Saturday, March 22, 2008

Federal Revision

I was talking with a friend I have who is hip to the Federal Vision. He recently told me that Trent's statements on justification were basically what (the book of) James, John Calvin, and the Westminster Confession of Faith had said (he didn't mention Paul, though). Okay, so after this I thought, "It's time to change their name to The Federal Revision."

In this conversation, he also told me that he'd rather go home to Rome than to be a Baptist, and thus have "pagan" children. I'm not a Baptist, but I'd rather be one any day of the week over being a Federal Revisionist, a Roman Catholic, or an Eastern Orthoduck. But for my friend, since he's Federal Revision, he doesn't think he's giving up that much if he were to go to Rome. After all, when it comes to the gospel of justification by faith alone, Rome says what James, Calvin, and the Westminster Confession of Faith all say. He'd rather be a tad bit off on justification (because Trent has a few minor problems, nothing to worry about, though) than a tad bit off on the subjects of baptism (oh, but he's a paedocommunionist too, so Rome still treats his children as part-way pagan!).

The interesting thing to me, though, is how many of these Federal Revision guys react to natural law and natural theology. Now, I'm not trying to get into a debate on those particular issues (for further study see: Stephen J. Grabill's Rediscovering The Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics, Erdmans, 2006; as well as Michael Sudduth's forthcoming The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology). They treat those things as close to heresy. My friend said that he'd have no problem going Roman Catholic (over credo baptist), because there wasn't that big of an issue on justification. But, when I told him about my recent forays into the above two subjects (in becoming more congenial towards natural law, at least fitting it into an overall broader ethic, and in agreeing with M. Sudduth on many of his thoughts regarding Natural Theology--who other presuppositionalists have seen a value in incorporating some of the NT arguments to function in various ways, e.g., defeater-defeaters, for one), he and some of his like-minded friends seem to think I'm close to spouting heresy (at least they act this way; but I am being hyperbolic, I don't think they really think I would be embracing heresy, per se). "Don't drink the kool-aid, Paul", one of them told me.

So, why is it that (many) Federal Revisionists will fight almost to the death with Rome on the issue of Natural Law and Natural Theology, but they'll happily join hands with them and claim that they are not that far-off on the issue of justification? Seems odd to me. I don't know of any Reformer who spilled his blood over a precise view on ethics, or arguments for God's existence . . .

Distortions Of Matthew 27:52-53

I just watched James White's videotaped comments on his debate last night with Nadir Ahmed, a Muslim apologist. There are a lot of problems with Ahmed's argumentation, but I want to single out one of them to address here.

Ahmed brought up Matthew 27:52-53. Some of you may remember that when the atheist Richard Carrier recently had an opportunity to discuss the resurrection on a radio program with two Christians who specialize in the study of the resurrection (Gary Habermas and Michael Licona), he chose to ask about that passage in Matthew 27 as one of a few issues he wanted to focus on. I've seen other critics of Christianity cite the passage as well. It seems to be a popular objection.

There are some problems with this appeal to Matthew 27, though, as we've explained previously (here and here). Nadir Ahmed refers to the people who were raised as "zombies". Does anything in the text of Matthew 27 suggest that the people who were raised would look any different from other people? No. What significance does the use of a term like "zombie" have, then? Ahmed claims that the dead who had been raised were seen by non-Christians. Does Matthew 27 say that they were seen, and were recognized as people who had risen from the dead, by people who remained non-Christians afterward? No. He asks why other sources don't report the event, but do we have any reason to expect any particular source to report it? No. The idea that a non-Christian source would have a compelling desire to report such an event so favorable to Christianity is dubious and is an assumption I've never seen any critic justify. And other Christian sources had enough material to use from other contexts, such as the resurrection appearances of Christ, to not have any compelling reason to include the event of Matthew 27 in their own accounts. Matthew only gives the event a brief mention. It doesn't seem to have had much prominence even in his mind.

The skeptical appeal to Matthew 27 should be abandoned. It's a bad argument. It relies on dubious assumptions. Even if we were to accept the argument, it wouldn't do much to undermine the historicity of something like the empty tomb or the resurrection appearances, about which we have far more information.

Friday, March 21, 2008

Chained to falsehood

PLUKEVDH SAID:

“That may be so, but tell me why your voice is not among theirs voting against Obama if you feel so strongly? Why do you rather sit here an criticize while not exercising the decision-making power you have?”

You don’t know the first thing about my voting habits. For the record, I voted in the SC primary. I voted in the GOP primary. And I voted for Huckabee.

Try not to raise foolhardy objections.

“You focused only on the divisive statement, not the fact that Obama agreed that they were wrong.”

That’s because I’m allowed to distinguish between my priorities and Obama’s. Obama and his supporters like to impute erroneous motives to his critics, then knock down the straw man they’ve erected. I reserve the right to clarify my own objections.

“This statement is incredibly judgemental and self-righteous. Who are you to make judgement of Obama's faith in this way?”

i) And it’s incredibly judgmental and self-righteous of your to pronounce a value-judgment on my statement. Who are you to judge me in this way?

ii) The Bible enjoins Christian believers to be wary of false teachers. So that’s what gives me the right to be “judgmental.”

iii) Obama belongs to a theologically far left denomination. And his social policies are contrary to Biblical ethics. So, yes, I’m entitled to compare his profession of faith with the rule of faith, and find that he doesn’t measure up.

The burden of proof is on a putative believer to offer a credible profession of faith.

“What does that even mean?”

To take an example: If a woman allows herself to be impregnated by her boyfriend du jour, she’ll be a single mom—assuming she carries the pregnancy to term. That’s a recipe for financial hardship.

In addition, the father of the boy won’t be around to advise him and correct him. And if she’s the sole breadwinner, then she won’t be around to monitor him either. That’s a recipe for juvenile delinquency.

“You seem to be opposing all of Obama's statements, but not arguing and real ideas for change. This doesn't do anything but create anger and division while not doing anything to help the problems Obama is at least calling for change in. Maybe Obama won't do what he says, but maybe his voice for a need for change is better than yelling at those who are calling for change.”

i) Oh, I do have my own ideas for change. We should raise boys according to the Book of Proverbs.

We should take a cue from OT penology. Those who commit property crimes should make restitution to their victims. Career criminals or heinous offenders should be executed.

We should replace welfare with workfare. Men and women should marry before they have kids. We should lower the tax burden so that families can afford to support themselves. I could go down the list.

ii) Change for the sake of change is no improvement. In Obama’s case (as well as Billary’s), it would be a change for the worse.

“What does your church look like on Sunday morning? Predominantly white? Isn't the statement Obama made true?”

i) Like a lot of illogical people, you don’t know what it means to answer someone on his own grounds. Obama made an issue of segregated churches. It’s therefore hypocritical of him to attend a racially homogenous church.

ii) I’m not the one who said that white churches or black churches are bad. Therefore, even if I attended a white church, it wouldn’t be inconsistent of me to answer Obama on his own grounds. I’m measuring him by his yardstick, not my own. Are you intellectually capable of absorbing that elementary distinction?

iii) There is also a difference between a black church and a black nationalist church, just as there’s a difference between a white church and a white supremacist church.

One might attend a white or black church for purely demographic reasons. Or one might attend a white or black church for purely stylistic reasons.

BTW, I agree with Gene about joint services.

iv) For the record, I attended a black church for a number of years back in the 80s. From time to time I also attended Ken Hutcherson’s multiethnic church (Antioch Bible Church). For a time I also attended a Messianic congregation. So my church attendance has been racially or ethnically diverse over the years.

Once again, try not to raise foolhardy objections.

“Your statement may be true, but it smacks of a very misinformed or ignorant position on the issues social movements of the early 1900's and its continuation into the current day.”

So a statement can both be true and very misinformed, all at the same time. You have a very flexible definition of truth.

“We can't be looking to politicians to correct all social ills, the answer to racism, poverty, homosexuality or abortion. That should be the church's job.”

Politicians like Obama (and Billary) help to create or exacerbate social ills by their immoral or misguided social policies.

To take one example: the church can’t very well correct the social ill of homosexuality if it becomes a hate crime to even criticize the homosexual lifestyle.

“And when the only thing that the church does (or the church's people do) is sit and criticize politicians for the things they say, thinking that their candidate will make more of a change than another one, while never looking to be the solution to any of the problems, they are just as hypocritical as any politician I've ever known.”

i) Actually, I pointed to individuals like John Perkins who has been offering a practical alternative for years.

ii) At the same time, *your* problem isn’t necessarily *my* problem. I’m not personally responsible for every social ill. And I’m not personally responsible for the solution to every social ill. There’s such a thing as individual accountability.

“Is it any wonder that the world thinks we hate everyone and are hypocritical and judgmental?”

i) Is it any wonder that they feel this way when folks like you contribute to that misperception by you sloppy and defamatory accusations?

ii) Not that you care about the Bible, but Jesus predicted that the world would look down on Christians precisely because we’re not of the world.

Sockpuppetdom

“It's been a week now, still no word from Triablogue about whether they used sockpuppets. We did get a response from Ben stating that he and Tom M. are real people (the post from March 13 has been updated accordingly), even graciously inviting us for coffee if we ever pass through Nashville -- which I may take him up on since I go by that way on occasion. Having resolved some of our curiousity, it makes me wonder why the members of Triablogue have not been so forthcoming with an answer.”

http://www.junkyard.indeathorlife.org/

Well, if you must know, Thibodaux and Kangaroodort are two of Manata’s sockpuppets. According to the Encyclopedia of Sockpuppetism, there is only one true existent, known as the Hand. The rest of us are puppetical projections of the Manatan hand.

But in any good puppet-play, you need heroes and villains. The fictional characters of Thibodaux and Kangaroodort are two stock villains in Manata’s cosmic puppet-show.

“Talk about your sincerest forms of flattery, I've not heard such brilliant comebacks since fourth grade. Looks like his arguments aren't the only things that lack any originality.”

This reaction is known, in the clinical literature, as the Sockpuppet Syndrome. Because puppetheads like Thibodaux are illusory, they suffer from an inferiority complex. They then attempt to compensate for their low self-esteem by resorting to self-important comparisons.

An early symptom of Sockpuppet Syndrome is Arminianitus. A puppethead resents the fact that the Hand is the only true existent. If left untreated, this psychotic condition results in delusions of grandeur as the mental patient frantically aspires to transcend its puppethood by asserting its imagined autonomy in relation to the Hand.

But, this too, is part of the show, as the cosmic Puppet-player manipulates his little toys.

“Sorry Hays, there's no divine promise that no saint will ever violate the warnings delivered to them.”

This statement disregards, without benefit of argument, the many explicit and implicit prooftexts for the perseverance of the saints.

“I never said anything about being preserved despite doing x, but that Calvinism makes both doing x and suffering y out to be not genuinely possible for the saints to whom these warnings were delivered.”

Notice that he’s merely rehashing his tendentious claim about what makes something “genuinely possible.”

J.C. has no argument for his position. Just assertion. That’s why he can never advance the argument—since there was no argument to begin with.

“I said that I didn't mention meaninglessness in the quote Hays cited, not that I never argued it at all.” Once again Hays handles the data very poorly.”

What I did was to point out the inconsistency in J.C’s objection.

“And Hays misses the point from my original challenge, in that the 3 major warnings cited therein are directed specifically at the saints, especially Revelation 22:19, since no unregenerate man has any part in God's kingdom (Ephesians 5:5).”

i) Notice he now thinks I should reference his original challenge, although, when I did that before (see above), he accused me of handling the data “very poorly.” J.C. can’t make up his mind.

ii) Also observe J.C’s exegetical ineptitude. Rev 22:19 isn’t “directed specifically at the saints.” Rather, it’s generally addressed to any reader whatsoever. Cf. S. Smalley, The Revelation to John (IVP 2005), 583.

“I agree with the first sentence, which is why such warnings are so disastrous for Hays' theology.”

They’re only “disastrous” for Reformed theology if J.C. uses Arminian theology as the yardstick, which begs the question.

“And the tail-chasing by Hays continues, I never argued that a warning was not genuine unless it was useless, for a warning being possible to violate does not make it ineffective, as was brought out in my last reply. This does not negate their deterrent effects, but rather my statements that they are possible for the saints to violate fully supports its use as a deterrent, as opposed to the Calvinist doctrine which concludes that such violation is not a genuine possibility for the saints.”

If the purpose of a warning is to deter x from doing y, and x does y anyway, then the warning was obviously ineffective. A warning cannot have a deterrent effect if it fails to effect the outcome (i.e. avoidance of the hazardous conduct).

If x can violate the warning, then that nullifies the deterrent value of the warning—since the warning failed to deter the agent from doing what he was forewarned to avoid.

J.C. has defined his terms in such a way that, as a matter of principle (as well as practice), for a warning to be genuine, it must be possible in each and every case for the warning to be unavailing. That’s a necessary condition of what makes a warning genuine. So a 100% failure rate is consistent with a divine warning.

A warning can’t be genuine unless it can always fail. If God’s warnings were always successful, then they wouldn’t be genuine.

So by claiming that God’s warnings are always effective, the Calvinist is guilty of making God’s warnings of none effect! Such is the Looking-Glass world of Arminian logic.

“Pure nonsense. To be effective as a deterrent, it need only deter one or more of those warned, not all without exception.”

If a warning only succeeds some of the time, then the outcomes lies, not in the efficacy of the warning, but in the compliance or noncompliance of the agent.

“To make matters even worse for Hays, the addition of a consequent makes the warning fully effective and meaningful whether heeded or disobeyed. If one disobeys, it does not make the warning void -- the violator merely suffers the consequences as the warning states.”

As usual, J.C. can only keep one idea in his puppethead at a time. As I already said, a divine warning has either of two different purposes. So I anticipated his lame objection before he raised it.

“And trying to explain the possibility of such a consequence away by stating that God would never allow the antecedent to occur is contrary to such a purpose, as we've already covered.”

Notice that J.C. is simply repeating himself—because he can’t refute my counterargument.

“And we only thought his arguments concerning foreknowledge were awful”

To the contrary, J.C. was never able to explain how God could foreknow the outcome if the outcome could go either way.

“For all his rhetoric, Hays never does give a clear answer as to why it's gospel truth according to the purpose of God for the apostles to sincerely warn the redeemed against the possibility of falling from God's grace with the worst of consequences, but it somehow becomes false teaching when we believe that what they warn against could actually occur.”

Of course, this is a tendentious statement of “God’s purpose,” in which J.C. uploads his Arminian definitions into all the key terms.

But we shouldn’t be too hard on him. Sockpuppets have a limited repertoire of scripted responses.

Thursday, March 20, 2008

Guilt by association

Today I heard a liberal flack try to dismiss the controversy over Obama’s relationship with Rev. Wright on the grounds that this is “guilt-by-association.”

By way of reply:

1.I think there are plenty of reasons not to vote for Obama, regardless of his relationship with Rev. Wright—just as I think there are plenty of reasons not to vote for Billary.

2.That said, we also need to distinguish between valid and invalid guilt-by-association.

i) Let’s take an invalid example:

If Kenneth likes Monet, and David Duke likes Monet, then that makes Kenneth Clark a racist.

This guilty association is fallacious because it’s purely coincidental or adventitious.

ii) Let’s take a valid example:

Kenneth Clark belongs to the Klan, therefore Kenneth Clark is a racist.

In this case, if Kenneth Clark a member of a racist organization, an organization that is defined by its racism, then it’s reasonable to infer that he’s a racist.

That’s not a deductive proof, in the sense of a strict implication. It’s logically possible that a member of the Klan is not a racist. For example, a woman might belong to the Klan because she’s the wife of a Klansman. She joined out of loyalty to him even though, let us say, she herself is not a racist.

Of course, even if you had motives other than racism for joining, it would still be culpable to belong to an organization like the KKK.

And belonging to such an organization carries the presumption that you agree with it. There are attenuating circumstances in which it may be possible, in some cases, to overcome that presumption, but the onus lies on you to do so. And you’re still complicit to some degree.

Now, Obama, for the last 20 years, has been a member of a black nationalist church. His church has been quite explicit about that.

So the burden of proof is on Obama to plausibly disassociate himself from the viewpoint of his church and his pastor if, in fact, he doesn’t share the same viewpoint.

Remember, he didn’t grow up in this church. He joined it as an adult.

Cotton Comes to Harlem

Barack Obama wants us to have a national dialogue on race. Very well, then. Dialogue is a two-way street.

“We may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we may not look the same and we may not have come from the same place, but we all want to move in the same direction - towards a better future for of children and our grandchildren.”

I don’t want to move the country in the same direction as Obama wants to take it. His hopes aren’t my hopes. His definition of a better future doesn’t comport with mine.

“Throughout the first year of this campaign, against all predictions to the contrary, we saw how hungry the American people were for this message of unity.”

No, we’ve only seen how appealing it is to a segment of registered democrats who vote in democrat primaries—mainly black voters, white yuppies, and college students.

“On one end of the spectrum, we've heard the implication that my candidacy is somehow an exercise in affirmative action; that it's based solely on the desire of wide-eyed liberals to purchase racial reconciliation on the cheap.”

Sounds like a very plausible explanation to me.

“I have already condemned, in unequivocal terms, the statements of Reverend Wright that have caused such controversy.”

He decided to condemn them after attending Wright’s church for twenty-years, and only after the statements became a political liability. That’s not a very credible or convincing disclaimer.

Moreover, he issued a very generic condemnation. I’d like to see Obama comment on the specific allegations raised by his “spiritual mentor.”

“Did I strongly disagree with many of his political views? Absolutely - just as I'm sure many of you have heard remarks from your pastors, priests, or rabbis with which you strongly disagreed.”

I wouldn’t sit for 20 years under the preaching of racist, paranoid hatemonger, or make large contributions to his church. Wright is a black Klansman. He’s David Duke in a parallel universe. Just substitute “Aryan” for “African.” Just substitute the pointy hat for the dashiki robe.

“As such, Reverend Wright's comments were not only wrong but divisive, divisive at a time when we need unity.”

I don’t object to his comments because they were divisive. I object to his comments because they were false.

“And I confess that if all that I knew of Reverend Wright were the snippets of those sermons that have run in an endless loop on the television and You Tube, or if Trinity United Church of Christ conformed to the caricatures being peddled by some commentators, there is no doubt that I would react in much the same way.”

To the contrary, this goes to the core of Rev. Wright’s black liberation theology.

“The man I met more than twenty years ago is a man who helped introduce me to my Christian faith.”

That no doubt explains a lot about Obama’s nominal Christianity.

“Like other black churches, Trinity's services are full of raucous laughter and sometimes bawdy humor. They are full of dancing, clapping, screaming and shouting that may seem jarring to the untrained ear.”

I don’t object to the tone of voice or style of worship. I object to the heretical theology and the crackpot conspiracy theories.

“I can no more disown him than I can disown the black community.”

Well, that tells you a lot about Obama’s insular experience of the black community. If he were to sit under Tony Evans or John Perkins for 20 years, he’d have a very different impression of the black community.

“I can no more disown him than I can my white grandmother.”

Of course he can. We choose a pastor. We don’t choose a grandmother.

“We can dismiss Reverend Wright as a crank or a demagogue.”

That would be a promising first step.

“We do not need to recite here the history of racial injustice in this country.’

Except that this is Obama’s cue to do that very thing.

“But we do need to remind ourselves that so many of the disparities that exist in the African-American community today can be directly traced to inequalities passed on from an earlier generation that suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim Crow.”

Is that really the source of the problem? Barack Obama is the son of an immigrant. But Barack went on to attend Columbia and Harvard. Became editor of the Harvard Law Review. Is currently a U.S. Senator.

Doesn’t sound like Barack was held back by the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow. Rather, it sounds like the proverbial American Dream. America as the land of opportunity.

What about his wife? Michelle attended Princeton and Harvard. Was associate student Dean at Chicago U. Doesn’t sound like Michelle was held back by the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow.

The Obamas have something in the neighborhood of a seven digit annual income. If that’s the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow, then it’s a pretty lucrative legacy.

If we’re going to rewind the loop-tape on slavery, here’s a better place to start:

http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/MichaelMedved/2007/09/26/six_inconvenient_truths_about_the_us_and_slavery

Continuing with Obama:

“Segregated schools were, and are, inferior schools; we still haven't fixed them, fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, and the inferior education they provided, then and now, helps explain the pervasive achievement gap between today's black and white students.”

Is that what explains the achievement gap? What about broken homes or the hip-hop culture?

“That history helps explain the wealth and income gap between black and white, and the concentrated pockets of poverty that persists in so many of today's urban and rural communities.”

Rural poverty is hardly limited to blacks. And the narco trade can be quite lucrative.

“And the lack of basic services in so many urban black neighborhoods - parks for kids to play in, police walking the beat, regular garbage pick-up and building code enforcement - all helped create a cycle of violence, blight and neglect that continue to haunt us.”

When law enforcement tries to crack down on inner city crime, it’s accused of police brutality and racial profiling.

“But for all those who scratched and clawed their way to get a piece of the American Dream, there were many who didn't make it - those who were ultimately defeated, in one way or another, by discrimination.”

What about people who are ultimately defeated by their self-defeating lifestyle?

“The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of Reverend Wright's sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the most segregated hour in American life occurs on Sunday morning.”

This is really rich coming from Obama. If he is opposed to racial segregation, why did he attend a black church rather than a multi-ethnic church—and not just a black church, but a black nationalist church? A church with a militantly Afrocentric theology? This is racial self-segregation, and proudly so.

“That anger is not always productive; indeed, all too often it distracts attention from solving real problems; it keeps us from squarely facing our own complicity in our condition, and prevents the African-American community from forging the alliances it needs to bring about real change.”

But unlike John Perkins or Bill Cosby, Obama has no track recording of squarely facing this self-destructive complicity.

“So when they are told to bus their children to a school across town; when they hear that an African American is getting an advantage in landing a good job or a spot in a good college because of an injustice that they themselves never committed; when they're told that their fears about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow prejudiced, resentment builds over time.”

Does this mean that Obama is opposed to affirmative action? Wasn’t he a civil rights attorney?

“Talk show hosts and conservative commentators built entire careers unmasking bogus claims of racism while dismissing legitimate discussions of racial injustice and inequality as mere political correctness or reverse racism.”

Maybe because so much of the discussion is an exercise in political correctness or reverse discrimination.

“In the white community, the path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that what ails the African-American community does not just exist in the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination.”

But what if it’s not the legacy of discrimination? What if it’s the result of lifestyle choices made in the here and now?

He follows this with the usual, Nannystate prescription. Let’s expand on the failed policies of the past. Throw more money down the drain.

“In the end, then, what is called for is nothing more, and nothing less, than what all the world's great religions demand - that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us. Let us be our brother's keeper, Scripture tells us. Let us be our sister's keeper.”

There was no welfare state in Scripture. Biblical charity took the form of workfare, not welfare.

And if he wants to cite Scripture, a good place to start would be the Book of Proverbs.

“For we have a choice in this country. We can accept a politics that breeds division, and conflict, and cynicism.”

But his career has been defined by identity politics.

“This time we want to talk about the crumbling schools.”

He wants to talk about buildings. Not about unruly students. Not about incompetent teachers. Not about liberal indoctrination as a substitute for job skills.

“This time we want to talk about how the lines in the Emergency Room are filled with whites and blacks and Hispanics who do not have health care.”

What about the ER filled with illegal immigrants?

As far as “postracial” candidates are concerned, I’ll take Bobby Jindal over Barack Obama any day of the week.

Some Video Clips Of The Svendsen/Pacwa Debate

Eric Svendsen returned to posting at his blog a few months ago. He recently posted two video segments of his debate with Mitchell Pacwa on authority (here and here).

How about Bill Cosby for Prez?

Dr. Bill Cosby speaks!

Wednesday, March 19, 2008

Thibochiuhuahua

“I was of course referring to circumstances which God would actually allow, Hays just has no better answer than playing word games.”

http://www.junkyard.indeathorlife.org/

J.C’s objection to Calvinism, as he worded it, was a straw man argument. So I corrected his caricature. If J.C. is too inarticulate to clearly express what he really means, then that’s his problem, not mine.

“Let's examine his argument for consequences as disincentive: If consequence y won't happen until condition x occurs, and one teaches that x will absolutely never occur because God ensures that it won't, then he is also teaching that y can never occur, therefore neither x nor y are genuine possibilities as neither will, nor could ever occur. In teaching so, he undercuts any fear or caution such a consequence would incite, hence making it void by his teaching. And so despite his gimmicks and quaint analogies, Hays' insistence that ‘fear of consequences’ is a ‘means’ to our perseverance runs aground on his own doctrine once again.”

Of course we exercise caution since the divine promise is indexed to our avoidance of y.

Poor Thibodaux keeps confusing Calvinism with fatalism or antinomianism. In Calvinism, the outcome is not irrespective of what you do. You are not preserved in spite of doing y; rather, you were preserved from doing y. And the warning is instrumental in your avoidance of y.

“Sheesh, chock-full of errors. I didn't even mention meaninglessness in the quote he cites.”

J.C. can’t keep track of his own argument. One of his criteria, in his original challenge, is that:

“Any teaching that would make any passage of scripture meaningless or of no effect is a false doctrine.”

http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/calvinism/reformedchallenge.php

“Refraining from eating poisonous mushrooms is not analogous with teaching that your eating them could never occur, and a warning being possible to violate does not render it ineffective.”

One of J.C’s problems is that, despite the rivers of ink he has wasted on the warnings of Scripture, he’s too intellectually shallow to ask himself the fundamental, preliminary question: “what is the function of a divine warning?”

Either:

i) To deter x from doing y.

Or:

ii) To inculpate x for doing y.

In Reformed theology, (i) applies to the elect, while (ii) applies to the reprobate.

a) In cases of (i), where the function of the warning lies in its deterrent value, an ineffective warning would subvert the purpose of the warning.

b) In cases of (ii), where the function is not to deter the sinner, but to either inculpate the sinner or aggravate his guilt, then the warnings serve their purpose when the sinner suffers the consequences of his defiant misbehavior.

“But if our making due use of grace is entirely contingent upon God working in us so that we will do so without fail, then scripture raising the possibility of one of the redeemed falling away effectively would be bringing up the contingency of God failing by the Calvinist paradigm.”

Scripture never raises the possibility that God would fail. Rather, that follows from the Arminian paradigm.

“So if they actually will fall in if they ignore the signs, then is Hays still going to insist that we're teaching doctrinal error if we tell others that it's possible for them to fall if they ignore the warnings? The absurd balancing act Hays puts on has scripture on one hand genuinely warning the saints against falling away, yet on the other hand condemning as false teachers those who teach that saints possibly could ignore the warnings and fall away.”

i) The warnings in Scripture don’t single out the “saints.” They are addressed to Israel or the church. Israel and the church include regenerates and unregenerates, true believers, nominal believers, immature believers, reprobates, and closet apostates. There’s no one-size-fits-all referent.

ii) J.C. both begs the question and oversimplifies the question of what constitutes a “genuine” warning, under what conditions, and for whom. To say that a warning can only be genuine if it’s inutile is tendentious and counterintuitive.

“His evasions cannot get around the obvious problem for his views that's been posed already: “Apparently, warning actual saints against the possibility of falling away is gospel truth when the apostles proclaim it, but now our affirming the viability of that same truth constitutes deep doctrinal error’."

All J.C. has done here is to reiterate his simplistic, tendentious, Arminian interpretation of the data.

“The other problem he has is that the 'warnings as means' argument by itself cannot account for the consequences attached to the warnings should they be violated (why give consequences to a warning that can't be violated by those to whom it was given?).”

The reprobate do suffer the consequences.

“But if he teaches that the purpose of such consequences is to spur us to perseverance, then teaching that it isn't possible for us to suffer such consequences mitigates that purpose (why fear a consequent with an antecedent that could never occur?), and hence he is making them of no effect, as was stated originally.”

Once again, he oversimplifies the issue. To be an Arminian you must be a theological simpleton.

i) Calvinism, unlike Arminianism, doesn’t believe that God issues useless warnings. Divine warnings always have their intended effect, but they also have more than one purpose.

ii) J.C., due to his dogmatic, Arminian precommitments, nullifies the deterrent value of a warning. For him, it must always be possible to violate a warning. Thus, it’s essential to his definition of a warning that it be ineffective.

For him, a warning is pointless unless it’s ineffectual. For him, even a divine warning is meaningless unless it’s nugatory.

iii) Calvinism, by contrast, doesn’t equate functionality with futility. Although not all warnings are meant to deter misconduct, some warnings are meant to deter misconduct, and if, in those cases, the purpose of the warning lies in its deterrent value, then it would subvert the purpose of the warning if it failed to deter the sinner.

iv) In ethics generally, contemplating the consequences of a hypothetical course of action can, of itself, have a deterrent effect. It’s because we fear the hypothetical consequences of that action that we don’t go down that fork in the road.

v)”It’s impossible” in what respect? It’s impossible because the elect will persevere, and they persevere, in part, by taking God’s admonitions to heart.

“He's not even dealt with the difficulties posed in the original challenge.”

Is that an allusion to this?

http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/calvinism/reformedchallenge.php

If so, then I’ve presented a very detailed defense of the Reformed interpretation of Heb 6.

“After we exposed their cheap tactics, the Triahuahuas seem more determined than ever to try and contravene their crushing defeat with sheer volume of yapping.”

Notice how Ben and J.C. are unable to muster the charitable tone which they warmly urge on their opponents. They betray their own cause when libertarians lack the willpower to live according to their own strictures.

Monday, March 17, 2008

Josephus on the canon

Jason Engwer and I have been appealing to Josephus as a well-placed, 1C witness to the OT canon. In taking issue with our appeal, Jimmy referred to Steve Mason on Josephus—as well as referencing The Canon Debate, edited by Lee McDonald. Since Mason contributed an article on Josephus to The Canon Debate, I assume that Jimmy is alluding to that contribution.

To judge by Jimmy’s elliptical references, the unsuspecting reader might surmise that Mason has a fundamentally different take on Josephus than Jason and I. But when we turn to his essay, this is some of what he actually has to say on the subject:

“His [Josephus’] actual use of scriptural materials in Antiquities agrees by and large with the summary statement in Against Apion: he really did believe at some deep level that uniquely inspired ‘prophets’ wrote the records in a bygone age…he seems aware, without saying as much, that books like 1 and 2 Maccabees are later and separate,” S. Mason, “Josephus and his Twenty-Two Book Canon,” L. Martin & J. Sanders, eds. The Canon Debate (Hendrickson 2002), 125.

“Josephus claims his positions are held in common by all Judeans—women, children, prisoners of war—and he would presumably be vulnerable to refutation if he were making this up or presenting idiosyncratic views. It would accordingly be hard to argue from Josephus for an open canon or for one that had been recently settled—at Yavneh in the 70s and 80s, for example. Those who are convinced by other evidence of the fluidity of scriptural boundaries in the first century do better, perhaps, to isolate Josephus as idiosyncratic, in spite of his claim to speak on behalf of Judeans, than to try to enlist his statements in support,” ibid. 126.

“But isolating Josephus, too, would be hard to justify. Perhaps the most significant corollary of this study is its negative results regarding any appeal to circumstantial evidence in support of the argument for an open canon,” ibid. 126.

“The problem with this reasoning will now be obvious, for all of the phenomena that Meyer finds in other sources are much more clearly and fully present in Josephus’s own use of the scriptures in the Antiquities…If we lacked the Against Apion, Josephus himself would offer a clear case for an open canon. But we do have the Against Apion, in which this same Josephus emphatically, but also matter-of-factly, insists that the Judea records have long since been completed in twenty-two volumes,” ibid. 126.

“Indeed, once we know Against Apion, we can go back to Antiquities and discover that Josephus really does believe that the succession of prophets has ceased, and we can discern a seam after the ‘records’ have been exhausted. Against Apion was written as a deliberate sequel to Antiquities, so it is unlikely that Josephus is aware of any substantial conflict between the two. This means that his willingness to alter the biblical text in manifold ways proves nothing about his formal view of canon. His example removes the force from appeals to circumstantial evidence as proof that the Dead Sea Scrolls’ authors or Philo or Ben Sira had an open canon,” ibid. 126-27.

Operation: Mop-Up

I’m performing a little mopping up operation on Arminian Perspectives. So watch your step—the floor is slippery:

“I would now like to issue a bit of a challenge for those who are so convinced that libertarian free will is a myth, and that determinism is the Biblical doctrine.”

Notice that Ben is the one who is issuing the challenge. His sidekick issued a challenge of his own:

http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/calvinism/reformedchallenge.php

This is useful to keep in mind when Ben and DC whine about how Triablogue has been pestering the poor little dears. They initiated the challenge. We merely took them at their word.

“Until you answer the following questions, I would ask that you refrain from attacking the contrary position.”

http://arminianperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/11/got-free-will.html

Why should we submit to that request? If the bible teaches predestination, then LFW is, indeed a myth. In that event, we don’t need to answer his questionnaire before we’re allowed to point that out. We don’t need a special permit to reiterate the teaching of Scripture.

And we also don’t need to justify predestination over and beyond the revelation of Scripture. So Ben’s attempt to disqualify his critics is sophistical.

“To the determinist I ask: 1) How do you make sense of regrets if you do not have the power of contrary choice? Why does your conscience bother you when you sin, if you could not have avoided that sin?”

i) How does a libertarian make sense of the fact that a compulsive gambler may well regret placing his dependents in financial hardship because he can’t resist the urge to roll the dice? He feels guilty that he lacks the moral resolve to do the right thing.

ii) Even in a game of chance, the odds are that every once in a while a random outcome will be the same as a predetermined outcome (e.g. loaded dice, a stacked deck). In both cases the gambler would do exactly the same thing, even if in once case—unbeknownst to him—the game was rigged.

iii) As a practical matter, we can only make one choice at a time. So what’s the point of having choices we were never going to make? What difference does it make if you could have one otherwise unless you would have done otherwise?

iv) If Ben wants a philosophical answer, he should consult the literature on compatibilism (e.g. John Martin Fischer).

“2) If God causes all things, then how can you claim that God does not cause sin?”

i) That’s equivocal. God is not the sole cause of everything that happens.

ii) And while we’re at it, let’s keep in mind that, after all these centuries, philosophers still can’t agree on how to define causation.

“If God is the only true actor in the universe, then all creatures are but passive instruments.”

That’s a straw man argument. Monergism is concerned with soteriology, not metaphysics. At even at the level of soteriology, not everything is monergistic. For example, regeneration is monergistic, but sanctification is not.

“3) Where did the first impulse to sin come from in both Satan and Adam?”

i) Why should a Calvinist be expected to answer that question?

a) We have no personal experience of sinless agency.

b) Revelation doesn’t tell us where the first impulse to sin came from.

c) And it’s not a truth of reason that we can intuit, like math.

So any answer is sheer speculation.

ii) At one level, God decreed the fall. But that doesn’t implant a disobedient impulse in Adam.

I’m also not sure that I see a problem. Although Adam was sinless, he wasn’t impeccable, so there was nothing to prevent him from sinning.

And even in a morally pristine universe, there are alternate or incommensurable goods. You can’t experience every good simultaneously. So even in a world without evil, there’s a potential for temptation. You don’t need a predisposition to sin in order to sin.

Suppose Adam and Eve both wanted the same juicy peach. That’s a natural desire for a natural good. But they can’t both have it. A sinless, but peccable, agent would still need to resist the temptation to covet the peach. To envy the good fortune of another. And there’s nothing that hinders him from giving into temptation. Even though he’s sinless, he must exercise a measure of moral restraint to check his natural impulses.

Since resisting temptation is a virtue, that tension can exist apart from the fall. The tree of knowledge was good. Curiosity is good.

iii) What is Ben’s alternative? LFW? But Ben says, “Appeals to mystery are inadmissible.”

Yet the appeal to LFW is an appeal to mystery. As Peter van Inwagen put it:

“But if we know that we are free—indeed, if we are free and do not know it—, there is some defect in one or both of our two arguments. Either there is something wrong with our argument for the conclusion that metaphysical freedom is incompatible with determinism or there is something wrong with our argument for the conclusion that metaphysical freedom is incompatible with indeterminism—or there is something wrong with both arguments. But which argument is wrong, and why? (Or are they both wrong?) I do not know. I think no one knows. That is why my title is, ‘The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom.’ I believe I know, as surely as I know anything, that at least one of the two arguments contains a mistake. And yet, having thought very hard about the two arguments for almost thirty years, I confess myself unable to identify even a possible candidate for such a mistake. My opinion is that the first argument (the argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism) is essentially sound, and that there is, therefore, something wrong with the second argument (the argument for the incompatibility of freedom and indeterminism). But if you ask me what it is, I have to say that I am, as current American slang has it, absolutely clueless. Indeed the problem seems to me to be so evidently impossible of solution that I find very attractive a suggestion that has been made by Noam Chomsky (and which was developed by Colin McGinn in his recent book The Problems of Philosophy) that there is something about our biology, something about the ways of thinking that are ‘hardwired’ into our brains, that renders it impossible for us human beings to dispel the mystery of metaphysical freedom. However this may be, I am certain that I cannot dispel the mystery, and I am certain that no one else has in fact done so.”

http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwvanInwagen1.htm

Continuing with Ben:

“Calvinists contend that the elect believe due to the influence of irresistible grace. Arminius and the Remonstrants rejected this partly due to the fact that the Bible plainly says that some do indeed resist the Holy Spirit (Acts 7:51)…So my question is rather simple. When a reprobate resists the Holy Spirit just what exactly is he resisting? If the Holy Spirit has no intentions of regenerating the reprobate and has instead decided to ‘pass him by’, then what on earth is the reprobate resisting?”

http://arminianperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/08/quick-questions-for-my-calvinists.html

In the TULIP acronym, irresistible grace stands for regeneration. That’s irresistible, both because it’s a direct act of God, and because the object of regeneration is passive in the process.

In Context, Acts 7:51 has reference to the Word of God. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of prophecy. The agent of inspiration.

In the very next verse (52), Stephen indicts unbelieving Jews for persecuting the prophets of yore. And when they disbelieve him, they repeat the same pattern, for Stephen is a modern prophet, inspired by the Holy Spirit (6:3,5).

In fact, that’s the same interpretation as Witherington’s, in the standard Arminian commentary on Acts: “always opposing the Holy Spirit. The implication is that Stephen is speaking at the direction of the Spirit and to oppose his words is like opposing the words of Moses or others in previous generations” (274).

It’s a pity when I have to point Arminians like Ben to their own writers. Can’t they at least keep up their own end of the argument?

In Reformed theology, the reprobate can disobey God’s preceptive will. They are not resisting the immediate agency of God. Rather, they are resisting the end-product of inspiration: the spoken or written word of God.

“I also want to ask my Calvinist friends how they can harmonize their doctrine of irresistible grace with Isaiah 5:1-4…So according to the Lord Himself, He had done all He could do to His vineyard, and yet it still did not produce acceptable fruit. Shouldn't we be able to answer the Lord, ‘Sorry, but you obviously didn't do all that you could have done Lord. You could have irresistibly caused your vineyard to produce good grapes.’ The Calvinist, to be consistent with his doctrine, could object in such a way. So here are my last two questions for my Calvinist friends. Would you feel comfortable saying such a thing to the Lord? Would you contend that God did not give sufficient grace for the Israelites to produce acceptable fruit?”

i) Well, Ben, we could always begin by keeping in mind that this is a parable. So it’s a mistake to take the details literally.

ii) For example, Ben quotes the following statement: “then he expected it to produce good grapes… when I expected it to produce good grapes.”

If Ben takes that literally, then this would be a prooftext for open theism. God can’t be both foresighted and shortsighted. So did God, in fact, entertain a false expectation?

iii) This also follows from the detail of the watchtower, which would guard the produce on the assumption of a yield that’s worth stealing. Once again, does Ben think that God failed to foresee the outcome?

iv) Then, in the part he didn’t quote, what about the vintner’s punitive reaction (5-6). Does Ben think that God is a disappointed lover who lashes out in a vindictive fit of pique?

How much of this parable does he take literally? The whole thing? Or is he selectively literal and figurative by turns. Is his principle that anything which supports Arminian theology should be taken literally, while anything which opposes Arminian theology should be taken metaphorically?

v) He assumes that the key phrase ought be rendered in terms of what more God “could” have done, rather than “should” have done, although—as Motyer points out—the Hebrew “uses the infinitive to express obligation” (68n3). God did everything he should have done. Thus, the blame lies elsewhere. That’s the point. God did enough to leave Israel at fault.

vi) As I’ve also said, “irresistible grace” is a synonym for regeneration. It’s not interchangeable with all God’s dealings with Israel in general or the church in general. Both Israel and the church are a mixed multitude of elect and reprobate members.

Sunday, March 16, 2008

Behind the beat

A while back I did a post on whether the Reformed doctrine of perseverance rendered divine warnings meaningless:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/12/admonitions-of-scripture.html

Although my post wasn’t specifically directed at him, Thibodaux replied:

http://arminianperspectives.blogspot.com/2007/12/truth-and-consequences.html

http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/calvinism/reformedchallenge/results/triabloguechallenge3.php

I haven’t gotten around to responding because I had other things focus on. And there’s not much to respond to his since criticisms suffer from persistent intellectual confusions on his part.

“Translation: The warnings are divine shock value, their consequences mere coercion.”

Wrong. I don’t take the position that God uses coercive methods to preserve his elect.

As I explained at the time, I was examining a coercive model for the sake of argument. An argument from the greater to the lesser.

Libertarians contend that coercion would render warnings meaningless. So the point I was making is that if the warnings are still meaningful even on a coercive interpretation, then they’re meaningful absent coercion. Sorry that J.C. was too obtuse to follow the argument.

“If God's purpose in giving such warnings was to make us live holy unto Him by indicating that if we walk away from Him, He will cast us away, yet you teach a doctrine that states He would never under any circumstance actually do such a thing, then have you not undone the holy fear which God's word was meant to instill in the hearts of His people and again made it of no effect?”

A straw man argument. Calvinism doesn’t take the position that God would never cast us away under any circumstances. The warnings are conditional. If we did such things, God would cast us away.

It’s just that those circumstances will not eventuate. And the warnings are part of what restrains us from doing such things. They serve as a disincentive to apostasy. So the worst-case scenario does not play out—thanks, in part, to the fear of consequences.

It’s easy for Christians to take revelation for granted. After all, we have divine revelation. So we know what’s expected of us.

But suppose we didn’t? We do not enjoy an inborn knowledge of everything that’s expected of us. So we depend on divine revelation to inculcate some of our duties to God and man.

Suppose I don’t know that a certain type of mushroom is poisonous, but you do. So you warn me not to eat that type of mushroom. As a result of your warning, I refrain from eating that type of mushroom.

The warning was hardly superfluous. It furnished me with some important information I wouldn’t otherwise have—information which enabled me to act prudently in that situation.

“The view that the members of Triablogue espouse puts them in a rather awkward position, as when God states 'heed or I shall revoke your part in my kingdom,' their reply is, 'Therefore having our part in God's kingdom revoked is not actually possible under any circumstance by virtue of the fact that God has threatened to do that very thing’.”

This repeats the same mistake. Also, to talk about what’s “actually possible” is slippery, for possibility and actuality are contrary categories.

If something is actual, then it’s possible—but if something is possible, then it’s inactual. It may not yet be actual, or it may never be actual. Indeed, most possibilities remain unexemplified.

“Perhaps as Hays' parallel of stimulus suggests, God preserves the saints by fear of falling away. But if such fear or coercion is His intended purpose in these warnings, then why do Calvinists teach a doctrine that goes directly against any such fear or coercion, which tries to reduce it to no effect in stating that it is not possible for the saints to fall away?”

Notice that J.C. is a one-trick pony. He keeps repeating the same mistakes. But repetition doesn’t make a falsehood any truer.

“ I agree that God does indeed spur we who are His on to glory with warnings, but not with hollow threats of Him committing things He would never actually do based on things He won't let happen.”

J.C. is treating Calvinism as if it were synonymous with fatalism. But in Calvinism, what we do makes a difference, for God often works through means—of which warnings are a case in point.

“So if God's purpose in issuing warnings with the worst possible consequences is to be compared to bogus, yet highly effective road signs, then how is saying 'Don't worry, those signs are feigned, they're just made to scare you, it's not actually possible for you to fall in' not going against that purpose?”

Notice how he always oversimplifies the explanation. To return to my illustration, the road signs would only be bogus if the bridge wasn’t washed out. But if the bridge is, indeed, washed out, and you disregarded the cautionary signage, then your car will plunge into the river below and you will drown. It’s a pity that J.C. can only keep one idea in his head at a time.

“Thus even if fear and coercion unto holiness were the sole intent of the consequences in God's warnings to the saints, the teaching of a doctrine that absolutely no saint can fall away directly contradicts such an intent.”

This is like saying that if I tell you not to eat those mushrooms because you’ll die of food poisoning should you do so, and you refrain from eating them as a result of my advice, then the warning was meaningless.

For J.C., a warning can only be meaningful if it’s ineffective. That’s an odd stipulation.

“The very fact that being cut off from Christ is listed as a consequence for not abiding in Him (which is not an obvious impossibility) suggests its possibility.”

J.C. always poses the alternatives in simplistic terms. “Possible” or “impossible” in what respect? Conditional? Unconditional?

“So if scripture makes it so plain that our perseverance is not dependent upon us in the least.”

Yet another simple-minded formulation. Perseverance involves, among other things, the due use of the means of grace. And God has given his elect a heart to use the means of grace.

“And God cannot fail to uphold His end.”

The means are instrument to the ends.

“Then why would scripture even bring up the contingency of His failure or unfaithfulness?”

Scripture never brings up the contingency of divine infidelity or failure. It does bring up the contingency of human infidelity or failure.

“One need only look at the admonitions in scripture to see what the apostles taught concerning security in Christ; to those engrafted Paul writes, ‘For if God did not spare the natural branches, He may not spare you either’ (Romans 11:21).”

J.C’s attacks systematically miss the mark. They might be valid against the antinomian brand of eternal security you find in some fundamentalist circles. But they’re irrelevant in reference to the doctrine of perseverance. J.C. always lags behind the beat.

“I agree that God does indeed spur we who are His on to glory with warnings, but not with hollow threats of Him committing things He would never actually do based on things He won't let happen.”

To revert to my illustration, suppose I tell my five-year-old not to eat the mushrooms. But, being a five-year-old, he disregards my warning. As he’s about to pluck a poisonous mushroom, I slap his hand.

Does the fact that I won’t let him eat the mushroom render the warning meaningless?

A bare warning may be insufficient for a five-year-old, but the educational process involves a combination of teaching and discipline so that, as a child matures, he no longer needs parental intervention. At that point in his cognitive development he will appreciate the wisdom of the warning and act accordingly.

Saturday, March 15, 2008

The Application of the Order of Benefits of Redemption

I've not responded to a number of comments on my last article on John 6 for a number of reasons:

1. Pike has done a good job.
2. I've been busy.
3. The Arminians have done little more than assume what they need to prove.

If LFW is not taught in Scripture, so much for their argument. To date, not a single Arminian has bothered to answer:

1. Where is LFW taught in Scripture? Until they can demonstrate this action theory is taught by Scripture, every objection they offer fails, insofar as it depends on the insertion of LFW into the text of John 6. The fact that they can't resolve the text without that appeal is proof positive that they have no *exegetical* objections to the text. They are offering *philosophical* objections.

2. Why does one person believe and not another, within the constraints of (a) John 6 (Hint, John 6 actually answers the question-they just don't like the answer) and (b) LFW? I keep asking this question. The answers I get are usually, "Because they decide to do so." That's not an answer. It merely restates the question. Can Arminians not recognize the regressive fallacy when they see it. They are only pushing the question back one step.


Regarding the “new covenant” and Isaiah 54:13 (cross ref Jer 31, Mathew 26, Hebrews 8, Hebrews 10, …) One of the blessings of the new covenant is regeneration, but another is forgiveness of sins. Do you believe people are forgiven before they come to Christ?

The answer to this question is bound up with a couple of issues that need to be disambiguated.

A. What do we,and Scripture, mean when referring to "Regeneration?"

I'd point out, Dan, that there's an archive function on this blog. Before asking me questions like this, you should consult them. I've been over "regeneration" many, many times here.

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/08/regeneration-and-flyswatter-part-two.html

Typically, I refer to "Regeneration" according to the dominant expression articulated by our theologians.

B. We're talking about a logical, not a temporal sequence:

Regeneration / effectual calling. This would be equivalent to "drawing" in John 6.
Faith/repentance (Conversion). This would be "coming."
Justification: This would be forgiveness of sins.

If regeneration does not precede faith, then why don't you affirm that good works precede regeneration?

C. Your question, indeed, objection turns on a conflation of ideas. Let's summarize it:

Regeneration preceding faith is illogical/unbiblical because it means you are saved/justified forgiven, before you are "saved/justified/forgiven."

Answer: These columns reflect the logical or causal connection between these aspects: regeneration, repentance unto life, faith in Jesus Christ, justification, definitive sanctification, adoption and sealing (indwelling), progressive sanctification, perseverance in holiness, glorification. DA = Divine Act (monergistic, e.g. God acts alone w/o man; where He acts alone, men are wholly passive). Div-Human Activ=Divine Human activity (synergistic):

Individual Salvation

Beginning Result Middle Result End


2 DAs 2 Div-Hum Activ. 3 DA’s 2 Div-Hum Activ. 1 DA

(5) Justification

(3) Repentance

(1) Effectual call (8) Progressive Sanct.

via

(2) Regeneration (6) Definitive Sanc. (10) Glorification

(4)Faith in Christ (9) Perseverance in holiness

(7) adoption and the

Spirit’s sealing


* Definitive Sanc. On the one hand Scripture says we are being sanctified progressively, and on the other it says we have been sanctified. DS refers to this act in the mind of God seeing us not only as righteous (justified) with the righteous of Christ imputed to us through faith, but also set apart completely. From A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, Second Edition, Robert Reymond, (Thomas Nelson, 1998, p.711).

This objection is fairly standard fare from anti-Calvinist writing and sermons. It’s pretty unsophisticated, but surprisingly frequent. This is a textbook example of equivocation: The disputant uses the same word in two (or more senses), trading on one sense in one occurrence to lend a surplus sense to the same word in another occurrence. The Arminian is accusing you of equivocating on your terms. In reality, s/he is equivocating on his/her terms.


Let’s reword this objection using biblical terminology. Regeneration precedes faith is logical, because it means you are regenerated before you are justified. The Reformed understanding of the order of salvation is:


Regeneration precedes faith. Men are dead in sin and cannot come to Christ to repent and believe apart from it. Men are not regenerated because they respond to God in faith. I John 5:1 explicitly states otherwise. The conclusion of John’s prologue in his gospel uses passive verbs to describe being born again and adds that men are born not by their own wills, but by God’s alone.


A man is not converted on account of his free will decision. He is converted because God unilaterally acts to regenerate Him. His faith and repentance are a response to God’s grace in doing this. John 6:44: No man can (has the ability) to come to me, unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up on the last day. Apart from God doing this, nobody would believe. It is simply impossible for an unregenerate person to choose Christ apart from effectual calling and regeneration. They cannot submit their minds to God or understand spiritual truth or come to Christ and believe apart from it.

We understand that there is a sense in which one is saved, i.e., regenerated before one is “saved,” i.e. justified. However, the Arminian must agree that men are “saved,” i.e. justified, before they are “saved,” i.e. regenerated or glorified as well. Calvinists do not say “we are saved before we are saved.” We teach we are regenerated before we believe and are justified. We are not the ones guilty of equivocating on our terms.

Dan wrote to Pete:

P1: Teaching, hearing & learning precede coming to Christ (taken from John 6:45)
P2: Teaching, hearing & learning are not referring to how one gets into the covenant, but instead are the promises given to those in the covenant (taken from your comments)
C1: therefore, being in the covenant precedes coming to Christ
P3: Part of being in the new covenant includes forgiveness of sins. (Taken from Jer 31, Mathew 26, Hebrews 8, Hebrews 10)
C2: therefore, forgiveness of sins precedes coming to Christ.
So I guess I still don’t understand your response.
Pete can respond on his own. I, like you, looking @ your blog, may be gone for awhile, so I may not be able to get back. But I'll just observe before I depart:

1. It depends on what one means by "getting into the covenant." If by this you mean "election," then these are promises that God will certainly bring to pass with respect to those persons. God does not fail to bring the elect to faith. This would moot all your objections.

2. You seem to be suggesting that "coming" and being "forgiven" are equivalent. (1) I've not argued that. (2) Pete didn't argue that. (3) Forgiveness of sins is a divine act, not a human act. True, one must "come"in order to be "forgiven" but all the elect will certainly "come."

3. To summarize then, the reasons that "being taught, hearing, and coming (to Christ)" are "promises" given to those in the New Covenant is due to election. We can think of being "in" the New Covenant in a presumptive sense, eg. in the mind of God. He "foreloves" the elect by chosing them a recipients of the application of the benefits of redemption. Alteraatively, we can think of them from the other side in a temporal, experimental sense, from the perspective of the elect. They stand as condemned sinners outside of the covenant insofar as they are objects of wrath until the benefits are applied, yet God will certainly bring that application of the benefits of redemption upon them.

I'd also refer you to Francis Turretin who, in the debate between the High Calvinists in his day, over what it meant for the covenant to be "unconditional" drew a distinction between a meritorious and instrumental condition. The Covenant is meritoriously unconditional. It is instrumentally conditional. This directly impacts any doctrine of "eternal justification." EJ is generally built upon the conflation of these conditions as unconditional. That's Hyper-Calvinism.

4. "Forgiveness of sins" is, by your own admission "part of" the New Covenant. The question does not involve that fact. Rather, the question is one of historical and/or logical order in which that blessing comes to the person, e.g. it relates the difference between redemption "accomplished" and redemption "applied." Historically, our redemption was accomplished at the cross, well before we were born. It was not applied to us until we believed, and we believed because of the Spirit's effectual call via the instrumentality of the Word (a classic Reformed Baptist formula).

I realize an objection may arise due to the non-temporal nature of God. Hyper-Calvinists draw their doctrine of EJ from that thinking. To anticipate it, as you seem to be following along those similar lines, I answer, with Robert Reymond (from his New Systematic Theology)

This thinking is muddled in several respects.

For starters, God does have a concept of cause and effect in that logic is an attribute of God's mind. He does understand that in order for x to occur as a concrete instance of what is in his mind, y must come to pass. It's an ends-means relation.

We understand cause and effect and the antecedence of x to y; ergo God does too, or else we have no ground for the logical process.

God Himself also grounds the passage of time in His creation. His own Word recognizes that we were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world. The very terms "in the beginning" and "before the foundation of the world," are about a cause-effect relation and a historical relation.

God does exist outside of time, but that also means He orders and grounds time.

Likewise, the objector conflating ontology and teleology. The timeless of God does not mean there is no teleological order to His attributes or the working of His mind. Ontologically, God is unaffected by relational sequence as to His person, but He is conscious of sequential duration, because sequential duration is a part of the ordering of his decree.

We know this because we have a sense of past, present, and future that, because it exists and will exist, is grounded by His mind. In other words, we actually experience this sequential order because we are part of the decree.

For God, all of these are internally intuited and not arrived at chronologically through a process, but the concept or idea of durational sequence or succession is a distinct epistemological, not ontological category. God knows all our thoughts and actions in the past, present, and future,and at the same time knows His own thoughts and actions in relation to each other and to our own and in what order. Thus, He can inspire Paul to say, "He chose before He created." He knows that He created the sea and dry land before He created birds and fish and animals and man. He knows 1 comes before 2 comes before 184, 388.739394. Likewise, He can perceive us as children of wrath prior to our calling and conversion and His children by adoption afterward.

5. All of which renders C2 fallacious.

I'm also a bit concerned about your use of the term "New Covenant." I take it you are a dispensationalist. Is it your position that persons were saved by a different means prior to the era of the "New" Covenant? Just curious.

I'd also point out that Jeremiah 31, if you're a Baptist, would undercut your appeal to Baptist ecclesiology. Baptists affirm the New Covenant is unbreakable. That's why we affirm regenerate church membership.
Presbyterians get around this by positing two dimensions to the covenant, one related to the visible church, the other the invisible, universal church. But as a Baptist, that option is not open to you. If you affirm that folks can lose their salvation, then you deny the New Covenant is unbreakable, thereby undercutting Baptist ecclesiology. I'm asking because I don't recall you staking out your eccleisology. Sometimes it helps to know if we're dealing with a (Credo)Baptist or a Paedo(Infant)baptist.

If you affirm that the NC is breakable with respect to its spiritual elements (eg. personal salvation), then how exactly is the NC better than the Old Covenant, given the the qualifications in Hebrews? How is Christ Mediator of a "better" covenant if he does not/cannot save His people from apostasy?

I suspect dispensationalists and covenant theologians might have very different points of view of end times. This could be impacting our differences on understanding Isaiah 54, and therefore John 6.
The Calvinist understanding of Isaiah 54 is not dependent on Covenant Theology.

Iraq, Al Qaeda, And Media Irresponsibility

Stephen Hayes of The Weekly Standard has written an article about links between the former Iraqi government, al Qaeda, and other anti-American terrorist groups, as well as how many in the American media have misrepresented those links. I recommend reading the entire article, but here are some excerpts:


This ought to be big news. Throughout the early and mid-1990s, Saddam Hussein actively supported an influential terrorist group headed by the man who is now al Qaeda's second-in-command, according to an exhaustive study issued last week by the Pentagon….

In 1993, as Osama bin Laden's fighters battled Americans in Somalia, Saddam Hussein personally ordered the formation of an Iraqi terrorist group to join the battle there….

According to a 1993 internal Iraqi intelligence memo, the regime was supporting a secret Islamic Palestinian organization dedicated to "armed jihad against the Americans and Western interests."…

In 2002, the year before the war began, the Iraqi regime hosted in Iraq a series of 13 conferences for non-Iraqi jihadist groups.

That same year, a branch of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) issued hundreds of Iraqi passports for known terrorists….

Documents reveal that the regime stockpiled bombmaking materials in Iraqi embassies around the world and targeted Western journalists for assassination. In July 2001, an Iraqi Intelligence agent described an al Qaeda affiliate in Bahrain, the Army of Muhammad, as "under the wings of bin Laden." Although the organization "is an offshoot of bin Laden," the fact that it has a different name "can be a way of camouflaging the organization." The agent is told to deal with the al Qaeda group according to "priorities previously established."…

In describing the relations between the Army of Muhammad and the Iraqi regime, the authors of the Pentagon study come to this conclusion: "Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda--as long as that organization's near-term goals supported Saddam's long-term vision."

As I said, this ought to be big news. And, in a way, it was. A headline in the New York Times, a cursory item in the Washington Post, and stories on NPR and ABC News reported that the study showed no links between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.

How can a study offering an unprecedented look into the closed regime of a brutal dictator, with over 1,600 pages of "strong evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism," in the words of its authors, receive a wave-of-the-hand dismissal from America's most prestigious news outlets? All it took was a leak to a gullible reporter, one misleading line in the study's executive summary, a boneheaded Pentagon press office, an incompetent White House, and widespread journalistic negligence….

Again, at precisely the same time Zawahiri was "joining with bin Laden," the spring of 1993, he was being funded by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. As Zawahiri's jihadists trained in al Qaeda camps in Sudan, his representative to Iraq was planning "commando operations" against the Egyptian government with the IIS.

Another captured Iraqi document from early 1993 "reports on contact with a large number of terrorist groups in the region, including those that maintained an office or liaison in Iraq." In the same folder is a memo from Saddam Hussein to a member of his Revolutionary Council ordering the formation of "a group to start hunting Americans present on Arab soil, especially Somalia."…

More recently, captured "annual reports" of the IIS reveal support for terrorist organizations in the months leading up the U.S. invasion in March 2003….

The third section of the Pentagon study is called "Iraq and Terrorism: Three Cases." One of the cases is that of the Army of Muhammad, the al Qaeda affiliate in Bahrain. A series of memoranda order an Iraqi Intelligence operative in Bahrain to explore a relationship with its leaders. On July 9, 2001, the agent reports back: "Information available to us is that the group is under the wings of bin Laden. They receive their directions from Yemen. Their objectives are the same as bin Laden."…

A separate memo reveals that the Army of Muhammad has requested assistance from Iraq. The study authors summarize the response by writing, "the local IIS station has been told to deal with them in accordance with priorities previously established. The IIS agent goes on to inform the Director that 'this organization is an offshoot of bin Laden, but that their objectives are similar but with different names that can be a way of camouflaging the organization.'"…

When bin Laden left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, the Iraqis sought "other channels through which to handle the relationship, in light of his current location." The IIS memo directs that "cooperation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop freely through discussion and agreement."…

What's happening here is obvious. Military historians and terrorism analysts are engaged in a good faith effort to review the captured documents from the Iraqi regime and provide a dispassionate, fact-based examination of Saddam Hussein's long support of jihadist terrorism. Most reporters don't care. They are trapped in a world where the Bush administration lied to the country about an Iraq-al Qaeda connection, and no amount of evidence to the contrary--not even the words of the fallen Iraqi regime itself--can convince them to reexamine their mistaken assumptions.

Bush administration officials, meanwhile, tell us that the Iraq war is the central front in the war on terror and that American national security depends on winning there. And yet they are too busy or too tired or too lazy to correct these fundamental misperceptions about the case for war, the most important decision of the Bush presidency.

What good is the truth if nobody knows it?

What does Heb 6 really mean?

Arminians typically accuse Calvinists of tampering with the obvious meaning of Heb 6 and its counterparts. Let’s begin by quoting the two major passages around which the controversy swirls:

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Hebrews 6:4-6 (English Standard Version)

4For it is impossible, in the case of those who have once been enlightened, who have tasted the heavenly gift, and have shared in the Holy Spirit, 5and have tasted the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the age to come, 6and then have fallen away, to restore them again to repentance, since they are crucifying once again the Son of God to their own harm and holding him up to contempt.

Hebrews 10:26-31 (English Standard Version)

26For if we go on sinning deliberately after receiving the knowledge of the truth, there no longer remains a sacrifice for sins, 27 but a fearful expectation of judgment, and a fury of fire that will consume the adversaries. 28 Anyone who has set aside the law of Moses dies without mercy on the evidence of two or three witnesses. 29How much worse punishment, do you think, will be deserved by the one who has spurned the Son of God, and has profaned the blood of the covenant by which he was sanctified, and has outraged the Spirit of grace? 30For we know him who said, "Vengeance is mine; I will repay." And again, "The Lord will judge his people." 31 It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.

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1.Now, let’s take a few steps back. Ask yourself, if either passage were intended to answer a question, what question would that be? Would it be, Is it possible for a Christian to lose his salvation? Or would it be, Is it possible for an apostate to be restored?

One of the ironic features of the modern debate about the “true” meaning of Heb 6 is that this debate is centered on answering a question which the passage wasn’t designed to answer. The Arminian, in particular, is asking a different question than the text is answering.

For the question which the text is answering is not about the possibility of losing your salvation, but the possibility—or impossibility—of returning to the faith.

So the Arminian is involved in a classic case of agenda-driven exegesis. When you come to a text of Scripture, demanding an answer it wasn’t intended to give, and—in the meantime—sideline the answer it was intended to give, then you’re coming to the text with a theological agenda, and you won’t be satisfied until you make the text answer the question you want it to answer. Your theological priorities are at odds with the text. You insist on putting a question to the text which the text was never meant to answer.

Once again, just stop for a moment and ask yourself, in proportion to the amount of time that an Arminian spends on trying to make the text answer a different question, how much time does he spend trying to answer the question which the text was actually addressing? In particular, how much time does the Arminian typically devote to the possibility, or not, of spiritual restoration, rather than the possibility of losing your salvation?

The Arminian is not allowing the text to set the agenda. He takes almost no interest in what the text is interested in. Indeed, the focus of the text is a very awkward for him since it’s hard for an Arminian to explain why an apostate, if he’s truly a free agent, would be unable to think better of his action, or why a loving God would refuse to reinstate him.

If the Arminian were to actually realign his concerns to correspond with the text, this would be a very problematic text for Arminian theology. That may well be one reason, aside from his eagerness to disprove Calvinism, that he marginalizes the teaching of the text, and substitutes a different question in its place.

In this respect, Donatism, Montanism, and Novatianism were at least asking the right questions. They were asking the same questions of the text that the text was designed to answer. Even if we disagree with their answers, their approach to Heb 6 was at least in line with the type of question which the text was addressing.

So it takes a lot of temerity for an Arminian to accuse a Calvinist of Scripture twisting when the Arminian is the one who is guilty of imposing his own agenda on the text, to the detriment of what the text is really teaching.

2.Apropos (1), if we take the impossibility of restoration at face value, then in what sense is it impossible?

i) There are only two options available to the Arminian:

a) Every apostate is unwilling to repent.

b) God is unwilling to restore any apostate, even if he is penitent.

But both explanations are in tension with Arminian theology. (i) is contrary to the libertarian freedom of the apostate, while (ii) is contrary to the universal love of God.

ii) By contrast, this is not a point of tension in Reformed theology. We could simply say an apostate is a hardened sinner. This explanation combines (i) and (ii). The apostate is unwilling to repent, and he’s unwilling to repent because God is unwilling to restore him. God has hardened him as a judicial punishment for his apostasy.

3.Recently, Ben Witherington has attempted to harmonize the rigorist interpretation with Arminian theology by taking a rhetorical approach:

“Rhetorically speaking, an orator must be able to keep the attention of the audience, especially if the discourse is going to be long…this being the case…the wise rhetor will pull out the emotional stops, use more colorful language, engage in rhetorical hyperbole, up the volume on ‘amplification’,” Letters and Homilies for Jewish Christians (IVP 2007), 203.

“One of the issues that many commentators misunderstand, because of failure to read the rhetorical signals, is that our author to some degree is being ironic here and engaging in a preemptive strike. That is, we should not read this text as a literal description of the present spiritual condition of the audience,” ibid. 204.

“One of the key factors in analyzing this section [Heb 5:11-6:12] is to realize that our author is trying to put the ‘fear of God’ into his audience by using rhetoric to prevent defections, and so one is not sure how far to press the specifics here, since it is possible to argue that some of this involves dramatic hyperbole,” ibid. 205.

“Our author is deliberately engaging in dramatic rhetorical statements for the purpose of waking up the audience. The function is not to comment on something that is impossible for God…In other words, these words were intended to have a specific emotional effect, not to comment in the abstract about what is impossible…In an honor-and-shame culture this is intended to be shocking language,” ibid. 212-15.

“In my judgment, these are the right kinds of questions to ask about an epideictic discourse clearly given to hyperbole at points. Two things result from taking such rhetorical factors into account: (1) our author really does think that at least some of the audience is in danger of apostasy and warns against it and (2) we may suspect that the ‘no restoration’ remark functions as a device to make clear how horrible committing apostasy really is. It is another way of pleading ‘please don’t go there.’ The consequences of apostasy are thereby shown to be grim by the use of hyperbolic language,” ibid. 218.

But there are two potential problems with this maneuver:

i) A Calvinist can help himself to the same rhetorical strategy (see below).

ii) Witherington isn’t consistent in applying the “rhetorical device.” For at one point he also says “our author seems to believe that one can go too far, past the point of no return and no restoration. This text then cuts both ways, against either a facile notion that forgiveness is always possible no matter how severe the sin in question is, but it equally must count against the ‘eternal security’ sort of argument as well,” ibid. 215.

4.Having said all that, I don’t necessarily object to posing questions to Scripture which the author didn’t intend to answer. For a text may contain logical implications that are valid irrespective of what was foremost in the mind of the writer. These are consistent with what he meant, even if that happens to be incidental to his immediate point.

What the Arminian would say is that the impossibility of restoration presupposes the possibility of apostasy. Unless it’s possible to defect from the faith, the impossibility of restoration is a moot issue. So why would the author even introduce this irrelevancy?

5.But even at that level, the inference fails to follow.

i) For it might depend on what is mooting the possibility of apostasy. The deterrent value of these very warnings may serve that purpose.

ii) This is further reinforced by the fact that if an Arminian is going to say the threat is hyperbolic, then the Calvinist can make the same move. Suppose a Calvinist says the possibility of a true believing falling away is a “genuine” possibility, but only in the counterfactual sense that if he went down this road, that consequence would follow—even though that is not a live possibility?

An Arminian will typically argue that this mitigating condition renders the threat “meaningless.” If, however, the Arminian softens the threat by claiming that the terms of the threat are hyperbolic, to harmonize the threat with his Arminian belief in the possibility of restoration, then the Arminian is in no position to attack the Reformed position. If the impossibility of restoration is hyperbolic, then why not treat the possibility of apostasy (however defined) as equally hyperbolic? Why take one literally, but not the other?

In light of Witherington’s rhetorical strategy, which he deploys to defend his Arminian commitments, it’s unintentionally comical to read an Arminian epologist wax indignant, in volleys of quaint, ornate diction, if the Calvinist is merely making the same hermeneutical move as Witherington :

“Translation: The warnings are divine shock value, their consequences mere coercion. I'd already factored in this defense into the challenge, concerning which I point out an obvious problem: All inherent problems aside, even if this were the case and God were simply 'putting us on,' so to speak, for the sake of our living righteously, then is it not better to take the Lord at His word? If God's purpose in giving such warnings was to make us live holy unto Him by indicating that if we walk away from Him, He will cast us away, yet you teach a doctrine that states He would never under any circumstance actually do such a thing, then have you not undone the holy fear which God's word was meant to instill in the hearts of His people and again made it of no effect?… I agree that God does indeed spur we who are His on to glory with warnings, but not with hollow threats of Him committing things He would never actually do based on things He won't let happen… Are we to seriously believe that God's holy word is touting false and misleading doctrine for the sake of our good practice? God isn't mumbling crazy impossibilities, heresy, or idle threats into the air to keep us secure."

http://arminianperspectives.blogspot.com/search?q=Hays

I’d suggest that Thibodaux redirect his baroque indignation at Arminian commentators like Witherington.

iii) Likewise, the Calvinist can also invoke the hyperbolic interpretation to distinguish between backsliders and apostates. The former will be restored, while the latter will not.

6.However, the Arminian objection is fallacious in another respect as well. A Calvinist doesn’t have to treat the possibility of apostasy as a merely hypothetical outcome. He can admit that this is a live possibility. That there are real life examples.

Remember, a Calvinist doesn’t think the terminology of Heb 6 & 10 denotes regeneration. In Reformed theology, an individual can experience what is described in these passages, and yet fall away at a later date—never to return. So this passage has a real world application in Calvinism. We apply it to nominal believers. As one scholar explains:

“More importantly, the above analysis sheds some valuable light on the vexing question of the status of those envisioned in Heb 6:4-6. After analyzing the statements in vv. 4-6, McKnight confidently concludes that ‘[i]f the author is accurate in his description of the readers' experience, then we can only say that they are believers—true believers.’49 However, the preceding analysis leads us in a different direction. It appears that in analogy to the old covenant community the people depicted in 6:4-6 are not genuine believers or true members of the new covenant community. Like their OT counterparts, they have experienced all these blessings (vv. 4-5), but like the wilderness generation they are hardhearted, rebellious (3:8) and possess an "evil heart of unbelief” (3:12, 19).50 More clearly, 4:2 poignantly states that both groups (the wilderness generation and the new covenant community) have had the gospel preached to them, but the wilderness generation to which the readers of Hebrews are compared failed to believe, and therefore the message was of no value to them. Thus, the conclusion of Lane that ‘[t]ogether, the clauses describe vividly the reality of the experience of personal salvation enjoyed by the Christians addressed’ is premature.51 Wayne A. Grudem has recently proposed a similar understanding to the one presented in this section.52 According to him, the descriptive phrases themselves in vv. 4-6 are inconclusive as to whether the subjects are genuine believers or not. Here in Hebrews 6 they describe ‘people who were not yet Christians but who had simply heard the gospel and had experienced several of the blessings of the Holy Spirit's work in the Christian community.’53 The falling away (v. 6) is not a falling from salvation, but a failure to exercise saving faith in light of the blessings to which the readers have been exposed through association with the Christian community.54 The preceding analysis of the OT background to 6:4-6 confirms Grudem's conclusions. Thus in analogy to the old covenant community, those envisioned in vv. 4-6 have experienced the blessings of the new covenant (‘being enlightened,’ ‘tasting the heavenly gift,’ etc.), experiences common to all by virtue of belonging to the new covenant community, but have recapitulated the error of their old covenant predecessors by failing to believe and rejecting what they have experienced. In doing so they come under the covenantal curse."

http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/Ted_Hildebrandt/OTeSources/04-Numbers/Text/Articles/Mathewson-Heb6OT-WTJ.pdf.

7.The reason a Calvinist has to spend a lot of time discussing those to whom the text does not apply (the elect) is because the Arminian wants to apply this text to Christians. That’s why the Calvinist has to shift attention away from its area of applicability (nominal believers) to its area of inapplicability (true believers). That’s the point at which a Calvinist will talk about counterfactual truth-values.

But this doesn’t mean we think the possibility only obtains in some possible world. It also obtains in the actual world. But it doesn’t obtain in the case of the elect.