Is God like us?

Here's a highly intelligent discussion of a recondite topic:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQyEO7cOExc&t=5174s

1. I agree with classical theism that God is timeless and impassable. Mullins has a nice definition of timelessness, but I'll quote his definition of impassibility, which makes three related claims bundled into one:

(i) Impossible for God to suffer.

(ii) Impossible for God to be caused or influenced by anything external to God.

(iii) Impossible for God to have an emotion that is inconsistent with his perfect happiness, his perfect rationality, and his perfect moral goodness.

Among other things, they define Thomstic simplicity to mean all God's attributes are identical to each other. All divine acts are identical to each other and to God's essence. God has no potentialities. God can't react.

2. I'm a classical theist but not a Thomist. I have almost no use for the Thomistic metaphysical categories. I concede that Classical theism is a combination of revelation and reason, special and general revelation. 

3. A big problem with Thomism is that it superimposes onto scripture an interpretive grid or philosophical hermeneutic that's imported entirely from the outside. It has no footing in scripture, and often overrides what the text says. 

4. Another problem with Thomism is that it leads to a very skeptical view of what we can know about God.

5. A basic appeal of non-classical theism is that it looks more biblical, more Protestant, than classical theism. 

6. On the issue of God-talk, I think Nemesh makes a good point that when God is "angry" in scripture, that's not a depiction of his mental state but an expression of his punitive actions. God's anger takes place in the world, not in himself. 

7. Because Thomistic simplicity is a bundle of distinct claims, it's not an all-or-nothing package. I agree with Aquinas that God is not an exemplification of properties over and above himself, but the exemplar. God is simple in the sense that he has no spatiotemporal parts or subdivisions. 

8. A problem with non-classical theism is that if in fact God is timeless and impassable, then how else can God relate to us except in ways that operate within what we are able to experience?

9. Scripture isn't uniform in how it depicts God. So it's not as though the non-classical theist consistently has scripture on his side while the classical theism must go outside of scripture. For instance, the predestinarian passages are much more consistent with classical theism than non-classical theism. God has an antemudane plan for the world. 

And that in itself suggests which set of passages we should use to interpret the other set of passages. The predestinarian passages go behind-the-scenes, showing us that the descriptions of God's activity in history are the outworking of his antemundane plan. So those enjoy interpretive priority. And it's not coincidental that the predestinarian passages of Scripture occur in the didactic genres (e.g. NT letters). 

10. It's not coincidental that the prooftexts for non-classical theism cluster around the narrative and poetic genres of scripture. But we'd expect the language of poetry to be more performative than propositional. 

11. Then there's God's relation to time. The world comes into being but God does not. Indeed, God brings the world into being. That raises the question of whether God subsists outside of time. Although it doesn't quite answer the question, I'd say that it's not only consistent with God subsisting outside of time but a more natural implication of the claim than the view that God was always temporal. Some non-classical theists split the difference by saying God entered time when he made the world. But the texts about creation don't say that.

12. Likewise, the predestinarian passages raise questions about God's relation to time. If time is an artifact of creation, and if time is part of God's plan for the world, then that suggests that his plan is timeless, in which case he is timeless. 

13. Among other things, biblical theism is supposed to be a corrective to pagan conceptions of God. But if we just went with certain poetic and narrative descriptions, Yahweh sometimes acts like the very humanoid heathen deities that scripture is designed to oppose. It blurs a critical point of contrast. 

All told, I think classical theism has a varied footing in text of scripture, unlike Thomism. 

14. When scripture records a conversation between Moses or Abraham and God, I don't think that's just a representation of God, where the narrator writes a story that doesn't correspond to what really happened. This is God's accommodation to our human limitations, but it's not a literary accommodation. 

As a matter of fact, Abraham hears God say something, then Abraham says something, then he hears God say something, then he says something. So the record of the conversation is true to Abraham's experience. 

However, the purpose of the conversation is not to peel back the curtain to show the metaphysical machinery behind the conversation. The fact that Abraham hears God in a temporal sequence doesn't entail that God is speaking to him directly. That God himself must enter time to have this conversation. Rather, God can use natural means to effect a script. 

15. Mullins objects that classical theism must explain away too much scripture. I agree with him in the case of Thomism. There is, however, nothing inherently wrong with having a unified hermeneutic which interprets the same kinds of passages the same way. 

16. Regarding the question of whether divine love is reducible to self-love, I say God can love us the way a fiction writer loves one of his characters. 

Why are bright guys suckered by Catholicism?

There are some very smart converts to Catholicism (as well as some very smart cradle Catholics). What's the appeal? If Catholicism is gravely mistaken, why can't they see through it? In my observation, there are at least four factors–which doesn't mean every bright convert exemplifies all four motivations:

1. Catholicism has a very rich, wide-ranging intellectual and artistic heritage that's naturally appealing to the religious-minded intelligentsia.

2. Many Catholic intellectuals are Thomists. Thomism presents a much less inviting target for atheists than a Bible-centered faith. Thomism is abstract and abstruse. Most atheists know nothing or next to nothing about Thomism, so they have no line of attack. If, by contrast, you have a Bible-centered faith, that instantly gives them hundreds of openings since there's a cottage industry of stock objections to Scripture.

3. Catholicism requires converts to make fewer accommodations to unfashionable beliefs. Take the facile way Bishop Barron relegates "problem passages" in the OT to pious fiction or allegory. They can leave "embarrassing" beliefs behind while retaining "respectable" beliefs they share in common with their secular counterparts. A Bible-centered faith doesn't have the same loopholes. It must stand and fight. 

4. Finally, if you're smart enough, you can defend almost anything, and you may revel the challenge. Here I think there's an element of divine irony or divine justice. High IQ confers a completive advantage, but that's offset by the fact that it can also be a snare or a source of self-deception. The temptation to flex his ingenuity plays to his intellectual pride. Coming up with clever, erudite defenses of Roman Catholicism is an opportunity to indulge in self-flattering showmanship. I hasten to add that it's by no means confined to Catholicism. There's a special kind of folly that bright guys are prey to. Their strength is their weakness. 

Someone might object that there's a certain tension between #4 and #'s 2-3. However, I think all these motivations are observable. People can be inconsistent. Psychology isn't logicality. Moreover, as I said at the outset, a convert doesn't have to check all four boxes. 

The common good

It's often said that western thinking is more individualistic whereas eastern thinking is more collectivist. Of course, that's a generalization, which is vulnerable to overgeneralization. But assume that's true, has that always been true? Consider Aquinas on capital punishment:

Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump" (1 Corinthians 5:6).

As stated above (Article 2), it is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3064.htm#article2

As it stands, that's a collectivist outlook. The good of the many automatically supersedes the good of the few or the one. 

Normally, Christian ethics places high value on individual wellbeing. Although the common good is important, an individual must do something wrong to forfeit certain rights and immunities. The common good is not sufficient to override the needs of the individual. 

Now, I'm not a scholar of Aquinas, so perhaps what he says here is counterbalanced by things he says elsewhere. Otherwise, his position is starkly utilitarian. It makes me wonder whether his viewpoint is a throwback to an older collectivist outlook that was typical in pre-Christian Europe. One which Christian reflection eventually overcame and supplanted. 

Prima Facie reservations on Thomism

https://tentsofshem.wordpress.com/2016/03/07/prima-facie-reservations-on-thomism/

Medieval Jewish polemics

Recently I was reading Daniel Lasker's Jewish Philosophical Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages.  

1. The Jewish polemic suffers from a couple of basic limitations:

i) As the author notes, their knowledge of Christian theology seems to derive from Catholic missionaries. Popularizers of Christian theology. They apparently lack direct acquaintance with high-level thinkers like Anselm and Aquinas. As a result, the Jewish critics often seem to be attacking a caricature of Christian theology, and they are sometimes unaware of how sophisticated Christian theologians responded to the stock objections they raise.

ii) Both the Jewish critics and their Christian counterparts operate within an Aristotelian framework. In one sense that's a point of strength. It means the Jews are responding to Christian exponents on their own ground. However, for a modern Christian reader, many of their objections lack traction unless you're a Thomist. 

Scholasticism and the Gospel

https://frame-poythress.org/scholasticism-and-the-gospel/

"Beginner-level mistakes"

Responding to Craig's "Does God Have both Necessary and Contingent Properties?", Mark Jones, on Facebook, exclaimed: "Wow, does he even do theology? Like those are beginner-level mistakes."

Here's what Craig said:

Basically, what your question asks is whether God can have some of His properties necessarily and some of them contingently.  It seems to me that He can and does.  Those who deny this would typically appeal to the doctrine of divine simplicity, which in its strongest form asserts the identity of God with His properties. But so strong a version of the doctrine has no biblical basis, is unintelligible, and has no compelling arguments in its favor. Given that God is not in this radical sense a simple being, he can have a plurality of properties, some of which He has necessarily and some contingently.

For example, God is essentially existent, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, good, and so on, and so has such properties in every possible world. But God has only contingently the properties of being the Creator of the universe, knowing what time it now is, being incarnate in Jesus Christ, being my Redeemer, and so on, since He has these properties only in possible worlds in which He wills to create a universe, which is the free and contingent choice of His will. Jews as well as Christians will recognize that God may have both sorts of properties. 

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/does-god-have-both-necessary-and-contingent-properties

According to Jones, Craig committed "beginner-level mistakes". Jones didn't bother to explain or correct Craig's alleged mistakes. He treats that as self-evident. Let's compare Craig's objection to this statement:

But it is very difficult to understand how a simple being could be free in the unconditional 'could have done otherwise' sense. If God is simple, then he is pure act in which case he is devoid of unrealized powers, potentialities or possibilities.  To act freely, however is to act in such a way that one (unconditionally) could have done otherwise, which implies unrealized possibilities. 

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2012/01/dolezal-on-divine-simplicity-does-he-make-a-mysterian-move.html

Vallicella is raising the same basic objection as Craig. Does Jones think Vallicella is making beginner-level mistakes? Vallicella authored the entry on divine simplicity for the prestigious Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 

And here's yet another example:

But if His essence is identical with what he does, then He would become a different being as He did different things…It seems that there are all sorts of contingent truths about God. If he created freely, then He might not have done so, and that God is a creator is a contingent truth….But if God's power and His knowledge are identical to the eternal act of being which is his nature, how could He do and know other than He does and know without being other than God?

"There are possible worlds in which God wills not to create…" But it is very difficult to see how God in the actual world could be the same being as God in some other possible world, if (1) God in the actual world is identical to His eternal and immutable act in this world, (2) God in a different possible world is identical to His act in that world, and (3) God's act in the actual world is not identical to His act in the other possible world."

A second possibility is to deny contingency in God…Given God's nature He could not do other than He does. There is no contingency in God, so there are no other possible worlds, whatever we may be able to imagine." Kathrin Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh U, 2000), 32,34.

Once again, that's the same basic argument as Craig. Does Jones think Rogers is making beginner-level mistakes? 

Ironically, her proposal to relieve the tension preserves simplicity by ditching impassibility:

Any systematic philosophy of God which incorporates free choice on the part of creatures would have to hold that God is somehow affected by and responsive to something outside Himself (37-38). 

So she resolves the dilemma by sacrificing one fixture of classical theism (impassibility) to salvage another fixture of classical theism (simplicity). Given a choice between simplicity and impassibility, she opts for simplicity. Given those alternatives, I'd opt for impassibility. 

Instant community

In this post I'd like to make two different but interrelated points, one substantive and one sociological. I'm struck by how Thomism has taken hold in some contemporary Reformed circles. Yes, you already had that in Reformed scholasticism, but I'm talking about the current fad. 

I see many Calvinists in social media passionately defending Thomistic  simplicity. That's due in part to the nature of social media. When you adopt a position for which there's a preexisting constituency, that gives you instant community. You don't just adopt that position. Rather, you join a community of like-minded people. Overnight, your membership gives you social status within that community. All of a sudden, you have a range of contacts with whom you share that belief or cause in common. A virtual community where you receive personal affirmation and reinforcement. Because humans are social creatures, that's psychologically appealing.

And this is true for anything. There are Facebook groups and discussion forums for just about any topic that catches your fancy. Or take how Ed Feser's blog becomes a social watering hole. Like an internet tavern where folks hang out to shoot the bull. 

I'm not saying that's good or bad. Depends on the issue. But we should examine our motives. Do we champion a cause du jour because that's a worthy cause, or because it gives us a sense of belonging? 

As I observe some Calvinists jumping on this bandwagon, I wonder what motivates them. All of a sudden, adherence to Thomistic simplicity is becoming a litmus test of orthodoxy in these theological circles. Have they thought about the implications of this position? Or is it that some folks are just swept up in theological fads, facilitated by the crowd psychology of social media? 

For instance, as I understand it, Thomistic simplicity denies any internal metaphysical distinctions in the Godhead. Here's one question I have about that. Scripture attributes many world events to divine agency. The Bible is replete with examples, but for convenience, consider the ten plagues of Egypt. According to Exodus, Yahweh brought about the ten plagues. God willed each plague. Each plague is the result of divine intention. 

But if Thomistic simplicity is true, then isn't God's will to bring about the plague of darkness identical to God's will to bring about the death of the firstborn? If, however, there's no internal, metaphysical distinction between God willing the ninth plague and God willing the tenth plague, then how did the same undifferentiated will select for two different outcomes? 

If God willing the ninth plague is indistinguishable from God willing the tenth plague, then the effect is the same. That makes the ninth plague identical to the tenth plague. These can't be two separate events, but one and the same event. But that's incoherent. 

Scholasticism and creation

Human actions are simply the occasions for the unfolding of God’s ad extra display of these unchanging and unacquired virtues…. God simply is that act of existence by which He is. This means that even His relation to the world as its Creator and Sustainer does not produce any new actuality in Him. (15)

I do not disagree with these statements, but I do think they raise a problem that Dolezal does not discuss: what is the status of God’s “relation to the world as its Creator and Sustainer?” Is that relation within him? One might argue that it is, because it certainly is a fact about God that he is related to the world. But on Dolezal’s view, if this relation is within God, then it is identical with his essence. That implies that God would not be God unless he were related to the world. And on that basis, the world itself is God’s essence. But to say that the world is God’s essence is pantheism.

That would not have been a problem for Parmenides, for whom all relations exist as aspects of a distinctionless “Being.” Parmenides was a consistent pantheist, as were his Greek philosophical predecessors. But in a Christian theology, pantheism destroys the creator-creature distinction, which of course is quite central to the biblical world view.

But consider this alternative: Perhaps the relation between God and the world is not his essence, but something entirely outside him. To assert that would allow us to renounce pantheism.

https://frame-poythress.org/scholasticism-and-creation/

God without parts

As Dolezal explains, the church has always understood that anything composed of parts depends on those parts for its being. The parts of a composite entity are ontologically prior to that which is composed of those parts. The bricks and mortar are prior to the wall...The doctrine of divine simplicity denied that God is composed of parts because there is nothing that is ontologically prior to God. 

https://tabletalkmagazine.com/posts/2017/11/book-review-all-that-is-in-god-by-james-dolezal/

i) I should say at the outset that I haven't read Dolezal's books. I've read lots of sympathetic expositions of classical theism generally, as well as Thomistic simplicity in particular. To judge by sympathetic reviews, I don't get the impression that Dolezal has anything original or ingenious to contribute to the traditional position. So I don't see any duty to read his books. 

ii) Although I think God is timeless and spaceless, I don't regard God as fundamentally simple. Rather, I regard God as fundamentally symmetrical. The Trinity is the archetypal mirror symmetry. And symmetries are far more interesting than an undifferentiated unity. 

iii) I'd add that symmetries are indivisible. Symmetries don't come in parts. Symmetries are irreducibly complex. 

iv) An acute irony in this debate is that the very people who champion Thomistic simplicity are typically the same people who champion eternal generation and procession. They regard the Father as the fons deitas. But that makes the Father "ontologically prior" to the Son and Spirit. The Son and Spirit are ontologically dependent on the Father for their existence. It's an asymmetrical dynamic. 

Of course, they don't call that composition, because tradition forbids it, but that's what their position amounts to. They just camouflage it with different language.

v) His classic argument for Thomistic simplicity shows how easily some people are bewitched by the power of a seductive illustration. Now there's nothing wrong with using examples to illustrate a principle. But we have to be wary of master metaphors, because that can myopically fixate on one all-controlling illustration while overlooking different metaphors. If you began with a different kind of metaphor, you might wind up with a different conclusion. I'll get to that in a moment.

vi) One basic problem with this comparison is that it gives the reader an argument from analogy minus the supporting argument. The comparison just assumes (or posits or stipulates) that concrete complexity is analogous in that regard to abstract complexity. Now maybe in his books, Dolezal provides a supporting argument. But as it stands, all we have here is the assertion that if God has distinct attributes, then that's like a bigger, more complicated thing that's made of smaller parts.

But if God is timeless and spaceless, then the question is whether the analogy breaks down at the critical point of comparison. Consider complex abstract objects like possible worlds, the number Pi, Euler's number, or the Mandelbrot set. Those are conceptually complex, but they're not "put together" like something made of legos. We can isolate a particular sequence in the decimal expansion of Pi, but that's inseparable from the whole. And it's not as if the whole is physically bigger than constitutive elements. Abstract objects like Pi, Euler's number, and the Mandelbrot set are complex yet indivisible. 

vii) In addition, the illustration is one-sided. Even with respect to physical objects, while there's a sense in which the whole is dependent on the constituent parts that compose it, there's another sense in which parts can be dependent on the whole. Take classical car buffs. Car parts wear out, and it's increasingly difficult to find vintage, original replacement parts. Eventually you must resort to new duplicate parts.

Suppose, over the course of time, you must replace every part of a classic Mustang or Jaguar, Packard or Duesenberg (take your pick). Is it the same car? It's the same car, not in the sense of having the same parts, but having the same pattern. The parts change, but the whole remains the same. 

In that respect, the whole can be ontologically prior to the parts. The whole is an abstract pattern that's multiply-instantiable. Different parts can replicate the same arrangement. 

A more dramatic example is the human body. As a living organism, the body is composed of parts. At one level, body organs are dependent on smaller "parts" that compose them.

However, the human body is factory that makes replacement parts. Stem cells create cells. New blood cells replace old blood cells. Or take the endocrine system, where glands secrete hormones. The brain produces chemicals. Or the production of seminal fluid.  

So there's top-down dependence as well as bottom-up dependence. Some parts depend on the whole. 

Or take a piece of music. You could say it's composed of notes. But the arrangement is unique, and that's recreated overtime there's a live musical performance. The score is an abstract structure that's indefinitely exemplifiable. A music score is complex, but more "ultimate" than any particular, temporary performance. Different players with different instruments who recreate the pattern. A violinist might use a Stradivarius or Guarneri.  

That's a problem with simplistic analogies, where a proponent is captivated by a particular illustration, which blinds him to alternate conceptions. Philosophical theologians need to have a wide variety of models and metaphors at their disposal, to avoid becoming entranced by one narrow comparison. If that's Dolezal's primary argument, then it's terribly simple-minded. 

I'm not saying that's how we should conceive the relation between God and his attributes. I'm just demonstrating the severe limitations of a particular nearsighted illustration. 

Biblical personalism

https://frame-poythress.org/biblical-personalism-further-thoughts-on-scholasticism-and-scripture/

Calvinism, Thomism, and the polemics of freewill theism

The God of Reformed theism is constantly impugned as a "moral monster," "worse than Hitler," "worse than Satan," &c. It makes God the "author of sin". Turns men into "robots" and "puppets". 

What's odd about this is the incessant attack on the morality of Calvinism, while Thomism gets a pass. Thomism is a very influential theological tradition that continues to have many devoted and outspoken adherents. Yet Thomism is just as "deterministic" as Calvinism. Why do freewill theists who chronically revile Calvinism ignore Thomism? Why the one-sided treatment? 

http://journal.rts.edu/article/aquinas-and-calvin-on-predestination-is-there-any-common-ground/ 

"I've been becoming a bit more Reformed of late, and I blame that on the Catholics"

http://thinktheology.co.uk/blog/article/thomas_aquinas_on_predestination

Feserettes

It's revealing to see the quality of reasoning on display by Feser groupies. 

Nathanael said...As a young Reformed guy who reads your blog regularly I'd just like to say, keep up the good work. 

Nathanael said...So I went over to Triablogue (my first visit there) and saw that the author recommended getting my theology from Turretin and my philosophy from Plantinga and Swinburne. Because apparently the best way to support Reformed theology is to follow guys who reject divine simplicity, divine aseity, and predestination. Oh, and who have a "social" view of the Trinity. Because I guess he never bothered to actually read Turretin (who was as scholastic as they come).

Compare that with what I actually said:

But because he usually writes at a popular level, there's not a lot of depth or detail. And it lacks technical rigor. Plantinga raised the bar for how to do Christian philosopher. The same holds true, in a different way, for Swinburne. 
I expect many young Calvinists of a philosophical bent may still get their theology from Warfield and Turretin, or Schreiner and Beale, or Frame, but their philosophical role models are more in the vein of Pruss, Plantinga, the McGrews, van Inwagen, &c. 

i) Notice that I didn't "recommend" Plantinga or Swinburne. Is Nathanael unable to distinguish between a description and a recommendation?

ii) Moreover, I was distinguishing between theological content and philosophical method. Is Nathanael unable to draw that elementary distinction? 

iii) Also observe how undiscriminating he is. If, say, Plantinga or Swinburne reject divine simplicity, does that render them useless in other respects?  

Being a regular reader of Feser hasn't done much to hone Nathanael's analytical skills. 

Daniel said...I think it is ridiculous that anyone should say that you ignore Frege when you frequently mention how great an influence his article ‘The Thought’ was in turning you away from any physicalist philosophy of mind.

Except for the awkward little fact that I didn't accuse Feser of ignoring Frege. Where did Daniel come up with that?

Anonymous said...Hmm, I'm betting rockingwithhawking = Steve.

Since that speculation is wrong, where do I go to collect on the bet?

Jacob Steiner said...Dr. Feser. First off, I have to give you a certain gratitude of thanks. During my reversion to Catholicism I too discovered St. Thomas Aquinas. I wanted to learn from the great Saint and his philosophical/theological system. Reading Mortimer books on Aristotle and then your book on Aquinas has really shaped me into a better defending of the faith and ultimately the the truth.

Not exactly surprising that a revert to Roman Catholicism would side with Feser. 

Scott said...@"steve":
Your latest rant is unlikely to draw anything but laughter from those of us who are—unlike (by your own admission) you—"qualified to offer an informed opinion of Feser."
This is a pretty good example of the depths of silliness to which you descend:
"[U]nless you have a vested interest in the truth of Thomism, it's philosophically unenlightening to judge ID theory by that yardstick."
That is utter nonsense on several levels.
First of all, if being rationally persuaded that a particular philosophy is true amounts to having a "vested interest" in it, I must have missed that day of logic class.

Yes, I'd say he skipped logic class that day.

Second, pointing out the incompatibilities between two philosophical outlooks is not the same thing as judging one by the yardstick of the other.

I never said that was generally the case. Rather, I said that's what Feser is doing. I guess Scott missed a week of logic class.

Third, even if Ed's sole purpose were to evaluate ID theory by the yardstick of Thomism, that wouldn't make it philosophically uninteresting to everyone who didn't have a "vested interest" in Thomism.

Unless you think Thomism is true, why is it philosophically informative to use Thomism as the benchmark to evaluate ID theory? 

I'm not going to go through your entire post and pick it apart, but the rest is of similar quality. Not only are you a mouse nipping at the heels of an elephant, but you haven't even got the right elephant.

You mean, like this?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXiMs65ZAeU

I appreciate Scott's suggestion that I have Feser running scared, although I doubt Feser would be as enthusiastic about the comparison.

Scott said...@Tom:
"@Scott: If you don't mind my asking, what are you, if not Catholic?"
Non-denominational classical theist and mostly Thomist, not terribly far from Mortimer Adler before his final conversion to Catholicism. I won't be the least bit surprised if I end up doing the same.

So it comes as no surprise that he's so defensive of Feser. 

Greg said...It's kind of like how I find Kant's evaluation of Hume to be unenlightening; I am not a Kantian, so anything Kant had to say is clearly valueless to me.

Unless he thinks Kant's evaluation of Hume is true, why would that be valuable?

Jonathan Garcia said...It is hillarious that the post is called "Doubting Thomist", yet he doesn't gives a single reason why we should doubt thomism.

Perhaps it's hilarious that he can't spell hilarious.

The post is called "Doubting Thomist" because that's a pun on Doubting Thomas. Sorry if that's too subtle for Garcia. 

Anonymous said...@Steve:
The first rule of holes is to stop digging. You just dug yourself even deeper, and you now proceed to advertise the fact in this combox.

Since you Triablogers love to quote scripture as though it were some kind of moral weapon, try this one on for size:

Because loving to quote Scripture is such an indictment. 

Mark Thomas said...Well said, Dr. Feser. There's a lot of "bright" fools on the web that dismiss something simply because "others disagree". 

Which wasn't the argument. The point, rather, is that since Feser's views on Thomism and ID theory have been challenged, his views are not a given. 

Further, there are more objection to intelligent design theory that are also independent of your metaphysics. For instance, check out Tim and Lydia McGrew's thoughts on the matter.

My post specifically mentioned that. Is he paying attention?

Greg said...
Perhaps I'm just siding with Feser out of my "Catholic partisanship," but this exchange strikes me as manifestly uncharitable on Steve's part.

Just what I'd expect a Catholic partisan to say. What a coincidence. 

The argument that Feser is making is clearly that ID is incompatible with classical theism. Not just Thomism, which is the subset of classical theism that Feser endorses. The issue with ID from the classical theistic perspective is that it portrays God as an artificer who acts on preexisting matter with its own quasi-mechanistic tendencies. That view of God is incompatible not just with Thomism but with other varieties of classical theism.

i) That's a ridiculous caricature of ID theory, as if ID theory views the Designer as a Demiurge who used preexisting matter to create the universe. 

ii) Why, moreover, is ID theory (allegedly) incompatible with classical theism, but theistic evolution (which most contemporary Catholic intellectuals espouse) not incompatible with classical theism? 

Nick said...Steve forgets apparently that a number of us fans of Feser are Protestants who happen to think Aquinas's metaphysics is right on a number of points. He can argue against Catholicism all day and not touch Feser's arguments. It's a straw man and for his audience, a way of poisoning the well.

Can Nick quote where I argued against Feser by arguing against Catholicism? Where did Nick come up with that? 

Nick said...Well that's amusing. I've been a fan of Feser for sometime, long before Steve went after him. It's why I hope to have him on my show sometime.
Steve's problem was that he kept equating classical theism with Thomism…

Can Nick quote me on that? I focus on Thomism because Feser is…a Thomist. Isn't that self-explanatory? 

 and made too many comments about Catholicism.

I compared Feser to other Catholic philosophers. What's wrong with that? 

 The debate over Catholicism for me is neither here nor there. It's one of the issues I don't look into and have no desire to. My time is limited.

I'd say that's the reductio ad absurdum of Resurrection apologists. Nick has no desire to have correct views on the scope of the canon, Biblical hermeneutics, Pauline justification, the sufficiency of the atonement, salvation by grace, the afterlife (i.e. Purgatory), the cult of the saints, Marian dogmas, &c. 

Ismael said...I think you made "Steve" cry... I hope he does not rust.

Isn't that clever?

Anonymous said...As a scientist and a former staunch Calvinist (now an "almost Catholic") who left the movement in part because of the unavoidable association with young-Earth creationists and ID proponents, I've heard a lot of "Steves" in my day. 

So a "now almost Catholic" sides with Feser. What a surprise.

Everything you've said about "Steve" is true, but unfortunately you are likely spitting into the wind. He and his ilk take "challenges" of their position as confirmation (Jesus said you'd be persecuted, after all), and yet they clearly perceive mere challenges of other positions as tantamount to disproof.

Nothing like armchair psychology as a substitute for reason and evidence.

Gary Black said...--Sorry, I keep moderating myself and have to delete previous comments--
Divine Frenzy,
I found your link very useful. I read the entire exchange and it was one of the things that spurred my first remark. During that exchange it was quite obvious that Steve will interpret Prejean in whatever light is most beneficial for Steve. It casts serious doubt on Steve's ability to do impartial exegesis. [This would be relevant to anyone looking at Steve as any authority on Biblical interpretation.]

Why frame Biblical interpretation in terms of "authorities" rather than who has the best exegetical argument?

My favorite part of the exchange is when Steve says "the purpose and practice of the GHM is widely attested in Scripture itself." Steve's argument is that we should use grammatico-historical method (GHM) and never allegory in our interpretation of Scripture. He states, "Incidentally, there is no such thing as 'moderate' allegorization ... Once you cut the text free from its historical moorings, you’re at sea without a map, compass, or coastline."
I found this hilarious because the New Testament quotes the Old in a way we know contradicts the original meaning of the OT author.

That's a stock allegation which many careful NT scholars have refuted. Gary suffers from self-reinforcing ignorance. 

Greg said...Indeed he does. Take him where TimL quoted him. Feser's critique of the philosophy of nature behind ID does not rely on Thomism. His series of posts on Nagel are themselves a critique of that mechanistic philosophy of nature.
Feser regards the weakness of naturalism (explicit in full-blown naturalism and implicit in ID) as a reason to adopt Thomism, but his critique of it does not rely on Thomism.

It doesn't? Then why is his critique of ID theory couched in explicit reliance on Thomist assumptions? For instance:

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/04/intelligent-design-theory-and-mechanism.html

Steve knows none of this, having by his own admission not read enough of Feser to know better (though he nevertheless insists that he shouldn't have to read Feser).

Perhaps Greg hasn't read (or remembered or understood) enough of Feser. to know better. 

Charles said...I have to say that after reading Steve's blog, I agree there is little there, other than name dropping and more name dropping. I am sure the guy is well read. So, I think that was the mission, rather than to critically examine Feser. In fact, he falls prey to his own critique of Feser, with regard to being more of a follower than a thinker. Most intellectually driven Reformed thinkers tend to do that. "Is it Van Tillian? Ok. Then I'm for it. Is it Schaefferian presuppositionalism? Then I am against it." That's nice to know how you feel, Mr. Reformed guy...but do us a favor and embellish a bit more on what you're saying.

Can Charles quote me on that? "Is it Van Tilian? Ok." Where do I say that?

Alyosha said...So, let me get this straight. The same guy ("Steve") who said this:
//A misunderstanding can be more philosophically fruitful than a correct understanding (of a philosopher's actual position). For what ultimately matters in philosophy is the truth or falsity of the idea, not the truth or falsity of the attribution. //
...also says that the only reason to be interested in the compatibility of Thomism and ID is "vested interest in Thomism"?
I thought what ultimately mattered in philosophy was the truth or falsity of the idea as opposed to the attribution. Shouldn't anyone interested in ID be interested in the arguments that have been made against it? And, shouldn't any Christian interested in ID be interested in whether it is compatible with Classical Theism (the historically dominant position among Christian thinkers)?
This Steve guy seems like a joke...

It's because what ultimately matters in philosophy is the truth or falsity of the idea that the only reason to judge ID theory by Thomism is if you grant the truth of Thomism. So the joke is on Alyosha. 

Finally, we're treated to an intelligent comment:

Mr. Green said...

Jeremy Taylor: I do think it incorrect though that ID is incompatible with Classical Theism. Maybe this is because I'm not sure what is being referred to as ID.

Since it's not a trademarked term, it is typically abused as much as "evolution" or "creation" in such arguments, and hence many discussions that employ the phrase are worthless from the get-go (well, Internet discussions, certainly... but then Sturgeon's Law surely applies here).

Does ID have to refer to a well-developed and mechanistic philosophical position, or can it just refer to scientific and mathematical critiques of the science of Darwinism?

I'd say neither, if we go by a reasonable definition that takes it primarily to have something to do with "intelligence" and "design". (Also, it depends on what we mean by "darwinism"... did I mention how badly terms get abused in any discussions about special evolution?)

It seems clear to me that the central point of interest in ID is that notion that some things clearly demonstrate their deliberate design (as opposed to being merely accidentally ordered, or showing "as-if" intentionality). And I take it as obvious that this is so: for example, if you found a pile of papers printed with Hamlet on the floor of a printers' shop, it wouldn't violate any law of physics to suppose that tray after tray of type accidentally fell over and marked up some pages, but nobody would actually believe that a complete and accurate copy of Hamlet "just happened" to tip over. And if ID is taken to mean a scientific claim, we can certainly be more precise and calculate how many possible possible positions a tray of type could fall into, etc., and come up with an empirically-based (un)likelihood. All of which is obviously compatible with classical theism. (Questions about biological evolution are of course a particular application of this principle — what the answer turns out to be when we ask ID questions about biology is something for biologists to figure out.)

Helping Feser think

Ed Feser is miffed by a post I did:

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/04/corrupting-calvinist-youth.html

Strangely, he spends most of his time faulting me for failing to hit a target I was never aiming at in the first place. 

Another funny thing is how he initially takes umbrage at what I said about him, then in a roundabout way admits that what I said was true. Take this:

Now, he’s right that I’m a critic of ID theory.  But his philosophy-by-power-browsing method has failed him badly if he thinks that my criticisms boil down to: “Well, it isn’t Thomism, ergo…”  First of all, as I have emphasized many times, I have two main problems with ID theory.  First, I hold that it presupposes, even if just for methodological purposes, a seriously problematic philosophy of nature. 

And what, pray tell, is the corrective? Wanna bet it's Thomism?

Second, I hold that it tends to lead to a dangerously anthropomorphic conception of God that is incompatible with classical theism.  

And the version of classical theism he espouses is…Thomism!

Now, to take the second point first, lots of classical theists are not Thomists. 

A red herring, inasmuch as that's the kind of classical theist he is.

And I imagine there are lots of people who might find it worthwhile inquiring whether classical theism and ID theory are compatible whether or not they are classical theists, or Thomists, or ID theorists for that matter. 

Unless you have a vested interest in the truth of Thomism, why would you find it worthwhile to make Thomism the frame of reference in evaluating ID theory? 

To come to my other line of criticism of ID, it is true that my reasons for rejecting the philosophy of nature that underlies ID theory are Aristotelian reasons, and Thomists are Aristotelians.

A backdoor admission conceding my original point.

However, this in no way entails that these reasons should be regarded as “philosophically unenlightening” to those who happen not to be Thomists. 

Once again, unless you have a vested interest in the truth of Thomism, it's philosophically unenlightening to judge ID theory by that yardstick.

For one thing, you don’t need to be a Thomist to find it of interest whether ID theory is compatible with Aristotelianism.  Not all Aristotelians are Thomists -- for example, many contemporary neo-Aristotelian metaphysicians and philosophers of science are not Thomists -- so that if ID theory is incompatible with Aristotelianism, it isn’t just Thomists who will reject ID’s underlying philosophy of nature.

Is "Ed" suggesting that Aquinas didn't modify Aristotelianism? So it's not like we're comparing pure Aristotelianism to ID theory. Aquinas has a very different concept of God than Aristotle. Does "Ed" think one's philosophy of nature is unrelated to one's concept of the Creator?

And as with the relationship between classical theism and ID theory, the relationship between Thomism and ID theory should be of philosophical interest in itself. 

Unless you think Thomism is true, why is that relationship philosophically interesting? Showing us that ID theory isn't Thomism doesn't show us that ID theory is false, unless we assume that Thomism is true. It's understandable why "Ed" makes Thomism the standard of comparison. But unless you're invested in the truth of Thomism, that's a tendentious criterion. 

(For example, if it turns out that Thomism and ID theory really are incompatible, surely this can be “philosophically enlightening” for those who are drawn to Thomism…

"Drawn to Thomism." Proves my point. 

…but don’t know what to make of ID theory, or who are drawn to ID theory but don’t know what to make of Thomism.) 

If they don't know what to make of ID theory, then the analysis should begin with an exposition of ID theory, not an exposition of Thomism. Showing how ID theory is unlike Thomism is a poor way of evaluating ID theory, just as showing how a dog is unlike a chair isn't terribly informative about the nature of dogs. 

Finally, I have, of course, given arguments -- at length, in depth, and in various books and articles -- for the various aspects of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature.  I don’t say: “If you just happen by arbitrary preference to be a Thomist like me, then you should reject ID theory.”  I say:  “Here are the arguments for why you should accept the Aristotelian position vis-à-vis act and potency, substantial form, final causality, etc.; and since ID theory is incompatible with all that, you should reject ID theory.” 

Notice how he keeps conceding my point. Unless you already share his Thomistic starting-point, why would you think comparing ID theory to Thomism is an enlightening way to evaluate ID theory?

“Steve,” despite his touching concern for the sound formation of “aspiring Reformed philosophers,” does not answer, or indeed even seem to be aware of, any of these philosophical arguments.

In my younger days I read many Thomists expounding Aquinas. But it was never the stated aim of my post to assess Thomism. 

But when a Thomist [or a Leibnizian, or a naturalist, or whatever] offers arguments for a position, it is no good for an “aspiring philosopher” to say: “Well, I’m not a Thomist [or a Leibnizian, or a naturalist, or whatever], so I don’t find all that ‘philosophically enlightening.’”  An “aspiring philosopher” should respond to the damn arguments.  Awful luck for those who would prefer to limit their philosophical investigations to the “admittedly cursory” kind, but there it is. 

Which misses the point. HIs critique of ID theory is only cogent if you already agree with his arguments for Thomism. 

BTW, he's rather conceited to act as if, unless you've read his arguments for Thomism, you're not qualified to judge the merits of Thomism. What if you've formed your opinion of Thomism based on other Thomists who are frankly far more eminent in the field than "Ed"?  

Finally, every aspiring philosopher must severely limit his philosophical investigations. Feser is a specialist on Thomism, and related philosophers. He's investigated Thomism far more deeply than many other philosophical traditions. 

As a practical necessity, philosophers, including aspiring philosophers, must make cursory judgments about where to invest their time. "Ed" is just being silly.

That’s it.  That’s all he says about the matter.  Do you hear that, “aspiring Reformed philosophers”?  Feser’s views have been challenged!  That never happens to serious philosophers.

No. That's not all I said. In fact, he quotes me saying more than that. I went on to say, as he himself quotes me saying:

Consider the running debates between his blog and Uncommon Descent.

Anyone with Internet access can mouse over to Uncommon Descent or Evolution News, input "Feser" or "Thomism" in the search box, and pull up extensive responses to his "damn arguments." It's not incumbent on me to do that for them. They can do their own research. 

The funny thing is that “Steve” never actually cites a case where I claim that something is true merely because Aquinas or some prominent Thomist like Cajetan said it…

Another funny thing is that "Ed" never actually quotes me attributing that claim to him.

...or where I have rejected a claim merely because it deviates from Aquinas or from the Thomist tradition…

By his own admission, he's judging ID theory by Thomism. 

Then we're treated to "Ed's" deliciously bungled refutation:

“Steve” piously avers, as if he were saying something I would disagree with: 

From an intellectual standpoint, a misinterpretation can be more useful than a correct interpretation. Suppose you improve on Aquinas by unintentionally imputing to him a better theory than he held. That's bad exegesis, but good philosophy. 

Yet compare this passage from my book Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction: 

No great philosopher, no matter how brilliant and systematic, ever uncovers all the implications of his position, foresees every possible objection, or imagines what rival systems might come into being centuries in the future.  His work is never finished, and if it is worth finishing, others will come along to do the job.  Since their work is, naturally, never finished either, a tradition of thought develops, committed to working out the implications of the founder’s system, applying it to new circumstances and challenges, and so forth.  Thus Plato had Plotinus, Aristotle had Aquinas, and Aquinas had Cajetan – to name just three famous representatives of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Thomism, respectively.  And thus you cannot fully understand Plato unless you understand Platonism, you cannot fully understand Aristotle unless you understand Aristotelianism, you cannot fully understand Thomas unless you understand Thomism, and so on.  True, writers in the traditions in question often disagree with one another and sometimes simply get things wrong.  But that is all the more reason to study them if one wants to understand the founders of these traditions.

Except that "Ed" does disagree with what I said, because when "Ed" proceeds to quote himself, he's makes the opposite claim. Compare my statement:

A misinterpretation can be more useful than a correct interpretation. Suppose you improve on Aquinas by unintentionally imputing to him a better theory than he held.

with his:

True, writers in the traditions in question often disagree with one another and sometimes simply get things wrong.  But that is all the more reason to study them if one wants to understand the founders of these traditions.

"Ed" is stressing the importance of correctly understanding the philosopher in question. I said just the opposite. A misunderstanding can be more philosophically fruitful than a correct understanding (of a philosopher's actual position). For what ultimately matters in philosophy is the truth or falsity of the idea, not the truth or falsity of the attribution. 

Is "Ed's" judgment so clouded by personal pique that he can't tell the difference between black and white? 

But to be fair, “Steve” can’t have been expected to see passages like that, since it would require actually bothering to read someone’s work before criticizing it; and that, it seems, is not an approach to research he would commend to “aspiring Reformed philosophers.” 

Except for the awkward little fact that in the very passage where "Ed" is quoting himself, in application to my statement, he botches his attempted refutation. Evidently, "Ed" can't be bothered to understand what he himself has written. 

Then there’s all that non-existent work of mine synthesizing Aristotelian and Kripkean insights; synthesizing Aristotelian insights and insights drawn from Karl Popper; defending the principle of sufficient reason, despite its origins in Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism, against Gilsonian Thomists who reject it as a foreign import (Scholastic Metaphysics pp. 138-40)...

Except for the awkward little fact that I quote him verbatim on his purity as a classical Thomist. It's up to him, not me, to square that with extraneous influences to the contrary.