The "Canonical" text

There's a reactionary movement afoot in some Reformed circles to reject the mainstream NT textual criticism and modern translations like the ESV in favor of the Textus Receptus (hereafter TR) and the KJV. Recently there was a Text and Canon Conference which promoted that position. I generally avoid live presentations. That's an inefficient way to process and reference information. I have read a few articles by Jeff Riddle, but I'm going to use two posts by Taylor DeSoto as representative samples of the rationale for this position:

https://youngtextlessreformed.com/2019/10/28/memoirs-of-an-esv-onlyist-reflecting-on-the-text-and-canon-conference/

https://youngtextlessreformed.com/2019/10/29/revisiting-the-fatal-flaw-argument-against-the-traditional-text/

1. At one level, the significance of this issue is easily overblown. The text of the NT has enormous multiple-attestation. Even if you opt for the Byzantine text, there's not much that can go wrong. 

2. At another level, it is a big issue. What's at stake is convincing Christians to believe their faith hinges on a particular text tradition like the Byzantine or the TR. That's the "canonical" text. This leaves them poised for a gratuitous crisis of faith if they develop doubts about the TR. In this case, their faith in the Bible becomes inseparable from faith in the TR and the KJV. That's apostasy waiting to happen. DeSoto is going down exactly the same road as Bart Ehrman. The same all-or-nothing mentality. The same false dichotomies. 

3. Because we have so many copies of the Greek NT, copies with many, mostly trivial variants, it's important although not strictly necessary to produce a critical edition of the NT. That's not unique to proponents of the eclectic text. Astute proponents of the Byzantine text also appreciate the need to produce a critical edition of the NT, using internal and external textual criteria. For instance: http://rosetta.reltech.org/TC/v06/Robinson2001.html

4. I myself subscribe to mainstream textual criticism and the eclectic text approach. I don't have a firm opinion about CBGM. Certainly we should take advantage of computers to digitize our MSS, then compare them. Stanley Porter is a critic of CBGM. 

I'd add that it isn't necessary to choose between CBGM and traditional textual criticism. You can compare the results of both, and the reasoning behind their choices. Metzger's textual commentary explains how traditional text critics made their choices. And there will be a textual commentary for the CBGM edition when that project is completed. 

5. Opting for the Byzantine tradition would be more defensible than opting for the T.R. That's not my own position,  but there's a respectable argument for that alternative. 

6. From what I can tell, all the Reformed proponents of the TR and the KJV are dabblers and dilettantes. They have no formal expertise in textual criticism. In fairness, they might say the same thing about me. But that proves my point. I admit that I'm an amateur when it comes to OT/NT criticism. And I don't object to amateurs having opinions about range of specialized issues. I don't think we should abode unconditional confidence in the judgment of experts. 

But it's because I'm an amateur that I don't need to get my information from another amateur. If I want an amateur opinion about textual criticism, I can just consult my own opinion! 

By the same token, I don't get my information about biology and physics from amateurs. Rather, I study what the professionals have to say. I might still dissent on philosophical or theological grounds. Or I might dissent if I think their discipline has become politicized, which skews their assessment.   

This also goes beyond formal training. Some scholars like Bruce Metzger, Peter Williams, and Emanuel Tov have an exceptional skill set and natural aptitude that many scholars lack. 

Reformed proponents of the TR might also say that since mainstream NT criticism is so compromised, it's a good thing that they lack formal training in that discipline. But that begs the question. 

7. A basic problem with canonizing the KJV is that most Christians aren't English-speakers, most Christians were never English-speakers, and within the foreseeable future, most Christians won't be English-speakers. So it's absurdly ethnocentric. 

8. Another problem is that we have a better understanding of Greek and Hebrew than the KJV translators. We have a wider sampling of ancient Hebrew than they had. And we have a wider sampling of ancient Greek than they had. For instance, Greek papyri give us access to non-literary Greek. That gives us access to Greek slang or Greek words with slang meanings. In addition, computers enable us to make exhaustive comparisons in vocabulary and grammatical constructions.  

9. It's true that earlier MSS aren't necessarily better than later MSS. Obviously an 8C MS isn't automatically better than a 9C MS. But when we're talking about the NT papyri, I do think there's a presumption that earlier is better because they are so chronologically close to the Urtext.  

10. Reformed TR proponents operate with an arbitrary notion of divine providence regarding the preservation of the text. They act like special providence singles out the TR rather than the Byzantine text or the NT papyri or the DDS or Codex Vaticanus. But why would providence only extend to the preservation of the text in the TR? 

Likewise, the reason OT textual critics sometimes prefer the LXX to the MT is because the LXX translators had an earlier text than the Massoretes. So they had a text that might well preserve the original reading in some cases where the MT lost it.  

11. I'm no expert (something I share in common with Reformed TR proponents), but it seems to be that appeal to the Majority text is a statistical fallacy. If more MSS were produced by a particular locality, and more of those survive, that just means our extant MSS oversample a local textual tradition. Their numerical preponderance in itself creates no presumption that it's more representative. Rather, that may simply be a geographical and historical accident. So the larger sample is an arbitrary sample. The fact that we have a larger sample of that textual tradition is random in the sense that it's a coincidence of geography and the ravages of time. The Majority text may well be unrepresentative because a local textual tradition is overrepresented. 

12. It's often said that despite all the textual variants, the true reading is contained somewhere in our "5000" extant Greek MSS. But that bare statement can be misleading. This isn't like finding a needle in a haystack. It's not like our MSS are riddled with indetectable mistakes. 

i) Words are parts of sentences. If a scribe uses the wrong word, that usually makes the sentence nonsense. And it's easy to spot which word is messing up the sentence. Moreover, it's usually easy to figure out what the right word was, even if you only have that MS to go by.

We do this all the time. Email and text messages frequently contained recognizable typos, but we can usually figure out the intended word. 

ii) But suppose we can't figure out what the original word was. So we consult other MS. The right word isn't indetectable. If another MSS has the same sentence, but with a different word, and the sentence makes sense, then that's probably the authentic reading. 

ii) Suppose I have two independent editions of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer. Both editions contain typos. But they contain different typos. Suppose one edition contains a sentence with a typo, and I can't figure out the original word. So I consult the other edition, where the parallel sentence makes sense. So that probably preserves the original word. 

13. Opponents of the eclectic text allege that editors are "creating" the text. But that's deceptive. It doesn't mean they are inventing sentences. It just means they use more than one witness to the text. Since we know for a fact that scribes introduces changes into the text (usually inadvertently), we can't rely on a single MS as it stands. It's necessary to make corrections. And we do that by reference to other MSS. 

14. In general, biblical teaching is redundant. It doesn't hinge on one particular passage. Major doctrines are multiply-attested. The life of Christ is multiple-attested (four Gospels). 

15. The way Reformed TR advocates cling to the Long Ending of Mark is hypocritical. If they truly believe that's the original ending, then they ought to belong to charismatic, snake-handling churches. 

16. What does God require of us? To be faithful to the best text we have at our disposal. Surely he doesn't require us to be faithful to an unattainable word-perfect text. Even in the 1C, Christians copied originals. The originals were inerrant but the copies were not. 

Text & Canon Conference

https://www.aomin.org/aoblog/2019/11/03/text-and-canon-conference-initial-thoughts/

Is the Bible the final authority?

Recently I was asked to comment on this:

https://www.theaquilareport.com/bible-not-final-authority/

In fact, I already did:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2018/10/why-bible-is-not-final-authority.html

But since the same article was once again brought to my attention, I have a few additional observations to make:

i) Ball fails to distinguish between a final interpreter and a final authority. There's a sense in which every reader of the Bible or reader of a a Bible commentary is the ultimate interpreter for himself. That's unavoidable. He will find a particular interpretation plausible or implausible, convincing or unconvincing. But there's no reason to recast that in terms of making him "the authority". "Authority" has the connotation of having authority over another or others, not having authority over oneself. 

I suppose you could say "I'm my own authority," yet that just means no one else has authority over me in that regard. But collapsing authority into each individual isn't what we normally mean by authority, since that normally requires a distinction between the subject of authority and the object of authority. If we collapse the distinction, then the word "authority" does no work. It adds nothing to the concept. You could more accurately say "It boils down to what seems true to me". 

ii) Or we could reframe the issue by saying that I'm ultimately responsible–which is different from saying that I'm the ultimate authority. 

iii) In addition, the fact that every reader is the ultimate interpreter for himself doesn't mean interpretation is necessarily arbitrary. Moreover, it doesn't mean the interpretation overrides the text.

To take a comparison: suppose I live in tornado alley. If a tornado siren goes off, or if I see a news report about a tornado in my neighborhood, I have to interpret the warning, but the tornado remains sublimely independent of my interpretation. If I recklessly disregard the warning, I may pay a terrible price. In a contest between the "authority" of the tornado and the "authority" of the interpreter, guess who's going to be the "final authority"!

Likewise, although there's a sense in which every reader is the final interpreter (for himself), that doesn't make him the standard of comparison–anymore than my interpretation of the tornado siren is the standard of comparison. No, the tornado remains the standard of comparison. 

Likewise, the meteorologist must interpret information about the tornado, viz. speed, velocity, trajectory. But there's something external to the weather report, and that's the tornado itself. Does the report correspond to the behavior of the tornado? That's the test. The reporter is not the criterion. 

iv) At the end of the day, exegesis isn't autonomous. It depends on divine providence. While we might say it's up to the reader which interpretation he find persuasive, that only pushes the question back a step: why does he find that interpretation more persuasive? Sometimes because it's has more explanatory power. Sometimes because there's better evidence for that interpretation.

But in back of that is the will of God for particular individuals as well as church history in general. Every reader is at the mercy of God's benevolence and providence. God protects some readers from more error than others.  

Yet that's out of our hands, so that's not something we ought to fret over. What we think is the result of something anterior to ourselves. So our concern should be to make conscientious use of the best resources that God has put at our disposal, which varies from individual to individual. 

"Protestantism is not a church"

I'm going to comment on something by an Eastern Orthodox apologist:

https://blogs.ancientfaith.com/orthodoxyandheterodoxy/2017/10/31/protestantism-not-united-not-catholic-not-church/

The EO/evangelical debate is underdeveloped on both sides compared to traditional debates like the Catholic/Protestant debate, the Calvinist/Arminian debate, &c., because evangelicalism wasn't a contender in the East while EO wasn't a contender in the west. So it's useful to engage EO arguments from time to since since that's the trail less taken. I won't comment on everything he says because some of his objections are identical to Catholic objections, and I've discussed those ad nauseam. 

He's interacting with a document called “Reforming Catholic Confession”. I might agree with some of his criticisms, but that just means I disagree with how the “Reforming Catholic Confession” frames certain issues. I can disagree with both of them: Eastern Orthodoxy and the “Reforming Catholic Confession” alike. 

Cambridge Companion to Reformed Theology

The reviewer has more of a "Confessional Calvinist" mindset than I do. However, the reviewer makes some useful points:

http://www.meetthepuritans.com/blog/book-review-cambridge-companion-to-reformed-theology

Divine Condescension and the Attributes of God

WTS theology/systematics prof. Scott Oliphint is facing a heresy trial:

https://www.theaquilareport.com/a-charge-brought-against-dr-scott-oliphint-professor-of-apologetics-at-westminster-seminary/

A few brief observations:

i) I lack in-depth knowledge of Oliphint's theology. It's one of those situations where you read enough of somebody to make a preliminary judgment about whether it's worthwhile to read more of their stuff. From what I've read of him, Oliphint doesn't strike me as a high-level thinker, so I haven't bothered to deepen and broaden my familiarity with his writings. It's my impression, from what I've read, that he's out of his depth. So my knowledge of his theology is admittedly cursory. Life is short, so we make investment decisions about where to put our time. He has a son (Jared Oliphint) who strikes me as having a sharper mind than his old man. 

ii) Ironically, WTS has made it very impractical to have a detailed knowledge of Oliphint's position by withdrawing his controversial book from circulation, which makes remaining copies prohibitively expensive. Not that I don't buy expensive books, but for the price of that one book I could buy several different books that actually interest me. 

Parenthetically, I question the ethics of WTS buying the rights to the book from the publisher, like a product recall. Is that an appropriate use of seminary funds? Likewise, is it appropriate to conceal his position from public view and scrutiny by making the evidence inaccessible? 

iii) Here's an excerpt from his controversial book:

When Scripture says that God changes his mind, or that he is moved, or angered by our behavior, we should see that as literal. It refers us to God and to his dealings with us. It is as literal or as real as God being the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Scott Oliphiint, God with Us: Divine Condescension and the Attributes of God (Crossway 2011), 123-24.

In a way this seems to be readjudicating the Clark controversy. To judge by the excerpt, Oliphint is adopting Murray's position, but taking it to a logical extreme. It becomes similar to open theist hermeneutics. Assuming that's a representative sample, he's staking out a position more characteristic of freewill theism than Calvinism. Calvinism and freewill theism are competing theological paradigms. A position that rejects divine aseity, immutability, and impassibility is on the opposing side of the spectrum.  

Now Oliphint tries to nuance that, but the question is whether he's attempting to have it both ways. Can you have it both ways? I don't think so. 

iv) In fairness to Oliphint, this goes back to perennial debates about the relationship between exegetical theology and philosophical theology. The role of anthropomorphism and all that. Certainly there's a danger, and not just a hypothetical danger, of filtering biblical theism through an extraneous interpretive grid. Take debates over divine simplicity, or the way Aquinas glosses Exod 3:14. 

v) This becomes, in part, an issue of theological method. Do we interpret narrative theology in terms of what Scripture says about the divine attributes in more didactic genres? If there are passages which teach divine aseity, omnipotence, omniscience, and impassibility, then those are logically and literally irreconcilable with narrative or poetic passages that depict God as shortsighted, short-tempered, blindsided, reactionary, &c. Take passages about absolute predestination. Well, that can't be true if God is surprised by the turn of events or angered by the outcome.    

By the same token, the OT indictment of pagan polytheism loses most of its force if Yahweh is typical of the high gods in the pagan pantheon, the primary difference being that there's just one deity of that kind rather than many–who happens to be the God of Israel. 

To be the absolute Creator, God had to exist apart from time and space if time and space are modes of creation. If everything unfolds according to a master plan, then there's an asymmetrical relation between God and creation, where the world has no effect on God. The influence goes one way. That's not philosophical theology. Rather, that's exegetical theology. That's biblical creation, predestination, and providence. Of course, freewill theists demur, but that illustrates the competition between two incompatible approaches. Different reading strategies, divergent theological paradigms. 

The alternative is to say that Scripture is inconsistent. But if we affirm inerrancy, then it's necessary to make allowance for anthropomorphism. And if, indeed, the God of classical theism is approximately correct, then we'd expect God to relate to us on our level. That's not special pleading. Admittedly, appeals to anthropomorphism can be too facile and reflexive. We need to be circumspect about that principle. But it's not imported from philosophical theology. 

vi) That said, the resurgence of Reformed Thomism and Nicene subordination is animated by tribal loyalties and crowd psychology rather than fidelity to the witness of Scripture. Perfunctory profession of sola Scriptura while chauvinistic tradition carries the day. There's blame to go around in this controversy. It's not one-sided. 

Sports and Sabbath

https://calvinistinternational.com/2019/01/07/should-we-be-celebrating-frank-reich/

1. For the record, I'm not personally invested in this issue. I rarely watch sports. 

2. American culture idolizes sports. And that's hardly unique to American culture. The idolization of sports is a global phenomenon. 

That presents Christians with two basic options. On the one hand we can constantly bitch about the inevitable. Constantly bitch about what we can't change. We can boycott it. Be separatistic. 

On the other hand, we can view sports as an opening for the Gospel. We can infiltrate sports. Take advantage of what we can't change. 

Christian coaches can mentor the next generation of men. They can reach the unchurched. They can reach boys and men who don't normally have occasion to be exposed to the Christian faith. Not to mention boys and men who wouldn't normally take the Christian faith seriously because they haven't seen representatives of the Christian faith they can take seriously. But a coach is an emblem of manhood, and there are boys and men who will give the Gospel a respectful hearing because they respect their coach. 

3. In addition, the secular progressives loathe masculinity with a passion. But sports can be a haven for common grace masculinity at a time when manliness is under sustained attack. In that respect it's more important than it used to be.

4. It's ironic that his daughter plays on the boys' team. That's functionally equivalent to the transgender movement. 

5. Jones sometimes writes useful things, but he's a classic company man. He epitomizes the "confessional Calvinist" mindset.

Although I defend Calvinism on a regular basis, I've always maintained a certain distance from the Reformed community due to its cliquishness and clannishness. I'm not suggesting that's distinctive to the Reformed community. You find that mentality in just about any religious community–as well as other kinds of communities. 

Theological traditions are off-the-shelf packages. And you always have dutiful adherents whose mindset is to robotically check every box. 

The motivation isn't primarily theological but sociological. Because human beings are social creatures, there's a powerful incentive to assimilate to your peer group. To be a loyal team-player. Where creeds simply function as a litmus test for membership in the club.

That reduces theological fidelity to playacting. Guys like Mark Jones and Scott Clark are actors who recite a script. Memorize a script. It's not first and foremost about fidelity to God but playing a role to be a member in good standing with your peer group.

John Frame used to get into hot water because he was too smart for his own good. By that I mean, he wasn't an actor. He wasn't just reciting his lines. He's an independent thinker whose priority is to be true to God's truth. As a philosopher and apologist, he cares about the quality of the arguments. 

His mentor John Murray had the same outlook. That's authentic, God-honoring piety. Instead of paying lip-service to sola Scriptura, it is serious about having biblical justification for what we think and do. The piety of John Owen, Richard Baxter, and Archbishop Leighton (to name a few), who avoided partisan entanglements and blandishments.  

It's not enough to believe the right things. We need to believe them for the right reason. As I say, Mark Jones is a recognizable personality type. Keeps the uniform well-ironed and spotless. Polishes the brass buttons. Smartly salutes and clicks his heels.

The psychology is interchangeable across theological and ideological boundaries. The confessional Baptist, confessional Presbyterian, confessional Lutheran, Eastern Orthodox, Rad-Trad Catholic, party-line Democrat, pious Muslim. Credal expositions like the WCF, WSC, LBCF, Canons of Dort, and Heidelberg Catechism are wonderful summaries of Christian faith. But they're no substitute for Scripture. To be a team-player won't help you on your deathbed, facing into eternity. We're ultimately answerable to God. 

Scripture and creedalism

You often hear professing Christians who make ancient statements of faith like the Apostles' creed the benchmark. If something isn't in the Apostles' creed or Nicene creed, then it's secondary and optional. 

But God didn't command us to make those creeds the benchmark,. Creeds can function as useful and necessary digests of doctrine, but God commands us to believe his Word (the Bible). That's the primary frame of reference. Creeds are no substitute for faith in Scripture. That's the standard to live by and die by. 

I confess

Confessions, in the 17th century, were not seen as candy-store-like documents from which a person could take some from one, some from the other, and still some from another, and formulate their own theology in isolation from a historical church tradition. That way of thinking is relatively innovative from the perspective of ecclesiastical history. Surely, fringe individuals have existed at all times throughout church history, but the scope and fervor of their subjective choosiness has never been so explosive until now. 

Is one allowed to take any exception and still be considered confessional? Are we really not confessional if we fail to believe the Pope is the antichrist, as some confessional documents have stated (including the 1689)? Admittedly, the answer to this question is not always easy, and there are many dear brothers who would consider themselves confessional while at the same time not holding to every jot and tittle of any one document (though, I would disagree with their approach).

https://reformbaptist.com/2018/08/02/what-does-it-mean-to-be-confessional/

i) I have no a problem with creeds and confessions. That's a legitimate and even necessary expression of the church's teaching mandate. 

ii) That said, is there something intrinsically wrong with creedal eclecticism? Is the objective fidelity to a creed or fidelity to revelation? 

iii) Is there any presumption that lengthy creedal statements like the WCF and LBCF will be inerrant? If anything, is there not a presumption that any inspired human document of sufficient size is likely to make mistakes? The longer the document, the greater opportunities for error.  

In fairness, 17C creeds have more shakedown time than primitive creeds. They distill centuries of theological reflection. In that respect a long later creed might be more accurate than a brief primitive creed.

Nevertheless, creeds and confessions are consensus documents. It comes down to which side has the most votes. That's a very fallible process. So we can't reasonably treat creeds as unquestionably true. Indeed, that isn't even possible since different creeds represent divergent theological traditions. Hence, you have to evaluate creeds on a case-by-case basis. 

iv) Moreover, some creeds are predetermined to be radically wrong. Given the theological agenda of the framers, the Racovian catechism is inevitably heretical. Tridentine theology is another example. So creeds can't be the ultimate benchmark. 

Aquinas reconsidered

I'm going to comment on some statements by Muller in his review of Oliphint's critique of Thomism.

http://www.reformation21.org/articles/aquinas-reconsidered.php

http://www.reformation21.org/articles/aquinas-reconsidered-part-2-1.php

http://www.reformation21.org/featured/aquinas-reconsidered-part-3.php

One preliminary observation: a theologian is not an end in himself. We shouldn't devote the same attention to exegeting a theologian that we devote to exegeting Scripture. Christianity is a revealed religion. Biblical revelation is the primatial source of Christian theology. Interpreting Aquinas is secondary to interpreting biblical revelation. 

Confessional seminaries

I'd like to discuss some of the moral permutations of confessional seminaries (as well as confessional colleges).

i) Confessional seminaries are justifiable, and even necessary. The purpose of a Christian seminary is to transmit the faith to the next generation. The faculty should be Christian. Moreover, students should know what to expect.

However, that general principle is subject to some caveats and complications.

ii) Suppose an applicant is hired on the basis of the institution's current statement of faith. Suppose, after he gets the job, the institution amends the statement of faith. Should he be fired if he dissents from the policy change? 

That depends. In some situations, that's clearly unfair. He wasn't hired on those terms, so he shouldn't be fired on those terms. He was hired based on a mutual understanding and agreement. To unilaterally changes the rules in the middle of the game may well be unjust. 

iii) On the other hand, because the political and theological climate changes over time, new issues may arise that weren't on the radar when the statement of faith was originally formulated. In some cases, it wouldn't be possible to anticipate those developments. In other cases, it was just understood back then that those were out-of-bounds.

So there are situations in which it's proper and necessary for a confessional institution to revise the statement of faith. I can't say in the abstract if that's good or bad, because it depends on the specifics. Warranted examples include Bryan College and Cedarville on the historical Adam. 

iv) In addition, sometimes the threat comes from the left rather than the right. Robert Gagnon lost his job because he was well to the right of his denomination and its flagship seminary. It was inevitable that this would come to a head. He was out of step with the liberal trajectory of the PC-USA. 

v) Sometimes, though, the ground can shift under faculty, not due to a formal change in the statement of faith, but due to a change in the ecclesiastical climate. Power-brokers in the denomination may exert great influence and pressure, which changes what is tolerated in practice, regardless of what is tolerated on paper. That's an unwritten code which may jeopardize the job security of faculty. 

Likewise, if the board rubber-stamps the college or seminary president, then he's a law unto himself. (But a potential check is the alumni, especially the donor base.) 

By "power-brokers," I have in mind players like Ligon Duncan, Albert Mohler, Russell Moore, and Paige Patterson. 

vi) In situations like that, a professor may find himself in something of a moral bind. He has prior obligations to his dependents. So he may prevaricate about his true position if his family's financial security is threatened by ex post facto changes. 

I think lying is prima facie wrong, but there are situations where that's overridden by a higher obligation. And that distinction can be consistent with deontological ethics, viz. threshold deontology.

I have in mind situations like Dembski found himself mired in vis-a-vis Paige Patterson. 

vii) If a professor ceases to believe the statement of faith in one or more respects, then as a rule he should resign or be fired. I have no sympathy for Christian college or seminary professors who suffer an intellectual crisis of faith. By that point in their intellectual development, they should be familiar with the stock objections to Christianity, and have resolved them to their personal satisfaction.

Sometimes, though, a crisis of faith may be triggered by personal tragedy. That goes to the emotional problem of suffering rather than the intellectual problem of suffering.

In that case, I don't think they should be summarily dismissed. They must continue to teach orthodox theology. They shouldn't air their doubts with students, much less use the classroom as a platform to attack Christianity.

But according to the "church as hospital" model, I think that should be treated as much as possible as a pastoral issue, like nursing a sick patient back to health. I have in mind the situation of Gary Habermas. 

Traditionalism

This is from a Facebook debate I had regarding James Dolezal's defense of Thomism:

Hays 

In his classic monograph (On a Complex Theory of a Simple God), Christopher Hughes unpacks the Thomistic notion of divine simplicity as a set of six distinct propositions:

(i) God is not composed of extended parts; hence, he is not, and does not have, a body.

(ii) God is not composed of substantial form–in virtue of which he is the kind of thing he is–and form-receiving matter–in virtue of which he is the particular thing he is. God is instead pure self-subsistent form, devoid of matter of any kind.

iii) God is not "composed" of act and potency. There is no distinction in God between an element by virtue of which he has certain potentialities and an element by virtue of which those potentialities are actualized. Consequently, God is entirely immutable and atemporal.

(iv) God is not composed of essence and anything disjoint from that essence. While there is a difference between the individual, Socrates, and his essence (humanity), there is no difference between God and his essence (Godhead or Deity).

(v) God is not composed of substance and accidents. There are not in God any properties outside of the divine essence which enter into composition with that essence. Instead, his wisdom, his power, his goodness, and the like are all the same as the divine essence (which is to say, the same as God), and hence all the same as one another.

(vi) God is not composed of essence and esse (existence)–or what-he-is and a that-he-is. The divine essence (God) is pure subsistent existence, inherent in nothing distinct from it, and having nothing dissect from it inherent in it.

(Ibid., pp3-4)

Now, even if you happen to agree with all that, are Dolezal's evangelical supporters claiming that you can derive each and every one of those particular propositions from Scripture? Likewise, are they alleging that all the church fathers subscribe to the same six propositions? 

If not, what kind of divine simplicity are they alleging that Scripture attributes to God? 

BTW, how many of Dolezal's supporters even understand these highly recondite categories and distinctions? I don't deny that some of his supports understand them.

Josh 

Unfortunately, Frame has become his own tradition. A dangerous place to be.

Hays

Everyone is selective about tradition. By your logic, everyone is in a dangerous place.

i) Every professing Christian is selective in his appropriation of tradition. That's unavoidable because there is no uniform tradition in historical theology. Church history contains a vast plethora of divergent traditions, so you can't avoid selectivity even if you wish to. You can't simultaneously adhere to divergent theological traditions. Therefore, some sifting and sorting is inevitable.

Novelty is unavoidable, even in historical theology. You won't find the Westminster Confession in the 13C. 

There are different ways a theological tradition can be novel. Even if it contained nothing but traditional elements, the way in which that package includes some traditional elements while excluding other traditional elements makes the combination novel.

Or it may include some theological innovations, in addition to traditional elements. That's something you get in Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, &c. 

Every theological tradition is a novel package in some respects.

ii) Some professing Christians do their own sifting and sorting while others default to second parties to do that for them. Some professing Christians simply identify with whatever theological tradition they were born into, raised in, or married into.

An obvious problem with this is that it makes one's profession an accident of birth. A coin flip where the theological tradition you happen to profess is a random result of external circumstances that have nothing to do with theological truth. If your parents were Lutheran, you're Lutheran. If your parents were Methodist, you're Methodist. If your parents were Pentecostal, you're Pentecostal. If your parents were Catholic, you're Catholic. If your parents were Mormon, you're Mormon. 

That's an unreliable basis for theological identity. Geography shouldn't be the basis of your theological affiliation. 

iii) Christian duties in that regard are person-variable, depending on one's aptitude and opportunities. If you're a 19C German immigrant with little formal education who belongs to a German-speaking community in the midwest, it's fairly inevitable that you will be Lutheran. That subculture is the only frame of reference you have.

Due to the power of social conditioning, in many cases God graciously puts the elect in churches where they will hear the Gospel. The churches vary in their theological accuracy, but they are sufficiently accurate that parishioners have an object of saving faith. 

iv) However, every Christian generation has an obligation to assess the theological legacy handed down to it. God requires us to be loyal to him. We don't have a right to delegate what be believe to a second party, handing him a blank check which he fills in and we sign. That's just playacting. It can't be, "I believe whatever he believes". That's not the standard of comparison.

v) Although individual duties vary, Frame is precisely the kind of person, due to his intellect and education, who has a duty to evaluate the theological traditions at our disposal. You can disagree with his conclusions, but he's doing what someone with his gifts is supposed to do.

Josh

Also, Frame has a habit of novelty making. His theistic personalism is one, his triperspectivism is another. If the church missed something for 2,000 years, and this generation all the sudden got it right, we're in trouble.

Hays

i) That's a classic objection which Catholic apologists and theologians raised in opposition to the Protestant Reformers. By the same token, that's an objection which Orthodox Jews raise to Christian theology. 

ii) What does Josh mean by "the church"? Is that a euphemism for theologians, church fathers, &c.? If so, what makes that a representative sample? That's an infinitesimal fraction of God's people. 

iii) Is Josh suggesting that traditional interpretations are unquestionable? For instance, does Josh deem it impossible for archeological discoveries to correct a traditional interpretation? 

iv) It's a problem when people take intellectual shortcuts ("That's a theological innovation!"). That's not a discerning way to arrive at the truth. 

v) Why does Mike Ricardi like Josh's comment? Isn't he a pretrib dispensationalist? And isn't that a theological innovation in the history of the church?

He descended into hell

http://journal.rts.edu/article/he-descended-into-hell/

“Mere Protestant” Confession Seeks to Reclaim the Word “Catholic”

By 1529, a dozen years after the start of the Reformation, there was an on-going dispute, both political and theological, between Martin Luther’s German Reformation, and the Swiss Reform led by Ulrich Zwingli. In an effort to bring the two sides together, Philip of Hesse, a local Protestant ruler, brought Luther, Zwingli, and a number of other Reformers (including the Stephan Agricola, Johannes Brenz, Martin Bucer, Caspar Hedio, Justus Jonas, Philipp Melanchthon, Johannes Oecolampadius, and Andreas Osiander) at the castle hall at Marburg for what has become known as the “Marburg Colloquy”. Primarily a political conference, the colloquy nevertheless marked the start of a long-standing division. According to Alister McGrath’s account:

This attempt foundered on one point, and one point only. On 14 articles, Luther and Zwingli felt able to agree. The fifteenth contained six points, on which they were able to reach agreement on five. The sixth posed difficulties. Luther and Zwingli reluctantly were forced to declare that they had not “reached an agreement as to whether the true body and blood of Christ are bodily present in the bread and wine.” From Alister McGrath, Reformation Thought: An Introduction (p. 183). Wiley. Kindle Edition.

This week, more than 250 Protestant leaders and theologians published what they call a “Reforming Catholic Confession”, “A ‘Mere Protestant’ Statement of Faith to mark the 500th anniversary of the Reformation”.

Just on the surface, I don’t like the word “catholic”, because of the kinds of confusion it can lead to, but this statement seems to genuinely re-capture and re-establish the proper meaning of that word.

Is there hierarchy in the Trinity?

I don't necessarily agree with all this, but it's one of the more intelligent analyses in a debate that's suffered from too much conceptual confusion and crudity:

https://ochuk.wordpress.com/2016/06/22/is-there-hierarchy-in-the-trinity/#more-2738

Theological networking

The current controversy over eternal submission of the Son raises the issue of how different branches of theology are interrelated. For instance, critics of eternal submission make historical theology the standard of comparison (e.g. creeds, confessions, tradition). 

There are different branches of theology. For purposes of this post, I'll discuss the interrelationship between exegetical theology, historical theology, systematic theology, and philosophical theology. 

1. Exegetical theology

Since Christianity is a revealed religion, revealed truths, revealed propositions, lay the foundation. By the same token, exegetical theology is the starting-point. It attempts to ascertain the meaning of primary source material from which Christian theology derives. When successful, exegetical theology enjoys priority or ultimacy. In principle, if there's a conflict between exegetical theology and historical, philosophical, or systematic theology, exegetical theology trumps the others. In practice, it isn't quite that clear-cut.

2. Systematic theology

Some exegetes make a virtue of compartmentalized interpretations. They deliberately isolate their interpretations of a given Bible writer from the Bible in general. If, however, the Bible is inspired, then exegesis should aim for interpretations that are consistent with the overall theology of Scripture. Interpret the part in relation to the whole. 

Systematic theology considers the implicit as well as explicit teaching of Scripture. The logical implications of Biblical propositions, both individually and in their relation to other propositions. And with harmonizing the various propositions of Scripture. To some degree, that's something an exegete must consider on a smaller scale when expounding the "theology of Paul", the "theology of John", the "theology of Hebrews", and so on.

3. Historical theology

Ideally, historical theology codifies received interpretations of Scripture that are true interpretations of Scripture. After exegetical theology has done its job, historical theology codifies the conclusions. 

There are situations in which creeds and confessions can be treated as settled doctrine. But from a Protestant perspective, that can't be absolute. For one thing, you have a diversity of theological traditions. They can't all be right. So sifting is necessary.

Even if a creedal statement is true, there are still situations in which it's necessary to scrutinize the claim. Although the Christian faith is true, the Christian faith is new to each new generation. Whether you grew up in the church or were unchurched, it is necessary for you to ascertain the truth of Christianity. So at that stage of the process you are treating these truth-claims as open questions. Even if a theological tradition got it right, assent should be more than an accident of birth or coin flip. Creeds and confessions must be intellectually defensible. 

That doesn't mean every generation must start from scratch. Theological traditions represent large-scale interpretations of Scripture. That gives the younger generation some preexisting options to consider. We don't have to reinvent the questions and answers. It is, however, still incumbent on us to assess the received answers.

Moreover, tradition may condition us to only ask traditional questions. But sometimes we need to reexamine old issues from a fresh perspective. Otherwise, we may be stuck in a theological rut. The way an issue is framed can prejudge the answers and artificially exclude a larger range of potential answers. But sometimes we need to think outside the box rather than filtering the discussion through a venerable paradigm. 

4. Philosophical theology

There's more to Christian theology than just quoting Scripture. It is necessary to understand what Scripture means. The ability to explain Scriptural propositions in your own words. Define terms. The ability to expound and summarize revealed concepts. Philosophical theology can help to articulate the meaning of Scripture by providing vocabulary and categories. 

Exegetes sometimes commit logical fallacies because they lack philosophical training. Exegetes sometimes overlook alternative explanations because they lack conceptual resources. In that respect, philosophical theology can supplement exegetical theology.

Then there's the whole issue of hermeneutics. What is the task of the exegete? 

Where is the locus of meaning? Original intent? Should an exegete focus on the original audience or the history of reception? What is the intended audience? Is that the original audience? Or is that the community of faith? Then there's the sense/reference distinction.

These are philosophical questions. In that respect, philosophical theology can supplement exegetical theology. 

Philosophical theology can also play a role in defending divine revelation. Likewise, philosophical theology supplies historical and systematic theology with models and metaphors. Traditionally, historical theology borrows distinctions and categories from Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. But there's no reason that can't be updated by recourse to more recent philosophical developments.

What are creeds and confessions?

https://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2016/07/what-are-creeds-and-confessions.html

Is Wayne Grudem a heretic?

Keep in mind that I oppose the eternal functional subordination of the Son. That said, 

1. I see critics of EFS raising two contradictory allegations:

i) EFS is an theological innovation

ii) The Nicene creed condemns EFS 

But both allegations can't very well be true. You can't simultaneously contend that EFS was developed by a subset of complementarians in the late 20C, but stands condemned by the Nicene Fathers in the 4C. These two allegations cancel each other out. I'll revisit this contradiction further down. 

2. Debate over EFS has been conflated with debate over eternal generation of the Son. 

i) That's in part because some people who support EFS oppose eternal generation. However, some people who support EFS also support eternal generation. So even if you consider rejection of eternal generation to be heretical, that would only apply to the subset of EFS proponents who reject it.

ii) One issue concerns the definition of heresy. To my knowledge, a traditional condition of heresy is denial of a formally promulgated article of faith. The denial isn't heretical unless and until a duly constituted ecclesiastical authority defines the doctrine in question. 

Content along is not a sufficient condition. Rather, there must be a prior exercise of the Church. That's what makes the denial heretical. 

But unless you think the judgment of the church is constitutive of heresy, rather than the content of the denial itself, then you're not operating with a traditional definition of heresy, as I understand it. 

Keep in mind that this requires an ecclesiology that strikes me as inconsistent with the Protestant faith. From a Protestant perspective, declaring something to be heretical is not what makes it so; rather, we declare it to be heretical because the content is heretical. Truth is prior to the declaration. The declaration isn't a constitutive act. 

3. Assuming for the sake of argument that we use the Nicene creed as an arbiter of orthodoxy, is it heretical to deny eternal generation? Let's begin by quoting the relevant article of the creed:

We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ,
the only Son of God,
eternally begotten of the Father,
God from God, Light from Light,
true God from true God,
begotten, not made,
of one Being with the Father.
Through him all things were made.

And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of
God, begotten of the Father before all ages;

Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten,
not created, of one essence with the Father
through Whom all things were made.

I quoted two English versions, which say pretty much the same thing. 

Is it heretical to deny what the Nicene creed affirms on this point? Not necessary. You have to ask, what is the implied point of contrast? 

To my knowledge, the article opposes Arianism. It opposes the view that the Son was a creature who came into being. 

By contrast, men like Grudem affirm the full divinity and eternal preexistence of the Son. They don't formulate it in the same terms as the Nicene Fathers, but they oppose the same Arian Christology that the Nicene Fathers oppose. 

4. If anything, isn't a Christology that says the Son derives his existence from the Father closer to Arianism than a Christology that affirms the aseity of the Son? 

5. We might also ask whether rejecting eternal generation is a theological innovation. From what I've read, this goes back at least as far as Moses Stuart's 1822 Letters on the Eternal Generation of the Son of God. Is a position that's been kicking around for two centuries a theological innovation? Innovative in relation to what? What's the cuff-off? 

Keep in mind that Stuart was defending the Trinity against Unitarians. 

6. However, the primary target for the charge of heresy is EFS. But even if we grant that the Nicene creed is an arbiter of orthodoxy (which is certainly disputable), the Nicene creed doesn't speak to the issue of EFS one way or the other. It looks like critics of EFS are hijacking the Nicene creed to make it condemn something that the Nicene Fathers never contemplated. 

Indeed, when critics of EFS attack it as a theological innovation, isn't that a direct admission that the Nicene Fathers did not and could not intend to condemn EFS? It wasn't even possible for them to have that in mind. So citing the Nicene creed to anathematize EFS is a bait-n-switch tactic. Even if denial of eternal generation is heretical (disputable in itself), you can't swap out eternal generation, swap in EFS, then say that's what the Nicene creed refers to. 

7. Perhaps critics would say that while the Nicene Fathers didn't intend to anathematize EFS, that's a logical implication of their Triadology. But there are several problems with that argument:

i) When someone makes a statement that has unintended implications, we normally consider that to be an ill-considered or short-sighted statement. He didn't anticipate the ramifications of his statement.

So we wouldn't ordinarily hold someone to the unintended implications of his statement. Rather, we'd say he misspoke. He spoke hastily, without due consideration for what that statement would lead to, if carried to its logical conclusion. 

ii) This isn't based on what the Nicene Fathers meant, but inferences which 21C critics are drawing in reference to an admitted theological innovation. It isn't the Nicene Fathers who are drawing this inference. 

But, then, isn't there something fishy about invoking the authority of dead bishops to retroactively condemn something that never occurred to them? They didn't have that in mind. They couldn't have that in mind. 

8. The allegation is that EFS posits two distinct wills in the Godhead, and that entails heretical subordinationism. 

i) To begin with, it's hard to see how that's a legitimate inference from anything the Nicene creed says. Indeed, Mark Jones resorts to Thomistic metaphysics (e.g. divine simplicity, God as pure act) to make his case. But it's grossly anachronistic to accuse Grudem et al. of denying the Nicene creed because their position may be at odds with Thomism. 4C Greek Fathers and Greek bishops weren't Thomists. Even if you think Thomism is the greatest thing since lava lamps, the metaphysical underpinnings of the Nicene creed aren't based on that paradigm. 

ii) Take the covenant of redemption. The Father wills to send the Son and the Son wills to be sent. Surely these are distinct volitions. One party wills to send while another party is willingly sent. That's not reducible to a single will, even though these are harmonious volitions. To send and to be sent are not equivalent actions. These involve distinct agents. The Son didn't will to send himself. 

9. Trueman talks about a breach over the very identity of God, as if that's a shocking developing. But there are long-standing disputes over the "very identity of God" in historical theology, viz. Reformed theism v. freewill theism, Latin Trinitarianism v. Eastern Trinitarianism, classical theism v. theistic personalism, apophaticism v. kataphaticism, Thomism v. Scotism. 

10. Finally, I'm puzzled by why the gatekeepers of Reformed orthodoxy have so much to say about EFS, but so little to say about libertarian Calvinism. To my knowledge, Scott Clark hasn't issued a critique of Oliver Crisp's defense of libertarian Calvinism in his 2014 monograph: Deviant Calvinism. And even though Mark Jones faulted certain aspects of the book, it's striking that he had nothing critical to say about libertarian Calvinism. Here we have a block of plastique planted at the base of Calvinism, yet the gatekeepers of Reformed orthodoxy are silent on that issue, while they obsess over EFS.  

Likewise, Trueman's campaign is driven by his vendetta against TGC, parachurch organizations, &c.