Stop Being So Deferential To Christine Ford

Republicans and other supporters of Brett Kavanaugh need to stop being so deferential to Christine Ford. The evidence still suggests that she's been lying about Kavanaugh's alleged assault on her and other, related matters. The verisimilitude of her facial expressions, tone of voice, and such at the hearings yesterday is far outweighed by the other evidence suggesting her untrustworthiness. As David French noted in an article yesterday that, unfortunately, is too deferential to Ford:

Moreover, we also often have this mystical faith in our own ability to discern the truth by examining tone, demeanor, and likeability. She was “real.” He’s been “wooden.” These things impact us far more than we’d like to admit. Yet if there is one thing we know from our modern re-examinations of the impact of witness testimony on case outcomes, our faith in ourselves is deeply misplaced. We’re not very good at determining who’s correct and who’s mistaken by watching people talk. That’s one reason why innocent people go to prison, including for rape….

She has made her claim, there are no corroborating witnesses. No one else can place the two of them together at the party — not even the witnesses she’s identified. She is inconsistent or forgetful on a number of key points. She can’t even identify who brought her to the party or who took her home. He’s denied the claims and will deny them again.

That’s thin — very thin — evidence of sexual assault. The evidence is no stronger this afternoon than it was before Dr. Ford testified. When this controversy began, I said that her claims were serious enough that, if true, Kavanaugh should not be confirmed. Further, I said [that] she should only have to carry the lowest burden of proof — to establish that her claims were more likely than not. If you step back, look at the totality of the evidence and consider that she has brought no new evidence to the committee, I still don’t believe she has met that minimal burden.

For those who think the verisimilitude of Ford's testimony yesterday equals or outweighs the evidence against her claims, how do you explain the verisimilitude of Kavanaugh's testimony later in the hearing? We can think of possible scenarios in which both individuals are sincere (drunkenness distorting memories, etc.). But the issue is what's probable, not what's possible, and these alternative scenarios have problems of their own. The explanation that best fits the totality of the evidence is that Ford has been lying. Stop being so deferential to her, especially when she just recently has been caught making so many dubious claims, repeatedly contradicting herself, acting as if she doesn't have certain political motives that the evidence suggests she does have, etc.

Are Perceptions Totally Subjective?

Zilch recently attempted to link the atheistic subjectivity of the concept of meaning to the proposed subjectivity of perception by stating (emphasis his):

I think you would agree that perception is "subjective" by your definition: my seeing a red hat, for instance, does not mean that you see a red hat: it is solely my perception. Of course, given the same or similar conditions, we might have similar perceptions, just as we might assign similar meanings to, say, the sight of a car veering off toward a group of deaf students. But my perception is in my mind, and does not affect your perception in your mind, unless I communicate it to you in some way.

The problem with that is perception is not solely in your mind at all (unless you do believe in the brain-in-a-vat theory). Indeed, if you perceived something that was only in your mind, that would be the definition of a delusion, wouldn't it?

The only way you can link perception and meaning is if you agree that objects have something that makes them meaningful in and of themselves. That is, meaning has to be objective in some way.

Consider it. We see a red hat. Even if the concept of "redness" is different for you than for me (that is, suppose that you see as the color "red" as what I see as the color "green") the fact remains that the object that we see exists and it exists in such a way that it absorbs all light except for that which we both perceive. That our perceptions are different is irrelevant here. After all, the object emits color X. The fact that your "red" is different from my "red" is irrelevant, because X itself is always labeled "red." The objective nature of X remains the same regardless of what we perceive.

But your idea of "meaning" is in no way similar at all. In atheism, objects do not exist with "meaning" attached to them in any way. There is no property "X" that conforms to "meaning" which we both perceive. Meaning is completely manufactured by you, and by you alone. Meaning totally exists within your subjective sphere and never shall depart it.

So your illustration is disanalogous.

I also find it interesting that you add: "unless I communicate it to you in some way." How can you communicate something that is completely subjective? Communication can only occur if you have ideas that transcend individuals, but that requires an objective sense for them. In the color example, the fact that X is objective allows us to communicate X to one another. We give X a specific label: "red." It doesn't matter how we perceive that, each of us labels our perception of X as "red" and therefore communication results.

In order to talk about meaning, you have to have an objective concept of meaning in place; but in your atheism, you've already said that meaning is itself completely subjective. It doesn't exist in the object, but in the "meaner." It is therefore impossible to communicate it.

Consider this: we can communicate colors because we link them to an objective fact. But suppose again that what I see as "red" you see as "green." This is a literal fact for the purposes of argument. But how do we communicate this to one another?

We cannot. I don't have access to your perception, so I can never compare it to what I perceive. All I have access to is what the object emits, and we both conventionally use the same label for that. So if our perceptions are different here, it is impossible for us to say they are different. I can never know that when you see color X that is labeled “red” you actually see what I call “green”, because I don’t have your perception.

In fact, the only way to determine that another's perceptions are actually different from ours is if they are unable to distinguish between the objective qualities of the object. For instance, my father is color-blind. He cannot see the color red at all. The problem for him arises not in the perceptual area, but instead in the objective area. That is, one object emits a color B and we call it "blue" and another emits the color P and we call it "purple." My father, who does not see the red in purple, says that B = P because to him both are "blue." We can tell this is wrong because we can see that B is NOT the same as P; there is a difference that he cannot see.

We know the problem not because we have access to his perceptions, but because we have access to the objects themselves. Thus, perception has an objective quality to it.

Meaning, however (according to your own stated views) does not have this objective quality at all. It is therefore impossible for atheists to talk about meaning at all, because meaning can never escape the subjective in atheism.

Touchstone's Subjective Objective in Being Objectively Subjective

The nice thing about asking T-Stone questions is that before I ask them I already know both the manner in which he will respond (obliquely, at best) as well as the fact that he would never pause to consider the reason why I asked the questions I did. As such, T-Stone is actually quite easy to "lead" to a specific area, which was the reason I asked the questions I did.

For instance, I originally asked:

How is it possible for you to even determine that you have a filter that needs corrected in the first place?

T-Stone responded:

If you are asking how can I determine *for certain* that I have such a filter, I can't.

But he then said:

Contradictory accounts of the same event suggest that a) either we weren't witnessing the same event in the first place, or b) one or more (or all) of us has an interpretation of the event that is at odds with what actually happened.

Given the choices of a) and b), b) seems more plausible (emphasis added).

The problem with this is that in order to determine plausibility in any meaningful way, you have to know what things ought to be normal. In other words, for T-Stone to say that b) is more plausible than a), he must know that reality more closely corresponds to b) than to a). In saying which is more “plausible”, T-Stone is smuggling in an objectivist claim.

Similarly, T-Stone continued:

A unified reality with various amounts of distortion in the perceptions of observers would explain the contradictions more naturally than some sort of "personal universes" or "multiple histories" view that maintains the perfection of the observer's perception, and instead messes with the underlying reality to resolve the contradictions (emphasis added).

T-Stone says that accepting his view is “more natural” than other views. This is therefore an objectivist claim. Likewise, he argues that these opposing views “[mess] with the underlying reality to resolve the contradictions.” But in order for T-Stone to know that these view “mess” with this “underlying reality” he is first required to know what the underlying reality is. Again, while claiming to be subjective, he’s engaging in objectivist claims.

This is most obvious in his answer to my question, “You are assuming that you have a subjective filter. Why? Because 'everyone' does?" In response, he says:

Simply because this assumption has proven the most effective for me as a model of the real world (emphasis added).

This statement simply cannot be made subjectively. There is no “subjective” way to determine that an assumption has proven effective, nor that it models “the real world” unless you know what the real world is. T-Stone’s argument requires him to have objective knowledge of the universe in order for him to make his subjective claim.

Naturally, T-Stone may simply reply, “It is only my subjective opinion that it would be more natural to believe what I do, or that it would model the real world accurately, etc.” But note A) T-Stone does not speak as if this is his mere opinion; he speaks using objectivist language while saying we ought to read it as if he applies a subjectivist disclaimer before he says it (but that subjectivist disclaimer refutes his very argument, which is why he never explicitly states it!); and B) if it really is just his subjective appeal all the way down, T-Stone’s denial of objective reality is based on a position of pure fideism. It is T-Stone’s belief that this is the case. There is no underlying basis for his position other than T-Stone’s bare faith. This is, indeed, the very definition of blind faith. He merely believes because he wants to believe, not because there is any reason for him to believe.

T-Stone also said:

I don't know for certain that Abraham Lincoln will not show up on my door tomorrow.

This is the silly sort of thing that T-Stone is reduced to stating because of how hard he must grasp at subjectivity. The fact of the matter is that he does know “for certain” that Abraham Lincoln will not show up at his door tomorrow. He only says he doesn’t know this “for certain” because if he said those two magic words, he’d be committing himself to an objectivist position.

But even not saying those two magic words, T-Stone has still committed himself to an objectivist position, for he has said that reality is objectively such that it he cannot be certain that Abraham Lincoln won’t show up at his porch tomorrow. In saying that he cannot rule out the possibility, he is saying that it is objectively the case that Honest Abe could possibly do this; and he can only know that Abe could possibly do this if he is making an objective statement about reality. Of course, T-Stone hasn’t considered this because he doesn’t really believe it. His subjectivity claims are merely to avoid having to argue for his position (remember, he only has bare fideism—and irrationalism—for his position).

To be fair to T-Stone, he did get close to the truth here:

But I have no experience available to me, no precedent, for the re-appearance of a long dead American President. I can't be certain that it can't or won't happen, but I have no empirical basis to suggest that it will.

I remind T-Stone that I originally asked him:

Is it reasonable for you to couch all your truth claims in subjectivist language, or is it instead reasonable to assert dogmatically that reality is what you think it is because you have no reason to think otherwise?

While I disagree with T-Stone’s empiricism in his above quote, I point out that the existence of it ought to lead T-Stone to an objective position rather than a position of subjective doubt. It is unreasonable to doubt everything. Again, my original post on radical skepticism dealt with this.

T-Stone finishes:

Hey, why am I answering all these questions you offer, when you won't answer the few that I've put to you?

Firstly, how am I supposed to know the inner workings of an irrational mind in or to answer the question of why you do anything? :-P Secondly, I have answered your relevant questions. Thirdly, if you’re referring to the definitions of subjective and objective (as is implied by your previous comments), it’s not like I’ve never provided a definition for them. Look at almost any one of my interactions with Dawson for examples of this. I don’t see a need to continually repeat myself simply because you don’t read.

But if you insist, a basic definition is easy. Objective truth is truth that is dependent upon the object; subjective truth is dependent upon the subject. Objective truth is true regardless of what the subject thinks, dreams, imagines, believes, etc because it is based on the ontology of the object. Subjective truth can never leave the subject. It is confined to each individual subject. Therefore, it is impossible for a subjective truth to be true for more than one subject (even if two subjects hold the same proposition, it is not really the same proposition for the first subject’s proposition is only true for the first subject, etc.).