Ron D. Meets That Triabloguer

Fellow Italian and Reformed Christian, Ron Di Giacomo, commented on an old post of mine on Vincent Cheung. His post is called: "Vincent Cheung Meets The Triabloguer." Possibly "A" Triabloguer would have been better than "The" Triabloguer? Everyone knows that Steve Hays is "The" Triabloguer. The rest of us are "A" Triabloguers. In fact, I might be lower than "A" Triabloguer. It might be more accurate to refer to me as "That" Triabloger. As in, "That Triabloguer who always posts stupid posts." Or, "That Triabloguer who gets PWNED by atheists." Or, "That Triabloguer who is a big meany."

I find that his post forgets the context of dialogue. It strays off the path it was meant to be on. There is background info not taken into account. This makes for a largely irrelevant post, whatever the merits (good or bad) of his post. I'll just quote his text in italicized red; I'll then respond.

"About a year ago, Triabloguer Paul Manata tried to take Vincent Cheung to task for asserting that God immediately and directly causes people to believe everything they believe. In spite of the fact that Vincent Cheung states that God causes men to know in this way; I do not find in the quotes provided by Manata that Cheung believes that God causes men in this way to believe all they believe. In other words, when knowledge is gained, Cheung is quoted as asserting God acts immediately and directly upon the mind. Yet, as Cheung knows, not all beliefs constitute knowledge; so without further evidence I cannot take Cheung to mean that God acts immediately and directly when one believes that which he does not know. Cheung may believe that but I do not believe that he does, which does not mean I disbelieve that he does. I have no basis for either belief."

I'm not too sure how familiar Ron is with Cheung's "works." His austere, robust, extreme, and mistaken view of God's sovereignty commits him, logically, to the belief that God directly causes all things - of which beliefs are then a subset. For example, on p.38 of "Ultimate Question" we read, "Therefore, it is correct to say that [God] alone is the cause of all things" (emphasis supplied). Therefore, if God is "alone" the cause of all things, and if beliefs are things, then God is "alone" the cause of "all" beliefs.

Next, we can read Cheung himself, "Yes, God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches)," SOURCE.

Now, it is important to note what beliefs are being referred to here. The context in Cheung's blog post is that two men, John and Tim, believe different things about the world. For instance, such mundane beliefs as: "I believe there is a bee on the rose," and "I believe that there are X number of ants in my backyard." Thus God causes men to believe heresy (see # 7 here) as well as causing them to believe propositions about bugs on flowers and amounts of bugs in your backyard. So, it looks like every one of our beliefs are directly caused by God. Unless, of course, Cheung (and Ron) believe that God only causes our theological, heretical, arthropodical, and botanical beliefs?

Cheung's view of God's sovereignty has God as the direct cause of everything. Even sin: "But the answer does not deny that God is the direct cause of sin; instead, it boldly says that God has a right to make whatever he wants and do whatever he wants." (SOURCE)

As far as "immediacy." Cheung states that God is in control of all things (as indeed he is, but not in Cheung's hyper-sovereignty sense). How is this "control" brought to bear on man's mind? "Scripture teaches that God not only exercise immediate control over man's mind....", according to Cheung (SOURCE, emphasis supplied).

So, putting it all together. God is the only cause of all things. God directly causes all things. As far as man's mind, God immediately controls it. So, God directly and immediately causes all men's beliefs.

I thus take it that I have provided sufficient evidence to undermine Ron's false belief about Cheung (which God caused, btw :-).

Next, I should note that my taking on Cheung is not the only effort by a T-blogger. Here is a page where Archetypal T-blogger Steve Hays, as well as guest T-blogger, the brilliant and prolific Aquascum, have "tried to take on Vincent Cheung:"

**********

http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/

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So, I'm not "the" Triabloguer, and Cheung has "met" other Triabloguers before and after my post.


Continuing...

"Nonetheless, let us assume with Mr. Manata that when Cheung says that "God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches)..." that Cheung means that God does so immediately and directly."

I think we've shown that that's a safe assumption.

Moving along...

"Now for Manata's criticism of Cheung's epistemology:"

He then quotes me:

"God immediately and directly causes people to believe everything they believe. Lie or truth. At this point I would like to know how Cheung knows anything? How does he know that God is not deceiving Cheung? If he replies that he has deductively valid arguments, deduced from scriptural premises, he doesn't escape. This is because the argument is only good if the premises are true. Cheung takes his understanding of verses and this understanding he has was immediately conveyed to his mind by God. Could God be deceiving Cheung? How would Cheung know?... So, when those divines who argued for an infralapsarian position, from the texts of Scripture, their understanding of those texts was wrong, according to Cheung, and their understanding, according to Cheung, was immediately conveyed by God on the occasion that they read those texts. Is Cheung better than those men? ...Cheung would need to show in a non-question begging manor that he was not deceived in this instance..."

"For Cheung, sufficient and necessary conditions for knowledge are justified true belief, where justification is maximal warrant and, therefore, excludes inductive inference."

A bit misleading. Let's read Cheung:

"Scripture is the first principle of the Christian worldview, so that true knowledge consists of only what is directly stated in Scripture and what is validly deducible from Scripture; all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best. This biblical epistemology necessarily follows from biblical metaphysics. Any other epistemology is indefensible, and unavoidably collapses into self-contradictory skepticism." (p. 43; cf. “Systematic Theology,” p. 18 para. 4, p. 22 para. 5, p. 41 fn. 42, emphasis supplied)

Cheung also holds to an internalist and an infallibilist constraint on knowledge. Thus Cheung:

"However, unless he constructs his claims upon an objective and infallible foundation, then if he can claim to know..." (SOURCE)

For a analysis of how Cheung is an internalist, see here (sec. 3.2).

So, for Cheung,

(*) For one to know that P, (i) P must be Scripture, or deductively deduced from Scripture, (ii) one cannot be mistaken that P, and (iii) one must have access to how one knows that P. All else is "unjustified opinion at best."

Unfortunately for Cheung, one can't deduce (*) from Scripture. (See link above for a complete demonstration of Cheung's affirmation of (*).)

"What is not being considered in the above criticism of Vincent Cheung’s epistemology is that although God can cause one to believe a lie; God cannot cause one to know a lie."

Where did I ever say that God could cause someone to "know" a "lie"? If God has caused Cheung to believe falsehoods, e.g., his occasionalism, his internalism, his infallibilism, namely, (*), then Cheung doesn't know those things. And, if Cheung knew those things, he'd have to show how he knows them according to the strictures laid out in (*). That is, Cheung can't pass his own test. The combination of Cheung's epistemological constraints is a volatile combination that explodes in the face of any who try and use it.

"Accordingly, Cheung, like Paul Manata or anyone else, can have reason to believe false propositions but such false beliefs can never entail the same confirmation that accompanies knowledge, since by the nature of the case what is falsely believed is contrary to truth and, therefore, the consistency that accompanies knowledge."

Yes, we can have reasons to believe falsehoods. I never denied such. But for Cheung, if what you believe is not directly stated in Scripture, or deducible from Scripture, or anything else contained in (*), then it is "unjustified opinion at best." But notice that Ron states that one can believe P for reasons, and hence be justified in believing P. Thus Ron isn't defending Cheung here. And, he's not critiquing me, either. I agree. Cheung wouldn't.

"How does Cheung know anything? Well, by the same way anyone else knows anything – by possessing true belief due to maximal warrant, which does not occur when one believes anything false (like a lie)."

And this simply fails to take into account the context of dialogue. I was offering an internal critique of Cheung. Though I don't know what Ron means by "maximal warrant," I'm not sure I agree with him on the particulars here, but that's fine, because Ron's views aren't at issue here. Besides any debate between us, I agree that Cheung can have knowledge of propositions that don't meet the criteria laid out in (*) above. So, I'm not saying that Cheung can't know anything, point blank. I'm asking how can Cheung know most of what he claims, if all the other things he claims about knowledge were true? Thus Ron is blogging just to blog. His comments are irrelevant to my critique of Cheung.

Continuing...

Ron quotes me asking, "How does he know that God is not deceiving Cheung?"

And replies,

"One cannot be deceived into knowing something false."

Right. But the truth of Cheung's assertions are at issue here. One can't just assert that they are true. Furthermore, I'm asking how Cheung can know that God is not deceiving Cheung. Since occasionalism grants the fact that billions of false beliefs are produced, then it is not an "infallible" method of attaining knowledge. Just as Cheung might admit that someone's intuitions might grant them a true belief, they don't know their belief since intuition is a fallible belief producing process.

Continuing...

"Accordingly, our query need not be limited to how one knows he is not being deceived but rather can be expanded to: how one knows that he knows. In other words, how can men who can believe falsely know anything and know that they know?"

Here it seems as if Ron adheres to internalism, viz., "know that you know." I deny this constraint. For just one devastating critique of internalism, Bergman's book can be consulted:

http://www.us.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Epistemology/?view=usa&ci=9780199275748

And, according to Cheung, our "query" can be limited to the question of deception. Cheung himself uses this tactic quite frequently on his interlocutors (see here, for example). If an atheist can't know, and show how he knows, that he is not being deceived (by dream, demon, senses, &c), then he cannot know what he claims to know. Thus, again, Ron is simply ignoring the context of discussion. According to how Cheung has framed the debate, my points were/are quite relevant indeed.

"However, if one is deceived about the truth of premises, he doesn’t have maximal warrant. The only question at this juncture is whether God when deceiving men through a lying spirit or “immediately” gives men the same confirmation as when he grants men maximal warrant. Manata seems to think that Cheung thinks so. I, however, do not assume that since it is not deducible from what I have read in Cheung."

Um, Cheung having maximal warrant is what's in question here. And, I don't think Cheung would appreciate this appeal to "confirmation." How could Cheung tell if his "confirmation" was a feeling or belief caused by God for purposes of deception? And, can Cheung deduce all that Ron said from Scripture? How would he know if his beliefs were not false ones implanted by God. Since God implants trillions and trillions of false beliefs, what are the odds that Cheung's are true? And, how would he know it? Could he deduce that his beliefs were true, from Scripture? How so?

[P1] I [Cheung] believe X.

[P2] Scripture teaches X.

[C1] Therefore, Scripture teaches what I [Cheung] believe.

Sorry, where is [P1] in Scripture? I never saw "Cheung believes X" in the Bible. Is "Cheung" deducible from the Bible? Cheung can't even know that he is a male, let alone know that he believes what he believes! Also, how would Cheung know that Scripture teaches X (P2)?

"Manata reasons by false disjunction. That one can believe he knows something that is false, does not imply that one cannot know that he knows when he knows."

Ron reasons by false attribution. He falsely attributes positions to me I never implied, and he doesn't even interact with my actual arguments. So, we can add ignoratio elenchi onto the charges.

Moving forward...

Ron quotes me,

"So, when those divines who argued for an infralapsarian position, from the texts of Scripture, their understanding of those texts was wrong, according to Cheung, and their understanding, according to Cheung, was immediately conveyed by God on the occasion that they read those texts. Is Cheung better than those men?"

And replied,

"If correct doctrine means “better than those men,” then yes, the high-Cavlinists were better. Cheung can know that infralapsarianism is false and that his position is true yet while believing he knows things he doesn’t."

My question was, what makes Cheung better than the divines in that God wouldn't deceive him but would deceive them?

Concluding...

Ron quotes me,

"Cheung would need to show in a non-question begging manor that he was not deceived in this instance."

And responds,

"Why must Cheung be able to persuade someone else that he knows something in order to know something? Moreover, that Cheung can be wrong does not mean he cannot know he knows. It only means that he is capable of believing he knows when he does not know. Either Manata must consign himself to skepticism or claim perfect knowledge if he doesn’t allow for fallible men to know while being capable of being deceived."

Again, Ron can't keep the broader context in view, here. First, I never asked to be "persuaded". Ron commits the intentional fallacy (add that to the pile). Second, I am applying Cheung's own standards of proof to him. This is called an internal critique. For example, here Cheung responds to someone by saying,

"Yes, but unless you can show how you know at any given instance whether that particular sensation is reliable or not, then you can’t show how you could trust any given instance of sensation.

So, even if some instances of sensation are reliable, and that in these instances, what you sense really corresponds to what is there to be sensed, unless you can show which instances of sensation are reliable and which instances are unreliable, it makes no difference -- you still can’t trust any of them, since you have no way of knowing when your sensations are right and when they are wrong."

So, Ron could ask Cheung, rather than me (I'm an externalist!), his question: "Why must [your interlocutor] be able to persuade [you, Cheung] that he knows something in order to know something?"

And, yes, I fully agree that the possibility of being wrong doesn't preclude knowledge (I'm not an infallibilist!). But here's the part Ron has missed throughout his entire response to me. That helpful piece of information is: CHEUNG DOES! So, Ron is simply proving the validity of my response to Cheung.

"Finally, I would argue that one can know that God would never deceive him, which is not to say that God does not deceive men; He does."

I agree too. Which is more evidence that Ron has totally jumped into a situation without knowing the shots.

I point out that I'm not an infallibilist or an internalist here.

Here as well.

And I argue against infallibilism, internalism, and the like, here as well.

I also address the argument that we can't know that God isn't deceiving us here.

So, Ron simply missed the boat on this one... sorry to say.

I'm The Best Around, Nothing's Ever Gonna Bring Me Down

So goes the chorus to the song You're The Best from the 80's that made movie fans cheer as Daniel LaRusso, The Karate Kid, got ready to take on Johnny. Perhaps Vincent Cheung watched this movie too many times. Reading his latest post conjured images in my head of Vince sitting at his desk with his iTunes headphones on, rocking out to Joe Esposito's You're The Best:

You’re the best!
Around!
Nothing’s gonna ever keep you down
You’re the Best!
Around!
Nothing’s gonna ever keep you down
You’re the Best!
Around!
Nothing’s gonna ever keep you dow-ow-ow-ow-own

Vince must have internalized much of the movie, The Karate Kid. He treats his position as if it were the "Crane Technique." Says Mr. Miyagi about the "Crane Technique: "If done right, none can defend."

So, Cheung "responds" to one of Steve Hays' criticisms against Cheung's occasionalism. Cheung writes,

"As for the critic who raised the objection, he might read this response and attempt another one. I will probably ignore him, or more likely, I will be unaware of his new attack. But this does not mean that I cannot answer him, or that you cannot answer him."

Notice the bolded word. One thing is clear, Cheung is offering a "response" to Hays. But why should that cause us to cast an evil eye upon what Cheung is doing. After all, that's what you do when someone critiques you - you write a response. Well, that would seem like the regular course of action for us, but not for Cheung. How does one come to that conclusion you're wondering. Simple. Cheung previously told us in a blog entry titled Taking Time To Refute Cheung that, "Nevertheless, if I ever realize that my materials are inadequate to handle a particular refutation, then of course I will take time to write a specific response." He has also stated that he doesn't feel the need to respond unless the critique is "earth shattering."

Now, you'll probably notice that I have no link to the old blog entry by Cheung (written on 06/27/05). Let me offer an apologetic for that. I don't because I cannot find it anymore. Cheung probably felt the need to hide this embarrassing quote. But why should he considering how smart he is and how everyone besides him is stupid? In case you doubt me, though, let me provide (Cheung forbid!) and inductive argument for my case. Take this post by James Anderson back in June of '05. You'll note that the first comment has a link to the Taking Time To Refute Cheung blog entry:

http://www.vincentcheung.com/2005/06/27/taking-time-to-refute-cheung/

But as of the writing of this post, the link is down. I have also searched Cheung's archives, can't find it. Now, unless James Anderson is a precog like those in Minority Report, why would he link to a post that never existed? Could he see that I'd write this post and so he set the chain of events in motion almost two years ago. Well, since I cannot deduce from Scripture that James Anderson is not a precog, and therefore can't know that he's not (according to Cheung, of course), I suppose this is all possible. Unlikely, though. Or, one could argue that Cheung did write that entry, but the quotes I cited are fabricated. But, I pulled those quotes from an July '05 entry of mine entitled Cheung, Knowledge, and Occasionalism. I'm no precog. So why would I make those quotes up almost two years ago? Perhaps I am a precog, but God (as Cheung conceives him) is allowing me to believe a lie. Possible, however unlikely.

But why have I gone to such lengths to show that Cheung did write said piece? Simple. His missing blog post is embarrassing (that he needed to take it down is even more embarrassing. He pretends like he never said such things so he can continue to portray the image of "invincible warrior" to the world). Take note of how Cheung belittles Steve Hays' critique:

"The fact that he was unable to even describe my position, but left God completely out of the picture, betrayed his incompetence and irreverence. [...] What he has against me is trivial [...] please, do not send me anymore objections from this person or anyone related to him. He is just not good enough. He possesses an altogether lower class of intellect. There is no competition, no comparison — I have no interest in him and no use for him."

First, Cheung wrote a blog entry once titled "Seminary Elitism." In part two he writes,

"If I ever find out that someone I’ve trained were to exhibit elitism, I would privately rebuke him and make him ask forgiveness from those whom he has offended. If he refuses, then he is a piece of spiritual garbage, and I would publicly denounce and humiliate him. I regard elitism in a believer as this serious and sinful, and teachers who do not correct this in their students partake in their sins." ("Seminary Elitism," pt. 2)

Second, Cheung previously claim of Hays,

"So, I will say this now: Unless Mr. H comes up with something spectacular against me, I will not say anything else in reference to him."

And so Cheung appears to have an unstable mind. He acts like an elitist, but chastises elitists. He says he'll not respond to hays anymore unless Steve comes up with something spectacular. But he belittled and made fun of Steve's post. Does he now think it's "spectacular?" If not, then why "say anything else in reference to him?" Was your response "inadequate?" Putting aside these problems, let's go back to the main criticism.

Recall above that Cheung previously had said, "Nevertheless, if I ever realize that my materials are inadequate to handle a particular refutation, then of course I will take time to write a specific response." He has also stated that he doesn't feel the need to respond unless the critique is "earth shattering."

So, above we have a "specific response" to Hays. According to Cheung, then, he must have "realize[d] that [his] materials are inadequate to handle a particular refutation." He had also said that he would respond if the critiques were "earth shattering." But in the quoted passage directly above Cheung says Hays' critiques are "mischaracterizations," and that they are "trivial," not "good enough," and from a "lower class of intellect." And so if we are to take Cheung at his word, and assume that he's so smart, never making mistakes, then we must assume that Cheung's "materials" were "inadequate to handle" some weak, trivial, ignorant, and stupid objections, from a stupid person. That doesn't bode to well for Cheung's "materials." Indeed, why would something "trivial" be considered "earth shattering?" How does Cheung handle this seeming inconsistency from his own words? Perhaps he's just talking smack? He didn't really mean what he wrote. He wasn't being honest (and, he was, because elsewhere he's written that, "Here I will just refer all of you to the recommended readings listed on the blog entry in question (and listed again below) as my response to ALL criticisms that you can find ANYWHERE written by ANYONE on this subject. I have confidence in my products — they are accurate and irrefutable"). Well, how much stock should we put into his most recent smack talking then? If Cheung was serious in his missing post, then dire consequences result. If he was not serious, then dire consequences result.

But more can be said. Cheung's response to Hays' critique of Occasionalism is essentially to say that Hays doesn't take God into account. Hays in an atheist, according to Cheung. Says Cheung,

"Here is the problem: Where in the world is GOD in this analogy? God — remember him? In my exposition of biblical occasionalism, I refer to God's constant and active power again, and again, and again, and again, and again. It is the defining factor in both my metaphysics and epistemology. So, although I put God before him over, and over, and over, and over again, this critic completely blocks God out in his thinking, and in his representation of my epistemology. If the critic is an unbeliever, then he has simply disregarded my belief in God — the very thing we disagree about in the first place — in order to refute my knowledge of God. If the critic is a professing believer, then it is even worse, for this betrays the irreverence — even secret atheism — in his thinking. How is it possible that I can put God before the face of a "Christian" again and again, and then he answers me as if God is absent from the conversation, as if I never mentioned him? This is his "secret fudge-factor" — atheism."

Note the bolded word. Cheung thinks he has "knowledge" of his occasionalism as the biblical model. Cheung thinks he has "knowledge" of all the little pieces to his Scripturalist package. All the knowledge Cheung has, he has via his occasionalist model. But that model has two parts (P1 and P2) to it which turn against Cheung. Cheung claims:

P1: "Christian epistemology affirms that all knowledge must be immediately – that is, without mediation – granted and conveyed to the human mind by God. Thus on the occasion that you look at the words of the Bible, God directly communicates what is written to your mind, without going through the senses themselves. That is, your sensations provide the occasions upon which God directly conveys information to your mind apart from the sensations themselves. Therefore, although we do read the Bible, knowledge never comes from sensation." (Cheung, (“Ultimate Questions,” p. 38)

P2: "God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches)..." (Cheung, "Short Answers To Several Criticisms")

God immediately and directly causes people to believe everything they believe. Lie or truth. At this point I would like to know how Cheung knows anything? How does he know that God is not deceiving Cheung? If he replies that he has deductively valid arguments, deduced from scriptural premises, he doesn't escape. This is because the argument is only good if the premises are true. Cheung takes his understanding of verses and this understanding he has was immediately conveyed to his mind by God. Could God be deceiving Cheung? How would Cheung know? Cheung could take an externalist out here, but he has not done so yet. To date, he's still and internalist. He always asks his interlocutors how they know X is true, and, how do they know that they know.

Cheung believes that the most brilliant theological minds have all had non-truths conveyed to them since he says that he has his own system and doesn't think any theologian got everything right. So, when those divines who argued for an infralapsarian position, from the texts of Scripture, their understanding of those texts was wrong, according to Cheung, and their understanding, according to Cheung, was immediately conveyed by God on the occasion that they read those texts. Is Cheung better than those men? Would God not deceive Cheung? What absolute standard does Cheung use to determine if God has not caused him to believe a lie? How was this standard obtained? If by his doctrine of occasionalism, then Cheung would need to show in a non-question begging manor that he was not deceived in this instance. But then we may ask Cheung how he came to the belief that his standard was correct and God did not deceive him in conveying this information? If by occassionalism (and it would have to be, see P1), then Cheung needs to know that God did not deceive him into thinking that his standard was the ultimate standard he could employ to determine if he had been deceived or not... ad infinitum.

Let's now give a concrete example to this argument: Cheung appears to think that he knows his apologetic method is true. On his blog he writes: "Here I will just refer all of you to the recommended readings listed on the blog entry in question (and listed again below) as my response to ALL criticisms that you can find ANYWHERE written by ANYONE on this subject. I have confidence in my products — they are accurate and irrefutable." Very well then, Cheung thinks his apologetic method is correct and he thinks he knows this. To claim to know something one must know that there is no possibility that one is wrong, according to Cheung. Or, one must have a reliable method which does not admit for error or mistake. But the method of Cheung's belief formation is just as unreliable and subject to false belief and error as, say, his points against intuition are (if not more so!). This infallibilist criteria is summed up nicely by Aquascum. Aquascum writes:

"Despite all this, we have hit upon something interesting: what Cheung is after is “an objective and infallible foundation,” and intuition is definitely not it. When one reads through “Arguing By Intuition,” Cheung’s main reason for rejecting intuition is because it doesn’t satisfy an infallibilist constraint on knowledge. Because intuition doesn’t give us certainty, then it can’t be a source of knowledge, because knowledge requires certainty, that is, a way of proceeding that is guaranteed not to lead to error.

For proof of this, consider the following, which immediately follows the quotes above:

When debating Arminians, or when reading their literature, you will notice that many of them base many of their crucial premises on intuition, and often on intuition alone. Ganssle’s pattern of argument is very common with them – they just assume that their needed premises are true because to them they seem to be true. They say that they are convinced that these premises are true (often they say that we are all convinced), and then they proceed on that basis. One of these premises is that we all seem to have free will; another is that it would seem unjust to hold someone morally accountable who does not have free will. At least in these instances, their ultimate standard of truth and morality is not God’s revelation but their own intuition. Their “seems like” seems unquestionable to them.

However, all the “seems like” could be wrong. To paraphrase Clark, it might be that we think we have free will not because we know something (that we have free will), but because we don’t know something (that we really don't have free will). It might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant. Luther puts it stronger, saying that we think we have free will because we have been deceived by Satan. In any case, the debate cannot be settled by intuition alone. (Cheung,“Arguing By Intuition,” pp. 3-4)

What is the main reason Cheung rejects the appeal to intuition? Here it is clear: intuitions are fallible, while knowledge must be infallible. Thus, just because some premises “seem to be true,” or you are “convinced that these premises are true,” or your “‘seems like’ seems unquestionable” to you, this is a very bad way of proceeding. Why? Because “all the ‘seems like’ could be wrong,” that is, because intuition is fallible. To put it another way, it might be consistent with everything else we know (i.e., epistemically possible) that the intuition in question is false. As Clark puts it, “it might be that… we don’t know something,” or “it might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant.” Or as Luther puts it, we might be “deceived by Satan.” Indeed, it “might be” any number of possibilities that is the source of the deception or mistake."

So if Cheung knows that his apologetic method is correct then he knows that God is not deceiving him into falsely believing it is correct. Cheung does not know this. Therefore Cheung does not know that his apologetic method is correct. Cheung would need to be able to "deduce from scripture, or find verses in scripture" which tell us that God is not deceiving Vincent Cheung in order to even have a fighting chance that God is not deceiving Vincent Cheung. But the second problem is that if he does find such a verse he needs to know that God has not deceived him into falsely understanding what the verse(s) mean!

And so Vince can keep thinking he's the best, a rou hound, but in all actuality he decimates Christianity and Christian apologetics rather than his Christian interlocutors. Oh, and by the way, we're still all waiting for Cheung to respond to his critics. But if he does, he's admitting his work is inadequate and our critiques are earth shattering. Quite a dilemma. Wouldn't want to be in his shoes.

{Note: Thanks to Patrick Chan who found the link to Taking Time To Refute Cheung via the internet archives "way back machine." If you go here and click on July 3, then scroll down until you get to the Taking Time To Refute Cheung entry. It's interesting that you cannot find it on his site, though. I searched his archives, and it is gone.}

I Was Wrong, nihil ad rem

Yeah, I was wrong, but so what? I figure that it is a good way to build character to admit that you were wrong. So, I’ll start out ‘08 working on the virtue of integrity and honesty.

How was I wrong?

Ron D. has offered some responses to my response to his rather poor attempt to interact with one of my critiques of V. Cheung.

I should note that my original response to him has not been interacted with.

I should also point out that the arguments in my original post (the one he responded to) have not been rebutted.

Be that as it may, we had been discussing my original response (which the essence was never rebutted) and Ron had been making the point that Vincent Cheung could be rational and justified in his beliefs.

I will divide this post into two parts. The first address this main point. The second interacts with some comments from his combox, I offer replies to either him or his commenters various critiques/questions.

PART I

Let’s offer a useful categorizing of things so to make the rest of the post flow easier. I will refer to them thorough the rest of this post:

[CSB] = Cheung’s Scriptural Beliefs

[CUB] = Cheung’s Unscriptural Beliefs

Now, my critique of Cheung’s occasionalism was a purely epistemic critique. I only had epistemic rationality and justification in mind. Thus I argued that given Cheung’s epistemological position, then epistemological problems are birthed.

I specifically argued that the point about occasionalism is that Cheung has no rational basis to believe that his caller ID is working. I take it that since God, via divine implantation, immediately gives everyone their beliefs, and since the probability that God is granting you a true belief over a false one is low or inscrutable, then it is irrational for you to believe anything. Cheung's views, if accepted, offer a defeater for all your beliefs. If the probability that your beliefs are true is low or inscrutable given Cheung's Epistemic Program CEP, and you accept CEP, then you have no rational basis to believe anything.

Furthermore, Cheung himself lets us do this. Since Cheung is an infallibilist, and since he says that sources of belief that are fallible cannot convey knowledge, and since beliefs obtained by occasionalism are more fallible than the reportings of our senses (or at least we can't determine which is more fallible), and since Cheung thinks that it is irrational to maintain beliefs given to us by these other fallible methods, then Cheung must think it is irrational to hold beliefs obtained by occasionalism.

Moreover, we should note that if Ron thinks that Cheung's (or G.H. Clark's) arguments against induction are good, and if he accepts other Cheungian propositions, then his critique suffers from the problem of appealing to propositions that your theory of knowledge doesn't allow you to justifiedly believe.

This is an epistemic argument. The terms are used in their epistemic sense. This was even noted by Aquascum in his review of my original argument:

http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/manata.htm

But Ron kept on insisting that Cheung could be justified, he could be rational in his beliefs.

Now, since I know that Ron is a bright guy, I kept interpreting him in the best light. My critique had to do with the epistemic implications of Cheung’s position. So, I naturally took his critique as an attempt to be a relevant response to my arguments. I think this is a fair and plausible way to proceed. So, I couldn’t understand why he didn’t get it. I then tried to offer this argument:

[1] All propositions not in or deducible from Scripture are "unjustified opinions, at best."

[2] Vincent believes many propositions that are not in or deducible from Scripture. (Call all these beliefs, Cheung’s Unscriptural Beliefs CUB.)

[3] Therefore, all the propositions believed in the set of CUB are "unjustified opinions, at best."

[4] If one's belief is an "unjustified opinion, at best," then one is unjustified in holding it.

[5] If one is unjustified in holding an unjustified opinion, then one has no justification for that opinion.

[5] Thus, if one's belief is an "unjustified opinion, at best," then one has no justification for that opinion.

[6] All propositions believed in CUB are "unjustified opinions, at best."

[7] Therefore, Cheung has no justification for his believed propositions contained in CUB.

Ron didn’t like [P4]. He wrote,

"Paul's premise [4] false, which invalidates his argument. The reason Paul does not, or should I say will not see this is that he insists on twisting Vincent's words. Vincent clearly speaks of the opinion being unjustified. Paul chooses to twist Vincent's words to mean that the one holding to the opinion is unjustified."

But I was confused. I thought Ron was trying to be relevant to my argument. And [4] is based off Cheung's internalist constraint. Let's get a feel of what internalism entails:

"[Internalism insists] that agents have cognitive access to what justified their beliefs ... [T]he internalist requirement for all justified beliefs is that before we can hold a belief rationally, we must, in principle in any rate, have cognitive access to the grounds of our belief." - W. Jay Wood, Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous, 1998, pp. 155-156.

"What all forms of internalism have in common is that they require, for a belief's justification, that the person holding the belief be aware (or at least potentially aware) of something contributing to its justification." - Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness, 2006, p.9.

"The internalism in question is the view that certain interesting and important epistemic evaluations depend entirely on internal factors, namely reason and evidence." - Richard Feldman, Justification is Internal, printed in Steup and Sosa ed. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2005, 283.

"The fundamental claim of internalism ... is that epistemological issues arise and must be dealt with from within the individual person's first-person cognitive perspective, appealing only to things that are accessible to that individual from that standpoint. The basic rationale is that what justifies a person's beliefs must be something that is available or accessible to him or her, that something to which I have no access cannot give me a reason for thinking that one of my beliefs is" [justified]." - Laurance BonJour, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses, 2002, p. 222.

Therefore, if someone S believes that a proposition P is "unjustified opinion, at best" at time t, then at t S is unjustified in holding P, according to internalist constraints. We could also add we have no reason to believe that the propositions believed by Vincent in the set of CUB are justified beliefs.

And so I was going to try to re-work an argument. I came up with something like this:

[1] All propositions not in or deducible from Scripture are "unjustified opinions, at best."

[2] Vincent believes many propositions that are not in or deducible from Scripture. (Call all these beliefs, Cheung’s Unscriptural Beliefs CUB.)

[3] Therefore, all the propositions believed by Vincent in the set of CUB are "unjustified opinions, at best."

[4] If it is and always will be the case that that a proposition P in CUB is "unjustified, at best," then there is no justification for P.

[5] If there is no justification for P, then any cognitive agent that believes P has no justification for it.

[6] Therefore, if it is and always will be the case that that a proposition P in CUB is "unjustified, at best," then any cognitive agent that believes P has no justification for it.

[7] All propositions in CUB are, by definition, not in or deducible from Scripture.

[8] Only propositions contained or deducible from Scripture are justified.

[9] Therefore, it is and always will be the case that all propositions in CUB are, by definition, "unjustified opinion, at best."

[10] Therefore, any cognitive agent A that believes P, and P is in CUB, A has no justification for P.

If one knows that there is no justification for any proposition that are not in or deducible from Scripture, then one can’t say that he knows that he has a justification for any of his beliefs that are not in or deducible from Scripture. If one knows that he can’t have a justification for an unbiblical belief, because there are no justifications to be had, then one cannot say that he is justified in believing any proposition no in or deducible from Scripture. It is simply epistemologically dastardly to affirm that you are justified in believing extra-biblical propositions if no justification exists. I took my premise to be something of a tautology. If there is no justification, a person can’t be justified. Just like if all dogs were “unwhite,” you couldn’t have a white dog.

But, as I was thinking about this, a way to read Ron came to my attention. Why didn’t he like the original [P4]? And, if he didn’t like that, he wouldn’t like [P5] in the revised argument. Why not? How could I salvage Ron’s credibility?

The only way is by introducing the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic justification (and/or rationality). This is the only way to read Ron where his original response to my post, and his subsequent comments, aren’t utterly ridiculous. So, I must take him has drawing this distinction. And with that, it makes me wrong. But so what?

I didn’t read Ron that way because, as I have stated, I was trying to read him in the best light. Here’s what I mean. Since my post specifically refers to epistemic issues, and attempts to issue epistemic challenges for Cheung’s epistemology, then a non-epistemic point brought up in response to my critique is irrelevant. Pointless. A waste of time. So, I was not even looking for the distinction I just drew above. Before moving on, then, I should say something about this distinction.

This distinction is subject to heated discussion. Without getting involved with that debate, we can offer some simple definitions. An epistemic justification is a justification that provides good reasons for the idea that your belief is true. A non-epistemic justification is a justification based on pragmatic, prudential, moral, eudemonic, survival-value, or proper function reasons for belief. To offer some practicality: To say that S believes that P because he clearly remembers that P is to offer an epistemic justification (I do not intend to get into a debate about whether this is a good justification or not, I only attempt to bring out the differences and I think succeed in appealing to basic intuition people have). To say that S believes that P (say, the belief that you will get better from being sick) because people who have a positive attitude tend to get better, is a non-epistemic justification for your belief.

Now, let’s remember Cheung’s epistemological position.

"Scripture is the first principle of the Christian worldview, so that true knowledge consists of only what is directly stated in Scripture and what is validly deducible from Scripture; all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best. This biblical epistemology necessarily follows from biblical metaphysics. Any other epistemology is indefensible, and unavoidably collapses into self-contradictory skepticism." (p. 43; cf. “Systematic Theology,” p. 18 para. 4, p. 22 para. 5, p. 41 fn. 42, emphasis supplied)

Cheung also holds to an internalist and an infallibilist constraint on knowledge. Thus Cheung:

"However, unless he constructs his claims upon an objective and infallible foundation, then if he can claim to know..." (SOURCE)

For a analysis of how Cheung is an internalist, see here (sec. 3.2).

So, for Cheung,

(*) For one to know that P, (i) P must be Scripture, or deductively deduced from Scripture, (ii) one cannot be mistaken that P, and (iii) one must have access to how one knows that P. All else is "unjustified opinion at best."

Thus it is clear that only those beliefs in [CSB] have epistemic justification. Those beliefs in [CUB] do not.

Now, my critique was that much of Cheung’s epistemological positions fall into the ken of [CUB] and not [CSB].

If my critiques are correct, this means that there is no epistemic justification for those beliefs. Cheung has no epistemic reason to believe them. Of course I didn’t put “epistemic” before the words I used. But I thought it was fairly obvious as to what I was referring to.

But then Ron comes along and says that Cheung can be justified and rational in holding those beliefs. But we have seen that he must mean that Cheung had prudential or pragmatic or functional justifications of reasons for those beliefs. Of course he didn’t put those words before the words he used. I originally had said he was wrong. But now I admit that I was wrong. But I then add a big SO WHAT?

I don’t give a rip if believing all those propositions in [CUB] make Cheung “feel better.” I don’t really care if he finds it “useful” or “beneficial” to believe propositions in [CUB]. I don’t, and never did, care if he found that he could function better by holding to propositions in [CUB]. That was never the intent of my critique. So, Ron’s response to me, read in its only defensible light, is totally irrelevant to anything I was attempting to do in the posts he critiqued.

But, we don’t need to stop there. Ron’s defense of Cheung actually brings out more problems with Cheung’s position. Specifically, if those propositions in the ken of [CUB] are not epistemically justified, then notice what that implies. Included among propositions believed in [CUB] are a variety of meta-level statements about knowledge, justification, infallibility, and so on. Is it good enough or all these claims to be justified on purely pragmatic grounds? As has been argued, and as has not been interacted with, occasionalism, infallibilism, internalism, and even (*) itself, cannot (has not) be deduced from Scripture. We await the attempt. On top of that, even if a valid argument is given, divine occasionalism is a fallible belief producing source. The probability that one’s beliefs are true given Cheung’s occasionalism are low or inscrutable. So why believe the premises are true? Thus a valid deduction wouldn’t be enough. A reason to believe the premises, viz., an epistemic justification that fits with (*) would be required.

But, yes, I was wrong. Cheung is still rational and justified to believe those things. It is, well, useful for him to believe in occasionalism. It’s helpful for his ability to function to believe that he isn’t being deceived. But, so what? That has nothing to do with my critique.

At best Ron has simply brought out more worries with Cheung. I mean, who “justifies” their epistemological desiderata by appeals to usefullness!? I mean, I guess Cheung can “justify” his occasionalism and his beliefs about not being deceived by saying that it is/isn’t prudent to believe those things, but then of course I think it’s prudent to deny his position! Ron has saved Cheung’s rationality. The price: Who cares. No one was ever disputing those things.

Lastly, we should add that it isn’t at all clear that all the beliefs in [CUB] are justified or rational by appeal to non-epistemic standards. The belief that there are over 500 blades of grass on your neighbor’s lawn doesn’t appear to be useful, for instance. But perhaps it could be in certain contexts. But surely we hold hundreds of beliefs while not being on the context that we would find them useful. Are these all irrational to hold - both epistemically and non-epistemically?


PART II

Ron D: "When I say that one can rationally believe by way of inductive inference, I am not constituting such inferences as knowledge. As I've shown on other blog post http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2006/05/induction-and-knowledge.html"

The conversation isn't even over "inductive beliefs." Though, that is part of it. Let's re-familiarize ourselves with Cheung's claim:

"Scripture is the first principle of the Christian worldview, so that true knowledge consists of only what is directly stated in Scripture and what is validly deducible from Scripture; all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best. This biblical epistemology necessarily follows from biblical metaphysics. Any other epistemology is indefensible, and unavoidably collapses into self-contradictory skepticism." (p. 43; cf. “Systematic Theology,” p. 18 para. 4, p. 22 para. 5, p. 41 fn. 42, emphasis supplied)

Cheung also holds to an internalist and an infallibilist constraint on knowledge. Thus Cheung:

"However, unless he constructs his claims upon an objective and infallible foundation, then if he can claim to know..." (SOURCE)

For a analysis of how Cheung is an internalist, see here (sec. 3.2).

So, for Cheung,

(*) For one to know that P, (i) P must be Scripture, or deductively deduced from Scripture, (ii) one cannot be mistaken that P, and (iii) one must have access to how one knows that P. All else is "unjustified opinion at best."


Therefore, for Cheung, it is not just inductive beliefs that are "unjustified opinions, at best," it is all beliefs that are "unjustified opinions, at best." Let's see what non-inductive beliefs would be included in our Cheungian ken:

A:

[1] All intentional states are non-physical states.

[2] Beliefs about tomorrow's weather are intentional states.

[3] Therefore, Beliefs about tomorrow's weather are non-physical states.

B:

[1] All moral facts M are grounded in some moral principle P.

[2] X is a M.

[3] Therefore, X is grounded in P.

C:

[1] Non-cognitivist theories of morality cannot make sense of moral discourse.

[2] Mark Timmons' contextualist theory is a non-cognitivist theory of morality.

[3] Therefore, Mark Timmons' contextualist theory cannot make sense of moral discourse.

We could obviously multiply the above. The point: According to (*), (A), (B), and (C) are instances where the premises and conclusions are "unjustifiable opinions, at best." (A), (B), and (C) are not constituted by inductive beliefs. Therefore, it is not only "inductive beliefs" that are "unjustified opinions, at best."

So, I don't know why Ron is stuck on inductive beliefs.


Ron: "If we allow the term "knowledge" to be given to inductive inferences, then having less information can be the source of more knowledge, and having more information can cause one to rationally lose the knowledge he once had."

I don't know how there is "more knowledge" if the claim to knowledge is a probabilistic claim. Furthermore, people wouldn't necessarily lose the knowledge they had, but the knowledge they thought they had.

Ron: "What is below is pasted from a the link I provided immediately above.

1. Justification: Inductive inference that the clock is working based upon history

2. Belief: Believe as true the time the clock indicates, which is 12:00

3. Truth: It is 12:00

Someone might say that since all the criteria for knowledge have been met, one can know it is 12:00 given inductive-knowledge. However, the 3 criteria justify the belief that it is 12:00 even when relying upon a broken clock! Shouldn't this intuitively bother us?"

First, I don't take "justification" to be either necessary or sufficient for knowledge (I am obviously distinguishing 'justification' from 'warrant.') Second, the above doesn't negate inductive reasoning as a source of knowledge, but shows the importance of a congenial cognitive environment as necessary for warrant. It wasn't induction that failed, it was the epistemic environment. Induction doesn't even claim certainty for its conclusions.

Ron: "Can we "know" things based upon false information? The problem with induction is that inferences that are rational to maintain can always be false."

Well, more than that. We can't know things based on true information! Here's an example of why the cognitive environment needs to be congenial for the epistemic agent:

Say that John is passing through Iowa. He comes upon a town that loves to trick visitors into thinking they are passing through the "barn capital of the world." So, they plant thousands of red barn facades throughout the countryside. But, they through in a real red barn here and there, say 1:1,000. Now, John justifiedly believes that all the barn facades he sees are in fact real barns. But, he doesn't have knowledge. But, it so happens that when he happens to look at one of the real barns, he doesn't know that that is a barn either. He had a justified, true belief. And, to meet Ron's criteria, his belief was caused by truth - a real barn. But, do we want to say that John knew what he happened to look at right then was a real barn? No. His belief was obtained by luck. And, he wasn't in a congenial cognitive environment.

Also, is the mere possibility of an inference being false negate that an agent can have knowledge? If so, then Ron is an infallibilist. If not, then his critique doesn't get off the ground.

Ron: "The man who is most informed about the clock is not able to know the time, whereas the man with less information about the clock would be able to “know” the time if inductive inference allows for knowledge!"

No, the man wouldn't be able to "know" the time. Ron's point isn't made more substantive by the addition of an exclamation point. At best, the man with less information will be able to think he knows the time, whereas the man with more information will know that he cannot know the time based only on the information provided by the broken clock.

Ron: "I have rehearsed all of that simply to say this. If Cheung suggests that inferences reduce to opinions at best, I would not take him to mean that he believes he has no rational basis for thinking his caller ID is working on his cell phone."

No, it isn't just "inferences" it is "ALL other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best" (emphasis supplied). Not all propositions are "inferences," Ron.

Does Cheung know that he has a "rational basis for thinking his caller ID is working on his cell phone"? if so, then let him deduce this from the Bible! If not, then on Cheungian terms, he could not say he knew that he has a rational basis to believe anything that is not deducible from Scripture. So, what epistemic support does his theory give him to make claims like that? I mean, Ron's free to shift the goal posts for Cheung, but that's not a defect in my argument. My argument was an internal critique, a reductio ad absurdem, against Cheung. So, these are just assertions, for Cheung. He may say that he believes all this stuff. He may claim that his position is such and such. But, he doesn’t really know all of that, does he? Perhaps it’s just “helpful’ for him to believe those things. Allows him to function as a Scripturalist in this world.

Ron: "Keith,

I addressed how Vincent can know things and how he can know that he is not being deceived by showing that his epistemology does not put him at a disadvantage over Paul’s epistemology."

Keith, Ron did no such thing, unless he moves the goal posts for Cheung. You see, Cheung can only know that he is not being deceived, and know "things" (whatever those are?), if he can deduce the conclusion from Scripture (or find it stated in Scripture). (Recall Cheung's strictures I cited in (*).) Cheung cannot deduce said propositions. Therefore, he cannot know them. I find it interesting that Ron didn't allow exactly what I said to Keith to be allowed to be posted on his blog. This is a tacit admission of defeat.


Brian: "Anonymous said...

There is no reason to doubt that Mr. Cheung meant what he wrote. What Mr. Cheung wrote is very cogent! Mr. Cheung embraces many propositions that are not justified - but we must - as Mr. Cheung points out. It is not incoherent that Mr. Cheung who defines knowledge as he does to be justified in believing *things* that cannot be *justified*.

Brian"

Of course I never denied that Cheung couldn’t believe things that cannot be justified.

And, if your response is taken to mean epistemic rationality or justification, then I’d disagree. Let's note that Cheung says that "all other PROPOSITIONS are unjustified." So, how is Cheung justified? Brian has Cheung as someone who is justified in believing that P, even though P cannot be justified. Note that if Cheung is justified in believing that P, and given Cheung’s internalism, then Cheung believes a proposition, namely:

(**) I am justified in believing that P due to justificatory feature(s) F.

But since (**) is a proposition, then Cheung believes that (**) is “unjustified opinion, at best.”

Shouldn’t the virtuous epistemic agent give up (**)? Since (**) is “unjustified opinion, at best,” then how could Cheung be justified in believing it? By appeal to:

(***) I am justified in believing that (**) due to justificatory feature(s) F.*

But (***) is a proposition, and so is unjustified, at best. Why believe it? I hope the reader can see where this is going.

If there is no justification for this proposition:

(****) I see a red car.

Then why is there justification for (**)? We are just as unjustified in believing (****) as we are (**).

We can also ask what would Cheung's justification be? What would fill in F above? An unjustified proposition, at best! How is Cheung justified? What confers this positive epistemic status on his beliefs? Illogical and irrational and fallible inductive inferences? Illogical and irrational and fallible memorial beliefs? Illogical and irrational and fallible sensations? What? And, on top of that, given Cheung's strictures on knowledge, how could Cheung know that "it is not incoherent that Mr. Cheung who defines knowledge as he does to be justified in believing *things* that cannot be *justified*?" Other propositions justify Cheung’s CUB beliefs. But all those propositions are “unjustified opinions, at best.” So, if they justify Cheung’s CUB’s, then we have unjustifying justifiers (I do know that non-cognitive Mark Timmons believes in unjustifying justifiers, but his view is soundly routed by Shafer-Landau in ch. 1 of his book, Moral Realism: A Defense.)

Moreover, none of this refutes my original piece, in the slightest. Cheung can't know that occasionalism is the case since he can't deduce it from the Bible (perhaps he can offer an abductive or inductive case for it, but that doesn't grant knowledge, according to Cheung). Occasionalism is a fallible belief producing mechanism which yields a probabilistic defeater for all (or, at least 99% of) for Cheung's beliefs. It therefore fails another on of Cheung's strictures. Cheung can't know that he is not being deceived since he can't deduce that from Scripture.

If Brian is taken to mean non-epistemic justification. So what. That answer has nothing to do with my original argument.

Lastly, what's most problematic, even for the non-epistemic out, Cheung can't know that he exists since he can't deduce that from the Bible. So, on Cheungian epistemology, if he can't know that he exists then surely he can't know if he is justified in believing anything since non-existent people aren't justified in their beliefs. Non-existent people aren’t even prudentially justified in their beliefs. This is the case, for many reasons, one being that non-existent people don’t exist in order to have beliefs that can be justified in any sense.

Maneuvering Around fatal Maneuvers

Vincent Cheung is back and thinks he's maneuvered around his opponent's fatal maneuvers of his apologetic method. His recent post attempts to show that those who think they've performed a "fatal maneuver" on him actually end up showing their own "stupidity."

For a while now there have been a lot of refutations put out against Cheung. Cheung has not responded, probably due to the busy life of being the worlds greatest theologian, but finally has carved out some time to respond to a couple of the critiques offered against him.

Cheung does not mention the names, nor does he provide links, of any of the people that have given these critiques so that we can cross check what Cheung says with the original, I assume he expects his readers just to take his word for it! This little detail, in and of itself, should serve to undermine the confidence Cheung's readers have in his ability to honestly assess and evaluate the arguments offered against him. Why? Well, simply put, he misunderstands, or misrepresents, the critiques leveled his way. Now, I understand that this is really not his fault. Cheung holds to occasionalism, which claims that,

"all knowledge must be immediately – that is, without mediation – granted and conveyed to the human mind by God. Thus on the occasion that you look at the words of the Bible, God directly communicates what is written to your mind, without going through the senses themselves. That is, your sensations provide the occasions upon which God directly conveys information to your mind apart from the sensations themselves." -Cheung, Systematic Theology

Therefore, upon the "occasion" of reading his critics' posts God must have communicated false information to Cheung. So, Cheung maintains his elevated status as "the best theologian in the world" while God takes the blame for not knowing how to read! Cheung has no problem with God deceiving Cheung. Cheung writes, "God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches)..." (-Cheung, Short Answers To Several Criticisms). Thus Cheung and his followers should have no problem affirming what I've just written (that is, if God chooses to communicate my meaning to their mind. Maybe I just wrote, "Poodles eat spinach salad on Friday," how would they know otherwise! Or, maybe Cheung wrote that "God does not immediately communicate the meaning of what is written directly to the mind." How would I know otherwise?! So, maybe I am the one critiquing a straw man? It's all so very confusing). At any rate, Cheung/God has misunderstood his critiques.

Before I begin my response, though, I would like to point out some more of Cheung's schizophrenic tendencies. You see, when our (Aquascum, Hays, Sudduth, Manata) critiques were being posted Cheung gave his readers the reason he was not responding. At that time Cheung thought it saved face, now it serves to blush face. In his blog piece "Taking Time To Refute Cheung," Mr. Cheung wrote: "Nevertheless, if I ever realize that my materials are inadequate to handle a particular refutation, then of course I will take time to write a specific response." He has also stated, in that same post, he doesn't feel the need to respond unless the critique is "earth shattering." So then, since Cheung has posted a response to my critique of his view of occasionalism then I must draw the conclusion that he thought his works were inadequate to handle my refutation and, also, that he considered my critique "earth shattering." But in his latest post on the fatal maneuver he says my points were "outright stupid." He also claims that,

"The fatal maneuver of showing self-contradiction in your opponent's position can be a powerful and effective move in debate. Just make sure that the opponent's position is in fact self-refuting and that your objection does not backfire against you. See to it that this fatal maneuver is not fatal just for you. Of course, if it can backfire to show incoherence in your own position, then your position is wrong and not worth defending in the first place, as the above have shown."

My question is, how are my critiques "outright stupid" if Cheung's work was inadequate? How can something "earth shattering" be "outright stupid?" Cheung seems to think his apologetic writings are "earth shattering." Can they also be, at the same time, "outright stupid?" Also, why am I chided and chastised for not understanding Cheung's position (i.e., making sure the critique lands) when Cheung's works were "inadequate to handle the refutation?" If his works were adequate then he would not have written a response, per Cheung. So, his work is inadequate and then I am lambasted for not seeing how it doesn't apply to Cheung!? Furthermore, how can I "make sure" that the opponents position is in fact self-refuting? Do I have "control" over this? Doesn't God "immediately communicate" the meaning of what Cheung writes to my mind? This is similar to the moral dilemma determinists face. If physical and biological processes determine how we behave, then why blame a rapist? Why treat him as if he could have done otherwise? Can my "making sure" I have properly understood my opponent thwart God's desire that I will not? So, it seems a bit disingenuous to tell me to "make sure" that I understand something properly. At any rate it is not I who have misunderstood my opponent.


PART I

Since my interest is in my critique of Cheung's occasionalism, as it relates to Cheung's internalist constraint on justification, I will address that first. I will then make some comments on his other comments but leave the main defenses for those with more of a vested interest in that line of attack.

Cheung's entire response to my critique is this:

QUOTE
**********

Then, there is another objection that has to do with my view on divine sovereignty, and how it relates to metaphysics and epistemology. I affirm that God must be active in facilitating and controlling all human thoughts, whether true or false, biblical or heretical. The adherents of this other school of presuppositional apologetics once again tries to perform a fatal maneuver against me. They suggest that according to my view, I could be deceived in affirming my view. First, this is just outright stupid, since the Bible says that God can send evil spirits to convince people of error. So no matter how it happens, God is the one who decrees that someone would be deceived. Second, they demonstrate that they really have no idea how to perform this fatal maneuver, since it again backfires against them. If I am deceived in the way that the objection suggests (that is, by my own explanation of how one comes to believe falsehood), then it actually proves my position. If I am deceived in the way that I say one is deceived, then I am in fact not deceived. To illustrate, if God sends a demon to "deceive" someone into thinking that God does not send demons to deceive, then God does send demons to deceive. Likewise, if God causes me to believe the "falsehood" that it is God who causes one to believe falsehood, then God does cause one to believe falsehood, and I am in fact not deceived. In other words, my position cannot be demonstrated as self-refuting in the manner attempted by the objection.

***********
END QUOTE

Note first that he calls this maneuver of mine a maneuver from "the other school of presuppositional apologetics." But the Cartesian evil demon argument (or the Ungerian evil scientist argument) is not unique to "my school" of apologetics.

Second, Cheung's two responses to my argument are:

(1) It's outright stupid since the Bible tells us that God deceives people.

and

(2) It proves Cheung's position since if Cheung is deceived by God about his position then this fact proves Cheung's position because if God causes Cheung to believe the "falsehood" that it is God who causes one to believe falsehood, then God does cause Cheung to believe falsehood, and Cheung is in fact not deceived.

Both these fail miserably. One could say that they are "outright stupid."

All (1) contends is that my critique is "outright stupid" since the Bible tells us that God deceives people. Since my critique never implied that God did not (or does not, or can not) deceive people then all Cheung shows is that he never read what I wrote. What bearing does (1) have on my argument? None. And Cheung never tells us what (1) is supposed to accomplish. Indeed, my critique even states, "But we know that God does deceive (or gives over to delusions) people; as in the case of Pharaoh, some of Israel's enemies, and Paul's indictment in Romans 1 tells us." In fact, my critique was not: "God does not deceive people." My critique was not: "If God deceives some people (or has deceived, or has the ability to deceive) then we cannot know anything." My critique, as my post indicates, was that given Cheung's occasionalism, coupled with his internalism, lands us in skepticism.

Cheung says my fatal maneuver is this, "They suggest that according to my [Cheung's] view, I [Cheung] could be deceived in affirming my [Cheung's] view." Now, what was "the view" that I was attacking? Was it "the view" that people are deceived? No, since my post admits this! Maybe, just maybe, was it Cheung's occasionalism and internalism that I was attacking? I thought so, but maybe God deceived me. In any case, my post says (or appears to say!) that I was attacking Cheung's occasionalism. But, brilliantly, Cheung retorts that my argument against occasionalism is "outright stupid" because the Bible tells us that God deceives people. Well, as Cheung is wont to do, I ask for him to provide the valid deduction which proves this. So far we have:

1) God deceives some people in the Bible.


BIG GAPING HOLE

_________
C1) Therefore my view (occasionalism) is true.

So, yes, I still maintain that according to Cheung's views, he could be deceived regarding occasionalism qua philosophy of mind. Cheung could be deceived about whether it was Joseph or Benjamin who had the colored coat. Cheung could be deceived on any number of passages and about a many number of things (e.g., his being male, his occasionalism). Just because the Bible tells us that people were deceived does not mean that Cheung's view of occasionalism and his internalism are correct or if we can know that we have true beliefs.

More importantly, Cheung claims that,

"...true knowledge consists of only what is directly stated in Scripture and what is validly deducible from Scripture; all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best." (Ultimate Questions, P.43, emphasis mine)

So, he needs to have a verse directly stated in Scripture which tells was that God deceives in order to deduce that God deceives people. Does he have one? Well, he thinks so. But maybe there is no verse. Maybe all the verses that talk of God's deceiving people really say that God does not (or did not) deceive so and so. How does Cheung know that on the occasion that he reads the text of Scripture God makes him think that the passages which speak of God's not deceiving people speak about God deceiving people. How does Cheung know that there are propositions in the Bible which say this? Write the syllogism out. We do know that Cheung cannot say that God wouldn't deceive him because "God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches)..." (-Cheung, Short Answers To Several Criticisms).

Cheung believes that the most brilliant theological minds have all had non-truths conveyed to them since he says that he has his own system and doesn't think any theologian got everything right. So, when those divines who argued for an infralapsarian position, from the texts of Scripture, their understanding of those texts were wrong, according to Cheung, and their understanding, according to Cheung, was immediately conveyed by God on the occasion that they read those texts. Is Cheung better than those men? Would God not deceive Cheung? What absolute standard does Cheung use to determine if God has not caused him to believe a lie? How was this standard obtained? If by his doctrine of occasionalism, then Cheung would need to show in a non-question begging manor that he was not deceived in this instance. But then we may ask Cheung how he came to the belief that his standard was correct and God did not deceive him in conveying this information? If by occassionalism (and it would have to be, see his quote on knowledge above), then Cheung needs to know that God did not deceive him into thinking that his standard was the ultimate standard he could employ to determine if he had been deceived or not... ad infinitum.

Lastly, we come to (2). (2) states that my critique proves Cheung's position since if Cheung is deceived by God about his position then this fact proves Cheung's position because if God causes Cheung to believe the "falsehood" that it is God who causes one to believe falsehood, then God does cause Cheung to believe falsehood, and Cheung is in fact not deceived. But, the concrete example I gave in my critique was on "Cheung's Apologetic Method." I never mentioned anything about the premise that God deceives people is wrong. Here is the "concrete example" I gave:

"Let's now give a concrete example to this argument: Cheung appears to think that he knows his apologetic method is true. On Cheung's blog he writes: "Here I will just refer all of you to the recommended readings listed on the blog entry in question (and listed again below) as my response to ALL criticisms that you can find ANYWHERE written by ANYONE on this subject. I have confidence in my products — they are accurate and irrefutable." Very well then, Cheung thinks his apologetic method is correct and he thinks he knows this. To claim to know something one must know that there is no possibility that one is wrong, according to Cheung. Or, one must have a reliable method which does not admit for error or mistake. But the method of Cheung's belief formation is just as unreliable and subject to false belief and error as, say, his points against intuition are (if not more so!)."

Where in any of this am I claiming anything like what Cheung thinks I claim in (2)? The only way (2) makes sense is if we substitute "God deceives people" with "my [Cheung] position." But that is also my position, and every other Christian's as well (i.e., that God does, or at least has the ability, to deceive people). So, I am not arguing that God does not deceive people. The problem here is that Cheung, being a smart fellow, really meant (occasionalism, or his apologetic method, or his brand of Calvinism) as "his position." We should make no mistake that Cheung is trying to defend his position on these matters and not trying to defend the boring claim that God has (or does) deceive some people. If Cheung is merely trying to defend the claim that God does indeed deceive people then we can note that (1) he's wasted his time and ours with his blog entry, (2) I already grant this, and (3) it would be a non-sequitur to reason from the fact that God deceives to the truth of Cheung's position. Since Cheung tries to slip a defense of his apologetic method and epistemology into pointing out that if I argue that God deceives people then I've proven Cheung's point that God deceives people, as well as saying that Cheung would not be deceived about God's deceiving people, if it were true that God deceived people, then many of his readers may have think that he scored a legitimate point here.

My critique is that given Cheung's desire for infallibalism and internalism with respects to his views on justification, coupled with his view of occasonalism, then Cheung cannot know much of anything. In his series on Arguing by Intuition Cheung makes clear his infallibalism:

However, all the “seems like” could be wrong. To paraphrase Clark, it might be that we think we have free will not because we know something (that we have free will), but because we don’t know something (that we really don't have free will). It might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant. Luther puts it stronger, saying that we think we have free will because we have been deceived by Satan. In any case, the debate cannot be settled by intuition alone. (“Arguing By Intuition,” pp. 3-4, emphasis mine)

Cheung regularly makes this point. In the Fatal Maneuver Cheung writes,

Because they have stated that one must use his senses to know what the Bible says, now they must show either that our senses are infallible, or if our senses are fallible, that there is an infallible way of telling in which instances they are correct and in which instances they are incorrect. If they cannot do this, then they cannot read the Bible, so that their entire system — their whole Christian faith — collapses, and it does so just as easily as empirical atheism, or any non-Christian religion or philosophy.

But one could argue that Cheung's occasionalism is a more fallible belief forming process than sense perception is. Divine occasionalism is responsible for deceiving billions and billions of people on a daily basis (since no two people believe exactly the same on every thing). So, is Divine occasionalism infallible? No. Is there an infallible way of telling which instances of Divine occasionalism are correct and in which instances they are incorrect? No (because, per Cheung, all beliefs come from the fallible occasionalism)! Therefore, on Cheung's own terms, he cannot know that his apologetic method, his view of occasionalism, his view of divine sovereignty, his maleness, et al, is correct! Cheung's "entire system — his whole Christian faith — collapses, and it does so just as easily as empirical atheism, or any non-Christian religion or philosophy." As Aquascum noted in his review of my above critique,

"Yes, that sounds about right! As long as Cheung believes infallibility is required for knowledge, then Cheung’s occasionalism can’t give him knowledge at all. Cheung has refuted Christianity as a means of defending Christianity. Whereas Kant said, “I had to destroy reason in order to make room for faith,” the moral of this story is that Cheung had to refute Christianity in order to make room for apologetics."

Therefore, I maintain that Cheung has not even touched my critique. He dealt with nothing I said or implied. He showed no awareness of what I wrote. He implied that I denied things that my post affirmed. He failed to defend his view and this failure costs him everything. Will he respond? If so, was the above "earth shattering?" I'll quote what Cheung writes on "Fatal Maneuvers:"

"There is a fatal maneuver in debate where if you can show that your opponent's position contradicts itself or makes itself impossible, then you have effectively destroyed his position and all that follows from it. It is a powerful move. It checkmates your opponent."

Now, what was the above?


PART II

In this section I'll pick and choose some statements made by Cheung and offer rebuttal. I'll do it in the form of a dialogue. Vincent Cheung will be VC and Paul Manata will be PM.

I'll use Chung's claim that "...true knowledge consists of only what is directly stated in Scripture and what is validly deducible from Scripture; all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best. (-Cheung, Ultimate Questions, P.43,), for much of my ammunition.


VC: My system of philosophy and method of apologetics is rightly called "biblical" or "presuppositional."

PM: Do you know this? Is the above claim directly stated in Scripture and/or validly deducible from Scripture? If not, then is you claim that your system of philosophy and method of apologetics is rightly called "biblical" or "presuppositional" unjustified opinion at best?

VC: One prominent school of "presuppositional" apologetics protests that this surely goes too far. It admits that induction is fallacious, at least on its own, but then it is somehow redeemed when we operate under biblical presuppositions.

PM: No, it admits that unbelievers cannot answer the problem of induction given their worldview. If we said it was deductively fallacious in a non-Christian worldview but not deductively fallacious in a Christian worldview then that would be "outright stupid."

VC: It admits that sensation cannot yield knowledge, at least by itself, but then it can function as a reliable way to acquire knowledge once biblical principles are assumed.

PM: No, sensation does not all of a sudden start functioning in a reliable way once "biblical principles are assumed." Are you seriously implying that the "other school" basically thinks unbelievers eyesight is unreliable until they assume a Christian worldview?

VC: I have already critiqued this incoherent and unbiblical school of apologetics in a number of places, and it is not my main purpose to do it again here.

PM: So your post was not meant to "critique" us?

VC: Yet my point concerns something else, and that is how this school of apologetics attempts to refute mine, and how this backfires against them.

PM: Oh, so you do intend to critique our critiques?

VC: One frequent objection is that if we must begin from the Bible, then surely we must first use our senses to even read the Bible.

PM: Was that Aquascum's Sudduth's, Hays', or my objection?

VC: Because I have answered the objection, it has failed to damage me. However, now that my opponents have stated the objection, and stated it as something that is consistent with their position, then they must answer it themselves. Because they have stated that one must use his senses to know what the Bible says, now they must show either that our senses are infallible, or if our senses are fallible, that there is an infallible way of telling in which instances they are correct and in which instances they are incorrect. If they cannot do this, then they cannot read the Bible, so that their entire system — their whole Christian faith — collapses, and it does so just as easily as empirical atheism, or any non-Christian religion or philosophy.


PM: Oh, you must be begging the question against externalists and those epistemologists (e.g., Audi's Introduction to Epistemology, William's Critical Introduction to Epistemology) who argue that knowledge need not be infallible? Or, you're still assuming, and not answering, Aquascum's fatal maneuvers in this paper. See section three where your infallibalism is dealt with. If you don't all you're doing is begging the question.'

VC: One frequent objection is that if we must begin from the Bible, then surely we must first use our senses to even read the Bible. I have already answered this several times in several places, and there has been no successful attempt at a rebuttal. Among other things, this objection begs the question, and really ignores my position in the first place.

PM: Pot, kettle, black? Or, et tu.

VC: Some of them try to justify sensation as a reliable way to obtain knowledge. To argue for empiricism apart from Scripture is impossible, and they acknowledge this. And so, seemingly consistent with their own position, they argue for the basic reliability of sensation from Scripture. But what would it take to establish their position from Scripture? They acknowledge that our senses are fallible, and so they are not interested in supporting empiricism by arguing that the senses are infallible. However, if the senses are fallible, then they must establish from Scripture an infallible method by which to distinguish instances in which the sense are correct and instances in which they are wrong. But if they have a method at all, and if their method is fallible, then we still need to infallibly know how fallible it is and when it is fallible; otherwise, the whole thing collapses into skepticism again.

PM: See my argument against your view of occasionalism. Read what you wrote, and then what i wrote, and then you'll see why you're dead in the water. In other words, the whole thing collapses into skepticism again.

Well, I think I'm done for now. All Cheung's post is, is old hat. That is, he still assumes his internalism and infalliblaism, while never arguing for it. He still has not defined knowledge. Thus, he's still refuted.

Intramural Debate (Part II)

"Street Apologist" offered some comments on this post of mine. I responded in the comments section, and Steve responded to his first comments as well. Since then, "Street Apologist" (SA) has commented again, and so I'll move it on to the "main stage" because I think his specific questions are important when we generalize them to the question of why we should have intramural debates at all.

(1) SA mentioned that he was "kind of surprised that so much time is being spent refuting Vincent Cheung. It seems to me that much of this is intramural." Is he saying that we should not spend much time on intramural debates? I gave two posts recently compared to the hundreds I write on atheism. SO, in comparison, it looks as if I am not spending "so much time" on Cheung.

(2) SA rightly notes that he does not

"believe that [I am] asserting that Cheung is an unbeliever, nor [am I] calling into question his commitment to defend the faith (in spite of [my] differences with his philosophy) in other words is all of this really necessary?"

He is right. I am not asserting this. But I don't know why that means that intramural debate is unnecessary if you believe that someone is a believer? A "believer" can be an Arminian. Does SA believe that debates with Arminians are "unnecessary?"

(3) SA mentions that "Perhaps we should remember Paul's words in Ephesians 4:1-15." Indeed, we should. I happen to be of the opinion, though, that God uses means to accomplish his ends. Thus I believe that one of the many means God uses to bring unity, and build up the body, is through intramural debate. Therefore I hold that in some respect Ephesians 4 can be used to support intramural debate. We do not live in the times of the Apostles where someone can authoritatively tell us what we should believe. In instances where Scripture is not clear, or where there is no laid out, detailed, approach to philosophical problems (think of the question of internalism vs. externalism, JTB vs. WTB, realism vs. anti-realism, etc) then one way that we can reach truth is for the adherents of these systems to debate each other. Moreover, should we not also Remember Paul's words in Galatians 2:11?

(4) SA asks, "Perhaps Occasionalism is incorrect, perhaps Cheung's entire system of apologetics is fatally flawed, how do we restore this brother?" Well, first off, it may be kind of hard to reason and restore someone who says things like this:

"Here I will just refer all of you to the recommended readings listed on the blog entry in question (and listed again below) as my response to ALL criticisms that you can find ANYWHERE written by ANYONE on this subject. I have confidence in my products — they are accurate and irrefutable." -Vincent Cheung

So, indeed, how would we "restore" this brother! One way is to hope that he listens to the refutations. As far as my critiques go, I feel I have neutered his philosophy. But, in regards to my critique, he could accept it and still hold to (basically) Scripturalism. All he would need to do is drop is version of occasionalism, coupled with the demand for infallibalism and his strong (or, strictly) internalist constraint on knowledge. This would hinder much of his method in debating unbelievers and humble his claims about his works, but he could still adhere to a kind of Scripturalism. The only problem, is that he could not stand in the face of Auquascum's or Sudduth's critique which effectively shows that Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent and is, at best, unjustified opinion. Maybe if he would actually interact with his opponents, which he has not done (as you must admit), he might see his errors and thereby be restored.

(5) SA asks "whether the refutation-counter refutation within the reformed family is really furthering the cause of Christ?" Does truth further the cause of Christ?

Take my last post on Cheung (The Creature From The Black Lagoon). In it I feel I showed that Cheung's views on epistemology, and thr requests he makes of his opponents, are opposed to Scripture and, indeed, make many passages in Scripture false! I pointed out that Hagar could not have logically laid out the premises of how she knew she was pregnant, establishing every one and showing how they necessarily lead to the conclusion. Cheung's views, therefore, go against the teaching of Scripture. Does that further the cause of Christ? As C.S. Lewis noted in his sermon at the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford, in 1939, "Good philosophy must exist, if for no other reason, because bad philosophy needs to be answered."

I responded to the above points and then SA returned with his second set of comments.

(6) SA writes, "Don't misunderstand me here. I am not saying that debate is unnecessary nor do I ever shy away when one is warranted." But above he asked if "all of this really necessary?" Furthermore, I do believe this is warranted. Just as Sproul and Bahnsen felt it was warranted. Just as Frame, Habermas, Craig, Clark, and Feinberg felt it was warranted. And, just as Cheung thinks it is warranted! So, if this is warranted, should we shy away from it? If we don't, do we not "further the cause of Christ."

(7) SA rightly notes that It "seems to [him] though, that within the reformed tradition we are really interested in being right (which is not a bad thing)." More than me "being right" is the concern for would be Christian apologists who earnestly desire to defend the faith, defending the faith with a faulty defense. Calling someone a moron, while you hold a moronic position, makes you look like a bigger moron than them. Apologetics needs to be advanced, not drug back in to the dark agaes of strong foundationalism. Christian apologists don't need to be unnecessarily made to look foolish. Especially when all one needs to do is spend a few hours writing blog entries warning of faulty tactics.

(8) SA rightly notes that "All of the debate should be aimed at edifying each other." This is good as far as it goes, but sometimes people need to be spoken to more sternly, especially if they are of that nature. I know that when people are blunt with me, it helps me to listen. In turn, I am edified. Furthermore, when people claim that their system is irrefutable andinvinciblee and infallible then we need to care more about the confusion of the creature with the creator. Funny a debate with a (basically) Clarkian would head in this direction!

(9) SA points out that I "have had some personal dialogue w/Cheung and he claims the same." Indeed I have. I was heading in to my first public debate with Derek Sansone. Cheung had spent a lot of time dealing with Sansone and so I thought it a wise move to make for research. I can admnit that Vincent gave me a few good points. I was content to sit back while Hays and Aquascum and Sudduth (on the All Bahnsen List) were critiquing Cheung. That is until Cheung chose to write blog entries critiquing some comments I had made to some of his followers while I was poking andproddingg his position. To be honest, his desire to critique my comments (e.g., "so God communicates to the believer his understanding of Scripture and the same with the heretic?") led to my formulation of my argument against his version of occasionalism, internalism, infallibalism, along with his view of God's sovereignty. Thus Cheung sowed the seeds of his own refutation.

(10) SA says that he is "just asking you to consider how you might help Cheung if he is in such serious error don't we owe it to him to help restore him?" Well, I hope he reads our critiques.

(11) After all of SA's qualifying and restating, his main question boils down to this:

I guess what I found strange was this statement:

"Your choice is pretty clear, join Cheung, defy Scripture. Join us, live in harmony with Scripture. Even our view of knowledge by sensation is harmonious with Scripture. The choice before you is simple, philosophy or anti-philosophy. Scripture or anti-Scriptural Scripturalism."

I don't know why that is strange? I think I showed that Cheung's views (i.e., his internalism and infallibalism) contradicted Scripture. I also played off of Cheung's setting up the debate between "his school" and the "other school" of apologetics. Cheung chose to set it up as an us/them dichotomy. I simply went along. So, I'm interested if you've e-mailed him on these issues? Or, does Cheung only have subjective and emotional defenders defending him. Stated differently, if you're trying to somehow defend Cheung (and I think you might be based on some terms you use on your blog, i.e., "first principles") are you admitting that he has no rational and objective defense left for him? Is the only defense left for him that we shouldn't be "picking on him?"

(12) Lastly, SA tells us why he thinks my claim was strange:

"Is the choice as clear cut as you surmise? I know that you are interested in refuting false systems, as am I. We owe it to those reading our writings however to tell the truth in love."

Well, I happen to think it is that clear cut. Not only are many of his philosophical positions wrong, but many of his views fly in the face of Scripture. His position, upon analysis, destroys knowledge of any philosophy, thus it is anti-philosophy. His position, upon analysis, contradicts Scripture, this it is anti-Scripture. Saying something cut and dry is not saying it unloving. If I have offended Cheung though (which would be hard to believe), then I do apologize for unintended offense. My hope is that you would look at the critiques and judge them on an objective basis. My hope is that you would want to see Cheung use the mind that God gave him, and his talents and prolific abilities, in the service of defending the faith with a more appropriate and philosophically cogent apologetic.