It would appear that a troubling consequence of Gordon Clark's view of persons, i.e., that they are identical to the propositions they think, i.e, they are propositions, is that it doesn't have the resources to argue that concepti, fetuses, and newborns should not be aborted or murdered.
Putting aside the incoherence of Clark's view, viz., he makes a distinction between the person and the propositions he thinks when there should be no distinction there, we have something like this:
x = y
x = the person
y = propositions the person thinks.
Now, if x and y are identical, then whatever is true of x is true of y, and vice versa.
Call concepti, fetuses, and newborns, Human Offspring, HO.
HO think no propositions, i.e., the set of propositions the person thinks is empty, it doesn't exist, i.e., y doesn't exist. But, where y does not exist, x does not either. Thus, HO are not human persons.
Two possible responses might be:
1. HO are human beings and it is immoral to end the life of a human being. However, I fail to see how a Scripturalist could argue for this distinction given Scripturalism. Second, it would be metaphysically impossible for a human being to become a human person if the latter is just a complex of propositions (HT James Anderson). I don't find this move to work, then.
2. HO do think propositions. I find this view highly implausible. It just seems false to say that concepti, for instance, have positive cognitive attitudes toward propositions. Indeed, same with a newborn infant. No doubt they have this potential, but it is not actualized yet. A potential to think propositions will not work for Clark's view, though. I am inclined to say that if Clarkians are forced to posit that concepti think in propositions, let alone think at all, this is simply an illustration of how desperate their view of persons is. Lastly, it goes without saying that I don't see how this view would be argued for from Scripture.
Therefore, I don't see how Scripturalists can wax indignant about abortion and infanticide.
Also, don't propositions have qualities that simply cannot apply to humans:
ReplyDelete1. Propositions can be true or false whereas it would not appear to make sense to call a human being true or false.
2. Propositions are immaterial, whereas humans are physical (at least substantially) entities.
Robbins once said that a consciousness that is conscious of nothing is a contradiction.
ReplyDelete"Robbins once said that a consciousness that is conscious of nothing is a contradiction."
ReplyDeleteI know Ayn Rand said that. I gave my Robbins answer to Rand book away and forgot what he said on this. However, concepti aren't "conscious" and, furthermore, the claim doesn't saying anything about what the consciousness is conscious *of*. So the claim is to abstract to work as a response to my specific argument.
AMC,
ReplyDelete1. I assume they would tell you that Jesus is called "truth."
2. They would claim that bodies are not persons.
My arguments gives them their position and derives an unacceptable conclusion.
I suppose "persons" in comatose or other such states aren't persons either.
ReplyDeleteIt seems that in such conditions "person" would be an accidental property of humans.
Jonathan,
ReplyDeleteI suppose they might say that said persons have thought a unique set of propositions and since that set exists that person does, even if comotose. However, that brings up another problem. At the moment, I am of the opinion that two minds could think the same set of propositions. So Clark's view fails at the level of individuation.
But where would the set exist? In the mind of God? Either way, it would still seem to be the case that the comatose "person" is not now thinking any set of propositions and if the person = the propositions the person thinks, then it's not clear to me how a non-propositionally thinking "person" could still be a person. Maybe I've misunderstood the sense in which you mean a person = the proposition a person thinks.
ReplyDeleteIt makes sense to say that two different persons could think the same set of propositions if we assume they have some other underlying substance that differentiates them, but in this case wouldn't it be question begging to assume that two *different persons* can think the same set of propositions?
Furthermore, if saying "the person has in the past thought a set of propositions that exist in the mind of God" is a valid move, then maybe the Clarkian could also say that the fetus will think a set of propositions that exist in the mind of God.
ReplyDeleteJonathan,
ReplyDeleteI presume they'd say that asking *where* the set exists is nonsense. Also, if they mean that the person has to actively think the propositions at all times, then you'd have a point. I wouldn't interpret them that way though. If you do, you don't need a coma to make your point, sleeping makes the point.
"It makes sense to say that two different persons could think the same set of propositions if we assume they have some other underlying substance that differentiates them, but in this case wouldn't it be question begging to assume that two *different persons* can think the same set of propositions?"
Why? Where's the problem? I want them to show me how this is *impossible.* Even the Clarkians thought the question worth answering. They said that first-person indexicals were what made the sets different. I'll assume you can see how easy it is to come up with scenarios that get around this constraint.
Furthermore, if saying "the person has in the past thought a set of propositions that exist in the mind of God" is a valid move, then maybe the Clarkian could also say that the fetus will think a set of propositions that exist in the mind of God.
ReplyDelete3/15/2010 7:40 AM
That doesn't work. The unique set *was* thought and *now* exists and will always exist, even if a coma is involved.
My arguement shows that the person does not exist *now*, at the time of the abortion or murder. If you want to critique a specific premise, do so.
The only way your move has bite is if we interpret the Clarkians as saying that persons have to actively, consciously think the propositions at all times. If that's what they think, then maybe your critique works (though they might say that while the body is comotose the *person* is always actively thinking those propositions).
However, as I said, I wouldn't interpret them this way. And besides, it seems as if we claim that the propositions exist in the mind of God then we must say that Clarkians believe that we have *always* existed, there never was a time when we didn't.
So I don't think your arguments stand against them. This doesn't mean that there position isn't nonsense, though.
When Clark says that 'a person is complex of propositions' is he saying that the proposition is true of the person in question?
ReplyDeleteWell this is confusing to me because statements like "Also, if they mean that the person has to actively think the propositions at all times, then you'd have a point" seem to assume that the person is not identical with the propositions being thought.
ReplyDeleteI guess I just don't understand the position.
The Clarkian says the universe is contradictory and unknowable. The Van Tillian says the same thing about Scripture.
ReplyDeleteJonathan, yes, that's a propblem. In my post I went on but made sure to "put aside that incoherence." Clark's statement presupposes a distinction when there should be none.
ReplyDeletePublius,
ReplyDeleteCan you quote any Van Tillians to that effect?
Or any Clarkians to that effect.
ReplyDeleteTF,
ReplyDeleteIs this a case of cleaning our own backyards. :-)
Short answer: no.
ReplyDeleteTF,
ReplyDeleteJust meant policing our own positions. I didn't bother to defend Clark, that's for Clarkians to do. Likewise, I wouldn't expect you to run to van Til's defense. If taken in this light I believe your short answer is "yes."
Perhaps, though my enjoyment of Clark's teaching has nothing to do with any view he may have had of people being their own thoughts. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that the post accurately depicts Clark's thought on the issue (and that I've understood what the post says), I'm not a "Clarkian."
ReplyDeleteI think you now agree the post accurately depicts his teaching.
ReplyDeleteThe post simply argues from laws of identity to the conclusion that if there never were any propositions thought by HO, then HO isn't a person.
Was there something you didn't understand?
If Clark's view is literally that a person consists of his thoughts, and if the very young lack thoughts, it seems to follow that the very young are not people.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure Clark would agree that the very young lack thoughts, but then I seem to have overlooked some of the material that has been brought to my attention regarding his definition of "person."
TF,
ReplyDeleteYes, that was one of the responses I gave for him. I find it simply implausible and lacking in any positive epistemic status.If that's where he must go to save his position, so much the worse for his position!