“The reasons [sic] Anderson fails to see the implications of his objections, that they are a rejection of scripture, is the irrational and insane world he lives in and his blind and rabid animus against Clark. All these are demonically motivated and reveal a pathological misology of the lowest sort.”
http://calvinatorium.wordpress.com/2010/03/13/why-james-anderson-is-not-a-clarkian/
What’s ironic about this statement is that I sometimes wonder if Scripturalism is even Christian. You see, Clarkians often talk as though reality is reducible to minds and propositions. But if they are truly serious about this, then Scripturalism is a variant of absolute idealism.
And if Scripturalism is, indeed, a version of idealism, then Scripturalism ceases to be Christian. Not even close.
For if idealism is true, then there is no Incarnation, crucifixion, Resurrection, or return of Christ. These are just mental projections. Illusions of physicality. Esse est percipi. The real is the rational.
In that case, Scripturalism is just another idealistic cult, like Christian Science.
Now, perhaps the Clarkians don’t mean to say what they seem to say. If so, then a clarification from their side would be salutary at this point.
Incidentally, it won’t suffice for them to demand a definition of “physical.” For if they take the position that physicality is indefinable, and whatever is indefinable is unknowable, then that’s an admission on their part that Scripturalism is a variant of absolute idealism.
For if idealism is true, then there is no Incarnation, crucifixion, Resurrection, or return of Christ. These are just mental projections. Illusions of physicality. Esse est percipi. The real is the rational.
ReplyDeleteCan you explain this a little more? Why can't there be an incarnation or a resurrection?
The Incarnation and Resurrection are physical events. If, by contrast, all things are mental entities (e.g. Divine ideas), then there are no physical objects or processes. At best, there are simulated physical objects or processes, like virtual reality.
ReplyDelete"For if idealism is true, then there is no Incarnation, crucifixion, Resurrection, or return of Christ. These are just mental projections. Illusions of physicality. Esse est percipi. The real is the rational."
ReplyDeleteIf all that existed were mental projections, it would not seem to be a strong objection that things other than mental projections fail to exist.
Surely you don't think that the Incarnation and Resurrection are any more real than yesterday, today, or tomorrow.
If the correct label for everyday events is "mental projection" then why would historical events like the Incarnation and Resurrection have a different label?
N.B. I'm not endorsing the "mental projection" idea, but rather simply trying to understand the objection.
Turretinfan said...
ReplyDelete"If all that existed were mental projections, it would not seem to be a strong objection that things other than mental projections fail to exist."
Hypothetically, yes. But the question at issue is factual, not hypothetical.
Is idealism coherent? Perhaps. Is it true? No.
"Surely you don't think that the Incarnation and Resurrection are any more real than yesterday, today, or tomorrow."
The question at issue isn't degrees of reality, but the kind of reality. In what sense are they real? What is their mode of subsistence? That's the question. Are they simply divine ideas? God's concept of the Incarnation?
Or does God's concept of the Incarnation have a spatiotemporal counterpart? Did he instantiate his concept in real time and real space?
It's like the difference between the degree, which is a divine idea, and the realization of his degree in creation, providence, and miracle.
"If the correct label for everyday events is 'mental projection' then why would historical events like the Incarnation and Resurrection have a different label?"
The question is whether that even begins to do justice to what the Bible means by the Incarnation, Resurrection, &c. Without a concrete, physical exemplification, this is not the biblical Incarnation or the biblical Resurrection.
"The question is whether that even begins to do justice to what the Bible means ..."
ReplyDeleteI think you would agree that it would be more problematic if someone said that some things are "physical" and other things are "mental constructs" and placed the Incarnation etc. in the latter category.
That pure idealism is wrong seems almost self-evident.
Well there all kinds of different versions of idealism, if I'm not mistaken. Leibniz's stuff about monads is not really the same as Berkeley's idealism, though they are both considered idealism according to the Wiki.
ReplyDeleteMaybe Clark's version is inconsistent?
Also, I'm wondering how you, Steve, an indirect realist, would reply to Berkeley's argument in favor of idealism from an indirect realism about sense perception on the basis of idealism being more parsimonious (minds and ideas) than indirect realism (minds and ideas and unperceivable objects).
STEVEN SAID:
ReplyDelete“Also, I'm wondering how you, Steve, an indirect realist, would reply to Berkeley's argument in favor of idealism from an indirect realism about sense perception on the basis of idealism being more parsimonious (minds and ideas) than indirect realism (minds and ideas and unperceivable objects).”
1.I think Berkeley raises some valid objections to direct realism.
2.I think theories of perception are to some extent underdetermined by the evidence. Although philosophical considerations can eliminate some contenders, philosophy lacks the resources to single out the correct theory.
3.Apropos (2), there’s a degree of circularity in our chosen theory of knowledge. On the one hand, we select a theory of knowledge based on what we think we cknow. On the other hand, a theory of knowledge selects for what we can know.
4.My theory of knowledge isn’t based on philosophical considerations alone. It is also based on what I think Scripture affirms or disaffirms regarding the objects of knowledge.
5.Berkeleyan idealism is metaphysically simpler than dualism (e.g. indirect realism). However, Occam’s razor involves tradeoffs.
i) There are certain advantages to a world that has physical as well as mental objects. Although it’s possible to simulate physical sensations, sensory simulations are parasitic on our experience of the real thing. For example, dreams simulate physical sensation, yet the furniture of dreams are drawn from genuine physical sensations which we store in memory and then manipulate in our imagination. It’s not clear how an idealistic world could jump-start that process.
ii) Although idealism is metaphysically simpler than dualism, it violates Occam’s razor in another respect. Idealism would be more plausible if the world were like a dream, where we merely experience surfaces. That would be adequate as a theater for mental and moral action.
But the world we experience is a world with many apparently functional substructures. Peel back a layer, and you find another layer underneath.
Take all of the subsystems which comprise the human body. Why, in an idealistic world, would a merely imaginary body have so many useless subsystems? All these intricate, interconnected systems which apparent perform vital biological functions, but, in fact, do nothing?
So idealism is actually quite clumsy and cumbersome at the detailed level, because it multiplies a superfluity of otiose appearances.