Let's play God for a day!

"God could’ve created all human beings with one color of skin. There has been too much killing, slavery, and wars because we are not one race with one language."

http://adebateontheproblemofevil.blogspot.com/2007/01/extent-of-suffering-in-our-world-makes.html

Let’s extend Loftus’ irresistible logic to a few more showcase examples:

1.Beautiful women tempt some men to commit fornication and adultery.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, there would be no beautiful women.

On the Loftus scale of values, a world without beautiful women is better than a world with beautiful women.

Bye, bye Lena Horne. Bye, bye Dolores Del Rio.

2.If it weren’t for the existence of women, there would be no female rape victims.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, there would be no women—beautiful or otherwise.

A world without women is better than a world with women.

Alternative: in a perfect world, all men would be eunuchs.

Will Loftus lead by example?

3.Fashion-conscious people are vain.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, everyone would dress in Maoist fatigues.

Lipstick would be banned.

All women would have buzz-cuts.

O, I forgot, in a perfect world there would be no women.

4.Kids sometimes break the China.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, there would be no kids.

Kids are such a nuisance anyway.

5.Puppies sometimes wet the rug.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, there would be no puppies.

6.The poor often envy the rich.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, everyone would be equally poor.

7. Some people overeat.

In a perfect world, there would be no ice cream. Just soybeans and tofu.

8.Sunbathers frequently get sunburn.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, there would be no sandy beaches or sunny weather.

A world with gray, overcast skies is better than a world with sunshine.

9.Some people use their fingers to make obscene gestures.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, there would be no fingers—just bony, fleshy stumps.

10.Dogs sometimes bite the hand that feeds them.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, there would be no pet dogs. (Not to mention kittens!).

11.Some people play their music too loud.

Therefore, in a perfect world, there would be no music.

12.The sense of touch tempts some people to commit fornication and adultery.

Therefore, if Loftus were God, hugs and kisses would be banned.

On second thought, in a perfect world there’d be nothing worth hugging.

13.To be continued…

Welcome to the best of all possible worlds. Sign up now while reservations last!

Sunday school atheism

“Christian philosopher James F. Sennett has said: ‘By far the most important objection to the faith is the so-called problem of evil. I tell my philosophy of religion students that, if they are Christians and the problem of evil does not keep them up at night, then they don’t understand it’.”

I haven’t authorized Dr. Sennett to be my spokesman. He doesn’t speak for me.

The problem of evil doesn’t keep me up at night, for if there is no God, there is no evil.

Notice that Loftus has never made a case for secular ethics. He has never said if he believes in moral absolutes. He’s never said what school of secular ethics, if any, he subscribes to.

Even assuming that secular ethics can get off the ground, Loftus has never explained how it’s possible to wrong a meat machine.

He’s never explained his position in relation to eliminative materialism.

“I’m arguing against the theistic conception of God, who is believed to be all powerful, or omnipotent, perfectly good, or omnibenelovent and all-knowing, or omniscient.”

As I pointed out in my review of his book, which he never responded to, the omni- prefix has snuck into the definition of divine goodness. From what I can tell, this is a fairly recent development.

It’s one thing to define God as benevolent, another to define him as omnibenevolent. That is not self-explanatory, but it tends to bias the debate by suggesting that if God is good, then he must treat all his creatures equally.

If so, then that prejudges the debate by defining goodness in Arminian terms. To be good is to be equitable.

As a Calvinist, I reject that definition. The correct formulation would be equal treatment all other things being equal. But things are often unequal.

The egalitarian definition of goodness is radically individualistic, as if creatures are discrete, self-contained units.

Paul Helm has pointed out some of the conceptual difficulties with this assumption. Cf. “Can God Love the World? K. Vanhoozer, ed. Nothing Greater, Nothing Better (Eerdmans 2001), 168-85.

Let’s remember that a Bible-believing Christian is only concerned with defending the God of Biblical self-revelation, and not a semantic abstraction, in which we infer the nature of God from an unrestricted definition of words like “omniscience,” “omnipotence,” or “omnibenevolence.”

To the contrary, we don’t begin with categories from philosophical theology, but from Biblical descriptions of God. That’s where the definitions come from, not vice versa.

“But what reason is there for creating anything at all? Theists typically respond by saying creation was an expression of God’s love. But wasn’t God already complete in love? If love must be expressed, then God needed to create, and that means he lacked something. Besides, a perfectly good God should not have created anything at all, if by creating something, anything, it also brought about so much intense suffering. By doing so he actually reduced the amount of total goodness there is, since God alone purportedly has absolute goodness.”

One of the problems with this discussion is a systematic equivocation of the nature of the “good.” “Good” is a relative term. Good *for what*? Good *for whom*?

The world isn’t good for God or bad for God. It has no effect on God.

The question is whether the world is good for others. And does the existence of evil subserve the ultimate good?

“Well over 100 million animals are slaughtered every year for American consumption alone, while animals viciously prey on each other.”

Is Loftus a vegan? Does he subscribe to the “meat is murder” philosophy?

I am not a vegan. I don’t regard a meat diet as unethical, and Loftus has given me no reason to think otherwise.

I daresay that many unbelievers enjoy their steak and lobster, so Loftus objection isn’t limited to Christian theism.

“If, however, God did not give us free will, then Calvinistic theology must justify why our world brings God more glory than a different world where he decrees from eternity that his creatures all perfectly obey him.”

Reformed theology has, in fact, mounted such an argument. Loftus simply chooses to ignore the argument—because he can’t answer it.

“No tornado’s, no floods, no hurricanes, no earthquakes, no devastating fires, no volcanic eruptions, no lethal parasites, or major diseases like cancer, polio, malaria, pneumonia or AIDS. There should be no poisonous creatures like the brown recluse spider, and no poisonous plants like Yew (eat it and you die within minutes).”

This is a very odd string of objections from someone who says he believes in natural science. These natural forces and natural events have a natural function in the balance of nature, in a physical, functional universe, with a self-contained ecosystem.

“If God exists he should stop all natural disasters too, like the Indonesian tsunami.”

Other issues aside, if you live on the coast, you are subject to coastal flooding. That’s a calculated risk.

“If God allows these disasters for a greater good, what’s the greater good here? Any paltry benefits to the victims could’ve been gained by other means. To say the victims are going to be rewarded in heaven for their suffering can never morally justify why they suffered in the first place, otherwise the final eternal state, even if it’s pleasant for them, only compensates them for their sufferings.”

i) This falsely assumes a one-to-one correspondence between victim and compensation.

ii) It also disregards the fact that, as sinners, we are morally liable to natural disasters even if there is no one-to-one correspondence between a particular sin and a particular catastrophe.

“If God exists he should not have created predation in the natural world, either.”

An assertion, not an argument.

“The amount of creaturely suffering here is atrocious as creatures prey on one another to feed themselves.”

i) How does he know what animals suffer? Does he know what it’s like to be a bat?

ii) Does he believe in animal rights? What is his secular justification for animal rights?

What does eliminative materialism have to say about animal suffering?

iii) Shouldn’t he at least draw a distinction between higher and lower animals? What’s a lobster’s capacity for pain and suffering?

“All creatures should be vegetarians.”

An assertion, not an argument.

Why should all animals be herbivores? Is it a miscarriage of cosmic justice when a sparrow eats an earthworm? Has the sparrow deprived the earthworm of its annelidan rights? Is this based on annelidan social contract theory?

Which version of annelidan social contract theory is Loftus appealing to? Hobbes? Locke? Rousseau? Rawls?

“And in order to be sure there is enough vegetation for us all, God could’ve reduced our mating cycles and/or made edible vegetation to grow as plenteous as wild weeds do today.”

I don’t see many human beings complain about the fact that they can have sex year round.

“In fact, there is no good reason for God to have created animals at all, especially since theists do not consider them part of any eternal scheme.”

If Lotus were God, there would be no rose gardens or camellias.

Loftus has a Scrooge-like view of the good. If Loftus were God, he would pave over Yosemite Park to put in a shopping mall.

But something doesn’t have to be an ultimate good to be a finite good.

Loftus is a good example of the atrophied worldview of unbelief. He knows the cost of everything and the value of nothing. It’s all about the bottom-line. The profit margin. Unadorned utility.

“As a result, William Rowe’s argument about a fawn that is burned in a forest fire and left to die a slow death without any human witness is gratuitous evil, plain and simple. It serves no greater good.”

Once again, this is an absurdly romantic notion of nature for someone who believes in natural science.

Animals die in wildfires because of animals, trees, and fire. It’s a natural side-effect of animals, trees, and lightening.

Electricity has a natural function in a physical universe. Trees have a natural function in the ecosystem. There’s nothing gratuitous about a forest fire.

“If God created the laws of nature in the first place, then he could’ve created a different set of laws.”

Now he’s shifting gears. He’s tacitly admitting that these are not gratuitous events, but purposeful events in a physical universe.

Yes, God could have created a world without “useless” creatures like camellias and butterflies.

Notice a fundamental tension in Loftus’s objections. On the one hand, he complains that nature is too ruthless, too efficient. On the other hand, he complains that nature is too gratuitous, too inefficient. Which is it?

Loftus is a standard-issue apostate, and, as a result, he exhibits the intellectual and emotional schizophrenia of the typical apostate.

Loftus looks at nature from the viewpoint of a disillusioned idealist. If Loftus were coming at this issue from scratch, as a purebred atheist with no Christian conditioning, he wouldn’t hold the natural world to this Edenic standard of perfectionism.

Ironically, his argument for naturalism comes from of an idyllic frame of reference which doesn’t come out of a naturalistic worldview.

He’s comparing the natural world with a sentimental preconception of how the world ought to be.

But that hardly represents a secular point of departure. Rather, it represents a theological starting point.

Moreover, it represents a very provincial starting point, which is just what you’d expect given his Church of Christ background.

He’s rebelling against the theological naïveté of his parochial Christian experience. His disappointment with that standard of comparison is what continues to supply the standard of comparison.

Instead of growing into a more sophisticated and exegetically astute Christian outlook, he simply revolts against his Sunday school version of the Christian faith.

Dim bulb nominations for 2007

God could’ve created us with much stronger immune systems such that there would be no pandemics which have decimated whole populations of people. At the very least, he could’ve given us the knowledge to cure these diseases the day after he created us, but he didn’t even do that.

God could’ve created us with self-regenerating bodies. When we receive a cut, it heals itself over time, as does a sprained ankle, or even a broken bone.

http://adebateontheproblemofevil.blogspot.com/2007/01/extent-of-suffering-in-our-world-makes.html

Notice how, on the one hand, Loftus leaves the fall out of consideration while, on the other hand, he omits glorification.

He creates an artificial problem of evil by truncating the Christian philosophy of history at both ends. A classic straw man argument.

John Loftus: Grand Wizard of Infidelity

"God could’ve created all human beings with one color of skin. There has been too much killing, slavery, and wars because we are not one race with one language."

http://adebateontheproblemofevil.blogspot.com/2007/01/extent-of-suffering-in-our-world-makes.html

If Loftus were God, he'd be the Imperial Wizard of the Universe.

No more Jews. Or Latinos.

No more Blacks. Or Chinamen.

Or Arabs. Or East Indians.

Or Polynesians.

No miscegenation.

Everyone would be a pure-bred Icelander.

What's it like to be a bat?

Loftus cites animal suffering as an argument against the existence of God:

"If God exists he should not have created predation in the natural world, either. The amount of creaturely suffering here is atrocious as creatures prey on one another to feed themselves."

http://adebateontheproblemofevil.blogspot.com/2007/01/extent-of-suffering-in-our-world-makes.html

One of the problems with this comparison is that it's so hopelessly anthropomorphic. For Loftus is simply projecting himself into the "mind" of an animal, as if he can identify with the "viewpoint" of an animal.

This merely illustrates the philosophically childish level at which Loftus operates. Loftus has been watching too many episodes of Deep Space Nine. You know...Odo, the shapeshifter—who knows what it feels like to be a poached egg.

As Thomas Nagel pointed out over 30 years ago:

This appears to create difficulties for the notion of what it is like to be a bat. We must consider whether any method will permit us to extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case, and if not, what alternative methods there may be for understanding the notion...I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task. I cannot perform it either by imagining additions to my present experience, or by imagining segments gradually subtracted from it, or by imagining some combination of additions, subtractions, and modifications.

To the extent that I could look and behave like a wasp or a bat without changing my fundamental structure, my experiences would not be anything like the experiences of those animals. On the other hand, it is doubtful that any meaning can be attached to the supposition that I should possess the internal neurophysiological constitution of a bat. Even if I could by gradual degrees be transformed into a bat, nothing in my present constitution enables me to imagine what the experiences of such a future stage of myself thus metamorphosed would be like. The best evidence would come from the experiences of bats, if we only knew what they were like...we believe that bats feel some versions of pain, fear, hunger, and lust, and that they have other, more familiar types of perception besides sonar. But we believe that these experiences also have in each case a specific subjective character, which it is beyond our ability to conceive.

http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/Nagel_Bat.html

Tom Schreiner on Baptism

JT interviews Tom Schreiner

Gamaliel

Liberals, as well as outright unbelievers, deny the inspiration and accuracy of Luke. Yet, generally speaking, their evidence comes down to just two or three threadbare examples: the genealogy, the census, and Theudas (Acts 5:36-37).

But if Luke really was an uninspired writer, more concerned with theology than history, the list ought to be far longer.

Moreover, we should expect to run across a few obscurities in a book written 2000 years ago. We are not the target audience. What was common knowledge for the original reader is often lost on us.

I’ve discussed the census and the genealogy in my review of TET. But what about Theudas?

The allegation is that Luke committed an anachronism by dating the leader of this revolt too early, contrary to the later date assigned to him by Josephus.

If you run through the liberal to conservative scholarship, you are generally presented with one of three options: (i) Luke was wrong; (ii) Josephus was wrong; (iii) Gamaliel was referring to another Theudas.

But there’s another option I haven’t seen debated. Let’s remember that Luke isn’t speaking for himself. He's not stating what he thinks really took place.

Rather, he's quoting someone else. He's reporting what was actually said, not what actually happened (according to the source he's quoting).

Why is it not equally possible that Gamaliel misspoke? After all, Luke is quoting (or summarizing) an extemporaneous speech. People often misspeak when they talk off-the-cuff—especially when they cite some news item or historical incident from memory.

Gamaliel wasn't delivering a prepared speech. Rather, he was ad libbing.

And although we don't know how old he was, it's a safe bet that he was getting up in years.

Some commentators conjecture that he was naming a different man by the same name.

Why not conjecture that he was misnaming the individual in question?

As the commentators point out, there were quite a few revolutionaries or insurgents during the period in question.

Admittedly, that's speculative on my part, but any explanation or harmonization is speculative at this juncture—from liberal (Luke was wrong) to conservative (Josephus was wrong, or Gamaliel was referring to another man by the same name). So it's not as if a conservative explanation is special pleading while a liberal explanation has the hard evidence in its favor.

We're more likely to correctly remember an event, but misremember a name than the other way round—especially when we're speaking impromptu. Recall the gist of the event even if we're fuzzy on the details.

Not to mention if we're getting up in years. I'm not saying he (Gamaliel) was senile, but when you live long enough, things tend to become a bit of a blur precisely because you've lived through so very much.

And, again, he was speaking off the top of his head.

If this is the true explanation, then, ironically, in would be a mark of Luke's accuracy rather than inaccuracy by accurately reporting an inaccurate statement.

Out of curiosity, I ran this explanation by Craig Blomberg, who agreed with me that this was a reasonable option.

Online Introduction to the NT

Daniel Wallace, of DTS, has written what is, in effect, a conservative, online introduction to the NT. This is a valuable resource.

TR identity-theft

TO: The Politburo
FROM: The Grand Mufti
RE: "Will I Lose My TR Card Over This Post?"


Tonight, T-bloggers will convene an emergency meeting of the Politburo to revise the protocols under which we issue TR cards, in order to stem the rising tide of TR identity-theft.

Draft proposals:

1. Honorary TR cards.

Cardholder will be entitled to attend TR sponsored events (e.g., the biennial auto-da-fe) when accompanied by a duly authorized TR-chaperon.

2. TR cards with annual expiration dates, subject to annual renewal.

Applicant must recite (from memory) the Solemn League & Covenant while standing on one hand.

3. TR discount card.

Cardhold will be entitled to free admission to TR sponsored events after buying 10 copies of Hoeksema's Triple Knowledge, five copies of Knox's First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women, and 15 jumbo bags of Cheetos.

4. Frequent Fryer card.

Applicant will be issued Frequent Fryer card after he burning 5 Remonstrants at the stake. (In case Remonstrants are out of stock, substitute Molinists.)

5. TR debit card.

Cardholder will be entitled to charge all goods and services to the Treasury of Demerit.

6. Iconoclasticard.

Cardholder will be entitled to free admission to TR sponsored events after smashing 4 organs, 3 Rose windows, 2 Lady chapels, and 1 crucifix. Don't leave home without it.

7. Junior TR card.

Covenant children will be issued Junior TR card after casting their Barbie dolls, GI Joe action-figures, and other idolatrous, damnable, papistical fripperies, into the bonfire of the vanities.

N. B. Ann Coulter action-figure exempt.

Will I Loose My TR Card Over This Post?

Just a few words about this past week's "tiff" in the blogosphere. You know the infamous "video." (Strike's up Darth Vader's theme from Star Wars).

If you'll notice, I've kept out of this...until now. I'll be catching flack for this.

1. We need to distinguish for a moment between what is said because of a reaction to what many of us experienced in the past and the relation of the Pauline order. The Pauline order in Romans, for example, is not - hear me well - a prospectus for evangelistic method. It's a theology text that follows the the order of knowing, rather than the order of being. The Reformers, even the ogre of many, Beza, stated that Romans provided the order for learning theology in a teleological fashion from what the believer has experienced to the more heady doctrine of God (ergo: depravity, justification, sanctification, the ordu salutis, election). Beza went the other direction in his Tabula, as did Perkins in Golden Chaine, but they both said this could not be understood apart from the Pauline order first. This "ontological order" was for the classroom for the mature Christian who already understood the doctrines from the other direction.

But we're not teaching theology in the classroom when we do evangelism. We aren't giving a prospectus for theology or theological method; we're sharing the gospel, and that is often tailored to the individual situation.

Many of us come from antinomian, easy-believism backgrounds. Its natural to react negatively to this video. But this leads me to

2. We need to separate our emotional reaction from our reasoned response. I am on record as stating that I have a far greater issue with the easy believism of the SBC and the IFBx people than the Wesleyans. I'd rather coopeate with the later in a single effort if necessary than the former. I disagree with the whole idea of prevenient grace in their theology. I disagree with "free will" as they define it. But they are just as horrified by easy believism as I am, and I am not going to mistake the objectivity of what Christ did and the scope and effectuality of the cross and grace with a person's subjective beliefs about the structure of the ordu salutis. I certainly am not going to evaluate an entire ministry based on a single video. What's next, shall the non-equivalentalists among those who believe in particular redemption and the equivalentalists squabble if one side allegedly muddles the doctrine of atonement?

3. Just this past month and again this past week, I was castigated by one James Jay, a man with no church - go figure - and one who has apparently interacted with James White. Mr. Jay thinks that it's not enough that I believe in particular redemption, defend it, and teach it myself, but I have to label all general redemptionists (and that includes Amyraldians and other "4 Pointers" out there, not just Lutherans, Arminians, and others) "unregenerate." Apparently, you have to perform that single work of superogation in order to be "truly saved," not just "TR." Of course, when I learned he had no church, it was pretty easy to tell him not to bother criticizing me, my ministry, or my church when he is not part of one himself- and he likely never will be, since he's the only one going to heaven - him and a group about the size of the Heaven's Gate cult.

I had planned to post that conversation on my church blog in toto to show them what a real hyper-Calvinist is like. I think now I'll post it here as well with no comment options (because Mr. Jay has forfeited the right to interact under Titus 3), just to give us all a little reminder of where this sort of fiestiness can lead if we don't police ourselves more closely. And this goes for people on both sides of the issue. You see, nobody really starts out like Mr. Jay; it takes time. Today, they seem perfectly reasonable, but they keep on and on and on, until one day they are off in a corner begging for a dime for a cup of proverbial coffee and talking to themselves is a schizophrenic fit. So, I think what I'll do is provide the moral equivalent of an object lesson, rather like taking your kids to the local jail to show them what life is really like. It's a lesson they will hopefully never forget.

When the Darkness Will Not Lift

John Piper has a new book out titled When the Darkness Will Not Lift about the Christian's struggle with depression. You can download it for free online.

Speaking of Piper, his sermons on John Newton and William Cowper (who himself suffered severe bouts of depression, not to mention insanity, throughout his life) would be worth listening to as well. They're freely available here in MP3 format. Scroll down to the section "Men of Whom the World Was Not Worthy."

Along the same lines, I found Michael Haykin's sermon on William Cowper equally edifying, particularly his comments on Cowper's hymns "God moves in a mysterious way" and "There is a fountain filled with blood."

I'd also recommend D. Martyn Lloyd-Jones' series of sermons which were subsequently turned into a book called Spiritual Depression.

Of course, the last thing a melancholy, downcast soul needs is a burdensome list of books and other resources to plough through, so please use your discretion.

Atheist Eschatology and the False Prophets

Imagine there's no Heaven
It's easy if you try
No hell below us
Above us only sky
Imagine all the people
Living for today

Imagine there's no countries
It isn't hard to do
Nothing to kill or die for
And no religion too
Imagine all the people
Living life in peace

You may say that I'm a dreamer
But I'm not the only one
I hope someday you'll join us
And the world will be as one

Imagine no possessions
I wonder if you can
No need for greed or hunger
A brotherhood of man
Imagine all the people
Sharing all the world

You may say that I'm a dreamer
But I'm not the only one
I hope someday you'll join us
And the world will live as one

- John Lennon

“Robert Owen - who rejected all formal religious systems - was greatly influenced by millennial ideas. He famously (or notoriously) tried to set up a planned utopia in the New World. At times, Owen took on the mantle of Messiah himself, writing of being compelled ‘to proceed onward to complete a mission’ whereby ‘the earth will gradually be made a fit abode for superior men and women, under a New Dispensation, which will make the earth a paradise and its inhabitants angels.’”

- cited in Michael Ruse, The Evolution Creation Struggle, Harvard, 2005, p.124.

"In the name of the best within you, do not sacrifice this word to those who are its worst. In the name of the values that keep you alive, do not let your vision of man be distorted by the ugly, the cowardly, the mindless in those who have never achieved his title. Do not lose your knowledge that man's proper estate is an upright posture, an intransigent mind and a step that travels unlimited roads. Do not let your fire go out, spark by irreplaceable spark, in the hopeless swamps of the approximate, the not-quite, the not-yet, the not-at-all. Do not let the hero in your soul perish, in lonely frustration for the life you deserved, but have never been able to reach. Check your road and the nature of your battle. The world you desired can be won, it exists, it is real, it is possible, it's yours.”

- Ayn Rand as “John Galt” in Atlas Shrugged

Postmillennialism, as the name implies, holds that (1) Christ will return subsequent to the millennium, which (2) represents a period which will see growth and maturation of righteousness, peace, and prosperity for Christ’s kingdom on earth (visibly represented by the church) through the gradual conversion of the world to the gospel, as well as a period for the glory and vindication of the saints in heaven. …Finally then, (7) over the long range the world will experience a period of extraordinary righteousness and prosperity as the church triumphs in the preaching of the gospel and discipling the nations through the supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit; however, the release of Satan at the very end of the age will bring apostasy from these blessed conditions.

- Greg Bahnsen, Christian Postmillennialist

FOR THE OPTIMISTIC atheist, the future looks bright. Through the preaching of science, unbelief will cover the face of the world, “like yeast that a woman took and mixed into a large amount of flour until it worked all through the dough.” At some point in the future no more will a man tell his neighbor to unknow the Lord, for they will all unknow him, from the least to the greatest.

Man’s problem: lack of education. The preaching of the Word of the Lord will not change men, but the teaching of the Word of the Scientists will. Our future well-being is not dependant upon the substitutionary death of Christ and the regenerating work of the Spirit. “Our future well-being--the well-being of all of us on the planet--depends on the education of our descendants” (Daniel Dennett).

Through education, men will drop such ridiculous beliefs as belief in the three-in-one God of the Bible. The scientist is not alone, if Reason is for you, who can be against you? Within the one being of Reason exists three non-persons, Science, Skepticism, and Free thought. Three-non-persons in one non-personal essence.

No more will men do all things to the glory of God, they will do all things to the glory of evolutionary biology. And there’s hell to pay for exchanging the glory of the created for that of the creator. A “good man” once said that “if anyone causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be better for him to have a large millstone hung around his neck and to be drowned in the depths of the sea.” “When these children grow up, in this Age of the Gene, they will want to know why you lied to them, why you hid the glories of evolutionary biology from them” (Dennett, ibid).

In the postmillennial golden age, believers will become like interesting cultural artifacts. And if it becomes necessary, “Safety demands that religions be put in cages” (Dennett, ibid). All sins are forgivable, except for the blasphemy of the Holy Mother. Thus Dennett, “Save the Baptists! Yes, of course, but not by all means. Not if it means tolerating the deliberate misinforming of children about the natural world” (Dennett, ibid).

This is the eschatology of victory, the bright hope of evolutionary postmillennialism.

Christians also hold eschatological beliefs. Though they’re a bit more internally rational (given that they do indeed see a telos, purpose, or goal to the universe) than their atheist counterparts. Given their views, that the world is headed somewhere is not a mere accident, pace Russell: “That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms…” (Russell, A Free Man’s Worship). Ultimately, the bright future of atheist postmillennialism is brought about by an accident. At best, people drop religious beliefs because holding non-religious beliefs has survival value, not because their cognitive faculties are aimed at producing (mostly) true beliefs. Thus Rorty,

"The idea that one species of organism is, unlike all the others, oriented not just toward its own uncreated prosperity but toward Truth, is as un-Darwinian as the idea that every human being has a built-in moral compass--a conscience that swings free of both social history and individual luck." (Richard Rorty, "Untruth and Consequences," The New Republic, July 31, 1995, pp. 32-36.)

And Churchland,

"Boiled down to its essentials, a nervous system that enables the organism to succeed in...feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principle [sic] chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. Improvements in their sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances for survival. Truth, whatever that is, takes the hindmost." (Praticia Churchland, "Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience," Journal of Philosophy 84 (October 1987): 548. Cited in, "C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea," Victor Reppert, IVP, 2002, pp. 76-77).

That Christians may be more internally rational does not mean that their beliefs are true, though. And some Christians have given reason for the mocking of Christian eschatology. Many Christians are embarrassed by the false prophets, never ceasing to predict the return of Christ. They see the “sign of the times” and then rush to such conclusions as: “See, Christ’s return is soon (where this means within our lifetime).” There also have been many predictions concerning Christ’s return. Ellen G. White is as good as any,

"I saw that the time for Jesus to be in the most Holy place was nearly finished, and that time cannot last but a very little longer. ... The sealing time is very short and soon will be over." (Experience & Views pp. 46-47)

Virtually any natural disaster brings Christians out in droves, proclaiming that Jesus’ return is weeks, months, and at most, a couple years away.

When Jerusalem became a state again in 1948, we heard claims like that of Darryl Young from Focus on Jerusalem: Prophecy Ministry,

"I believe that the 2nd coming of Jesus is very imminent. I believe that (since 1948) we are living in the terminal generation. Matthew 24:34 Verily I say unto you, This generation (generation born contemporary with Israel) shall not pass, (die out) till all these things be fulfilled."

Since the 70’s men like Hal Lindsey have claimed Jesus is coming very soon, Christians will rule for the millennium and unbelief will be stomped out. (Lindsey is not a postmillennialist, but there are some surface similarities here. Of course postmillennialism is light years ahead of premillennialism exegetically and hermeneutically, in my opinion.) Lindsey looks at the stats and declares,

"To the skeptic who says that Christ is not coming soon, I would ask him to put the book of Revelation in one hand, and the daily newspaper in the other, and then sincerely ask God to show him where we are on His prophetic time-clock." - Lindsey, There's a New World Coming

Obviously this has received much scorn from the non-religious,

"For years, end-time soothsayers have been trying to convince us that the end is near, whether in a pre-tribulational rapture, a Great Tribulation, or the Second Coming of Christ. Hal Lindsey's, The Late Great Planet Earth (1970), was not the first book on Bible prophecy to assert that we are living in the last days. For centuries, Christian writers have used the Bible to predict that the end was "near." One would think that, with all the failed predictions, Christians would wise up and begin to scrutinize the interpretive methods used by so-called prophetic experts." -Anonymous

Or, Martin Gardner, writing for the Skeptical Inquirer,

“You would think that believers in the imminence of Christ's return would be bothered by the fact that, ever since the gospels were written, huge numbers of Christians have interpreted Biblical signs of the end as applying to their generation. The sad history of these failed prophecies makes no impression on the mind-sets of today's fundamentalists. Even Billy Graham, who should know better, has for decades preached and written about the impending return of Jesus. He grants that no one knows the exact year, but all signs indicate, he believes, that the great event is almost upon us.” -The Skeptical Inquirer, Jan/Feb 2,000 edition.

Even internet atheologians take shots at these Christians. For example, amateur atheologian, Aaron Kinney, calls Christians who believe that Jesus will return in 2007, retards.

And so it should be clear that this constant proclaiming that Jesus is returning soon is cause for ridicule. But do atheist have premillennial eschatologists in their own camp? Because of the providential workings of Reason - the three impersons in one impersonal being - unbelievers have thought the establishment of Reason, upon her unholy mountain, was immanent. At least soon. At least in their lifetime, or the life time of their children. But would one also think that unbelievers should be “bothered by the fact” that the claims they’ve made, for centuries, have not come true. Should they be thrown into the same camp as the fundamentalist?

First, do they really make such claims? Remember Hal Lindsey knew unbelief would die away, belief would reign, all because Jesus was coming soon and would be enthroned in Jerusalem, ruling, because he checked the Bible with the newspaper? Looking at the world around him, he could see the shift in tide. Take Aaron Kinney again. He also employs newspaper exegesis:

“As if the night wasn't great enough being able to dance to the intense house music of Donald Glaude, I got to see an atheist with an atheistic tattoo prominently displayed on his bicep. What a cool night!

Now, there have undoubtedly been atheists in America since America was founded. But what about proudly displaying that type of affiliation on one's arm? What I mean is that this young man is doing something that he could not have done a few generations ago without severe consequences. 200 years ago, this man would have been persecuted for that kind of display, even in America. 100 years ago, this man would have been blacklisted for such a display. Even 50 years ago this man would possibly have been blacklisted, and most likely ostracized from his community.

Nowadays, you can still find yourself in a bad light for this kind of display in certain rural parts of America, but even then, not to the degree that you would have found yourself in 50 years ago. And nowadays in most parts of America you can proudly show off these kinds of tattoos without fear of persecution or too much grief from your local community.

Attitudes are most definitely changing, and they are changing for the better. I bet that 50 or 100 years ago, there were no atheists in America with atheistic tattoos. But today there are very likely more tattooed atheists than just this one guy.

The afterlife is dying, one dance party at a time.” SOURCE

Reading the newspapers is a prophetic tool used by atheist and theist alike, thus Kinney (again):

“The year 2006 was a very bad year for the Kristian Kause. Two top dogs at The New Life Church were outed as queers, numerous Catholic Churches filed for bankruptcy, Jesus Camp closed, the Offspring Murder Club had a membership explosion, Kent Hovind got thrown in jail for tax evasion (for the record I think Hovind should be released), and theistic arguments have generally weakened.

Countless other blows were dealt to religion in 2006, including the release of a number of best-selling books written by prominent atheists and scientists, and studies that show that atheism is gaining much popularity in the developed world…. From the looks of things, 2007 will be an even better year for atheists.” SOURCE

And in the comments section of that same post, Kinney states,

“Yes, 2006 was a big year for atheists. We finally got a lobbying group in DC, many Christians and Chrristian empires fell/began their fall, etc, plus all the other stuff I mentioned.

Ann's book sold better. Fine. Even with that, I think I can pull up more examples than you can of my respective worldview making progress. In this comment section you only came up with a small few. I can bring up lots more if I dig a little deeper. The stuff I posted about was just off the top of my head.

Christianity is still in the majority in the US, but secularism and atheism in particular are gaining ground and winning battles, and the momentum is increasing, not decreasing. Thank God (LOL) for the internet.”

We find the same with amateur internet atheologian, John Loftus, who sees himself as an atheist Messiah of some sort: “I see myself as a liberator of superstitious and even dangerous delusionary thinking” (SOURCE) , and his followers at Debunking Christianity. Thus Daniel Morgan who posts excerpts from two articles from the National Secular Society. Why? Because “they filled me with hope for our future this morning,”

“Less than half Australia’s young people say they believe in a god, and many believe there is little truth in religion, a new study has found. The three-year national study, a joint project between Monash University, the Australian Catholic University and the Christian Research Association, found many young people live an entirely secular life.”

And,

“A poll of 1,450 young people in Spain shows that most believe that religion is of little importance and has no place in schools. The survey of people aged 15 to 29 shows that attitudes have changed radically since the era of the dictator Franco. Then, homosexuality was banned. Now gay marriage is legal, with 80 percent of those who were asked agreeing with the change in the law.” SOURCE

But forget about contemporary amateur atheologians and contemporary skeptical newspapers, what about atheists through history? Is there something of the same thing we see coming from the Christians who claim Jesus is about to return? Can we find such predictive prophecy in the atheists of days-gone-by?


Voltaire is reputed to have proclaimed about the Bible, "In 100 years this book will be forgotten and eliminated..." Though this claim as not been substantiated, we can find substantiated claims as well:

"As an unbeliever, I ask leave to plead that humanity has been a real gainer from skepticism, and that the gradual and growing rejection of Christianity - like the rejection of faiths which preceded it - has in fact , added, and will add, to man’s happiness and well being." Charles Bradlaugh, Humanity’s Gain From Unbelief, 1889, cited in S.T. Joshi, Atheism: A Reader, p. 171, 2000.

As the good news of Science is preached from the lecterns, belief will fade away,

“To those who believe in the Uniformity of Nature, religion is impossible. - Robert G. Ingersoll, What Is Religion, 1899, cited in S.T. Joshi, Atheism: A Reader, p.86, 2000

And so Bertrand Russell likewise claimed, “Religion is something left over from the infancy of our intelligence; it will fade away as we adopt reason and science as our guidelines.”

Indeed, we’re living in the last days (though we’ve been living in the last days for hundreds of years, apparently!):

"I do not believe that Christianity holds anything more of importance for the world. It is finished, played out. The only trouble lies in how to get rid of the body before it begins to smell too much..." - John Beevers, World Without Faith, 1935, cited in S.T. Joshi, Atheism: A Reader, 311, 2,000.

"The evolutionary future of religion is extinction. Belief in supernatural beings and in supernatural forces that affect nature without obeying nature’s laws will erode and become only an interesting historical memory. …[A]s a cultural trait, belief in supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over the world, as a result of the increasing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge … the process is inevitable." -Anthony F.C. Wallace, Religion: An Anthropological View (New York: Random House, 1966), cited in Warranted Christian Belief, Alvin Plantinga, p. 193, 2000

But modern day unbelievers continue to preach the return of Reason, that impersonal being in whom the three separate but equal non-persons, Free thought, Science, and Skepticism, reside. Thus Farrell Til,

“Information is religion's greatest enemy, and in an age when information is just a few keyboard strokes away from anyone with a computer, this is going to pose a greater threat to Christianity than anything it has yet 'survived.'"

The same claims made by their ancestors are made today,

"As humans get smarter, the old religions will fade. What will replace these religions is yet to be seen however it is reasonable to conclude that as people get smarter, that reality itself will become more prominent [sic]. One can't help but believe that smarter people will be interested in looking at the world the way it really is."- Church of Reality SOURCE

And fantastic tales of a great future life are told:

"The jig was up for religious leaders all over the world, and many decided to come clean. From Britain, the long-suppressed introduction to the King James Bible was released: "This is a booke of instructional tayles for children and the weak of minde, and not to be taken too seriously." Israeli archaeologists confessed that the Dead Sea Scrolls were a rather crude forgery which contained such glaring anachronisms as "toothpaste," "steam engine," and "Phil Silvers." And Chinese scholars admitted that the chubby smiling Buddha began life as a corporate logo for pickled eel in the third century; he was, in effect, the Bob's Big Boy of his time." SOURCE

And so like the orthodox and thoughtful theist must chastise those within his own camp, the orthodox and thoughtful atheist should clean up his own backyard before pointing out our mess. It appears as if the atheists have their own batch of “fundamentalists” to worry about. The rhetoric coming from many atheists today, e.g., Dawkins, Harris, Dennett, etc., can only serve to make atheism look more and more elitist, outlandish, and narrow-minded. These are the sorts of things the atheist community despise.

Maybe the orthodox atheists are more like Hume, who said:

"Look out for a people entirely void of religion, and if you find them at all, be assured that they are but a few degrees removed from the brutes.”

And they cannot live consistently with the unorthodox atheists, who seem to side with Darwin,

“At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace throughout the world the savage races.”

The atheists must settle this for if Charles Darwin is correct, and if David Hume is correct, then atheists had better be on the look out because they may be "exterminated and replaced" because they are "savage brutes."

At present, though, if Christians have cause to be embarrassed, then so do atheists. Let’s be consistent with our eschatology. Christians can continue to proclaim that Jesus will win, and atheists can echo the eschatology of Bertrand Russell at the end of Free Man’s worship,

“Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power.”

Religion of Peace?

Religion of Peace? by Andrew McCarthy

How to lose

The Panderer
01/09 02:01 PM
There's a lot of slobbering over Senator McCain these days — from some on the right.  They are impressed with his insistence on increasing troop strength in Iraq.  We are told he has always held that position, even at the beginning of the war.  Well, I'm not impressed.  I'm not impressed with his position on Iraq or homeland security.

McCain says nothing about Iran and Syria, which means he doesn't have the political courage to recognize the existence of a regional war in the Middle East.  This is a defect in his thinking, and the thinking of others who believe a surge, as they call it, will win anything more than the day.  It won't win the war.  And if we send more troops into Iraq, without addressing the importation of insurgents and weaponry into that country, what exactly will be accomplished?  McCain's position is untenable, as are most being offered by Washington.  

If we do not topple the regimes in Iran and Syria, there can be no victory in Iraq.  On this point, Israel and most of its Arab neighbors agree.

McCain's position on domestic security has been disgraceful.  He joined with the radicals in the Democrat party to confer constitutional and international rights on unlawful enemy combatants (a.k.a. al Qaeda terrorists) for the first time in American history.  He led the effort to water down our interrogation methods, some of which were highly effective.  The damage McCain and others have inflicted on homeland security will become obvious should we be attacked again.

McCain has learned the art of pandering, and he's now pandering to conservatives.  Let's hope enough conservatives see through it.

http://levin.nationalreview.com/post/?q=M2U0MjkzYzMyYTgzYTI2OWRiY2NkYWM3ZjU2YzljZDI=

Holofamily values

The primary Catholic objection to the Protestant rule of faith (sola Scriptura) is that we can’t agree with each other.

There are several problems with this objection, but let’s focus on two in particular.

1. The Catholic conception of unity reminds me of a Star Trek episode: “Real Life,” wherein the Doctor creates the perfect holographic family:

The setting is a modern human home where everything is spotlessly clean and neatly arranged. Charlene, Jeffrey, and Belle hurry downstairs in unison and line up next to the front door. There is almost a Stepford Wives feeling as Charlene checks that her children's fingernails are clean and their shoes polished. Belle asks to greet her father first because she thinks Jeffrey always gets the honor, but Jeffrey reminds Belle that she went first yesterday. Charlene cheerily tells the children to get along. Politely, Jeffrey apologizes to Belle, who concedes that it is Jeffrey's turn. Charlene seems excited and the three of them stand at attention as the man of the house approaches.

The Doctor turns a corner, a cup of coffee in one hand and a briefcase in the other, and compliments Charlene on the quality of the coffee. Charlene tells him she replicated a new blend from Paxor III and she seems pleased to hear he enjoyed it. The Doctor kisses her on the cheek and informs her he will be home at the usual time. Everything seems to be in order as Charlene reminds her husband not to overwork himself, Jeffrey promises to have his homework done by the time the Doctor returns from work, and Belle assures the Doctor she will receive an A on her history test. She adds that she'd like to do some algebra problems with him if he has the time. Finally, Charlene reminds the Doctor to invite some of his friends from work for dinner, as she wants to meet them before she and the children say goodbye to the Doctor.

In sickbay, Kes stands at a terminal as the Doctor materializes, a satisfied look upon his face. Kes asks what the Doctor's new holo-family is like, and he confidently informs her it is everything he could have hoped for.

The Doctor and Kes tell B'Elanna of his new holographic family, which he found surprisingly easy to manage despite what he has heard about families being difficult. Both B'Elanna and Kes express interest in meeting his new family, so he invites them over for dinner.

At dinner, the Stepford Wives mentality continues as Charlene informs B'Elanna and Kes that she took a course in continental cuisine so she could replicate new and interesting foods for Kenneth (the Doctor's name in the program). Kes tries to be polite and goes along with the program, but B'Elanna grows increasingly impatient as the conversation continues. When Charlene, Belle, and Jeffrey cheerily describe Kenneth as the best husband and father in the quadrant, B'Elanna stops the program. The Doctor is confused, as he sees nothing wrong with the program, but B'Elanna informs him that his family is nothing like a real family. Describing the Doctor's wife and children as "lollipops," she explains that he won't learn anything from spending time in a fantasy world with a perfect family. However, she offers to help him make them more realistic.

Upon entering his holographic home, the Doctor finds his home disorganized with things lying around everywhere, no one to greet him at the door, and a strange series of bangs and other sounds that resemble music (Klingon music) coming from elsewhere in the house. Charlene is in a hurry to go somewhere and seems less than interested in his usual stories about his day at work. She is set to speak at the Tholian embassy, and he learns that it is his turn to cook. Belle yells from her room that she can't find her mallet and Charlene tells her she would have better luck if she cleaned her room. After Charlene leaves, the Doctor attempts to be reasonable with Belle, explaining she would know where it was if she put it in her closet. She whines as she searches the house frantically, late for practice, but they can agree that the music is too loud. The Doctor tells Jeffrey to turn it off, and he all but ignores his father. Two Klingon adolescents, Larg and K'Kath, knock on the door and rudely ask where Jeffrey is; when the Doctor tells them Jeffrey is doing homework and can't see friends, Jeffrey emerges and says something to Larg and K'Kath in Klingonese. They simply walk past the Doctor while he attempts to deal with the temperamental Belle. The Klingons upstairs and Belle in tears, the Doctor realizes how different real life is.

Memorable Quotes

"Well, we're proud of him too. In fact, we think we have just about the most wonderful husband and father in the quadrant."
"Yes, we d..."
"Computer, freeze program."
"Lieutenant? What are you doing?"
"I'm stopping this before my blood-sugar levels overload."
- Charlene, Jeffrey and Belle, Torres, and the Doctor

"No one has a family like this – this is a fantasy! You're not going to learn anything from living with these... lollipops."
- B'Elanna Torres, to the Doctor

http://memory-alpha.org/en/wiki/Real_Life

Now, the church is a family—the family of God. But from the way that Catholics talk about Protestants, you’d think they never grew up in a real family, but derived their notions of family life from a holographic program.

2. In addition, Catholics have a very deceptive notion of what it means to agree with each other.

In the modern age, with its emphasis on psychology and the role of the individual, we tend to define agreement in terms of shared beliefs.

And yet it’s quite clear that when Catholicism speaks of unity, that is not its operating definition. Let’s take a few paradigm cases:

“The Council [Vatican I] was polarised between two groups, the infallibilist majority, led by Archbishop Manning, and the inopportunist minority, which included all the Austrian and German hierarchy, and many of the French…The final vote on the infallibility decree took place on 18 July 1870. Fifty-seven members of the minority, including Dupanloup, having fought the definition to the last, had left Rome the day before so as not to have to vote against a measure they now knew would go through by an overwhelming majority,” E. Duffy, Saints & Sinners: A History of the Popes (Yale 1997), 230,232.

Putting things up for a vote is not a sign of consensus. Rather, it’s simply a way of imposing majority rule on the minority. There are winners and losers. The winners don’t win over the losers. They don’t persuade them.

This is not a case of conviction, but submission. Will you submit to the will of the majority? Not—“Do you agree with us?”—but, “Do you agree with our authority?”

Do you agree with the rules? That’s the bottom line.

Continuing:

“Not everyone like Paul’s methods [Paul VI]. Determined that the Conciliar reforms should not be thrown off course, he was also determined that no one should feel steamrollered…To achieve this, he tried to neutralize conservative unease by matching every reform gesture with a conservative one. In a series of deeply unpopular interventions, he watered down Conciliar documents which had already been through most of the stages of Conciliar debate and approval, notably the decrees on the Church and on Ecumenism, to accommodate conservative worries (which he himself evidently shared),” ibid. 275-76.

Here, instead of majority rule, we have autocratic intervention. Deep-seated disagreements are simply papered over with diplomatic doubletalk.

Finally, there’s the case of Humanae Vitae, in which Paul VI overrode the majority report of the pontifical commission.

My immediate point is not to take issue with either the tactics or the question of which side was right.

My point is that in these three paradigm cases, involving two ecumenical councils and a notorious encyclical, unity is not defined in terms of intellectual consent or popular consensus, but ultimate conformity to the institutional chain-of-command.

This is hardly surprising. The Catholic church is an authoritarian institution because it came of age during the era of imperial regimes. The papacy and the episcopate are simply the ecclesiastical parallel to the Roman imperium and the aristocracy.

Under such a system, no reasonable person expects a subordinate to agree with everything his emperor, commander, or master says and does. That’s not the point.

The point, rather, is whether a subordinate is prepared to obey orders. To carry out the will of his superiors—whatever his personal misgivings. Insubordination, not unbelief, is the acid test.

The reason that Protestantism is less united than Catholicism is not because Protestantism devalues or undervalues unity, but, to the contrary, because it values true unity by holding it to a higher standard of genuine agreement in the form of rational assent rather than external conformity.

And since agreement cannot be coerced, we live with a measure of disagreement. Just as members of the same family are naturally united despite their individual differences.

Indeed, one of the lessons of family life, and—I daresay—one of the reasons that God puts us in families, is to confront us with conflict, thereby teaching us how to cope with conflict, accommodating one another where possible while holding firm on non-negotiables. That balancing act operates at different levels, from spousal through parental to sibling rivalry.

Making the Garden Grow

Bobby Grow said:

1. Many of the Reformed developers of theology are very scholastic/thomist/rationalistic in their approach to doing theology; according to Richard Muller in his book: Christ and the Decree. Such as: Vermigli, Zanchius, and Polanus just to name a few. This is a debatable issue, and not as clear-cut as Gene would lead us to believe.

2. Bobby Grow Says:
   January 10th, 2007 at 4:19 pm

   Here’s what Muller says on Zacharias Ursinus’ usage of rationalistic methodology:

   Calvin had often argued in terms of the Aristotelian categories of causality, but here in addition to the concepts of primary and instrumental causality, we encounter the concept of God as the unmoved mover. This is one of the more fully developed uses of Aristotelian-Thomistic conceptuality in the Reformed theology of the sixteenth century. (Richard Muller, Christ and the Decree, 107)

   It’s easily demonstrable that Reformed theology has explicitly taken shape through the rationalistic lens,
   just look at Polanus, Perkins, and Turretins theologies amongst many others.

Unfortunately, Bobby does not get what Dr. Muller is stating because in his haste to impeach Reformed Theology with the charge of "rationalism," he has reversed Muller's entire historical thesis. Muller is stating that the METHOD and FORM was "scholastic" but there is no such thing as "scholastic content" that is imported wholesale from Aristotle or used as a controlling metaphysic over theology, exegesis, and exposition. Bobby Grow desires to cast Reformed Theology as a system of thinking that posits metaphysical determinism and then constructs its theology accordingly, but Thomism does not select for any particular theology. Oops. He tries to weasel around Muller by saying "this is a debateable issue." I agree, but it would be helpful if he was an opponent that demonstrated some basic knowledge of the material and what "rationalism" actually is. Notice he employs Muller on Ursinus - but without so much as a note of what Muller is saying. Has he actually read Christ and the Decree? I understand it is currently out of print? Has he read Protestant Scholasticism: Essays In Reassessment? If so, where is his detailed rebuttal? Has he read Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Muller's larger, expanded work? Has he read the work of R.Scott Clark? For that matter, has he read Turretin? Perkins? Voetius? Volanus? Ursinus? Witsius? Beza? Gomarus? Twisse? Hyperius?

They employed this method simply to be understood in the academy and to organize theology into rational and logical form, and they further distinguished between the thelogical method of teaching in a university and in the church and said specifically that what goes in the confessions must be from the latter and in its form and not the former. In the former, they employed existing Scholastic methods, in the latter they largely differ little from the way we do theology and exposition in the churches today. In order to make the charge of "rationalism" stick, Mr. Grow, you need to show us Muller's definitions of "rational" and "rationalism" and where he is saying that Aristotelean logic selects for particular content that is then carried through as a controlling principle over all of Reformed theology, rather than being employed in subordination to Scripture and invoked for content only where they felt it made for an ancillary, supporting argument.

Muller argues for continuity between the Reformation and the previous period and between High Orthodoxy and the Reformation, which is a CONTRADICTION of the thesis Mr. Grow wants to advance. To understand him as supporting the idea that RT is philsophially "rationalistic" is an exact reversal of his thinking. If that is his thesis, then why does he, in exact contrast to the thesis that RT is "rationalistic" beginning with Beza, argue exactly the opposite, that Beza did not write a prospectus for theology, nor did he begin with the concept of predestination and then order a whole theology based on this controlling idea, or apart from interaction with Calvin and others, nor did he do it apart from Scripture. In fact, he specifically argues that the Tablula is NOT a prospectus and the doctrine is to understood first from the order of knowing, which is Scripture. He takes much of his exegesis for granted, because he is writing against the backdrop of the Bolsec Controversy, and Calvin was part of that, and he had already provided "the order of knowing," and stated that the "order of being," should also be taught; Beza merely filled in that gaping lacunae, and he did it in dialogue with Calvin and several others. I'm sitting here with a copy of "The Use and Abuse of a Document: Beza's Tabula Praedestinationis, the Bolsec Controversy, and the Origins of Reformed Orthodoxy" in my hands, and he reference his work in Christ and the Decree several times in this regard, so, if Bobby thinks that he is asserting that RT is "rationalistic" theology he is grossly mistaken.

Rather, he describes the Reformers and their successors and beginning with a reappraisal of Scripture and then using this exegetical theology to develop a basic theological structure. In the ages that followed, whereas the first and second generation Reformers were unconcerned with interacting with the academies, their successors found it needful, in lieu of polemic controversies, the need for institutionalization in the university setting, and the desire to use supporting material if it was congruent with their already established exegetical theologies, to use the form and method of their forebears of generations past in the academy, so they wouldn't have to "reinvent the wheel." In fact, Muller says, "Even though the philosophical perspective of most of the Protestant orthodox was basically the modified Christian Aristotlianism that had dominate Western theology since the 13th century, the orthodox did not view their theology as bound to any particular philosophical system. (My addition: for example Ramism was an alternative). Any use of philosophical concepts by Protestant scholastics involved the REJECTION (my emphasis) of views noticably at variance with Christian doctrine....they refus(ed) these particular tenets (speaking of notions of the eternity of the world and destructibility of the soul) and ANY OTHER RATIONAL DEDUCTIONS AT ODDS WITH REVEALED DOCTRINE (my emph.) - such as the curious cosmology of Descartes or the occasionalism of Geulincx. This generalization extends even to the Cocceian theologians Heidanus, Burman, and Wittich, who were most influenced by the Cartesian views of truth and substance. (PRRD1, 143).

Mr. Grow seems unaware "rationalistic method" and "rationalism" are not convertible concepts. Muller argues for the former, not the latter, in relation to Protestant Orthodoxy. "The Protestant attempt to argue the ancillary status of reason ought no more to be called rationalism than the medieval attempt, nor ought it to be dismissed as a form out of touch with the exigencies of philosophical argument." (Ibid).

Rationalism, in the terms employed by the purveyors of the "Reformed Theology takes a metaphysical rationalism" (eg. takes predestination or metaphysical determinism or ideas about the sovereignty of God) and contructs its theology around it/them." That would mean that "reason" (namely these preconcieved notions) is/are the fundamental source of truth. "Rationalism" in the sense of historians like Bray, Armstrong, and Bizer is used in this sense and is not defined as the use of philosophical categories as a method or form of expression of ideas for purposes of organization or ancillary argumentation. Rather, they mean something quite different.

"Some distinction needs to be made, therefore, between a "rationalism" defined as the rationalizing tendency in theology brought about in the transition from earlier exegetical and discursive models to fully developed scholastic system and "rationalism" defined either as the incorporation of a rationalist philosophy into Protestant theological system, or, indeed, as the use of reason as the fundamental source and norm of truth. Scholasticism can be identified as a form of the FORMER sense (emph. mine), particularly given the assumption of the most scholastic efforts that rational FORMS (emph. mine - e.g. a logical way of thinking, categorizing, and organizing material) must be used in exposition of doctrine and that reason can be employed as a tool or instrument in the formulation of theology (eg. as ancillary argumentation). The former, rarely used definition, is characteristic of Protestant Scholasticism, while the LATTER (emph. mine - which I described in the preceding paragraph) occured ONLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (emph. mine, since Ursinus wrote in the 16th, and Turretin died in 1687!), following the demise of the Aristotlian-Ptolemaic worldview it presupposed. (PRRD1, 139).

I'll simplify this for him, since he can't seem to understand Muller. He is saying that RT is a "rationalistic" system, if, by that, you mean it is logical and orderly and employs philosophy in a subordinate status to exegesis, and where it coincides with doctrine that can be exegetically supported, but not as a control to determine what exegesis must conclude. Frequently, in the latter period, they will assume the reader already knows the exegetical foundation, since it was, at that point, a few generations old, but they will also write their Scriptural arguments first (as in Turretin), then "demonstrate from reason," where appropriate, and often after whole rejection and if not rejection modification of a philosophical idea - much like Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Iranaeus did in the Ante-Nicene period, and often with a polemic cast, for example to contradict the Remostrants or the Socinians. This is descriptive of its method, not its controlling principles. He even discusses the fact that the Cartesian covenant theologians he names were careful NOT to press philosophical demonstration into all the loci of their theologies. He concludes that "(t)he rationalization and intellectualization of theology into a system characteristic of the orthodox or scholastic phase of Protestantism NEVER SET THE STADARDS OF THE OF SCRIPTURAl REVELATION AND RATIONAL PROOF ON AN EQUAL PAR (emph. mine) and certain never viewed either evidential demonstration or rational necessity as the grounds of faith...(they) disavow evidentialism and identify theological certainty as something quite distinct from mathematical and rational or philosophical certainty. The also argue quite pointedly that reason has an instrumental function and NOT (emph. mine) a magisterial function. Reason never proves faith but only elaborates faith toward understanding (Ibid, 141, 142)

This is in contrast to rationalism in the latter sense, in which "this traditional view of faith and reason, an anthropology in which sin and the problematic nature of human beings plays a major role" is reduced and subordinated to reason on the "Enlightenment rationalist assumption of an untrammeled original constitution of humanity." (Ibid.) (With which, I might add, notions about libertarian free will are certainly at home).

This is all to say that there is a difference between a methodological process by which theology is done with exegesis as the sole, underwriting foundation and reason as philosophy as a help but not a magiterial authority vs. reason and philosophical ideas themselves used as controlling principles placed over revelation. This latter phenomenon is what you see whenever somebody posits ideas about God's justice and mercy and libertarian free will and the read them back in a controlling manner in your theology or when folks, like the Neo-Orthodox, take "revelation as encounter" and metaphysical ideas about the unknowability of God and contruct an entire theology; or if you, like Moltmann, take "Hope," and then do the same thing. Deism (Epicureanism revived) is "rationalistic" in the latter sense. Stoicism is also rationalistic in this latter sense. These were ideas revived in the 18th century and well into the next. Hyper-Calvinism is the epitome of rationalism, because it does begin with predestination and election or particularly the idea that the covenant of grace is unconditional with respect to both merit and instrumentality. Covenant Theology, if it becomes an over-riding controlling principle and sole method for doing, eg. constructing and explaining theology, is rationalistic in this sense (because the redemptive-historical hermeneutic becomes the controlling motif - Vos runs dangerously close to this at times), as is dispensationalism, or NCT. Those that think Reformed Theology is "rationalistic" in this sense, as apparently you do, have stared into the well of church history only to mirror-read, that is impute ideas to your opponents that are descriptive not of them, but yourselves.

"Scholasticism itself had been the result of a yearning for rational insight, of a desire to understand and to find reasons for what it believed...the goal of its search was fixed by faith: philosophy served as its handmaiden...They did no study the world as we study it, they did not pursue truth in the independent manner of the Greeks, but that was because they were so firmly convinced of the absolute truth of thier premises, the doctrines of the faith. These were their facts, with these they whetted their intellects, these they sought to weld into a system." (Thilly, Hist. of Philosophy, in Ibid,142). Protestant theology, Mr. Grow, of this period and RT as a whole is "neither an irrational fideism nor an incipient rationalism." (Ibid, 143).

In fact, the decline of Orthodoxy after the death of Francis Turretin is attributed to the demise of the Ptolemaic worldiview from which their method was derived. His sucessors adopted Amyraldianism first, then Cartesianism, through J.A. Turretin and Louis Tronchin. Then Arminian and Socinian tendencies under Jacob Vernet, and by 1814, they had so dumbed down their theology that they did not say you must worship Christ. Oh, and let's not forget that Arminianism and Socinianism made fast friends on the Continent, and nearly killed the General Baptists. Sorry, Bobby, you can't trace liberalism through Calvinism, but just about every time, it crosses through Arminianism. You have to leave the twin principia of Reformed Theology and drop the doctrine of inspiration and your soteriology to get Barthianism out of RT. All you have to do is follow Arminianism's own philosophical rationalism to its end, since it begins with a truly rationalistic principle or principles and constructs itself accordingly.

As for Orthodox theologies of the 18th century, you'll find a return to simplified forms in many places, as theology for a time was divorced from the Academies. The churches largely took it up. Gill, Ridgely, and Boston (and for that matter a great many who would be called "Ramists" as well if they had lived a few generations before) were largely aphilosophical - so latter Reformed theology of this period incorporates little if any philosophy at all, bar in polemics. You'll see the Presbyterian tradition in particular continue in the old forms in part, but if you pick of Charles Hodge in the 19th century, you'll see that while he follows form and refers to the old traditions, he largely writes in polemic dialogue against the rationalistic philosophies and theologies of his own age. James Boyce, in the SBC, as well as P.H. Mell and John L. Dagg incorporate a fair amount of polemics, but if you can identify a single overriding theme that Boyce uses for his theology, you are welcome to make the attempt. The Presbyerians and Dutch Reformed churches had their own divinity schools, and in the late 19th century we Baptists added ours. In the 20th, Princeton and Westminster split. The Baptist seminaries are still with us. In addition, the curriculum at the Reformed seminaries is organized largely to reflect the now mature form of RT into its exegetical, biblical, systematic, pastoral, and polemic components - a form that is largely reflective of the integrated form of RT as a whole.

While we're at it let's talk a bit about the UnMoved Mover, Ursinus, and Turretin.

Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics is largely a greatly expanded version of Christ and the Decree which was simply Dr. Muller's Ph.D. thesis. CATD was his first attempt to refute the historical thesis you have tried to put forth, indeed, which you have seemingly tried to invoke him as affirming. Let's take quick tour.

Apparently, Bobby does not understand his overall thesis.

"For the most part, early Orthodox Protestant theologians doubted the new cosmology and REJECTED rationalist philosophy, resting content with the late Renaissance revisions of Christian Aristotelianism at the hands of Roman Catholic Philosophers like Zabarella and Suarez and of Protestant thinkers like Ramus and Bugersdijk. (PRRD, 71)

In addition he writes, the understanding of the relationship of philosophy to theology propounded in the Reformed prolegomena and in various apologetic works of the era of orthodoxy assumes a view of philosophy as ancilla and subordinate both in a purely hierarchical sense among the forms of knowing and in a historical sense, regarding it as a derivative form of knowing.

To connect the dots for Bobby, what's being said here is that philosophy is the handmaiden of Scripture and only invoked for FORM and method in the university setting in particular, for content where it was believed to coincide Scripture and be useful for explanation/demonstration/illustration.

Under "Defining the Relationship" in PRRD1, speaking of the claims that there was a return to "Aristotelean thinking" after the early moments with Luther, he says, "Such claims are the natural, albeit unforntuane, outgrwoth of the older Protestant scholarship that marked out a neat break between the Middle Ages and the Reformation and another neat break between the Reformation and Protestant orthodoxy; that strictly identified scholastiscm as an Aristotlean form of philosophy and theology rather than as primarily a method; that offered a vague and generalized identification of "Aristoteleanism" without either a precise statement of the philosophical concepts that make one Aristotelian or a distincition (quite necessary to the understanding of the thought of the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation) between logic and rhetoric on the one hand and metaphysics on the other; and assumed that both scholasticism and Aristotelianism were brought to an end or should have been brough to at end (at least for Protestants) by the Reformation.

Regarding Ursinus:

"On these grounds, the maintenance of Aristotleian logical and dialectic and the rejection of Ramism by such writers as Ursinus and Beza ought to be viewed as a point of continuity with the curricula instituted by the Reformers - and NOT as some writers have indicated, aa a sign of resurgent Aristotleanism." (PDDR1, 372)

Also, nobody denies that as the end of the era of High Orthodoxy ended, RT took on rationalistic overtones, as the theologies of the Arminians, hyper-Calvinists, and the Amyraldians demonstrated. This led to the softening of Calvinism after Francis Turretin who was the last. His son J.A. Turretin is the one that was the philosophical rationalist; it was not the result of following the principia of Reformed Scholasticism, but the result of a departure from them. That's Muller's point. However, the confessions themselves predate the period of High Orthodoxy, as the antecedents to the WCF and the LBCF1 and 2 were written in the previous period and simply duplicated with a few changes for each denomination. The period of High Orthodoxy proper ca. 1640-1725), but it did not create the Reformed system, rather it only elaborated the extant system in relation to the changing intellectual climate. (PRRD1,74). It did this, in part to answer the Remonstrants, Socinians, Lockeans, and others on their own terms. It was part of their polemic theology, not their exegetical theology. There was also concern that the federal theology of the Cocceians was "rationalistic" because it used CT as a controlling pattern to be used in theological method; but covenentalism is not itself "rationalistic" as the Voetians were using it too, and the language went back into Calvin and Zwingli, and from them well into the Ante-Nicene era. Golding picks up on this in Covenant Theology: The Key to Reformed Theology.

Regarding the use of Aristotle, Dr. Muller states that one can view it as the metaphysical model in which a finite unmoved mover acts primarily as the final cause and actualization of all things out of an infinite and eternally existing material substaratum, it would be difficult to find an Aristotelian theologians in tat any point in the development of Western or Latin Christianity (PRRD1, 372) But if you definite it as the view of the universe that affirms both primary and secondary causality, that assumes the working of first and final causality through the means of instrumental, formal, and material causes, and that, using this paradigm, can explain various levels of necessary and contingent existence, then a large number of Aristotlians appear on the horizon." (Ibid).

After discussing the reticence of the pastoral theologians of the early Orthodox period's reticence to employ philsophical categories in theology, he also notes that

"the orthodox of the 17th century drew on philosophical categories and recognized the presence of fully developed models in academic dialogue with their theoologies. Nonetheless there is a continuity in the development as well...writers like Keckermann and Alsted, Maccovius and Voetius, worked to maintain a sense of the boundaries of legitimate Christan philosophy, boundaries that had largely been set in the debates of the Reformation era. This continuity is particularly evident by the adversaries chosen by the Orthodox: Epicureanism, Skepticism, Stoic fatalism; emananationiic and pantheistic dimensions of Platonism, and what might be called the pagan as distinct from the Christianized Aristotle."

Regarding the use of philosophy and reason in relation to theology and its use: Reason is at it were the eye of the mind; while Scripture is the standard, by which this eye measures the objects under examination. Reason in the instrument used by the faithful in examining the objections of belief presented by Scripture, as the infallible norm of truth...but reason itself is not the norm of these objects of belief.

(Pictet, in PRRD1,400).

Muller also discusses Turretin and notes;

"Turretin views all of the essential attributes as rationally arguable, but he never introduces the rational argumentation principally: he always introduces his Scriptural argumentation first and then, only by way of confirmation, does he use rational argumentatiion. A similar model is followed by Mastricht. The system NEVER (his emphasis) moves from reason to revelation or from natural to supernatural theology. The Reformed orthodox recognize, however, that the use of philosophy must be carefully defined so that the potential compatibility of the disciplines does not become the basis for a principal use of human reason in theological matters. Turretin distinguishes between 2 basic errors concerning the use of reason; the Socinians err in excess, the Lutherans in defect - the former assume that ntothing can be believed that is not founded upon reason, while the latter refuse to permit rational judgment between these extremes by affording the proper place to rational judgment in theology."

Regarding the statements of Ursinus, he used the Unmoved Mover in the proofs for the existence of God, in which the Unmoved Mover is employed not as a statement identifying God with the Unmoved Mover in Aristotle without great Christianization but an ancillary argument. Rather, his argument is adapted as a philosophical proof for the existence of God, not to ground the theology of God, but as supporting material. In Ursinus Catechism, which PRRD3 quotes (102) Muller writes that the first sets of questions were a series of proofs for the existence of God, the second sets were a place for both contrast of a purely philosophical defintion of God and a definition based on revelation and for a significant exposition of divine attributes. On page 172, he says,

"Ursinus, similarly, argues the proofs first in his introduction to the doctrine of God and then restates elements of the proofs as part of a philosophical argument, secondary to and supportive of arguments drawn from Scripture, that the world was created, and that by God.' We are impressed, here, as in the proofs offered by Melancthon and Chemnitz, with an absence of logical rigor and philosophical elaboration and with a mixture of logical and philosophical with purely rhetorical arguments." He also writes of his statements that show he was unwilling to import such purely philosophical concepts as the predication of "nature" to God if it meant God was identical with nature, the essence of pantheism. Rather, "God is not nature itself, nor matter (the element of a substance that receives form), nor form (the elements of a substance), but the efficient cause of all things; neitehr is His essence mixed or blended with other things; it is different and unlike anything else.

Regarding the way they related known Scholastic categories to revelation, we find that existing theophilosopical categories (eg. dogmatic categories) only served as a method by which to organize the attributes of God. Here, we see them taking predicated attributes of God, like wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, and then explicating first the Scriptures and then using philosophy as analogical argumentation, in other words the same way we do when we illustrate using natural theology, NOT to control their exegesis.

Muller also has some interesting things to say about the idea of the Unmoved Mover. Namely, it is NOT the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle.

Speaking of discussions of God's essential attributes, in this case eternity, Leigh stated that "The eternity of God ought not be defined merely negatively in view of the problem of temporal succession but also positively in view of the necessary relationship between God and the created order, namely, the relation between the infinite source of all good and the vast order of created goods. " If this is so, Muller says, we have once again encountered the phenomenon of Christianized Aristotlianism, as different from its ancient philosophical source as the scholastic conception of God as First or Unmoved Mover is different from the original Aristotlian conception. (PRRD3,360)

He also states rather clearly that this idea, related to the decrees of God and His will was employed because it provided a means of discussing the fact that there can be no final cause of the will of God, because "it is clear that anything that itself has a final cause cannot be the final cause of mediate or fine wills." (Ibid, 469)

In their theologies, they often discussed God's omniscience, and, once again the idea of the Unmoved Mover crops up, not as a controlling idea, but as a tool to explain the concepts they found in Scripture after their exegesis. The question arose, as it had in the Middle Ages as to whether or not God could know singular things, or only composite things. They answer that God knows both as well as counterfactuals, necessary things, and contingent things.

"The point is obviously necessary to Christian theology, inasmuch as teh God of the Bible, unlike the strictly Aristotlian First or Unmoved Mover, is the creator of the finite - and is, to borrow on the Aristotelian terms themselves, the first, efficient cause and not merely the final cause of all things. (from Copelston, Hist. of Phil, 314-317, PRRD, 429). Indeed this is one of several places in the doctrine of God at which all the Scholastics distance themselves from an unadulterated Aristotlian system not only as philosophically unacceptable but also as a source of a series of errors in theology both in and beyond the doctrine of God." (Ibid). They identify those very errors at being at the heart of Pelagian and Socinian (and thus Arminian) thinking about the nature of the will and the nature of the claim that God knows neither those individuals who will believe nor any future contingents, but merely decrees to save in general any who will believe and repent. Ibid, 409-410 After this, Muller runs over the Scriptural arguments to which the Reformed appealed in view of the rejection of this content in Aristotle).

So, ultimately, Arminian theology gets impaled on the horns of Aristotlean/rationalistic ideas defining content, not our own.

In fact, in relation to the historical thesis Bobby seems to wish to put forth, Muller (Ibid, 560) writes that "This understanding of the divine affections as movements or attractions in some sense defined by their external objection is a significant element of the Reformed orthodox system, both in terms of the implications of the concept for orthodox theology as a whole and in view of the frequently heard clam that the older theology was so caught up in an Aristotlian conceptuality of God as Unmoved Mover that it paid scant attention the biblical language of God in relation to his world. Quite the contrary, orthodox doctrine of the divine essence presses out into the rest of the theological system with the assumption of attributes requiring external objects and capable of being understood only insofar as they are relations ad extra." He then quotes at length from Leigh and, immediately prior Owen. The idea of course, is that this view of the affections of God is not philosophical in any respect, it is exegetical, and, in all their theology, philosophy is employed not a controlling or defining principle over the whole of theology, but an ancillary. This is particularly true in their doctrine of Scripture and their use of Scripture, which is the subject of Volume 2.

This conversation took place in response to statements by Dave Hunt relative to free will, and specifically in response to Frank Page's book currently popular in the SBC, in which the old prevailing historiographical thesis, including the "Calvin Against the Calvinist" thesis, is/are repeated as if there has been no work done in rebuttal, when in fact, you can find it going back to the time of its very inception in, for example, the work of William Cunningham in The Reformers & The Theology of the Reformation. No, rather than producing material on their own, these Baptist critics have proven themselves impervious to actually interacting with Helm, Nicole, Rainbow Muller, Mallinson, Clark, Trueman, Godfrey, Beeke, Klauber, Platt, Steinmetz, and others. It's not as if the list is that terribly short and their work unavailable. Rather, they draw on Bizer, Armstrong, Bray, Kickel, and the usual culprits, some of which have an odd tendency to reference each other and misquote the primary sources. "The Calvin Against the Calvinist" thesis is increasingly in dispute, and, having read the material from the other side, I must concur with Rainbow that it largely consists of quoting Calvin's discussions of the universal preaching of the gospel, then assuming this is related to the scope of atonement or neglecting his wider body of work for the Institutes and a few Commentaries. If Mr. Grow has problems with Rainbow, then I look forward to his detailed rebuttal of Rainbow's monograph, which is itself available from Amazon.