Unitarian propagandists like Dale Tuggy act as though numerical identity presents a challenge unique to the Trinity. However, the relationship between personal identity and numerical identity is a source of ancient and perennial philosophical dispute. In that regard, the Trinity at best belongs to a family of similar puzzles. Insofar as there's a point of tension between personal identity and numerical identity, there are different strategies for broaching that issue. What gives?
For instance, can the same object have incompatible properties? If an object undergoes change, it has incompatible properties at different times. But in that case, what makes it the same object? Or is it the same object?
Am I the same individual I was yesterday? Due to successive thoughts, my mental state is never the same from one minute to the next.
Likewise, is it meaningful to speculate on what might have been? How would I be different if I was an orphan? Or if I am an orphan, how would I be different if I wasn't an orphan?
By the same token, how do we finessed the mind/body problem?
i) Most thinkers take personal identity as fundamental. If that's in tension with numerical identity, they make necessary adjustments to numerical identity.
ii) Some thinkers like Hume and Buddhists relieve the point of tension by denying personal identity. They take the radical step of denying one side of the tension. That resolves the puzzle, but at a high cost, by relocating difficulty.
iii) Some thinkers like McTaggart and Gödel relieve the point of tension by denying the reality of time and change. They take the radical step of denying another side of the tension. That resolves the puzzle, but at a high cost, by relocating the difficulty.
iv) Or take the vexed question of transworld identity. Some thinkers relieve the tension by denying the truth-value of counterfactuals. They take the radical step of denying one side of the tension. That resolves the puzzle, but at a high cost, by relocating the difficulty.
v) Some thinkers resolve the mind/body problem by denying consciousness. They take the radical step of dyeing one side of the tension. That resolves the puzzle, but at a high cost, by relocating the difficulty.
When it comes to the Trinity, I'm not doing anything unusual. I'm making the same move most thinkers make in relation to other puzzles regarding numerical identity. There's nothing exceptional about the Trinity in that regard.
By contrast, unitarians like Tuggy are opting for the radical, eccentric strategy of Hume, Buddhists, McTaggart, and eliminative materialists by denying one side of the (alleged) tension.
"Unitarian propagandists like Dale Tuggy act as though numerical identity presents a challenge unique to the Trinity."
ReplyDeleteThis is an ignorant statement, in at least four ways. First, there is no "the Trinity" - no one Trinity theory. Second, of the Trinity theories, some have obvious problems of coherence that have something to do with identity, but others don't - they vary quite a lot. Third, it is not just unitarians who see pitfalls for Trinity theories having to do with identity, but it is all the trinitarian analytic theologians who build Trinity theories! These guys: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/ Fourth, no one, least of all me, thinks that it is only or mainly Trinity theories that have problems of coherence relating to identity. The indiscernibility of identicals is deployed commonly against, e.g. materialistic accounts of mind, and objections involving identity are all over discussions of personal identity through time. Reasoning using the concept we represent with = in modern logic is all over contemporary metaphysics.
All these metaphysical puzzles you bring up, there is a broad consensus that these are not really about our concept of numerical identity, but rather about persons, time, change, etc. Only the small minority of "relative identity" theorists disagree.
"When it comes to the Trinity, I'm not doing anything unusual. I'm making the same move most thinkers make in relation to other puzzles regarding numerical identity."
What, pray tell, would this "move" be? "Preserving tensions"? Like, between monotheism and there being three beings, each of whom has all the divine attributes?
The comparison between eliminating types in philosophy and unitarian Christians is a poor one, as the Trinity isn't an obviously existing reality like the self or real change. Rather, its existence is inferred, for theoretical reasons. (Supposedly, it best explains what is in the NT.) Unitarians are more like nominalists, deniers of Platonic universals, who think the postulated entities cause more problems than they solve, and that the observable phenonmena are better explained by a simpler theory, one which involves widely agreed-on realities, and so is "cheaper" (metaphysically speaking) than the rival.
"All these metaphysical puzzles you bring up, there is a broad consensus that these are not really about our concept of numerical identity, but rather about persons, time, change, etc."
DeleteThe broad consensus is to take personal identity as basic, then define/redefine numerical identity to be consistent with personal identity rather than defining/redefining personal identity to be consistent with an austere definition of numerical identity.
"The comparison between eliminating types in philosophy and unitarian Christians is a poor one, as the Trinity isn't an obviously existing reality like the self or real change. Rather, its existence is inferred, for theoretical reasons."
Is God an obviously existing reality like the experience of change, or is God's existence inferred, for theoretical reasons? Consider typical theistic proofs.
"The broad consensus is to take personal identity as basic, then define/redefine numerical identity to be consistent with personal identity rather than defining/redefining personal identity to be consistent with an austere definition of numerical identity."
DeleteThe first part of this is demonstrably false. Please actually look into = as treated in a logic text, like this one. https://www.amazon.com/Power-Logic-Frances-Howard-Snyder-Dr/dp/0078038197/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1527518846&sr=8-1&keywords=the+power+of+logic (An older edition will work too.)
Older theorists, like Locke, tried to define personal identity in terms of other concepts. Recently, some metaphysicians have concluded that personal identity should just be understood as a special case of identity - so then, it's just the identity of *persons*. https://philpapers.org/rec/MERTAN We still argue then about the nature of persons.
"Is God an obviously existing reality like the experience of change, or is God's existence inferred, for theoretical reasons? Consider typical theistic proofs."
I hold to Plantingian views about human knowledge of God; in my view, human knowledge of God needn't be inferred. But (alleged) knowledge that God is a Trinity are another matter. This is neither experienced nor directly testified to in scripture. Yes, it's a matter of theorizing about the texts - although there is testimony here too to be considered - the testimony of many catholic Christians since about 381 AD.
If I talk about early Wittgenstein and late Wittgenstein, am I referring twice to one individual, or once to two individuals? Can the same individual have incompatible properties? How's that consistent with numerical identity? Can the same individual lose properties and gain properties?
DeleteMost metaphysicians treat personal identity as basic, then make whatever sacrifices are necessary to the concept of numerical identity to create elbowroom for personal identity. That's easily documented throughout the history of ideas. Metaphysicians who start with numerical identity, and deny personal identity because change or difference is antithetical to numerical identity, are rare.
But God's existence isn't obvious in the same way change is obvious. One might claim that it's obvious in a different way, but then your comparison breaks down.
DeleteMoreover, is God's existence "Obvious"? Or is it subtle? It's obvious to people who experience God in dramatic ways, but many people don't.