Like a Broken Reppert

Apparently Reppert wasn't clear on my argument, I'll have to repeat it (and add a new one at the end). He writes,

I had asked: "Could it not be rational for a person to say that they have more reason to believe that a predestinating God would not be good than to believe that Scritpure teaches predestination even if, upon the study of the Scripture, they discover that, so far as the biblical evidence is concerned, it is more likely than not that Scripture teaches predestination."

As I said, it depends. Fill your question out more.

Who is this "person?" Is he a Christian? Does he believe in inerrancy?

Say the person is a Christian. Say that they believe in infallibility.

Here's two ways to answer your question:

[1] Sam is a Christian. Sam believes in infallibility (No Error, NE). Sam believes that whatever the Bible teaches is true. If it teaches some teaching T, then ~T is false. Sam also believes that Scripture teaches (a) Calvinism and (b) God is a good God. Sam also believes, by intuition, (c) God is not good if (a). At the same time, (d) Sam believes NE. In this case it would not be rational for Sam to believe (c) given his other beliefs.

So, [1] is a case where the person would be irrational.

Here's another way to read your question:

[2] Sam is a Christian. Sam believes in infallibility NE. Sam believes that whatever the Bible teaches is true. If it teaches some teaching T, then ~T is false. Sam also believes that Scripture does not teach (a) Calvinism. But it does teach that (b) God is a good God. Sam also believes, by moral intuition, (c) God is not good if (a). At the same time, (d) Sam believes NE. In this case Sam is not irrational.

I read your question in sense [2] because of your statement that,

(*) "Could it not be rational for a person to say that they have more reason to believe that a predestinating God would not be good than to believe that Scripture teaches predestination . . .

The italicized portion in (*) indicates that Sam does not believe that the Bible teaches Calvinism.

But on this reading, [2], the best argument for not believing in predestination, for Sam, is because Sam believes that it is not taught in the Bible. Why would a Christian believe a Christian doctrine not found explicitly or implicitly in the Bible? Thus the moral intuition would just be, perhaps, confirmation why Calvinistic predestinarian doctrines aren't found in the Bible.

Here's another way to look at your question:

[3] Sam is a Christian. Sam does not believe in infallibility NE. Sam does not believes that whatever the Bible teaches is true. If it teaches some teaching T, then ~T might be true or false. Sam also believes that Scripture does teach (a) Calvinism. And, it does teach that (b) God is a good God. Sam also believes, by moral intuition, (c) God is not good if (a) is true. At the same time, (d) Sam does not believe NE.

In this case Sam is not irrational given this particular set of beliefs. I should say that he is not internally irrational. Sam may be irrational for other reasons. Say he believes ~NE due to cognitive malfunction. Or, he could gain another belief, (e) all Christians should believe in inerrancy, such that he would be internally irrational.

So, in what sense should I read your argument, [1], [2], or [3]?

Victor goes on to say:

"The Triabloggers are claiming that an adequate sense of what it is to be Christ's disciple means that I must believe what I think is most likely to be Scripture's teaching based on biblical evidence alone, regardless of what any other sources of knowledge might provide."

i) Reppert hasn't been debating all "Triabloggers" and so it is unwise to categorize or implicate all of them this way. Maybe they do, maybe they don't. If they do, it's not because of the debate Reppert has been engaged in.

ii) I specifically denied this claim. For example, I previously wrote:

"There is nothing we know that contradicts what Scripture teaches. There are some things we think we know that might affect how we interpret a passage. But, we cannot know that the passage teaches X, and also claim to know ~X."

And,

"I never denied that my situation is involved in my exegesis. I never denied that we use extra-biblical knowledge or evidence to help with our exegesis. So I'm not clear on how you think you're arguing against my position, at all."

iii) I know that Steve Hays will use extra-biblical knowledge to aid in interpretation too. In response to Reppert Steve said,

"If, in fact, it conflicts with something else we *know*. But Reppert isn’t talking about something he knows to be true. Rather, he’s appealing to his vague moral intuitions."

iv) So Reppert is, as has been his forte this entire debate, forging ahead with critiques of us without reading what we write. Or, at best, skimming what we write.

This kind of tactic is not epistemically virtuous.

v) The point is that if you are Christ's disciple, and you believe he is divine, and Christ says X, you don't say, ~X, you say, "Yes Lord." Remember, Peter is the one who said, "I will never betray you Lord. Not I!" Peter probably had strong intuitions, and reasons, to the effect that he would not deny Jesus; once, let alone three times!

"What is in my way, they suggest, is my arrogant refusal to humble myself. They haven't quite said that I am not a Christian, but they have suggested that my devotion to Christ is massively deficient."

i) Again with the "they." I have purposefully refrained from any statement to this effect so that I could avoid the Arminian peanut gallery turning attention from this debate to things irrelevant to the argument.

ii) Again, what is your developed story. If you believe that Scripture teaches X, and you believe in inerrancy, but you continue to believe ~X, then, yes, you are arrogant and irrational. This was proved by [1] above.

Lastly,

Or how about this from John Wesley;

This is the blasphemy clearly contained in the horrible decree of predestination! And here I fix my foot. On this I join issue with every assertor of it. You represent God as worse than the devil; more false, more cruel, more unjust. But you say you will prove it by scripture. Hold! What will you prove by Scripture? That God is worse than the devil? It cannot be. Whatever that Scripture proves, it never proved this; whatever its true meaning be. This cannot be its true meaning. Do you ask, "What is its true meaning then?" If I say, " I know not," you have gained nothing; for there are many scriptures the true sense whereof neither you nor I shall know till death is swallowed up in victory.

Now my response to this is for the purpose of our objective debate, not to call you or Wesley non-Christian.

I maintain that your agreement with Wesley either forces you to be inconsistent in your arguments against me, or forces you to allow one of my main arguments to go through.

When I resorted to Skeptical theist arguments, resorted to mystery and the secret council of God, you responded:

REPPERT: "It seems we should prefer positions that offer something in the direction of an explanation over positions that offer nothing."

And,

REPPERT: "If you have one scientific theory that says "I have no idea why there are gaps in the fossil record" and someone else says "I have a way of telling you how they got there" the second theory has an advantage."

And,

REPPERT: "As I see it, there is an epistemic cost involved in appealing to mystery and unknown or unknowable reasons, and so you want to bring that pitcher in as late in the game as possible."

And,

REPPERT: "It's my contention, however, that the more you appeal to mystery, the worse it is for you epistemically. The more of an explanation you can have for suffering, the better your theology is, all things being equal."

That's enough.

So, it is my contention, that Victor's endorsement of Wesley offers evidence against his previous responses to my arguments to the effect that he must (a) admit my arguments are sufficient to answer his ethical objections to Calvinism, or (b) self-except himself from his own critiques.