Saturday, April 14, 2007

Touchstone's Pickle

Touchstone has been arguing lately that the laws of logic are possibly not necessary, that TAG is a bad argument, that he objects to arguments that use words like "necessary" etc., etc., etc.

Well, since I've been cursed with a crazy memory, I remember something Touchstone said once on Debunking Christianity which, when coupled with the above, make for some interesting predicaments.

Touchstone had said in a thread last year on Debunking Christianity when asked how he knew something,

"Espistemically, we *don't* know that God got it right this time. I'm not one to point to a deductive production that establishes that."


And therefore according to Touchstone to epistemically know (whatever that means, is there non-epistemic knowledge that is distinct from opinion? If not, then "epistemic knowledge" seems a bit redundant. Anyway...) that P one must be able to "point to a deductive production that establishes that" P.

Despite the problems with this infallibilist constraint on knowledge, Touchstone pretty much ruins anything he says here. Does he know that TAG is a bad argument? No. In fact, given his antipathy towards "words like necessity" why would he even say what he says above! Apparently since he has such a big problem with "necessity," and cringes when us Triabloggers use the word, then he should never try to know anything. Unless, perhaps he will be consistent and say that "point[ing] to a deductive production that establishes that" P doesn't necessitate the conclusion. That is, there could still be a possibility that P is false. If so, then why can't he say that "God got it right this time?" That doesn't require certainty. That doesn't require necessity. And so we must interpret Touchstone as saying that he can't know that P because he can't establish P in a necessary and infallible way. Not only is he tacitly assuming that laws of logic are necessarily true, he's also acted like a hypocrite here. Indeed, since he has such an aversion towards "necessity," especially "logical necessity," then I guess Touchstone doesn't "know" anything! Therefore, all Touchstone has been doing here is offering his opinion on matters. Why someone debates so vigorously and in such a long winded way about matters of opinion is beyond me. But perhaps I'm wrong. Perhaps Touchstone is the sort of fellow that stands out in front of Baskin And Robbins ice cream shop debating people about whether chocolate tastes better than vanilla.

This is what happens to people with bad philosophy. People who don't bother to think through their system. People who say things without thinking them through. Touchstone said he doesn't like philosophy. Perhaps if he didn't hate it so much he'd avoid silly mistakes like the one above. Now, if he wants to deny his internalist and infallibilist constraint on knowledge, fine. Then he's wrong in what he said on Debunking Christianity. He's not a careful and cautious thinker. More like a gun man who fires wildly with his M-60, hoping to hit anything. A sniper takes his time, systemizes his thoughts. But Touchstone hates sniping. Takes too much intellectual time and effort. Better to blaze away. Touchstone is the Kamikaze of apologists, not the Bob Lee Swagger. In order to "save" his faith, he must make knowledge unatainable. In order to save himself, he kills himself. He knows he's going down, so he takes others with him.

13 comments:

  1. You admit that formal proof that Christianity is true is not (yet) available to you. So doesn’t that mean that your assent is merely a result of your subjective opinion? You *believe* your reasons are good ones, but, then, you could be wrong. Other equally intelligent folks disagree with you by virtue of *their* subjective opinions. There is, after all, no *objective* standard of cogency to measure one’s views against.

    And so you admit you’re sealed off from strict formalism even as you snub T-stone for his mere “opinion”. Yet, what species of knowledge are we left with if both formal proofs *and* our subjective inclinations (opinions) are off the table? Is it not patently obvious that there is no middle ground?

    As I see it, you and T-stone come to the Faith via faith (subjectivity ‘writ large’), but you’re loathe to grant to him any common ground. You and he are brothers in the faith, but your intellectual vanity presents you with a formidable stumbling block.

    Andrew

    ReplyDelete
  2. Uh, Andrew seems to have a bit of a problem paying attention. Hopefully he reads this and tries to actually understand something rather than just being so amped up to “refute a theist.”

    “You admit that formal proof that Christianity is true is not (yet) available to you.

    No, actually I don’t. In fact, I have a formal proof in the other thread. In fact, coming up with formal proofs is easy. I could do it all day long. The problem is coming up with a *cogent* proof.

    Look, most people would say that this is a formal proof for Socrates’ mortality:

    1. All men are mortal.

    2. Socrates is a man.

    3. Therefore Socrates is mortal.

    Now, if you didn’t want to question the premises, this would work just fine. But suppose that you question P1. How do we know this? It’s not the *essence* of man. It’s not analytic. We haven’t checked all men. And, the only way we’ll verify it when it comes to us is posthumously. Or, what about P2. Perhaps Socrates was a robot? How do we know he was a man. So, if you granted the truth of the premises, or didn’t deny them, then this would be a formal proof, for you, wherein the conclusion was necessitated by the premises. Or, you may still accept it because you find doubting the premises to be irrational. Now, if someone was dead set to deny the premises, where would you go?

    “doesn’t that mean that your assent is merely a result of your subjective opinion?”

    Andrew, certainly this doesn’t follow, you must agree. It’s not my belief that one must have a “formal proof” for P in order to ascend to P. That one doesn’t have a deductive argument for a conclusion C does not imply that one accepts C based on *subjective opinion.* For starters, one could base it of *induction.* One could “just know.” Have a tacit knowledge. The belief could be basic, not in need of propositional evidence for the rational acceptance of the belief. All sorts of things. So, you’ve simply shown how skilled in non sequiturs you are, that’s all.

    “You *believe* your reasons are good ones, but, then, you could be wrong.”

    Well, first off, you’re free to shift the goal posts for Touchstone, but you’re not addressing *my post* with your comment. It was *Touchstone* who placed the infallibilist constraint on knowledge, not me. Second, unless you’re prepared to argue infallibilist, I deny that one does not know that P if one is not epistemically certain that P where epistemic certainly implies that there is no broadly logical possibility that they might be wrong.

    “Other equally intelligent folks disagree with you by virtue of *their* subjective opinions.”

    And by now we’ve put this little canard to bed. And, in fact, this has nothing to do with the context of my post on Touchstone. If anything, you should be commenting on his hypocrisy. It is *him* who railed against us for “necessity” but here he says that to know that P, P must necessarily be the case.

    “There is, after all, no *objective* standard of cogency to measure one’s views against.”

    This is, after all, your subjective opinion, and so I have no objective reason to accept it, Andrew. And, one wonders how Andrew has objective access to the universe such that he can say that there is *no* objective standards. So, Andrew, you might want to avoid the self-undermining comments in the future.


    “And so you admit you’re sealed off from strict formalism even as you snub T-stone for his mere “opinion”.

    Well (a) no I don’t and (b) that’s not why I “snubbed” T-stone. I snubbed T-stone for his double standard. His hypocrisy. His inattention to detail.

    “Yet, what species of knowledge are we left with if both formal proofs *and* our subjective inclinations (opinions) are off the table?”

    I’ve already demonstrated that this objection is misplaced. Second, it appears that Andrew conflates knowledge with *both* formal deductive proofs and subjective opinion. This is an odd statement he’s making. Lastly, say my “species” of knowledge was largely externalist with some caveats for a kind of internalism allowed as well.

    “Is it not patently obvious that there is no middle ground?”

    Not to me, especially if one has the presupposition that all ground is God’s ground. So, I guess you could assume the falsity of Christian theism to make your point, but other than begging the question, what other reasons could you give me for your statement. After all, it shouldn’t be too hard considering that it’s “obvious.”

    “As I see it, you and T-stone come to the Faith via faith (subjectivity ‘writ large’), but you’re loathe to grant to him any common ground.”

    Well, you’ve admitted that “the way you see it” is simply your “subjective opinion” and so I, frankly, care little about your mere opinion on the matter. Secondly, T-stone and I do have common ground. So do you and I. But, just because you *don’t like* my answer to this doesn’t mean it’s false or that I should be somehow worried that an atheist disagrees with me. That’s about as worrisome as a cloudy day, to tell you the truth.

    “You and he are brothers in the faith, but your intellectual vanity presents you with a formidable stumbling block.”

    And of course this is just your opinion on the matter. So we have no reason to listen to you.

    Anyway, hope that helped, Andrew

    ~PM

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  3. “You admit that formal proof that Christianity is true is not (yet) available to you.

    No, actually I don’t. In fact, I have a formal proof in the other thread. In fact, coming up with formal proofs is easy. I could do it all day long. The problem is coming up with a *cogent* proof.

    Look, most people would say that this is a formal proof for Socrates’ mortality:

    1. All men are mortal.

    2. Socrates is a man.

    3. Therefore Socrates is mortal.

    Now, if you didn’t want to question the premises, this would work just fine. But suppose that you question P1. How do we know this? It’s not the *essence* of man. It’s not analytic. We haven’t checked all men. And, the only way we’ll verify it when it comes to us is posthumously. Or, what about P2. Perhaps Socrates was a robot? How do we know he was a man. So, if you granted the truth of the premises, or didn’t deny them, then this would be a formal proof, for you, wherein the conclusion was necessitated by the premises. Or, you may still accept it because you find doubting the premises to be irrational. Now, if someone was dead set to deny the premises, where would you go?

    ---
    Uh…Paul, you’re making my point for me. Thanks. If someone were dead set against my premises I’d have no where to go because, as I said, there is no objective metric to hold against him; hence, subjectivity.
    ---

    Andrew, certainly this doesn’t follow, you must agree. It’s not my belief that one must have a “formal proof” for P in order to ascend to P. That one doesn’t have a deductive argument for a conclusion C does not imply that one accepts C based on *subjective opinion.* For starters, one could base it of *induction.* One could “just know.” Have a tacit knowledge. The belief could be basic, not in need of propositional evidence for the rational acceptance of the belief. All sorts of things. So, you’ve simply shown how skilled in non sequiturs you are, that’s all.

    ---
    It *could* be any of those things, yes. But why believe such? You could be wrong, couldn’t you? Induction is vague. I could believe for all sorts of reasons that *seem* basic and *warranted* to *me*. Notions like ‘warrant’ and
    ‘seems’ are still subjective. Anything *could be*. What makes your point of reference better than mine (objectively speaking)?
    ---
    Well, first off, you’re free to shift the goal posts for Touchstone, but you’re not addressing *my post* with your comment. It was *Touchstone* who placed the infallibilist constraint on knowledge, not me. Second, unless you’re prepared to argue infallibilist, I deny that one does not know that P if one is not epistemically certain that P where epistemic certainly implies that there is no broadly logical possibility that they might be wrong.

    ---
    So why should I accept that what you deny is normative? Why should I care what you think? You’re just as infallible as me. Or can you show otherwise (from first principles that all men/women would accept)? Or am I to just accept what PM says is normative, since he is clearly God’s appointed fountainhead of truth and wisdom:)
    ---

    And by now we’ve put this little canard to bed. And, in fact, this has nothing to do with the context of my post on Touchstone. If anything, you should be commenting on his hypocrisy. It is *him* who railed against us for “necessity” but here he says that to know that P, P must necessarily be the case.

    ---
    I don’t pretend to speak for T-stone, but I think he regards ‘Truth’ to be mediated by faith in the final analysis, not irrefutable, water-tight arguments that are indisputable to all.
    ---

    “There is, after all, no *objective* standard of cogency to measure one’s views against.”

    This is, after all, your subjective opinion, and so I have no objective reason to accept it, Andrew. And, one wonders how Andrew has objective access to the universe such that he can say that there is *no* objective standards. So, Andrew, you might want to avoid the self-undermining comments in the future.

    ---
    Okay, please *demonstrate* this *objective* standard. Perhaps I erred in making so sweeping a statement. I’m humble enough to admit I have no formal proof that I’m right. Fact is, I’m not averse to a demonstration to the contrary. I just haven’t seen one thus far. If you can show me such, I’m more than open to it. I’d actually like a ‘God proof’ to shore up my faith. Can you help me, or is this just more bravado?
    ---

    “And so you admit you’re sealed off from strict formalism even as you snub T-stone for his mere “opinion”.

    Well (a) no I don’t and (b) that’s not why I “snubbed” T-stone. I snubbed T-stone for his double standard. His hypocrisy. His inattention to detail.

    ---
    So you (a) have a formal proof to offer us? Let’s see it. And as for (b), what “detail” are you referring to? T-stone appeals to faith, whereas you appeal to…well, I’m not sure what. Not formal proof, it seems, and, apparently, not to your mere opinion either, but, fact is, you’ve yet to elucidate the middle ground that makes your arguments more compelling and logical than your opponent’s.
    ---

    “Yet, what species of knowledge are we left with if both formal proofs *and* our subjective inclinations (opinions) are off the table?”

    I’ve already demonstrated that this objection is misplaced. Second, it appears that Andrew conflates knowledge with *both* formal deductive proofs and subjective opinion. This is an odd statement he’s making. Lastly, say my “species” of knowledge was largely externalist with some caveats for a kind of internalism allowed as well.

    ---
    Demonstration as in formal demonstration, or subjective demonstration? Must be the latter, since you’ve admitted strict formalism is a non-starter for you.
    ---

    “Is it not patently obvious that there is no middle ground?”

    Not to me, especially if one has the presupposition that all ground is God’s ground. So, I guess you could assume the falsity of Christian theism to make your point, but other than begging the question, what other reasons could you give me for your statement. After all, it shouldn’t be too hard considering that it’s “obvious.”

    ---
    Please elucidate this ‘middle ground’ that defeats the need for formalism and subjectivity. As I see it, I can conclude anything on the basis of the appropriate ‘presupposition’. Big deal. Given your faith based ‘presuppositions’, all that you derive therefrom is true *by definition*. So what.
    ---

    “As I see it, you and T-stone come to the Faith via faith (subjectivity ‘writ large’), but you’re loathe to grant to him any common ground.”

    Well, you’ve admitted that “the way you see it” is simply your “subjective opinion” and so I, frankly, care little about your mere opinion on the matter. Secondly, T-stone and I do have common ground. So do you and I. But, just because you *don’t like* my answer to this doesn’t mean it’s false or that I should be somehow worried that an atheist disagrees with me. That’s about as worrisome as a cloudy day, to tell you the truth.

    ---
    In the same vein, why should I care about your subjective opinion? Why is there not complete symmetry in that regard? Also, just because you don’t like *my* answers doesn’t mean they are false. Again, why do you not regard that we are all in the same epistemic boat. Why should I be any more worried than you that I’ve gotten it wrong?
    ---

    “You and he are brothers in the faith, but your intellectual vanity presents you with a formidable stumbling block.”

    And of course this is just your opinion on the matter. So we have no reason to listen to you.

    Anyway, hope that helped, Andrew

    ---
    Yes it is my *subjective* opinion. Would you claim that your opinion that I am wrong is objective? On what basis? It must be on the basis of something other than a formal proof (as you’d surely agree) and yet still remain objective and irrefutable. So where do you begin in *demonstrating* your thesis???
    ---

    andrew

    ReplyDelete
  4. Andrew, conversation is a two way street. If you’re not going to make an effort to understand things I say, or to avoid obvious objection which are inherent in my answers, then why comment?

    ANDREW: “Uh…Paul, you’re making my point for me. Thanks. If someone were dead set against my premises I’d have no where to go because, as I said, there is no objective metric to hold against him; hence, subjectivity.”

    Uh… Andrew, you fail to ingest what was said. Let me help you buy walking you back through the discussion:

    * Andrew said that Paul has to admit that a formal proof that Christianity is true is not available to me.

    * Paul responded that indeed there are formal proofs available to me, but none such that the premises where universally agreed upon by all men.

    * Andrew says that this makes his point (I.e., that Paul admits no formal proof are available for him) because someone else may not accept my premises.

    Certainly we all here can see that Andrew’s point doesn’t follow. It does not follow that *I* have no formal proof *FOR ME* because *SOMEONE ELSE* may deny a premise I accept. Andrew’s question wasn’t whether I denied whether I had a formal proof that *ALL MEN ACCEPTED.* It was simply whether Paul admits that a formal proof was not available *TO PAUL.* So, Andrew’s comeback to my claim simply fails to understand *THE CONTEXT* of the discussion. What’s so bad is that this was the context *HE BROUGHT UP.*

    So, I gave an example of a formal proof for someone S in which the premises could be doubted by someone else S*. That S* can doubt the truth of the premises does not mean that S has to doubt the truth. And, S does not need to believe that the premises are *necessarily* true in order to have a formal proof. It is not the case that all the premises need to be necessarily true in all possible worlds for a deductive argument to work. There are possible worlds where this Andrew kid could be intelligent. But, in this world that’s not the case. So, Andrew’s benightedness could be used in a premise, even though his nullifidian benightedness isn’t necessarily true in all possible worlds. For some reason Andrew thinks that because someone might doubt the premises that means there’s a problem for someone who doesn’t doubt the truth of the premises. So, in this answer he’s bumbled the context, and then supplied no reasons for what his argument enthymematically assumes.

    ANDREW: It *could* be any of those things, yes. But why believe such? You could be wrong, couldn’t you? Induction is vague. I could believe for all sorts of reasons that *seem* basic and *warranted* to *me*. Notions like ‘warrant’ and ‘seems’ are still subjective.”

    The context here was that Andrew said that if I don’t have a “formal proof” for some proposition P then my assent to P must be “subjective opinion.” I then denied this infallibilist constraint on knowledge, and Andrew’s comeback was, among other things, “You could be wrong, couldn’t you.” That’s some first class question begging there! Rather than prove his infallibilist constraint in the wake of my denial of said constraint, Andrew just continues to assume it as if he thinks that when I deny the infallibilist constraint in situation A, perhaps he’ll get lucky and I won’t apply it in situation B. He then says that “warrant” is subjective. I don’t know what he means here. What if warrant is defined as that quantity, enough of which turns true belief into knowledge. A belief B has warrant for a person S if B is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, functioning in an epistemic environment sufficiently similar to the one S's cognitive faculties were designed for, the design plan governing the production of B has as a function or purpose the production of true beliefs, the design plan is a good one, and S has no undefeated-defeaters for B. Now, this is “subjective” in the sense that it’s talking about *my* cognitive equipment. But I don’t see how it’s subjective in an epistemic sense. I’m not saying this is like chocolate ice cream. And then he asks why I should believe things like “all men are mortal” or that ‘Socrates was a man.” Well, because I think it’s irrational to doubt those things. Why should I doubt that all men are mortal? What reasons does Andrew give us to cause us to doubt the truth of the proposition in question? His infallibilist constraint? Sorry, that’s not good enough for me. If the *possibility* of being wrong about any proposition is enough to say that we shouldn’t believe the proposition, then Andrew shouldn’t believe *THAT* proposition. And, once he denies *that* proposition, he must deny his argument against me.


    ANDREW: “So why should I accept that what you deny is normative? Why should I care what you think? You’re just as infallible as me. Or can you show otherwise (from first principles that all men/women would accept)? Or am I to just accept what PM says is normative, since he is clearly God’s appointed fountainhead of truth and wisdomJ”

    This is in response to my denial of his infallibilist constraint. Andrew wants to know why he should drop his claim. I would think it would have been obvious, indeed, my post gave a reason why, but here it is: Andrew, you should accept what I say because if you don’t then you must deny the infallibilist constraint (the rather harsh one you’re employing) per your own standards. Now, if you want to say that you can be an epistemological hypocrite, be my guest. So my claim is that according to how Andrew has been arguing here, -- saying that I shouldn’t believe P because I could be wrong about P -- then Andrew shouldn’t believe his infallibilist constraint since “he could be wrong.” Therefore, if Andrew has the desire to stay consistent, he should see how obvious my argument against him is. So, I didn’t just “say” that he should drop it, I actually gave him a reason to do so. Rather than address the reason, he acts as if I just “said so” and threw in a jab about me being God’s appointed minister of truth. So, I was right. Andrew is a 10 yr. old atheist playing games. He has no desire to engage my arguments, he just wants to play the role of immature skeptic. He’s obviously not skilled in his Pyrrhonic escapades, though.

    ANDREW: I don’t pretend to speak for T-stone, but I think he regards ‘Truth’ to be mediated by faith in the final analysis, not irrefutable, water-tight arguments that are indisputable to all.”

    Even if that’s the case, that has nothing to do with my post. I showed how T-stone was a hypocrite. One the one hand he argues about the necessity of logic, on the other hand he gives the impression that one could know with this method because it yields conclusion which are certain and immune from doubt. So, you should at least condemn his hypocrisy, otherwise you seem like an impartial little fella who just has a bone to pick with me. What, did I refute you on ex-Christian dot net a couple years back. Have you been in training all these years? Here to try out your big moves?

    ANDREW: “Okay, please *demonstrate* this *objective* standard. Perhaps I erred in making so sweeping a statement. I’m humble enough to admit I have no formal proof that I’m right. Fact is, I’m not averse to a demonstration to the contrary. I just haven’t seen one thus far. If you can show me such, I’m more than open to it. I’d actually like a ‘God proof’ to shore up my faith. Can you help me, or is this just more bravado?”

    Well, first, it was Andrew who made the claim that “there is no objective standards.” Now, he admits he spoke too fast and wants me to “demonstrate” this to him. But how would I do that? He doesn’t accept any objective standards, so what standard would he judge my argument by? Thus his very answer back to me presupposes that he does think he has an objective standard by which he can judge my argument.

    Next, I doubt he’d *agree* to a subjective standard I laid forth. But that doesn’t mean that it is not objective just because Andrew disagrees with it. So, here is one objective standard: The word of God. This isn’t supported by propositional evidence, and so doesn’t require “demonstration.” In fact, it is self-attesting. It should be treated in an unquestionable fashion. This is external to the human mind and so is not subjective in the relevant epistemic case.

    Now, if he “believes” that the Word of God is not objective, then he “shouldn’t believe” this since “he could be wrong.” And so applying my young padowan’s own standards to my example gives me an out against any rebuttal of his.


    ANDREW: “So you (a) have a formal proof to offer us? Let’s see it. And as for (b), what “detail” are you referring to? T-stone appeals to faith, whereas you appeal to…well, I’m not sure what. Not formal proof, it seems, and, apparently, not to your mere opinion either, but, fact is, you’ve yet to elucidate the middle ground that makes your arguments more compelling and logical than your opponent’s.”

    (b) first. T-stone applied criteria over there which he said was impossible here. T-stone has been simply giving us his opinion here. He’s been arguing so vigorously for only an opinion of his. He also forgot that he wrote what he wrote, apparently. Since at debunking Christianity he implied that laws of logical are necessary and infallible, he denied that here.

    Remember that (a) is in the context of whether I have a “formal proof for Paul Manata.” I don’t what ‘for us” means. Does Andrew mean to say that I should offer a formal proof that he accepts? Or, just lay formal proofs out for him to see? Now, no doubt he’ll disagree with them, but let’s remember the Andrew Criteria AC. AC states that: “why should we believe that P since we could be wrong about P.” And so when Andrew believes that a premise of mine has gone awry, he should drop that belief. If he believes that a premise is false, he should likewise drop that belief. Andrew needs to be a consistent skeptic. So, here are some:

    1. If knowledge then God.

    2. Knowledge.

    3. Therefore God.

    Or

    4. If objective morality then God.

    5. Objective morality.

    6. Therefore God.

    Or

    7. If reason then God.

    8. Reason.

    9. Therefore God.

    Or

    10. God exits or nothing exists;

    11. Not nothing exists; therefore,

    12. God exists. (hey, it’s valid and I accept the premises!)

    As Michael Butler wrote in his article on transcendental arguments:

    “For x (some aspect of human experience) to be the case, y must also be the case since y is the precondition of x. Since x is the case, y is the case.”

    And that would proceed like this:

    13. ~A: (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.

    14. (~A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility

    15. (~B): There is intelligible experience (Contradiction!)

    16. (~ ~A): It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)

    17. (A): --> God does exist (Law of negation.)

    But (14) can’t be argued for with a Cartesian certainty (e.g., a 4-in-1 God counter). It could be shown by induction, though. But, again, I don’t have a problem accepting this without a God-like certainty which dispels all possible reasons for doubt.

    18. Either naturalism or theism.

    19. Not naturalism.

    20. Therefore theism.

    21. If Jesus resurrected from the dead then Christianity is true.

    22. Jesus resurrected from the dead.

    23. Therefore, Christianity is true.

    24. If God has revealed himself and told us he exists, then he exists.

    25. God has so revealed himself.

    26. Therefore God exists.


    Basically, we could do this all day long. Now, of course, the debate will be over the truth, justification, warrant, etc., of the premises. I make no pretenses that these are easy to show. I make no pretenses that every single premise up there is immune from logically possible doubt. But logic in the abstract isn’t ultimate for me anyway. It’s a tool to be used in the service of God. But, despite that, all I was asked to do was to show “formal proofs.” Now, of course Andrew can dispute all the premises, but I don’t need to worry about Andrew since he’s silenced himself. Andrew cannot believe the falsity of any of the premises. Since the “could” be true then, according to him, he “shouldn’t believe that they are not.” Furthermore, Andrew has no basis to trust in the reliability of his cognitive faculties. He thus has an alethic rationality defeater for all his beliefs. So, Andrew can pretty much see his way out of the combox.

    ANDREW: “Please elucidate this ‘middle ground’ that defeats the need for formalism and subjectivity. As I see it, I can conclude anything on the basis of the appropriate ‘presupposition’. Big deal. Given your faith based ‘presuppositions’, all that you derive therefrom is true *by definition*. So what.”

    I never said there was middle ground that defeats the need for formalism and subjectivity. I just said that there was common ground. And, I said what it was. That it’s based in an ultimate presupposition to God’s say-so doesn’t mean “big deal.” Why should I doubt it? Andrew gives me no reason to. Just because he says “big deal?” Well, “big deal” back atcha. And, a proof based upon certain presupposition is not necessarily “true by definition.” And, why does he believe any of this? He “could be wrong” about it all, so shouldn’t he refrain from believing any of it in an objective and rational way?

    ANDREW: “In the same vein, why should I care about your subjective opinion? Why is there not complete symmetry in that regard? Also, just because you don’t like *my* answers doesn’t mean they are false. Again, why do you not regard that we are all in the same epistemic boat. Why should I be any more worried than you that I’ve gotten it wrong?”

    But the problem with AC is that *ANDREW HIMSELF* shouldn’t believe what he says! Now, if Andrew’s answer are *TRUE* then it appears that there is an “objective standard” he’s using. See, Andrew can’t seem to anticipate the problems of his position. For example, how does he know that “just because I don’t like his answers doesn’t mean that they are false?” What objective criteria is he using to determine this? Andrew has hanged himself. He beat himself. I didn’t have to do anything. We are all in the same epistemic boat. We have nowhere to go accept to the Lord of Epistemology. Clinging on to his revelation of the way things are, how man is, our condition, or destiny, our answers, etc. I find that if I don’t accept the word of God then all is an epistemological wasteland. Now, Andrew may say, “So, maybe we’re in an epistemological wasteland.” Okay, and so (a) all those who don’t want to be there, come with me, and (b) Andrew shouldn’t believe he’s in an epistemological wasteland…. *according to Andrew!*

    ANDREW: “Would you claim that your opinion that I am wrong is objective? On what basis? “

    We can start with self-refuting and then work our way out from there. The problem for Andrew is that he has no reason to believe that my opinion that he’s wrong isn’t objective. He needs to remain silent. Stop opening his mouth. Every time he does, he acts as if there are obvious objective rules, ie., mere opinions of humans don’t translate into objective truths about the outside world. But he can’t have these rules, or else he defeats himself. So, he needs to move to Tibet and into a Buddhist compound. There, the wise man doesn’t speak for to speak is to enter into duality. No, the wise man contemplates on the sound of one hand clapping. And that’s what our little atheist friend Andrew should do henceforth.

    ReplyDelete
  5. “Andrew said that Paul has to admit that a formal proof that Christianity is true is not available to me.”

    All along I’ve meant formal proof from premises that *all agree to*, not just Paul. I thought the context made that clear. If not, I apologize.

    “Paul responded that indeed there are formal proofs available to me, but none such that the premises where universally agreed upon by all men.”

    So would you say you have *direct* knowledge of your premises, or just what? I can accept that knowledge doesn’t have to be certain to be true, warranted, rational, but if someone else doesn’t have that same knowledge and/or has different knowledge, are they any less warranted or rational than you? By *their own* lights they wouldn’t be and so it seems reasonable to say we are each ‘stuck’ in our own little box of subjectivity.

    I don’t think saying this makes me a relativist because I do, in fact, *believe* there is an objective fact of the matter. But since I admit I could be wrong, since I lack certainty, and since my cognitive faculties could be deceiving me, I call those beliefs subjective. I say they are true ‘just for me’ but only in the sense that I can’t consider those who disagree to be irrational, and I have no way compel others to believe along with me because I usually have no definitive arguments to offer.

    “Andrew says that this makes his point (I.e., that Paul admits no formal proof are available for him) because someone else may not accept my premises.”

    No, I got the fact that *you* have proofs that not all people accept. I didn’t mean to refer to *that* kind of proof, as I already mentioned. I was actually just attempting to reiterate that you do admit you can’t prove your beliefs to *everyone’s* satisfaction. Maybe I’m belaboring this, but I was trying to underscore that this introduces a subjective element into your belief system: there are certain core beliefs whose truth is a matter of faith (they can’t be deduced or shown). You seem *somewhat* accepting of this characterization but with qualifications that are unclear to me.

    I harp on this because you and others here seem loathe to use the word “faith”, almost as though it is somehow anathema to your theology. Cleary faith must play a role for you, but I don’t see just where or how it ‘fits in’. Getting to the bottom of this faith thing is the critical item for me.

    “We are all in the same epistemic boat. We have nowhere to go accept to the Lord of Epistemology. Clinging on to his revelation of the way things are, how man is, our condition, or destiny, our answers, etc. I find that if I don’t accept the word of God then all is an epistemological wasteland.”

    This is a passionate account of *your* reasons for belief. When other Christians (like T-stone) give *theirs*, you mock them, even though the object of belief is the same. I don't get that. You often come close to equating intellectual disagreement with heresy.

    You make a lot of hay out of falsely imputing to me an “infalliblist constraint on knowledge”. I haven’t made that move so the lion’s share of your post misses the target.

    Andrew

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  6. Andrew already beat himself in the first post. His second post was a meager attempt at defending his self-defeating views in the first. His third post now is an evasive maneuver. The defensive attempts of a man who doesn't know when to say when. Who hates his opponents so much, and hates what they believe or stand for, that he can't stand to lose to them. These types of defenses usually amount to equivocations, backpedaling, and goal post shifting....

    ANDREW: "All along I’ve meant formal proof from premises that *all agree to*, not just Paul. I thought the context made that clear. If not, I apologize."

    Well, he did talk about formal proofs available "to me." Anyway, Andrew's big critique is supposed to be that people disagree with me and my premises? So what? Given the fact that my worldview tells me that people hate God, and the issue is moral, not intellectual, finding people who disagree with my premises is *precisely* what I would expect to find if what my worldview says about anthropology is the case. Therefore, this isn't something that should cause me worry, at all. I think my arguments are good ones. But, proof is not persuasion. And so whittled down, all Anthony's critique says is that people aren't persuaded by my arguments. Okay. I admit I should try to find way to make the case more compelling, more persuasive, more cogent, but that takes nothing away from the proofs qua proofs, just from the proof qua persuasive proofs.

    ANDREW: "So would you say you have *direct* knowledge of your premises, or just what?"

    Some of them, yes. Others have strong inductive support. Others have absurd consequences for denying them, though that doesn't stop many for embracing absurdity. Further, not all things we know need to be fully explicable. Sometimes we "just know." See, for example, some of the work of Polanyi.

    ANDREW: "I can accept that knowledge doesn’t have to be certain to be true, warranted, rational, but if someone else doesn’t have that same knowledge and/or has different knowledge, are they any less warranted or rational than you?"

    But above you denied this. You said that our believing was "subjective opinion" if we didn't have "formal proof" and you apparently meant by that, "premises which are universally agreed upon." And since "knowledge" has always been contrasted with "subjective opinion," even since the time of Plato, I don't know why you'd now say that I can know that P without this formal certainty where the premises are immune from all possible doubt (no matter how wild), but above you said I only had "subjective opinion" that P.

    Secondly, no one has *knowledge* that actually contradicts my *knowledge.*

    Third, the above is extremely vague. There are many scientists and mathematicians who have "different" knowledge than I do. Many specialists do as well. You have different knowledge than I do. So, I don't even know what you're talking about, Andrew. I mean, I don’t have the knowledge of what it feels like for Andrew to be in pain.

    Fourth, perhaps you mean to say that I think those who deny Christianity, or my beliefs about what the Bible teaches, are "irrational." Well, for one, as Plantinga has noted, this term (irrational) is a multifarious one. So, how are you using the term? In some senses they have alethic irrationality, which is translated into a kind of proper function irrationality.

    ANDREW: "I don’t think saying this makes me a relativist because I do, in fact, *believe* there is an objective fact of the matter."

    Unfortunately above you said, QUOTE: "There is, after all, no *objective* standard of cogency to measure one’s views against." END QUOTE

    ANDREW: "But since I admit I could be wrong, since I lack certainty, and since my cognitive faculties could be deceiving me, I call those beliefs subjective."

    Well, not being epistemically certain that P does not imply "subjectivity" about P. You're just using terms poorly.

    Second, how is "could" being used in the sentence "my cognitive faculties could be deceiving me." That there's a wild logical possibility? Because that's not the argument I give against the conjunction of evolution and naturalism. My argument is that this *is* the attitude that you should take toward the reliability of your cognitive faculties. I don't think my cognitive faculties are subject to the same sort of argument, and so *in that sense,* my CFs *could not* be deceiving me. Do I have Cartesian certainty, immune from any and all doubt, no matter how wild, that they are not? No. But that's uninteresting. I have no reason to believe those skeptical arguments where *you do* have a reason to believe my arguments against yours.

    ANDREW: "I was actually just attempting to reiterate that you do admit you can’t prove your beliefs to *everyone’s* satisfaction."

    And my response is to say, "whoopdy do."

    ANDREW: "Maybe I’m belaboring this.."

    Like a broken record.

    ANDREW: "but I was trying to underscore that this introduces a subjective element into your belief system: there are certain core beliefs whose truth is a matter of faith (they can’t be deduced or shown)."

    The subjectivity involved it not of the kind that has any weight against my arguments. You're trading on a common assumption of subjectivity, but then not employing that conception. I mean, in one sense, all beliefs are "subjective" in that they are *my* or *your* beliefs! They are believed by a *subject.*

    And, you mean "they can't be deduced or shown" to *ALL PEOPLE.* First, how do you know?

    Second, my view of faith isn't the one you're hoping people assume in the debate. I agree I accept things on faith, but that is not a "blind, subjective, non- (or ir-) rational leap in the dark." On my view, faith is cognitive. I take things on faith in this context means "I take something on the testimony of another." So, one could say that I grant what I believe by faith one of the strongest positions in my web of beliefs. They are beliefs I have taken from the testimony of a person who cannot lie.

    Third, you act is if I can't "tell others that they are wrong" because of all this. But, then what are you doing here?

    ANDREW: "I harp on this because you and others here seem loathe to use the word “faith”, almost as though it is somehow anathema to your theology."

    Actually that's a lie and a mischaracterization of "us here." We "loathe" *YOUR DEFINITION* of faith.

    ANDREW: "Cleary faith must play a role for you, but I don’t see just where or how it ‘fits in’. Getting to the bottom of this faith thing is the critical item for me."

    Faith can mean, for me, trusting the say-so of another, or trusting in the work or actions of another what you yourself cannot accomplish. It's all extrospective. Regards the first, these beliefs would have warrant if they have warrant for the testifier. Given the Christian worldview, then, I can "know" things based on faith. The second is more involved in salvation (though the first is included in salvation as well). The faith can be weak, very weak. All that matters is *WHO THE FAITH IS IN.* It's *extrospective.* Far from subjectivity here, Andrew.

    ANDREW: "This is a passionate account of *your* reasons for belief. When other Christians (like T-stone) give *theirs*, you mock them"

    Actually Andrew, that's not true and you should know it. First, this is the *first* post I have *ever* directed towards Touchstone. he has been the one to *come after me.* In fact, your argument *should be given against him equally!* Furthermore, this was not an attack on T-stone's reasons for belief. This was an attack on T-stone's hypocritical position. He's the one who denied "necessary" laws of logic and "certainty" but then I quote him as *assuming* what he railed against here. I pointed out that according to what he said, he can't know the things he's said here. This was an internal critique. Touchstone said that to know that P we had to be able to "to point to a deductive production that establishes that" P. This, as you've so painfully seen, is wrought with problems.

    ANDREW: "You make a lot of hay out of falsely imputing to me an “infalliblist constraint on knowledge”. I haven’t made that move so the lion’s share of your post misses the target."

    No, this is an excuse to avoid the arguments.

    You had said,

    * ...what species of knowledge are we left with if both formal proofs *and* our subjective inclinations (opinions) are off the table?

    * But why believe such? You could be wrong, couldn’t you?


    * Why should I care what you think? You’re just as infallible as me.

    I could keep going, Andrew. Now, I understand why you want to pretend that you didn't say all those problematic things above, but you can't deny it.

    You said that since I "could be wrong" about P then "why should I believe" that P.

    So, my counter is, since Andrew could be wrong about everything he's said here, he should not believe what he's said here.

    He says that "there is no knowledge left" of one denies 'certainty.' I appeal to inductive reasoning; he says "that's vague."

    So, Andrew most certainly has insisted on an infallibilist constraint, i just don't think he knew what he was saying and what he was getting into.

    If he doesn't want to deny what he's said above, then since he, "could be wrong," why "should he believe" what he's said above?

    ~PM

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  7. Hi Andrew,

    To reiterate and reinforce some points I've made with you in the past.

    1. Traditionally, epistemology has been preoccupied with second-order knowledge: knowing how we know, or knowing that we know. Preoccupied with proof.

    But I prefer to distinguish between knowledge and proof. And I prefer a more organic model of how we actually come to know things or believe things, rather than taking some ideal of apodictic proof as our frame of reference, and constructing a theory of knowledge around that.

    In this respect I'm more sympathetic to the way in which Newman's illative sense and Polanyi's tacit knowledge capture how and what we can know. I don't agree with everything they say, but I think it's a more realistic model, and, at the same time, spares us from a lot of gratuitous skepticism.

    http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/tacitknowledge.html

    http://www.sveiby.com/Portals/0/articles/Polanyi.html

    http://www.culturaleconomics.atfreeweb.com/Anno/Polanyi%20Tacit%20Knowlng%20RMP%201962.htm

    http://www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/mp-stability.htm

    http://www.newmanreader.org/works/grammar/chapter9.html

    Mitchell, Basil (1990), "Newman as a Philosopher" in Newman after a Hundred Years, eds Ian Ker and Alan G. Hill, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    2. As a Christian I also look in the direction of religious epistemology.

    And there are at least two areas in which it makes a big difference:

    i) Probability & Providence.

    Probability means something very different in a secular worldview than in a Christian worldview.

    To begin with, there's a fundamental difference in what is metaphysically possible or probable depending on your worldview.

    And there is also a big difference in the epistemology of probabilities.

    Suppose we only have probable evidence for some of our religious beliefs. But if we have good reason to believe in divine providence, then the evidence we have is the sampling of evidence that God has chosen to give his people or preserve for posterity.

    And, with that in mind, I think we can be more confident about our reliance on probabilistic reasoning, for if God has wanted us to have more evidence or better evidence, then it was within his power to do so. Hence we are judging certain questions on the basis of the evidence which he has left at our disposal.

    Therefore, we shouldn't be plagued by nagging, gnawing doubts about the possibility of being wrong. Even if I were wrong some of the time, it's out of my hands, and I'm in his hands. As a Christian, I don't require a godlike control over the evidence. I can go with what I've got because it's what God has given me to go by.

    ii) Revelation.

    Revelation is the highest form of reason, for revelation is a disclosure of God's reason to man.

    Therefore, divine revelation is the reference point for human knowledge generally.

    3. Finally, I'd distinguish between proof and truth-conditions. Truth-conditions can't be proven directly because we must make use of them to prove anything else. But that constitutes an indirect form of confirmation.

    And that global framework in turn supplies the basis for local forms of proof and probability.

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  8. Thanks Steve.

    I think I do have something like tacit knowledge of God, but it is damnably generic and vague knowledge. It is the specifics that elude me and that is due mostly, I’m sure, to my highly-skeptical disposition.

    I’ve begun reading the links you’ve provided and I’m anxious to get through them all. I’ve committed myself to being more deliberate and tenacious in trying to work through my issues, and your input has been very helpful.

    Any idea where I can find more info. related to the Reformed view of faith? I’m still very murky on its place in Reformed thinking.

    Andrew

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  9. Anonymous said:

    "Any idea where I can find more info. related to the Reformed view of faith? I’m still very murky on its place in Reformed thinking."

    Traditionally, Reformed theology has presented a rather schematic view of faith. For a more nuanced view, see:

    P. Helm, Calvin's Ideas (Oxford 2004), chapter 9.

    P. Helm, Faith with Reason (Oxford 2000).

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  10. ***********
    ANDREW: "You make a lot of hay out of falsely imputing to me an “infalliblist constraint on knowledge”. I haven’t made that move so the lion’s share of your post misses the target."

    No, this is an excuse to avoid the arguments.

    You had said,

    * ...what species of knowledge are we left with if both formal proofs *and* our subjective inclinations (opinions) are off the table?

    * But why believe such? You could be wrong, couldn’t you?


    * Why should I care what you think? You’re just as infallible as me.

    I could keep going, Andrew. Now, I understand why you want to pretend that you didn't say all those problematic things above, but you can't deny it.
    ***************

    I take full ownership of all the quotes and still you’ve missed:

    The first quote is a question, not a statement of my beliefs about anything. The question still stands, by the way, though the partial answer is that I’ve apparently been using the term ‘subjective’ in a much broader sense than you.

    The second question was somewhat tongue-in-cheek and hyperbolic and was prompted by what in my view is an in-your-face triumphalism on your part that is disproportionate to the strength of your arguments. I half expected that you’d answer that you *couldn’t* possibly be wrong and that only a fool would disagree.

    As for the third quote, see above. But even if it is taken at face value, all it would prove is that I think you only have to be less fallible than me before I’d have to take you seriously.

    And as for your claim that you haven’t “attacked” T-stone: In the course of 2 or three posts you’ve called me an atheist, a liar, and a hater, so clearly you use the term “attacked” (just like “subjectivity”) in a much narrower sense than I.

    You’ve given some partial answers to some of my questions. For that I thank you.

    Andrew

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  11. Andrew,

    Let's say I "attacked" you. That doesn't mean I "attacked" Touchstone.


    Lastly, okay, so you don't hold an infallibilist constraint and therefore the fact that I "could be wrong" doesn't mean that I "should give up" what I belive.

    At the end of the day your beef with me is what you *take* as my "in your face triumphalism." And so, quit ironically, it is *you* who is the subjectivist.

    Triumphalism means one person is wrong, and the other side wins the day. Are you saying that I can't say that one side is wrong because of *the possibility* that they are not?

    Really, I don't even understand your purpose here. It seems as if you just have an axe to grind with me.

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  12. “Let's say I "attacked" you. That doesn't mean I "attacked" Touchstone.”

    I think “attacked” was your word. I used “mock”. I’ll meet you halfway and say you mocked Touchstone and attacked me:)

    ”Lastly, okay, so you don't hold an infallibilist constraint and therefore the fact that I "could be wrong" doesn't mean that I "should give up" what I belive. “

    Paul, not only do I not deny you your belief and certainty, I respect and admire it. Hopefully I’ve made it clear what I *don’t* respect.

    ”At the end of the day your beef with me is what you *take* as my "in your face triumphalism." And so, quit ironically, it is *you* who is the subjectivist. “

    I think I’ve made it clear that I’m subjective, so I’m the last to deny your charge here.

    ”Triumphalism means one person is wrong, and the other side wins the day. Are you saying that I can't say that one side is wrong because of *the possibility* that they are not?”

    No way am I saying that. I think you are a smart and rational person. My only beef is the heavy-handed approach to defending your faith.

    ”Really, I don't even understand your purpose here. It seems as if you just have an axe to grind with me.”

    I can’t resist coming back to this blog because I find it edifying, but I’d, personally, be better served if the polemics were toned down a bit. Even Steve is over-the-top polemical for my taste at times (though he’s always nothing but gracious toward me); you just take it to the next level.

    Not everyone who goads you into a debate is trying to demean you. I goad my friends the same way, but we have an understanding that there is nothing personal about our disagreements, and we always fight fair and give each other the benefit of the doubt.

    Yeah, some of the folks who post here got it coming, but the tit-for-tat gets way out of hand (in my very subjective and humble opinion).

    Andrew

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  13. Andrew,

    I'll be sure to try to live up to your subjective requirments on my life. You are against the absolutists, but then you act like an absolutist. Interesting to watch.

    As far as what you came here to argue, I think I've sufficiently answered you.

    Since, despite what you think, I don't like to get bogged down in petty debates about "so and so did this," and "but you did that," I'll have to bid you farewell.

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