Tuesday, April 15, 2008

From The Mailbag

A few atheists sites have been lauding this "letter" to God:




i) I didn't know atheists wished Hitler and Jeffery Dahmer were still walking around among us.

ii) Perhaps this will help: No one "dies". You're just leaving your earthly stage of life. You will live forever (see Q/A. 19). So, don't worry, no one ceases to exist. Where you exist is another matter altogether.

Is it Permissible for God to Kill People?

On the Prosblogian an argument against God’s killing (or commanding killing) of persons as being permissible was made. I quote the essence of the No Divine Killing Allowed argument:

[NDKA] “So here is an argument that it is wrong for God to kill people as he does in the Bible. Argument: unless very strong utilitarian considerations are not at stake, it is wrong to violate a right. If (b) or (c) is true, then God is violating people's rights in the Bible when he kills them or commands others to kill them. Very strong utilitarian considerations are not at stake. Therefore, it is wrong for God to violate people's rights in the Bible when he kills them or commands others to kill them.”

Of course there are a multitude of responses one could give, different directions a rebuttal might take, I’ll just copy and paste the posts I gave (others responded so you can go there to read some of the rebuttals to my argument) in the meta over there as one way to argue against the NDKA argument:

**************

Paul said:

I take it that it is not wrong for one person to kill another person if that is the just penalty he deserves for his crime. God even gives us this right in Genesis.

I take it that this is what is going on when God kills people (e.g., when God commands the Israelites to wipe out certain people-groups, including children).

When we put certain criminals to death, we don't own their body. So, even if God did't own our bodies, I find that irrelevant.

There's more to say, but that's sufficient for now...I think.

April 5, 2008 10:24 PM


Paul said:

Hi Andrew,

But on the doctrine of original sin one need not *do* anything in order to be guilty.
Then, if you fill that out with a robust doctrine of the federal headship of Adam, it is all the more a defensible position. This is argued for primarily in Romans 5 (but cf. various arguments from federal headship by covenant theologians).

The Bible operates on the principle of federalism. This is the worldview presupposed. You may disagree, but the Bible does provide the resources for defending this view. Thus, pulling from all my resources, I find the muscle needed to defend my position inherent in my position.
Conversely, I'd say that if the federal representation of Adam for all his is denied, then one can't turn around and take Christ's federal representation for all his. It's like this, for example: Say you are a child and your father makes some bad business decisions. He loses everything. Now you guys are dirt poor. Rice and beans for dinner. Holes in your jeans. All that. You didn’t do anything wrong per se. But, you still suffer for the decisions of your representative. The state doesn't come and take you away, give you to new parents, and give a "fair shot" at a comfortable upbringing. No, you suffer with the family for the decisions the head or representative made. You can't very well go and divorce your family, asking for a new representative. You were born with the representative you had.

Now imagine this situation is reverses. Your father invests in some stocks that blow up over night. He earns millions of dollars. If it wasn't fair or right for you to reap the fruits of his poor decisions, why would it be fair to reap the fruit of his wise decisions?
Thus notions of federalism are still in play, though not as prevalent as in ancient societies (cf. Marriage and Family in the Biblical World, for evidence to this effect), and so you can still see hints of this prevalent and pervasive notion that informed the world of the Bible in our own time.

I would thus argue that if the doctrine of the federal representative status of Adam is denied, so would that of Christ's. Romans 5 links the two together, and it cannot be denied that Christ stood in as a representative of his people. So, Adam's federal headship can't be denied either, I would argue.

And so this is the way I would answer your argument. You may not be persuaded by it, but that is somewhat person relative. If my position is correct, though, then I've presented a model where it is not wrong for God to kill (or command to be killed) people since I take it that it is not wrong to issue just penalties for crimes committed. And the penalty for Adam's transgression was death.

Blessings,
Paul

April 8, 2008 2:55 AM

Paul said:

Hi Andrew,

I thought you might remain unconvinced.

But, your post did talk about the "best way out for the *Bible*-believer." And if my interpretation is correct, then this may be one of the best ways out since I do not think anyone has a problem with justly punishing criminals.

Now, you may not agree with the biblical position regarding its stance on federal headship, but that's another argument (which would also take us too far off course).

I'm not too sure about your inability to make sense of the claim that "A is guilty for B's actions and deserves punishment." For example, if A hired B to murder A's wife, and B succeeds, many times our court will try *both* of them for first-degree murder.

Adam represented all mankind. That is, God tested mankind in Adam. This was a fair representation in that Adam was infallibly chosen and perfectly represented us such that he was the best possible representative. If he did X, any of us would have done X. That we didn't choose him, or weren't born yet, does not mean that we can't suffer the consequences (we would have gladly accepted the blessings if he were to have had kept the covenant of works!). Our children, and children's children, will reap the consequences of our choices. We reap the benefits of America, the choices of our founding fathers. If we're going to be intellectually honest, why do we take the benefits while not wanting the consequences?

I would wonder, though, given your reasoning, why you would think anyone should get the other end of the stick? That is, why should someone (say, someone we *know* is a sinner) get treated as *not*-guilty based on *another's* [Jesus'] actions? Why doesn't *this* seem unjust? Why is it just that Jesus should die for our sin? He didn't sin? If Adam had fulfilled his covenantal obligations, all of humanity would not have been born into a state of sin and misery. We would have been born sinless and unable to sin. So it seems, to me, that you would have to deny some major themes in the Bible in order to deny my argument.

But, yes, other arguments never hurt anyone! And, thank you for granting the position I (and others) offered was a possible solution.

April 8, 2008 8:50 PM

Paul said:

Hi Philip,

I'm not sure I grasp your objection about "deserving." In Federal Headship theology, the representative *stands in for you*. He makes decisions for you. He speaks *for you.* It would be like during the Revolutionary war. Say you voted for some person to represent your town. This man goes to a meeting where it is decided, by his vote and others, that we will go to war with England. Now, say that a red Coat comes to your door. He aims to take your property, etc. What sense does it make to say, "But I don't deserve this? I didn't vote to go to war against you."?

Now, you may say, "Ah, but you chose your representative." Fair enough. Granting me all the parts of my theology on this matter, our representative was chosen, not by us, but by God. Now, let's explore that. When we pick someone to stand in for us, we hope to pick the best man for the job. But we are finite. We don't know for sure if he is making false promises. We don't know, for certain, that those we vote for are the best man (or woman!) for the job. He may or may not be. In the case of our original representative before man in fulfilling the covenant of works, there was a choice for us, God made it.

Now, what follows from that? Well, for one thing, the choice (Adam) was *the best possible choice* that could have been made. It is not as if Adam failed but if it had been you, you would have succeeded. This choice was perfect. Adam really was, the best man for the job. So, say you are in a voting situation. Say you can chose for A or B candidate. You think about it, and you think you have some good reasons to chose A over B. You want your choice to be the best one possible. After all, you have children and you don't want someone who will make foolish decisions which could affect your children. Now, say that God comes down to you, tell you that B is the best bet for you. Since God cannot be wrong, knows everything, is all-good, etc., then the most rational thing to do would be to go with B.

Apply that to the Garden Scenario GS. In the GS God was totally fair. it would have been *unfair* for God to let *you* chose. You may have picked the wrong candidate. God picked for us. His choice was perfect and infallible. I take it as obvious that whenever someone gives me the best shot to win, they've been fair with me. Thus I deny the intuitions behind your argument.

Moving along to your comments on Jesus vs. Adam. I have already covered the "choosing" portion. But furthermore, since faith is a *gift*, then even your choice was not something you made all on your own. Indeed, given a Reformed view of Scripture, you did not chose God out of your own free will, he had to change your nature first, giving you a heart which desired to chose him. Indeed, in John 6:44 Jesus says that "no man can come to him [Jesus] unless the Father who sent him [Jesus] draws him, and I [Jesus] will raise him up on the last day." Since not all men are raised up (putting aside universalism for now), then the father chooses who comes to Jesus.

So, though we did pick Jesus, God picked Adam. To say that "none of us would have consented to Adam being our representative" is to say, "I know better than God. I could make a better choice than God." So, I don't think that maneuver works.
Lastly, it is not a counter-factual claim I'm appealing to. Original sin is not about a counter-factual state of affairs. It states that all men *do* have a sinful nature. A nature that is opposed to God. A nature that if left to develop on its own will necessarily sin. So, we *are* sinners.

Jeremiah 17:9 says that "the heart is more deceitful than all else and is desperately sick; who can understand it." This seems to assume original sin--wickedness is a property of the human heart. Ecclesiastes 9:3 declares a similar truth: "...the hearts of the sons of men are full of evil, and insanity is in their hearts through their lives."

So, given the *truth* of Christian theism (or my representation of it), then the argument goes through.

Let me make another distinction that has not been brought here. Maybe this works. Since, on the traditional view, all men have a soul that can never die, we will live forever, then technically God isn't "killing" anyone so much as he is allowing them to progress to the next stage of *life.* All those "killed" do not cease to exist. I don't see why God is required to keep your body in *this stage* of life rather than the next. The physical "death" is just a vehicle for God to move you on to your next stage of life--heaven or hell. It could also be that God does not allow any infant to go to hell. So, he moves infants on to their next stage of life, heaven. Anyone older than an infant, given original sin and total depravity, will have committed actual sin, and so this meets some of the worries here.

I hope the above wasn't too jumbled!

Blessings!
Paul

April 10, 2008 9:35 PM

Paul said:

Hi Philip,

You said, "I agree that if we grant your theological position then the problem is solved. However, I think that our intuitions about desert may give us reason to question some aspects of your theological system." Okay, but my response has aimed to satisfy the question put to me in the original post, namely, what is the "best way out for the *Bible*-believer." I'd furthermore add that I don't come to the Bible and expect it to conform to my moral intuitions, I conform my intuitions to the Bible. This especially true given the nature of my fallenness, my epistemic situation with respect to God's plan, etc. Surely there are some that have the intuition that it is immoral to punish an innocent man for the sins of the guilty. Yet this is what we ask people to accept when we ask them to consider the claims of Jesus' death for sinners. Would your intuitions not have a problem with, say, the nice old grandma on the block being punished for the crimes of the pedophile on the block...even if they both agreed for this transaction to take place!?

You have agreed that someone S can be punished for the crimes of another S* (say, a S hires a hit man S* to knock off his wife in order to collect the insurance money; in this case S can be tried for murder even though S did not commit the murder himself, S* did), but this is acceptable for you because S chose S* to act as his representative. I don't think this is necessary, though. Our children may be economically punished by the voting decisions of their parents. Their parents chose their representative for them, and they get punished for the decision of their parent. Besides this, I have not totally removed the notion of choice, I just transferred it out of your hands and into God.

At this point, I think this is the best position to be in for us. I would rather have God make choices that mattered for me, given that he is all-wise, all-good, all-just, etc. Now you balk at what I took to be an eminently plausible position! How strange for a philosopher to balk at plausible assumptions! You invoke the baseball illustration to make your point. But, I do not think that was an appropriate illustration. How about this:

Say you got the opportunity to win a million dollars by kicking a football through the uprights from 45 yards away during the half-time show of the Super bowl. Suppose they gave you the option of having Adam Vinatieri represent you and kick for you. Who has the better shot? Who would you rather kick for you?

Or,

Say you had to answer 20 questions for a terrorist otherwise he would blow up NYC. Say they were multiple choice, but they were all mensa level questions. Now, you had get all of them right. No error. Say that, unwisely for his purposes perhaps, the terrorist also allowed you to step down and have "the smartest man alive" answer the questions for you. He was smarter than you in every conceivable category. Who would you rather have making the choices? For my sake and everyone else affected, I would hope you would choose "the smartest man alive."

That is to say, when the steaks are high, I want the best man for the job. God put that man in there. He made our choice for us. There was going to be a choice no matter what, and so given that, I have no problem that he chose our representative for us. Therefore, I do not find it entirely against intuition for us (and not problematic at all, for me), that (a) we could be punished for someone else’s crime, and (b) that the representative was chosen for us, and (c) that the choice made for us was the best possible choice. And, say it was guaranteed that you would fail just as quick and miserably. Does it matter? Why the need for the existential involvement in the situation?

Now, if your view is that we are born evil, then I fail to see why it is unjust for God to enact the consequences of evil--"death". I would also take issue with the idea that original sin is like someone planting an evil psychology in us. Furthermore, your view seems to imply Pelagianism. So, since this view has been dubbed heretical in Christian theology (cf. the many cross-denominational councils), it would be no help to the *Bible*-believer.
Lastly, regarding John 6:44 and John 12:32, you're right, there are responses one could make to this! You say my view would lead to universalism. But that is odd, I think the Arminian view would since they believe all are "drawn" in a John 6:44 way. And since John 6:44 is a conjoined with "raise him up on the last day," and the two "hims" are the same him, we have universalism. Here are some problems:

i) John 6:44 *clearly* states that no one can (is able) to come to Jesus unless the father draws him.

ii) Since the sentence is a conjunction, and if all men are drawn, then all men are raised. All sides must take this view, then.

iii) Since universalism is false (as you seem to grant), then it can't be that John 12:32 refers to all men whoever. The context seems to indicate that it is classes of men being referred to as right before v.32 some *gentiles* now come and are seeking Jesus.

iv) Other passages would also seem to indicate that not all men whoever are drawn to the cross: 1 Corinthians 1:22-24 says, "For indeed Jews ask for signs and Greeks search for wisdom; but we preach Christ crucified, to Jews a stumbling block and to Gentiles foolishness, but to those who are the called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God."

v) Dr. White James white comments: "To whom is Christ the power and wisdom of God? To "the called." What is the preaching of the cross to those who are not called? Something that draws them or repels them? The answer I think is obvious. The cross of Christ is foolishness to the world. These considerations, along with the immediate context of the Gentiles seeking Christ, make it clear that if He is lifted up in crucifixion, He will draw all men, Jews and Gentiles, to Himself. This is exactly the same as saying that He has sheep not of this fold (John 10:16), the Gentiles, who become one body in Christ (Eph. 2:13-16)."

vi) It is not clear that "draw" is used the same in John 6 and 12. And in John 6 it is the who does the drawing and in John 12 it is Jesus who does the drawing.

Now, sorry for all that theology ;-), but the important point is to show that God chooses who will come to Jesus. Thus, if this is established, then I have reinstated the Jesus counter in my argument viz. you can't deny Adam's imputed guilt and sin and accept Jesus' imputed righteousness.

As far your acknowledging the possible answer my “moving to the next stage of life” argument gives and to answer your question, I’d say that the reason God can send someone into the next stage of life and not man is (a) man can do that sometimes, when authorized by God, and (b) he can’t when not-authorized. Because God can doesn’t mean man can. Not all laws that apply to man apply to God. For instance, God doesn’t have to pray to himself and say something like “Our *Father*” though men are commanded to pray. Jesus commands men not to judge and indicates that God will do so. Paul says that we are not to take vengeance, though God can do so.

Thank *you* for the good conversation, and your time!

Blessings,
Paul

April 11, 2008 7:06 PM

Problem of Evil

One of my favorite bands, The OC Supertones, sings about the problem of evil. If you're familair with contemporary moves in the debate, the song below will resonate...

**********************

The rain falls on the righteous and the wicked
Mine is not to reason why this is
In this I rest in this I find my refuge
That my thoughts and ways are not His
I spend my life on looking up the answers
It's rare that I can't find a reason why
But reasons fail at children without mothers
His plan is more than I can know

Have you ever held in doubt
What this life is all about
Have you questioned all these things that seem important to us
Do you really wanna know
Or are you a little scared
You're afraid that God is not really exactly what you'd have Him be
What should I hold to and what should I do
How do I know if anything's true
I'm somewhere in-between Canaan and Egypt
A place called the wilderness

I'm not one who always trusts their feelings
I don't believe in what you'd call blind faith
But faith that you can do all that you promised
And you said it all works for good
It's safe to say I don't see the big picture
I can't see the forest for the trees
And if five hundred lives
Were mine to get to know
You all could be spent on just this

God do you really understand what it's like to be a man
Have You ever felt the weight of loving all the things you Hate
Have You struggled have you worried
How can You sympathize

I have spoken too soon put my hand over my mouth
I can't contend with You
Your ways are so much higher
And we pass through the fire that Christ endured before us
When You were in the wilderness

Orthopods

Some Orthodox epologists have been piling on Josh Brisby over at his blog:

http://joshbrisby.blogspot.com/2008/04/debate-weastern-orthodox-part-9-reader.html

Keep in mind that their questions were originally addressed to Josh, not to me, and they sometimes quote him. Josh and I might phrase things differently or answer things differently, so I don’t presume to speak for him, but only for myself.

“If Reformed soteriology is plain in the scripture, then it has always been plain and no Christian in history is exempt from adhering to it without ‘denying the gospel’. Why then do you refuse to anathematize Augustine, the Cappadocians, Athanasius, Ignatius, Justin, Irenaeus, Anselm, indeed every father of the ancient church as they clearly and openly rejected both sola fide and sola scriptura, not by denying fide or scriptura, but by denying sola. And why do you not also grant such leniency to those today who espouse the same things as those fathers did regarding those doctrines, but rather say that they may be saved only if they do not consciously reject them. Both groups consciously reject them, but why is only the second group anathema?”

i) This question has nothing to do with where the truth lies. It’s just a debater’s ploy, a way of trying to put psychological pressure on his opponent. It’s irrelevant to the truth of falsity of Evangelicalism as over against Orthodoxy.

ii) Something can be objectively evident without being subjectively evident. To some extent we are products of our social conditioning. For example, Anselm didn’t know Greek and Hebrew. He was dependent on the Vulgate.

iii) It’s ultimately up to God to apportion blame. He knows the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in each particular case.

“How do you know for sure that exegesis is better?”

i) How does an Orthodox believer “know for sure” that Orthodox exegesis is better?

ii) Does God oblige us to “know for sure” whose exegesis is better? Or does he oblige us to make the best use of the evidence at our disposal?

“Especially considering that the vast witness and testimony of those who were heirs and even contemporaries of the apostles are against many of the Protestant interpretations that you (and I) have held.”

i) Canadian is conflating two distinct issues. Even if the “heirs” constitute “vast” testimony, it doesn’t follow that the “contemporaries” constitute “vast” testimony.

In his opinion, how many of the church fathers were contemporaries of the apostles? And what specific interpretations do they witness to, at variance with Protestant exegesis?

ii) How does Canadian define an “heir” to an apostle? Does he mean an immediate successor? If so, how many of the church fathers were “heirs”?

Or does he mean “heir” in the attenunated sense of apostolic succession, so that an Orthodox bishop of the 21C is just as much of an heir as Clement of Rome?

iii) When he appeals to contemporaries of the Apostles, that’s an appeal to primitive tradition. Such an appeal implicitly concedes the principle that earlier historical testimony enjoys greater prima facie value than later historical testimony.

If we apply that principle to Holy Tradition, then ecumenical councils are too late to be evidentially germane.

“Question 1: Now you've changed your mind on one of these and need a new denomination.”

To the contrary, Josh switched from one preexisting denomination to another preexisting denomination.

“Is this church hopping part of God's big plan? If not, what went wrong?”

Yes, “church hopping” is part of God’s big plan. There are no unforeseen contingencies in God’s big plan. Everything happens according to plan.

Evidently, Orthodox is an open theist. God was caught off guard by Josh’s “church hopping.”

“Question 2: Thinking about the numerous 'falling away' verses, (you know what they are, Heb 6:4, James 5:20 etc etc). Do you agree that taken in isolation, they are most naturally interpreted to mean someone can fall away?”

i) ”Taken in isolation,” Jn 14:28 is “most naturally interpreted to mean” that Jesus is a lesser being than God. Does Orthodox subscribe to Aryan hermeneutics?

ii) Calvinism doesn’t deny that “someone can fall away.”

“If so, how do you know that interpreting these verses through the lens of your understanding of other verses is more correct than interpreting these other verses through the lens of these verses?”

Since the question is predicated on the false assumption that, in Calvinism, “someone” can’t “fall away,” there is no other “lens” to “correct” the Reformed understanding of Heb 6, &c.

“Question 3: If apostolic succession within the concept of ‘one catholic church’ is in no way a good argument, how would someone know in the 2nd century what is the true faith among a whole bunch of religious sects, many claiming the name of Christ and many claiming pseudopigraphal writings of Jesus and the apostles?”

Not everyone in the 2C would know the true faith. There were 2C reprobates who belonged to heretical sects. God doesn’t shield everyone from spiritual deception and self-deception. Only the elect.

“Question 4: Read the parable of the sheep (Luke 15:4, of the woman with coins (v8) and the parable of the ungrateful son (v11). Jesus is painting a picture for us of what God is like. Does this picture fit in with the reformed picture of a God who decides to damn most people because of his choice?”

i) Does the parable of the prodigal son “fit in with the picture of a God” who won’t forgive anyone apart from Calvary?

ii) Calvinism has no official position on what percentage of humanity is elect or reprobate.

“Question 5: What books about Eastern Orthodoxy have you read? Do you think it is enough to truely understand Orthodoxy?”

i) What books about Reformed theology have you read? What books about Protestant canonics have you read? What commentaries on the Apocrypha have you read?

ii) Yes, I think I’ve read enough to understand the claims of Orthodoxy.

“Question 6: Can you point to any church father, priest, bishop or church between the apostles and the reformers whose church you would be more or less happy to have been in theologically? “

I often attend churches I don’t completely agree with. I often consult theologians and Bible scholars whom I don’t completely agree with.

“Question 7: What went wrong practically speaking when the church came to recognize the deutero-canon?”

It’s wrong to insistent that something is the Word of God when it’s only the word of man.

“How do you know the same thing didn't go wrong with the Jews?”

Rom 3:2.

“Question 8: How do you know Esther is scripture?”

i) How do *you* know that Esther is scripture?

ii) Sometimes we don’t *know* things. Sometimes we merely *believe* them on the basis of the best available evidence.

This is a good occasion to make a larger point. What are our duties to God? God often commands his people to do things which fall short of knowledge.

Take the OT law code. There were a number of capital crimes in the OT. The accused was put on trial. Witnesses were summoned.

The judge himself did not observe the crime. He was dependent on second-hand evidence. Witnesses can be mistaken. Witnesses can lie. An innocent man can be convicted.

Yet the Jews were duty-bound to execute a man convicted of a capital offense. The Jews were obligated to carry out their judicial duties on the basis of evidence which could be misleading or erroneous.

So God can oblige us to do something even in cases where the evidence may let us down. Our moral and spiritual responsibilities aren’t contingent on my being right all the time.

iii) Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we mistakenly include Esther in the canon, because we went the best available evidence, which happens to point in the wrong direction.

This doesn’t mean we shouldn’t follow the evidence. Our obligations to God do not require apodictic proof.

“Question 9: Do you agree that the Church at the time the NT canon was settled was very similar to Eastern Orthodoxy? If not, why not.”

This is deceptive. The de facto question of when the NT canon was settled is distinct from the de jure question of how the NT canon ought to be settled.

“If so, why do you trust implicitely the decisions and tradition of the Church that you so deeply distrust today?”

i) I don’t accept the decisions and traditions of the church as a package deal. I open the package, sift the traditions, and reexamine the decision-making process.

ii) Moreover, the case for the NT canon isn’t limited to external attestation.

“Question 10: What was the new covenant rule of Christian faith in first century churches before they had NT scripture and when apostles were not present (for whatever reason)? Do you agree that it was oral tradition?”

i) ”Tradition” is a loaded word. Even the Orthodox don’t equate every tradition with Holy Tradition. We’re talking, at most, about oral *transmission*, not oral *tradition*.

ii) An oral mode of transmission was never a rule of faith. That confuses a temporary, utilitarian process with a theological criterion.

“If so, what went wrong when the Church never discarded this rule of faith that it had from the beginning?”

i) The modality of oral transmission was never the “rule of faith.” What was “discarded” was not the rule of faith, but a process—a mode of transmission.

ii) There’s an obvious difference between St. Paul telling me something, and a friend of a friend of a friend of a friend of a friend of somebody who said he heard St. Paul say something.

iii) There’s a reason why the Apostolic kerygma was committed to writing. There’s a reason we have a NT.

“1.) Why did you ignore his quotes of Protestant scholars? I noticed over at Trioblog that they tried to make the new testament seem as if it didn't quote the DC or paraphrase the DC, but that still doesn't deal with the many protestant scholars who said the opposite. He gave lots of quotes from Protestant scholars and they were never dealt with.”

i) Which quotes by which scholars on which particular topics were “ignored”?

ii) We saw Dyer deliberately quoting Bruce out of context.

iii) Whether or not the NT ever alludes to the Apocrypha is a red herring. The question is how a literary allusion functions. How does a NT writer treat his sources? What is their prior reputation?

“2.) Why would you point to the ‘science of textual criticism’ in regards to ‘authentic books and inauthentic books’? You are aware what the Liberals have done to most of the Biblical books you accept by using the science of textual criticism.”

Strictly speaking, “textual criticism” is used to authenticate or inauthenticate a text, not a book, viz. the Long Ending of Mark.

“The traditional Reformed arguments against the DC(deuto-canon) books are used by Liberals against the PC(protocanon books) books.”

There’s nothing inherently wrong with historical criticism. But liberals operate with liberal presuppositions when they use historical criticism.

“3.) You know historicaly the evidence would support the opposite conclusion. It would be more accurate to say that ‘all jews’ before the first advent didn't embrace the D.C. books. “We know that many did embrace the DC books.”

Tell us specifically what pre-Christian Jews canonized the Apocrypha. Give us names and dates.

“The dead sea scrolls have many D.C. books...so they obviously embraced some of them before the first advent.”

This is equivocal. “Having” many books in your library is not the same thing as canonizing a book. I have books by atheists in my library. I don’t confuse them with the Bible.

“But one could also say that some jews only embraced the first five books.”

Which Jews? Is this an allusion to the Sadducees? If so, then that’s a popular misconception of what they believed. Cf. F. F. Bruce, The Canon of Scripture, 40-41.

“This is true too. The jews were not in agreement about the books before 150 A.D.”

Where’s your evidence?

“4.) Do you think you misunderstood Jay's LXX argument? You called it a ‘source fallacy’? But wouldn't it be more likely that they actually used the LXX as their Old Testament text? I mean, if they often quoted from it then it would mean that they often read it.”

You’re equivocating between the content of the Old Greek version and the content of Christian copies of the LXX.

When codices of the LXX include Christian books like Barnabas, Hermas, or 1-2 Clement, does this mean the Jews originally included Barnabas, Hermas, and 1-2 Clement in their OT canon?

I understand that many Orthodox believers are ignorant about the textual history of the LXX, but when their ignorance has been repeatedly corrected, and they continue to peddle the same erroneous arguments, then it’s difficult to acquit them of dissimulation.

“5.) “My question is: Do you think it is possible that the Jews rejected the D.C. books in 150 A.D. because the christians were using them to convert them to christianity?”

i) This isn’t a case of what’s “possible.” It’s a case of what the evidence points to.

ii) Why would Jews reject (or eject) the Apocrypha on those grounds, but not reject OT books containing OT prophecies (e.g. Isaiah, Daniel, the Psalter)?

iii) What probative evidence do you have that the Jews rejected the Apocrypha after 150 AD?

“6.)If the 1st century church didn't have 100% uniformity in regards to the books of the Bible, and if the churches after them didn't have 100% uniformity of Bible books then what makes you think that the Church today should have 100% uniformity?”

Because Orthodox epologists typically claim that Orthodoxy confers an epistemic advantage over the Protestant position.

“7.) You said that the D.C. has historical errors. Liberal Prots say the samething about the Protocanon itself.”

And conservative Protestant scholars have argued them down. We’re waiting to see you do the same thing.

“Plus I have seen Roman Catholic Apologists (Like my friend Phatcatholic) show that the D.C. doesn't have the historical errors as you claim.”

Funny, since I was quoting from a Roman Catholic scholar (Fitzmyer) on the historical errors in Tobit.

“Just as things can be explained away in the Protocanon.....the samething can be done for the Deuto-canon.”

If it can be done, do it. Don’t say it, show it. For example, do you think Solomon wrote Wisdom?

“8.) The differences in the canon of scripture among the Byzantine and Slavic rites is not great. Yet you make it seem as if it is. 4th Maccebees is in the Apendix of one. The same might be true in regards to the Prayer of Manessah. Other than that the only other differences don't really matter to this conversation.”

The Orthodox church has been back and forth on the canon throughout its checkered history:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/history-of-apocrypha.html

“The Eastern Orthodox have a different understanding of what the word ‘Canon’ means.”

Just as Solomon had a different understanding of what the word “monogamy” means.

The Orthodox church gives you a buffet a canons to choose from.

“Our understanding is more Church Historic.”

Their understanding is more Church phantasmagoric.

“You can find it in the Ancient Church.”

Since the church fathers didn’t agree on the canon, where in the ancient church are we to look?

Monday, April 14, 2008

A Funny Thing Happened At the Forum Today...

This evening I dropped by the local Christian bookstore and coffeehouse. I don't go there much - place is a repository of "Jesus junk," but I needed to do some work on my laptop, so I borrowed their connection to the internet.

I had the privilege of overhearing a men's Bible study. Much is to be commended of these men:

1. Three were white, four (or was it five?) were black. It's good to see "Neither Jew nor Greek..." in practice.

2. Following the tradition in many black churches, the leader would call out a reference, and a reader would read it to the group after they had all turned to it. Nice touch, I'll file that away for future use.

3. I caught snippets of their conversation. They are recovering the Gospel. They discussed the way preachers abuse the idea of "Jesus accepts us as we are," and minimize the need for repentance.

4. They danced around it, and I wanted to walk over and instruct them directly but did not, but they wondered about "Free Will," and how this worked with the necessity of man to have a new heart. They quoted from Ezekiel (I will remove your hearts of stone...), and their leader said, "It's God, not us, who gives us a new heart." I didn't quite catch it if he made the right connection to the ordu salutis or not, but I think he's on the right track. There was some oscillation between we have to repent to get a new heart and God has to make us new to repent. So, they aren't clear, but I'm praying they'll figure it out eventually.

5. They talked about wheat and tares and discussed the number of tares in the church today.

So, there is hope for us after all. You just have to open your eyes. I, for one, was encouraged. Pray for this group of men. God is opening their eyes to the Gospel. One remarked, and I've heard this comment before, that it's like unlearning much of what you've been taught as a child. He's right. There's a lot of bad ecclesiastical tradition out there today, but God is working in our midst to correct it.

Living the Land of Make Believe

Dear Children,


Americans today are living in the Land of Make Believe.

Let me introduce you to some of our citizens and attractions....







The dollar is weak because we are playing with make believe money after the banks made pretend loans for pretend homes to pretend buyers.








We have make believe science and scientists.

We also have make believe celebrities with make believe talent.





















And we have make believe political leaders who make believe they can get away with whatever they want and say we don't have any right to sit in judgment over them. This one lives in my home state of NC. We've had several of these of late. I understand that they are several of them in many states...










We have make believe ministers preaching make believe gospels. This one is very popular.

















Children, we live in the Land of Make Believe. We have make believe money, leaders, science, gospels, celebrities, and government. Is it any wonder our nation is in such turmoil? It's time to return to reality. May God have mercy on our souls.

Obama Was Right - Sorta

Obama's little slip of the tongue has garnered attention from many quarters. Nobody wants to admit that there are people out there who do, in fact, cling to God and guns, etc. when times are hard. What Obama is saying is that people turn to religion because they are "down" on their circumstances. Why is this surprising to anybody?

Isn't this the gist of Black Liberation Theology? That's the really big elephant in the room that none of his supporters want to acknowledge.

But before they get too upset if they read this, how is that theology functionally different than "Your best life now," taught by Joel Osteen?

Answer: It's not. Both of these theologies teach the very thing that Obama has stated. These theologies encourage people to turn to religion because they are downtrodden, disenfranchised, etc.

So, Obama was wrong in one way: There are those of us who believe apart from feelings of disenfranchisement. But he's right in another, for he's repeating the very theology taught by Jeremiah Wright, his own pastor on the one hand and Joel Osteen on the other.

Obama has, unwittingly, highlighted a major problem in the American Church: We have lost the Gospel. It's just that simple.

Sunday, April 13, 2008

Talking 'bout my Intuitions

Victor Reppert has repeatedly appealed to his "intuitions" as a source for disbelieving Calvinism. Let's see what his favorite Christian apologist and philosopher(?) has to say about this:

"Reality, in fact, is usually something you could not have guessed. That is one
of the reasons I believe Christianity. It is a religion you could not have
guessed. If it offered us just the kind of universe we had always expected, I
should feel we were making it up. But, in fact, it is not the sort of thing
anyone would have made up. It has just that queer twist about it that real
things have. So let us leave behind all these boys' philosophies--these over
simple answers. The problem is not simple and the answer is not going to be
simple either." — C.S. Lewis
It's safe to say sin- and self-loving mankind would not have "come up" with Calvinism. And, its reality is not something I would have guessed at. It doesn’t offer us a universe we would have expected. But, it does have that queer twist about it that real things have. So let's leave behind all these boys' theologies--these over simple answers. The problem is not simple and the answer is not going to be simple either.

Goodbye Norma Jean

Norma Jean wrote:

The scriptures have no conflict with Craig’s use of middle knowledge in the same way the scriptures have no conflict with reason.
According to Craig's theory of Middle Knowledge, God infallibly foresees any number of possible universes in which libertarian agents make particular choices and then decrees this and only this universe into existence.

Every so often, Molinism comes up on the Arminian side, so it's helpful to review it's many problems.

If the Scriptures do not conflict with Craig's use of MK, then the Scriptures should teach LFW as an action theory. Where, pray tell, may we find this teaching in Scripture?

I'd add that Scripture isn't very friendly to LFW.

Norma Jean said:

Try reading the scriptures through the lens of someone other than Calvin, perhaps Paul or an early Jew.

I choose Christ, and here's what He said about LFW:
You are of your father the devil, and you want to do the desires of your father He was Whenever he a murderer from the beginning, and does not stand in the truth because there is no truth in him speaks a lie, he speaks from his own nature, for he is a liar and the father of lies.
The devil speaks from his nature.
He's a liar.
So, he speaks lies.
He's evil, so he speaks evil.
He's a murderer, so he seeks to commit murder.

You (Jewish leaders) are of your father,the devil.
So, you share his nature
So you want to do what your father the devil wishes ( "lie and murder Me" are implied)

So, Scripture not only doesn't teach LFW, it explicitly denies LFW right here, from the lips of Jesus Himself.

Craig's Molinism is predicated on LFW. Scripture denies LFW by explicitly contradicting LFW, so it can't "have no conflict with Craig's use of LFW."

Maybe one of these days advocates of LFW who name the name of Christ will actually take their Bibles seriously here. If Jesus didn't believe in LFW, why should we?

Moving on...

God instantiates this and only this universe. So how does this give Libertarian Freedom to the agents? Their acts are being determined beforehand, since no other outcomes will ever obtain.

And how does God know the outcomes of these indeterminate "possibilities" without them ever being instantiated? At least the Simple Foreknowledge folks appeal to God's timelessness on the idea that He's already there. Granted, this means He knows the outcomes because they actually instantiate - but that's the point, how can God know "possibilities" if all they are are indeterminate "possibilities?" At least in the other view,they actually happen, so God "sees" them as real outcomes.

All Craig uses Scripture to show is the existence of counterfactuals. However that doesn't select for a theory of Middle Knowledge. Calvinism doesn't deny the existence of counterfactuals. The issue isn't the existence of counterfactuals, but what grounds God's (fore)knowledge of them. In our theology, the knowledge of them is a function of God's self-knowledge. He knows what will obtain, because He decreed it,and He knows what won't obtain, because He knows what He did not decree, the way an author knows the contents of the book He wrote and the book He thought of writing but chose not to write.

Finally, here's what Craig actually says about Scripture and Middle Knowledge in Four Views of Divine Foreknowledge, p. 125:

Since Scripture does not reflect upon this question, no amount of proof-texting can prove that
God’s counterfactual knowledge is possessed logically prior to his creative decree. This is a
matter for theological-philosophical reflection, not biblical exegesis.

So, the reason that Scripture has no such conflict, by his own admission, is that Scripture doesn't talk about it. By his own admission, it's a philosophical argument, not an exegetical argument.

Molinism is a lot of bark with very little bite. It can take some convoluted forms, but in the end, there's very little to it, and it's quite easy to formulate a rebuttal.

Who Will Make it Into Heaven? Not Those Who Die in The Womb

Revelation 20 gives us some answers:

8 But the cowardly, the unbelieving, the vile, the murderers, the sexually immoral, those who practice magic arts, the idolaters and all liars—their place will be in the fiery lake of burning sulfur. This is the second death.

v. 8 forgot, "and all infants." What's that!?, you say.

Well, in discussions between Arminians and Calvinists, the Arminian likes to rail against compatibilism. "If an act is determined," they say, "then it is not free." "And agent has to be able to actuate alternative possibilities. We then inquire about heaven. Will the saints be able to sin in heaven? Are they free to worship God or actualize the alternative state of choosing not to? In other words, is it possible that the saints will sin in heaven? Given how heaven is described, many have answered in the negative:

1 Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and there was no longer any sea. 2 I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her husband. 3 And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, "Now the dwelling of God is with men, and he will live with them. They will be his people, and God himself will be with them and be their God. 4 He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away."

[...]

22 I did not see a temple in the city, because the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are its temple. 23 The city does not need the sun or the moon to shine on it, for the glory of God gives it light, and the Lamb is its lamp. 24 The nations will walk by its light, and the kings of the earth will bring their splendor into it. 25 On no day will its gates ever be shut, for there will be no night there. 26 The glory and honor of the nations will be brought into it. 27 Nothing impure will ever enter it, nor will anyone who does what is shameful or deceitful, but only those whose names are written in the Lamb's book of life.

If one can have libertarian freedom in heaven, and if they never do what is wrong, then it is possible for God to actualize a world where people always do what is right, and do it (libertarian) freely. This undercuts Victor Reppert's argument since we can turn around and ask him why God didn't make the world where we always do right and do it (libertarian) freely.

Or, if this cannot be achieved, then is sinning a live option for the saints?

If it is said that a glorified saint cannot sin, then does not this nature determine their choices?

Now, here is one particular libertarian response that I thought was interesting. It comes from the mind of philosopher James Sennett, self-described "die-hard Arminian." Here is what was claimed:

I'm going to be shamelessly self-serving and point out that I developed many of these ideas in two articles in Faith and Philosophy: "The Free Will Defense and Determinism" (vol. 8, 1991, pp, 340-51), and "Is There Freedom in Heaven?" (vol. 16, 1999, 69-82). In the latter, I develop a notion of "proximate compatilibilism," which allows for the coherence of determined free actions, provided that they contain in their causal history libertarian free actions by the same agent.

This is interesting! Let me note two points:

i) If our actions are determined in heaven, then there is nothing incoherent, pace almost all the Arminians who frequent here, with a determined free action. if the action is "determined" and if it is "free," then so much the worse for the old "robot" canard.

ii) More interesting, though, is that since the requirement for having compatibilist freedom in heaven is that any actor in heaven "contain in their causal history libertarian free actions by the same agent," we can see the rules out infants who die in infancy (the womb included) from being in heaven since they did not have libertarian free pre-heaven actions. Well, perhaps it doesn't rule this out necessarily. I'll offer three points of analysis: (a) Perhaps they will have libertarian freedom in heaven, but then this ruins the motivation for Sennett's arguments in the journals: if they can have libertarian freedom, and not be able to sin, why can't everyone else?; (b) perhaps only these agents (infants who died in infancy) can sin in heaven, but this also seems to ruin the motivation for Sennett's arguments in the journals: if they can sin in heaven, why the desire to make sure everyone else can't?; and (c) it is often argued by libertarians (e.g., some that grace our blog site, Moreland and Rea in Body & Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis of Ethics, Moreland and Craig in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview) that since God has libertarian freedom, and we are made in his image, then we have it too. But this likewise destroys the motivations for Sennett's arguments in the journals: if God is in heaven, and God cannot sin, and God has libertarian freedom, then why can't the saints?

Thus the question of sinless action in heaven on a libertarian model still looms large on the horizon.

Obama's Freudian slip

Speaking to a sympathetic audience (in San Francisco), Obama momentarily let his guard down and inadvertently said what he really thought of the voters he was busily courting:

“You go into these small towns in Pennsylvania and, like a lot of small towns in the Midwest… it's not surprising then they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren't like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations."

Hillary immediately denounced Obama’s comment as “elitist.”

Of course, given the fact that the Clintons occupy the top one-hundredth of 1 percent of the tax-bracket means that we must wash her indignation down with generous amounts of champagne and caviar.

The Bart Truman Show

Remember the opening scene in the Truman Show? Unbeknownst to him, Truman Burbank has been living his entire life on a sound stage. It’s only when a stage light falls from the illusory sky that he begins to suspect that something may be amiss in Seahaven.

Bart Ehrman is one of those autistic individuals who discovers the existence of evil when he wakes up one morning at the age of 30 or 40. He then writes a book to share his novel finding with the rest of the world.

Did Ehrman never watch the evening news when he was growing up? Did he live in Seahaven all those years?

Ehrman tells us that at Moody Bible Institute “I worked hard at learning the Bible—some of it by heart. I could quote entire books of the New Testament, verse by verse, from memory,” God’s Problem (HarperOne 2008), 2.

A few pages later, he says, “For the authors of the Bible, the God who created this world is a God of love and power who intervenes for his faithful to deliver them from their pain and sorrow—not just in the world to come but in the world we live in now. This is the God of the patriarchs who answered prayer and worked miracles for his people; this is the God of the exodus who saved his suffering people from the misery of slavery in Egypt; this is the God of Jesus who healed the sick, gave sight to the blind, made the lame walk, and fed those who were hungry. Where is this God now?…If God intervened to deliver the armies of Israel from its enemies, why doesn’t he intervene now when the armies of sadistic tyrants savagely and destroy entire villages, towns, and even countries” (5).

Didn’t Ehrman, back when he was committing entire books to the Bible, ever notice that God doesn’t always deliver his people from pain and suffering? Yes, he delivered the Exodus generation. But what about generations enslaved before the Exodus? What about the Assyrian deportation, the Babylonian Exile, and the Roman occupation.

Yes, Jesus healed many people. But he didn’t heal everyone. He didn’t heal every Jew, much less every heathen. And what about all the sick people who lived and suffered and died before his advent? Did Ehrman never notice the Biblical refrain, “How Long, O Lord?”

And that’s not merely an OT refrain. That’s also a NT refrain. The Apocalypse ends on that refrain.

Ehrman is manufacturing an artificial tension between the past and the present. Scripture never fostered the false expectation that God’s people will be immune to pain and suffering. Much less that God will spare every unbeliever from pain and suffering.

But since he brings it up, let’s take the case of the Exodus. For one thing, this event was preceded by the ten plagues. God inflicted pain and suffering on the Egyptians to deliver his people from bondage. Some suffered more so that others would suffer less.

In addition, the Exodus was a very disruptive event. An event that resulted in massive dislocation.

Most of us have seen science fiction films or TV shows in which a lover travels back in time in to save his beloved—in a hitech version of Orpheus. He preempts her untimely demise by changing the future. But he succeeds at a cost. In saving this one life, he erases the lives of millions or billions. By changing their future, they have no future. They never existed.

Suppose God had delivered his people just a generation earlier. One result is that many men and women would pair off with different men and women. Massive dislocation has an appreciable impact on mating patterns. You meet and marry different people.

Just consider the impact if all the immigrants who came to America remained in the old country. Pretty soon you’d end up with a different set of people—just like those science fiction scenarios in which a future race is wiped out by one man’s intervention.

Now, I’m not saying that this is good or bad. Those who didn’t make the cut are no more or less deserving than those who take their place. But it’s a tradeoff. There are winners and losers. Whatever generation is the Exodus generation has a domino effect on the next generation—whether you move if forward or backward in time. If God intervened as frequently as Ehrman thinks he should have, Ehrman wouldn’t even exist—or his sympathetic readers.

“Why are babies still born with birth defects? (5)”

Well, if a baby was born without a birth defect, would it be the same baby? To some extent we’re the product of our experience. Our socialization.

Take someone born blind or deaf. He’d likely receive far more attention from his parents and siblings. People who go out of their way to be nice to him. If he were normal, like the next guy, they’d ignore him.

Most of us have also seen science fiction films or TV shows in which a time-traveler is trapped in the past or the future. He was planning to explore the past or the future, but something went wrong and now he can’t get back. For the first few months or years he desperately misses all the folks he left behind. He spends all his waking hours figuring out how to return to his own time.

But, eventually, he resigns himself to his fate. He makes a life for himself. Gets married. Has kids. Makes friends. He may still feel a tinge of homesickness every now and then, but he’s made the adjustment. Made his peace. Found contentment and happiness.

Then, one day, he discovers how to get back. This is what he wanted more than anything. But now he can’t bring himself to part with his newfound life and friends and family.

Suppose Ehrman had a child who was born blind or deaf. Would he regret having had that child? Would he be sorry that his wife didn’t abort the baby?

Maybe he would. Historically, Christians have valued the disabled in a way that unbelievers have not.

“Where is God now? If he came into the darkness and made a difference, why is there still no difference?” (5).

In fact, the Christian faith has made a world of difference in those parts of the world where it’s taken hold. Ehrman’s problem is that he takes the difference for granted, because he’s a beneficiary of the difference it’s made. He didn’t grow up in a heathen home.

At the same time, the first coming of Christ was never meant to change everything overnight. Here is a man who’s memorized entire books of the Bible, yet he doesn’t know the difference between the first coming of Christ and the second coming of Christ. This is not heaven on earth. That awaits the Parousia.

And it’s rather silly to complain that Christianity hasn’t made more difference in the lives of those who repudiate Christianity.

“If people do bad things because God ordains them to do them, why are they held responsible?” (120).

That’s a good philosophical question. But Ehrman acts as if he’s the first person to pose it. It’s been asked and answered many times before.

“Roasting in hell was, for me, not a metaphor but a physical reality” (127).

“Hell” is a physical reality, but “roasting” in hell is a metaphor.

“I came to believe that there is not a God who is intent on roasting innocent children and others in hell because they didn’t happen to accept a certain religious creed” (128).

I often don’t know if Ehrman misrepresents the Christian faith because he’s an apostate, or if he’s an apostate because he misrepresents the Christian faith.

Christian theology never took the position that God damns the innocent. Moreover, rejecting “a certain religious creed” is not a precondition of damnation. Generic sin will suffice.

“The serpent is not said to be Satan, by the way: that’s a later interpretation. This is a real snake. With legs” (64).

Ehrman says tht he “chose to go off to a fundamentalist Bible college—Moody Bible Institute” (1), and he’s been rebelling against his fundamentalist education ever since. That’s his frame of reference.

He continues to interpret the Bible as a fundamentalist. The only difference is that he no longer believes it.

Take the example of the serpent. When you use an English word to translate a Hebrew word, the English word will have its own connotations. But the Hebrew word has a different set of connotations. As one commentator points out:

“A more directly sinister nuance may be seen in Heb. nahas if it is to be connected with the verb nahas, ‘to practice divination, observe signs’ (Gen 30:27; 44:5,16; Lev 19:26; Deut 18:10)…The related noun nahas means “divination” (Num 23:23; 24:1). Near Eastern divination formulae frequently include procedures involving a serpent,” V. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17, 187.

Several things to keep in mind:

i) All these references come from the Pentateuch, and the Pentateuch is a literary unit, so this is germane to the usage in Gen 3:1. Cf. J. Currid, Ancient Egypt and the Old Testament (Baker 1997), chap. 8.

ii) Hence, the word doesn’t only mean “snake.” It’s associated with other words which connote cursing or hexing of fortunetelling. And in the “folk etymology” of Scripture, this probably means that we are to treat the name of the “serpent” as a pun.

iii) This play on words also dovetails with ANE ophiolatry and ophiomancy. This is a world with snake-gods. Pharaoh’s uraeus is a snake-god, and the confrontation between Moses and Egyptian magicians, changing a staff into a snake, and vice versa, was a direct challenge to Egyptian theology. Cf. J. Currid, Exodus: Chapters 1-18, 161.

Ehrman also alludes to the curse. But as another commentator explains,

“Serpents are often the object of curses in the ancient world, and the curse in verse 14 follows somewhat predictable patterns…Some spells enjoin the serpent to crawl on its belly (keep its face on the path). This is in contrast to raising its head up to strike. The serpent on its belly is nonthreatening while the one reared up is protecting or attacking,” J. Walton, Genesis, 224-25.

Once again, we back in the world of ophiolatry and ophiomancy. Snakes stood for numinous beings, the way idols stood for gods and goddesses:
“In the ancient world the serpent became an integral part of religion. Sacred snakes and serpent gods were considered not only forces of death but also forces of life and fertility. In Egypt good snakes and bad snakes guarded sanctuaries and the mortuary temples, as the paintings in the tombs display. The pharaoh himself wore the image of the sacred cobra on his headdress. And in Canaan incense burners and other cultic implements were decorated with serpents, evening the Israelite period, indicating that many Israelites got caught up in the veneration of the serpent,” A. Ross, Recalling the Hope of Glory (Kregel 2006), 110.

Finally, the Pentateuch has many angelophanies. So the identification of the serpent in Gen 3 with a fallen angel was not a reinterpretation of the text. The original text always had subtextual associations linking it with something above and beyond herpetology.

Since we are stepping back into a culture other than our own, we need to be sensitive to this cultural code language. Ehrman is tone-deaf to these textual and intertextual clues. That’s because he wants to make fun of it rather than understand it.

“We don’t even have to grapple with the animals we eat—heaven forbid that we should actually have to observe the butcher cutting up the meat, let alone watch the poor beast get killed, the way our grandparents did” (198).

Why is a man who believes in naturalistic evolution so squeamish about steak and lobster?

Ehrman is schizophrenic about what he demands from a theodicy. On the one hand, he tells us that “other books are morally dubious, in my opinion—especially those written by intellectual theologians or philosophers who wrestle with the question of evil in the abstract, trying to provide an intellectually satisfying answer to the question of theodicy” (18). On the other hand, he tells us that “in this book I’ve looked at a range of the biblical answers, and most of them, in my opinion, are simply not satisfying intellectually or morally” (74).

Naturally he brings up the Holocaust. Like every other atheistic book on the problem of evil, he stuffs it full of every cliché-ridden example he can Google, as if he needs to educate the reader on these well-known events.

Now, there’s no doubt that the Holocaust was a paradigm of evil. Yet there’s a sense in which human mortality is a serial Holocaust.

That’s why these examples don’t have much effect on me. Ehrman is trying to manipulate my emotions, but it doesn’t work.

We expect people to die of “natural causes,” so that doesn’t make the headlines. But if an airplane crashes into a mountain, killing everyone on board, that makes headlines. When a lot of people die all at once, that’s newsworth.

Yet, if the airplane hadn’t hit the mountain, everyone one board would have died sooner or later. A hundred years later, every passenger would still be dead, just as dead, whether by “natural causes” or pilot error. Dead is dead—whether it takes the form of a serial Holocaust or a concomitant Holocaust. A distributive Holocaust or a collective Holocaust.

In a sense, it’s even worse when people die one at a time, one after another, rather than all at once. For they leave grieving survivors behind. And that’s something we all live with. Whenever we bury a loved one, that’s a Holocaust in miniature. And it adds up.

Does this trivialize the Holocaust? No. Rather, we trivialize death by natural causes.

And let’s be brutally frank for a moment. We don’t feel the same way about the death of a stranger that we do about someone we know and love.

More to the point, Ehrman’s whole book, if true, is predicated on a falsehood. Why should we care about the pain and suffering of others? Why is empathy a virtue?

From the standpoint of evolutionary ethics, natural selection has programmed us to feel compassionate about our own kind because altruism confers a survival advantage on the species. But that’s it. A form of biological brainwashing.

Natural selection programmed us to care for Cro-Magnon, but not for Neanderthal. Neanderthal was our rival. The enemy. The way a lion will kill the cubs of rival lion.

But now that we’ve evolved to the point that we’re aware of our evolutionary conditioning, we’re aware of the fact that social morality is an illusion. It’s a way to perpetuate the human race. And yet the perpetuity of the human race is just a surd event in a surd universe. We reproduce because we can. We perpetuate the lifecycle like replaceable cogs on the treadmill of life. The machine can repair itself. Yet the machine serves no purpose. It’s like a gas station in a ghost town.

That’s what Bart Ehrman’s worldview will buy you, adjusted for inflation. And the hyperinflation rate which atheism exacts on morality is ruinous.

Ehrman asks, “What else could I do? What can you, or anyone else, do when you’re confronted with facts (or, at least, with what you take to be facts) that contradict your faith” (126).

The fact of evil is not a fact that contradicts my faith. To the contrary, my faith is predicated on the fact of evil. How could Ehrman commit the Bible to heart, but miss that fact—writ large on the pages of Scripture?

But Ehrman’s problem is that he is now confronted by facts without values. In leaving the faith behind, he hasn’t left the facts behind. The strident facts of pain and suffering remain. But they lose their moral dimension. Ehrman’s world is a world of surfaces. Sense data. Nerve endings.

But there’s no moral meaning behind the superficialities of pain and suffering. Matter is the only dimension. A one-dimensional world. Matter rearranging itself. That’s the meaning of life and death.

There is no tragedy in Ehrman’s skin-deep world. Just the illusion of tragedy programmed into us by natural selection.

Ehrman has some residual awareness of what his apostasy cost him:

“Another aspect of the pain I felt when I eventually became an agnostic is even more germane to this question of suffering. It involves another deeply rooted attitude that I have and simply can’t get rid of…I don’t have anyone to express my gratitude to. This is a void deep inside me, a void of wanting someone to thank, and I don’t see any plausible way of filling it” (128).

However, he tries to extinguish this religious ember with the following rationalization:

“By saying grace, wasn’t I in fact charging God with negligence, or favoritism?” (129).

Ehrman doesn’t know the difference between justice and mercy. How could he memorize so much of the Bible, and never register the difference?

The fact that God is merciful to me rather than you is not a reason for me to be thankless. Rather, it’s a reason for me to be humble.

The only Biblical answer he agrees with is the answer offered by Ecclesiastes. Unfortunately, this involves him in a fundamental misreading of the text. He fails to appreciate the allusions to the Fall in Ecclesiastes. He also fails to appreciate Solomon’s distinction between empirical appearances and eschatological judgment. The final judgment lies in the future, which is unobservable—at present. So we tend to judge by appearances—which are pretty indiscriminate.

Sometimes Ehrman turns his guns on liberal theodicies:

“For Kushner, God is not the one who causes our personal tragedies. Nor does he even ‘permit’ them when he could otherwise prevent them. There are simply somethings that God cannot do…but for a biblical scholar like me, I have to admit that it still seems problematic. Most of the Bible’s authors are completely unequivocal about the power of God. It is not limited. God knows all things and can do all things. That’s why he is God. To say that he can’t cure cancer, or eliminate birth defects, or control hurricanes, or prevent nuclear holocaust is to say that he’s not really God—at least not the God of the Bible and of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Believing in a God who stands beside me in my suffering, but who cannot actually do much about it, makes God a lot like my mother or my kindly next-door neighbor, but it doesn’t make him a lot like GOD” (272).

Here he reads the Bible with a candor of a Calvinist since, as an unbeliever, he has nothing to lose. But he concludes his book with a Pepsi Generation bromide.

So, unlike Truman Burbank, Bart Ehrman never left the set of Seahaven. Like most apostates, he merely transfers his Christian idealism to another cause. He changes his voter registration from Republican to Democrat. Puts a “Visualize World Peace” sticker on the back bumper of his Volvo. Has fewer kids and more cats. Eats organic food. Volunteers to chair the neighborhood recycling committee. Buys a solar-powered basket rotator. Or carbon offsets. And kills time.

Saturday, April 12, 2008

Why Reppert Can't Unsolve Calvinist Solutions to Problems of Evil

Reppert re-published an old post where he argues that Calvinism can't solve the problem of evil. There's not much to respond to since I already undercut or rebut his major premises. There's been no response as of yet. In any event, I'll offer a couple quick comments to some of his other complaints:

1. God, if God exists, is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good.
2. If there is a God, then there is no unnecessary evil.
3. But there is unnecessary evil.
4. Therefore God does not exist.


P3 is the problem. Victor would need to prove it. But then the conclusion would follow. So, Reppert doesn't believe P3. In fact, he thinks it is downright false. Thus, the argument is unsound. Why does Victor think an unsound argument is a problem for anyone, let alone a Calvinist? Perhaps Victor means, on the Calvinist's system, the argument goes through. But this is an internal critique, and so I get to pull from all my resources. I get to use all those nasty premises which go against the grain of Reppert's intuitions. So, internally, I'm fine.


"Now a lot of responses to the problem of evil employ two themes. One of those themes is that many evils in the world are not caused by God, but are the result of God's allowing creatures to act freely."

This is Reppert's defense. But this is just the greater good defense. The Calvinist can use a greater good defense.

And, what does Reppert mean that the evils are not "caused" by God? Reppert still must believe God allowed the world to be actualized, and if he hadn't, there wouldn't have been the evils. If Reppert knew that a NASCAR car had bad breaks, and a serious crash would occur if he let that car race, and he let that car race anyway, how is Reppert not a "cause" of the resultant evils?

And, on a Calvinist scheme, we employ dual causality where the agent is the actor who commits the sin, and that's all that's relevant. God didn't sin, the agent did.

I'd also point out that the classic evidential PoE argument is phrased as Bambi suffering in a forest fire. Say no human started the fire. Thus, no free will was involved. Thus, how does Victor's "free will defense" remove himself from dealing with the problem? Perhaps he will just admit that natural evils are not really evils. If so, then since the vast majority of philosophers who offer the argumentfrom evil do think the burning Bambi is an instance of evil, Victor can't make much more use out of his "intuition" arguments against Calvinism. Perhaps he will say "free will" was involved in Adam's choice to eat the fruit. If so, why is it moral for God to punish Bambi, or starving children in Africa for that matter, for something Adam did? The best resources here come from the Calvinist camp.

"If God makes us free to commit murder or not to commit murder, then God cannot guarantee that we not commit murder."

But if God knew at t1 God knew you would commit murder at t2, then how could you not have committed murder at t2? By causing God's infallible belief to be false? And, can we sin in heaven? Can God guarantee that we won't? Maybe someone will rape someone in heaven. Can Reppert guarantee that the won't? So in Reppert's heaven there is no guarantee that rape and murder will not occur.

"Second, some things that seem evil from a temporal, present-day perspective may not be evils from an eternal perspective."

The Calvinist can say this too (see my last post). And, to give criminals in God's universe their just deserts is not evil even from a temporal perspective; unless, of course, Reppert thinks it is evil to punish law-breakers.

"The problem with Calvinism is that on the Calvinistic view God sovereignly determines the outcome of every action."

He means, "the trouble with the God of the Bible is...." There's plenty of books, systematic theologies, exegesis, etc., that demonstrate this. How familiar is Reppert with them? How can he just assert that this is what Calvinism teaches? By doing that he is implicitly denying that the Bible teaches this. but I don't grant this premise of his. So it's an unargued premise. I don't stipulate it.

"Consider what philosopher Douglas Jesseph calls "The World of Mr. Rogers." In the world of Mr. Rogers, it's all a big happy neighborhood and everyone does what is right, and then go to heaven when they die. This world is obviously a better world than this one."

Who said that is better than this world? I think a redeemed world is better than one that never fell. I think a world where "greater love" is shown better than a world where it is not shown. "Greater love" shows itself in a man dying for his friends. In Christian theology, Jesus died because of sin. Evil. The curse. So, how could Mr. Roger's World WMR be better than Jesus' sin-sick world? In the former "greater love" does not get instantiated. Any world where "greater love" does not get instantiated isn't a better world than a world where it is instantiated. So, I just don't share Reppert's intuitions (I say as I pooch out my lips and shake my head back and forth).

"Just ask anyone who has gone to hell and see if they wouldn't prefer the World of Mr. Rogers."

Imagine a world where pedophiles get to violate children and earn no repercussion. or, imagine one where they get castrated.

Just ask pedophiles if they like the world where they get punished and see if they wouldn't prefer the world of flagrant violation.

It is telling that Reppert wants to poll law-breaking, God-hating, God's-people-hating sinners for what world is better.

And, Reppert shows us, again, his low view of sin. Sinners L-O-V-E their sin, Victor. They H-A-T-E God and his righteous ways. Therefore, they would not want God's holy, sinless world! Reppert think sinners in hell will be crying out for God to rescue them. Evincing regret for their actions. This is false. They will be maximally depraved. Their heart will be revealed for what it is when the sin-restraining power of common grace is removed. Sinners will want to stay in hell. This Pollyanna view of sinners has been repeated assumed by Victor in these dialogues, he has yet to defend it even though I have called him out on it repeatedly.

"The simple fact is that if Calvinism is true, then God could have created the World of Mr. Rogers, but sovereignly chose not to. Why?"

Because God wanted to show his mercy by saving sinners. There is no mercy shown in WMR. Because the Son wanted to show "greater love." Because a redeemed world is better than a fallen world. Because God is wiser than Victor. Because God is not a humanist. Because God's thoughts and ways are higher than ours. What Reppert would do if he were his straw man view of Calvin's God is a good indication that God wouldn't do it that way. Reppert isn't God. He's acting like John Loftus who says that if he were God he would have made us with wings so would wouldn't fall to our death and gills so we would drown.

The simple fact is that if Arminianism is true, then God could have created a world where people always do the right thing but do it with libertarian freedom. Does Reppert deny that God could do this? How so? And, if this kind of world is "boring" then he must say heaven is "boring too." If he resorts to compatibilism just for heaven, then how are we not robots in heaven? Do we freely worship God in heaven? Indeed, why is Victor's best world--heaven--a world where people have compatibilistic free will? Is compatibilism better than libertarianism? Then how can he appeal to libertarian free will as an escape from the problem of evil? What's so good about a good will that will get tossed like yesterday's trash?

"At this point it is possible to now appeal to human limitations, either limitations in human knowledge or in human goodness. Even though we can't see that this world is better than the WMR, it really is better, even though some people are damned in this world and no one is damned in WMR. I think these arguments from the limits of our knowledge have more force where the final outcome is unknown or inadequately understood. We know the final outcome in both worlds. Everyone is happy in the WMR and everyone gets saved. Many people suffer in our world and some are lost"

I deny that Victor "knows the outcome." He may know some outcomes, but how can he say he knows all of the outcomes? Especially when we're dealing with a Divine plan? How can Victor think he knows all the outcomes when he doesn't even know how God created a rat turd.

"Another way of replying is to present a version of Paul's rebuttal from the Book of Romans, "Who are you, o man, to answer back to God?" Now if this is a version of the argument from the limitations of our knowledge, which I think it is, then it has some value, but not on a Calvinistic scenario. If however, it is a way of simply dismissing the argument from evil, it is a transparently question-begging argument. The AfE questions whether there is a God, that is, a being omnisicent, omnipotent, and perfectly good, to answer back to. We cannot assume that such a being exists in order to eliminate the question as to whether or not an OOP being exists."

This is ridiculous. The AFE must allow the Christian to pull from all his resources. Indeed, the argument is supposed to be an internal critique. As William Lane Craig has stated:


"Since the problem is being presented as an internal problem for the Christian
theist, there is nothing illicit about the Christian theist's availing himself
of all the resources of his worldview in answering the objection."

And, we certainly can take all the resources of our position to bear on a problem. In his memorable address, Alvin Plantinga had this to say to Christian philosophers:

And my point here is this. The Christian philosopher is within his right in holding these positions, whether or not he can convince the rest of the philosophical world and whatever the current philosophical consensus is, if there is a consensus. But isn't such an appeal to God and his properties, in this philosophical context, a shameless appeal to a deus ex machina? Surely not. "Philosophy," as Hegel once exclaimed in a rare fit of lucidity, "is thinking things over." Philosophy is in large part a clarification, systematization, articulation, relating and deepening of pre-philosophical opinion.

[...]

So here again: my plea is for the Christian philosopher, the Christian philosophical community, to display, first, more independence and autonomy: we needn't take as our research projects just those projects that currently enjoy widespread popularity; we have our own questions to think about. Secondly, we must display more integrity. We must not automatically assimilate what is current or fashionable or popular by way of philosophical opinion and procedures; for much of it comports ill with Christian ways of thinking. And finally, we must display more Christian self-confidence or courage or boldness. We have a perfect right to our pre-philosophical views: why, therefore, should we be intimidated by what the rest of the philosophical world thinks plausible or implausible?

[...]

In still others the Christian will take for granted and will start from assumptions and premises rejected by the philosophical community at large.

[...]

Philosophy is many things. I said earlier that it is a matter of systematizing, developing and deepening one's pre-philosophical opinions. It is that; but it is also an arena for the articulation and interplay of commitments and allegiances fundamentally religious in nature; it is an expression of deep and fundamental perspectives, ways of viewing ourselves and the world and God. Among its most important and pressing projects are systematizing, deepening, exploring, articulating this perspective, and exploring its bearing on the rest of what we think and do. But then the Christian philosophical community has its own agenda; it need not and should not automatically take its projects from the list of those currently in favor at the leading contemporary centers of philosophy. Furthermore, Christian philosophers must be wary about assimilating or accepting presently popular philosophical ideas and procedures; for many of these have roots that are deeply anti-Christian. And finally the Christian philosophical community has a right to its perspectives; it is under no obligation first to show that this perspective is plausible with respect to what is taken for granted by all philosophers, or most philosophers, or the leading philosophers of our day.

In sum, we who are Christians and propose to be philosophers must not rest content with being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be Christians; we must strive to be Christian philosophers. We must therefore pursue our projects with integrity, independence, and Christian boldness.

For you see, we can appeal to that passage in Romans because we think that given our whole package, some problems don't even arise for us. So, I would argue that the AFE may question whether there is a "god" or not, but its questions don't apply to whether there is a "GOD" or not.

If the unbeliever comes to me and gives me the AFE as a reason for why I should not believe in God, then you can bet dollars to donuts that I will appeal to the Bible. Since I believe it is true, and for me it is evidence, evidence of the highest sort being the testimony from a person who cannot be wrong, then I sure can appeal to it.

If the unbeliever uses it as a reason for her not to believe, I will point out that it only gains force if it doesn't take into account that Christianity is true. Thus it only has force if the one who employs the argument assumes that the Christian story is false. So, they beg the question as well. Indeed, to say that there is "unnecessary evil" already assumes that what God has said---there is no unnecessary evil---is false. So, the atheist offers an argument that assumes the falsity of theism. i do not find Victor's point here convincing at all.

Lastly, I am answering Reppert and not an atheist. In our context of dialogue, then, I can certainly appeal to biblical texts! Reppert keeps jumping from pillar to post. Reppert does the same thing as I do when answering the atheist, too. He makes a move that God gave us "free will." But if there is no God, then there is no God to give us free will. So, Reppert's arguments remain entirely unconvincing to me, and even border on incoherence.

"But why would God want to give us any kind of free will other than the kind of free will that the compatibilist (and the Calvinist) is prepared to admit? The incompatiblist holds that human beings have the kind of freedom that is incompatible with our acting from a determining cause. If we sin, we could have done otherwise under the actual circumstances."

Well here, Reppert endorses Pelagianism. But this position has been condemned as heresy across denomination boundaries

Councils of Carthage (412, 416 and 418)

Council of Ephesus (431)

The Council of Orange (529)

Council of Trent (1546) (Roman Catholic)

2nd Helvetic (1561/66) 8-9. (Swiss-German Reformed)

Augsburg Confession (1530) Art. 9, 18 (Lutheran)

Gallican Confession (1559) Art. 10 (French Reformed)

Belgic Confession (1561) Art. 15 (Lowlands, French/Dutch/German Reformed)

The Anglican Articles (1571), 9. (English)

Canons of Dort (1618-9), 3/4.2 (Dutch/German/French Reformed).

Source.

Reppert thinks it is possible for a mere human to go through life sinless.

Repperts attacks on Calvinism fail to find their mark, again.

I should also add that libertarian free will isn't without its philosophical (not to mention Scriptural) objections. For example, are his actions uncaused? How does he find belief in uncaused events rational? Or, are they self-caused? If so, how doe he answer the arguments from those like van Inwangen and Mele against agent causation? Arguments like the "luck" objection. Arguments from control and reliable mechanisms which lead to the conclusion that if an act is free then it is determined.

Arminianism, Libertarian Free Will, and the Road to Open Theism

Some LFWers (and some atheists) here raised the objection of theological fatalism for the Calvinist (though we escape that by denyingt eh LFW premise).

We raised the objection that exhaustive, traditionally conceived views of God's foreknowledge actually puts the LFWer in the predicament.

They danced around that with the Boethian shuffle.

We shoot back with the Dr. Sudduth bazooka.

"It seems that divine timelessness, rather than providing a way to reconcile foreknowledge and indeterministic freedom, actually accentuates the difficulty, perhaps even rendering such a reconciliation logically impossible."

Friday, April 11, 2008

Reply to the Anti-Calvinists

Victor Reppert is continuing his muddled critique of Calvinism over at DI. I'll offer some muddled responses. His comments will be in red.

"First, while I admit that Scripture can correct my conception of goodness, accepting reprobation would, on my view, not be a correction, but an out and out reversal, of what goodness seems to me to be. If Hitler was wrong to send people to Auschwitz, could it be OK for God to send people to an everlasting Auschwitz, when he could have chosen eternal bliss for them?"

i) And can Scripture "reverse" some particular conception of goodness? I don't see why not. Some may think that it is never good in any circumstance to make an innocent man pay for the sins of the guilty. In coming to the Bible, and being asked to accept what Jesus did on behalf of sinners, this man could reply: "That requires me to reverse my conception of goodness." Or, say one is a humanist. Man is the highest good. Since Reppert admits that God is the highest good, then he presents the humanists with a concept of goodness that is the reverse (outright denial, even) of the humanists. So, I don't see the problem Victor has here.

ii) Notice the philosopher's version of an ace up the sleeve. The philosopher's get out of jail free card. It is: The Appeal to Intuition (and this intuition is not like our intuition that modus ponens is correct, either. Not even close to that universally recognized). Now, the secret to offering this particular response to a position is that you much pooch our your lips, shake your head back and forth and say, "I just don't have that intuition."

iii) Reppert makes a disanalogy between Hitler and God. One relevant detail left out is that God is sending criminals to their just deserts.

iv) Reppert is more confused why God who would send sinners to hell, I'm more confused at why the Holy One of Israel, the Fear of Isaac, would save anyone. The Calvinist's high view of God is matched by Reppert's low view of sin.

v) If Reppert believes in hell, then he must answer why God would instantiate any person who chooses to go to hell when he could have saved them the pain and everlasting punishment by not creating them. If he believes all go to heaven, and also all have libertarian freedom, he must answer how God can guarantee this on a libertarian model.

vi) Was it impossible for God to make a world where everyone freely (in a libertarian way) did what was right? If not: (a) what happens in heaven?, (b) if Plantinga's transworld depravity is appealed to, what about Jesus' creaturely essence not being depraved?. If so, why this world? If for a greater good defense, why can't the Calvinist appeal to this?

"Second, it’s the very influence of Scripture on my character that makes Calvinism a problem. Scripture teaches that I should love my neighbor as myself and undermines the idea, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, that there are people outside the pale of being my neighbor. If I think about the people whom I come the closest to loving as I do myself, I don’t find that there are two good options, either an eternal bliss in relation to God, or eternal justified punishment forever and ever separated from God. The more I love someone, the less acceptable the second option is."

i) This is poor reasoning. It begs the question. If the sinner is a criminal worthy of punishment, then what does "loving your neighbor" have to do with anything? (Indeed, who says we are God's neighbor, anyway? Someone's massively confusing the Creator/creature distinction.) Does Reppert protest the sending away of child molesters? Of punishing them for their crimes? Either he does not love them (and undercuts his argument), or there is no problem with him loving his neighbor and punishing them.

ii) Love of neighbor is not the same kind of love as salvific or electing love (see D.A. Carson's The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God for some relevant distinctions). Reppert is making a category mistake with this argument from love of neighbor.

iii) Apropos (ii), love of neighbor doesn't mean I can't kill someone trying to kill my wife. Is this man, who is trying to kill my wife, outside the pale of neighbor? Why should God alloow those in heaven who (a) hate him?, (b) hate his followers?, and (c) don't want to be there. Reppert's apologetic inspiration, C.S. Lewis, once said: "There are two kinds of people in the end. The ones who say to God "Thy will be done", and the ones to whom God will say, "thy will be done."

iv) As a matter of fact, there are people outside the pale of neighbor. Those trying to do you harm, for instance. Does Reppert think he should help those trying to beat and rob him like like the man who fell into the hands of the robbers in Luke 10?

v) Reppert acts as if every law Reppert is commanded to obey, God is likewise obliged. This logically leads to Mormonism, though. Does God need to honor his father (and mother!)? How about theft? If God owns everything, how can he steal what is his? We are commaded to pray, does God pray to himself.

"Finally, the summum bonum that God pursues in saving and damning is supposed to be his own glory. How in the world does damning someone eternally glorify God. How does taking voices out of the heavenly choir glorify God? Sending people to hell by a decree before the foundation of the world deprives God of glory."

i) I am trying to make a metaphysical point, Reppert is acting as if epistemic hindrances have something to do with that. Say I don’t know, what of interest follows? That God does not in fact gain glory from his cosmic display of justice? Hardly. What follows is the uninteresting claim that Paul Manata doesn't know how God gains glory.

ii) It's not as if those who go to hell did not commit acts of sin themselves. That God decreed it is not a problem to me. Now, allow me to pooch my lips out, shake my head from side to side, and say to Reppert: I just don't have these intuitions.

iii) Reppert is asking questions and then asserting. The above isn't an argument. He wouldn't accept it if someone simply asserted: "Neurons do all the work attributed to the mind."

iv) How does allowing unrepentant criminals into heaven add to the glory of God? Does Reppert think God forces people to repent? Perhaps Reppert think that after some time in hell, people will gladly repent. In this reppert demonstrates his low view of sin. The sinners will gnash their teeth against God in hell. Their pride will be maximalized. Their hatred intensified. God's goodness villainized. God and his people stigmatized. This compounds their crime. Begets more judgment. How does allowing these people into heaven add to God's glory?

v) Reppert begins his theology with his intuitions, the Calvinist begins with Scripture. Reppert can't show his views in Scripture. Can Reppert exegete any of his views from Scripture? How about libertarian freedom? Can Reppert exegete universalism from Scripture? I think not. So, his argument is armchair philosophical speculation.

"Paul Manata does not think that Calvinism relies on theological voluntarism, and does therefore think that God’s goodness, even on a Calvinistic view, is in some way commensurable with goodness as human beings ordinarily understand it."

i) I think I said that the good God does is really and objectively good. Since it is, Reppert would have to, if he were thinking appropriately, admit the actual goodness of God's actions.

ii) And, it's no big mystery that there is a position on God-talk called "analogy." And it's not just the Calvinist who uses it. A dog is faithful to his master as a man is faithful to his wife in an analogous way. But the Creator/creature distinction comes into play here. Though God is truly good, it's not an univocal good with man's goodness. Man isn't, for instance, infinitely good.

Michael Sudduth writes,

"The theological pessimist emphasizes the fact that God is unlike anything in the world. But what does this mean? Is God not completely like everything in the world of human experience? Or he is completely unlike everything in the world of human experience? If God is not completely like everything in the world of human experience, then God does share all properties or characteristics with anything else. But if God is completely unlike everything in the world of human experience, then God does not share any properties or characteristics with anything else. It is certainly true that God does not share all properties with anything else, but it's hard to see how God could not share any properties with anything else. If God had nothing in common with anything else, God would have at least one thing in common with everything else, namely the property of "having nothing in common" (as this would be a property of both God and everything else)."

"He claims Sudduth blows the idea that Calvin is a theological voluntarist. He quotes a passage with suggests otherwise, but I wonder how he would interpret the following statement form the Institutes

The will of God is the highest rule of justice, so that what He wills must be considered just…for this very reason, because he wills it. (Institutes, vol ii, chap 3, trans. John Allen. Philadephia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, p. 23) quoted in John Beversluis’ C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion p. 230.

Now, as I see it not much turns on whether Calvin was a voluntarist (or, to use Beversluis’ terminology, and Ockhamist) or not. I suspect that a textual case could be made on both sides of the issue."


i) Here Reppert loses some respect. If he's going to "interact" with an article, and try to "rebut" one of my points, he can at least read the article he's "rebutting." Here's what I mean. It just so happens, unfortunately for Reppert, that Sudduth deals with this exact quote from the institutes! Starting with II. Calvin’s Rejection of the Distinction and reading down will be enough to show Reppert’s position in error. Here's the link to Sudduth.

ii) Respected Calvinist philosopher, Paul Helm, also interacts with this exact quote. Helm points out that, in the same section Reppert mines from Beversluis, Calvin goes on to say:

We do not advocate the fiction of “absolute might”: because this is profane, it ought rightly to be hateful to us. We fancy no lawless God who is a law unto himself…But we deny that he is liable to render an account; we also deny that we are competent judges to pronounce judgment in this cause according to our own understanding’. (Inst. III.23.2)

"I am more interested in Manata’s suggesting that, for the most part, you can use many of the same defensive responses to the problem of evil if you are a Calvinist. Of course you can’t use the free will defense, but there are other considerations used by people like Plantinga, Alston, Adams, etc, that a Calvinst can still use."

i) Can Reppert use the free will defense? How does that work for heaven?

ii) Is Reppert thinking of Plantinga's free will defense? That's been shown to be insufficient for defending Christian theism (sec. 1.3).

"In many cases, we find that some things that seem to be gratuitously evil turn out to have good sides we couldn’t see. The wicked act of selling Joseph to the slavers resulted, after a long chain of events, in Jacob’s family being able to settle in Egypt and to avoid the ill effects of the famine."

i) It's more than that. It's that we might not see that things "turn out" for good, and is possible that we might never understand, given our creatureliness and the magnitude of God’s plan. I quote Welty at length,

But now let us suppose, again for the sake of argument, that Wykstra's application of CORNEA is an utter failure, an overly bold and therefore indefensible amendment to the Principle of Credulity. What of the weaker hypothesis that Alston proposes in its place? Rather than "proceeding on the basis of any such unrestricted epistemological principle," Alston says the more proper response

focuses on the peculiar difficulties we encounter in attempting to provide adequate support for a certain very ambitious negative existential claim, viz., that there is (can be) no sufficient divine reason for permitting a certain case of suffering, E. I will be appealing to the difficulties of defending a claim of this particular kind, rather than to more generalized human cognitive weaknesses (102).

That is, Alston (unlike Wykstra) is willing to initially grant the atheist his 'it appears' claims. But, Alston argues, a moment's reflection on the part of the atheist will rob premise (1) of Rowe's argument of any rational support.[16] The atheist is perhaps initially entitled to say, "it appears that God could not have a morally compelling reason for permitting this evil." But when he is led to reflect upon, more particularly, his cognitive limitations vis-à-vis the complexity of God's plan, to reflect upon his inability to determine whether or not an omniscient God could have a sufficient reason for permitting this evil, he should realise that this very cognitive limitation is a reason that tells against the initial 'appears' claim. The common-sense qualification Swinburne makes to the Principle of Credulity has been fulfilled in the course of this very exercise.

Swinburne would disagree; he alleges that even if Alston is right that our moral and logical intuitions may be in error when examining an instance of evil, this is a worthless point, for Alston has still given us no "reason to suppose that our error is more likely to lie in the one direction rather than in the other" (1998, 28). That is, if Alston's argument is to be consistent, it must call into question all of our moral and logical intuitions. We need "positive argument for supposing that certain appearances rather than others are misleading" (1998, 28).

Three replies are in order here.

3.2.2.1 Alston Defines the Limits

First, this criticism overlooks the explicit restriction Alston places upon his scepticism, as well as his rationale for that restriction. The heart of Alston's argument is that

the critic is engaged in attempting to support a particularly difficult claim, a claim that there isn't something in a certain territory, while having a very sketchy idea of what is in that territory, and having no sufficient basis for an estimate of how much of the territory falls outside his knowledge. This is very different from our normal situation in which we are forming judgments and drawing conclusions about matters concerning which we antecedently know quite a lot, and the boundaries and parameters of which we have pretty well settled (120)... [The point] is that the judgments required by the inductive argument from evil are of a very special and enormously ambitious type and that our cognitive capacities that serve us well in more limited tasks are not equal to this one" (124 fn. 36) (my italics).

Alston is zealous to maintain this explicit restriction upon his scepticism. Thus,

having carefully examined my desk, I can infer 'Jones's letter is not on my desk.' But being ignorant of quantum mechanics, I cannot infer 'this treatise on quantum mechanics is well done' from 'so far as I can tell, this treatise on quantum mechanics is well done' (102).

If the Principle of Credulity cannot be fitted to obvious counterexamples like the above, then the Principle as it stands has no authority with respect to the judgements that are relevant to the evidential argument from evil, since these counterexamples form a precise parallel to those judgements. Even as ignorance of the complexities of quantum mechanics disqualifies me from passing judgement on how well done is a treatise on the subject, so ignorance of the complexities of God's plan disqualifies human beings (in their present cognitive condition) from passing judgement on how well done is a world God has made.

3.2.2.2 Alston Appeals to Discontinuity

Second, this criticism overlooks the fact that Alston's argument appeals to a clear principle of discontinuity between our knowledge of human affairs and our knowledge of God's affairs, to a discontinuity between our ability to conceptualise possibilities for sufficient reasons and God's ability to conceptualise them. Thus Alston asks his readers to

remember that our topic is not the possibilities for future human apprehensions, but rather what an omniscient being can grasp of modes of value and the condition of their realization. Surely it is eminently possible that there are real possibilities for the latter that exceed anything we can anticipate, or even conceptualize. It would be exceedingly strange if an omniscient being did not immeasurably exceed our grasp of such matters (109, my italics).

Such an appeal to discontinuity is familiar to those conversant with Joseph Butler's apologetic strategy in The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature (1736). From the title alone it might be inferred that Butler only appealed to observed continuities between religious claims and the 'constitution and course of nature,' but this is not the case. While Butler does make great use of reasoning about unknown possibilities from the known constitution and course of nature, he recognises (and, like Alston, even exploits to his advantage) the limitations of this method of reasoning.

Thus, Butler argues for human immortality by pointing out that although we have in our lifetime undergone much change, we have still survived. Therefore, it is likely that we will survive death. This is Butler employing the principle of continuity. But, Butler also points out that we do not know enough about death to say (with the materialist) that it involves a loss of our present powers. This is Butler employing the principle of discontinuity. (For both of these points, see "Of a Future Life, " in ch. 1 of the Analogy.)

We can see Wykstra's emendation to the Principle of Credulity, and Alston's argument generally, as being in the spirit of Butler's appeal to discontinuity. There are areas concerning which human beings (in their present cognitive condition) are not qualified to speculate. If this is true for some of us with respect to human endeavours like quantum mechanics; why is it not all the more true for all of us with respect to divine endeavours?

As one commentator has expressed Butler's strategy:

Analogy tries to show that special revelation is analogous to natural revelation. Disanalogy, or the argument from ignorance, tries to show that the unlikeness of the supernatural invalidates unbelieving objections: the unbeliever does not know enough to object to scriptural teaching. This too is, in Butler's estimation, a practical kind of argument, like those by which we make decisions in everyday life. He presses the non-Christian to be consistent: admit in the religious debate the same continuities and discontinuities that you freely recognize elsewhere. When you do that, he tells the inquirer, you will see that special revelation has the same cogency that you accept in natural revelation. And if there are problems in special revelation, they are no greater than the problems of natural revelation. Since you are able to bear with the latter, you should be able equally to bear with the former.[17]

3.2.2.3 Alston Provides 'Positive Argument'

Third, I take Alston as having, in any case, fulfilled Swinburne's requirement; he has given "positive argument for supposing that certain appearances rather than others are misleading" (Swinburne, 1998, 28). Namely, those 'appearances' into which the concept of God enters as part of its description are misleading, to the extent that we have not reflected upon the relationship between the cognitive abilities of that God, and our own cognitive limitations. We can interpret Alston as holding that 'it appears that p' (where p is 'God could not have a morally compelling reason for permitting this evil') would be misleading, if the aspect of 'God' being considered is merely that he is a perfectly good being. But if, in addition to his perfect goodness, his perfect wisdom and power are equally considered - that is, if it is truly the concept of God (and not a scaled-down substitute) which enters into the content of p in 'it appears that p' - then cause for scepticism as to the rational acceptability of p is due to enter in. It was the burden of Alston's article to argue this point at length. He initially concedes to the atheist his 'it appears that p' only because he is convinced that further reflection on the content of p will make p well-nigh indefensible.

To formalise a bit,[18] if we take the following definitions:

h = 'God could not have a morally compelling reason for permitting this evil'

e = 'it seems to me that God could not have a morally compelling reason for permitting this evil'

k = irrelevant background knowledge

c = considerations of our human cognitive condition vis-à-vis God's omniscience and omnipotence

Then I am convinced that Alston's argument is meant to show that, even if it is a fact of human psychology that P(h/e.k)> 1/2, what is important with respect to the evidential argument from evil is that Alston's considerations lead to P(h/e.k.c)W 1/2.

"So if something appears evil, it may not be because

1) We don’t see all the causes and effects that will result for this so-called evil.
2) We don’t see the long-term consequences of the evil.
3) We don’t see the eternal consequences of the evil.
4) We don’t see the possible bad consequences of eliminating the evil."


i) Given God's infinity, he divine plan, the massive gap between his knowledge and ours, possibly hundreds of various theodicies, the promise of his trustworthy word that "the judge of the earth shall do right," and that he has a morally sufficient reason for what he does, and that he is working all thing together for the good of those who love him, Reppert’s 4 little points may safely be said to be a tad bit underwhelming. I quote Helm, again:

God may have a reason and yet that reason not be available to us. Perhaps this is true of all the particular things that God ordains. Why was Esau the twin of Jacob and not, say, Izzy (or Lizzy)? Or why were there not triplets, Jacob, Esau and Izzy? It may seem arbitrary of God to bring into existence these two, and not some other two, or some three. We may presume that Calvin might say there is a reason for this, but that the reason has not been disclosed to us. There are multitudes of reasons for multitudes of states of affairs, perhaps none of which we can give the reason for. Maybe the reason for this irritating fact is that the will of God is not concerned with separately-identifiable situations, but with whole ensembles, with worlds. That is, maybe we ought to be asking not, why not Izzy? But, Why a world in which there is no Izzy? However, we find, naturally enough, that whether we ask ‘Why not a world with Izzy?’ we do not have a reason for that, though we have fewer questions to ask. Perhaps the reason can be given, and appreciated, only when the world is over, when this passing world is done.

ii) Reppert is begging the question against the model. Recall Alston:

remember that our topic is not the possibilities for future human
apprehensions, but rather what an omniscient being can grasp of modes of value
and the condition of their realization. Surely it is eminently possible that
there are real possibilities for the latter that exceed anything we can
anticipate, or even conceptualize. It would be exceedingly strange if an
omniscient being did not immeasurably exceed our grasp of such matters"
(emphasis added).

"Now if someone went to hell as a result of divine decree who could have been saved, and I say that isn’t something a good God could permit, which one of these mistakes could I be making? It’s a final result for someone’s soul. We see all the causes and effects, at least so far is this particular life is concerned. The long-term consequences are known, even the eternal consequences are known, and the alternative possibility of God’s saving that person is also known. So my error can’t be traced to any of these four sources. So where did I go wrong if I thought this would be wrong for God to do, but it really isn’t? It must be that my conception of goodness is dead wrong. That’s all that’s left."

i) I proved above (my first (i)) that it is many times that our conception of "good" is "dead wrong." This doesn't imply that metaphysical conclusion that God's actions are not good.

ii) Reppert equivocates. he could have been saved only by another decree. Given the decree, he could not be saved.

iii) How does Victor know that we see all the causes and effects? I don’t see how he can say that, at all. And, his admission that "at least in this life" is perhaps more telling than he admits. If he doesn’t know all, most, many, some, hardly any, of all the causes and effects, how is he in a position to make this judgment, at all? Especially when the Calvinist trusts God at his word, the testimony of another person, a person who cannot lie, that he will do good, right, just.

iv) How are the long term consequences known? We're talking eternity here. Victor thinks that all that is taken into account is that we know "He is in hell for eternity." How in the world does he know that that is the only long term consequence?

v) Victor's error can most certainly be traced to those four sources, and the multitude of other sources involved in a divine plan. Indeed, look at the finding of science. The detailed plans of how our universe is fine tuned. The amazing DNA program we have. Most learned scientists admit we only know the tip of the ice berg here! Is it a little presumptuous for victor to think that he has the majority of the picture in an admittedly more involved, detailed, and mysterious part of God's plan for all things? I refer to Paul Helm once again:

One can think up other sorts of considerations why the reasons are presently hidden, reasons to do with prudence, or appropriateness, or the fact that it is none of our business, or otherwise not in our interests to know them. In modern society there is the problem of balancing the disclosing of information with the right to privacy. In respect of the reasons for the election of one and the reprobation of another Calvin asserts God’s right to privacy, as Paul does in Romans 11.33f. The sources of election etc. are ‘secret’, as Calvin often says.

Perhaps, as Jesus once said of his own disciples, there are reasons that we presently cannot bear. Perhaps because we would necessarily misconstrue these reasons, or make a bad use of them. In any case why, if God has a reason for doing X or not doing it, do we have an overriding entitlement to know what that reason is? As Alvin Plantinga asked, in a rather different context, Why should we be the first to know? Different attitudes to this question mark deep religious differences.

vi) I am not convinced by Reppert's arguments in the slightest. He may dislike Calvinism all he wants, disagree with it, etc., but I would at least appreciate his admission that on this argument, he doesn't have the Calvinist where he thinks he has him. I trust Reppert can be intellectually honest here. Admitting my points doesn't mean he needs to become a Calvinist. It will just show that he can treat his opponent charitably, recognizing what the good vs. the bad arguments against a position are. Surely Reppert doesn’t think that every single argument he ever offers against the Calvinist is spot on, does he? That’s a pretty good record, especially for someone who admits he’s not an expert in theology, historical theology, Calvinism, or Calvin.

(HT James Anderson for Helm's paper)