Thursday, March 06, 2014

Lent


I've noticed some critics of Ash Wednesday and Lent. I'll make a few quick points:

i) They seem to equate Ash Wednesday and Lent with Roman Catholicism. However, this holiday and season are observed by Lutheran and Anglican Protestants as well. Obviously, the liturgy and specific theology varies with the denomination. 

ii) It's important to distinguish between what's permissible and what's obligatory. There's no religious duty to follow the church calendar. However, it's permissible, and it can be edifying. It's an annual cycle that charts the main events in the life of Christ–along with Pentecost and Trinity Sunday. That's a salutary reminder to ourselves, as well as a witness to the world. 

Christians who oppose Ash Wednesday or Lent should also oppose Christmas and Easter. And, indeed, some Christians are consistent in opposing every holiday on the church calendar. But others seem to be selectively critical. 

“Pope Francis”: Roman Catholic Church now a victim in sex abuse scandals

In effect, he has picked up the standard response we’ve seen from other apologetics: “Other people are doing it too … family, neighbors … we’re the only one attacked for not doing enough for it”. From here:

Pope Francis offered one of his more forceful responses yet to criticisms that the church hasn't done enough to respond to the child-abuse scandals that have shaken the church.

Last month, the United Nations issued a report that was highly critical of the Vatican's handling of priests who had abused children, arguing that the church allowed them to escape punishment. Victims' groups have accused Pope Francis—who established a committee charged with developing a more uniform response to the problem—of saying too little about the scandal.

"The cases of abuse are terrible because they leave very deep wounds," he said, citing statistics showing that most child abuse is perpetrated in the family or by neighbors. But "the church has done a lot—perhaps more than anyone….And yet the church is the only one that is attacked."

Oh, the poor Church, the poor, poor Church. “We’re the real victims around here.”

Well, family and neighbors never mounted an organized campaign effort at hiding pedophiles or obstruction of justice.

“Pope Francis”: “I’m not some kind of superman”

From here:

As the anniversary of his election approaches, the Argentine-born pontiff also sought to rebuff criticisms that he has done too little to respond to the sex abuse scandals that have rocked the church. He also sought to play down his huge popularity, saying that he is "not some sort of superman." ...

Finally, Pope Francis tried to play down the popularity he has enjoyed in the past year, which has landed him on magazine covers and even inspired an Italian artist to depict him as superman on a mural near the Vatican.

"I don't like this mythology of Pope Francis," he said. "It seems offensive to me to depict the pope as some sort of superman or a kind of star. The pope is a man who laughs, cries, sleeps soundly at night and has friends just like anyone else. A normal person."

Wednesday, March 05, 2014

"What white folks say and do"


Leon Brown has another post on white folks:


He cites five good examples. If he just stuck with his examples, it would be an unobjectionable post. 

But unfortunately, as we've come to expect, his worthwhile observations tend to be obscured by his myopic racial prism. 

Let's begin with the title: Five Offensive Statements/Actions: What White People Say and Do

It doesn't even occur to him to include an adjective: What Some White People Say and Do

No, the title is worded as a blanket statement about white people en masse. What does it not occur to him that that's offensive?

Then there's how he frames the issue in the body of the text:

I am simply highlighting some things that the majority of our readers may not have considered as they interact with people in the sub-dominant culture.

I see. Are upper-echelon members of the Executive Branch like Barack Obama, Eric Holder, Susan Rice, Todd Jones, Valerie Jarrett,  and Ayo Kimathi, or big city majors like Kasim Reed, Frank Jackson, Michael A. Nutter, Michael B. Coleman, Kevin Johnson, Vincent C. Gray, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, A C Wharton, Jr, Alvin Brown, Rashad Young, and William V. Bell representatives of the "subdominant culture"? If so, I'd like to know how I can get into the subdominant culture. Is there a membership form I can fill out to join the club? 

How to Debate a Christian Apologist

http://www.reclaimingthemind.org/blog/2014/02/how-not-to-debate-a-christian-apologist/

Before Columbus

http://gptsrabbi.blogspot.com/2009/06/uncle-bens-book-blog-1491new.html

On Ash Wednesday, Lent, Easter, and the Roman Desire for Power

If you’re looking at Ash Wednesday as a potential option (as even some evangelicals seem to want to do), keep in mind that Steven Wedgeworth has pointed out that “the practice of the imposition of ashes in the manner of today’s Ash Wednesday celebrations dates back to 10th cent. Spain. It was quite localized at first, and it slowly caught on across Europe.” – not something the ancient church thought about.

It’s true that some form of “pre-Easter fasting” was practiced In the early church, but there were multiple “traditions” available surrounding this practice, as well as the date and practice of Easter. According to Eusebius, Irenaeus wrote this:

The dispute is not only about the day but also the practice of the fast. Some think that they ought to fast for one day, others for two, others even more, and some count forty day-night hours in their ‘day’ [of fasting].

It’s important to note that the one truly “Apostolic” tradition of the early church, one that truly has such origins as it can claim to have been “instituted by the Apostles” was squashed by a bishop of Rome in the late second century.

A Late Awakening to Gödel in Physics

http://www.sljaki.com/JakiGodel.pdf

Tuesday, March 04, 2014

Noah



Testing God

http://lydiaswebpage.blogspot.com/2014/03/testing-god.html

God loves a hilarious giver


I'm going to comment on this:



Scripturalism, then, teaches that all of our knowledge is to be derived from the Bible, which has a systematic monopoly on truth. This approach to a Christian worldview is taught by the Apostle Paul and is confirmed by the teachings of the Westminster Standards. According to the Reformation principle of sola Scriptura, neither science, nor history, nor philosophy is needed to give truth. According to the Scripturalist, there is no “two-source” theory of truth taught in the Word of God. 

That's demonstrably false inasmuch as the Confession itself designates "the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence" (WCF 1.1) as sources of knowledge in addition to Scripture.  

The Bible teaches, as stated by John Calvin, that the Spirit of God has implanted an innate idea of Himself, a sensus divinitatis, in all men, which is propositional and ineradicable. This is due to the fact that all men are created in the image of God. 
How does Crampton prove that this is "propositional" rather than tacit?
When man interacts with God’s creation, which demonstrates His glory, power, and wisdom, man, as God’s image, is forced, in some sense, to “think God.” The visible creation itself does not mediate “knowledge” to man (as in the epistemology of Thomas Aquinas), for the visible universe sets forth no propositions. Rather, it stimulates the mind of man to intellectual intuition (or recollection), who as a rational being is already in possession of apriori, propositional information about God and His creation This apriori information is immediately impressed upon man’s consciousness, and it is more than adequate to show that the God of the Bible is the one and only true God. 
Crampton's theory of repressed memories comes from Plato rather than Scripture.  Keep in mind that Plato espoused reincarnation. Given his theory of preexistence, we retain repressed memories (anamnesis) from former lives:
The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection -all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection.


Perhaps Crampton has now explained how Michael Sudduth went from Scripturalism to Hinduism! They share the same underlying epistemology. 

Back to Crampton:

Rather, as noted above, the senses apparently stimulate the mind of man to intellectual intuition, to recollect the God-given innate ideas that man already possesses. Gordon Clark used the illustration of a piece of paper on which is written a message in invisible ink. The paper (by illustration, the mind) might appear blank, but in actuality it is not. When the heat of experience is applied to the mind (as when heat is applied to the paper), the message becomes visible. Human knowledge, then, is possible only because God has endowed man with certain innate ideas.
Another problem with Crampton's theory is the failure to distinguish between versions of nativism. As one philosopher notes, there are three different versions:
The Intuition/Deduction Thesis

The Innate Knowledge Thesis

The Innate Concept Thesis


Crampton needs to specify which model he's endorsing. And he needs to defend his preferred model against objections.

Since all knowledge must come through propositions (which are either true or false), since the senses in interacting with creation yield no propositions, knowledge cannot be conveyed by sensation. 
That's an assertion in search of an argument. Let's take a counterexample. I see a sapphire. I think to myself, "That looks blue to me." That's a proposition. 
Not just a proposition, but propositional knowledge. An indexical, self-presenting state. Notice that this doesn't depend on whether or not the sapphire is actually blue. What makes it a true belief or true proposition is that it appears to be blue to me. If it looks blue to me, then it's true that it looks blue to me.  
Some of these propositional truths are implanted in man from conception by God. And when man interacts with creation or reads the words of Scripture, the divine teacher, the Logos, illuminates the mind so that the propositions come to consciousness, as the invisible ink. This is possible because the mind of man is enveloped by the mind of the Logos, who enlightens him to understand the eternal propositions in the mind of God. It does not come about by man’s effort or initiative, but by God’s, who reveals truth.God created humans with rational minds that use the same laws of thought as His own; men are image-bearers of God. The principles of reason (logic) and knowledge are innately given by God to mankind through the Logos.The Christian view of epistemology has its roots in the Logos doctrine.(15) According to the Gospel of John, Jesus Christ is the cosmological Logos (1:1-3), the epistemological Logos (1:9, 14), and the soteriological Logos (1:4, 12-13; 14:6). He is the Creator of the world, the source of all human knowledge, and the giver of salvation. As to the epistemological Logos, which is the focus of the present study, Christ is the “true light which enlightens every man coming into the world” (1:9). Apart from the Logos, the “inward teacher,” knowledge would not be possible.
Several problems with Crampton's Mickey Mouse prooftexting:
i) The ambiguous syntax of Jn 1:9: does it refer to Christ coming into the world or everyone coming into the world? Crampton doesn't even acknowledge the syntactical issue, much less demonstrate that his construction is the best interpretation of the passage. 
ii) Even if (ex hypothesi) it refers to everyone coming into the world, Crampton fails to show from the text how that selects for internal revelation rather than external revelation. 
iii) Furthermore, to say that Christ enlightens every man falls far short of showing that "the senses apparently stimulate the mind of man to intellectual intuition, to recollect the God-given innate ideas that man already possesses." Jn 1:9 doesn't make that specific claim. Not even close. 
So much does the Bible speak of God as the God of logic, that in John 1:1 Jesus Christ is called the “Logic” of God:  “In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God”  (the English word “logic” is derived from the Greek word Logos used in this verse).  John 1:1 emphasized the rationality of God the Son.  Logic is as eternal as God himself because “the Logos is God.”  Hence, God and logic cannot be separated; logic is the characteristic of God’s thinking.  In the words of Clark, “God and logic are one and the same first principle, for John wrote that Logic was God.”

i) That's on the same level as saying God loves a "hilarious" giver or the Gospel is the "dynamite" unto salvation. 
ii) As many commentators have documented, John is using "logos" as a Septuagintal carryover for God's creative speech. It doesn't mean "logic." That's further borne out by the conspicuous allusion to Gen 1. The background lies in OT usage rather than Greek philosophy. 
Another way of explaining this is that the sum total of all truth exists in the mind of God: “For in Him [God] we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28). Nothing exists outside of the mind of God. 
i) To say nothing exists outside the mind of God commits Crampton pantheistic idealism. It denies denies a physical world, objective to God. 
ii) It also renders time illusory, if God's mind is timeless. In that case, nothing really happens. No creation. No exodus. No Incarnation. No crucifixion. No Resurrection. No return of Christ. These are just divine ideas. Timeless ideas.
iii) Acts 17:28 doesn't say we live and move and have our being in the mind of God. What would it even mean to say we "live" or "move" in God's mind? Are ideas alive? Do ideas move from one place in God's mind to another place in God's mind? Does Crampton think God's mind has spatial dimensions? 
That is the meaning of the words “omniscient” and “omnipresent.” 
It is? I take omnipresence to be a picturesque metaphor for God's omniscience and omnipotence. 
If man is going to know the truth, he must come to know the eternal propositions in the mind of God. As stated by Jonathan Edwards, “since all truth is in the mind,” and since “God is truth itself,” if we are going to know the truth there must be “the consistency and agreement of our ideas with the ideas of God.”(16)  Thus, whenever human beings know truth, they know that which exists in the mind of God; they do not merely have a representation of the truth.Scripturalism denies the correspondence theory of truth, i.e., that the mind of man has only a representation of the truth, and not the truth itself. Rather, a Christian epistemology holds to the coherence theory of truth, which maintains that what man has is the real truth: the same truth that exists in man’s mind exists first in the mind of God. As stated by Gordon Clark: “Realism is the view that the mind of man actually possesses the truth. Representationalism holds that the mind has only an image, a picture, a representation, an analogy of the truth, but does not have the truth itself.”
To revert to my example, when I think to myself, "that sapphire looks blue to me [a man]," then, according to Scripturalism, that can only be true if God thinks to himself, "that sapphire looks blue to me [God]." 
Does Crampton think physical objects appear to be colored to God? Does an emerald appear to be green to God? Doesn't that theory of knowledge attribute sensory perception to God? 
For speech to be intellible [sic], words must have univocal meanings.  What makes the words meaningful and revelation and communication possible is that each word conforms to the law of contradiction.

So double entendres are meaningless? 

Christians as “image-bearers” of God: “To be fully human is to be an image of the divine glory in God’s creation”

Over the last 50 years, our culture has been aware of the notion that the medium is the message. First it was simply TV, then it became personal computers, then the Internet, and now, we hold the medium/message is in our pockets and in the palms of our hands.

But there is another, greater theater going on, and we are part of it:

The Art of Being Calvinist: Imitating God in the Divine Drama.

In this article, Stephen Wolfe argues that in the Kingdom of God, the true art is “the everyday life of a Christian”. But this is not a passive thing. “The Adamic human race perverts the cosmos; the Christian human race renews it.”

The Reformation ushered in a way of looking at the world that had profound implications for what constitutes art. My purpose here is to suggest that Calvinists did not reject religious art. Religious art remained just an important as before. However, religious art did not remain in the old forms, but became redeemed life itself. Everyday life became images of God. Art, in a sense, became hidden within the daily life of the community of faith. I am not referring to everyday objects, but everyday activity. And I am not referring to everyday activity as captured in paintings or the other mediums, but in the activity itself in the world. The activity itself is the medium. The ordinary lives of redeemed people are religious images.

Monday, March 03, 2014

Picking an epistemology


Christians with a philosophical bent often wish to develop a Christian epistemology. A theory of knowledge which incorporates Christian distinctives, like Biblical revelation, the imago Dei, divine providence, the noetic effects of sin, &c.
They don't necessarily start from scratch. This may involve assessing extant rival theories of knowledge, like rationalism, empiricism, and variations thereof. Sometimes Christians will modify a preexisting theory of knowledge, the way Thomism modifies Aristotelian epistemology, or Augustinianism modifies Platonic epistemology. 
In this respect, Christians often take sides in traditional debates. They side with rationalism (e.g. Augustine) or empiricism (e.g. Locke). They endeavor to determine which competing position is correct, then hitch their star to that position. And it's obviously valuable to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of various positions.
That said, Reformed theism has the metaphysical resources to make different theories of knowledge work. Take the debate between internalists and externalists concerning epistemic justification:

There is considerable disagreement among epistemologists concerning what the relevant sort of justification here consists in. Internalists about justification think that whether a belief is justified depends wholly on states in some sense internal to the subject. According to one common such sense of ‘internal’, only those features of a subject's experience which are directly or introspectively available count as ‘internal’—call this ‘access internalism’. According to another, only intrinsic states of the subject are ‘internal’—call this ‘state internalism’. See Conee & Feldman 2001 for the distinction. 
Conee and Feldman present an example of an internalist view. They have it that S's belief that p is justified if and only if believing that p is the attitude towards p that best fits S's evidence, where the latter is understood to depend only on S's internal mental states. Conee and Feldman call their view ‘evidentialism’, and characterize this as the thesis that justification is wholly a matter of the subject's evidence. Given their (not unsubstantial) assumption that what evidence a subject has is an internal matter, evidentialism implies internalism.[5] Externalists about justification think that factors external to the subject can be relevant for justification; for example, process reliabilists think that justified beliefs are those which are formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones.[6] We shall return to the question of how reliabilist approaches bear on the analysis of knowledge in §6.1. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#JusCon 
Internalism 
Belief is a mental state, and belief-formation is a mental process. Accordingly, one might reason, whether or not a belief is justified – whether, that is, it is formed in the right way – can be determined by examining the thought-processes of the believer during its formation. Such a view, which maintains that justification depends solely on factors internal to the believer’s mind, is called internalism. (The term “internalism” has different meanings in other contexts; here, it will be used strictly to refer to this type of view about epistemic justification.) 
According to internalism, the only factors that are relevant to the determination of whether a belief is justified are the believer’s other mental states. After all, an internalist will argue, only an individual’s mental states – her beliefs about the world, her sensory inputs (for example, her sense data) and her beliefs about the relations between her various beliefs – can determine what new beliefs she will form, so only an individual’s mental states can determine whether any particular belief is justified. In particular, in order to be justified, a belief must be appropriately based upon or supported by other mental states. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/#SH3a 
Externalism 
According to externalism, the only way to avoid the isolation objection and ensure that knowledge does not include luck is to consider some factors other than the individual’s other beliefs. Which factors, then, should be considered? The most prominent version of externalism, called reliabilism, suggests that we consider the source of a belief. Beliefs can be formed as a result of many different sources, such as sense experience, reason, testimony, memory. More precisely, we might specify which sense was used, who provided the testimony, what sort of reasoning is used, or how recent the relevant memory is. For every belief, we can indicate the cognitive process that led to its formation. In its simplest and most straightforward form, reliabilism maintains that whether or not a belief is justified depends upon whether that process is a reliable source of true beliefs. Since we are seeking a match between our mind and the world, justified beliefs are those which result from processes which regularly achieve such a match. So, for example, using vision to determine the color of an object which is well-lit and relatively near is a reliable belief-forming process for a person with normal vision, but not for a color-blind person. Forming beliefs on the basis of the testimony of an expert is likely to yield true beliefs, but forming beliefs on the basis of the testimony of compulsive liars is not. In general, if a belief is the result of a cognitive process which reliably (most of the time – we still want to leave room for human fallibility) leads to true beliefs, then that belief is justified. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/#SH3b
i) Suppose justification depends on a reliable belief-producing process. Calvinism, with its doctrine of meticulous providence, could make that work. General or special providence could ground that. If God intends someone to have a justified (or warranted) belief, God can ensure a reliable chain of testimony, confirm his recollection, or make inductive samples representative.
Conversely, suppose justification depends on mental states. Since God controls our thought processes, God can ensure the suitable relationship between various mental states. 
ii) Apropos (i), suppose that after examining the pros and cons of externalism and internalism, you can't decide which is correct. Maybe both can account for the relevant facts. Or maybe each has unique advantages and disadvantages, such that neither one enjoys a decisive advantage over the other.
Indeed, it can be difficult to form a definitive assessment inasmuch as this is an ongoing debate in which both sides continue to refine their positions in response to criticisms from the other side. You don't have the luxury of comparing the final version of externalism against the final version of internalism.
If, however, both are workable given Reformed theism, then perhaps it's not necessary for you to choose which one is right. 
iii) Apropos (i-ii), if God can make either model work, then that raises the question of whether we can know which one true. Which one is true depends on whether God put us in a world where internalism is true or a world in which externalism is true. If, however, both are viable, then perhaps we can't tell which world we're in. If both are adequate to account for the relevant facts, then at that level, there doesn't seem to be any independent criterion to distinguish which one describes the real world. 
Of course, if one is clearly defective, then that's a distinguishing consideration. 

PBS on the Resignation of Pope Benedict: “he was killing the church”

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/religion/secrets-of-the-vatican/robert-mickens-from-benedict-to-francis/

When he resigned, Benedict XVI left a church that was almost run into the ground. Some brighter people and more astute people on the workings of the church had confided in me, even people on the inside, he was killing the church. People were moving away from the church; people were leaving the church in droves.

What he did in his seven years as pope or so, is he brought back into the mainstream many fringe groups on the extreme right, groups that did not like or threw into question the reforms that happened at the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. The modernization of the church these people did not like. They wanted to go back to the old Tridentine Mass, the pre-Vatican II Mass, and he allowed them. These people were brought back into the mainstream of the church, even though they’re tiny little pockets, insignificant pockets really, [and] they became the tail wagging the dog.

This was driving away a lot of people, even inside the Vatican. The Vatican is naturally a conservative place. … Ratzinger, Benedict XVI, was too conservative even for them.

On Pope Francis:

What’s the biggest danger he faces?

… The strength of this pope will be the people, and the people who continue to push him. …

His biggest danger is that there are a lot of small-minded bishops that were appointed under Benedict XVI and John Paul II and a whole cadre of clergy that were ordained in the last 10 years on some idea of priesthood in church, so very different from the one that Francis is putting forward, who will find it hard to be enthusiastic and to follow and to pick up his message and to diffuse it among the people.

“The about-face the [Roman Catholic] church has made on this subject [Religious Liberty] is abundantly clear”

Dr. Mark Hausam has written a two-part article series outlining “an example of the Roman Catholic Church blatantly contradicting itself in its teaching on a very important doctrinal matter--the matter of religious freedom.” His two part (so far) series may be found here:

Religious Freedom and the Fallibility of the Roman Catholic Church, Part I

Religious Freedom and the Fallibility of the Roman Catholic Church, Part II

This series is in response to a Bryan Cross article found here:

On Religious Liberty: An Objection Considered.

The objection, of course, is that Rome contradicted itself in two “infallible” documents: Quanta Cura (which was published in conjunction with the 1864 “Syllabus of Errors”) and Dignitatis Humanae.

Hausam first investigates the Roman Catholic understanding of things up to Vatican II, and in the second article, he investigates the post-Vatican II understanding.

Hausam’s conclusion is, “The about-face the church has made on this subject is abundantly clear”.

Needless to say, I think the Roman Catholic responses to Hausam are quite ridiculous, and Hausam considers both the defense within the Vatican II document and also one of the CTC responses (and rejects it), but I’ll let you have a look at them for yourselves.


Sunday, March 02, 2014

Spy lights

http://rt.com/news/big-brother-street-lamps-286/

BW3 reviews Son of God

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/bibleandculture/2014/02/28/son-of-god-the-burnett-and-downey-version/

Prooftexting epistemology


Does the Bible adjudicate the debate between empiricism and rationalism? It's possible that Scripture attests a position that's less specific than either alternative. It's possible that Scripture doesn't divvy up knowledge in the way these two alternatives do. 
i) Although empiricism is committed to sense-knowledge, commitment to sense-knowledge doesn't entail commitment to empiricism. Strict empiricism considers sensory experience to be the only source of our concepts and knowledge. But, in principle, you can espouse sense-knowledge without regarding the senses as the exclusive source of what we know.
Conversely, rationalism regards some or all of our knowledge as innate or intuitive and inferential. However, to say our knowledge is not acquired through the senses does not entail that our knowledge is innate. A third possibility is that our knowledge is acquired by extrasensory means. It could still be derivative. 
ii) Sense-knowledge is fairly easy to prooftext from Scripture. God designed our senses (Exod 4:11; Ps 94:9). Scripture places great stock in the value of eyewitness testimony, in the broader sense of audio, visual, and tactile sources of information (e.g. Lk 1:2; Acts 1:3; Heb 2:4; 1 Jn 1:1-2).
This is sufficient to disprove rationalism, if rationalism is taken to mean that none of our knowledge is sense-knowledge. 
iii) On the other hand, Scripture also affirms extrasensory knowledge. For instance, visionary revelation bypasses the physical senses to communicate information directly to the mind of the seer. A kind of telepathy. It simulates sensory stimuli. The seer hears and sees things in his mind or imagination. But there's no external stimulus producing or corresponding to that impression. It's not innate or empirical, yet it's still derivative. 
Put another way, the seer acquires knowledge through experience, but it's not empirical experience. A posteriori rather than a priori. 
At the same time, visionary revelation mimics sensory experience. To that extent, the intelligibility of visionary revelation depends on prior experience with the sensible world. That supplies an interpretive frame of reference. If a seer had no prior experience of the external world, the simulated imagery would be incomprehensible. For instance, to someone born blind or deaf, if his sight or hearing is restored, that will be very disorienting at first. It will take him time to adjust. To lean how to decode his newly-found sensory experience. 
iv) Rationalism is often associated with logical, mathematical, and/or moral intuition. Scripture doesn't have a theory of logic. But Scripture does take informal logic for granted. Here's a classic discussion:
Of course, that, by itself, doesn't select for rationalism. Empiricists use logic too. And they attempt to ground and justify logic through empirical resources. We can debate how successful they are, but that's an essentially philosophical debate which goes well beyond the witness of Scripture.
v) It's difficult to prooftext rationalism from Scripture. 1 Jn 2:20,27 may be the closest. That suggests a kind of spiritual illumination which detects heresy. But it's not properly innate or a priori. It's the result of regeneration. And it operates in tandem with external revelation (e.g. apostolic teaching). In addition, it has a narrow scope.
One might also appeal to Jer 31:33-34 The question is how to unpack that metaphor. It is literally referring to internalized knowledge, or spiritual renewal? The latter interpretation is more likely. 
At best, rationalism is underdetermined by Scripture. And we need to avoid a false dichotomy. You can be a rationalist about math, but an empiricist about astronomy or biology. 
As I recall, Gordon Clark once defended rationalism by contending that Adam and Eve had innate knowledge. But there are two problems with that appeal:
a) Clark rejects inductive logic. If you see 50 black ravens in a row, the 51st raven may be albino. Clark can't extrapolate from Adam and Eve to humans generally. That would commit the "fallacy of induction." He can't derive a universal or even general conclusion that goes beyond the sample. Not to mention that a single breeding pair is a barely minimal sample to begin with.
b) In addition, Adam and Eve are hardly representative. Of necessity, they had innate knowledge because they were created as adults. That's not analogous to normal human cognitive development, which tracks maturation.
Moreover, even Adam and Eve subsequently acquired additional knowledge through their senses. Their empirical knowledge of the garden. Hearing God tell them things. 

Special kids

Just a plug for Special Kids.

As an example of kids the organization helps, check out Christian Buchanan's story.

Here is another video about Christian Buchanan:

Kafeteria Kasper

Who is Walter Kasper? Thanks to “Pope Francis”, he’s on top of the Roman Catholic world today.

Steve wrote this about Walter Kasper and his understanding of Scripture, in 2005:

Among other things, Kasper says the following:

***QUOTE***

A number of miracle stories turn out in the light of form criticism to be projections of the experiences of Easter back into the earthly life of Jesus, or anticipatory representations of the exalted Christ. Among these epiphany stories we should probably include the stilling of the storm, the transfiguration, Jesus’ walking on the lake, the feeding of the four (or five) thousand and the miraculous draught of fishes…It is the nature miracles which turn out to be secondary accretions to the original tradition.

The result of all this is that we must describe many of the gospel miracle stories as legendary. …

***END-QUOTE***

My primary purpose in quoting from Kasper is not to comment on the merits of his position. Rather, this serves to document the mainstream view of Scripture in modern Catholicism. Although Kasper was not a high-ranking prelate at the time he wrote this book, what he wrote was obviously no impediment to his ecclesiastical preferment.

Now, if these statements were made by a man of similar ecclesiastical standing in any other denomination--say, Lutheran or Episcopalian or Presbyterian or Baptist—everyone would grant that his particular denomination was on the liberal end of the theological spectrum.

But when a Catholic scholar and high-placed prelate like Kasper says the very same thing, conservative Catholics rush in to distance their church from this sort of teaching. ...