In another thread, I gave Orthodox two links to articles I've written about the sinlessness of Mary (here and here). In response, he wrote:
"If we just take the identified ECFs here, and not the commentaries, there's nothing here about Mary sinning. One quote about Mary not being perfectly righteous (orthodox would say she was born with the propensity to sin of Adam, thus she did lack something to be perfectly righteous.) a quote about Jesus being the only 'Man' who was sinless. Then a bunch of quotes about various things that occured in Jesus' life where you are apparently ASSUMING that must mean she is thought to have sinned."
Notice the unreasonable manner in which he interprets "man". Notice how he ignores the use of other terms in these sources, like "all", not just "man". Notice how he tries to avoid interacting with the scholars I cited, since those scholars aren't original documents.
Here are some examples of what these patristic sources said about Mary. Read these comments of John Chrysostom and see if you, like Orthodox, are unable to discern any references to Mary as a sinner:
"even to have borne Christ in the womb, and to have brought forth that marvellous birth, hath no profit, if there be not virtue. And this is hence especially manifest. 'For while He yet talked to the people,' it is said, 'one told Him, Thy mother and Thy brethren seek Thee. Butt He saith, who is my mother, and who are my brethren?' [Matthew 12:46-48] And this He said, not as being ashamed of His mother, nor denying her that bare Him; for if He had been ashamed of her, He would not have passed through that womb; but as declaring that she hath no advantage from this, unless she do all that is required to be done. For in fact that which she had essayed to do, was of superfluous vanity; in that she wanted to show the people that she hath power and authority over her Son, imagining not as yet anything great concerning Him; whence also her unseasonable approach. See at all events both her self-confidence and theirs. Since when they ought to have gone in, and listened with the multitude; or if they were not so minded, to have waited for His bringing His discourse to an end, and then to have come near; they call Him out, and do this before all, evincing a superfluous vanity, and wishing to make it appear, that with much authority they enjoin Him. And this too the evangelist shows that he is blaming, for with this very allusion did he thus express himself, 'While He yet talked to the people;' as if he should say, What? was there no other opportunity? Why, was it not possible to speak with Him in private?" (Homilies On Matthew, 44)
"For where parents cause no impediment or hindrance in things belonging to God, it is our bounden duty to give way to them, and there is great danger in not doing so; but when they require anything unseasonably, and cause hindrance in any spiritual matter, it is unsafe to obey. And therefore He answered thus in this place, and again elsewhere, 'Who is My mother, and who are My brethren?' [Matthew 12:48], because they did not yet think rightly of Him; and she, because she had borne Him, claimed, according to the custom of other mothers, to direct Him in all things, when she ought to have reverenced and worshiped Him. This then was the reason why He answered as He did on that occassion....And so this was a reason why He rebuked her on that occasion, saying, 'Woman, what have I to do with thee?' [John 2:4] instructing her for the future not to do the like; because, though He was careful to honor His mother, yet He cared much for the salvation of her soul" (Homilies On John, 21)
We've already repeatedly seen Orthodox's poor exegetical skills with regard to scripture. He seems to have a lot of problems with interpreting the church fathers as well.
Saturday, March 17, 2007
Friday, March 16, 2007
Praying To The Deceased
In another thread, Orthodox wrote the following in defense of praying to the deceased:
"St. Cyprian of Carthage writing to Pope Cornelius of Rome said that the Saints should keep praying for one another even after some depart to be in the presence of God. And that is all that the Orthodox want to do is ask the Saints to keep praying for us."
Was Cornelius dead when Cyprian wrote to him? No, he wasn't. Asking a living person to pray for you after he dies isn't equivalent to praying to the deceased. See here and here for some discussions of the evidence against praying to the dead.
And is it true that "all that the Orthodox want to do is ask the Saints to keep praying for us"? No, that's not true. Here, below, are some examples of prayers to Mary in Eastern Orthodoxy. Notice that they do much more than asking Mary to pray for them. And even if they did only ask her to pray for them, the practice would still involve praying to the deceased, something the earliest Christians knew nothing about and sometimes condemned.
Here's an example of a prayer to Mary:
Another example:
"St. Cyprian of Carthage writing to Pope Cornelius of Rome said that the Saints should keep praying for one another even after some depart to be in the presence of God. And that is all that the Orthodox want to do is ask the Saints to keep praying for us."
Was Cornelius dead when Cyprian wrote to him? No, he wasn't. Asking a living person to pray for you after he dies isn't equivalent to praying to the deceased. See here and here for some discussions of the evidence against praying to the dead.
And is it true that "all that the Orthodox want to do is ask the Saints to keep praying for us"? No, that's not true. Here, below, are some examples of prayers to Mary in Eastern Orthodoxy. Notice that they do much more than asking Mary to pray for them. And even if they did only ask her to pray for them, the practice would still involve praying to the deceased, something the earliest Christians knew nothing about and sometimes condemned.
Here's an example of a prayer to Mary:
Rejoice Mary, Mother of God, Virgin, full of grace, the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women and blessed is the Fruit of thy womb, for thou hast borne the Savior of our souls. Meet it is in truth, to glorify thee, O Birth-giver of God, ever blessed, and all undefiled, the Mother of our God. More honorable than the Cherubim, and beyond compare more glorious than the Seraphim, thou who without stain didst bear God the word, true Birth-giver of God, we magnify thee.
O gracious Mother of the gracious God, O most pure and blessed Mary, the Mother of God, pour the mercy of thy Son and our God upon my impassionate soul, and with thine intercessions set me unto good deeds, that I may pass the rest of my life without blemish and, with thine aid, attain heaven. O Virgin mother of God, the only one who art pure and blessed. O Queen of the Heavenly Host, Defender of our souls: being delivered from evil, as thy servants, O Mother of God, we offer unto thee the hymns of thanks and victory; but as thou hast power invincible, deliver us from all calamity, that we may cry unto thee: Rejoice, O ever-Virgin Bride!O virgin, spotless, undefiled, unstained, all-chaste and Pure Lady, Bride of God, who by the glorious birth-giving hast united God the Word with Man and linked our fallen nature with Heavenly Things; who art the hope of the hopeless, the helper of the oppressed, the ready protection of those who haste unto thee, and the refuge of Christians; despise me not, who am defiled and sinful, who by my wicked thoughts, words and deeds, have become an unworthy servant, and by my slothfulness have turned into a slave to evil affections. O Mother of the God of Love, have mercy and compassion upon me, a sinner and a prodigal. Accept this prayer which is offered to thee from my impure lips; and putting forward thy maternal influence with thy Son, my Lord and Master, beseech Him to open unto me the lovingkindness of His grace; beseech Him to overlook my countless transgressions, to give me true repentance and to make me to be a zealous doer of His commandments. And thou, being gracious and compassionate and tender-hearted, be thou ever present with me in this life as my defender and helper, so that I may turn aside the assault of my enemies, and guide me into salvation; help my poor soul at the hour of my death, and drive far from it all the dark forms of the evil ones. And in the dreadful Judgement Day, deliver me from everlasting punishment, and present me as an inheritor of the ineffable glory of the son, our God.
O may I obtain this, most-holy Lady and Birth-giver of God, through thine intercessions and mediations, by the grace and exceeding great love of thine Only-Begotten son, my Lord and God and Savior, Jesus Christ, to Whom is due, with the eternal Father and the All-Holy, Good and Life-Giving Spirit, all honor and glory and worship, now and ever, and unto ages of ages. Amen.O most glorious Ever-Virgin Mary, Mother of Christ our God, accept our prayers and present them to thy son and our God, that He may, for thy sake, enlighten and save our souls. (source here)
Another example:
Tenderness springs forth from you, O Theotokos, make us worthy of
compassion. Look upon sinful people, reveal your power for ever as we hope in
you and cry aloud: Hail! as did the Archangel Gabriel, Chief Captain of the
Bodiless Powers. Amen. (source here)
Thursday, March 15, 2007
Sola Ecclesia
(submitted on behalf of Steve Hays)
Several years ago, Philip Blosser wrote a thoroughgoing critique of sola scriptura entitled:
“Philosophical and Practical Problems with Sola Scriptura.”
At a later date he posted his article online:
http://www.lrc.edu/rel/blosser/Sola.htm
I then posted a reply:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/12/by-scripture-alone_116761459386808418.html
And he, in turn, posted a rejoinder.
http://catholictradition.blogspot.com/2007_01_01_archive.html#116811942690127319
This is my surrejoinder.
It’s not quite as longwinded as it looks, for a fair amount of the word count involves me quoting him quoting me quoting him.
Because our arguments and counterarguments are so intercalated at this point, there’s not much opportunity to cut it down.
I’ve responded to most of what he’s said. I’ve skipped over a few things where I either thought it was becoming redundant or where I felt that we’d pursued a particular matter as far as it needed to go.
I doubt many readers will complain that it should have been longer.
Download the Acrobat PDF or the Microsoft Reader version.
(Future versions of this document, and Steve Hays' other downloadable writings including This Joyful Eastertide: A Critical Review of The Empty Tomb, can be found here as well.)
Several years ago, Philip Blosser wrote a thoroughgoing critique of sola scriptura entitled:
“Philosophical and Practical Problems with Sola Scriptura.”
At a later date he posted his article online:
http://www.lrc.edu/rel/blosser/Sola.htm
I then posted a reply:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/12/by-scripture-alone_116761459386808418.html
And he, in turn, posted a rejoinder.
http://catholictradition.blogspot.com/2007_01_01_archive.html#116811942690127319
This is my surrejoinder.
It’s not quite as longwinded as it looks, for a fair amount of the word count involves me quoting him quoting me quoting him.
Because our arguments and counterarguments are so intercalated at this point, there’s not much opportunity to cut it down.
I’ve responded to most of what he’s said. I’ve skipped over a few things where I either thought it was becoming redundant or where I felt that we’d pursued a particular matter as far as it needed to go.
I doubt many readers will complain that it should have been longer.
Download the Acrobat PDF or the Microsoft Reader version.
(Future versions of this document, and Steve Hays' other downloadable writings including This Joyful Eastertide: A Critical Review of The Empty Tomb, can be found here as well.)
Grandma Got Run Over By A Mugger
**********
`There is one general law [natural selection] leading to the advancement of all organic beings, namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die'. - Charles Darwin
**********
**********
When male lions reach sexual maturity they tend to leave the pride otherwise they will have to challenge the dominant male in the pride. Once the young males leave the pride they start searching for other prides where they challenge the dominant males to be able to join the pride. Being younger and stronger, the young males usually kick the old males out, and moreover they kill the old males' cubs to provide better chance for their own cubs.
http://www.insyncexotics.com/educ/educationFramework.htm
**********
Territory; lions are social animals, unlike most other members of the cat family, living in a pride (family group) with between 20 and 30 members. Some prides have just one male, others up to four. Lions are strongly territorial and will fight off any strange male who tries to enter their territory. Fights can be vicious, often not ending until one lion is dead. The winner takes over dominance of the territory, and the pride. Old or injured lions who have lost their territory often die trying to fend for themselves.
http://www.yptenc.org.uk/docs/factsheets/animal_facts/lion.html
**********
**********
Wild Facts
Only the strong survive
Predators often catch and kill the weakest animals in the population. Biologists think that wolves tend to kill young, old, weak, or injured moose and deer because they are not able to swiftly escape wolf attacks. The wolf is actually strengthening the moose population by removing the old and sick and leaving the healthiest to have young.
http://www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/youthdevelopment/components/6340-02.html
**********
NEW YORK - For a moment, the man in the grainy video looks like a good Samaritan holding the door open for an elderly neighbor. Then he turns and delivers three sharp punches to the 101-year-old woman’s head.
...
The 85-year-old woman believed to be the mugger’s second victim, Solange Elizee, told police she was punched and pushed to the floor outside her apartment door by a man who had initially offered to help her get home.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17557851/
**********
Grandma got run over by a mugger
Walking home from our house Christmas eve.
You can say there are such things as ethics,
But as for me and Darwin, we disbelieve.
She'd been trusting too much in Darwinian society,
And we'd begged her not to go.
But she'd left her medication,
So she stumbled out the door into the snow.
When they found her Christmas mornin',
At the scene of the attack.
There were knuckle prints on her forehead,
And incriminatin' Mugger marks on her back.
Grandma got run over by a mugger,
Walkin' home from our house Christmas eve.
You can say there are such things as ethics,
But as for me and Darwin, we disbelieve.
Now were all not so proud of our fellow Darwinists,
They've been being inconsistent so well.
See them in there watchin' the nightly news,
Drinkin' beer and condeming the mugger's actions as not so swell.
It's not Christmas without Grandma.
All the family's dressed in black.
And we just can't help but wonder:
Why care when the elderly are under attack?
Grandma got run over by a mugger,
Walkin' home from our house Christmas eve.
You can say there are such things as ethics,
But as for me and Grandpa, we disbelieve.
Now we all know ethics is a fable.
And the strong will survive to live.
Maybe next time they'll beat down old aunt Mable,
And pull the hair out of your Grandma's wig.
I've warned all my friends and neighbours.
"Better watch out for Grandma."
If we live in Darwin's world,
Who cares if a man gives her a Cerebral edema?
Grandma got run over by a mugger,
Walkin' home from our house, Christmas eve.
You can say there are such things as ethics,
But as for me and Darwin, we believe.
**********
Exodus 20:12 Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land which Jehovah thy God giveth thee.
**********
Q. 123. Which is the fifth commandment?
A. The fifth commandment is, Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Q. 124. Who are meant by father and mother in the fifth commandment?
A. By father and mother, in the fifth commandment, are meant, not only natural parents, but all superiors in age and gifts; and especially such as, by God’s ordinance, are over us in place of authority, whether in family, church, or commonwealth.
-Westminster Larger Catechism
**********
Don't be jealous that you've been borrowing from my worldview when you've been condemning these recent attacks on the elderly.
`There is one general law [natural selection] leading to the advancement of all organic beings, namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die'. - Charles Darwin
**********
**********
When male lions reach sexual maturity they tend to leave the pride otherwise they will have to challenge the dominant male in the pride. Once the young males leave the pride they start searching for other prides where they challenge the dominant males to be able to join the pride. Being younger and stronger, the young males usually kick the old males out, and moreover they kill the old males' cubs to provide better chance for their own cubs.
http://www.insyncexotics.com/educ/educationFramework.htm
**********
Territory; lions are social animals, unlike most other members of the cat family, living in a pride (family group) with between 20 and 30 members. Some prides have just one male, others up to four. Lions are strongly territorial and will fight off any strange male who tries to enter their territory. Fights can be vicious, often not ending until one lion is dead. The winner takes over dominance of the territory, and the pride. Old or injured lions who have lost their territory often die trying to fend for themselves.
http://www.yptenc.org.uk/docs/factsheets/animal_facts/lion.html
**********
**********
Wild Facts
Only the strong survive
Predators often catch and kill the weakest animals in the population. Biologists think that wolves tend to kill young, old, weak, or injured moose and deer because they are not able to swiftly escape wolf attacks. The wolf is actually strengthening the moose population by removing the old and sick and leaving the healthiest to have young.
http://www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/youthdevelopment/components/6340-02.html
**********
NEW YORK - For a moment, the man in the grainy video looks like a good Samaritan holding the door open for an elderly neighbor. Then he turns and delivers three sharp punches to the 101-year-old woman’s head.
...
The 85-year-old woman believed to be the mugger’s second victim, Solange Elizee, told police she was punched and pushed to the floor outside her apartment door by a man who had initially offered to help her get home.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17557851/
**********
Grandma got run over by a mugger
Walking home from our house Christmas eve.
You can say there are such things as ethics,
But as for me and Darwin, we disbelieve.
She'd been trusting too much in Darwinian society,
And we'd begged her not to go.
But she'd left her medication,
So she stumbled out the door into the snow.
When they found her Christmas mornin',
At the scene of the attack.
There were knuckle prints on her forehead,
And incriminatin' Mugger marks on her back.
Grandma got run over by a mugger,
Walkin' home from our house Christmas eve.
You can say there are such things as ethics,
But as for me and Darwin, we disbelieve.
Now were all not so proud of our fellow Darwinists,
They've been being inconsistent so well.
See them in there watchin' the nightly news,
Drinkin' beer and condeming the mugger's actions as not so swell.
It's not Christmas without Grandma.
All the family's dressed in black.
And we just can't help but wonder:
Why care when the elderly are under attack?
Grandma got run over by a mugger,
Walkin' home from our house Christmas eve.
You can say there are such things as ethics,
But as for me and Grandpa, we disbelieve.
Now we all know ethics is a fable.
And the strong will survive to live.
Maybe next time they'll beat down old aunt Mable,
And pull the hair out of your Grandma's wig.
I've warned all my friends and neighbours.
"Better watch out for Grandma."
If we live in Darwin's world,
Who cares if a man gives her a Cerebral edema?
Grandma got run over by a mugger,
Walkin' home from our house, Christmas eve.
You can say there are such things as ethics,
But as for me and Darwin, we believe.
**********
Exodus 20:12 Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land which Jehovah thy God giveth thee.
**********
Q. 123. Which is the fifth commandment?
A. The fifth commandment is, Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Q. 124. Who are meant by father and mother in the fifth commandment?
A. By father and mother, in the fifth commandment, are meant, not only natural parents, but all superiors in age and gifts; and especially such as, by God’s ordinance, are over us in place of authority, whether in family, church, or commonwealth.
-Westminster Larger Catechism
**********
Don't be jealous that you've been borrowing from my worldview when you've been condemning these recent attacks on the elderly.
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
Secular shark bait
A couple of unbelievers have responded to my Benatar post.
Before I offer a direct reply, I’d just note that both the anonymous commenter and Loftus are attempting to change the subject.
I posted a couple of reviews of book by David Benatar. This is a book which was recently published by one of the premier academic publishing houses in the world.
Here is a little bit more about Benatar:
“David Benatar PhD is Associate Professor in the UCT Department of Philosophy. He has been actively involved with developing and teaching medical ethics in Cape Town, in close collaboration with Professor S Benatar, since these activities were initiated in the 1980s. He is the editor of an anthology on 'Ethics for Everyday' published by McGraw Hill in 2001.”
http://www.irensa.org/cgi/about.cgi
And who is the other Benatar?
“Program Director - Solomon R Benatar MB ChB, FFA, FRCP, FACP (Hon) was Head of the Department of Internal Medicine at the University of Cape Town and Chief Physician at Groote Schuur Hospital from 1980-1999. He has been an invited teacher at many medical schools world-wide. During the past decade he has led the University of Cape Town's Centre for Bioethics, as its founding Director. He is an elected Foreign Member of the US National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine (1989), and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1994). He has been a consultant to the World Health Organization, UNAIDS, Medecins Sans Frontiers and the HIV Prevention Trials Network He is Visiting Professor in Medicine and Public Health Sciences at the University of Toronto (1999-). He is Chairman of the South African National Research Ethics Committee, and President of the International Association of Bioethics.”
Other faculty include:
***QUOTE***
Associate Director - Theodore E Fleischer JD, LL.M had an extensive career in law in the USA. As a practising attorney, he engaged in a wide variety of legal and government activities, including representation of the Alaska State Legislature and other State and local government agencies. He undertook two years of graduate study (1995-97) at the Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law and the Law Faculty at McGill University, where he obtained the LL.M with specialization in Bioethics. He then spent two years as a fellow (later senior fellow) at the MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics at the University of Chicago. In 1999 he became a Visiting Scholar at the University of Cape Town Bioethics Centre. He taught, and supervised student dissertations, in the UCT MPhil in Bioethics program, and also developed and teaches a course in Law and Medicine at the UCT Law Faculty.
Bernard Dickens PhD, LL.D is Professor, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Medicine, Centre of Criminology, Institute of Medical Science, and Joint Centre for Bioethics, University of Toronto and Adjunct Professor of Law, School of Public Health, Columbia University. He taught at the Law Society' school, The College of Law, in London, England until 1974 when he left to join the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto. He was research Professor there until 1980 when he took up his present position. He was a founder member of the University's Joint Centre for Bioethics, and continues to teach at the University's law school, medical school and bioethics centre. He chaired the Medical Research Council of Canada Committee of Ethics' Workshop Group to develop the MRC's 1987 Research Ethics Guidelines, and was a member of the Tri-Council Working Group developing the 1998 Tri-Council Policy Statement in research ethics. He was also a founder member and, from 1995 to 1999, Chair of the Research Ethics Board of the National Research Council of Canada. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine (London) and, since 1998, a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.
Lesley Henley PhD, MPhil Bioethics (UCT) is Senior Lecturer in the School of Child and Adolescent Health at UCT. She has supervised students' research dissertations in the fields of nursing science, occupational therapy, and pediatrics and child health: dissertations with a specific bioethics focus that she has supervised include "Professional nurses' perceptions at Red Cross War Memorial Children's Hospital concerning ethics and ethical dilemmas' (1996) and "The impact of HIV/AIDS on nursing staff as caregivers in a pediatric hospital' (ongoing). She has significant publications in bioethics and serves on the Research Ethics Committee in the Faculty of Health Sciences, UCT and on the Research Committee of the Institute of Child Health in the School of Child and Adolescent Health, UCT. She is a Consultant to the Ethics Institute of South Africa.
Willlem A Landman, DPhil, B Proc is currently Chief Executive Officer, Ethics Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa (since 2000) and Extraordinary Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. He was Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of the Western Cape, South Africa from 1986-1995, Full Professor with tenure, Department of Medical Humanities, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA from 1995-2000. He is Co-editor and co-founder of the international bioethics journal Developing World Bioethics. He has been on the Editorial Board of the South African Journal of Philosophy, since 1994. He has had extensive experience teaching bioethics to medical students and PhD research students in the medical sciences.
Paul Roux MD, M Phil Bioethics is Senior Lecturer, Department of Pediatrics and Child Health, Senior Pediatrician and Head of Pediatric HIV/AIDS service, Groote Schuur Hospital. He teaches Pediatrics at undergraduate and post-graduate level and supervisors post-graduate research students. He also works on Community information and liaison projects on the HIV/AIDS epidemic. His community activities include the development and management of Pediatric HIV/AIDS clinic at Groote Schuur hospital and the creation of the Kidzpositive Family Fund for support of families affected by HIV/AIDS. (http://www.kidzpositive.org) He has been a Visiting Scholar at the Hastings Center, and he is collaborating with Angela Wasunna and Daniel Callahan on a project relating to 'Ethical and Legal issues relating to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Southern Africa' (June 2001).
Peter A. Singer, MD, MPH, FRCPC is the Sun Life Chair in Bioethics, Director of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics and Director of the Canadian Program on Genomics and Global Health. He is also Professor of Medicine at Toronto Western Hospital. He studied internal medicine at the University of Toronto, medical ethics at the University of Chicago, and clinical epidemiology at Yale University. He is a Medical Research Council of Canada Scientist, and an Associate Editor of the Canadian Medical Association Journal . He led the development of the CMAJ "Bioethics for clinicians" series, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada "Bioethics Education Project", and the "Ethics OSCE." He is a member of the ethics committee of the British Medical Journal, and Director of a WHO Collaborating Centre for Bioethics.
***END-QUOTE***
So Benatar isn’t just some flaky academic writing a flaky book on secular ethics. No, he’s on the faculty of The University of Cape Town Centre for Bioethics.
This is an institution which is teaching medical ethics to future physicians, nurses, and lawmakers.
Would you want to be treated, or have one of your family members treated, by a surgeon, nurse, or child psychologist or pediatrician who shared Benatar’s outlook on the value of human existence?
Would you want to see his outlook enacted into law? Become public policy?
Remember, this isn’t just a hypothetical. These are real world examples. That’s the mission of IRENSA.
And the faculty is very well connected. This isn’t just a South African thing. It’s international. And it’s political.
Again, I’m not saying that every faculty member shares Benatar’s philosophy. But his philosophy is clearly compatible with the objectives of IRENSA.
And he’s collaborated with Program Director.
Now, I don’t mind if secular commenters want to pose the same questions for the Christian.
But don’t use that as an excuse to shirk your own responsibilities in answering these same questions as well.
Benatar is merely taking an atheistic worldview to a logical extreme.
Except for a one-sentence intro, I didn’t comment on Benatar’s position. Rather, I simply posted a couple of reviews.
At one level, it requires no comment. It speaks for itself. This is the logical alternative to Christian anthropology and Christian ethics.
And I think it’s a public service to simply put this in the public domain so that everyone can see it for what it is.
There are basically two versions of humanism. There’s the hortatory, starry-eyed version promoted by the likes of Carl Sagan, Jacob Bronowsky, and Paul Kurtz.
This is the version which is put out for public consumption. It’s a softening-up exercise. It advertises atheism as a liberating force. It frees humanity from the shackles of superstition and oppression. Hallmark card humanism.
It’s a throwback to European anticlericalism.
After this advertising campaign has lowered popular resistance to atheism—especially among the elite policymakers—we are then treated to the utterly grim reality.
Moving along:
***QUOTE***
ANONYMOUS SAID:
In all seriousness, I fail to see how the Christian philosophy doesn't bring you to question bringing a child into this world more than I will question doing so: while I may, in fact, have a child with a finite life that may or may not be miserable and may or may not have cosmic "meaning" (as if "meaning's" existence is metaphysically objective), you may bring a child into existence which faces an infinite misery and whose "meaning" is to be consigned as a "vessel fit for destruction" and cast into hell.
How can you feel comforted at that thought? "Oh well, God chooses who He will?"
***END-QUOTE***
Several issues:
i) The word “child” is ambiguous, and it triggers different associations depending on which definition is in play.
a) A child may denote a young boy or girl.
b) A child may denote an adult descendant.
I don’t feel the same way about (i) as I do about (ii).
We are instinctively protective of young children, although the Singers and Benatars of the world are trying to erode that God-given instinct.
But the status of grownups or adult “children” is a good deal more complex.
ii) Suppose my son grows up to be a serial killer. How will I feel? I will feel conflicted, ambivalent.
iii) There are some parents who completely identify with their own kids. Their children can do no wrong.
If they discover that their son is a serial killer, they will cover for him. Buy him a plane ticket to a country without an extradition treaty. Send him a monthly stipend so that he can live in style. Anything for their boy.
At an emotional level, that may be understandable—but it is also deeply immoral.
iv) Apropos (iii), it’s a mistake to confuse sympathy with morality.
Although Moltmann would disagree, the fact is that sympathy or empathy is, strictly speaking, a human trait rather than a divine attribute.
In the nature of the case, you have to be the same kind of being, or sufficiently alike, to analogize or project from your experience to the other.
And there is often a conflict between empathy and justice.
Suppose my best friend from high school becomes a compulsive gambler or junkie. And suppose, due to his addiction, he robs me in order to support his habit.
Now, he’s guilty on two counts:
a) He’s blamable for becoming a compulsive gambler or junkie or porn addict, even though he may now be unable to kick the habit.
b) He’s also blamable for ripping me off. That’s theft. And stealing from a friend makes it worse.
And yet, I can’t help but sympathize with his plight. It’s a terrible thing to be sucked into vortex of self-destruction. It’s even more terrible when you know the consequences of your actions, but lack the willpower to resist the downward spiral.
One would be inhumane not to feel for someone in that condition—especially a friend or family member.
So I may forgive my friend, despite the injustice he’s done me. I may try my best to reclaim him, even though, in so doing, that gives him yet another opportunity to wrong me.
But God is not a man, and while empathy may be, up to a point, a human virtue, it is not a divine virtue. It is not even a divine attribute.
To be sure, God is often merciful, but that is not because he is literally sympathetic with our sorry situation. God doesn’t feel our pain. He knows our pain, but he doesn’t feel our pain.
By contrast, justice is a divine attribute. A judge whose heart goes out to the perpetrator at the expense of the victim is an unjust judge.
What is a virtue in a parent may be a vice in a judge. Emotional detachment is a virtue in a judge.
That’s why it’s best to assign the adjudication of justice to a disinterested third-party.
A judge who’s own son is arraigned in his own courtroom should recuse himself.
JOHN W. LOFTUS SAID:
“Have you ever heard of the phrase, ‘you'll wish you were never born?”"
i) As a matter of fact, the Bible admits that it would be better if some people were never born (Mt 18:6; 26:24).
However, Loftus’ objection is predicated on a couple of key equivocations.
ii) Better for whom?
Suppose a serial killer contracts terminal cancer. The cancer isn’t better for him, from his viewpoint, but it’s better for his prospective victims.
Cancer doesn’t do him any good, but it does his prospective victims a world of good, for he will die before he can kill again.
iii) Benatar’s position is that it would be better for everyone concerned if no one was born.
That is quite different than saying that it would be better for some people if they were never born.
For example, it would be better if some people never married. Or if they never married their particular spouse.
Does this justify the general inference that unless everyone has a happy marriage, no one should have a happy marriage?
We should deny everyone the opportunity to be happy unless, in fact, everyone is happy?
Maybe Loftus has such a sour outlook on life that he actually believes that. Consistent atheism can take an emotional toll. Embitter you to every natural good.
iv) But notice that Loftus and Benatar are presuming to speak for everyone. Yet it’s obvious that most folks, including most unbelievers, don’t feel that way—otherwise they’d commit suicide.
It’s pretty easy to kill yourself. There are many ways to do it. Some are fairly painless.
But most folks, including most unbelievers, don’t take their own lives. So they don’t feel that it was better never to be born.
To the contrary, many or most unbelievers fear death. They regret that this will come to an end. That they won’t get a chance to learn from their mistakes.
“This is what I'm referring to, and all you can do is to joke about it.”
Actually, they’ve been joking about you, John. You’re the joke.
“Because you can't face the problem head on for what it really is.”
I have written quite a lot about the problem of evil, and the argument from evil, and the doctrine of hell.
And David Wood has a blog exclusively devoted to that subject. He’s also debated the issue with Loftus.
So both of us regularly face the objections head on.
“Face the problem head on. There are people according to YOUR own theology who wish they had never been born.”
That’s irrelevant. The question at issue is not whether some people feel that way.
Rather, the question at issue is whether it is unjust to bring anyone into the world because some fraction of the total feels that way about their fate.
To revert to my earlier example, a serial killer will regret that he came down with terminal cancer.
But I don’t share his regret. The fact that he feels that way doesn’t mean that I feel the same way for him. To the contrary, if a serial killer dies of cancer, I celebrate.
“Stop joking about thie real situation from the standpoint of siler spoon in your mouths.”
“Silver spoon?” It’s not as if unbelievers hold the patent on suffering or personal tragedy.
We live in the very same world you do. We’re exposed to the very same calamities. We simply respond differently.
“You actually make me sick.”
“Bottom tier buddy. Sorry. But that conclusion is inescapable.”
Loftus still doesn’t get it. He is merely flirting with unbelief. But he’s the one who can’t face the consequences of atheism head-on.
He constantly uses emotive language to shame his opponents into submission.
But atheism takes the sting out of shame. The rhetoric of shame loses its bite if you take atheism seriously.
And it also loses its bite of Christianity is true.
As I’ve said before, the atheist is gambling with Confederate currency. If he wins, he wins nothing of value—and if he loses, he loses nothing of value (from his perspective).
It’s a high stakes game with worthless money. If you win the bet, you lose by winning—and if you lose the bet, you lose by winning. Either way you lose.
And that isn’t merely my own opinion. Benatar clearly thinks that everyone loses out, merely be being born. Not just some people—but everyone without exception.
Atheism is a philosophy for losers. Welcome to The Losers Club.
Whether you’re on the upper deck or lower deck of the Titanic, you’re all headed down to the bottom of the sea. Secular shark bait.
Before I offer a direct reply, I’d just note that both the anonymous commenter and Loftus are attempting to change the subject.
I posted a couple of reviews of book by David Benatar. This is a book which was recently published by one of the premier academic publishing houses in the world.
Here is a little bit more about Benatar:
“David Benatar PhD is Associate Professor in the UCT Department of Philosophy. He has been actively involved with developing and teaching medical ethics in Cape Town, in close collaboration with Professor S Benatar, since these activities were initiated in the 1980s. He is the editor of an anthology on 'Ethics for Everyday' published by McGraw Hill in 2001.”
http://www.irensa.org/cgi/about.cgi
And who is the other Benatar?
“Program Director - Solomon R Benatar MB ChB, FFA, FRCP, FACP (Hon) was Head of the Department of Internal Medicine at the University of Cape Town and Chief Physician at Groote Schuur Hospital from 1980-1999. He has been an invited teacher at many medical schools world-wide. During the past decade he has led the University of Cape Town's Centre for Bioethics, as its founding Director. He is an elected Foreign Member of the US National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine (1989), and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1994). He has been a consultant to the World Health Organization, UNAIDS, Medecins Sans Frontiers and the HIV Prevention Trials Network He is Visiting Professor in Medicine and Public Health Sciences at the University of Toronto (1999-). He is Chairman of the South African National Research Ethics Committee, and President of the International Association of Bioethics.”
Other faculty include:
***QUOTE***
Associate Director - Theodore E Fleischer JD, LL.M had an extensive career in law in the USA. As a practising attorney, he engaged in a wide variety of legal and government activities, including representation of the Alaska State Legislature and other State and local government agencies. He undertook two years of graduate study (1995-97) at the Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law and the Law Faculty at McGill University, where he obtained the LL.M with specialization in Bioethics. He then spent two years as a fellow (later senior fellow) at the MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics at the University of Chicago. In 1999 he became a Visiting Scholar at the University of Cape Town Bioethics Centre. He taught, and supervised student dissertations, in the UCT MPhil in Bioethics program, and also developed and teaches a course in Law and Medicine at the UCT Law Faculty.
Bernard Dickens PhD, LL.D is Professor, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Medicine, Centre of Criminology, Institute of Medical Science, and Joint Centre for Bioethics, University of Toronto and Adjunct Professor of Law, School of Public Health, Columbia University. He taught at the Law Society' school, The College of Law, in London, England until 1974 when he left to join the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto. He was research Professor there until 1980 when he took up his present position. He was a founder member of the University's Joint Centre for Bioethics, and continues to teach at the University's law school, medical school and bioethics centre. He chaired the Medical Research Council of Canada Committee of Ethics' Workshop Group to develop the MRC's 1987 Research Ethics Guidelines, and was a member of the Tri-Council Working Group developing the 1998 Tri-Council Policy Statement in research ethics. He was also a founder member and, from 1995 to 1999, Chair of the Research Ethics Board of the National Research Council of Canada. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine (London) and, since 1998, a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.
Lesley Henley PhD, MPhil Bioethics (UCT) is Senior Lecturer in the School of Child and Adolescent Health at UCT. She has supervised students' research dissertations in the fields of nursing science, occupational therapy, and pediatrics and child health: dissertations with a specific bioethics focus that she has supervised include "Professional nurses' perceptions at Red Cross War Memorial Children's Hospital concerning ethics and ethical dilemmas' (1996) and "The impact of HIV/AIDS on nursing staff as caregivers in a pediatric hospital' (ongoing). She has significant publications in bioethics and serves on the Research Ethics Committee in the Faculty of Health Sciences, UCT and on the Research Committee of the Institute of Child Health in the School of Child and Adolescent Health, UCT. She is a Consultant to the Ethics Institute of South Africa.
Willlem A Landman, DPhil, B Proc is currently Chief Executive Officer, Ethics Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa (since 2000) and Extraordinary Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. He was Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of the Western Cape, South Africa from 1986-1995, Full Professor with tenure, Department of Medical Humanities, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA from 1995-2000. He is Co-editor and co-founder of the international bioethics journal Developing World Bioethics. He has been on the Editorial Board of the South African Journal of Philosophy, since 1994. He has had extensive experience teaching bioethics to medical students and PhD research students in the medical sciences.
Paul Roux MD, M Phil Bioethics is Senior Lecturer, Department of Pediatrics and Child Health, Senior Pediatrician and Head of Pediatric HIV/AIDS service, Groote Schuur Hospital. He teaches Pediatrics at undergraduate and post-graduate level and supervisors post-graduate research students. He also works on Community information and liaison projects on the HIV/AIDS epidemic. His community activities include the development and management of Pediatric HIV/AIDS clinic at Groote Schuur hospital and the creation of the Kidzpositive Family Fund for support of families affected by HIV/AIDS. (http://www.kidzpositive.org) He has been a Visiting Scholar at the Hastings Center, and he is collaborating with Angela Wasunna and Daniel Callahan on a project relating to 'Ethical and Legal issues relating to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Southern Africa' (June 2001).
Peter A. Singer, MD, MPH, FRCPC is the Sun Life Chair in Bioethics, Director of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics and Director of the Canadian Program on Genomics and Global Health. He is also Professor of Medicine at Toronto Western Hospital. He studied internal medicine at the University of Toronto, medical ethics at the University of Chicago, and clinical epidemiology at Yale University. He is a Medical Research Council of Canada Scientist, and an Associate Editor of the Canadian Medical Association Journal . He led the development of the CMAJ "Bioethics for clinicians" series, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada "Bioethics Education Project", and the "Ethics OSCE." He is a member of the ethics committee of the British Medical Journal, and Director of a WHO Collaborating Centre for Bioethics.
***END-QUOTE***
So Benatar isn’t just some flaky academic writing a flaky book on secular ethics. No, he’s on the faculty of The University of Cape Town Centre for Bioethics.
This is an institution which is teaching medical ethics to future physicians, nurses, and lawmakers.
Would you want to be treated, or have one of your family members treated, by a surgeon, nurse, or child psychologist or pediatrician who shared Benatar’s outlook on the value of human existence?
Would you want to see his outlook enacted into law? Become public policy?
Remember, this isn’t just a hypothetical. These are real world examples. That’s the mission of IRENSA.
And the faculty is very well connected. This isn’t just a South African thing. It’s international. And it’s political.
Again, I’m not saying that every faculty member shares Benatar’s philosophy. But his philosophy is clearly compatible with the objectives of IRENSA.
And he’s collaborated with Program Director.
Now, I don’t mind if secular commenters want to pose the same questions for the Christian.
But don’t use that as an excuse to shirk your own responsibilities in answering these same questions as well.
Benatar is merely taking an atheistic worldview to a logical extreme.
Except for a one-sentence intro, I didn’t comment on Benatar’s position. Rather, I simply posted a couple of reviews.
At one level, it requires no comment. It speaks for itself. This is the logical alternative to Christian anthropology and Christian ethics.
And I think it’s a public service to simply put this in the public domain so that everyone can see it for what it is.
There are basically two versions of humanism. There’s the hortatory, starry-eyed version promoted by the likes of Carl Sagan, Jacob Bronowsky, and Paul Kurtz.
This is the version which is put out for public consumption. It’s a softening-up exercise. It advertises atheism as a liberating force. It frees humanity from the shackles of superstition and oppression. Hallmark card humanism.
It’s a throwback to European anticlericalism.
After this advertising campaign has lowered popular resistance to atheism—especially among the elite policymakers—we are then treated to the utterly grim reality.
Moving along:
***QUOTE***
ANONYMOUS SAID:
In all seriousness, I fail to see how the Christian philosophy doesn't bring you to question bringing a child into this world more than I will question doing so: while I may, in fact, have a child with a finite life that may or may not be miserable and may or may not have cosmic "meaning" (as if "meaning's" existence is metaphysically objective), you may bring a child into existence which faces an infinite misery and whose "meaning" is to be consigned as a "vessel fit for destruction" and cast into hell.
How can you feel comforted at that thought? "Oh well, God chooses who He will?"
***END-QUOTE***
Several issues:
i) The word “child” is ambiguous, and it triggers different associations depending on which definition is in play.
a) A child may denote a young boy or girl.
b) A child may denote an adult descendant.
I don’t feel the same way about (i) as I do about (ii).
We are instinctively protective of young children, although the Singers and Benatars of the world are trying to erode that God-given instinct.
But the status of grownups or adult “children” is a good deal more complex.
ii) Suppose my son grows up to be a serial killer. How will I feel? I will feel conflicted, ambivalent.
iii) There are some parents who completely identify with their own kids. Their children can do no wrong.
If they discover that their son is a serial killer, they will cover for him. Buy him a plane ticket to a country without an extradition treaty. Send him a monthly stipend so that he can live in style. Anything for their boy.
At an emotional level, that may be understandable—but it is also deeply immoral.
iv) Apropos (iii), it’s a mistake to confuse sympathy with morality.
Although Moltmann would disagree, the fact is that sympathy or empathy is, strictly speaking, a human trait rather than a divine attribute.
In the nature of the case, you have to be the same kind of being, or sufficiently alike, to analogize or project from your experience to the other.
And there is often a conflict between empathy and justice.
Suppose my best friend from high school becomes a compulsive gambler or junkie. And suppose, due to his addiction, he robs me in order to support his habit.
Now, he’s guilty on two counts:
a) He’s blamable for becoming a compulsive gambler or junkie or porn addict, even though he may now be unable to kick the habit.
b) He’s also blamable for ripping me off. That’s theft. And stealing from a friend makes it worse.
And yet, I can’t help but sympathize with his plight. It’s a terrible thing to be sucked into vortex of self-destruction. It’s even more terrible when you know the consequences of your actions, but lack the willpower to resist the downward spiral.
One would be inhumane not to feel for someone in that condition—especially a friend or family member.
So I may forgive my friend, despite the injustice he’s done me. I may try my best to reclaim him, even though, in so doing, that gives him yet another opportunity to wrong me.
But God is not a man, and while empathy may be, up to a point, a human virtue, it is not a divine virtue. It is not even a divine attribute.
To be sure, God is often merciful, but that is not because he is literally sympathetic with our sorry situation. God doesn’t feel our pain. He knows our pain, but he doesn’t feel our pain.
By contrast, justice is a divine attribute. A judge whose heart goes out to the perpetrator at the expense of the victim is an unjust judge.
What is a virtue in a parent may be a vice in a judge. Emotional detachment is a virtue in a judge.
That’s why it’s best to assign the adjudication of justice to a disinterested third-party.
A judge who’s own son is arraigned in his own courtroom should recuse himself.
JOHN W. LOFTUS SAID:
“Have you ever heard of the phrase, ‘you'll wish you were never born?”"
i) As a matter of fact, the Bible admits that it would be better if some people were never born (Mt 18:6; 26:24).
However, Loftus’ objection is predicated on a couple of key equivocations.
ii) Better for whom?
Suppose a serial killer contracts terminal cancer. The cancer isn’t better for him, from his viewpoint, but it’s better for his prospective victims.
Cancer doesn’t do him any good, but it does his prospective victims a world of good, for he will die before he can kill again.
iii) Benatar’s position is that it would be better for everyone concerned if no one was born.
That is quite different than saying that it would be better for some people if they were never born.
For example, it would be better if some people never married. Or if they never married their particular spouse.
Does this justify the general inference that unless everyone has a happy marriage, no one should have a happy marriage?
We should deny everyone the opportunity to be happy unless, in fact, everyone is happy?
Maybe Loftus has such a sour outlook on life that he actually believes that. Consistent atheism can take an emotional toll. Embitter you to every natural good.
iv) But notice that Loftus and Benatar are presuming to speak for everyone. Yet it’s obvious that most folks, including most unbelievers, don’t feel that way—otherwise they’d commit suicide.
It’s pretty easy to kill yourself. There are many ways to do it. Some are fairly painless.
But most folks, including most unbelievers, don’t take their own lives. So they don’t feel that it was better never to be born.
To the contrary, many or most unbelievers fear death. They regret that this will come to an end. That they won’t get a chance to learn from their mistakes.
“This is what I'm referring to, and all you can do is to joke about it.”
Actually, they’ve been joking about you, John. You’re the joke.
“Because you can't face the problem head on for what it really is.”
I have written quite a lot about the problem of evil, and the argument from evil, and the doctrine of hell.
And David Wood has a blog exclusively devoted to that subject. He’s also debated the issue with Loftus.
So both of us regularly face the objections head on.
“Face the problem head on. There are people according to YOUR own theology who wish they had never been born.”
That’s irrelevant. The question at issue is not whether some people feel that way.
Rather, the question at issue is whether it is unjust to bring anyone into the world because some fraction of the total feels that way about their fate.
To revert to my earlier example, a serial killer will regret that he came down with terminal cancer.
But I don’t share his regret. The fact that he feels that way doesn’t mean that I feel the same way for him. To the contrary, if a serial killer dies of cancer, I celebrate.
“Stop joking about thie real situation from the standpoint of siler spoon in your mouths.”
“Silver spoon?” It’s not as if unbelievers hold the patent on suffering or personal tragedy.
We live in the very same world you do. We’re exposed to the very same calamities. We simply respond differently.
“You actually make me sick.”
“Bottom tier buddy. Sorry. But that conclusion is inescapable.”
Loftus still doesn’t get it. He is merely flirting with unbelief. But he’s the one who can’t face the consequences of atheism head-on.
He constantly uses emotive language to shame his opponents into submission.
But atheism takes the sting out of shame. The rhetoric of shame loses its bite if you take atheism seriously.
And it also loses its bite of Christianity is true.
As I’ve said before, the atheist is gambling with Confederate currency. If he wins, he wins nothing of value—and if he loses, he loses nothing of value (from his perspective).
It’s a high stakes game with worthless money. If you win the bet, you lose by winning—and if you lose the bet, you lose by winning. Either way you lose.
And that isn’t merely my own opinion. Benatar clearly thinks that everyone loses out, merely be being born. Not just some people—but everyone without exception.
Atheism is a philosophy for losers. Welcome to The Losers Club.
Whether you’re on the upper deck or lower deck of the Titanic, you’re all headed down to the bottom of the sea. Secular shark bait.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Liberal tax evasion
I’ve a native of the Evergreen State. Here’s a fascinating example of liberal tax evasion by citizens of two deep-dyed blue states.
Liberals believe in high taxes—as long as someone else pays.
*************************************************************
Vancouver [WA] lies just north across the Columbia River from Portland, Oregon. Because of its proximity to Portland, many people who live in Vancouver work there. Consequently, much of Vancouver's growth is due to Portlanders moving across the river but keeping their old jobs in Portland. In 2003, 70% of workers in Vancouver worked in Clark County. Those who live and work in Clark County do not have to pay Oregon's relatively high income tax. (Washington State does not have such a tax.) Additionally, they may choose to shop in Portland to take advantage of a wider variety of shopping choices, and the fact that Oregon has no sales tax. Very few other cities in the USA allow for such an easy avoidance of both sales and income tax.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vancouver,_Washington
Liberals believe in high taxes—as long as someone else pays.
*************************************************************
Vancouver [WA] lies just north across the Columbia River from Portland, Oregon. Because of its proximity to Portland, many people who live in Vancouver work there. Consequently, much of Vancouver's growth is due to Portlanders moving across the river but keeping their old jobs in Portland. In 2003, 70% of workers in Vancouver worked in Clark County. Those who live and work in Clark County do not have to pay Oregon's relatively high income tax. (Washington State does not have such a tax.) Additionally, they may choose to shop in Portland to take advantage of a wider variety of shopping choices, and the fact that Oregon has no sales tax. Very few other cities in the USA allow for such an easy avoidance of both sales and income tax.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vancouver,_Washington
Pre-Reformation Disunity
In another thread, Orthodox wrote:
"It may be an unfair exaggeration to say there are 30,000 unique denominations, as is sometimes quoted. Still, there ARE thousands, which is considerably more than 1 that existed a thousand years ago."
I don't know whether Orthodox intended his comment to apply to one thousand years ago and no other timeframe. If so, then the objection doesn't seem to have much significance. If there were other denominations before and after one thousand years ago, then what would be the significance of singling out one short period around 1000 A.D.? Even during that short period, there were many different groups professing to be Christian, with a wide variety of beliefs. He goes on to write:
"Just the other day I was talking to someone from a major protestant group in the Phillipines, who among other wierdnesses, only partakes communion once per year."
I'll assume, for the sake of discussion, that the group in question actually is Protestant rather than being labeled as such just because it isn't Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox, for example. I disagree with only partaking of communion once a year, but that difference among Protestants isn't as significant as many of the differences that existed among professing Christians prior to the Reformation.
Pre-Reformation Christians disagreed with each other on many issues, to differing degrees of significance. People may choose not to apply the term "denomination" to these pre-Reformation divisions, but many of these people acted independently of one another and considered their churches governmentally independent of other churches they disagreed with. As early as the second century, the pagan critic Celsus would comment:
"Christians at first were few in number, and held the same opinions; but when they grew to be a great multitude, they were divided and separated, each wishing to have his own individual party: for this was their object from the beginning....being thus separated through their numbers, they confute one another, still having, so to speak, one name in common, if indeed they still retain it. And this is the only thing which they are yet ashamed to abandon, while other matters are determined in different ways by the various sects." (cited in Origen's Against Celsus, 3:10, 3:12)
It's to be expected that there will be a wider variety of professing Christians with the passing of time and with the expansion of social factors like the sort of political freedoms we have today in places like the United States. Just as there's a wider variety of professing Christians today than 500 years ago, we can expect there to be a wider variety 500 years from now than today. The same could be said of atheists, Muslims, etc.
Through the centuries, we find many disputes among the churches that existed, one bishop writing against another bishop, one church avoiding fellowship with another, councils held in opposition to each other, etc. (see, for example, Hippolytus, The Refutation Of All Heresies, 9:2; Athanasius, Festal Letter 29; John Chrysostom, Correspondence Of St. Chrysostom With The Bishop Of Rome, Letter 1:4; Jerome, Letter 16:2; etc.) A figure like Cyprian comes to mind, who held a high view of the unity of the bishops and church unity in general, yet repeatedly asserted the governmental independence of each bishop and had multiple public partings with the bishop of Rome. People often advocated high ideals with regard to church unity, yet also added many qualifiers to those ideals and were willing to assert independence from other churches and oppose those other churches when disagreements arose. We can't just quote what these people said about unity while ignoring the qualifiers they added and the incidents in which they practiced disunity.
Even in the Middle Ages, when there tended to be more of an effort toward outward displays of organizational unity and assistance in such efforts from the state, we still come across many incidents like this one Philip Schaff described:
"Henceforward the Immaculate Conception became an apple of discord between rival schools of Thomists and Scotists, and the rival orders of the Dominicans and Franciscans. They charged each other with heresy, and even with mortal sin for holding the one view or the other. Visions, marvelous fictions, weeping pictures of Mary, and letters from heaven were called in to help the argument for or against a fact which no human being, not even Mary herself, can know without a divine revelation. Four Dominicans, who were discovered in a pious fraud against the Franciscan doctrine, were burned, by order of a papal court, in Berne, on the eve of the Reformation. The Swedish prophetess, St. Birgitte, was assured in a vision by the Mother of God that she was conceived without original sin; while St. Catherine of Siena prophesied for the Dominicans that Mary was sanctified in the third hour after her conception." (The Creeds Of Christendom [Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998], Vol. I, pp. 123-124)
People who belong to the same denomination often disagree with each other about matters more significant than how often they take communion. Two Baptists who belong to governmentally independent churches often have more unity with each other than two Roman Catholics have with one another.
"For even as the Lord who dwells in us is one and the same, He everywhere joins and couples His own people in the bond of unity, whence their sound has gone out into the whole earth, who are sent by the Lord swiftly running in the spirit of unity; as, on the other hand, it is of no advantage that some are very near and joined together bodily, if in spirit and mind they differ, since souls cannot at all be united which divide themselves from God's unity." (Firmilian, Cyprian's Letter 74:3)
"It may be an unfair exaggeration to say there are 30,000 unique denominations, as is sometimes quoted. Still, there ARE thousands, which is considerably more than 1 that existed a thousand years ago."
I don't know whether Orthodox intended his comment to apply to one thousand years ago and no other timeframe. If so, then the objection doesn't seem to have much significance. If there were other denominations before and after one thousand years ago, then what would be the significance of singling out one short period around 1000 A.D.? Even during that short period, there were many different groups professing to be Christian, with a wide variety of beliefs. He goes on to write:
"Just the other day I was talking to someone from a major protestant group in the Phillipines, who among other wierdnesses, only partakes communion once per year."
I'll assume, for the sake of discussion, that the group in question actually is Protestant rather than being labeled as such just because it isn't Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox, for example. I disagree with only partaking of communion once a year, but that difference among Protestants isn't as significant as many of the differences that existed among professing Christians prior to the Reformation.
Pre-Reformation Christians disagreed with each other on many issues, to differing degrees of significance. People may choose not to apply the term "denomination" to these pre-Reformation divisions, but many of these people acted independently of one another and considered their churches governmentally independent of other churches they disagreed with. As early as the second century, the pagan critic Celsus would comment:
"Christians at first were few in number, and held the same opinions; but when they grew to be a great multitude, they were divided and separated, each wishing to have his own individual party: for this was their object from the beginning....being thus separated through their numbers, they confute one another, still having, so to speak, one name in common, if indeed they still retain it. And this is the only thing which they are yet ashamed to abandon, while other matters are determined in different ways by the various sects." (cited in Origen's Against Celsus, 3:10, 3:12)
It's to be expected that there will be a wider variety of professing Christians with the passing of time and with the expansion of social factors like the sort of political freedoms we have today in places like the United States. Just as there's a wider variety of professing Christians today than 500 years ago, we can expect there to be a wider variety 500 years from now than today. The same could be said of atheists, Muslims, etc.
Through the centuries, we find many disputes among the churches that existed, one bishop writing against another bishop, one church avoiding fellowship with another, councils held in opposition to each other, etc. (see, for example, Hippolytus, The Refutation Of All Heresies, 9:2; Athanasius, Festal Letter 29; John Chrysostom, Correspondence Of St. Chrysostom With The Bishop Of Rome, Letter 1:4; Jerome, Letter 16:2; etc.) A figure like Cyprian comes to mind, who held a high view of the unity of the bishops and church unity in general, yet repeatedly asserted the governmental independence of each bishop and had multiple public partings with the bishop of Rome. People often advocated high ideals with regard to church unity, yet also added many qualifiers to those ideals and were willing to assert independence from other churches and oppose those other churches when disagreements arose. We can't just quote what these people said about unity while ignoring the qualifiers they added and the incidents in which they practiced disunity.
Even in the Middle Ages, when there tended to be more of an effort toward outward displays of organizational unity and assistance in such efforts from the state, we still come across many incidents like this one Philip Schaff described:
"Henceforward the Immaculate Conception became an apple of discord between rival schools of Thomists and Scotists, and the rival orders of the Dominicans and Franciscans. They charged each other with heresy, and even with mortal sin for holding the one view or the other. Visions, marvelous fictions, weeping pictures of Mary, and letters from heaven were called in to help the argument for or against a fact which no human being, not even Mary herself, can know without a divine revelation. Four Dominicans, who were discovered in a pious fraud against the Franciscan doctrine, were burned, by order of a papal court, in Berne, on the eve of the Reformation. The Swedish prophetess, St. Birgitte, was assured in a vision by the Mother of God that she was conceived without original sin; while St. Catherine of Siena prophesied for the Dominicans that Mary was sanctified in the third hour after her conception." (The Creeds Of Christendom [Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998], Vol. I, pp. 123-124)
People who belong to the same denomination often disagree with each other about matters more significant than how often they take communion. Two Baptists who belong to governmentally independent churches often have more unity with each other than two Roman Catholics have with one another.
"For even as the Lord who dwells in us is one and the same, He everywhere joins and couples His own people in the bond of unity, whence their sound has gone out into the whole earth, who are sent by the Lord swiftly running in the spirit of unity; as, on the other hand, it is of no advantage that some are very near and joined together bodily, if in spirit and mind they differ, since souls cannot at all be united which divide themselves from God's unity." (Firmilian, Cyprian's Letter 74:3)
Monday, March 12, 2007
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence
For an uplifting exposition on the joys of atheism:
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence
by David Benatar
Editorial Reviews
Book Description
Most people believe that they were either benefited or at least not harmed by being brought into existence. Thus, if they ever do reflect on whether they should bring others into existence---rather than having children without even thinking about whether they should---they presume that they do them no harm. Better Never to Have Been challenges these assumptions. David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm. Although the good things in one's life make one's life go better than it otherwise would have gone, one could not have been deprived by their absence if one had not existed. Those who never exist cannot be deprived. However, by coming into existence one does suffer quite serious harms that could not have befallen one had one not come into existence. Drawing on the relevant psychological literature, the author shows that there are a number of well-documented features of human psychology that explain why people systematically overestimate the quality of their lives and why they are thus resistant to the suggestion that they were seriously harmed by being brought into existence. The author then argues for the 'anti-natal' view---that it is always wrong to have children---and he shows that combining the anti-natal view with common pro-choice views about foetal moral status yield a 'pro-death' view about abortion (at the earlier stages of gestation). Anti-natalism also implies that it would be better if humanity became extinct. Although counter-intuitive for many, that implication is defended, not least by showing that it solves many conundrums of moral theory about population.
A True Inconvenient Truth, March 12, 2007
Reviewer:
Juggernaught "Peace Through War" (USA) - See all my reviews
What still is never critically examined is the fact that when anyone brings a child to life; they bring on all of life's miseries and ills on to said child. Therefore every single horror brought on to this child is the parents' fault. Wouldn't it just have been better for that child to never have been born? We live and we die without purpose or meaning. Our existence is so sad and pathetic that we invent religions and a host of other nonsense to fit the theme of "ignorance is bliss." Let's think rationally about children shall we?
- Practically: Raising a child is no cake walk. All children are selfish little mongrels bent on getting things their way. Through the early stages of life, you're going to be constantly attending to their waste output. Growing older, they learn how to communicate in our language to say "gimme." Then with another slap to the face, they rebel for the sake of rebelling and eventually move out. You've just lost a generation of your life, congratulations.
- Economic factors: Want to put off your retirement? Want to live below the standards of what your paycheck indicates? Great! Nothing sucks out your money dry with absolutely no gain like bearing children.
- Moral considerations: Is it not immoral to force someone into life without invitation? Is it not the greatest wrong doing to bring a child into a world of untold suffering?
People have children just because they can and this is without any rational considerations. Some people say they want to pass down their genes. While that child may be composed of a similar biological structure, it is still not you and will never be you. Others have children because of hormones and we all know what I mean by that. You're going to cause around seventy years of suffering to someone else just because your hormones were raging? That has got to be one of the most selfish acts one can do.
I suspect that other reviewers will engage in personal attacks upon the author instead of evaluating the message. The author's message is a harsh truth that exposes parents to be the worst of people. Don't you know? Survival for the sake of survival can only cause pain to others.
Comments (2) | Was this review helpful to you?
http://www.amazon.com/Better-Never-Have-Been-Existence/dp/0199296421
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence
by David Benatar
Editorial Reviews
Book Description
Most people believe that they were either benefited or at least not harmed by being brought into existence. Thus, if they ever do reflect on whether they should bring others into existence---rather than having children without even thinking about whether they should---they presume that they do them no harm. Better Never to Have Been challenges these assumptions. David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm. Although the good things in one's life make one's life go better than it otherwise would have gone, one could not have been deprived by their absence if one had not existed. Those who never exist cannot be deprived. However, by coming into existence one does suffer quite serious harms that could not have befallen one had one not come into existence. Drawing on the relevant psychological literature, the author shows that there are a number of well-documented features of human psychology that explain why people systematically overestimate the quality of their lives and why they are thus resistant to the suggestion that they were seriously harmed by being brought into existence. The author then argues for the 'anti-natal' view---that it is always wrong to have children---and he shows that combining the anti-natal view with common pro-choice views about foetal moral status yield a 'pro-death' view about abortion (at the earlier stages of gestation). Anti-natalism also implies that it would be better if humanity became extinct. Although counter-intuitive for many, that implication is defended, not least by showing that it solves many conundrums of moral theory about population.
A True Inconvenient Truth, March 12, 2007
Reviewer:
Juggernaught "Peace Through War" (USA) - See all my reviews
What still is never critically examined is the fact that when anyone brings a child to life; they bring on all of life's miseries and ills on to said child. Therefore every single horror brought on to this child is the parents' fault. Wouldn't it just have been better for that child to never have been born? We live and we die without purpose or meaning. Our existence is so sad and pathetic that we invent religions and a host of other nonsense to fit the theme of "ignorance is bliss." Let's think rationally about children shall we?
- Practically: Raising a child is no cake walk. All children are selfish little mongrels bent on getting things their way. Through the early stages of life, you're going to be constantly attending to their waste output. Growing older, they learn how to communicate in our language to say "gimme." Then with another slap to the face, they rebel for the sake of rebelling and eventually move out. You've just lost a generation of your life, congratulations.
- Economic factors: Want to put off your retirement? Want to live below the standards of what your paycheck indicates? Great! Nothing sucks out your money dry with absolutely no gain like bearing children.
- Moral considerations: Is it not immoral to force someone into life without invitation? Is it not the greatest wrong doing to bring a child into a world of untold suffering?
People have children just because they can and this is without any rational considerations. Some people say they want to pass down their genes. While that child may be composed of a similar biological structure, it is still not you and will never be you. Others have children because of hormones and we all know what I mean by that. You're going to cause around seventy years of suffering to someone else just because your hormones were raging? That has got to be one of the most selfish acts one can do.
I suspect that other reviewers will engage in personal attacks upon the author instead of evaluating the message. The author's message is a harsh truth that exposes parents to be the worst of people. Don't you know? Survival for the sake of survival can only cause pain to others.
Comments (2) | Was this review helpful to you?
http://www.amazon.com/Better-Never-Have-Been-Existence/dp/0199296421
A Prairie Home Companion to Evangelical Denominations
Catholic apologetes often decry the number of Protestant denominations. This is their trump card to falsify the Protestant rule of faith (sola Scriptura).
However, our greatest living theologian—by whom I mean, needless to say, Garrison Keillor—has proposed a scientific taxonomy of Protestant denominationalism which is simplicity itself, and one that reduces the superficial diversity to just one fundamental difference. So, the next time a Catholic polemicist wheels out the tired old objection, refer him to the Keillor Classification System of Evangelical Denominations:
****************************************************
Q: Speaking of Charleston, what is the biggest difference you've found between Midwesterners and Southerners?
A: Southerners are less cautious about bringing up unsavory things.
Q: Is that a nice way of saying we lack tact?
A: No, no, no. They're very tactful. Very polite. To give you an example, I was with a group of Southerners who brought up a man who had hung himself with a garden hose in his garage. I just can't imagine Lutherans discussing that.
http://v2.charleston.net/assets/webpages/departmental/news/Stories.aspx?section=preview&tableId=133394&pubDate=3/8/2007
However, our greatest living theologian—by whom I mean, needless to say, Garrison Keillor—has proposed a scientific taxonomy of Protestant denominationalism which is simplicity itself, and one that reduces the superficial diversity to just one fundamental difference. So, the next time a Catholic polemicist wheels out the tired old objection, refer him to the Keillor Classification System of Evangelical Denominations:
****************************************************
Q: Speaking of Charleston, what is the biggest difference you've found between Midwesterners and Southerners?
A: Southerners are less cautious about bringing up unsavory things.
Q: Is that a nice way of saying we lack tact?
A: No, no, no. They're very tactful. Very polite. To give you an example, I was with a group of Southerners who brought up a man who had hung himself with a garden hose in his garage. I just can't imagine Lutherans discussing that.
http://v2.charleston.net/assets/webpages/departmental/news/Stories.aspx?section=preview&tableId=133394&pubDate=3/8/2007
Sunday, March 11, 2007
More on Plantinga's EAAN
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Apolonio,
Good thoughts/questions...
By way of reply,
1. I recently posted about "what [I] actually thought of Plantinga's argument." See Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3.
2. I won't comment as to how Dusman was using 'rationality,' since I'm not sure. There's many subsets, i.e., alethic rationality, internal rationality, etc. Proper function rationality determines what we should do when confronted with one of these cases of irrationality. So, his point may have been more specific.
3. Plantinga does believe that EAAN gives the reflective naturalist a "kind of" proper function rationality defeater - a Humean defeater (see ND? p.209-211).
4. "Short of warrant" does not necessarily mean "unjustified," correct. But, the reflective naturalist has a defeater for his belief that he has "done his duty." Furthermore, the reflective naturalist has no reason to believe R. Similarly, the believer who accepts that his belief in God is the product of wish fulfillment, and beliefs finding their source in the cognitive faculties responsible for producing wish-fulfillment are not aimed at truth but some other purpose, has a defeater for his belief in God. This person's belief in God has no epistemic justification, then. The same for the reflective naturalist, then. Before reflecting, he may be justified, but not after.
5. Even if EAAN didn't take away "animal knowledge," the naturalist would still have a defeater for his beliefs, and so EAAN would still be pretty forceful.
6. Relying on Bergmann's idea of R being properly basic, and so it's a defeater-deflector for EAAN, seems to miss the point of EAAN. Of course proper function would demand continued belief in R, but this is not because this portion of your cognitive faculties are aimed at truth, but, rather, at the avoidance of cognitive disaster. A person S may be in a situation - say, lost in a snow storm on top of a mountain - and S may see a ridge that S thinks could be leaped to. Based on perception, this belief is basic to S. But, S would not have thought this if S were not in this survival situation. So S maintains this belief that the chasm is able to be jumped. Proper function requires this belief to be maintained. The optimistic overrider has kicked in. But the faculties governing this have some other virtue in mind - survival rather than true belief. In normal, reflective situations, S would not form said belief.
Or, suppose S ingests agent XX, a hallucinogenic drug, producing hallucinations in 90% of those who take XX. Proper function would require assuming R so as to avoid cognitive disaster. So, S has powerful inclinations to continue on in belief in R, even though S has come to believe that P(R / XX) is low or inscrutable, and S may take it in a basic way, but of course these powerful inclinations don't count as evidence for R. S would have this inclination whether she was in or out of the lucky 10%.
7. One can only use Bergmann's position that R has non-propositional evidence for it, raising the probability thesis, in cases of an unreflective naturalist. But, can the reflective naturalist have this? Well, if so, then R has warrant for him only if R is produced by proper functioning cognitive faculties successfully aimed at truth. But his beliefs are only successfully aimed at truth if they are reliable, and this is precisely what's in question. And, just to say that he has a strong inclination to believe R, doesn’t get him where he wants (see (6) above). And, if he assumes N & E, he has no reason to assume that his beliefs are aimed at truth. So non-propositional evidence doesn't help S.
8. If all it took was that a belief B could not be defeated D because B had non-propositional evidence, then it would appears that basic beliefs could not be defeated. Say that you go inside a widget producing factory. You see the widgets, and they appear red to you. The belief is formed by your senses, which proper function demands you believe are reliable, and hence the belief is basic. But, the shop manager, and close friend, tells you that the widgets have a red light illuminating them so as to detect otherwise unnoticeable defects in the widgets. He says that there are actually very few red widgets coming down the assembly line. It would appear that your basic belief was defeated that what you were seeing was a red widget because the probability that you were seeing a red widget was low.
Or, say that S comes to believe that she is a brain-in-the-vat (BIV). Further, so has no reason to believe that the Alpha Centaurian super scientists care whether she has mostly true beliefs or not. So, she believes P (R/ BIV) as low or inscrutable. Doesn't she have a defeater for R, no matter how strongly she continues to assume R on an every day basis. After all, the Alpha Centaurians needs to see her in every day life and so have constructed her to continue to believe R, and act as if R, because to not act that way would lead her into cognitive despair. But, when she reflects on her thoughts, she quires a defeater for R, and so gives it up. Same with the naturalist.
9. Lastly, S is irrational because proper function for internal rationality that S give up one of S's beliefs: R v N&E. If S came to believe that she had ingested agent XX - which caused hallucinations in 90% of those who took it, and S also held to R, proper function would require S to drop R. Or, say that S believed his head made of glass, and believed that he could play football without a helmet, then he would be internally irrational to not give up one of the beliefs (if, following Alston, one wishes to say that S should drop N&E rather than R, I still think that gets you to ~R, but just takes the long way. For without a story on the purpose of your cognitive faculties, how they got here, or anything, S should remain agnostic A about R, and so P(R/ A) would be inscrutable, and the defeater for R has not left. Though she still might act as if R, upon reflection, rationality demands R to be dropped. We would call someone who believed both of the above propositions, irrational. If S is in a similar situation with P(R / N&E), then S is irrational for holding to R in the Humean and alethic-rationality way.
Paul,
Thanks for the response. I was wondering what you actually thought of Plantinga's argument.
Coming back to Dusman's argument, he was talking about rationality. I took that as proper function rationality. And Plantinga does not believe that N&E is a proper-function rationality defeater against R. Suppose I say that the atheist does not have animal knowledge of ULL. It does not mean that she does not have justification for ULL. It may be that she is just short of warrant. But short of warrant does not necessarily mean that she is not justified.
Now here is an example where an atheist may still have animal knowledge of ULL. Suppose that S comes to believe in ULL through virtue (I'm using virtue epistemology rather than proper function but you can substitute whatever). And now we show that P(ULL/N&E) is low. It does not necessarily mean that S does not have animal knowledge of ULL. N&E may even be a defeater for S, but it may not take away justification nor knowledge. Suppose that the way S forms ULL, with regards to evidence (used broadly), she has .8 degree of belief or justification towards ULL. Given E at t1, her justification is .8. Now suppose N&E is low given R. It is a defeater. But suppose that S also has nonpropositional evidence for ULL (see Bergmann's article in Naturalism Defeated?). E at t2 would include N&E, but it does not necessarily mean that S has no justification for ULL at all. It may be that given new evidence, N&E, she just has to lower her degree of credence or belief to, say, .56. But it may be that .56 is just enough for knowledge. So S can have knowledge. In other words, if N&E is a defeater, it may simply show that S has a lesser degree of justification. It does not mean she is not justified or irrational, but her degree of justification or rationality just dropped.
What do you think?
Quote Taken from here
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Apolonio,
Good thoughts/questions...
By way of reply,
1. I recently posted about "what [I] actually thought of Plantinga's argument." See Round 1, Round 2, and Round 3.
2. I won't comment as to how Dusman was using 'rationality,' since I'm not sure. There's many subsets, i.e., alethic rationality, internal rationality, etc. Proper function rationality determines what we should do when confronted with one of these cases of irrationality. So, his point may have been more specific.
3. Plantinga does believe that EAAN gives the reflective naturalist a "kind of" proper function rationality defeater - a Humean defeater (see ND? p.209-211).
4. "Short of warrant" does not necessarily mean "unjustified," correct. But, the reflective naturalist has a defeater for his belief that he has "done his duty." Furthermore, the reflective naturalist has no reason to believe R. Similarly, the believer who accepts that his belief in God is the product of wish fulfillment, and beliefs finding their source in the cognitive faculties responsible for producing wish-fulfillment are not aimed at truth but some other purpose, has a defeater for his belief in God. This person's belief in God has no epistemic justification, then. The same for the reflective naturalist, then. Before reflecting, he may be justified, but not after.
5. Even if EAAN didn't take away "animal knowledge," the naturalist would still have a defeater for his beliefs, and so EAAN would still be pretty forceful.
6. Relying on Bergmann's idea of R being properly basic, and so it's a defeater-deflector for EAAN, seems to miss the point of EAAN. Of course proper function would demand continued belief in R, but this is not because this portion of your cognitive faculties are aimed at truth, but, rather, at the avoidance of cognitive disaster. A person S may be in a situation - say, lost in a snow storm on top of a mountain - and S may see a ridge that S thinks could be leaped to. Based on perception, this belief is basic to S. But, S would not have thought this if S were not in this survival situation. So S maintains this belief that the chasm is able to be jumped. Proper function requires this belief to be maintained. The optimistic overrider has kicked in. But the faculties governing this have some other virtue in mind - survival rather than true belief. In normal, reflective situations, S would not form said belief.
Or, suppose S ingests agent XX, a hallucinogenic drug, producing hallucinations in 90% of those who take XX. Proper function would require assuming R so as to avoid cognitive disaster. So, S has powerful inclinations to continue on in belief in R, even though S has come to believe that P(R / XX) is low or inscrutable, and S may take it in a basic way, but of course these powerful inclinations don't count as evidence for R. S would have this inclination whether she was in or out of the lucky 10%.
7. One can only use Bergmann's position that R has non-propositional evidence for it, raising the probability thesis, in cases of an unreflective naturalist. But, can the reflective naturalist have this? Well, if so, then R has warrant for him only if R is produced by proper functioning cognitive faculties successfully aimed at truth. But his beliefs are only successfully aimed at truth if they are reliable, and this is precisely what's in question. And, just to say that he has a strong inclination to believe R, doesn’t get him where he wants (see (6) above). And, if he assumes N & E, he has no reason to assume that his beliefs are aimed at truth. So non-propositional evidence doesn't help S.
8. If all it took was that a belief B could not be defeated D because B had non-propositional evidence, then it would appears that basic beliefs could not be defeated. Say that you go inside a widget producing factory. You see the widgets, and they appear red to you. The belief is formed by your senses, which proper function demands you believe are reliable, and hence the belief is basic. But, the shop manager, and close friend, tells you that the widgets have a red light illuminating them so as to detect otherwise unnoticeable defects in the widgets. He says that there are actually very few red widgets coming down the assembly line. It would appear that your basic belief was defeated that what you were seeing was a red widget because the probability that you were seeing a red widget was low.
Or, say that S comes to believe that she is a brain-in-the-vat (BIV). Further, so has no reason to believe that the Alpha Centaurian super scientists care whether she has mostly true beliefs or not. So, she believes P (R/ BIV) as low or inscrutable. Doesn't she have a defeater for R, no matter how strongly she continues to assume R on an every day basis. After all, the Alpha Centaurians needs to see her in every day life and so have constructed her to continue to believe R, and act as if R, because to not act that way would lead her into cognitive despair. But, when she reflects on her thoughts, she quires a defeater for R, and so gives it up. Same with the naturalist.
9. Lastly, S is irrational because proper function for internal rationality that S give up one of S's beliefs: R v N&E. If S came to believe that she had ingested agent XX - which caused hallucinations in 90% of those who took it, and S also held to R, proper function would require S to drop R. Or, say that S believed his head made of glass, and believed that he could play football without a helmet, then he would be internally irrational to not give up one of the beliefs (if, following Alston, one wishes to say that S should drop N&E rather than R, I still think that gets you to ~R, but just takes the long way. For without a story on the purpose of your cognitive faculties, how they got here, or anything, S should remain agnostic A about R, and so P(R/ A) would be inscrutable, and the defeater for R has not left. Though she still might act as if R, upon reflection, rationality demands R to be dropped. We would call someone who believed both of the above propositions, irrational. If S is in a similar situation with P(R / N&E), then S is irrational for holding to R in the Humean and alethic-rationality way.
The Significance Of 1 Corinthians 15
One of the most significant New Testament passages illustrating the nature of the historical evidence for Jesus’ resurrection is 1 Corinthians 15. Regarding a creed Paul cites in that passage, Gary Habermas and Michael Licona write:
"In fact, many critical scholars hold that Paul received it [the creed of 1 Corinthians 15] from the disciples Peter and James while visiting them in Jerusalem three years after his conversion [Galatians 1:18-19]. If so, Paul learned it within five years of Jesus' crucifixion and from the disciples themselves. At minimum, we have source material that dates within two decades of the alleged event of Jesus' resurrection and comes from a source that Paul thought was reliable. Dean John Rodgers of Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry comments, 'This is the sort of data that historians of antiquity drool over.'" (The Case For The Resurrection Of Jesus [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Kregel Publications, 2004], pp. 52-53)
Though we can attain a lot of data on the resurrection from the gospels and other sources, notice some facts we can establish just from this creed in 1 Corinthians 15 and its immediate context:
1. The testimony to the resurrection is early. The whole spectrum of scholarship, from liberals to conservatives, is in agreement that 1 Corinthians can be dated to within 30 years of Jesus’ death and that the creed in 1 Corinthians 15 can be dated even earlier (1 Corinthians 15:3).
2. The testimony to the resurrection is Jewish. Paul refers to the resurrection occurring "according to the [Jewish] scriptures" (1 Corinthians 15:4). The mainstream Jewish view of resurrection at the time Paul was writing involved a resurrection of the same body that went into the grave. As Paul goes on to explain, that which goes into the ground is what comes out in a transformed state (1 Corinthians 15:36-38).
3. The testimony to the resurrection is accepted by people other than the professing eyewitnesses, and is still considered credible decades later (1 Corinthians 15:1), even among people who doubted the resurrection of individual believers (1 Corinthians 15:12-13).
4. The testimony to the resurrection is from multiple sources. Paul mentions hundreds of people (1 Corinthians 15:5-8).
5. The testimony to the resurrection is detailed. Paul names people and mentions identifiable groups, he mentions witnesses in their chronological order ("then", "after that", and "last of all" in 1 Corinthians 15:5-8), and he knows what proportion of the witnesses are still living (1 Corinthians 15:6).
6. The testimony to the resurrection comes from eyewitnesses. Paul was an eyewitness (1 Corinthians 15:8), and other eyewitnesses were giving their testimony (1 Corinthians 15:11).
7. The testimony to the resurrection comes not only from individual experiences, but also from group experiences. Hallucinations are individual experiences, but the apostles saw the risen Jesus together, as did more than 500 people at once (1 Corinthians 15:5-7).
8. The largest group mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15 is referred to as seeing Jesus "at one time" (1 Corinthians 15:6), not just around the same time. The fact that such a detail is included indicates that the early Christians were aware of the significance of group appearances and were interested in preserving such details.
9. Some of the witnesses saw Jesus more than once. Peter apparently was present for at least three of the appearances (1 Corinthians 15:5, 15:7)
10. The appearances must have occurred over a lengthy enough period of time to allow Peter to be alone or with different groups of people for multiple appearances.
11. The testimony to the resurrection doesn’t just come from people who were already believers when they saw the risen Jesus (1 Corinthians 15:9).
12. The testimony to the resurrection is given realistically. Paul understood the significance of what he was asserting ("of first importance" in 1 Corinthians 15:3 and 1 Corinthians 15:14-19).
13. The testimony to the resurrection was given by people willing to suffer for what they were testifying to (1 Corinthians 15:30-32).
14. The testimony to the resurrection was reevaluated on an ongoing basis. Even about two to three decades after the resurrection occurred, Paul was following the lives of the other resurrection witnesses so closely that he knew that a majority of the more than 500 people he mentions were still living, though some had died (1 Corinthians 5:6). Apparently, Paul was being careful with the data he was citing and was continually thinking about it and rethinking it. He wasn’t being careless.
15. The testimony to the resurrection is unified. Whatever false views non-leaders in the early church may have adopted, the leaders of the church, including Jesus’ closest disciples, were agreed in what they were teaching on the subject (1 Corinthians 15:11).
Such facts and others can also be derived from other early Christian sources. But even from 1 Corinthians alone, especially chapter 15, a document that both liberals and conservatives accept as early and as written by Paul, we can dismiss many popular arguments against the traditional Christian view of Jesus’ resurrection. The claim that the resurrection belief came from unhistorical legends that gradually developed over time is refuted by the earliness of 1 Corinthians and the creed of 1 Corinthians 15. The theory that the witnesses of the risen Christ were hallucinating is inconsistent with the unbelief of some of the witnesses, the realism and carefulness of Paul’s testimony, and the fact that Jesus sometimes appeared to multiple people at once. Other skeptical theories likewise can’t survive the scrutiny of this one passage, much less the combined scrutiny of all of the evidence.
"In fact, many critical scholars hold that Paul received it [the creed of 1 Corinthians 15] from the disciples Peter and James while visiting them in Jerusalem three years after his conversion [Galatians 1:18-19]. If so, Paul learned it within five years of Jesus' crucifixion and from the disciples themselves. At minimum, we have source material that dates within two decades of the alleged event of Jesus' resurrection and comes from a source that Paul thought was reliable. Dean John Rodgers of Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry comments, 'This is the sort of data that historians of antiquity drool over.'" (The Case For The Resurrection Of Jesus [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Kregel Publications, 2004], pp. 52-53)
Though we can attain a lot of data on the resurrection from the gospels and other sources, notice some facts we can establish just from this creed in 1 Corinthians 15 and its immediate context:
1. The testimony to the resurrection is early. The whole spectrum of scholarship, from liberals to conservatives, is in agreement that 1 Corinthians can be dated to within 30 years of Jesus’ death and that the creed in 1 Corinthians 15 can be dated even earlier (1 Corinthians 15:3).
2. The testimony to the resurrection is Jewish. Paul refers to the resurrection occurring "according to the [Jewish] scriptures" (1 Corinthians 15:4). The mainstream Jewish view of resurrection at the time Paul was writing involved a resurrection of the same body that went into the grave. As Paul goes on to explain, that which goes into the ground is what comes out in a transformed state (1 Corinthians 15:36-38).
3. The testimony to the resurrection is accepted by people other than the professing eyewitnesses, and is still considered credible decades later (1 Corinthians 15:1), even among people who doubted the resurrection of individual believers (1 Corinthians 15:12-13).
4. The testimony to the resurrection is from multiple sources. Paul mentions hundreds of people (1 Corinthians 15:5-8).
5. The testimony to the resurrection is detailed. Paul names people and mentions identifiable groups, he mentions witnesses in their chronological order ("then", "after that", and "last of all" in 1 Corinthians 15:5-8), and he knows what proportion of the witnesses are still living (1 Corinthians 15:6).
6. The testimony to the resurrection comes from eyewitnesses. Paul was an eyewitness (1 Corinthians 15:8), and other eyewitnesses were giving their testimony (1 Corinthians 15:11).
7. The testimony to the resurrection comes not only from individual experiences, but also from group experiences. Hallucinations are individual experiences, but the apostles saw the risen Jesus together, as did more than 500 people at once (1 Corinthians 15:5-7).
8. The largest group mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15 is referred to as seeing Jesus "at one time" (1 Corinthians 15:6), not just around the same time. The fact that such a detail is included indicates that the early Christians were aware of the significance of group appearances and were interested in preserving such details.
9. Some of the witnesses saw Jesus more than once. Peter apparently was present for at least three of the appearances (1 Corinthians 15:5, 15:7)
10. The appearances must have occurred over a lengthy enough period of time to allow Peter to be alone or with different groups of people for multiple appearances.
11. The testimony to the resurrection doesn’t just come from people who were already believers when they saw the risen Jesus (1 Corinthians 15:9).
12. The testimony to the resurrection is given realistically. Paul understood the significance of what he was asserting ("of first importance" in 1 Corinthians 15:3 and 1 Corinthians 15:14-19).
13. The testimony to the resurrection was given by people willing to suffer for what they were testifying to (1 Corinthians 15:30-32).
14. The testimony to the resurrection was reevaluated on an ongoing basis. Even about two to three decades after the resurrection occurred, Paul was following the lives of the other resurrection witnesses so closely that he knew that a majority of the more than 500 people he mentions were still living, though some had died (1 Corinthians 5:6). Apparently, Paul was being careful with the data he was citing and was continually thinking about it and rethinking it. He wasn’t being careless.
15. The testimony to the resurrection is unified. Whatever false views non-leaders in the early church may have adopted, the leaders of the church, including Jesus’ closest disciples, were agreed in what they were teaching on the subject (1 Corinthians 15:11).
Such facts and others can also be derived from other early Christian sources. But even from 1 Corinthians alone, especially chapter 15, a document that both liberals and conservatives accept as early and as written by Paul, we can dismiss many popular arguments against the traditional Christian view of Jesus’ resurrection. The claim that the resurrection belief came from unhistorical legends that gradually developed over time is refuted by the earliness of 1 Corinthians and the creed of 1 Corinthians 15. The theory that the witnesses of the risen Christ were hallucinating is inconsistent with the unbelief of some of the witnesses, the realism and carefulness of Paul’s testimony, and the fact that Jesus sometimes appeared to multiple people at once. Other skeptical theories likewise can’t survive the scrutiny of this one passage, much less the combined scrutiny of all of the evidence.
Saturday, March 10, 2007
The Resurrection Narratives Came From Sources Who Were Named And Known
"All four Gospels are anonymous in the formal sense that the author's name does not appear in the text of the work itself, only in the title (which we will discuss below). But this does not mean that they were intentionally anonymous. Many ancient works were anonymous in the same formal sense, and the name may not even appear in the surviving title of the work. For example, this is true of Lucian's Life of Demonax (Demonactos bios), which as a bios (ancient biography) is generically comparable with the Gospels. Yet Lucian speaks throughout in the first person and obviously expects his readers to know who he is. Such works would often have been circulated in the first instance among friends or acquaintances of the author who would know who the author was from the oral context in which the work was first read. Knowledge of authorship would be passed on when copies were made for other readers, and the name would be noted, with a brief title, on the outside of the scroll or on a label affixed to the scroll. In denying that the Gospels were originally anonymous, our intention is to deny that they were first presented as works without authors. The clearest case is Luke because of the dedication of the work to Theophilus (1:3), probably a patron. It is inconceivable that a work with a named dedicatee should have been anonymous. The author's name may have featured in an original title, but in any case would have been known to the dedicatee and other first readers because the author would have presented the book to the dedicatee....In the first century CE, most authors gave their books titles, but the practice was not universal....Whether or not any of these titles originate from the authors themselves, the need for titles that distinguished one Gospel from another would arise as soon as any Christian community had copies of more than one in its library and was reading more than one in its worship meetings....In the case of codices, 'labels appeared on all possible surfaces: edges, covers, and spines.' In this sense also, therefore, Gospels would not have been anonymous when they first circulated around the churches. A church receiving its first copy of one such would have received with it information, at least in oral form, about its authorship and then used its author's name when labeling the book and when reading from it in worship....no evidence exists that these Gospels were ever known by other names." (Richard Bauckham, Jesus And The Eyewitnesses [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2006], pp. 300-301, 303)
"Nevertheless the fact remains that it is utterly improbable that in this dark period, at a particular place or through a person or through the decision of a group or institution unknown to us, the four superscriptions of the Gospels, which had hitherto been circulating anonymously, suddenly came into being and, without leaving behind traces of earlier divergent titles, became established throughout the church. Let those who deny the great age and therefore basically the originality of the Gospel superscriptions in order to preserve their 'good' critical conscience, give a better explanation of the completely unanimous and relatively early attestation of these titles, their origin and the names of authors associated with them. Such an explanation has yet to be given, and it never will be. New Testament scholars persistently overlook basic facts and questions on the basis of old habits." (Martin Hengel, The Four Gospels And The One Gospel Of Jesus Christ [Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 2000], p. 55)
See, also, my comments on eyewitness testimony in the gospels here.
"Nevertheless the fact remains that it is utterly improbable that in this dark period, at a particular place or through a person or through the decision of a group or institution unknown to us, the four superscriptions of the Gospels, which had hitherto been circulating anonymously, suddenly came into being and, without leaving behind traces of earlier divergent titles, became established throughout the church. Let those who deny the great age and therefore basically the originality of the Gospel superscriptions in order to preserve their 'good' critical conscience, give a better explanation of the completely unanimous and relatively early attestation of these titles, their origin and the names of authors associated with them. Such an explanation has yet to be given, and it never will be. New Testament scholars persistently overlook basic facts and questions on the basis of old habits." (Martin Hengel, The Four Gospels And The One Gospel Of Jesus Christ [Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 2000], p. 55)
See, also, my comments on eyewitness testimony in the gospels here.
Friday, March 09, 2007
Dialectical Tensions
Introduction: What follows is a response that I offered to a fellow who was asking why the Christian God should be considered the sufficient precondition for the intelligibility of the laws of logic. I have shown how an internal tension develops when such a one seeks to account for uniformity and regularity autonomously via the route of scientific rationalism, whereas a harmonious and complimentary accounting for said regularity is found to be inherent within the Christian worldview."Hey, I still don't understand why someone cannot choose non-christian presuppositions and establish a "coherent worldview".
Theoretically you can, but: (1) it can’t be atheism because atheistic worldviews are internally self-contradictory and (2) if you can, please bring forth *that* particular theoretical, self-consistent worldview and show how it contains within itself the sufficient preconditions for the intelligibility of reality.
"Why can't I just presuppose the existence and correctness of absolute laws of logic?"
This is a good question and I will take time to offer a response. You can simply presuppose the existence and correctness of absolute laws. However, if you do (presuming that you’re an atheist, please forgive me if I have you labeled incorrectly) you will be irrational and internally contradictory. Please let me explain.
I. I believe that irrationality will follow because you’re simply presupposing without epistemic warrant the uniformity of logical laws via a vicious circularity. We can presuppose the uniformity of logical law (hence appealing to rationality contained with creation) because God Himself declared that there will be uniformity found within the created order, including the laws of logic (Gen. 8:22 – an appeal to mystery as contained within the mind of God). If you are an atheist, you have no such authoritative declaration, but must assert with mere probability that future instances of past events will occur in the future as they have in the past. This is a fine example of circular reasoning. Also, you will show that you are working off of a type of faith as well (albeit a drastically different one from the Christian conception thereof) because you are merely assuming that the laws of logic will behave in the future as they have in the past without any epistemic warrant.
As an aside, I took note that you used the descriptor, “the correctness of absolute laws” to refer to logical laws. Assuming that we try to understand the universe through the worldview of philosophical materialism, it is logically impossible to have both absolute, unchanging, and immaterial logical laws being derived from a non-absolute, continuously changing, material universe consisting of only particular entities.
"How do you account for the existence of God? I'm sure you will say you don't need to because it’s your presupposition, ie. what you take for granted. Why can't I do the same maneuver with the laws of logic?"
II. Again you can (and do) take the laws of logic for granted, but you have no rational reasons for expecting the uniformity of logical law. If you are a naturalist, you’ll simply presuppose it a priori in a similar way that we presuppose the Triune God a priori because he is the final locus of authority for us as Christians. The final locus of authority for you will consist of your own brain. From our drastically different perspectives, we have no higher authority upon which to turn. We turn to the authority of the Triune God, you turn to the authority of your finite brain.
III. We have continually asked the materialist to give an account for the most basic laws of nature to which you have essentially responded, “I can’t. No explanation exists for the most fundamental, presupposed, and ultimate regularities of life and reality. There is no regularity about the most basic regularity because there is no law in terms of which the basic law can be accounted for.” So, you are assuming that the laws of logic and the laws of nature are the most basic, presupposed, foundational principles of reality in an atomistic sense, meaning that there is nothing more ultimate that you can turn to other than the basic laws of nature because there is nothing at the base of them. This rational maneuver of atomizing things, that is, analyzing things in terms of their most basic components or laws by which the universe operates has to end somewhere for you, and when it ends, your basic laws have no explanation at all. Given your position, the most basic laws themselves cannot be accounted for because they are ultimate. This is certainly understandable given your atomism.
So, how do we know these basic laws and how do we explain them at all? Why are they the way that they are? In answering questions like these an atomistic rationalist will end up doing the very thing he is trying to avoid, which is appealing to mystery. Why is this a problem for you? Because when you make an appeal to mystery it ruins your entire worldview, for you desire to rest your views on what you perceive to be a rational, empirical explanation, yet at the base of it, it is rooted in mysticism, the very thing you seek to avoid and the very opposite of what scientific rationalism claims to be. Here is the rational system of scientific, empirical explanation ultimately resting on a foundation of mysticism, the thing which is the very opposite of what it claims to be. Science and mysticism are supposed to be poles apart, but it turns out that scientific rationalists are mystics at base. So, when you are asked to account for the existence of logical laws/scientific laws apart from God, your response ultimately reduces to this answer: “They just are as they are”. Hence, you show that you believe that the basics just are as they are. According to your understanding, it’s just some kind of mystical, positive, reality that cannot be explained.
But the Christian is not reduced to a dialectical tension consisting of a rationalism and a mysticism that are at odds with each other within the same worldview. When we appeal to mystery, it’s mystery because we say, “Our finite minds cannot account for it” and “It’s mystery because we only know this because we are depending upon the special revelation of God.” The sense of mystery, or if you will “irrationalism” in Christianity is that it appeals to that which goes beyond the finite human mind. You do the same thing, you just don’t appeal to God. You stop short of that by appealing to a lucky mystery based upon the chance happenings of the evolved universe. So, the rational/irrational internal tension remains strong within your worldview. However, when we appeal to the revelation of God we don’t do so at the expense of our rationalism, but instead this becomes the very foundation of our rationalism. Because God is the divine regulator and orderer, His mind is reflected in creation, and as a result, He has given us a mind and the necessary laws by which we *can* reason in the first place (i.e., the laws of logic, etc.).
And so, the atomistic, scientific rationalist, has to explain his basic laws in terms of just the “mystical positive of chance”, but that’s just the very antithesis of scientific rationalism and empiricism. However, the Christian, by appealing to the mind of God as understood in the Scriptures, can account for all the regularities and order of the universe without giving up his rationalism. And so, if you compare the two worldviews, you see the dialectical tension of the one, and the harmony of the other, and by way of conclusion, I think that such internal contradictions within the unbelieving systems of thought reveals what the Apostle Paul had in mind when he said that the unbeliever continually “opposes himself” (2 Tim. 2:25).The Genre Of The Resurrection Narratives
"Lemcio's work coheres strongly with the general, though quite recent, acceptance in Gospels scholarship that, generically, the Gospels are biography - or, more precisely, they are biographies (bioi) in the sense of ancient Greco-Roman biography. Different as this genre is from modern biographies, it nevertheless entails a real sense of the past as past and an intention to distinguish the past from the present. No ancient reader who identified the Gospels as bioi could have expected their narrative form to be merely a way of speaking of the risen, exalted Christ in his present relationship to his people. They would expect the narratives to recount the real past and not to confuse this with the present." (Richard Bauckham, Jesus And The Eyewitnesses [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2006], p. 276)
"Readers throughout most of history understood the Gospels as biographies (Stanton 1989a: 15-17), but after 1915 scholars tried to find some other classification for them, mainly because these scholars compared ancient and modern biography and noticed that the Gospels differed from the latter (Talbert 1977: 2-3; cf. Mack 1988: 16n.6). The current trend, however, is again to recognize the Gospels as ancient biographies. The most complete statement of the question to date comes from a Cambridge monograph by Richard A. Burridge. After carefully defining the criteria for evaluating genre (1992: 109-27) and establishing the characteristic features of Greco-Roman ‘lives’ (128-90), he demonstrates how the canonical Gospels fit this genre (191-239). The trend to regard the Gospels as ancient biography is currently strong enough for British Matthew scholar Graham Stanton to characterize the skepticism of Bultmann and others about the biographical character of the Gospels as ‘surprisingly inaccurate’ (1993: 63; idem 1995: 137)….But though such [ancient] historians did not always write the way we write history today, they were clearly concerned to write history as well as their resources allowed (Jos. Ant. 20.156-57’ Arist. Poetics 9.2-3, 1451b; Diod. Sic. 21.17.1; Dion. Hal. 1.1.2-4; 1.2.1; 1.4.2; cf. Mosley 1965). Although the historical accuracy of biographers varied from one biographer to another, biographers intended biographies to be essentially historical works (see Aune 1988: 125; Witherington 1994:339; cf. Polyb. 8.8)….There apparently were bad historians and biographers who made up stories, but they became objects of criticism for violating accepted standards (cf. Lucian History 12, 24-25)….Matthew and Luke, whose fidelity we can test against some of their sources, rank high among ancient works….Like most Greek-speaking Jewish biographers, Matthew is more interested in interpreting tradition than in creating it….A Gospel writer like Luke was among the most accurate of ancient historians, if we may judge from his use of Mark (see Marshall 1978; idem 1991) and his historiography in Acts (cf., e.g., Sherwin-White 1978; Gill and Gempf 1994). Luke clearly had both written (Lk 1:1) and oral (1:2) sources available, and his literary patron Theophilus already knew much of this Christian tradition (1:4), which would exclude Luke’s widespread invention of new material. Luke undoubtedly researched this material (1:3) during his (on my view) probable sojourn with Paul in Palestine (Acts 21:17; 27:1; on the ‘we-narratives,’ cf., e.g., Maddox 1982: 7). Although Luke writes more in the Greco-Roman historiographic tradition than Matthew does, Matthew’s normally relatively conservative use of Mark likewise suggests a high degree of historical trustworthiness behind his accounts….only historical works, not novels, had historical prologues like that of Luke [Luke 1:1-4] (Aune 1987: 124)…A central character’s ‘great deeds’ generally comprise the bulk of an ancient biographical narrative, and the Gospels fit this prediction (Burridge 1992: 208). In other words, biographies were about someone in particular. Aside from the 42.5 percent of Matthew’s verbs that appear directly in Jesus’ teaching, Jesus himself is the subject of 17.2 percent of Matthew’s verbs; the disciples, 8.8 percent; those to whom Jesus ministers, 4.4 percent; and the religious establishment, 4.4 percent. Even in his absence he often remains the subject of others’ discussions (14:1-2; 26:3-5). Thus, as was common in ancient biographies (and no other genre), at least half of Matthew’s verbs involve the central figure’s ‘words and deeds’ (Burridge 1992: 196-97, 202). The entire point of using this genre is that it focuses on Jesus himself, not simply on early Christian experience (Burridge 1992: 256-58)." (Craig Keener, A Commentary On The Gospel Of Matthew [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999], pp. 17-18, 21-23, 51)
See also the further discussion in the introduction in the first volume of Keener’s commentary on the gospel of John (The Gospel Of John: A Commentary [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003]). Keener goes into much more detail than what I outline above, too much to quote here. Here's a portion of his discussion:
"The lengths of the canonical gospels suggest not only intention to publish but also the nature of their genre. All four gospels fit the medium-range length (10,000-25,000 words) found in ancient biographies as distinct from many other kinds of works….all four canonical gospels are a far cry from the fanciful metamorphosis stories, divine rapes, and so forth in a compilation like Ovid’s Metamorphoses. The Gospels plainly have more historical intention and fewer literary pretensions than such works….Works with a historical prologue like Luke’s (Luke 1:1-4; Acts 1:1-2) were historical works; novels lacked such fixtures, although occasionally they could include a proem telling why the author made up the story (Longus proem 1-2). In contrast to novels, the Gospels do not present themselves as texts composed primarily for entertainment, but as true accounts of Jesus’ ministry. The excesses of some forms of earlier source and redaction criticism notwithstanding, one would also be hard pressed to find a novel so clearly tied to its sources as Matthew or Luke is! Even John, whose sources are difficult to discern, overlaps enough with the Synoptics in some accounts and clearly in purpose to defy the category of novel….The Gospels are, however, too long for dramas, which maintained a particular length in Mediterranean antiquity. They also include far too much prose narrative for ancient drama….Richard Burridge, after carefully defining the criteria for identifying genre and establishing the characteristic features of Greco-Roman bioi, or lives, shows how both the Synoptics and John fit this genre. So forceful is his work on Gospel genre as biography that one knowledgeable reviewer [Charles Talbert] concludes, ‘This volume ought to end any legitimate denial of the canonical Gospels’ biographical character.’ Arguments concerning the biographical character of the Gospels have thus come full circle: the Gospels, long viewed as biographies until the early twentieth century, now again are widely viewed as biographies….Biographies were essentially historical works; thus the Gospels would have an essentially historical as well as a propagandistic function….[quoting David Aune] ’while biography tended to emphasize encomium, or the one-sided praise of the subject, it was still firmly rooted in historical fact rather than literary fiction. Thus while the Evangelists clearly had an important theological agenda, the very fact that they chose to adapt Greco-Roman biographical conventions to tell the story of Jesus indicates that they were centrally concerned to communicate what they thought really happened.’…had the Gospel writers wished to communicate solely later Christian doctrine and not history, they could have used simpler forms than biography….As readers of the OT, which most Jews viewed as historically true, they must have believed that history itself communicated theology….the Paraclete [in John’s gospel] recalls and interprets history, aiding the witnesses (14:26; 15:26-27).…the features that Acts shares with OT historical works confirms that Luke intended to write history…History [in antiquity] was supposed to be truthful, and [ancient] historians harshly criticized other historians whom they accused of promoting falsehood, especially when they exhibited self-serving agendas." (pp. 7-13, 17, n. 143 on p. 17, 18)
"Readers throughout most of history understood the Gospels as biographies (Stanton 1989a: 15-17), but after 1915 scholars tried to find some other classification for them, mainly because these scholars compared ancient and modern biography and noticed that the Gospels differed from the latter (Talbert 1977: 2-3; cf. Mack 1988: 16n.6). The current trend, however, is again to recognize the Gospels as ancient biographies. The most complete statement of the question to date comes from a Cambridge monograph by Richard A. Burridge. After carefully defining the criteria for evaluating genre (1992: 109-27) and establishing the characteristic features of Greco-Roman ‘lives’ (128-90), he demonstrates how the canonical Gospels fit this genre (191-239). The trend to regard the Gospels as ancient biography is currently strong enough for British Matthew scholar Graham Stanton to characterize the skepticism of Bultmann and others about the biographical character of the Gospels as ‘surprisingly inaccurate’ (1993: 63; idem 1995: 137)….But though such [ancient] historians did not always write the way we write history today, they were clearly concerned to write history as well as their resources allowed (Jos. Ant. 20.156-57’ Arist. Poetics 9.2-3, 1451b; Diod. Sic. 21.17.1; Dion. Hal. 1.1.2-4; 1.2.1; 1.4.2; cf. Mosley 1965). Although the historical accuracy of biographers varied from one biographer to another, biographers intended biographies to be essentially historical works (see Aune 1988: 125; Witherington 1994:339; cf. Polyb. 8.8)….There apparently were bad historians and biographers who made up stories, but they became objects of criticism for violating accepted standards (cf. Lucian History 12, 24-25)….Matthew and Luke, whose fidelity we can test against some of their sources, rank high among ancient works….Like most Greek-speaking Jewish biographers, Matthew is more interested in interpreting tradition than in creating it….A Gospel writer like Luke was among the most accurate of ancient historians, if we may judge from his use of Mark (see Marshall 1978; idem 1991) and his historiography in Acts (cf., e.g., Sherwin-White 1978; Gill and Gempf 1994). Luke clearly had both written (Lk 1:1) and oral (1:2) sources available, and his literary patron Theophilus already knew much of this Christian tradition (1:4), which would exclude Luke’s widespread invention of new material. Luke undoubtedly researched this material (1:3) during his (on my view) probable sojourn with Paul in Palestine (Acts 21:17; 27:1; on the ‘we-narratives,’ cf., e.g., Maddox 1982: 7). Although Luke writes more in the Greco-Roman historiographic tradition than Matthew does, Matthew’s normally relatively conservative use of Mark likewise suggests a high degree of historical trustworthiness behind his accounts….only historical works, not novels, had historical prologues like that of Luke [Luke 1:1-4] (Aune 1987: 124)…A central character’s ‘great deeds’ generally comprise the bulk of an ancient biographical narrative, and the Gospels fit this prediction (Burridge 1992: 208). In other words, biographies were about someone in particular. Aside from the 42.5 percent of Matthew’s verbs that appear directly in Jesus’ teaching, Jesus himself is the subject of 17.2 percent of Matthew’s verbs; the disciples, 8.8 percent; those to whom Jesus ministers, 4.4 percent; and the religious establishment, 4.4 percent. Even in his absence he often remains the subject of others’ discussions (14:1-2; 26:3-5). Thus, as was common in ancient biographies (and no other genre), at least half of Matthew’s verbs involve the central figure’s ‘words and deeds’ (Burridge 1992: 196-97, 202). The entire point of using this genre is that it focuses on Jesus himself, not simply on early Christian experience (Burridge 1992: 256-58)." (Craig Keener, A Commentary On The Gospel Of Matthew [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999], pp. 17-18, 21-23, 51)
See also the further discussion in the introduction in the first volume of Keener’s commentary on the gospel of John (The Gospel Of John: A Commentary [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003]). Keener goes into much more detail than what I outline above, too much to quote here. Here's a portion of his discussion:
"The lengths of the canonical gospels suggest not only intention to publish but also the nature of their genre. All four gospels fit the medium-range length (10,000-25,000 words) found in ancient biographies as distinct from many other kinds of works….all four canonical gospels are a far cry from the fanciful metamorphosis stories, divine rapes, and so forth in a compilation like Ovid’s Metamorphoses. The Gospels plainly have more historical intention and fewer literary pretensions than such works….Works with a historical prologue like Luke’s (Luke 1:1-4; Acts 1:1-2) were historical works; novels lacked such fixtures, although occasionally they could include a proem telling why the author made up the story (Longus proem 1-2). In contrast to novels, the Gospels do not present themselves as texts composed primarily for entertainment, but as true accounts of Jesus’ ministry. The excesses of some forms of earlier source and redaction criticism notwithstanding, one would also be hard pressed to find a novel so clearly tied to its sources as Matthew or Luke is! Even John, whose sources are difficult to discern, overlaps enough with the Synoptics in some accounts and clearly in purpose to defy the category of novel….The Gospels are, however, too long for dramas, which maintained a particular length in Mediterranean antiquity. They also include far too much prose narrative for ancient drama….Richard Burridge, after carefully defining the criteria for identifying genre and establishing the characteristic features of Greco-Roman bioi, or lives, shows how both the Synoptics and John fit this genre. So forceful is his work on Gospel genre as biography that one knowledgeable reviewer [Charles Talbert] concludes, ‘This volume ought to end any legitimate denial of the canonical Gospels’ biographical character.’ Arguments concerning the biographical character of the Gospels have thus come full circle: the Gospels, long viewed as biographies until the early twentieth century, now again are widely viewed as biographies….Biographies were essentially historical works; thus the Gospels would have an essentially historical as well as a propagandistic function….[quoting David Aune] ’while biography tended to emphasize encomium, or the one-sided praise of the subject, it was still firmly rooted in historical fact rather than literary fiction. Thus while the Evangelists clearly had an important theological agenda, the very fact that they chose to adapt Greco-Roman biographical conventions to tell the story of Jesus indicates that they were centrally concerned to communicate what they thought really happened.’…had the Gospel writers wished to communicate solely later Christian doctrine and not history, they could have used simpler forms than biography….As readers of the OT, which most Jews viewed as historically true, they must have believed that history itself communicated theology….the Paraclete [in John’s gospel] recalls and interprets history, aiding the witnesses (14:26; 15:26-27).…the features that Acts shares with OT historical works confirms that Luke intended to write history…History [in antiquity] was supposed to be truthful, and [ancient] historians harshly criticized other historians whom they accused of promoting falsehood, especially when they exhibited self-serving agendas." (pp. 7-13, 17, n. 143 on p. 17, 18)
Round 3: The Come Back Kid, or, Rope-A-Dope
If one of my introduction to philosophy students writes something like this on their upcoming midterm exam, they will receive no credit for the answer. That's how bad this is. My students, most of whom being underclassmen, and only one of whom being a philosophy major, could easily point out that Tremblay doesn't have the faintest familiarity with [anything relevant to critiquing Plantinga or being philosophically sophisticated]. - Travis White
**********
Francois Tremblay is attempting a comeback. Can he, like Hulk Hogan, turn the match around in his favor? Can he, like Rocky Balboa, mount a comeback for the ages? No. Why not? Because those men were Americans and Tremblay is not only Canadian, he's French Canadian. Hogan and Balboa loved mom and apple pie. Tremblay's intellectual punches are as slow as Maple Syrup. Seriously, I hope people took the above humor in the light-hearted way in which it was meant. In all actuality, I don't have anything against Canadians. After all, if I had really want to get down and dirty, I'd just mention that Canadian beer is for women.
Tremblay responded to round one against Plantinga with a series of wild hay-makers. Unfortunately for Tremblay, Plantinga (as well as myself) were on the other side of the "squared-circle." But, we did feel the breeze. Tremblay picked just 5 points from my paper to respond to. He still didn't even show any familiarity with Plantinga's EAAN, and again, sadly, didn't offer anything so much as constituting a substantial response to EAAN (or my other points). I'll quote Tremblay, and then respond below:
Tremblay: Actually, since Plantinga's definition of "proper function" demands design, his definition of "rationality" is hokum, so I hardly saw the need to mention his silly fallacy in that regard. But since you're going to bring it up, Manata, by all means shoot your own foot...
Actually, Plantinga's, says Plantinga, definition of "proper function" does not demand "design" in any specially theistic or supernaturalistic way. Says Plantinga,
"Human beings are constructed according to a certain design plan. This terminology does not commit us to supposing that human beings have been literally designed - by God, for example. Here I am using 'design' the way Daniel Dennett (not ordinarily thought unsound on theism) does in speaking of a given organism as possessing certain design, and of evolution as producing optimal design: 'In the end, we want to be able to explain the intelligence of ,am, or beast, in terms of design; and this in turn in terms of natural selection of this design (Dennett, Brainstorms, 1982, p.12).' We take it that when the organs (or organic systems) of a human being (or other organism) function properly, they function in a particular way. Such organs have a function or purpose... the ultimate purpose of the heart is to contribute to the health and proper function of the entire organism.... but of course the heart also has a... specific function: to pump blood. ...[T]here is something like a set of specifications, for a well formed, properly functioning human being ... as any first year medical student will tell you." - Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p.13-14
Now of course Plantinga will later make the argument that theism ultimately works better here, and that the reflective naturalist who believes naturalism conjoined with evolution suffers an alethic-rationality defeater of a Humean kind for his belief that his cognitive faculties are reliable R, where R stands for the proposition: "Our cognitive faculties are reliable." And, "reliable" cognitive faculties are faculties that produce mostly true beliefs. But, it is sufficient to point out that, according to Plantinga, his view of 'design' does not "demand" 'design' to be used in any unacceptable way. Simply put, that our cognitive faculties CF have been designed simply means that they seem to have a specific function, and that there is a proper and improper way for them to work. Therefore we begin where we left off: Tremblay simply butchers Plantinga and shows a general ignorance of the position, and a total disregard for stating Plantinga's position in the way Plantinga states it.
So, he swings and misses.
Tremblay: This kind of juvenile infinite regress can be applied to any claim to knowledge. Manata's reply describes little more than a petulant little child asking "why? why? why?" over and over. In practice, we pass judgment on the evidence presented for a proposition and decide for ourselves whether the evidence is relevant or not. We don't waste our time in constant validation. And of course, unlike Manata's Christian nihilistic worldview, mine has an end point: the axioms.
Of course Tremblay is free to move the goal posts if he so chooses, but let's note pretend he's totally missing the point of why I brought up the infinite regress argument (which, by the way, isn't "childish" or "a waste of time"). Recall that Tremblay gave this definition of 'rationality': "Rationality is the general epistemic position that we should validate knowledge only with objective evidence (including, of course, perception)." But note above that he now says that "we don't waste our time in constant validation." According to his definition of 'rationality,' though, if one doesn't "validate" his claims to knowledge, then one is irrational. And so is Tremblay irrational, or is it acceptable to have some claims to knowledge "not validated" by "evidence?" If the former, I concede this point and all matters of expertise on it to my opponent. If the latter, then Plantinga can hardly be called "irrational" for have "basic beliefs" that are not "validated" on the basis or propositional evidence. At any rate, if Tremblay accepts the latter, he must revise his definition of 'rationality,' since he'd be violating it. More to the point, Tremblay's definition has nothing to do with EAAN and Plantinga since both don't assume this faulty (as Tremblay now admits) definition of 'rationality.' (Leaving aside, of course, the problems with this definition of 'rationality'. Why is it that I've never seen anyone give this as a definition of 'rationality?' Out of all the definitions I've ever seen, all those given by top notch philosophers, no one ever came up with Tremblay's view. And, why should we validate "knowledge?" Can we know things, on Tremblay's view, that are not validated? And, supposing that we do indeed know that P, what is supposed to be wrong with us if we don't "validate" P? Now, I can understand if Tremblay means that we are supposed to "validate" our true beliefs, but then of course this isn't 'rationality' but it is just justification, of the deonotological variety. I highly doubt this is either a necessary or sufficient condition for 'rationality.' Indeed, children don't "validate" their true beliefs, but we wouldn't call them irrational. If justification isn't the same as rationality, then why not give us the definition of rationality instead of justification? These would be interesting questions to explore, but that is not needed to point out the complete failure of Tremblay's discussion of Plantinga.)
So, he swings and hits himself in the head.
Tremblay: Yes, that is what Plantinga claims. Manata at least scores high on reading comprehension.
Sorry I cannot say the same for my esteemed colleague.
However, my response concerned the fact that N&E together only pertain to instincts, NOT rationality (which is the product of a personal process of evolution, and far too subtle to be captured by fundamental and vague factors like N and E, just as basic knowledge of chemistry is not sufficient to extrapolate to the complexity of, say, what it means for me to love my wife), and that therefore any epistemic examination on Plantinga's part can only be construed as complete if we assume that thought, which is partly molded by rationality, is purely the product of instinctual behaviour.
However I showed that N&E together constitutes a defeater for all of one's beliefs. Simply restating a refuted position doesn’t make it stronger. Apparently Tremblay belabors under the assumption that while 0 + 0 may = 0, 0 + 0 + another 0, gets you a answer different from 0. If P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, then how is this possibly not a defeater for all of ones beliefs? Suppose we look at an analogous case: Say someone S ingested the hallucinate-causing drug XX, which worked on 90% of its patients. The probability of R/XX is low. Thus S, if S reflected on his situation, and came to believe that he did ingest XX, would have a defeater for R. Or, suppose one had no idea the purpose or function his cognitive faculties CF are supposed to have. He had no idea whether their purpose was the production of true beliefs over false ones. The probability would be either low or inscrutable. He should be agnostic with respectsn to R. This person, reflecting on his situation, would then have a defeater for R. Therefore, a low or inscrutable assignment of R (given the relevant information is conditinalized, and, we're talking about sources for belief), yields a defeater for the reflective naturalist (or anyone). The argument is that these two analogues are relevantly similar to N&E, and hence P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable. Hence the reflective person who holds to N&E, has a defeater for all of his beliefs. Unfortunately Tremblay totally fails to interact with Plantinga's arguments for the low probability assignment, and therefore totally fails to undermine EAAN. And, it appears that Tremblay agrees that we have a low or inscrutable probability assignment when he says that the information we have is "vague factors like N and E." According to opponents of EAAN, like Otte, of course, N&E are said to be the relevant information to conditionalize on. And so opponents of the argument would disagree with Tremblay here. Furthermore, we do know some information, such as our CFs were produced by random mutations and there is no guarantee that truth was what was selected for, or that belief content causes behavior. Now, Tremblay could actually deal with the arguments Plantinga gives here, but since he hasn't, his posturing aside, he's, again, failed to even touch EAAN. it floats like a butterfly, stings like a bee, EAAN is beautiful, like Tremblay wants to be.
So, Tremblay swings, slips, and falls face-flat on the mat.
Plantinga's claim is that we should evaluate our truth-generating faculties solely on the standpoint of being molded by an evolutionary process, while excluding the correcting effects of rationality.
But of course the correct claim is that our truth-producing faculties are evaluated on naturalism and evolution, not just evolution. I think I've corrected Tremblay on this more than enough.
Now, Tremblay at least mentions one argument that has been seen in the literature. Levin tries to argue from the "self-correcting nature of inquiry." But this has its problems. First, Tremblay has not even addressed the belief-behavior relationship sketched out in (i)-(iv) in my Round 1 post. Second, this assumes scientific realism. Third, the objection, and how it's supposed to help the naturalist has not been spelled out. Fourth, to say that a belief B is "corrected" by another belief B*, where "corrected" means, "exchanged for a true belief," simply begs the question against EAAN. Why think our "correctings" get us to truth? Suppose that you have a BIV (brain in the vat). Now, what is P(R/BIV)? Low or inscrutable. Say that you knew that a person S was a BIV. And, say that S had certain beliefs at one point. Then, the Alpha Centaurian super scientist caused S to see that his previous beliefs had been "false" and so S, going on information given by the scientist, "corrects" B and puts B* in B's place. What would you assign S's B*? How would you view R? Still low (or inscrutable). And, likewise, if evolution simply cares that our CFs get our body parts in the right place to survive, and "truth takes a back seat," why assume that our "correctings" are any better than our beliefs that were "corrected?" Of course we may continue to go through life assuming R in our "corrections," but upon reflection, given our situation and belief in N&E, our defeater comes flooding back in again, and therefore we doubt R, and thus we doubt our "correctings."
So, he swings with style, but still misses.
This is the sound of a worldview clash completely whizzing past Manata's head.
I hope I don't need to answer this nonsense any further. I would, however, like to mention another point that whizzed right past Manata's head. He contrasted my proposition that our sensory perception is necessarily valid with my proposition that a Matrix-style scenario is possible. However, he completely failed to note the part he himself quoted right after I said that:
'But why should we consider this possibility as having any epistemic importance whatsoever?'
Never mind what I said about Manata. The man obviously failed reading comprehension. How can I be contradicting myself on an epistemic issue when one of the two propositions has no epistemic importance?
1. Conceding defeat and not being able to answer the question always sounds better when you phrase it as if you're "wasting time" and your stellar philosophical insights are "whizzing past" your interlocutors head, but to those who want answers, Tremblay leaves us high and dry.
2. Actually, what went whizzing past a head - Tremblay's - was the comment about perception. So what that Tremblay doesn't "consider it important" that it is "possible his senses aren't veridical and are actually implants from the Matrix?" Proper function of the CF aimed at wish fulfillment or survival wouldn't have it any other way. We might die off, given N&E, if we did sit around constantly doubting R. This does not make our cognitive faculties reliable, though. Furthermore, notice that most of the people in the Matrix didn't take the idea seriously that they were in the Matrix. This doesn't mean that they were not indeed inside the Matrix and, hence, the vast majority of their beliefs were false.
3. Furthermore, this was all show. My point still refutes Tremblay's claim that the senses are necessarily veridical. Since he allowed for the possibility that they weren't, this means that he allows for the fact that they aren't necessary. Even if he doesn't "think it's a big deal," this doesn't change the refuted modal status of his claim, i.e., they are not necessarily veridical.
4. Lastly, let's say that I say P and ~P. Let's suppose further than ~P has "no importance for me," haven't I still contradicted myself? Does it matter a lick to the law of non-contradiction of I hold to a claim and its negation, while also holding that one is "unimportant" to me? Doesn't Tremblay sound foolish talking the kind of smack he has, while arguing and thinking the way he has? How embarrassing.
Now, I'd wager that if you own a signed copy of one of Tremblay's atheological books, hang on to it, it will be a rare comodity, what, with the majority of them being thrown away as we speak.
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