Ps. 105:24-25).We could go on and on and on with these declarations in Scripture.
Isaiah 46:10
Declaring the end from the beginning,
And from ancient times things which have not been done,
Saying, 'My purpose will be established,
And I will accomplish all My good pleasure'
Ephesians 1:11
11also we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to His purpose who works all things after the counsel of His will,
And especially here in Ephesian 1, talking about predestination and planning, we have not a reference to the precepts and commands of God, like the Law, what we would call the "revealed will" of God, but to His decrees, what Deut. 29:29 calls "the secret things." Also, notice the connection to Isaiah 46 in Ephesians 1, where God predestines us according to the "kind intension" (or "good pleasure) of His will.
And, as Brother Dustin Segers pointed out to us in our church several months ago, this text can be read emphatically such that God is working, literally "all all things" in such a manner.
People get hung up on the idea of "exhaustive determinism" and "decrees" and act like, as Steve has now twice pointed out and I have pointed out myself in the parent topic twice myself as well, decrees are not the same thing as "causality," and decrees don't do anything. They act as a blueprint. Blueprints don't build buildings. That requires means - materials, machines, people. In Scripture, the decrees (God's counsels) are worked out by providence. Decrees are not interchangeable with "causality." In Scripture, providence, which is usually by second causes, works out the plan. Steve put it his way:
Further, it's not as if Arminians haven't themselves said that God decrees things like the Fall. Read the Arminian order of decrees: Here are the first two: Creation...Permit Fall. Any Calvinist that has any clue about the Amyraldian, Infralapsarian, and Supralapsarian schemes knows that they also have God permitting the Fall. The difference between the Arminian scheme and the others is that the Arminian is speaking of "bare" permission. Put another way God decreed the "possibility" of the Fall. This reflects the Arminian (pre)commitment to indeterminism. The others have the decree as "efficacious," and the main dispute between Supras of the older variety and Infras has to do with the way God discriminates among men - not the nature of the permission of the Fall.
Another Scholastic distinction that I believe Charles Hodge used, even though we admit is has been discussed to death and fraught with difficulties since the Middle Ages, is the distinction between God's absolute power (Potentia Absoluta) and ordinary power (Potentia Ordinata). Whatever the difficulties of those distinctions in the older theologies (See Richard Muller's discussions in Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics - it's too long to enter for my purposes here), I think they are useful, at their root, insofar as they help accurately describe the way God uses means. With respect to things like creation ex nihilio, miracles, the Incarnation, regeneration, etc. God's absolute and direct control is very involved. In all other things, the decrees fall out according to the nature of second causes "either necessarily, freely, or contingently."
Notice that even in the creation narrative, we have an implication of second causes. There are commands that say, "Let there be..." and others that say ,"Let the earth bring forth..." In the Incarnation, we have a direct miracle @ conception, but it isn't as if Jesus just appears full formed as a 30 year old man like some sort of animus springing from Mary's womb. Rather, there is a normal pregnancy; He grows through childhood into adulthood, etc. We speak of regeneration in two senses: the wider and the narrower. In the narrower, we mean the direct act of God raising the soul dead in sin to life, but we are comfortable pointing out that "means" are the ordinary mode of that occurrence. As Dr. Sproul has said, the Spirit and the Word of God (preaching, studying, reading, etc) are working together.
What I would like to particularly point out for the purposes of this posting is that what Robert has provided us with is his own use of one of his Libertarian objections to Calvinism where it suits him:
Here's Robert's schizophrenic logic: he'll take the "pantos" passages of Scripture regarding the atonement or God's desires (1 Tim 2:4 for example) to mean "everyone without exception" and then reduce "all things" to "some." All the while, he finds the doctrine of particular atonement odious, because we're turning "all" and "world" into "some."
Robert believes that God only predetermines *some things* but when we look at Scripture, we find that the list is quite exhaustive (indeed the above list can be multiplied greatly) and Robert, while accusing us of emphasizing the particular over the general and claiming, I suppose, that "all means all," quickly reduces "all," as in Ephesians 1 to "some." Robert needs a supporting argument that these declarations above are all exceptions and that the salvation of men lies not in the predestination of God but in man's libertarian freedom. He needs an exegetical argument to that effect, but, as we have seen many times, he falls strangely silent when pressed on that matter.
What is truly annoying in that regard is that he has also stated this:
Robert, please give us the exegetical foundation of your view of indeterminate freedom. I'd like to know, because Arminians freely admit this is not an exegetical argument.
I'm reminded of what a friend of mine who once taught at SWBTS (and is now pastoring in NC) once said to me: "In the end, there are really no exegetical arguments against the doctrines of grace, only ethical and philosophical ones." Regardless of the broader merits of his statement, if Robert is an example, Dr. Minor was on the mark.
Ever get tired of these statements and those like it?:
1. All means all!By way of reply, generally, I find these sort of objections rather low brow anyway, but I'd like to draw your attention to a particular statement made this past Monday by Robert:
2. Calvinists emphasize the particular over the general.
3. World means world!
4. Calvinists are notorious for making all mean some.
Scripture is clear that He does predetermine some events, most notably the crucifixion of Jesus Acts 2:23, 4:25-28), but not all events.Really?
The author of Proverbs declares that, “The lot is cast into the lap, but its every decision is from the Lord” (Prov. 16:33).
“Our God is in heaven; he does whatever pleases him” (Ps. 115:3).
God said to Isaiah that “From the east I summon a bird of prey. . . to fulfill my purpose” (46:11) showing that even birds are controlled by him.
Jesus said that “not one [sparrow] will fall to the ground apart from the will of your Father” (Mt. 10:29), meaning that something even as insignificant as the death of a sparrow is predetermined by God.
God is even the ultimate cause of calamity and disaster. He interrogated Moses from the burning bush, “Who makes [a man] deaf or mute? Who gives him sight or makes him blind? Is it not I, the Lord?” (Ex. 4:11). As God shapes a child in its mother’s womb, he forms some with physical and mental disabilities, and others he makes healthy. He is free to do with us as he chooses, since we are merely clay in his hands (Rom. 9:21). And only the impious would dare challenge his authority by quipping, “why did you make me like this?” (Rom. 9:20). Earthquakes, famine, pestilence and storm all befall a city because of God. Amos asked the rhetorical question, “When disaster comes to a city, has not the Lord caused it?” (Am. 3:6).
Does an offer of choice imply the freedom and ability to choose contracausally, that is does command to do a thing prove the ability to do it? E.g. God would not command us to do what we cannot do? Frequently Arminians will appeal to Deuteronomy where Moses says, "choose life in order that you may live,..." to say that this proves men must have contracausal freedom, but Moses said that the reason the Israelites were a stiff-necked people who refused to stop sinning was because, “to this day the Lord has not given you a mind that understands or eyes that see or ears that hear” (Deut. 29:4). The answer is, "No," nothing can be deduced about ability from such statements.
“I form the light and create darkness, I bring prosperity and create disaster; I, the Lord, do all these things” (Isa. 45:7). The darkness of night and plague is from God. And the wealth and peace of the nations is in his hands. It is easy to suppose that men are somehow exempt from the sphere of God’s sovereign control. But this is not the case. If Isaiah can say that God controls birds, it is just as certain that he controls men: “From the east I summon a bird of prey; from a far-off land, a man to fulfill my purpose” (Isa. 46:11).
Proverbs 21 declares, "The heart of the king is like channels of water in the hands of the Lord, He turns it wherever He wishes." God even causes a man to say every word that comes from his mouth: “from the Lord comes the reply of [a person’s] tongue” (Prov. 16:1). And the Lord ordains every course of action a man takes for Scripture says, “the Lord determines [a man’s] steps” (Prov. 16:9). David said, "All the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them came to be." (Ps. 139:16).
Proverbs declares, “The Lord works out everything for his own ends – even the wicked for a day of disaster” (Prov. 16:4). Paul asserts, like Isaiah, that, “God has bound all men over to disobedience” (Rom. 11:32). This teaching pervades all of Scripture. The Psalmist declared, “The Lord made his people very fruitful; he made them too numerous for their foes, whose hearts he turned to hate his people, to conspire against his servants” (Ps. 105:24-25).We could go on and on and on with these declarations in Scripture.
Isaiah 46:10
Declaring the end from the beginning,
And from ancient times things which have not been done,
Saying, 'My purpose will be established,
And I will accomplish all My good pleasure'
Ephesians 1:11
11also we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to His purpose who works all things after the counsel of His will,
And especially here in Ephesian 1, talking about predestination and planning, we have not a reference to the precepts and commands of God, like the Law, what we would call the "revealed will" of God, but to His decrees, what Deut. 29:29 calls "the secret things." Also, notice the connection to Isaiah 46 in Ephesians 1, where God predestines us according to the "kind intension" (or "good pleasure) of His will.
And, as Brother Dustin Segers pointed out to us in our church several months ago, this text can be read emphatically such that God is working, literally "all all things" in such a manner.
People get hung up on the idea of "exhaustive determinism" and "decrees" and act like, as Steve has now twice pointed out and I have pointed out myself in the parent topic twice myself as well, decrees are not the same thing as "causality," and decrees don't do anything. They act as a blueprint. Blueprints don't build buildings. That requires means - materials, machines, people. In Scripture, the decrees (God's counsels) are worked out by providence. Decrees are not interchangeable with "causality." In Scripture, providence, which is usually by second causes, works out the plan. Steve put it his way:
Robert is confusing *causality* with *certainty*.I'd add that this seems to be regular feature of libertarians' objections to Calvinism's view of providence.
Further, it's not as if Arminians haven't themselves said that God decrees things like the Fall. Read the Arminian order of decrees: Here are the first two: Creation...Permit Fall. Any Calvinist that has any clue about the Amyraldian, Infralapsarian, and Supralapsarian schemes knows that they also have God permitting the Fall. The difference between the Arminian scheme and the others is that the Arminian is speaking of "bare" permission. Put another way God decreed the "possibility" of the Fall. This reflects the Arminian (pre)commitment to indeterminism. The others have the decree as "efficacious," and the main dispute between Supras of the older variety and Infras has to do with the way God discriminates among men - not the nature of the permission of the Fall.
Another Scholastic distinction that I believe Charles Hodge used, even though we admit is has been discussed to death and fraught with difficulties since the Middle Ages, is the distinction between God's absolute power (Potentia Absoluta) and ordinary power (Potentia Ordinata). Whatever the difficulties of those distinctions in the older theologies (See Richard Muller's discussions in Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics - it's too long to enter for my purposes here), I think they are useful, at their root, insofar as they help accurately describe the way God uses means. With respect to things like creation ex nihilio, miracles, the Incarnation, regeneration, etc. God's absolute and direct control is very involved. In all other things, the decrees fall out according to the nature of second causes "either necessarily, freely, or contingently."
Notice that even in the creation narrative, we have an implication of second causes. There are commands that say, "Let there be..." and others that say ,"Let the earth bring forth..." In the Incarnation, we have a direct miracle @ conception, but it isn't as if Jesus just appears full formed as a 30 year old man like some sort of animus springing from Mary's womb. Rather, there is a normal pregnancy; He grows through childhood into adulthood, etc. We speak of regeneration in two senses: the wider and the narrower. In the narrower, we mean the direct act of God raising the soul dead in sin to life, but we are comfortable pointing out that "means" are the ordinary mode of that occurrence. As Dr. Sproul has said, the Spirit and the Word of God (preaching, studying, reading, etc) are working together.
What I would like to particularly point out for the purposes of this posting is that what Robert has provided us with is his own use of one of his Libertarian objections to Calvinism where it suits him:
Scripture is clear that He does predetermine some events, most notably the crucifixion of Jesus Acts 2:23, 4:25-28), but not all events.Notice how quickly the libertarian's "all means all" argumentation quickly turns into, "all means some." "God works all things after the counsel of His will" (in Greek, literally "all, all things)" is reduced, without benefit of argument, to "some things."
Here's Robert's schizophrenic logic: he'll take the "pantos" passages of Scripture regarding the atonement or God's desires (1 Tim 2:4 for example) to mean "everyone without exception" and then reduce "all things" to "some." All the while, he finds the doctrine of particular atonement odious, because we're turning "all" and "world" into "some."
Robert believes that God only predetermines *some things* but when we look at Scripture, we find that the list is quite exhaustive (indeed the above list can be multiplied greatly) and Robert, while accusing us of emphasizing the particular over the general and claiming, I suppose, that "all means all," quickly reduces "all," as in Ephesians 1 to "some." Robert needs a supporting argument that these declarations above are all exceptions and that the salvation of men lies not in the predestination of God but in man's libertarian freedom. He needs an exegetical argument to that effect, but, as we have seen many times, he falls strangely silent when pressed on that matter.
What is truly annoying in that regard is that he has also stated this:
You prove my point, you can argue for it, but you do not have the verses to show it to be true. Since you do not have the texts, you like Owen, must construct logical arguments to substitute for biblical texts.I believe he has said this at least twice. What does Robert offer for an exegetical argument? Looking here and here and, I think, here we find precious little. What we do find is that all the while crying about Owen's supposed lack of exegetical foundation and substitution of 'logical arguments' for exegetical ones - and Manata (and I imagine the rest of us who have replied to him as well) following in Owen's footsteps, Robert has consistently offered ethical and philosophical arguments and analogies (for that's what libertarian freedom is - a philosophical argument) -not an exegetical argument - and he has the nerve to talk about alleged "double standards" of the authors of this blog?! I don't think so. What we have here is a classic example of projection.
Robert, please give us the exegetical foundation of your view of indeterminate freedom. I'd like to know, because Arminians freely admit this is not an exegetical argument.
I'm reminded of what a friend of mine who once taught at SWBTS (and is now pastoring in NC) once said to me: "In the end, there are really no exegetical arguments against the doctrines of grace, only ethical and philosophical ones." Regardless of the broader merits of his statement, if Robert is an example, Dr. Minor was on the mark.
There Is a God: How the World's Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind
Antony Flew's "conversion account" is coming out this November.
Here's a couple blurbs:
Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
British philosopher Flew has long been something of an evangelist for atheism, debating theologians and pastors in front of enormous crowds. In 2004, breathless news reports announced that the nonagenarian had changed his mind. This book tells why. Ironically, his arguments about the absurdity of God-talk launched a revival of philosophical theists, some of whom, like Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne, were important in Flew's recent conversion to theism. Breakthroughs in science, especially cosmology, also played a part: if the speed or mass of the electron were off just a little, no life could have evolved on this planet. Perhaps the arrogance of the New Atheists also emboldened him, as Flew taunts them for failing to live up to the greatness of atheists of yore. The book concludes with an appendix by New Testament scholar and Anglican bishop N.T. Wright, arguing for the coherence of Christian belief in the resurrection. Flew praises Wright, though he maintains some distance still from orthodox Christianity. The book will be most avidly embraced by traditional theists seeking argumentative ammunition. It sometimes disappoints: quoting other authorities at length, citing religion-friendly scientists for pages at a time and belaboring side issues, like the claim that Einstein was really a religious believer of sorts. (Nov.) Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Book Description
In one of the biggest religion news stories of the new millennium, the Associated Press announced that Professor Antony Flew, the world's leading atheist, now believes in God.
Flew is a pioneer for modern atheism. His famous paper, Theology and Falsification, was first presented at a meeting of the Oxford Socratic Club chaired by C. S. Lewis and went on to become the most widely reprinted philosophical publication of the last five decades. Flew earned his fame by arguing that one should presuppose atheism until evidence of a God surfaces. He now believes that such evidence exists, and There Is a God chronicles his journey from staunch atheism to believer.
For the first time, this book will present a detailed and fascinating account of Flew's riveting decision to revoke his previous beliefs and argue for the existence of God. Ever since Flew's announcement, there has been great debate among atheists and believers alike about what exactly this "conversion" means. There Is a God will finally put this debate to rest.
This is a story of a brilliant mind and reasoned thinker, and where his lifelong intellectual pursuit eventually led him: belief in God as designer.
Here's a couple blurbs:
Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
British philosopher Flew has long been something of an evangelist for atheism, debating theologians and pastors in front of enormous crowds. In 2004, breathless news reports announced that the nonagenarian had changed his mind. This book tells why. Ironically, his arguments about the absurdity of God-talk launched a revival of philosophical theists, some of whom, like Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne, were important in Flew's recent conversion to theism. Breakthroughs in science, especially cosmology, also played a part: if the speed or mass of the electron were off just a little, no life could have evolved on this planet. Perhaps the arrogance of the New Atheists also emboldened him, as Flew taunts them for failing to live up to the greatness of atheists of yore. The book concludes with an appendix by New Testament scholar and Anglican bishop N.T. Wright, arguing for the coherence of Christian belief in the resurrection. Flew praises Wright, though he maintains some distance still from orthodox Christianity. The book will be most avidly embraced by traditional theists seeking argumentative ammunition. It sometimes disappoints: quoting other authorities at length, citing religion-friendly scientists for pages at a time and belaboring side issues, like the claim that Einstein was really a religious believer of sorts. (Nov.) Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Book Description
In one of the biggest religion news stories of the new millennium, the Associated Press announced that Professor Antony Flew, the world's leading atheist, now believes in God.
Flew is a pioneer for modern atheism. His famous paper, Theology and Falsification, was first presented at a meeting of the Oxford Socratic Club chaired by C. S. Lewis and went on to become the most widely reprinted philosophical publication of the last five decades. Flew earned his fame by arguing that one should presuppose atheism until evidence of a God surfaces. He now believes that such evidence exists, and There Is a God chronicles his journey from staunch atheism to believer.
For the first time, this book will present a detailed and fascinating account of Flew's riveting decision to revoke his previous beliefs and argue for the existence of God. Ever since Flew's announcement, there has been great debate among atheists and believers alike about what exactly this "conversion" means. There Is a God will finally put this debate to rest.
This is a story of a brilliant mind and reasoned thinker, and where his lifelong intellectual pursuit eventually led him: belief in God as designer.
Monday, September 17, 2007
On Avoiding the Obvious
Recently I came across an argument on the web that the word “you” in 2 Peter 3:9 should be limited to the elect, because the context of this passage is more eschatological than soteriological. So when Peter says that God does not want “anyone” to perish, that simply means he does not want any of the elect to perish. And we are supposed to believe that this conclusion is based upon pure exegesis. Right. This attempt to read hyper-Calvinistic dogma into Holy Writ fails for several reasons.So, apparently, Dr. Owen thinks that Richard Bauckham is a hyper-Calvinist, not to mention Robert Reymond and R.C. Sproul, or is his target James White, yet again? Why does one get the feeling that this is also a rather simplistic presentation of this exegetical argument? If one is going to critique it, wouldn't it be better to at least name the person or place from which one is taking it or at least address the best of those who come to this conclusion?
Bauckham is rather clear here that 2 Peter 3:9 is about God's keeping judgment away for the sake of the covenant community. I look forward to Dr. Owen's detailed response to Bauckham and his justification for calling this interpretation "hyper-Calvinist," since Bauckham's theological affirmations are more along the lines of Moltmann. It isn't as if Calvinists are the only ones that arrive at this exegetical conclusion.
1. The Bible is not a systematic theology textbook. You simply cannot chop the text up into “soteriology” passages and “eschatology” passages. No serious exegete would put forth such a suggestion. Students of biblical theology are well aware of the fact that the hope of final salvation is embedded within the eschatological expectations of all of the biblical writers. It is scarcely possible to separate the two.Who is asserting otherwise?
In verse 9, coming to repentance is the opposite of perishing. It goes without saying that the opposite of perishing is salvation. In verse 13, the new heavens and new earth is the place where “righteousness” dwells–an allusion to Isaiah 65-66, which describes the anticipated salvation of Israel and the nations. Righteousness dwells there because the land has been ridden of all those who oppose God. Within the book of Isaiah “righteousness” is the equivalent of God’s saving mercy (cf. 46:13; 51:5-8; 56:1; 62:1-2). Both verse 9 and verse 15 speak of God’s patience, and in verse 15 we are told to consider the Lord’s patience to be “salvation.” The idea that this is not a passage we would want to put in the “soteriology” column is absurd.
However, if this is true, then the salvation in Isaiah is admittedly one that is anticipated, and that is eschatological. In fact, verse 13 is directly referring to the Second Coming.
The idea that this text can be limited to the elect is just silly. The point of verse 9 is not at all difficult to understand. The Church is tempted to doubt God’s word, because the Day of Judgment seems to be delayed. So Peter is reminding the Church of the words of the prophets and apostles (v. 2). Many will scoff at God in the last days, pointing out that the world continues as always (vv. 3-4). They have forgotten the lesson of the Great Flood (vv. 5-7). So Peter reminds his friends that the passage of time has no effect upon the eternal God (v. 8). The reason God has not yet judged the world is he wants to give everyone ample opportunity to repent (v. 9).The reason "the Church" is tempted, according to this text is because:
3Know this first of all, that in the last days mockers will come with their mocking, following after their own lusts,4and saying, "Where is the promise of His coming? For ever since the fathers fell asleep, all continues just as it was from the beginning of creation."
Moving on...
Why does Peter say that God is patient with “you”? The answer is obvious. Many within the Church have fallen away into apostasy and sin after having their sins cleansed away (1:9).It's nice to see that Dr. Owen denies the perseverance of the saints. Where is "apostasy" in that text?
The passage has nothing to do with God’s desire for salvation being limited to the elect; it is addressing the need for wayward Christians to be given an opportunity to turn back from apostasy before it is too late. God does not want any of his sheep to be lost forever (3:17).
Well, if they are truly God's sheep, then aren't they also "elect?" Doesn't the first chapter talk about election?
Not only is God patient toward his straying sheep, but in fact it is not his desire that anyone should perish. He wants all to come to repentance. That is what the text says. That is what the text means. Though it is true that we find in other places that God has predestined only the elect to have life eternal, that is not the issue being addressed here. This passage is speaking of God’s desire, not of his decree. It is speaking of his revealed will, not his secret will.
The problem is, to import that distinction into this text is to import a distinction that the text does not address. The text is not explaining the distinctions within God's will. So, what Dr. Owen has done, like Dr. Murray (and Owen is no Murray) is import a theological distinction into the text that does not obtain from the text. That distinction is more properly found in Ezekiel 33, but where is the connection here? If an exegete is going to freight the text with such a distinction, then it should be derived from the text. Where is the supporting argument? That is precisely why those of us holding to what he wishes to tar a "hyper-Calvinist" exegesis of this passage object to this line of thinking.
In this text: “any” and “all” are both universal class quantifiers. Recall the extensional fallacy: Christians who deny special redemption typically appeal to the “pantos” (“all”) passages of Scripture. But this confuses extension (referent) with intension (sense). A universal quantifier has a standard intension, but a variable extension. And that follows from the nature of a quantifier, which is necessarily general and abstract rather than specific and concrete marker. That’s what makes it possible to plug in concrete content. A universal quantifier is a class quantifier. As such, it can have no fixed range of reference. In each case, that must be supplied by the concrete context and specific referent. In other words, a universal quantifier has a definite intension but indefinite extension. So its extension is relative to the level of generality of the reference-class in view. Thus, there is no presumption in favor of taking “all” or “every” as meaning everyone without exception. “All” or “every” is always relative to all of something.
What is the referent? Answer: “You/us” delimits “any” and “all.” However, unless there are other clues in the text itself, these delimiters could be out of place and the text could be universal. Are there any additional clues? Yes.
In 3:3-7 Peter sets up an “us/them” dichotomy. “Them” refers to unbelievers, specifically false teachers, who have risen up and are preaching against the Second Coming. They are mockers, “following after their own lusts,” and making light of the promise of Christ’s return. Peter speaks of this happening in “the last days,” and, since these kinds of men have risen up throughout history, we know Peter thinks of the present day as the last days. In verse 8, Peter directs his message to his audience, telling them not to let what follows escape their (“your”) attention. “You” is his audience, whom he clearly says in 1:2 have received Christ and in 1:10 are “brethren,” and in 3:1 are “beloved.” You, which is delimiting “all” and “any” refers to the brethren, beloved, those who have received Christ.
Peter is teaching that, contrary to the mockers and false teachers, God is not at all slow concerning His promise. What promise? Answer: the return of the Lord, and He is patient toward you (beloved) not desiring that any (of you) perish, but all (of you) come to repentance. To come (and not perish)to repentance is defined in v.14: that Christians be found by Christ in peace, spotless, and blameless, and on guard against error. Peter is teaching two things: (1) God is holding off the Second Coming until all those who have been chosen for salvation according to His plan come to it (e.g. He is holding off judgment for the sake of the covenant community) and that (2) God is being kind toward those living at the time of His coming, commanding them to be ready and prepared, desiring the repentance of the backslider too. The "backslider" and the "apostate" are intersecting, but not interchangeable categories.
Also, assuming Petrine authorship, it is highly likely that the text is alluding to the Olivet Discourse where Jesus says: Unless those days had been cut short, no life would have been saved; but for the sake of the elect those days will be cut short.
If any/all refers to all men without exception, then this text means the world may never end, because new people are being born all the time. If the reference is to God’s people, the world will end when the last of the elect (a large, but finite number) has repented and believed.
Sunday, September 16, 2007
Inspiration & canonization
In answer to some questions from a correspondent (I've slightly edited the original questions):
“The doctrine of inspiration has come up in recent conversations within the circle of friends I am around, and a great many questions have arisen. First, is there any clear argument from the New Testament that their writings were on par as the Old Testament scriptures?”
1.Let’s guard against false expectations. The NT writers already have the OT as their paradigm. So we wouldn’t necessarily expect them to explicitly claim inspiration. And that’s because they’re already writing in a sacred genre. They’re picking up where the OT left off. They’re downstream in that canonical tradition. They don’t have to repeat everything about themselves that OT writers say about themselves. Rather, their inspiration is a given, for the genre is inspired.
These are Jews, often writing for a Jewish audience. Even when they’re writing for Gentiles, their audience is expected to know it’s way around the OT. And to recognize the literary cues in the NT counterpart.
2.The restoration of prophecy was associated with the Messianic age, viz. John the Baptist, Pentecost, Lk 1-4 (e.g. Zechariah, Anna, Simeon).
3.If the new covenant is greater than the old covenant, would we expect the record of the old covenant to be inspired while the record of the new covenant is uninspired? The new covenant is the culmination of the old covenant.
4. For some specific evidence, see the following:
http://www.bible-researcher.com/warfield3.html
http://garyhabermas.com/articles/areopagus_jesusinspirationscripture/areopagus_jesusinspirationscripture.htm
“1 Peter 3:16 seems ambiguous, as ‘scripture’ there, can be taken as ‘word’ in the Greek.”
In NT usage, it’s a technical term for “scripture.”
“Whether that was referring to the OT seems debatable.”
It usually denotes the OT, but that’s a matter of context. Here it has reference to some of Paul’s letters.
“Regardless, how do we know what Peter is talking about all of Paul writing?”
It may not be talking about “all” of his letters, but that’s irrelevant. What’s germane is the writer, not the writing—in the sense that the character of the writing derives from the character of the writer. If Peter is putting Paul on par with OT writers, then his past, present, and future writings will be inspired.
“Is he talking about those books that will later be canonized?”
It's unnecessary to be that specific. It’s sufficient that if a writing is Pauline, then it’s inspired. And if it’s inspired, then any surviving epistle of Paul’s should be included in the canon. Writings of a certain genre automatically merit canonicity.
“If so (as it has been argued, though, seemingly irrational) why would he not inform his readers of those specific letters and not other letters of Paul that would not be canonized?”
i) Peter wouldn’t merely allude to these letters unless his readers already knew what he was talking about.
ii) Any surviving letter of Paul’s should be canonized. But Peter is in no position to know which letters would survive. Indeed, he didn’t know, at the time of writing, whether Paul would be composing any more letters. This objection is a red herring.
“Furthermore is seems that we would also have to presuppose that Peter thought that his own writings are 'God breathed' if we take that he is recommending Paul’s letters as 'God breathed'."
And what’s the problem with that presupposition? He was an apostle. He was a recipient of the charismatic promise which Christ made to the Apostolate at the Last Supper (Jn 14-16).
“Furthermore, why do we accept the canon as it is? It seems that we impose extra biblical methodology to discovering biblical authority. Doesn’t that negate biblical authority?”
There are both internal and external lines of evidence for the canon. Scripture is not opposed to extrascriptural evidence.
For example, the Bible contains many prophecies. These refer to real world events. To appreciate the fulfillment of prophecy, you have to connect a Scriptural oracle with an extrascriptural event.
When we form critical judgments on the basis of external evidence, we are judging by the evidence that God as providentially left at our disposal. If the evidence is misleading, God could have preserved a more representative sample of evidence.
“It just seems unclear how one can make a case for the New Testament, much less individual books.”
You can make a case for the NT canon on both internal and external grounds. For the moment, let’s confine ourselves to internal grounds.
i) Authorship
Authorship alone can be a sufficient criterion where it applies. If a book is by a certain kind of writer (e.g. an apostle), then it automatically merits canonization.
I’m not saying that only apostolic writings are canonical. Rather, I’m saying that if a writing is apostolic, you don’t need to look for an additional reason to include it in the canon.
Based on internal (as well as external) evidence, that already gives you 21 of the 27 books of the NT, viz. Matthew, John, Romans-Philemon, 1-2 Peter, 1-3 John, Revelation.
ii) Intertextuality
Don’t think of the 27 books of the NT as a miscellaneous collection of individual books. For there’s a great deal of cross-attestation in the NT. You can group various NT books in interlocking units or larger blocks of material:
i) Common authorship
Individual books by the same author obviously go together:
a) Luke-Acts
b) John, 1-3 John, Revelation
c) Romans-Philemon
d) 1-2 Peter
ii) Common speaker
A book by one author may refer to another author. Author B may be a speaker or historical figure in Author A.
a) Matthew-John>1-2 Peter; James; 1-3 John; Revelation
The gospels refer to Peter, James, and John. And we have writings by Peter, James, and John outside the gospels.
b) Luke>Paul
Luke refers to Paul.
c) Paul>Luke
Paul refers to Luke.
d) Paul>Peter, John
Paul refers to the Peter and John.
e) Peter>Paul
Peter refers to Paul.
f) Luke>Matthew
g) Mark>Matthew
h) Luke>John
i) Luke>Peter
j) Luke>James
k) Luke>Mark
l) Hebrews>Timothy
m) Paul>brothers of Jesus
(a)-(m) are forms of cross-attestation.
I’m not going to give you chapter and verse for all this. You can look it up yourself. I’m just giving you a way of thinking about how the NT writings are interconnected by writer, as one writer cross-references another.
iii) Common source
a) Matthew/Luke>Mark
According to the usual solution to the synoptic problem, Matthew and Luke made use of Mark. This is, among other things, a form of implicit attestation.
Different solutions to the synoptic problem are possible, but even if you rearrange the order of literary dependence, you still get a form of cross-attestation.
b) James>Jude
One is usually thought to be literarily dependent on the other. That’s a form of implicit attestation.
A lot of what I’ve said here could be amplified and fine-tuned. The main point is that the NT books bear witness to a close-knit social circle. You can trace that out in detail. Writings go with writers, and writers go with other writers.
“To perhaps flush out my question with regards to inspiration and canonization, it would seem to me that that apostles did not know that what they were writing was inspired.”
Why do you take that position? I’m not saying that inspiration can’t operate at a subliminal level. But your statement is rather sweeping.
“Though I agree that it was, it seems that part of the inspiration process was the canonization process in which certain books were approved and some were not.”
This statement is potentially misleading. On the one hand, there were probably some inspired books which were never canonized, not because they were rejected, but because they didn’t survive.
On the other hand, the surviving NT books are the only live options we have. The NT apocrypha is obviously pseudepigraphical, given their 2C (or later) date of composition.
“Now, let me clarify with a better question to not confuse you. Were the rough draft copies of Luke, for example, inspired? Or did he write a rough draft, scratched it, wrote another rough draft, scratched it, and then wrote what we have today and said ‘Ah ha! This is inspired.’ Do you understand my point?”
To take a real-life comparison, the Book of Jeremiah is an anthology of his oracles, and it includes earlier “draft” editions of his oracles. He would collate his oracles up to a certain point in time. Then, after he delivered another batch of oracles, he would incorporate these in a revised and expanded edition. I wouldn’t be surprised if Baruch compiled the final “collected prophecies” of Jeremiah.
So I see no reason why inspiration cannot or did not apply to an earlier edition—whether by Jeremiah or Luke.
“Were the other letters of Paul (those that we do not have) inspired as well?”
Inspiration is a property of a writing because it’s a property of the writer. So, yes, his “lost letters” would also be inspired.
“They seemed to have circulated to the church's. So was the understanding of the writings at that time different than our understanding today?”
You seem to be assuming that a writing wouldn’t survive because it wasn’t deemed to be inspired or worthy of canonization, in the estimation of the church.
But there’s no reason to jump to that conclusion. To survive, a letter would have to circulate in enough *copies* so that while a number of copies (as well as the original) would be lost to the ravages of time, a sufficient number would last long enough to be recopied, and so on and so forth.
The NT church didn’t have a printing press. Not every Pauline church would necessarily have a scribe on call.
The Pauline epistles are occasional writings, dealing with the particular needs of particular churches. Some of these letters would be of more enduring value to posterity than others. So, in the providence of God, some letters survived while others, due to their topicality, were allowed (by God) to perish.
“The doctrine of inspiration has come up in recent conversations within the circle of friends I am around, and a great many questions have arisen. First, is there any clear argument from the New Testament that their writings were on par as the Old Testament scriptures?”
1.Let’s guard against false expectations. The NT writers already have the OT as their paradigm. So we wouldn’t necessarily expect them to explicitly claim inspiration. And that’s because they’re already writing in a sacred genre. They’re picking up where the OT left off. They’re downstream in that canonical tradition. They don’t have to repeat everything about themselves that OT writers say about themselves. Rather, their inspiration is a given, for the genre is inspired.
These are Jews, often writing for a Jewish audience. Even when they’re writing for Gentiles, their audience is expected to know it’s way around the OT. And to recognize the literary cues in the NT counterpart.
2.The restoration of prophecy was associated with the Messianic age, viz. John the Baptist, Pentecost, Lk 1-4 (e.g. Zechariah, Anna, Simeon).
3.If the new covenant is greater than the old covenant, would we expect the record of the old covenant to be inspired while the record of the new covenant is uninspired? The new covenant is the culmination of the old covenant.
4. For some specific evidence, see the following:
http://www.bible-researcher.com/warfield3.html
http://garyhabermas.com/articles/areopagus_jesusinspirationscripture/areopagus_jesusinspirationscripture.htm
“1 Peter 3:16 seems ambiguous, as ‘scripture’ there, can be taken as ‘word’ in the Greek.”
In NT usage, it’s a technical term for “scripture.”
“Whether that was referring to the OT seems debatable.”
It usually denotes the OT, but that’s a matter of context. Here it has reference to some of Paul’s letters.
“Regardless, how do we know what Peter is talking about all of Paul writing?”
It may not be talking about “all” of his letters, but that’s irrelevant. What’s germane is the writer, not the writing—in the sense that the character of the writing derives from the character of the writer. If Peter is putting Paul on par with OT writers, then his past, present, and future writings will be inspired.
“Is he talking about those books that will later be canonized?”
It's unnecessary to be that specific. It’s sufficient that if a writing is Pauline, then it’s inspired. And if it’s inspired, then any surviving epistle of Paul’s should be included in the canon. Writings of a certain genre automatically merit canonicity.
“If so (as it has been argued, though, seemingly irrational) why would he not inform his readers of those specific letters and not other letters of Paul that would not be canonized?”
i) Peter wouldn’t merely allude to these letters unless his readers already knew what he was talking about.
ii) Any surviving letter of Paul’s should be canonized. But Peter is in no position to know which letters would survive. Indeed, he didn’t know, at the time of writing, whether Paul would be composing any more letters. This objection is a red herring.
“Furthermore is seems that we would also have to presuppose that Peter thought that his own writings are 'God breathed' if we take that he is recommending Paul’s letters as 'God breathed'."
And what’s the problem with that presupposition? He was an apostle. He was a recipient of the charismatic promise which Christ made to the Apostolate at the Last Supper (Jn 14-16).
“Furthermore, why do we accept the canon as it is? It seems that we impose extra biblical methodology to discovering biblical authority. Doesn’t that negate biblical authority?”
There are both internal and external lines of evidence for the canon. Scripture is not opposed to extrascriptural evidence.
For example, the Bible contains many prophecies. These refer to real world events. To appreciate the fulfillment of prophecy, you have to connect a Scriptural oracle with an extrascriptural event.
When we form critical judgments on the basis of external evidence, we are judging by the evidence that God as providentially left at our disposal. If the evidence is misleading, God could have preserved a more representative sample of evidence.
“It just seems unclear how one can make a case for the New Testament, much less individual books.”
You can make a case for the NT canon on both internal and external grounds. For the moment, let’s confine ourselves to internal grounds.
i) Authorship
Authorship alone can be a sufficient criterion where it applies. If a book is by a certain kind of writer (e.g. an apostle), then it automatically merits canonization.
I’m not saying that only apostolic writings are canonical. Rather, I’m saying that if a writing is apostolic, you don’t need to look for an additional reason to include it in the canon.
Based on internal (as well as external) evidence, that already gives you 21 of the 27 books of the NT, viz. Matthew, John, Romans-Philemon, 1-2 Peter, 1-3 John, Revelation.
ii) Intertextuality
Don’t think of the 27 books of the NT as a miscellaneous collection of individual books. For there’s a great deal of cross-attestation in the NT. You can group various NT books in interlocking units or larger blocks of material:
i) Common authorship
Individual books by the same author obviously go together:
a) Luke-Acts
b) John, 1-3 John, Revelation
c) Romans-Philemon
d) 1-2 Peter
ii) Common speaker
A book by one author may refer to another author. Author B may be a speaker or historical figure in Author A.
a) Matthew-John>1-2 Peter; James; 1-3 John; Revelation
The gospels refer to Peter, James, and John. And we have writings by Peter, James, and John outside the gospels.
b) Luke>Paul
Luke refers to Paul.
c) Paul>Luke
Paul refers to Luke.
d) Paul>Peter, John
Paul refers to the Peter and John.
e) Peter>Paul
Peter refers to Paul.
f) Luke>Matthew
g) Mark>Matthew
h) Luke>John
i) Luke>Peter
j) Luke>James
k) Luke>Mark
l) Hebrews>Timothy
m) Paul>brothers of Jesus
(a)-(m) are forms of cross-attestation.
I’m not going to give you chapter and verse for all this. You can look it up yourself. I’m just giving you a way of thinking about how the NT writings are interconnected by writer, as one writer cross-references another.
iii) Common source
a) Matthew/Luke>Mark
According to the usual solution to the synoptic problem, Matthew and Luke made use of Mark. This is, among other things, a form of implicit attestation.
Different solutions to the synoptic problem are possible, but even if you rearrange the order of literary dependence, you still get a form of cross-attestation.
b) James>Jude
One is usually thought to be literarily dependent on the other. That’s a form of implicit attestation.
A lot of what I’ve said here could be amplified and fine-tuned. The main point is that the NT books bear witness to a close-knit social circle. You can trace that out in detail. Writings go with writers, and writers go with other writers.
“To perhaps flush out my question with regards to inspiration and canonization, it would seem to me that that apostles did not know that what they were writing was inspired.”
Why do you take that position? I’m not saying that inspiration can’t operate at a subliminal level. But your statement is rather sweeping.
“Though I agree that it was, it seems that part of the inspiration process was the canonization process in which certain books were approved and some were not.”
This statement is potentially misleading. On the one hand, there were probably some inspired books which were never canonized, not because they were rejected, but because they didn’t survive.
On the other hand, the surviving NT books are the only live options we have. The NT apocrypha is obviously pseudepigraphical, given their 2C (or later) date of composition.
“Now, let me clarify with a better question to not confuse you. Were the rough draft copies of Luke, for example, inspired? Or did he write a rough draft, scratched it, wrote another rough draft, scratched it, and then wrote what we have today and said ‘Ah ha! This is inspired.’ Do you understand my point?”
To take a real-life comparison, the Book of Jeremiah is an anthology of his oracles, and it includes earlier “draft” editions of his oracles. He would collate his oracles up to a certain point in time. Then, after he delivered another batch of oracles, he would incorporate these in a revised and expanded edition. I wouldn’t be surprised if Baruch compiled the final “collected prophecies” of Jeremiah.
So I see no reason why inspiration cannot or did not apply to an earlier edition—whether by Jeremiah or Luke.
“Were the other letters of Paul (those that we do not have) inspired as well?”
Inspiration is a property of a writing because it’s a property of the writer. So, yes, his “lost letters” would also be inspired.
“They seemed to have circulated to the church's. So was the understanding of the writings at that time different than our understanding today?”
You seem to be assuming that a writing wouldn’t survive because it wasn’t deemed to be inspired or worthy of canonization, in the estimation of the church.
But there’s no reason to jump to that conclusion. To survive, a letter would have to circulate in enough *copies* so that while a number of copies (as well as the original) would be lost to the ravages of time, a sufficient number would last long enough to be recopied, and so on and so forth.
The NT church didn’t have a printing press. Not every Pauline church would necessarily have a scribe on call.
The Pauline epistles are occasional writings, dealing with the particular needs of particular churches. Some of these letters would be of more enduring value to posterity than others. So, in the providence of God, some letters survived while others, due to their topicality, were allowed (by God) to perish.
Saturday, September 15, 2007
The Jesus Legend
I'm in the process of reading The Jesus Legend (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2007) by Paul Rhodes Eddy and Gregory Boyd. It argues for the historicity of the view of Jesus presented in the Synoptic gospels. It interacts with liberal scholarship in general, but also responds to some of the less popular elements of liberal scholarship, such as Robert Price and others who are skeptical of Jesus' existence. I'm only about 80 pages into it, but if the remainder of the book is as good as what I've read so far, it's one of the best books I've seen arguing for the traditional Christian view of Jesus. You can read the endorsements from Richard Bauckham, Craig Keener, and other scholars on the amazon.com page, under the "From the Back Cover" heading. They also allow you to search the book, so you can read some portions of it online. The book is around 450 pages long, and it's heavily footnoted, so it's going to take me a while to read through it, but I want to direct people's attention to it now. I recommend getting it.
Friday, September 14, 2007
Elective reincarnation
“At 72, the Dalai Lama, who has lived in India since 1959, is beginning to plan his succession, saying that he refuses to be reborn in Tibet so long as it's under Chinese control.”
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20227400/site/newsweek/
So the Dalai Lama can decide where or where not to be reborn. This raises a number of logistical questions.
How far up the Buddhist ladder of enlightenment must you progress before you have the clout to dictate the location of your next reincarnation? Does Steven Segal have a piece of the action?
And how, exactly, do you go about booking reservations for the next life? Is there a switchboard that you can call? Does it have a toll-free number, or is the number unlisted? In any event, it sounds like a long distance call.
Still, it would be useful to have the number on speed-dial just in case you see an 18-wheeler accidentally cross the median and continue in your direction. (This would also be a really bad time for dropped calls.)
And suppose there are no vacancies. I mean, what if I want to be reborn in Monte Carlo, and a number of other Tibetan monks want to be reborn in Monte Carlo? Can I bump one of them—or vice versa? Is there a standby system in case somebody cancels his metempsychotic reservations? Is there a surcharge for last-minute cancellations or no-shows?
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20227400/site/newsweek/
So the Dalai Lama can decide where or where not to be reborn. This raises a number of logistical questions.
How far up the Buddhist ladder of enlightenment must you progress before you have the clout to dictate the location of your next reincarnation? Does Steven Segal have a piece of the action?
And how, exactly, do you go about booking reservations for the next life? Is there a switchboard that you can call? Does it have a toll-free number, or is the number unlisted? In any event, it sounds like a long distance call.
Still, it would be useful to have the number on speed-dial just in case you see an 18-wheeler accidentally cross the median and continue in your direction. (This would also be a really bad time for dropped calls.)
And suppose there are no vacancies. I mean, what if I want to be reborn in Monte Carlo, and a number of other Tibetan monks want to be reborn in Monte Carlo? Can I bump one of them—or vice versa? Is there a standby system in case somebody cancels his metempsychotic reservations? Is there a surcharge for last-minute cancellations or no-shows?
Thursday, September 13, 2007
Sincere Offer Polemics
I take it as undisputed that: if you tell someone the truth, you've been sincere or genuine with them.
What is the "offer of the Gospel?" Put simply: Romans 10:9 if you confess with your mouth that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.
The argument is frequently stated that "If you're a 5-point Calvinist then you believe in limited atonement, thus you cannot make a sincere offer of the Gospel."
Before an answer is given, let's note something about conditionals. A conditional statement is, "an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false. For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true."
So a conditional statement, taken as a whole statement, has a true truth value just in case the consequent is not false while the antecedent is true. To use the above example, if I say If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down, then I have made a true statement, irregardless of whether or not I in fact throw the ball into the air or not.
Therefore, going back to the issue at hand, since it is impossible for someone who believes to not be saved, then when we tell anyone that "if you confess with your mouth that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved," then we have told that person the truth. As I said above, I take it as axiomatic that "if you tell someone the truth, you have been sincere with them." Thus we can make the argument:
1) If you tell someone the truth, you have been sincere with them.
2) When a Calvinist makes a Gospel offer to anyone he is telling that person the truth.
3) Therefore, when a Calvinist makes a Gospel offer to anyone, he has been sincere with them.
Thus Calvinism has no problem with "the sincere offer of the Gospel."
What is the "offer of the Gospel?" Put simply: Romans 10:9 if you confess with your mouth that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.
The argument is frequently stated that "If you're a 5-point Calvinist then you believe in limited atonement, thus you cannot make a sincere offer of the Gospel."
Before an answer is given, let's note something about conditionals. A conditional statement is, "an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false. For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true."
So a conditional statement, taken as a whole statement, has a true truth value just in case the consequent is not false while the antecedent is true. To use the above example, if I say If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down, then I have made a true statement, irregardless of whether or not I in fact throw the ball into the air or not.
Therefore, going back to the issue at hand, since it is impossible for someone who believes to not be saved, then when we tell anyone that "if you confess with your mouth that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved," then we have told that person the truth. As I said above, I take it as axiomatic that "if you tell someone the truth, you have been sincere with them." Thus we can make the argument:
1) If you tell someone the truth, you have been sincere with them.
2) When a Calvinist makes a Gospel offer to anyone he is telling that person the truth.
3) Therefore, when a Calvinist makes a Gospel offer to anyone, he has been sincere with them.
Thus Calvinism has no problem with "the sincere offer of the Gospel."
For Us and for Our Salvation
For Us and for Our Salvation: The Doctrine of Christ in the Early Church by Stephen J. Nichols
Read the Introduction & Chapter 1.
Read the Introduction & Chapter 1.
Endorsements: “In a world where the biblical depiction of Christ is often distorted or denied, this book serves as a tremendous defense of orthodox Christian belief. But its value is more than just apologetic. Its Christ-centered focus makes For Us and for Our Salvation a recommended read for anyone who wants a clear picture of the Savior.” - John F. MacArthur, Pastor-Teacher, Grace Community Church, Sun Valley, California
“With clarity and brevity, Stephen Nichols presents the intriguing development of the doctrine of Christ over the early centuries of the church. His account of the key councils and theological proposals is written in a very simple and readable style, and the reader is made aware of how much was at stake ‘for us and for our salvation’ in these very crucial debates.” - Bruce A. Ware, Professor of Christian Theology, Senior Associate Dean, School of Theology, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
“By interweaving original sources and explanatory chapters, Nichols has given us a genre of historical theology that is both informative and interesting.” - Millard Erickson, Distinguished Professor of Theology, Western Seminary, Portland
Southern (Baptist) Gentlemen
Tom Ascol said, Paige Patterson once told him:
"I have learned what I would never have imagined to be true--that so many Southern Baptist pastors are cowards." He went on to explain that a common refrain he was hearing went like this: "I am with you, brother. I believe in inerrancy and think we need to take a stand, but because of my position, I am not able to come out and speak on this openly."
I'd like to add something to Dr. Ascol's statement here.
I find it rather ironic, if not frankly hypocritical, that those who would agree to these statements then would do something else now when talking about Calvinism in the SBC. In the standard anti-Calvinist sermon or "white paper" that we hear or read seemingly every few months, we inevitably hear about "certain seminaries," "professors," "young men and women," "some churches," and other like comments. No names are mentioned. Jack Graham did this in sermon a couple of years ago as I recall. I think Nelson Price has made similar comments in recent months.
I've said this before - I come from the generation that was told frequently from the pulpit that we shouldn't be afraid to point out error and name names. However, when we do so we are told we are wearing our Calvinism on our sleeves or are not acting like "gentlemen" by naming names.
This leads me to a few more thoughts.
First,
1. As a matter of principle, should we always avoid a harsh, judgmental tone?
2. Assuming an affirmative answer to (1), are there times when (1) is inappropriate.
I'd answer both in the affirmative.
My problem is with the imposition of an unscriptural speech code (eg. 1), as if Christians should always use the same tone with everyone, and that tone should always be sweet and buttery.
To insist on such a speech code is unscriptural legalism—trying to be more pious than the Bible. We've been over this many times on this blog. Being a Christian or calling yourself a Christian does not mean we use a sweet buttery tone or language. Likewise, if you are a chronic liar - and this is demonstrable, it is not out of bounds to refer to you as a chronic liar. There's a purpose there - not to denigrate you - but get your attention. Implicitly, it's a call for you to correct your misrepresentations and/or repent of your behavior.
Second, to the matter of "gentlemanly" speech. What I think this most often means isn't so much, as Steve (Yankee that he is ... sorrry Steve, it's just a fact), the effeminization of Christian behavior, rather, in the South, it's the way modern Southerners express themselves. Let's face it, in the South, we say, "Bless your heart, "and we really mean, "Go to hell." We say one thing and do another, often to maintain a certain appearance of decorum. Southern English can the language of ignorance, like Gomer Pyle, or the language of seduction, like Gone With the Wind, all in the same breath.
However, is this the way our ancestor Southern Baptists acted? No.
Allow me to recount a couple of stories from Baptist history to illustrate.
R.B.C. Howell was one of the greatest leaders of the early SBC. Howell helped found the Convention. He founded The Baptist, today known as The Tennessee Baptist and Reflector, Tennessee’s state Baptist newspaper. He was SBC President from 1851 – 1859, serving also as president of the FMB, the Bible Board, and the First Sunday School Board. He was, like the other Founders, a “Five-Point” Calvinist, affirming simple worship, the providence of God, church discipline, and the universal preaching of the gospel. Howell also believed the unity of the Convention was necessary if it was going to survive. In 1857, after pastoring in Virginia, First Baptist Nashville urged Howell to return.
Howell had first come to First Baptist Nashiville after the church had been ravaged by the Campbellites. Under his leadership, they rebuilt their church and even found a new building, for the old one had been lost. When Howell returned, he and J.R. Graves butted heads almost immediately. This time, the controversy was over the Southern Baptist Publication Society.
Graves had been using his own company, the rival Southern Baptist Sunday School Union to compete with the Publication Society. Howell openly opposed Graves efforts. This led to high drama, for the two men were in the same church!
On September 28, 1858, two members of First Baptist Nashville called for Graves to be tried in a church court for slandering the pastor, for sowing division, for libeling Southern Baptist leaders in his newspaper, and for uttering falsehoods in nine different specifications. On October 12, Graves demanded the charges be dropped. The church voted 91 to 48 to proceed with the trial. In nine meetings in which Graves was not present and not represented, he was found guilty and excluded from the church.
Graves refused the discipline of his local church (contrary to his own ecclesiology) and 46 of his followers declared that First Baptist Nashville was not a valid church and they were the one true First Baptist Church. Later, they took the name State Street Baptist. Graves then proceeded to use his influence in Tennessee Convention to exclude First Baptist Nashville from having its messengers seated. His bid was successful. He further called a meeting of Concord Association in March 1858 to overthrow the actions of First Baptist Nashville. In so doing, he violated his own ecclesiology which affirmed absolute local church autonomy.
Now obviously quite proud of himself, he decided he would repeat his victories at the next Southern Baptist Convention in Richmond. He also decided he would confront Howell.
The Richmond Convention of 1859, however, had different ideas. They seated the messengers of Graves’ church and those from First Baptist Nashville. The Convention messengers then elected Howell SBC President on the first ballot. Furthermore, after a full day of debate over whether or not to close the FMB, in which Graves spoke at length, the Convention refused to close it. Graves attempted to take the power to choose, appoint, direct, support, and examine missionaries from the FMB based on the notion that only churches or associations should engage in these activities. The Convention’s vote was unanimous.
They did agree to help those churches wishing to appoint their own missionaries. Howell resigned the presidency in order to promote unity. This would set a pattern, for, when Landmarkists intersected with the Convention in matters of missions, they were refused. This also set another precedent. Since that time, churches may affiliate themselves with any level of the denomination. Churches not members of their own state conventions may be members of the SBC and vice versa. Notice that names were named, but nobody objected to it. The objections were rather consistently the libelous nature of what was said. It's fine to name them, just don't lie about it in the process.
Before the Howell-Graves controversy, while Waller and Graves were arguing at each other in their respective newspapers, what started out as a conflict of personalities in Georgia took on a theological dimension. The personalities involved read like a “Who’s Who” of Baptist history. They were Patrick Hues Mell, John L. Dagg, and Nathan Crawford at Mercer. This conflict had both immediate and long term effects on Landmarkism. On the one hand the discussion highlighted the growing conflict over Landmark ecclesiology; on the other, in the midst of this, Dr. Dagg would refine his ecclesiology and refute Landmarkism quite soundly in his Manual of Theology.
In 1854, Dr. Dagg resigned from the presidency of Mercer at the age of sixty, because he believed the work had become burdensome. The trustees acceded to his request but asked him to stay on as Professor of Theology. The trustee’s public statement explained Dr. Dagg’s resignation was due to his failing health.
This was the day when Southern men considered such a claim, if untrue, to be akin to questioning one’s manhood or honor. Moreover, Dr. Dagg’s eyes failed in 1824. He was functionally blind with respect to his ability to write, having to rely on an amanuensis or avail himself of a board he had invented for himself and the help of his wife, who dotted “i’s” and crossed “t’s” for him. He fully admitted that he regarded his infirmities the chief trial from the Lord, although inscribed with love from Him. Dr. Dagg had not cited health reasons for his resignation, so Dr. Dagg protested, and the ensuing disagreement caused division between the faculty and the board. Dr. Dagg requested the faculty testify to the board in his favor. All of them except Nathan Crawford complied with his request. The board then decided to select a new president. Their candidates were P.H. Mell and Crawford.
The faculty opposed Crawford, but Crawford was elected to the presidency. Mell and Crawford’s relationship soured to the point that the two men, who lived across they way from one another, did not speak. Friction between the faculty and trustees continued to grow.
In 1855, Professors Dagg, Hilyer, Mell, and Crawford all left Mercer. They were eventually persuaded to return, unitl Crawford resigned again and charged Mell with the vague charge of acting with hostility toward the president. After meeting in October, the board voted to remove Mell. Dr. Dagg left in 1856, as did Hilyer, and, in a supreme twist of irony, Crawford left to Mississippi.
One could easily write off these events as foreshadowing the high drama of the 20th century prime time soap operas, little more than a conflict of personalities. However, these men are regarded as “Baptist Fathers,” regarded by Southern Baptists very like the Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers to whom the Roman Catholic Church appeals. For this reason alone, one should take a second look. The conflict between these men went deeper than personalities and offended honor, for they differed over ecclesiology.
Crawford was a Landmarkist. In Baptism: Its Mode and Subjects, Mell asserted that believers in other denominations were Christians and their ministers were validly recognized as ministers of the gospel. Landmarkists believed only local churches, naturally Baptist churches, could validly ordain ministers. Ergo, only Baptist ministers were valid ministers in their view.
Landmarkists like Graves and Pendleton, and now Crawford, insisted that the New Testament uses the word “ecclesia” in only one sense, with reference to local congregations.
Pendleton wrote:
If Pedobaptist societies are not churches of Christ, whence do their ministers derive their authority to preach? Is there any scriptural authority to preach which does not come through a church of Christ? And if Pedobaptist ministers are not in Christian churches, have they any right to preach? That is to say, have they any authority according to the gospel? They are doubtless authorized by the forms and regulations of their respective societies. But do they act under evangelical authority? It is perfectly evident to the writer that they do not. It would be strange indeed for them to act under a commission, some of the injunctions of which they utterly disregard. The ordinance of baptism in its action and subject they pervert. They change the order of the ascending Savior’s last commission, and administer what they call baptism to infants who give no proof of discipleship, and who are naturally incapable of going through the process of discipleship. Are we at liberty to bid those men "God speed" and aid them in deceiving the world, by acknowledging their societies as churches, and themselves as veritable gospel ministers, who invert the order established by the Head of the church?
Would Pedobaptists recognize as a minister of Christ a good man whom they consider unbaptized, and consequently disconnected from what they would term every "branch of the church?" They would not. They would say to such a man, "We would not judge your heart—we do not deny your piety, etc., but we cannot countenance you as a preacher as long as you remain unbaptized and sustain no ecclesiastical relation." This is in substance what they would say, and I ask if Baptists should not look on Pedobaptist ministers just as the latter would look on unbaptized men who might choose to go forth and preach? If Pedobaptists are unwilling to recognize as ministers of the gospel men who, in their judgment, have never been baptized, why should Baptists be expected to do so? Consistency, so far from requiring it, requires the very opposite. Pedobaptists cannot reasonably complain of us, for in this we act on the principle which their practice sanctions. Believing their preachers unbaptized, we cannot with the shadow of propriety recognize them as gospel ministers. If Jesus Christ intended that his ministers should be the servants of the church—and have the sanction of the church in their work—who can be a minister of Christ, according to the gospel, without belonging to the church? No one will say that a church can send forth a man to preach who does not belong to her body, and over whom she has no jurisdiction. The writer does not say there are not pious, devoted men in the Pedobaptist ministry, but he denies that they have scriptural authority to preach. He denies in reference to them just what they would deny in reference to a pious Quaker minister. The so-called baptism of a Pedobaptist preacher is no more authority for preaching than the no-baptism of a Quaker. The former is as evidently out of the church as the latter. It is as well to discard an ordinance altogether as to pervert and caricature it. Neither Pedobaptists nor Quakers have baptism among them, and "where there is no baptism there are no visible churches."
Now, if Pedobaptist preachers do not belong to the church of Christ, they ought not to be recognized as ministers of Christ. But they are so recognized wherever Baptist ministers invite them to preach or exchange pulpits with them. As to calling on them to pray, it is a different matter; for men ought to pray whether they are in the church or not. But they ought not to preach unless they have membership in the church of Christ. To this all will agree, who have scriptural baptism, as well as those who substitute it for that which is no baptism.
Mell insisted that the New Testament traded on the use in two senses, essentially accusing the Landmarkists of committing the fallacies of semantic inflation and semantic anachronism. Mell said that the New Testament refers to the church as the whole body of believers in heaven and earth at any point in history and as a local assembly. In his volume Corrective Church Discipline: With Development of the Scriptural Principles Upon Which It is Based (1846), Mell again refuted the Landmark tenets on the same grounds.
Crawford responded in his review of Corrective Church Discipline by A.S. Worrell. Crawford seems to have taken Mell’s work personally, as he says in his introduction that Mell’s work motivated his review of Worrelll’s book. Crawford attacked Mell’s definition of the church, insisting it refers only to the local assembly. Mell had also insisted that the actions of one Baptist church were binding on another. Crawford insisted on local church autonomy. In his own Manual of Theology, published in 1858, Dr. Dagg disagreed with Crawford and generally agreed with Mell’s definition of the church, but he further agreed with Crawford and disagreed with Mell on the autonomy of the local church, but denies that local churches are completely independent of each other. He views that as an ideal if all men are sanctified and living rightly, but, unless the churches are connected in some manner, there is no way to adjudicate division. There are cases, because we live in a fallen world, that outside help must be sought. This does not, however, mean that the actions of one church are binding upon another. For elsewhere, he argues that, in matters in which two local churches disagree, as in the case of baptisms, no one church may impose its answer to a difficult case on another, regardless of the position each church takes, as long as that position is based on reasonable evidence and appropriate argumentation. Dagg’s work would have long lasting influence, for it became a standard reference for those opposed to Landmarkism.
Even after Mell’s dismissal, the controversy engulfed the Georgia State Convention. Perhaps foreshadowing the rise of blogs in the 21st century as a means to present “the other side of the story” Mell wrote An Exposition of Recent Events In Mercer University, which he made available to all, in which he accused the trustees of having unjustly removed him without giving him an opportunity to defend his actions. He also detailed what he perceived as a personal conflict with Crawford going back as far as 1855. Mell further questioned the board’s actions, stating that barely a quorum was present and the charge of hostility to the president was vague and non-specific. Absent specific charges, Mell refused to believe he had been discharged with just cause. He further insisted that there could be only one basis for his dismissal, Crawford’s resignation. He complained he had not been allowed to face his accuser. Mell charged the board with conducting an unethical caucus among themselves in an effort to decide their verdict beforehand, without giving him a reasonable, impartial hearing.
Mell stated his pamphlet was intended as a public record of these events. As a result, the Georgia Convention was forced to intervene. They appointed a committee to investigate the matter in 1856. Later, they concluded the trustees decision should stand, but not in a manner that would impugn Mell’s good character. Mell went on to be offered the presidencies of Mississippi College in Clinton, Mississippi and Cherokee Baptist College in Cassville, Georgia. He declined both offers in order to serve the churches. Later, he taught languages at the University of Georgia, where he later served as president. He remained there for the rest of his life, despite repeated attempts by other colleges and universities to get him to teach or preside over their institutions. He was also a staunch defender of the faith, especially against those who attacked the doctrines of grace and made it their goal to exterminate Calvinism from the earth. When discussing Russell Reneau, who made it his business to exterminate Calvinism from the earth, Mell regarded such individuals as both arrogant and vain. Reneau was the perennial anti-Calvinist. Referring to Reneau (and one would say foreshadowing every anti-Calvinist who has spoken in recent history), Mell wrote in Predestination and the Saints' Perseverance, “"Calvinism has never heard of him before, and if its advocates ever think of him hereafter it will never be in a connection flattering to his vanity."
We could on and on. One need only read a standard theological work, newspaper article, or pamphlet of that era to know they named names and documented their charges. If an assertion was "libelous" it was exposed. This isn't simply a "Baptist thing" either. The theologians of the High Orthodox era in the previous centuries named names too. The Presbyterians of the 19th century did so as well. Granted they often named representative theologians - but they still named names, and that's the point.
As Tom Ascol once said, on the one hand we are excoriated for wearing our Calvinism on our sleeves. On the other, if we don't come right out and say it, we're told we are being deceptive. We were told we should not be cowards, but if we name names, we are "sowing division" or "being disrespectful." Such accusations say more about the accusers than they do us. The younger leaders in the SBC (and even in the Independent churches), not just Calvinists, but in general are feeling the same way about many things these days. We were told to take the Bible seriously. We were told to stick to the Bible. We were told to name names and not be cowardly. However, when we speak out about our theological conclusions and they are different than those of the older generations, as in the case of the doctrines of grace, and we reply that we believe as we do because of what we have found in the Scriptures - the way Luther, Bucer, Zwingli, et. al. once did - we are excoriated from pulpits. Our names are not named by men who told us to name names, but then when we do so ourselves - as we were told to do when we were younger - we are accused of sowing division. This is sad; we should be able to comport ourselves in a "gentlemanly" fashion as did our forefathers in all of these matters.
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