Sean's Hammer

(Posted on behalf of Steve.)

Since I've been responding to Gerety's posts, I think it's only fair that readers should know where to find his blog. Here's the link.

Scripturalist Metaphysics of Personhood

Sean Gerety couldn't answer any of the questions or arguments I posed to him in my last response. That didn't stop him from declaring victory and then moving (in a hurry I might add) on to other things. I asked him several questions, yet, rather than answer them, he said I "threw in the towel." So here I am, all lonely with my questions unanswered, and now I don't even have my towel anymore.

Since Gerety doesn't want to engage me anymore, I thought I'd make a couple quick corrections to two things he said in regards to me and then move on to something that is really puzzling about Clarkian conceptions of personhood.

I. Gerety's Minor Response to Me Dealt With

First, in response to Gerety's claim that, "Given that only propositions can be either true or false and sensations, whatever they may be, are non-propositional, I have no idea how anyone might advance the idea of 'sense knowledge?'"; I replied that the senses were a source of knowledge. Gerety responded, "Well, of course they are Paul. They must be. After all you said they are." Of course, the point was to correct Gerety's misunderstandings. Given that the senses are a source of knowledge then his criticism doesn't even apply. That's the point I was making. I'd be happy to engage Gerety on the issue, he just has to formulate an objection correctly. You know, make it easy for me to see the argument by removing all the smoke introduced by burning straw men. Oh, by the way, if he chooses to advance an argument against "sense knowledge" I expect to see deductions from the Bible. Like, for example, where does a Scripturalist get the epistemically justified belief that "only propositions can be true or false?"

Second, Gerety said I was "unable to form any cogent arguments." Like with "sense knowledge" above, I doubt Gerety is using terms correctly. I am under no illusion that I can present a cogent argument to a Scripturalist for almost anything. Cogency has to do with persuasiveness, and Scripturalists have negated themselves from constructive debate. Their epistemology precludes them from granting cogency. In other words, Gerety's just complaining that I'm not a Scripturalist.

II. Scripturalism's Odd Metaphysic of Personhood

I truly find the claim that "persons are the propositions they think" to be about one of the most absurd claims I've come across. However, I'm open to elucidation. It may be that I'm just misunderstanding their claim. Here's some of the issues I have with the claim:

1. The biblical support for this claim seems utterly contrived. In response to Hays, Gerety offers up what he takes to be biblical support from the metaphysics of personhood, namely, that "a person is the propositions they think." Gerety wrote, "I suppose Solomon was also guilty of 'pantheistic idealism' when he wrote; 'For as a man thinks within himself, so he is.'"

I find it hard to accept that Solomon was offering a treatise on the metaphysics of personhood here. And doubly so without the attendant exegesis. Can Sean point to any exegesis that supports his understanding of this passage?

Here's some problems I have with this "exegesis":

i) Solomon is talking about dinning with stingy men, not about the metaphysics of personhood. He's also using a lot of metaphors.

ii) Other translations might be "his heart is not with you."

iii) The selfish man is the only one said to "think in his heart so he is." Gerety is moving beyond the premises by applying this to all men, making an invalid move from particular to universal. Or, did he use induction?

2. Given that people believe different propositions at different times, what grounds personal identity across time? In other words, if I believe a set S of propositions at t, and then I believe ~S at t1, what does it mean to say that the two "I's" are the same, identical person?

3. How can 1 minute old concepti be persons? How can a Clarkian consistently condemn abortion? In fact, do infants "think propositions?" How can a Clarkian condemn infanticide?

4. What if I am not thinking any propositions (say I'm sleeping)?

5. (a) Is it false to say the numerically one God thinks?

(b) Since Jesus thinks (a) I am created and (b) I am not created, is Jesus two people? That looks like it follows straight from Sean's claim that since the Father doesn't think "I am incarnated" and since the Son does, this gives them their status as separate persons. Where's the flaw in my deduction from Sean's claims?

6. Gerety says, "Of course, since no two people think precisely the same thoughts, no two people are the same person." But, (a) how does he know this and (b) it seems possible that two people could think, at some time, precisely the same thought(s). I could see some successful psychologist or hypnotist doing some experiment whereupon completion his patients think the same thoughts. Say he binds them to beds, places them in a pitch black room, erases their memory, and hypnotizes them to think "I am a mermaid." What's the difference between the two?

7. What if Sean Gerety and I switched bodies, bumped our heads, and became amnesiacs. After retraining, I believed I was Sean Gerety and believed Sean-Gerety-propositions. Gerety, the more lucky of the two in this scenario, had the same happen. Would I be the same "person" as Anita Manata's oldest son? On what basis? To say the same person now believes an entirely different set of propositions seems to imply a substance that exists through time and can have different things predicated of it.

As I said, I'm just asking. Can a Scripturalist spell out this "persons are the propositions they think" concept more clearly?

Marcion And The New Testament

"According to the Church Fathers, Marcion rejected certain books, and selected others for his canon out of a more comprehensive Church canon. Harnack, on the other hand, developed the thesis that Marcion was the first to construct a formal canon of Christian Scripture and that the Church followed his lead, eventually adopting four Gospels and thirteen Epistles of Paul, in addition to other books as well. John Knox, following suggestions made by F.C. Baur and others, went still further and maintained that Marcion had a kind of proto-Luke which the Church later enlarged in the interest of anti-Marcionite polemic, producing our present Luke sometime after A.D. 150. Knox was unable, however, to show that after the middle of the second century conditions prevailed in the Church to render possible the immediate general acceptance of a newly redacted gospel....It is nearer the truth to regard Marcion's canon as accelerating the process of fixing the Church's canon, a process that had already begun in the first half of the second century." (Bruce Metzger, The Canon Of The New Testament [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], pp. 98-99)

"[the theory] that Marcion used a 'Proto-Luke' which has been expanded by the church for the purpose of anti-Marcionite polemic not only completely fails to recognize the historical context of the Third Gospel but also comes to grief on its stylistic and theological unity. Moreover there is no manuscript evidence for such a hypothesis. Such a manipulation of the text would have had to find a record around 150; moreover it would no longer really have been generally recognized." (Martin Hengel, The Four Gospels And The One Gospel Of Jesus Christ [Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 2000], n. 131 on p. 230)

"More recent studies have shown, however, that Marcion's Pauline corpus is derivative in both content and structure from another early edition of the letters. With the exception of Galatians, Marcion's arrangement of the letters follows the principle of decreasing length, with letters to the same communities being counted together. Since this principle was not maintained by Marcion and apparently had no importance for him, his edition must have depended on another for which this principle was fully constitutive....Such an edition emphasized by its arrangement the number of communities to which Paul had written, namely precisely seven churches....It may be in consequence of such an edition of Paul's letters that we have two other groups of early Christian letters similarly addressed to seven churches: the letters of the Apocalypse (2:1-3:22), and of Ignatius....This arrangement of the letters [with Galatians at the head] is presupposed by the old prologues to the Pauline letters. While they have long been regarded as Marcionite, it is now clear that they are catholic products, and thus the edition itself must be catholic. Marcion's edition was not only substantively and structurally derivative from an earlier one, but also textually derivative....his [Marcion's] text of the epistles belonged to a common pre-Marcionite form of the Pauline text that was already current around the beginning of the second century....Marcion's importance for the history of Pauline texts has been substantially diminished....most recent studies offer more moderate estimates of his [Marcion's] influence, suggesting that he prompted the church to become more self-consciously reflective about the scope of its scriptures and the basis of their authority, or that he only accelerated a development that was already underway. Even this, however, may concede too much. It is quite uncertain, for example, that Marcion considered his canon to be closed and exclusive; his followers, in any case, apparently did not....The Gospel-Apostle framework of Marcion's canon was certainly not his creation." (Harry Gamble, in Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], pp. 283-284, 292)

"More recent scholarship has been less sure of Marcion's influence on the formation of the canon, but still regards him as important....Marcion's concern was to exclude books that he disapproved of from his 'canon.' He was not assembling a collection of Christian books, but making a (very restricted) selection from the corpus of texts which already existed and which must already have been recognized as sacred by many in the church - otherwise he would not have needed to insist on abolishing them....if Marcion caused the church to have a 'New Testament,' we should see an increase in the use of New Testament texts from the mid-second century onwards, as the church in general became more aware of its own scriptures as distinct from the Old Testament. Christians should have become, for polemical reasons, more self-conscious in using the texts that would eventually form the New Testament. But in fact this is not the case. The New Testament books, or at any rate the central 'core' of the Gospels and the Pauline and Catholic Epistles, were already used very widely in the time before Marcion, and continued to be so used after him. Franz Stuhlhofer has shown by a detailed statistical analysis that, proportionately to their length, the New Testament scriptures were already cited considerably more intensively than the Old by the early second century, and no difference in their use can be established following Marcion....Thus Marcion seems to have had far less influence on the development of the New Testament canon than he is still given credit for, despite modifications to Harnack's rather extreme proposal....The development of the New Testament followed its own logic, and Marcion did not influence it one way or the other....To put it in a somewhat exaggerated form, Marcion was not responsible for Christians' adopting a New Testament; he was responsible for their retaining an Old Testament. Interestingly enough, Stuhlhofer's statistics indicate an increase in the citation of Old Testament texts by Christian writers from about the time of Marcion onwards....In short, Marcion was not a major influence on the formation of the New Testament; he was simply a Marcionite." (John Barton, in Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], pp. 342-344, 350-351, 354)

"But although Marcion's list is the first, it is going too far to say that the very idea of a Christian Bible is the work of Marcion. Paul's letters were already circulating in collected form, and probably the four canonical gospels as well. More important, the idea of New Testament Scripture, certainly well established in the first part of the second century, presupposes some sort of canonical limit sooner or later." (D.A. Carson and Douglas Moo, An Introduction To The New Testament [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2005], p. 732)

David Has Been Banned

I warned David that he might be banned if he didn't change his behavior. His latest posts, which I just deleted, were more of the same. He's now banned.

"Virtue" ethics

Some atheists argue it's possible for objective morals to exist without God.

Of course, I don't agree.

But, playing along, I have a question. If it's possible for objective moral virtues to exist without God, then it's possible for objective moral vices to exist without God, isn't it? If it's possible for courage, self-sacrifice, and love to exist without God, then isn't it also possible for cowardice, self-centeredness, and hatred to exist without God?

If so, then I have a follow-up question. Given this, who or what would necessitate or obligate our obedience or disobedience? That is, even if the virtue of justice or mercy exists without God, what would obligate someone to be just or merciful? On this view, merely because a virtue or vice exists does not mean we ought to obey or disobey it, does it? Not as far as I can see.

Thus, even if the atheist is correct that it's possible to have objective morals without God, there's still no obligation for a person to behave morally or not behave immorally -- at least not as far as I can tell. But it's possible I'm mistaken.

Taliban held to blame in airstrike

"Taliban held to blame in airstrike"

"Afghan militants using white phosphorus"

Collateral damage

There’s a Catch-22 is modern warfare. On the one hand, due to advances in military technology, it’s possible to minimize civilian casualties in a way that wasn’t possible in the past.

And, indeed, we’ve exploited that technology to minimize civilian casualties where possible.

On the other hand, even though civilian casualties have been declining as a result of smart-bombs and other suchlike, every time a military strikes results in collateral damage, bobble-heads in the news media hype the story. Then a parade of gov’t officials rush to waiting microphones to promise a “thorough investigation” of the incident. Promises stated in defensive, apologetic, or even accusatorial tones.

The more our military tries to minimize collateral damage, the more it succeeds in minimizing collateral damage, the more it comes under fire for any incident of collateral damage.

Frankly, if that’s how its efforts are rewarded, then there’s no incentive for the military to minimize civilian casualties.

Collateral damage is an inevitable consequences of war. Despite painstaking efforts to minimize collateral damage, there will always be some loss of innocent life in time of war.

In a further irony, while our soldiers bend over backwards to minimize civilian casualties, our enemies bend over backwards to maximize civilian casualties–by using human shields.

Indeed, this is a deliberate strategy. They are banking on the Pavlovian reaction of the news media and the political establishment to an incident of collateral damage.

If, despite its best efforts to the contrary, our military is constantly criticized for civilian casualties, then why bother? Why not go back to carpet-bombing or nuking a city?

If, no matter what you do, you’re going to be attacked by the news media and opportunistic politicians, then why not get it over with sooner rather than later? Why put your troops at extra risk to spare civilian lives?

Or perhaps our armed forces should just go on strike for a few years until the news media and the political establishment begin to feel personally threatened by what happens when our enemies are allowed to flourish unchecked.

Man-caused disasters

When it comes to counterterrorism or “man-caused disasters,” the Obama administration has fascinating moral priorities. On the one hand it refuses to ever use sleep deprivation, stress positions, forced nudity, or waterboarding on terrorists to extract actionable intel. That would amount to “torture.” We “lost our moral bearings” when we resorted to such methods.

On the other hand, the Obama administration is conducting military operations in Afghanistan which target suspected terrorists. Needless to say, it’s not as if the suspected terrorists are tried and convicted, or even Mirandized, before we order an airstrike. So this amounts to summary execution.

Now I have no objection to killing terrorists in Afghanistan or Pakistan. It would be incredibly dangerous to American national security if the Taliban were to seize power in Pakistan.

I am, however, fascinated by the moral logic of claiming that it’s impermissible to subject a high-value terrorist to sleep deprivation to extraction information which would save innocent lives, but it’s permissible or even obligatory to conduct a military campaign with the express purpose of killing terrorists.

Popes, Councils, And The New Testament Canon

It's often claimed that the New Testament canon, or the entire canon of scripture, was taught by one or more councils in the fourth century or by one or more Roman bishops in the fourth and fifth centuries. Sometimes it's claimed that the canon was settled by such a council or Roman bishop, as if they were exercising some sort of infallibility or were fallible, but widely followed. For example:

"The fact is that the Holy Spirit guided the Catholic Church over time to recognize and determine the canon of the New and Old Testaments in the year 382 at the synod of Rome, under Pope Damasus I. This decision was ratified again at the councils of Hippo (393) and Carthage (397 and 419). You, my friend, accept exactly the same books of the New Testament that Pope Damasus decreed were canonical, and no others." (Catholic Answers)

Whatever Catholic Answers means by "determine", it seems that many people have the impression that fourth-century councils and Roman bishops around the same time played more of a role than they actually did. It's often claimed that the Council of Nicaea promulgated a canon, even though it didn't. Councils and Popes had less of a role than is often suggested:

"For the first fifteen centuries of Christianity, no Christian Church put forth a definitive list of biblical books. Most Christians had followed St. Augustine and included the 'Apocrypha' in the canon, but St. Jerome, who excluded them, had always had his defenders." (Joseph Lienhard, The Bible, The Church, And Authority [Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1995], p. 59)

"in the fifth century a more or less final consensus [on the New Testament canon] was reached and shared by East and West. It is worth noting that no ecumenical council in the ancient church ever ruled for the church as a whole on the question of the contents of the canon." (Harry Gamble, in Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], p. 291)

"[Athanasius was] a witness to a consensus that had long been emerging in the churches. The councils of the church played little part in the canonization of scripture. When councils did speak on the subject, their voice was a ratification of what had already become the mind of the church. Canon 60 of the Council of Laodicea (c. 363 C.E.) is likely a later insertion into the decrees of the council; it lists a twenty-six book New Testament, lacking Revelation. The first councils certainly to speak on the subject of the canon were in North Africa: Hippo (393) and Carthage (397 and 419). They were under the influence of Augustine, who regarded the canon as closed: 'For the canon of the sacred writings, which is properly closed' (Civ. 22.8)." (Everett Ferguson, in Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], pp. 319-320)

"Revelation was added later in 419 at the subsequent synod at Carthage [after being left out in the synod that occurred there in 397]." (Lee McDonald, in Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], n. 19 on p. 595)

"Since the study of canon should also include the documents collected much later into the 'Christian Bible,' notably the New Testament, additional documents must be included and the timeline extended to about 1000 CE when the Greek Orthodox Church accepted the Revelation of John (which is still not canonical according to the Syriac Church)." (James Charlesworth, in Craig Evans and Emanuel Tov, edd., Exploring The Origins Of The Bible [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008], p. 59)

"But, as evidence from subsequent writers reveals, not all in the Church were ready to accept precisely the canon as identified by Athanasius, and throughout the following centuries there were minor fluctuations in the East as well as in the West." (Bruce Metzger, The Canon Of The New Testament [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], pp. 7-8)

"Eventually lists of apocryphal writings were drawn up, warning the faithful that they were not to be received as authoritative Scripture. One such list is included in an early Latin document, the so-called Decretum Gelasianum, which the manuscripts attribute indiscriminately to Popes Damasus, Hormisdas, and Gelasius. The document is in five parts, one of which gives a list of books included in the Old Testament and the New Testament (the latter is without the Book of Revelation), and another gives a lengthy list of apocryphal works (sixty-two titles) and heretical authors (thirty-five names). According to von Dobschutz it is not a Papal work at all, but a private compilation that was drawn up in Italy (but not at Rome) in the early sixth century." (Bruce Metzger, The Canon Of The New Testament [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], p. 188)

"If one asks what was the reason for this concern [by Eusebius] in registering numerous individual testimonies concerning the Scriptures, the answer certainly must point to Eusebius' search for certainty as well as to the absence of any official declaration having an absolute value, such as a canon issued by a synod, or the collective agreement among churches or bishops. Of these there is not a trace in the long series of literary notices, so conscientiously amassed by the historian....In the absence of any official list of the canonical writings of the New Testament, Eusebius finds it simplest to count the votes of his witnesses" (Bruce Metzger, The Canon Of The New Testament [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], pp. 202-203)

I agree with most of what the sources above have said. But I don't agree with everything.

Some scholars think that the portion of the Decretum Gelasianum listing the New Testament canon should be traced back to Damasus or might come from him. Metzger's opinion isn't shared by all scholars. But I include his comments to illustrate that it's a disputed matter and that Roman Catholics and others who make an appeal to Damasus should be expected to make a case for that appeal. And I don't know that Metzger is correct about the absence of Revelation in the Decretum Gelasianum. The copy of the document I've seen includes Revelation. But maybe one or more other copies don't. Or maybe there's some other reason to think that the original didn't include Revelation. I don't know.

Lee McDonald is the only scholar I've seen make the claim that Revelation wasn't included by the council of Carthage in 397. Other sources in that region around the same time and in earlier generations, like Tertullian and Augustine, treat Revelation as scripture. Even if Revelation wasn't included in the canonical list of the council in 397, it may have been left out unintentionally. In a recent post, I gave some examples of other canon lists that seem to have unintentionally left out one or more books. I don't know whether McDonald is right. But it's a disputed issue, and that fact should be kept in mind.

And these issues surrounding the Decretum Gelasianum and the council of 397 aren't of much significance. The twenty-seven-book New Testament was advocated by earlier sources. It's found in other sources around the same time as Damasus and the 397 council in Carthage. And we don't have any reason to believe that Damasus, a council in Rome in 382, or the council in Carthage in 397 was acting infallibly or was widely perceived as having settled the issue in some other manner.

My main point in this post is that there was nothing like a promulgation of the canon by an early ecumenical council or an early papal decree that was widely considered definitive. Rather, the fourth-century councils that produced a canon were regional councils that seem to have reflected an earlier consensus that arose without anything like a ruling from a Pope or ecumenical council. People in the West and East continued to advocate other Old Testament and New Testament canons for centuries afterward.

Virginitas in partu

I’m going to briefly compare two Marian dogmas. Here’s the rationale for both:

Immaculate Conception

And indeed it was wholly fitting that so wonderful a mother should be ever resplendent with the glory of most sublime holiness and so completely free from all taint of original sin that she would triumph utterly over the ancient serpent. To her did the Father will to give his only-begotten Son -- the Son whom, equal to the Father and begotten by him, the Father loves from his heart -- and to give this Son in such a way that he would be the one and the same common Son of God the Father and of the Blessed Virgin Mary. It was she whom the Son himself chose to make his Mother and it was from her that the Holy Spirit willed and brought it about that he should be conceived and born from whom he himself proceeds.

http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius09/p9ineff.htm

Virginitas in Partu

I answer that, Without any doubt whatever we must assert that the Mother of Christ was a virgin even in His Birth: for the prophet says not only: "Behold a virgin shall conceive," but adds: "and shall bear a son." This indeed was befitting for three reasons. First, because this was in keeping with a property of Him whose Birth is in question, for He is the Word of God. For the word is not only conceived in the mind without corruption, but also proceeds from the mind without corruption. Wherefore in order to show that body to be the body of the very Word of God, it was fitting that it should be born of a virgin incorrupt. Whence in the sermon of the Council of Ephesus (quoted above) we read: "Whosoever brings forth mere flesh, ceases to be a virgin. But since she gave birth to the Word made flesh, God safeguarded her virginity so as to manifest His Word, by which Word He thus manifested Himself: for neither does our word, when brought forth, corrupt the mind; nor does God, the substantial Word, deigning to be born, destroy virginity."

Secondly, this is fitting as regards the effect of Christ's Incarnation: since He came for this purpose, that He might take away our corruption. Wherefore it is unfitting that in His Birth He should corrupt His Mother's virginity. Thus Augustine says in a sermon on the Nativity of Our Lord: "It was not right that He who came to heal corruption, should by His advent violate integrity."

Thirdly, it was fitting that He Who commanded us to honor our father and mother should not in His Birth lessen the honor due to His Mother.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4028.htm#article2

The Thomistic rationale is pretty ad hoc. Regarding the third rationale, does childbearing dishonor a mother? Didn’t God design this process? Doesn’t this design antedate the fall?

As for the first two reasons, Aquinas seems to be saying that ordinary childbirth would defile both the Christchild and his mother.

But it’s hard to see the logic of that, even on Catholic grounds:

i) A body qua body is not sinful. What we do with our bodies can be sinful, although childbirth is hardly sinful.

ii) Since Christ is both sinless and impeccable, how could passage through the birth canal defile him?

iii) Since, according to the Immaculate Conception, Mary is sinless, how could her birth canal define the Christchild?

The only plausible explanation I can proffer for these inconsistent positions is that each dogma represents a legendary embellishment which evolved independently of the other, without thought for the other. And that’s why they don’t go together.

Verifying apostolic succession

A lot of Catholic epologists seem to think that all they need to do to prove apostolic succession is to prove the idea of apostolic succession in the church fathers. It doesn’t occur to them that proving the existence of an abstract idea is not the same thing as proving the concrete existence of what that idea purports. Even if you could prove the idea of apostolic succession in the church fathers, that doesn’t begin to prove the reality of apostolic succession. Apostolic succession posits a series of interlocking events. Cause and effect. But a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

Apostolic succession involves a historical claim regarding a series of historical events. Therefore, one needs some form of historical evidence commensurate with the scope of the claim to verify the claim.

And this isn’t just my Protestant opinion. Take a classic example: the way in which Leo XIII denies the apostolic succession of the Anglican church. For Leo XII, apostolic succession is contingent on valid ordination. And the validity or invalidity of ordination is a historical question which must be subjected to detailed historical investigation to verify or falsify the claim.

I apply to Catholicism the same standard that Leo XIII applies to Anglicanism. If the Church of England must verify every step of the process, so much the Church of Rome.

I’ll reproduce the text of Leo’s Encyclical so that you can see the type of historical reasoning that feeds into his conclusions. The very same requirements would apply, perforce, to the claims of Rome.

******************************************************************

Apostolicae Curae

Promulgated September 18, 1896 by Pope Leo XIII

In Perpetual Remembrance

1. We have dedicated to the welfare of the noble English nation no small portion of the Apostolic care and charity by which, helped by His grace, we endeavor to fulfill the office and follow in the footsteps of "the Great Pastor of the sheep," Our Lord Jesus Christ. The letter which last year we sent to the English seeking the Kingdom of Christ in the unity of the faith is a special witness of our good will towards England. In it we recalled the memory of the ancient union of the people with Mother Church, and we strove to hasten the day of a happy reconciliation by stirring up men's hearts to offer diligent prayer to God. And, again, more recently, when it seemed good to Us to treat more fully the unity of the Church in a General Letter, England had not the last place in our mind, in the hope that our teaching might both strengthen Catholics and bring the saving light to those divided from us. It is pleasing to acknowledge the generous way in which our zeal and plainness of speech, inspired by no mere human motives, have met the approval of the English people, and this testifies not less to their courtesy than to the solicitude of many for their eternal salvation.

2. With the same mind and intention, we have now determined to turn our consideration to a matter of no less importance, which is closely connected with the same subject and with our desires.

3. For an opinion already prevalent, confirmed more than once by the action and constant practice of the Church, maintained that when in England, shortly after it was rent from the center of Christian Unity, a new rite for conferring Holy Orders was publicly introduced under Edward VI, the true Sacrament of Order as instituted by Christ lapsed, and with it the hierarchical succession. For some time, however, and in these last years especially, a controversy has sprung up as to whether the Sacred Orders conferred according to the Edwardine Ordinal possessed the nature and effect of a Sacrament, those in favor of the absolute validity, or of a doubtful validity, being not only certain Anglican writers, but some few Catholics, chiefly non-English. The consideration of the excellency of the Christian priesthood moved Anglican writers in this matter, desirous as they were that their own people should not lack the twofold power over the Body of Christ. Catholic writers were impelled by a wish to smooth the way for the return of Anglicans to holy unity. Both, indeed, thought that in view of studies brought up to the level of recent research, and of new documents rescued from oblivion, it was not inopportune to reexamine the question by our authority.

4. And we, not disregarding such desires and opinions, above all, obeying the dictates of apostolic charity, have considered that nothing should be left untried that might in any way tend to preserve souls from injury or procure their advantage. It has, therefore, pleased Us to graciously permit the cause to be reexamined, so that, through the extreme care taken in the new examination, all doubt, or even shadow of doubt, should be removed for the future.

5. To this end we commissioned a certain number of men noted for their learning and ability, whose opinions in this matter were known to be divergent, to state the grounds of their judgment in writing. We then, having summoned them to our person, directed them to interchange writings, and further to investigate and discuss all that was necessary for a full knowledge of the matter. We were careful, also, that they should be able to reexamine all documents bearing on this question which were known to exist in the Vatican archives, to search for new ones, and even to have at their disposal all acts relating to this subject which are preserved by the Holy Office or, as it is called, the Supreme Council and to consider whatever had up to this time been adduced by learned men on both sides. We ordered them, when prepared in this way, to meet together in special sessions. These to the number of twelve were held under the presidency of one of the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, appointed by ourself, and all were invited to free discussion. Finally, we directed that the acts of these meetings, together with all other documents, should be submitted to our venerable brethren, the Cardinals of the same Council, so that when all had studied the whole subject, and discussed it in our presence, each might give his own opinion.

6. This order for discussing the matter having been determined upon, it was necessary, with a view to forming a true estimate of the real state of the question, to enter upon it, after careful inquiry as to how the matter stood in relation to the prescription and settled custom of the Apostolic See, the origin and force of which custom it was undoubtedly of great importance to determine.

7. For this reason, in the first place, the principal documents in which our predecessors, at the request of Queen Mary, exercised their special care for the reconciliation of the English Church were considered. Thus Julius III sent Cardinal Reginald Pole, an Englishman, and illustrious in many ways, to be his Legate a latere for the purpose, "as his angel of peace and love," and gave him extraordinary and unusual mandates or faculties and directions for his guidance. These Paul IV confirmed and explained.

8. And here, to interpret rightly the force of these documents, it is necessary to lay it down as a fundamental principle that they were certainly not intended to deal with an abstract state of things, but with a specific and concrete issue. For since the faculties given by these pontiffs to the Apostolic Legate had reference to England only, and to the state of religion therein, and since the rules of action were laid down by them at the request of the said Legate, they could not have been mere directions for determining the necessary conditions for the validity of ordinations in general. They must pertain directly to providing for Holy Orders in the said kingdom, as the recognized condition of the circumstances and times demanded. This, besides being clear from the nature and form of the said documents, is also obvious from the fact that it would have been altogether irrelevant thus to instruct the Legate one whose learning had been conspicuous in the Council of Trent as to the conditions necessary for the bestowal of the Sacrament of Order.

9. To all rightly estimating these matters it will not be difficult to understand why, in the Letters of Julius m, issued to the Apostolic Legate on 8 March 1554, there is a distinct mention, first of those who, "rightly and lawfully promoted," might be maintained in their orders: and then of others who, "not promoted to Holy Orders" might "be promoted if they were found to be worthy and fitting subjects". For it is clearly and definitely noted, as indeed was the case, that there were two classes of men; the first of those who had really received Holy Orders, either before the secession of Henry VIII, or, if after it, and by ministers infected by error and schism, still according to the accustomed Catholic rite; the second, those who were initiated according to the Edwardine Ordinal, who on that account could not be "promoted", since they had received an ordination which was null.

10. And that the mind of the Pope was this, and nothing else, is clearly confirmed by the letter of the said Legate (29 January 1555), sub-delegating his faculties to the Bishop of Norwich. Moreover, what the letters of Julius m themselves say about freely using the pontifical faculties, even on behalf of those who had received their consecration "irregularly (minus rite) and not according to the accustomed form of the Church," is to be especially noted. By this expression those only could be meant who had been consecrated according to the Edwardine rite, since besides it and the Catholic form there was then no other in England.

11. This becomes even still clearer when we consider the Legation which, on the advice of Cardinal Pole, the Sovereign Princes, Philip and Mary, sent to the Pope in Rome in the month of February, 1555. The Royal Ambassadors three men "most illustrious and endowed with every virtue," of whom one was Thomas Thirlby, Bishop of Ely were charged to inform the Pope more fully as to the religious condition of the country, and especially to beg that he would ratify and confirm what the Legate had been at pains to effect, and had succeeded in effecting, towards the reconciliation of the Kingdom with the Church. For this purpose, all the necessary written evidence and the pertinent parts of the new Ordinal were submitted to the Pope. The Legation having been splendidly received, and their evidence having been "diligently discussed," by several of the Cardinals, "after mature deliberation," Paul IV issued his Bull Praeclara Charissimi on June 20 of that same year. In this, whilst giving full force and approbation to what Pole had done, it is ordered in the matter of the Ordinations as follows:

Those who have been promoted to ecclesiastical Orders . . . by any one but a Bishop validly and lawfully ordained are bound to receive those Orders again.

12. But who those Bishops not "validly and lawfully ordained" were had been made sufficiently clear by the foregoing documents and the faculties used in the said matter by the Legate; those, namely, who have been promoted to the Episcopate, as others to other Orders, "not according to the accustomed form of the Church," or, as the Legate himself wrote to the Bishop of Norwich, "the form and intention of the Church," not having been observed. These were certainly those promoted according to the new form of rite, to the examination of which the Cardinals specially deputed had given their careful attention. Neither should the passage much to the point in the same Pontifical Letter be overlooked, where, together with others needing dispensation are enumerated those "who had obtained both Orders as well as benefices nulliter et de facto." For to obtain orders nulliter means the same as by act null and void, that is invalid, as the very meaning of the word and as common parlance require. This is specially clear when the word is used in the same way about Orders as about "ecclesiastical benefices". These, by the undoubted teaching of the sacred canons, were clearly null if given with any vitiating defect. 13 Moreover, when some doubted as to who, according to the mind of the pontiff, could be called and considered bishops "validly and lawfully ordained," the said Pope shortly after, on October 30, issued a further letter in the form of a brief and said:

"we, desiring to wholly remove such doubt, and to opportunely provide for the peace of conscience of those who during the aforementioned schism were promoted to Holy Orders, by clearly stating the meaning and intention which we had in our said letters, declare that it is only those bishops and archbishops who were not ordained and consecrated in the form of the Church that can not be said to be duly and rightly ordained..."

14. Unless this declaration had applied to the actual case in England, that is to say, to the Edwardine Ordinal, the Pope would certainly have done nothing by this last letter for the removal of doubt and the restoration of peace of conscience. Further, it was in this sense that the Legate understood the documents and commands of the Apostolic See, and duly and conscientiously obeyed them; and the same was done by Queen Mary and the rest who helped to restore Catholicism to its former state.

15. The authority of Julius m, and of Paul IV, which we have quoted, clearly shows the origin of that practice which has been observed without interruption for more than three centuries, that Ordinations conferred according to the Edwardine rite should be considered null and void. This practice is fully proved by the numerous cases of absolute re-ordination according to the Catholic rite even in Rome.

16. In the observance of this practice we have a proof directly affecting the matter in hand. For if by any chance doubt should remain as to the true sense in which these pontifical documents are to be understood, the principle holds good that "Custom is the best interpreter of law." Since in the Church it has ever been a constant and established rule that it is sacrilegious to repeat the Sacrarnent of Order, it never could have come to pass that the Apostolic See should have silently acquiesced in and tolerated such a custom. But not only did the Apostolic See tolerate this practice, but approved and sanctioned it as often as any particular case arose which called for its judgment in the matter.

17. We adduce two cases of this kind out of many which have from time to time been submitted to the Supreme Council of the Holy Office. The first was (in 1684) of a certain French Calvinist, and the other (in 1704) of John Clement Gordon, both of whom had received their orders according to the Edwardine ritual.

18. In the first case, after a searching investigation, the Consultors, not a few in number, gave in writing their answers or as they call it, their vota and the rest unanimously agreed with their conclusion, "for the invalidity of the Ordination," and only on account of reasons of opportuneness did the Cardinals deem it well to answer with a dilata (viz., not to formulate the conclusion at the moment).

19. The same documents were called into use and considered again in the examination of the second case, and additional written statements of opinion were also obtained from Consultors, and the most eminent doctors of the Sorbonne and of Douai were likewise asked for their opinion. No safeguard which wisdom and prudence could suggest to ensure the thorough sifting of the question was neglected.

20. And here it is important to observe that, although Gordon himself, whose case it was, and some of the Consultors, had adduced amongst the reasons which went to prove the invalidity, the Ordination of Parker, according to their own ideas about it, in the delivery of the decision this reason was altogether set aside, as documents of incontestable authenticity prove. Nor, in pronouncing the decision, was weight given to any other reason than the "defect of form and intention"; and in order that the judgment concerning this form might be more certain and complete, precaution was taken that a copy of the Anglican Ordinal should be submitted to examination, and that with it should be collated the ordination forms gathered together from the various Eastern and Western rites. Then Clement XI himself, with the unanimous vote of the Cardinals concerned, on Thursday 17 April 1704, decreed:

"John Clement Gordon shall be ordained from the beginning and unconditionally to all the orders, even Holy Orders, and chiefly of Priesthood, and in case he has not been confirmed, he shall first receive the Sacrament of Confirmation."

21. It is important to bear in mind that this judgment was in no wise determined by the omission of the tradition of instruments, for in such a case, according to the established custom, the direction would have been to repeat the ordination conditionally, and still more important is it to note that the judgment of the pontiff applies universally to all Anglican ordinations, because, although it refers to a particular case, it is not based upon any reason special to that case, but upon the defect of form, which defect equally affects all these ordinations, so much so, that when similar cases subsequently came up for decision, the same decree of Clement XI was quoted as the norm.

22. Hence it must be clear to everyone that the controversy lately revived had already been definitely settled by the Apostolic See, and that it is to the insufficient knowledge of these documents that we must, perhaps, attribute the fact that any Catholic writer should have considered it still an open question.

23. But, as we stated at the beginning, there is nothing we so deeply and ardently desire as to be of help to men of good will by showing them the greatest consideration and charity. Wherefore, we ordered that the Anglican Ordinal, which is the essential point of the whole matter, should be once more most carefully examined.

24. In the examination of any rite for the effecting and administering of Sacraments, distinction is rightly made between the part which is ceremonial and that which is essential, the latter being usually called the "matter and form". All know that the Sacraments of the New Law, as sensible and efficient signs of invisible grace, ought both to signify the grace which they effect, and effect the grace which they signify. Although the signification ought to be found in the whole essential rite, that is to say, in the "matter and form", it still pertains chiefly to the "form"; since the "matter" is the part which is not determined by itself, but which is determined by the "form". And this appears still more clearly in the Sacrament of Order, the "matter" of which, in so far as we have to consider it in this case, is the imposition of hands, which, indeed, by itself signifies nothing definite, and is equally used for several Orders and for Confiirmation.

25. But the words which until recently were commonly held by Anglicans to constitute the proper form of priestly ordination namely, "Receive the Holy Ghost," certainly do not in the least definitely express the sacred Ordel of Priesthood (sacerdotium) or its grace and power, which is chiefly the power "of consecrating and of offering the true Body and Blood of the Lord" (Council of Trent, Sess. XXIII, de Sacr. Ord. , Canon 1) in that sacrifice which is no "bare commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the Cross" (Ibid, Sess XXII., de Sacrif. Missae, Canon 3).

26. This form had, indeed, afterwards added to it the words "for the office and work of a priest," etc.; but this rather shows that the Anglicans themselves perceived that the first form was defective and inadequate. But even if this addition could give to the form its due signification, it was introduced too late, as a century had already elapsed since the adoption of the Edwardine Ordinal, for, as the Hierarchy had become extinct, there remained no power of ordaining.

27. In vain has help been recently sought for the plea of the validity of Anglican Orders from the other prayers of the same Ordinal. For, to put aside other reasons when show this to be insufficient for the purpose in the Anglican life, let this argument suffice for all. From them has been deliberately removed whatever sets forth the dignity and office of the priesthood in the Catholic rite. That "form" consequently cannot be considered apt or sufficient for the Sacrament which omits what it ought essentially to signify.

28. The same holds good of episcopal consecration. For to the formula, "Receive the Holy Ghost", not only were the words "for the office and work of a bishop", etc. added at a later period, but even these, as we shall presently state, must be understood in a sense different to that which they bear in the Catholic rite. Nor is anything gained by quoting the prayer of the preface, "Almighty God", since it, in like manner, has been stripped of the words which denote the summum sacerdotium .

29. It is not relevant to examine here whether the episcopate be a completion of the priesthood, or an order distinct from it; or whether, when bestowed, as they say per saltum , on one who is not a priest, it has or has not its effect. But the episcopate undoubtedly, by the institution of Christ, most truly belongs to the Sacrament of Order and constitutes the sacerdotium in the highest degree, namely, that which by the teaching of the Holy Fathers and our liturgical customs is called the Summum sacerdotium sacri ministerii summa . So it comes to pass that, as the Sacrament of Order and the true sacerdotium of Christ were utterly eliminated from the Anglican rite, and hence the sacerdotium is in no wise conferred truly and validly in the episcopal consecration of the same rite, for the like reason, therefore, the episcopate can in no wise be truly and validly conferred by it, and this the more so because among the first duties of the episcopate is that of ordaining ministers for the Holy Eucharist and sacrifice.

30. For the full and accurate understanding of the Anglican Ordinal, besides what we have noted as to some of its parts, there is nothing more pertinent than to consider carefully the circumstances under which it was composed and publicly authorized. It would be tedious to enter into details, nor is it necessary to do so, as the history of that time is sufficiently eloquent as to the animus of the authors of the Ordinal against the Catholic Church; as to the abettors whom they associated with themselves from the heterodox sects; and as to the end they had in view. Being fully cognizant of the necessary connection between faith and worship, between "the law of believing and the law of praying", under a pretext of returning to the primitive form, they corrupted the Liturgical Order in many ways to suit the errors of the reformers. For this reason, in the whole Ordinal not only is there no clear mention of the sacrifice, of consecration, of the priesthood (sacerdotium), and of the power of consecrating and offering sacrifice but, as we have just stated, every trace of these things which had been in such prayers of the Catholic rite as they had not entirely rejected, was deliberately removed and struck out.

31. In this way, the native character or spirit as it is called of the Ordinal clearly manifests itself. Hence, if, vitiated in its origin, it was wholly insufficient to confer Orders, it was impossible that, in the course of time, it would become sufficient, since no change had taken place. In vain those who, from the time of Charles I, have attempted to hold some kind of sacrifice or of priesthood, have made additions to the Ordinal. In vain also has been the contention of that small section of the Anglican body formed in recent times that the said Ordinal can be understood and interpreted in a sound and orthodox sense. Such efforts, we affirm, have been, and are, made in vain, and for this reason, that any words in the Anglican Ordinal, as it now is, which lend themselves to ambiguity, cannot be taken in the same sense as they possess in the Catholic rite. For once a new rite has been initiated in which, as we have seen, the Sacrament of Order is adulterated or denied, and from which all idea of consecration and sacrifice has been rejected, the formula, "Receive the Holy Ghost", no longer holds good, because the Spirit is infused into the soul with the grace of the Sacrament, and so the words "for the office and work of a priest or bishop", and the like no longer hold good, but remain as words without the reality which Christ instituted.

32. Many of the more shrewd Anglican interpreters of the Ordinal have perceived the force of this argument, and they openly urge it against those who take the Ordinal in a new sense, and vainly attach to the Orders conferred thereby a value and efficacy which they do not possess. By this same argument is refuted the contention of those who think that the prayer, "Almighty God, giver of all good Things", which is found at the beginning of the ritual action, might suffice as a legitimate "form" of Orders, even in the hypothesis that it might be held to be sufficient in a Catholic rite approved by the Church.

33. With this inherent defect of "form" is joined the defect of "intention" which is equally essential to the Sacrament. The Church does not judge about the mind and intention, in so far as it is something by its nature internal; but in so far as it is manifested externally she is bound to judge concerning it. A person who has correctly and seriously used the requisite matter and form to effect and confer a sacrament is presumed for that very reason to have intended to do (intendisse) what the Church does. On this principle rests the doctrine that a Sacrament is truly conferred by the ministry of one who is a heretic or unbaptized, provided the Catholic rite be employed. On the other hand, if the rite be changed, with the manifest intention of introducing another rite not approved by the Church and of rejecting what the Church does, and what, by the institution of Christ, belongs to the nature of the Sacrament, then it is clear that not only is the necessary intention wanting to the Sacrament, but that the intention is adverse to and destructive of the Sacrament.

34. All these matters have been long and carefully considered by ourselves and by our venerable brethren, the Judges of the Supreme Council, of whom it has pleased Us to call a special meeting upon the 16th day of July last, the solemnity of Our Lady of Mount Carmel. They with one accord agreed that the question laid before them had been already adjudicated upon with full knowledge of the Apostolic See, and that this renewed discussion and examination of the issues had only served to bring out more clearly the wisdom and accuracy with which that decision had been made. Nevertheless, we deemed it well to postpone a decision in order to afford time both to consider whether it would be fitting or expedient that we should make a fresh authoritative declaration upon the matter, and to humbly pray for a fuller measure of divine guidance.

35. Then, considering that this matter, although already decided, had been by certain persons for whatever reason recalled into discussion, and that thence it might follow that a pernicious error would be fostered in the minds of many who might suppose that they possessed the Sacrament and effects of Orders, where these are nowise to be found, it seemed good to Us in the Lord to pronounce our judgment.

36. Wherefore, strictly adhering, in this matter, to the decrees of the pontiffs, our predecessors, and confirming them most fully, and, as it were, renewing them by our authority, of our own initiative and certain knowledge, we pronounce and declare that ordinations carried out according to the Anglican rite have been, and are, absolutely null and utterly void.

37. It remains for Us to say that, even as we have entered upon the elucidation of this grave question in the name and in the love of the Great Shepherd, in the same we appeal to those who desire and seek with a sincere heart the possession of a hierarchy and of Holy Orders. 38. Perhaps until now aiming at the greater perfection of Christian virtue, and searching more devoutly the divine Scriptures, and redoubling the fervor of their prayers, they have, nevertheless, hesitated in doubt and anxiety to follow the voice of Christ, which so long has interiorly admonished them. Now they see clearly whither He in His goodness invites them and wills them to come. In returning to His one only fold, they will obtain the blessings which they seek, and the consequent helps to salvation, of which He has made the Church the dispenser, and, as it were, the constant guardian and promoter of His redemption amongst the nations. Then, indeed, "They shall draw waters in joy from the fountains of the Savior", His wondrous Sacraments, whereby His faithful souls have their sins truly remitted, and are restored to the friendship of God, are nourished and strengthened by the heavenly Bread, and abound with the most powerful aids for their eternal salvation. May the God of peace, the God of all consolation, in His infinite tenderness, enrich and fill with all these blessings those who truly yearn for them.

39. We wish to direct our exhortation and our desires in a special way to those who are ministers of religion in their respective communities. They are men who from their very office take precedence in learning and authority, and who have at heart the glory of God and the salvation of souls. Let them be the first in joyfully submitting to the divine call and obey it, and furnish a glorious example to others. Assuredly, with an exceeding great joy, their Mother, the Church, will welcome them, and will cherish with all her love and care those whom the strength of their generous souls has, amidst many trials and difficulties, led back to her bosom. Nor could words express the recognition which this devoted courage will win for them from the assemblies of the brethren throughout the Catholic world, or what hope or confidence it will merit for them before Christ as their Judge, or what reward it will obtain from Him in the heavenly kingdom! And we, ourselves, in every lawful way, shall continue to promote their reconciliation with the Church in which individuals and masses, as we ardently desire, may find so much for their imitation. In the meantime, by the tender mercy of the Lord our God, we ask and beseech all to strive faithfully to follow in the path of divine grace and truth.

40. We decree that these letters and all things contained therein shall not be liable at any time to be impugned or objected to by reason of fault or any other defect whatsoever of subreption or obreption of our intention, but are and shall be always valid and in force and shall be inviolably observed both juridically and otherwise, by all of whatsoever degree and preeminence, declaring null and void anything which, in these matters, may happen to be contrariwise attempted, whether wittingly or unwittingly, by any person whatsoever, by whatsoever authority or pretext, all things to the contrary notwithstanding.

41. We will that there shall be given to copies of these letters, even printed, provided that they be signed by a notary and sealed by a person constituted in ecclesiastical dignity, the same credence that would be given to the expression of our will by the showing of these presents.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, in the year of the Incarnation of Our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-six, on the Ides of September, in the nineteenth year of our pontificate.

-- Leo PP. XIII

http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Leo13/l13curae.htm

How we got the New Testament

When we ask, “How we got the NT,” we are actually asking several different questions. One question is how did the books of the NT originate? How are they related to each other? Why these 27 books? Why not fewer books, or more books, or different books?

That question has reference to the original production of the NT canon. Who are the NT writers, and how are they related to each other?

Then there’s the historical question of how early Christians came to recognize the NT canon. That is also an evidentiary question. Where we’re consulting very early Christian writers, or somewhat later Christian writers who incorporate the testimony of very early Christian writers, that may shed valuable light on the first question. It’s a form of corroborative evidence. It helps to identify the writers of the NT.

Mind you, there is internal evidence as well as external evidence to on matters of dating, authorship, and so on.

Finally, there’s the retrospective question of how Christians at a later date should recognize the NT canon. Do we evaluate the tradition or traditions which have come down to us? Or do we simply rubberstamp the result?

This is obviously a question that Protestants must ask themselves since we believe in the necessity of sifting tradition. Questioning received answers.

But it’s also a question that Catholics have to confront. For example, the Tridentine Fathers debated the scope of the canon. And modern Catholic Bible scholars ask the same questions as their Protestant counterparts.

From a Protestant perspective, the first question is the primary question. Answering the second question helps us to answer the first question, although that’s not our only source of information.

If you read Bart Ehrman or the average Catholic epologist, you’d think the process went something like this: a lot of indistinguishable Christian literature was written in the first phase of the Christian church. Later Christians then had to do some sorting. They started with this bit, random pile of books. They tossed out some books, and the remainder became the canon.

But this set of books is arbitrary. If Christians did their own sorting, without the church authorities breathing down their necks, they’d come up with a different canon of books.

However, this approach to the NT canon fails to connect the NT canon with NT history. The history of the NT canon parallels the history of the NT church. A detailed argument is presented by Earle Ellis in The Making of the New Testament Documents (Brill 2002). And his conclusions are reaffirmed by Paul Barnett in Finding the Historical Christ (Erdmans 2009). For now I’m going to summarize their conclusions.

Is there a unifying principle to the NT? On traditional authorship, we can group some of the NT books based on common authorship. Likewise, many NT books were penned by apostles. But five books were not. How do the non-apostolic writers (and writings) related to the apostolic writers (and writings)? And how does a writing by one apostle relate to a writing by another? Is there any coordination?

As Ellis has detailed, the NT is not a random anthology of unrelated books. Rather, it falls into four blocks of interrelated material.

The NT church was a missionary church. It had four missionary teams with four team leaders: Peter, Paul, James, and John.

(By “James” I mean James the Just, brother of Christ, and not the Apostle James.)

The above statement needs to be slightly qualified. On the one hand, John was an itinerate evangelist, but we don’t have any NT evidence of a Johannine missionary team. On the other hand, we have a Jacobean missionary team, but James may have merely overseen their efforts rather than functioning as an itinerate evangelist in his own right.

They divided up the mission field in the far-flung Roman Empire. There was some overlap between one mission field and another. And they were at liberty to shift their base of operations.

The NT literature is missionary literature, targeting different demographic groups. For example, the Gospel of Matthew and Letter of James are directed at Jews and Jewish Christians.

There are natural alliances as well. For example, Jude is the younger brother of James.

On this analysis, Mark is a member of the Petrine circle, Matthew and Jude are members of the Jacobean circle, while Luke and the author of Hebrews of the Pauline circle.

Each missionary team has a Gospel–as well as correspondence. To evangelize and disciple the lost, church-planters needed Christian literature–especially literature attuned to the particular needs of the demographic niche they were targeting.

On this analysis, we can correlate the NT documents as follows:

Petrine Mission

Gospel of Mark
1-2 Peter

Pauline Mission

Gospel of Luke
Book of Acts
Romans-Philemon
Hebrews

Johannine Mission

Gospel of John
1-3 John
Revelation

Jacobean Mission

Gospel of Matthew
Letter of James
Letter of Jude

The Catholic conundrum

James Swan did a recent post entitled “Catholics Need Catholic Answers, But Will Settle for Protestant Answers.”

Among other things, he said “One would think, the alleged ‘true’ church would have her top scholars working on such a project, or perhaps the Pope could say something infallible to help out. If Rome has done a detailed response to Ehrman, I'm not aware of it. However, what I found interesting was the authorities listed in the thread for a response to Ehrman were Protestant. It is ironic that the only authorities suggested on Catholic Answers were Protestant.”

http://www.aomin.org/aoblog/index.php?itemid=3271

I’d like to add a couple of supplementary observations:

1.One reason that Catholics have to default to Evangelical scholarship on issues like this is that while Catholic apologists are generally quite conservative, Catholic Bible scholars are generally quite liberal. And, of course, that's sanctioned by the Magisterium.

2.But there’s another reason that goes to an even deeper dilemma. Erhman’s argument against the NT canon is structurally parallel to the Catholic argument for the NT canon. It’s as if the Catholic apologist occupies one universe while his alter-ego occupies a parallel universe.

Ehrman contends that the NT canon represents an arbitrary anthology of Christian writings. The books of the NT canon are not inherently or exclusively canonical. Rather, some books were included which could just as well have been excluded, while other books were excluded which could just as well have been included. It was the Catholic authorities who imposed this miscellaneous collection on Christendom. Absent the Catholic authorities, this is not the canon which Christians, if left to their own devices, would come up with all by themselves.

Now, if you think about it, it would be nearly impossible for a Catholic apologist to critique this representation. For that’s exactly how Catholic apologists argue for the canon. Put another way, that’s exactly how Catholic apologists attack the basis of the Protestant canon.

A Catholic apologist would therefore find it very hard to distinguish his own argument from Ehrman’s argument. Find it very hard to refute Ehrman’s argument without refuting his own argument.

So it’s safer to say nothing at all. A Catholic apologist can only win the argument with Ehrman by losing the argument with Catholicism. When faced with a conundrum like that, silence is the only option.

Neotheism and anthropomorphism

Traditionally, Christian theologians regard certain Biblical descriptions of God as anthropomorphic. Neotheism (or open theism) treats this appeal as special pleading–at least when it’s applied to neotheistic prooftexts.

Now it’s true that a philosophical theologian can begin with an essentially philosophical model of God, and then reinterpret Biblical descriptions accordingly. However, the identification of anthropomorphic usage in Scripture is by no means the result of superimposing an extrascriptural view of God onto Scripture. To the contrary, anthropomorphic usage is an idiomatic feature of Scriptural usage. So this is not a category which is generated by the relation between Scripture and extrascriptural concerns. While that’s a possible source of anthropomorphic interpretations, the operating category is intrinsic to Scriptural usage–as I’ll be documenting shortly.

Moreover, anthropomorphic language isn’t limited to God-talk. Furthermore, anthropomorphic language isn’t restricted to the ascription of human properties to superhuman or subhuman entities. In reference to God-talk, anthropomorphic language is just a special case of a universal phenomenon. So, once again, it’s not as if this was concocted by theologians to save appearances.

Anthropomorphic usage is a special type of metaphorical usage, which is–in turn–a special type of analogical usage. In every analogy there is an element of disanalogy. An analogy is a controlled comparison. The trick is to isolate the analogous element from the incidental features which accompany the picturesque metaphor.

In picture language, you have to draw a picture: otherwise, it wouldn’t be picture language. Hang together. Form a coherent image. But that doesn’t mean every picturesque detail is significant.

The anthropomorphic depictions of God in Scripture are meaningful. But we must take care in how we pinpoint the meaning. It we made no allowance for anthropomorphic usage, the God of Scripture would be a metamorphic being–by turns humanoid, bestial, or inanimate. Not only does that go far beyond orthodox theism, but far beyond open theism or even Mormonism.

Open theism arbitrarily demarcates the literal from the anthropomorphic. If anything, open theism is guilty of special pleading.

To illustrate my points, I’ll quote some passages from a classic treatment of anthropomorphic usage in Scripture.

“But in a broader sense anthropomorphism is commonly used to cover any attribution of human characteristics to that which is not human…Problems of theological language look very different as soon as we recognize that anthropomorphism is not confined to religion,” G. B. Caird, The Language and Imagery of Scripture (Eerdmans 1996), 172.

“In all languages a considerable portion of the word stock of daily speech is supplied by the metaphorical usage of words which literally connote parts of the human body: the eye of the needle, a tongue of land, the mouth of a river, the neck of a bottle, the shoulder of a road, the belly of a ship, the foot of a mountain,” ibid. 172-73.

“Such idiomatic phrases occur also in Hebrew and Greek, but with variations: where we say ‘face of the land,’ Hebrew says ‘eye of the land’ (Exod 10:5); where we say ‘tongue of land,’ Hebrew says ‘tongue of sea’ (Isa 11:15); and for ‘edge of the sword,’ Hebrew uses ‘mouth of the sword’ (Num 21:24),” ibid. 173n3.

“Only captious pedantry or childish humor will find it necessary to remark that the eye of a needle cannot see or a tongue of land speak. In fable, myth and strip cartoon animals are portrayed acting as though they were human beings (cf. Dan 8:3ff.; 2 Esdr. 11:1ff.; Rev 5:6ff.). By what might seem to be a converse process, the names of animals may be applied to a description of character to human beings–lion (2 Tim 4:17), fox (Lk 13:32), pig (2 Pet 2:22), snake (Gen 3:1; Mt 10:16); but, since the animals in question rarely possess the assumed qualities, this may be more plausibly understood as another example of the projection of human characteristics on to animals. The personification of the inanimate (e.g. Gen 37:9; Isa 10:15) and of the abstract (e.g. Wisd. 18:14ff.; Prov 8:1ff.) belong in this category, as does the personification of Nature [Ps 77:16; 96:11-12], commonly but misleadingly called ‘the pathetic fallacy’,” ibid 173.

“Thus anthropomorphism in all its variety is the commonest source of metaphor, and in it we can observe both the cognitive and the expressive aspects of language at work. The human body, senses and personality are the objects with which we have the most direct, first-hand acquaintance, and the cognitive principle of proceeding from the known to the unknown makes it natural for human beings to see the rest of the world in the light of that experience. But the continuing popularity of such usage is undoubtedly due to its vividness and the power of its appeal to the imagination,” ibid. 173-74.

“The same two principles govern the usage of anthropomorphic imagery in reference to God…The only choice open to us, therefore, is whether we derive our metaphors from the human realm or from the non-human, and it is important to note that the biblical writers use both kinds. There are frequent images drawn from inanimate nature. God is a sun (Ps 84:11; cf. Rev 1:16), his voice like a mighty torrent (Ezk 43:2; cf. Rev 1:16) or like thunder (Ps 29:3; cf. Rev 14:2), his spirit like the wind (Jn 3:8), his justice like the deep ocean (Ps 36:6)…He is a rock (Deut 32:15), a spring (Jer 2:13), a devouring fire (Deut 4:24). Somewhat less frequently we find animal imagery. God descends on Israel like a lion, panther, leopard or bear (Hos 5:14; 17:7-8; Lam 3:10), but also carries them on eagle’s wings (Exod 19:6) or protects them like nestlings (Ps 17:8; Lk 13:34),” ibid. 174.

“For all that, by far the greater proportion of the biblical language which refers to God is anthropomorphic. At the simplest level God is said to have head, face, eyes, eyelids, ears, nostrils, mouth, voice, arm, hand, palm, fingers, foot, heart, bosom, bowels…Here as always we must remember that vividness of expression is not the same as literality. There are explicit denials that God has a body of flesh (Isa 31:3), even though he is envisaged as having one,” ibid. 174-75.

“Far more important is the terminology of divine actions and attitudes, of which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to provide a complete catalogue. God sees and hears, speaks and answers, calls and whistles, punishes and rewards, wounds and heals, opposes and supports, fights, preserves and rescues, guides and guards, makes and unmakes, plans and fulfills, appoints and sends. He displays love, pity, patience, generosity, justice, mercy, jealousy, anger, regret, hatred, pleasure and score. He is potter, builder, farmer, shepherd, hero, warrior, doctor, judge, king, husband and father. Whatever may have been the case with their hearers or readers, the biblical writers at least were alert to the possible abuses of such language and at pains to guard against them. God is not like mankind, subject to vacillation and weakness (1 Sam 15:29; Isa 55:8; Hos 11:9; Mal 3:6),” ibid. 175.

Rage, rage against the dying light

As in time past we felt no distress when the advancing Punic hosts
were threatening Rome on every side, when the whole earth, rocked
by the terrifying tumult of war, shudderingly quaked beneath the
coasts of high heaven, while the entire human race was doubtful into
whose possession the sovereignty of the land and the sea was
destined to fall; so, when we are no more, when body and soul, upon
whose union our being depends, are divorced, you may be sure that
nothing at all will have the power to affect us or awaken sensation in
us, who shall not then exist—not even if the earth be confounded
with the sea, and the sea with the sky.

Life is granted to no one for permanent ownership, to all on lease.
Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that
elapsed before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in
which nature shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see
anything fearful in it? Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not
appear more peaceful than the deepest sleep?

–Lucretius

This is the standard secular argument against the fear of death. We run across popular variations on this theme in modern atheistic literature. What are we to make of this claim?

1.Some unbelievers taunt Christians who fear death or avoid premature death. They point out that when Christians are diagnosed with cancer (to take one example), the Christian will seek medical care rather than resign himself to death by cancer. Yet Christians are supposed to believe in heaven. Isn’t heaven better than anything we have on earth?

Therefore, when the turf meets the surf, Christians don’t really believe in heaven. So goes the argument.

I’ve addressed this allegation before, so I won’t repeat myself here. For now I wish to make a different point:

When the average unbeliever is diagnosed with cancer, he also seeks medical care. Yet, according to Lucretius, an atheist has nothing to fear from death.

If, therefore, the Christian response to a life-threatening situation is inconsistent, so is the atheistic response to a life-threatening situation.

2.There are also a couple of flaws in the symmetry argument. To begin with, postmortem oblivion is significantly disanalogous to prenatal oblivion.

In the case of postmortem oblivion, death robs you of an experience you had. Life is a cumulative experience. A series of formative or memorable events. One thing builds on another.

But, according to physicalism, death washes all that away in a single wave.

So there’s a fundamental asymmetry between the two states.

In addition, what about prenatal oblivion? To be denied the opportunity to exist is not a trivial or inconsequential deprivation. It may not be the same thing as losing something you actually had, but it does entail the possible loss of a great good. And that’s a genuine deprivation.

Suppose my wife dies of cancer. That’s a loss to me, as well as to her. An actual loss.

But suppose I can’t marry the woman I love. That, too, is a great deprivation.

To the extent that both states are analogous, that parallel actually undercuts the argument of Lucretius.

3.Finally, I think it is possible for an unbeliever to view death as a relief. An unbeliever has a different view of death because he has a different view of life.

To a Christian, this world is a fallen world. It’s a mix of good and evil. But a better world awaits us.

To an atheist, by contrast, this world is all there is. It will never get any better. If it’s full of pain and suffering and disappointment, that’s just a fact of life. That’s the nature of things.

So an atheist may well get to the point where he finds life very tedious. It ceases to be fulfilling. Even if he’s had the best of what a fallen world can offer, what a fallen world can offer is ultimately unsatisfying. It palls.

A Christian can feel the same way, but from a different perspective.

Oblivion: thumbs up or thumbs down?

Roger Ebert recently posted something on his blog regarding his impending demise. In his post, his repairs to the standard secular bromide about how death is no big deal–even a relief–using an argument that’s been kicking around since the days of Lucretius.

What’s striking about this is not the banality or unoriginality of his argument. What’s striking, rather, is that in a movie review from a just few years before, he heaped scorn on precisely that superficial view of mortality and oblivion.

Oblivion: Thumbs Up!

I know it is coming, and I do not fear it, because I believe there is nothing on the other side of death to fear. I hope to be spared as much pain as possible on the approach path. I was perfectly content before I was born, and I think of death as the same state. What I am grateful for is the gift of intelligence, and for life, love, wonder, and laughter. You can't say it wasn't interesting. My lifetime's memories are what I have brought home from the trip. I will require them for eternity no more than that little souvenir of the Eiffel Tower I brought home from Paris.

But certainly, some readers have informed me, it is a tragic and dreary business to go into death without faith. I don't feel that way. "Faith" is neutral. All depends on what is believed in. I have no desire to live forever. The concept frightens me.

So within that reality, someday I will certainly die. I am 66, have had cancer, will die sooner than most of those reading this. That is in the nature of things.

What I expect will most probably happen is that my body will fail, my mind will cease to function, and that will be that.

I believe that if, at the end of it all, according to our abilities, we have done something to make others a little happier, and something to make ourselves a little happier, that is about the best we can do.

http://blogs.suntimes.com/ebert/2009/05/go_gently_into_that_good_night.html

Oblivion: Thumbs Down!

"Tuck Everlasting" is based on a novel well known to middle school students but not to me, about a romance between two teenagers, one of whom is 104. It contains a lesson: "Do not fear death--but rather the unlived life."

These are the Tucks. Mae and Angus, Mom and Dad, are played by Sissy Spacek and William Hurt. Years ago, they drank from the spring and have become immortal. "The spring stops you right where you are," Winnie is told, and that's why Jesse has been 17 for all these years.

The movie oozes with that kind of self-conscious piety that sometimes comes with the territory when award-winning young people's books are filmed ("Harry Potter" is an exception). The characters seem to lack ordinary human instincts and behave according to their archetypal requirements.

The movie is too impressed with its own solemn insights to work up much entertainment value; is too much fable to be convincing as life…Even its lesson is questionable. Is it better to live fully for a finite time than to be stuck in eternity? The injunction to live life fully need not come with a time limit. That's why the outcome of the romance is so unsatisfactory. I dare not reveal what happens, except to say that it need not happen, that the explanation for it is logically porous, and that many a young girl has sacrificed more for her love. Besides, just because you're 17 forever doesn't mean life loses all delight. You can get rid of that horse and carriage and buy a motorcycle.

http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20021011/REVIEWS/210110307/1023

The New Testament Canon And Church Authority

A commenter by the name of David wrote the following about my discussion of the New Testament canon in the church fathers:

You're basing this all off the writings of those whom later history would see as the true church or catholic church or whatever term you might want to use. Later history approved of these folks, so it preserved their writings and continued that lineage. If the writings of the non-"orthodox" church groups were taken into account, the view could be very different.

So you have to sit in the lap of a "catholic" church, in order to slap its face....

Origen and Tertullian were in the catholic church, which is the point. They are a witness to that tradition, and not any of the many other "Christian" groups that existed at the time.

And the lap he is sitting in, is the idea that there was one catholic church which was the ark of truth. If or where that ark may continue today is another separate question. But those fathers appealed to the practice of that church, over and above other "Christian" groups, as decisive in the Canon.

For Jason to then appeal to the unity of _only_ people in that one religious community, whose self-proclaimed foundation was apostolic succession, whilst denying that very foundation that gave them an objective differentiator from those other groups, is to do what I said: to sit in a catholic lap to slap a catholic face.

Now if you want to deny the existence of an apostolic succession through to today, then don't pretend to appeal to a consensus of fathers whose commonality was that very belief in one catholic church. You're going to have to instead throw in every weird heretical, gnostic, marcionite and whatever group into the mix.

Below is my response to David, for the sake of those who aren't following the original thread.

David,

Aside from the fact that you're making assertions that you don't even attempt to support, you're misrepresenting my position and you're raising objections we've addressed in previous threads.

In my last post in this series on the canon, which I've linked above, I cited the example of Donatist agreement with the twenty-seven-book canon. I haven't just appealed to the church fathers or those who are generally considered part of the mainstream of the ancient church. In other threads, I've discussed corroboration of the authorship, and thus by implication canonicity, of some of the New Testament books by various heretical and non-Christian individuals and groups. See, for example, here and the post here along with the other posts linked within it. I've often discussed corroboration of the New Testament canon from heretical and non-Christian sources, and I intend to discuss that issue again later in this series. I neither said nor suggested that this post you're responding to represents the entirety of my case for the New Testament canon.

You write:

"And the lap he is sitting in, is the idea that there was one catholic church which was the ark of truth."

Where did I say that I'm "sitting in that lap"? I appeal to the testimony of the fathers and other people you consider part of the "one catholic church" as one line of evidence among others. Even if we limit ourselves to those sources from what you call the "catholic church" for the moment, I don't accept their testimony just because they were part of a church that was "the ark of truth". Their participation in the church, which I don't define as you define it, has some relevance, but these sources are credible for other reasons as well. A person can be credible for more than one reason. A Christian of the second century, for example, can be credible to me because he's a Christian, but also because of other factors, such as when he lived, what sources he had access to, etc.

Steve's citation of Tertullian and Origen is correct, and your response to his comments needs to be argued, not just asserted. As a Montanist, Tertullian was a critic of what Roman Catholics and others would consider the catholic church of that day. Though Tertullian and Origen had some supporters among mainstream Christians, they also had some critics who sometimes referred to them as schismatics or heretics. For example, Jerome writes of Tertullian, "Of Tertullian I say no more than that he did not belong to the Church." (The Perpetual Virginity Of Mary, Against Helvidius, 19) Regarding Origen's treatment by some of his critics, I give some examples here. In light of your claim that "Later history approved of these folks, so it preserved their writings", you may want to take note of the comments, in that post I just linked, concerning the condemnation and destruction of Origen's writings.

Similar observations could be made about other fathers. Hippolytus wrote of a Roman bishop, Callistus, and those who followed him:

"The impostor Callistus, having ventured on such opinions, established a school of theology in antagonism to the Church, adopting the foregoing system of instruction. And he first invented the device of conniving with men in regard of their indulgence in sensual pleasures, saying that all had their sins forgiven by himself. For he who is in the habit of attending the congregation of any one else, and is called a Christian, should he commit any transgression; the sin, they say, is not reckoned unto him, provided only he hurries off and attaches himself to the school of Callistus. And many persons were gratified with his regulation, as being stricken in conscience, and at the same time having been rejected by numerous sects; while also some of them, in accordance with our condemnatory sentence, had been by us forcibly ejected from the Church....And withal, after such audacious acts, they, lost to all shame, attempt to call themselves a Catholic Church!" (The Refutation Of All Heresies, 9:7)

In that same section of the work cited above, Hippolytus tells us that Callistus used the analogy of Noah's ark that you're appealing to: "he affirmed that the ark of Noe was made for a symbol of the Church, in which were both dogs, and wolves, and ravens, and all things clean and unclean; and so he alleges that the case should stand in like manner with the Church" (The Refutation Of All Heresies, 9:7). He rejects Callistus' definition of how the church is like the ark. Men like Hippolytus and Callistus can agree that there's one church, and agree that the church is comparable to Noah's ark in some manner, for example, without considering each other part of the same church and without agreeing with every implication you're drawing from their ecclesiology.

For another example, read Cyprian's Letter 74 to see how much unity Firmilian thought he had with the Roman bishop Stephen.

It's possible to classify all of these men as Christians and as part of the same hierarchical church, but not by using their standards. And if you can accept some of their standards on such issues while rejecting other standards they held, why can't we do the same?

You tell us that Tertullian and Origen "are a witness to that tradition", the tradition of the catholic church as you define it. But they, and others, like Irenaeus, were also witnesses to the beliefs of other individuals and other groups. As Augustine refers to Donatist agreement with the mainstream New Testament canon, so also men like Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen refer to corroboration of various parts of the New Testament canon by heretics and non-Christians. The church fathers aren't just witnesses to mainstream church tradition. They're also witnesses to less popular opinions within the church and the beliefs of those outside the church. Even when they witness to mainstream church tradition, one doesn't have to agree with everything that church believed, or even consider himself part of that church, in order to accept that testimony as historical evidence. I can accept the testimony of Roman Catholic individuals regarding the authorship of a Roman Catholic document, such as a papal decree, without agreeing with all that Roman Catholicism teaches and without being a Roman Catholic myself. Must you be an atheist to accept the testimony of an atheist regarding a historical issue, such as who authored a particular document?

I've addressed apostolic succession and other issues pertaining to the identity of the ancient church elsewhere. You tell us that "those fathers appealed to the practice of that church, over and above other 'Christian' groups, as decisive in the Canon", but different fathers defined the church in different ways, the fathers cited other lines of evidence for the canon as well, and I haven't denied that the church has been involved in the canonical process.

Furthermore, it's not as though every source I've cited makes the appeal to the church that you're attributing to them. Rather, you're referring to what some patristic sources said about some of the evidence for the canon, and you're reading your definition of terms like "church" into what they said, in addition to assuming that they were correct and that I must agree with them on that issue in order to accept their testimony on another issue. If Origen makes a comment along the lines of what you're attributing to the fathers, why should I believe that he's defining the church as you define it, that other fathers, like Justin Martyr and Jerome, agreed with him, and that I must accept his assessment on that issue in order to accept his testimony on other issues related to the canon?

Many of the sources who give us evidence for the canon advocated some form of apostolic succession. But not all of them did. And those who did defined the concept of apostolic succession in a variety of ways. Not everybody who advocated some type of apostolic succession claimed that it was foundational in the manner you're claiming it is. Even if a given source did so, I can consider him credible on some matters without considering him credible about everything. We're all selective in what we do and don't believe in historical sources. Bart Ehrman can believe Clement of Rome's and Irenaeus' testimony about the Pauline authorship of 1 Corinthians without also accepting their beliefs about apostolic succession. Non-Christian scholars frequently accept the testimony of ancient Christians pertaining to issues relevant to the canon, as well as other issues, without agreeing with those sources about apostolic succession and other matters.

The secular solipsist

One of the oddities about modern atheism is the neglect of W. V. Quine. Quine was undoubtedly the most important secular philosopher of the 20C. By that I don’t mean the most important 20C philosopher who happened to be a secularist–as if secularism were incidental to his work. No, secularism was central to his work.

His entire philosophy is a research programme in atheism. A thoroughgoing attempt to secularize ontology and epistemology.

Even The Secular Web, which has a big online library of modern and historical atheists, has nothing on Quine. Why is that?

I can think of a couple of reasons. Quine doesn’t use specifically atheistic language. He doesn’t explicitly attack Christianity or theism. Unlike Russell or Mackie or Flew, his atheistic agenda is far more subtle. So subtle, indeed, that he’s invisible to the average atheist!

On a related note, he’s a dry, technical writer. He lacks the rhetorical zingers or picturesque parables that you get from secular popularizers. He lacks their hortatory, moralistic, inspirational style.

All of which goes to show how the average atheist is fundamentally anti-intellectual. They don’t read Quine because he’s boring. They’d rather be entertained. That’s why the clownish potboilers of Hitchens and Dawkins are bestsellers, while Quine gathers dust on numbered shelves of the college library.

However, if you want to see what a rigorously atheistic worldview looks like, read Quine. And if you do read Quine–especially late Quine, when he was putting the finishes touches on his philosophy–what do you find?

Ironically, Quine begins with hard science, which endeavors to reduce everything to a third-person description, only to end up with a highly internalized and ultimately projective viewpoint–where the input is the output. His epistemology is so circular and skeptical, while the resultant ontology is so subjective and attenuated, that his outlook is practically indistinguishable from solipsism.

“It would address the question of how we, physical denizens of the physical world, can have projected our scientific theory of that whole world from our meager contacts with it; from the mere impacts of rays and particles on our surfaces and a few odds and ends such as the strain of walking uphill,” From Stimulus to Science (Harvard 1999), ibid. 16.

“There is a puzzle here. Global stimuli are private: each is a temporally ordered set of some one individual’s receptors. Their perceptual similarity, in part innate and in part modeled by experience, is private as well. Whence then this coordination of behavior across the tribe?” ibid. 20.

“The sensory atomist was motivated, I say, by his appreciation that any information about the world is channeled to us through the sensory surfaces of our bodies; but this motivation remained obscure to him. It was obscured by his concern to justify our knowledge of the external world. The justification would be vitiated by circularity if sensory surfaces and external impacts on nerve endings had to be appealed to at the outset of the justification,” Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionist and Other Essays (Harvard 2008), 328.

“There is much clarity to be gained by dropping the project of justifying our knowledge of the external world but continuing to investigate the relation of that knowledge to its sensory evidence. Obscurity about the nature of the given, or epistemic priority, is then dissipated by talking frankly of the triggering of nerve endings. We then find ourselves engaged in an internal question within the framework of natural science. There are these impacts of molecules and light rays upon our sensory receptors, and there is all this output on our part of scientific discourse about sticks, stones, planets, numbers, molecules, light rays, and, indeed, sensory receptors; and then we pose the problem of linking that input causally and logically to that output,” ibid. 328.

“Much as I admire [David] Lewis’s reduction, however, it is not for me. My own line is a yet more sweeping structuralism, applying to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately. I base it, paradoxically as this may seem, on a naturalistic approach to epistemology. Natural science tells us that our ongoing cognitive access to the world around us is limited to meager channels. There is the triggering of our sensory receptors by the impact of molecules and light rays. Also there is the difference in muscular effort sensed in walking up or down hill. What more? Even the notion of a cat, let alone a class or number, is a human artifact, rooted in innate predisposition and cultural tradition. The very notion of an object at all, concrete or abstract, is a human contribution, a feature of our inherited apparatus for organizing the amorphous welter of neural input,” ibid. 402-03.

“The conclusion is that there can be no evidence for one ontology as over against another, so long anyway as we can express a one-to-one correlation between them. Save the structure and you save all. Certainly we are dependent on a familiar ontology of middle-sized bodies for the inception of reification, on the part both of the individual and of the race; but once we have an ontology, we can change it with impunity,” ibid. 405.

“This global ontological structuralism may seem abruptly at odds with realism, let alone naturalism. It would seem even to undermine the ground on which I rested it: my talk of impacts of light rays and molecules on nerve endings. Are these rays, molecules, and nerve endings themselves not disqualified now as mere figments of an empty structure?” ibid. 405.

“Naturalism itself is what saves the situation. Naturalism looks only to natural science, however, fallible, for an account of what there is and what what there is does. Science ventures its tentative answers in man-made concepts, perforce, couched in man-made language, but we can ask no better. The very notion of object, or of one and many, is indeed as parochially human as the parts of speech; to ask what reality is really like, however, apart from human categories, is self-stultifying. It is like asking how long the Nile really is, apart from parochial matters of miles or meters. Positivists were right in branding such metaphysics as meaningless,” ibid. 405.

“So far as evidence goes, then, our ontology is neutral. Nor let us imagine beyond it some inaccessible reality. The very terms ‘thing’ and ‘exist’ and ‘real,’ after all, make no sense apart from human conceptualization. Asking after the thing in itself apart from human conceptualization, is like asking how long the Nile really is, apart from our parochial miles or kilometers,” ibid. 416.

“So it seems best for present purposes to construe the subject’s stimulus on a given occasion simply as his global neural intake on that occasion. But I shall refer to it only as neural intake, not stimulus, for other notions of stimulus are wanted in other studies, particularly where different subjects are to get the same stimulus. Neural intake is private, for subjects do not share receptors,” ibid. 463-64.

“But in contrast to the privacy of neural intakes, and the privacy of their perceptual similarity, observation sentences and their semantics are a public matter, since the child has to learn these from her elders. Her learning then depends indeed both on the public currency of the observation sentences and on a preestablished harmony of people’s private scales of perceptual similarity,” ibid. 464.

“These reflections on ontology are a salutary reminder that the ultimate data of science are limited to our neural intake, and that the very notion of object, concrete or abstract, is of our own making, along with the rest of natural science and mathematics,” ibid. 471.