The Spurious Seed

In the second century, a Christian by the name of Athenagoras wrote a treatise on the resurrection. The treatise opens with some comments that are reminiscent of the modern world and its attempts at dismissing Jesus' resurrection:

"By the side of every opinion and doctrine which agrees with the truth of things, there springs up some falsehood; and it does so, not because it takes its rise naturally from some fundamental principle, or from some cause peculiar to the matter in hand, but because it is invented on purpose by men who set a value on the spurious seed, for its tendency to corrupt the truth." (On The Resurrection Of The Dead, 1)

Risen Indeed!

Dr. Anderson has drawn my attention to an article in the Spectator:

http://www.spectator.co.uk/article.php?id=7618

“The Spectator approached politicians, churchmen, media folk and entertainers — and members of its own staff — and asked them a simple question: ‘Do you believe that Jesus physically rose from the dead?’ Some did not answer the question: Tony Blair, Ruth Kelly, Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Sir Menzies Campbell. Those who did reply gave some surprising answers. The results of our inquiry reveal a remarkable mix of faith, doubt and evasion.”

I’ll comment on some of the answers:

[The Most Revd Dr Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury]
“Archbishop Rowan said to put him firmly in the ‘yes’ camp.”

i) It, of course, says something about the state of the Anglican Communion that you have to ask the Archbishop of Canterbury if he even believes in the Resurrection.

ii) Also, as I recall, his position is actually a good deal more equivocal. This issue came up on Virtuosity when Rowan’s name was first floated for the job.

If memory serves, Rowan took the position that we should be open to the possibility of the Resurrection. We shouldn’t rule it out.

This is quite different from believing in the Resurrection. It simply means that he doesn’t disbelieve it. He’s open-minded about what may have happened.

[Tony Blair]
‘I am afraid the Prime Minister does not take part in surveys.’

What is notable in this non-response is that Tony Blair is on record as calling himself a Christian—a “Christian” who has lobbied to export abortion throughout the UK.

So his refusal to answer this question is hardly surprising.

[Peter Oborne, political editor, The Spectator]
“There’s a great deal of compelling evidence that something astonishing happened. The Resurrection caused the apostles to take the path they did after Jesus’s death. The gospel writers were convinced. But you can’t prove it and one is bound to have doubts. You are choosing to believe the unbelievable. That is what faith is about.”

This is a textbook expression of fideism. And it goes awry in several respects:

i) Belief is not a matter of choice. Acting on a belief is a matter of choice, but belief is essentially involuntary, although we can do certain things to cultivate or undermine a belief by what evidence we avoid or expose ourselves to.

ii) If we “choose” to believe something, then that’s a classic case of make-believe.

iii) Doubt is not the essence of faith. In Scripture, faith is a mode of knowledge. The essence of faith is mediate rather than immediate knowledge—knowledge by description rather than acquaintance.

By faith, we know something to be true, not as a matter of personal experience, but because we rely on a reliable source of information.

By knowing the source of information to be reliable, that indirectly warrants whatever the source informs us of.

iv) You don’t need direct evidence for everything you believe. It is sufficient to have a reliable source of information.

v) Faith is not believing the unbelievable.

vi) It is possible for a true believer to entertain doubts. He is not bound to have doubts, but it’s possible to be doubtful about some things, and still be a true believer. We see this in Scripture itself.

There are different sources of doubt:

a) In some cases it’s temperamental. Some people are prone to self-doubt, and this, in turn, leaves them unsure of what they believe. Their self-doubt is infectious with respect to their other beliefs.

b) Conflicting beliefs, due to divided intellectual commitments, leave a person in something of a mental quandary.

c) Simple scepticism in the face of something out of the ordinary, something which we ourselves have never observed.

[The Rt Revd Richard Harries, Bishop of Oxford]
“Yes. I believe that the tomb was discovered empty and that Jesus was raised as what St Paul calls “a spiritual body” (I Corinthians xv,44). This is not a miracle like any other but comparable only to the creation of the world ex nihilo and its transmutation into glory at the end of time. It can only be depicted in symbolic terms, hence the unsatisfactory nature of so much over-literalistic Western painting and the spiritual power of the Orthodox icon of the Anastasis.”

This is a terribly confused statement:

i) In Pauline usage, “spiritual” is simply an adjectival expression of the Holy Spirit’s agency. This goes all the way back to the creation account.

ii) Time does not come to an end. Perhaps the good bishop is alluding to the Authorized Version of Rev 10:6, but that’s a very misleading rendering.

What comes to an end is a particular phase of history. But the saints in glory are still time-bound creatures.

iii) It is unclear what, exactly, the good bishop thinks can only be depicted in symbolic terms. Does he mean the actual event of the Resurrection—the process by which Jesus was raised? Of does he mean the effect of the Resurrection—whether the Risen Lord was a visible, tangible being?

In principle, you could have had a camera in the empty to record the actual event. In addition, Luke and John also go out of their way to affirm public character of the Resurrection.

[Fergal Keane, broadcaster]
“I believe the question is in danger of missing the point. Faith is a mystery and at the heart of it all — for me — is the Resurrection. Did Christ rise from the dead? He did. Do I feel the need to seek the impossible, namely physical evidence? I do not.”

Why does he think that it’s impossible to find physical evidence for the Resurrection? We have no direct physical evidence in the sense of a photographic record of our Lord’s restoration to life.

But you can have direct physical evidence that someone was dead or alive. And you can have eyewitness evidence to the fact that someone was dead or alive.

Indeed, nothing is more commonplace than life and death. What is out of the ordinary is going from death to life rather than life to death. But the evidence is the same regardless of the sequence.

[Keith Ward, Professor of Divinity at Gresham College, London, and emeritus student of Christ Church, Oxford]
“I am certain the apostles had visionary experiences of Jesus after his death. I think these were genuine. But though Jesus appeared in physical form, his mode of existence after death was not in physical space-time as we know it.”

There are, needless to say, several problems with this characterization.

i) The NT doesn’t describe the postmortem appearances of Christ as “visions,” in the private, subjective sense of the word.

They are, rather, extramental events—on the same order as the premortem appearances of Christ.

ii) Be definition, any experience will be a genuine experience. A vision of the Virgin Mary is a genuine experience. But whether it’s a genuine experience of the Virgin Mary is another question entirely.

iii) As to the mode of his postmortem existence, unfortunately a certain school of apologetics has obscured the physicality of the Resurrection by inferring from Jn 20:19 (cf. v26) that Jesus could materialize and dematerialize at will.

But there are several problems with this inference:

a) As a matter of sound theological method, it takes the wrong point of departure. The very purpose of this pericope is to accentuate the physicality of the Resurrection. That’s where we should begin. Any interpretation of v19 should take v20 (cf. V27) as its frame of reference, not vice versa.

The point is to interpret v19 in light of v20, not reinterpret v20 in light of v 19.

This is reinforced by chapter 21, which, once again, reaffirms the physicality of the Resurrection.

b) V19 doesn’t state that Jesus passed through a solid door. That’s not what is says, and that’s not what it implies.

Indeed, the point is just the opposite: that Jesus could come and go at will without having to come through the front door.

What we have here is a local mode of existence allied to a discontinuous mode of translocation.

This is no doubt miraculous, but we expect a miraculist to do the miraculous.

Even before the Resurrection, see how he could do a disappearing act (Lk 4:30; Jn 7:30, 44; 8:20,59; 10:39; 12:36).

The “elusive Christ” is one of the subthemes of the Forth Gospel. There’s something preternatural about his ability to evade his enemies time and again, to hide in plain sight, even when he’s in their midst.

[Richard Dawkins]
“No. People believe in the Resurrection not because of good evidence (there isn’t any) but because, if the Resurrection is not true, Christianity becomes null and void, and their life, they think, meaningless. From this it is grotesquely false logic to conclude that therefore the Resurrection must be true. The alternative — that their religion is indeed null and void — may be unpleasant for Christians to contemplate, but there is no law that says the truth has to be pleasant. And nature does not owe us a meaningful life. It is up to us to make it so.”

i) Of course, we’ve come to expect this sort of thing from Dawkins. Dawkins speaks as an outsider who makes no effort acquaint himself with real Christians and why they believe what they do.

Dawkins has misdirected the motive. This is not the reason why Christians accept the event itself; rather, it’s the reason why they refuse to accept rationalistic reinterpretations of the event.

ii) Many Christians do believe in the Resurrection because of good evidence. The fact that Dawkins doesn’t think there’s any good evidence for the Resurrection doesn’t mean they share his opinion.

He’s projecting his own scepticism onto the Christian, which is rather incoherent, for if they were as sceptical as he was, they wouldn’t be Christians in the first place. He’s imputing his own sceptical motives to them in order to then impute an existential motive. This is a complete mess.

iii) In addition, he hasn’t see all the same evidence they have, for he hasn’t bothered to familiarize himself with the standard literature in defense of the Resurrection.

iv) Notice how he goes wobbly in the knees at the very end. After the hortatory, stiff upper-lip shtick, he then says it’s up to us to make life meaningful.

But this is “grotesquely false logic.” If human existence is objectively meaningless, then any attempt to infuse it with a dose of subjective meaning would be play-acting.

So, for all his high-strutting atheism, Dawkins also loses his nerve when he’s staring into the abyss. He clings to a beautiful illusion as soon as the despairing outlook of atheism proves to be unbearably bleak.

Dawkins is like the leader of a suicide cult who shames the reluctant members into drinking the Kool-Aid. “If you really loved me, you’d die with me. This is the true test of your faith. Don’t be a coward!”

But after Dawkins has shamed his epigones into imbibing the Kool-Aid, he has second thoughts. He chickens out at the last minute. After gingerly stepping over the corpses of all his devoted disciples, he escapes into the la-la land of Existentialism.

[Charles Moore]
“Yes: he overcame death, body and soul. However, this is a statement of belief, not science. If archaeologists could prove (which they won’t) that they had found the bones of Jesus in Jerusalem, Christianity would still be true. This sounds like a contradictory statement, but I do not think it is.”

Yet another classic expression of fideism. Have you ever noticed that the more educated some people get, the dumber they get?

There is, in academia, an affectation to deny the obvious. For to affirm the obvious is…well…obvious. Any country bumpkin can affirm the obvious.

So what sets us apart from the common herd and proves us to be true sophisticates is our ability to deny the obvious. That’s so much more profound, you see.

A Response to Ex-Believer, and his Deluded Self-Debunker Buddies

Our friend "Ex-Believer" (or, as some have called him, "Ex-Brainer") wrote a post where he asks about how to justify TAG. So, in this post I'll (1) address a couple of his silly self-debunking buddies who popped off in the comments section, (2) answer his question, and (3) offer a refutation of his Wittgensteinian defense of logic.

Ex-believer, notice the mere assertions and argumentum ad baculums above.

Notice the over-heated typewriter of Bethrick. And notice the massive amount of terms and sentences with emotional baggage attacked to them (e.g., " magic being;" "permafrost of religious illusion" etc).

Unfortunately, no actual argument was given. Just a series of assertions, back up by fancy-sounding rhetoric.

Bethrick is a liar and is well known for being full of hot air. He fails to understand his opponent and is well known for not understanding arguments, as I've demonstrated here:

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

this is an ongoing series, part 4 is not up yet.

Now, since I can't conclude that Bethrick doesn't know what he's talking about here, based of his previous blunders, I suppose I'll have to actually give new examples of

Notice how Bethrick has almost no knowledge of philosophy. He writes,

"This pretense is supported by embarrassingly naïve understandings of the problems themselves (e.g., failing to question Hume's conception of the problem of induction)..."

Notice he says that we have an "embarrassingly naive understanding of the [problem of induction]." The example he gives (for what(!), oh yeah, our embarrassingly naive understanding of the problem of induction) is that we fail to "question Hume's conception" of the problem of induction (POI)!

Aside from the fact that this does not show that we misunderstand the POI simply because we fail to question Hume's concept of the POI, this shows Bethrick's total ignorance on the history of philosophy.

In all of my philosophy books, when I read on the POI, Hume is brought up. One could say that Hume's question is the problem of induction. The problem is, "what gives us a right to reason from particular instances of our experience to a generalized conclusion?" Now, that's the problem. There are many answers to the problem (e.g., uniformity of nature; language; pragmatic; etc), and the apologist might go on to show that the answers to the problem fail to make muster.

Let me pause and go grab a few random philosophy books off my shelf. ...Okay. Now, the above was my understanding of the problem. Let's see if it is naive:

Hmmm, Bertrand Russell (that naive hack) agrees (see, Russell, Problems of Philosophy, Oxford, 1912, 1997, p.60). And, let's see, oh(!), and Pojman's edited book The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, (Wadsworth, 2003; pp. 431-60) agree as well. Pojman (that stupid idiot) writes, "From a single experience, we sometimes make an inductive leap to many; from some of a certain kind, we often make a leap to judgments about allexperiences of a kind. ...But though inductive probability is psychologically inescapable, we have trouble providing a rational justification for it. ...It was David Hume (11711-1776)who first raised the problem of induction..." This naive understanding is also the naive understanding of that chop-shop piece of hack-work, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (ed. Hendrich, Oxford, 1995, p.405-6). This problem is also attributed to Hume, and is roughly laid out as I did above, by epistemoligical sad-sack of sad-sacks, Robert Audi (hack par excellence) in his book Epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the problems of knowledge (Routledge, 2003, p.296-98). And, lastly, our whirlwind tour leads us to the sloppiest of which another cannot be conceived: The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (ed. Audi, Cambridge, 1995, p.745-746). Wesley C. Salmon (philosophical chump) writes that the POI was "First stated by Hume, this problem concerns the logical basis of inferences from observed matters of fact to unobserved matters of fact."

Now, we can see that Dawson Bethrick has effectively said that virtually every philospher/epsietmologist (yes, the above is a valid appeal to authority) in the world is naive on a subject which they supposedly have mastered. Indeed, since it is Hume's problem then one could make the argument that if you do not state Hume's problem, you're not stating the POI (though there have been many nuances since Hume).

What's going on here? Well, as Bethrick has previously squawked, he takes an Objectivist (Ayn Rand's pseudo-philosophy) approach to solving the POI. He even admits that this is "not well known in some academic circles." Well, he was being generous. Actually, it's not well known is most academic circles. So, we're charged with being naive of the problem, yet this problem is hidden in an obscure corner of the philosophical landscape. Indeed, Bethrick nowhere lays out his answer to the problem. The best we get in in this post of his. Bethrick makes mention of an email exchange he had with Dr. James Anderson (though the entirety of the email is not published). He quotes part of the conversation:

I must say, however, I'm always surprised, when reading a paper that attempts to deal with induction, that there is no discussion of concepts, the nature of their forming, or their relationship to inductive generalization, as if these issues did not matter.

In response to this, Anderson replied:

Well, it's not immediately obvious to me how the nature of concept formation bears either on the description of the problem of induction or on the development of cogent solutions. Perhaps you can elaborate.

Bethrick's "elaboration" is mysteriously missing from his post. So, we're "naive" because we're not Radroids. Actually, as Anton Thorn (Bethrick's hero) has argued, the POI is solved by "Objectivist Axioms." Indeed, this is an Objectivist response. The axiom appealed to is "the law of identity: A=A. We read that this is how Objectivists understand the problem when Thornwrites:

Christian: As creator and sustainer of the universe, God guarantees the laws of nature.

Non-believer: So, in essence, you hold that God is required for A to be A?

Notice that the not-so-naive-ones think that A=A is how to answer the question as to how one knows that nature is uniform. But "nature is uniform" is A is B. A is A breaks down to nothing more than: nature is nature! With this sturdy paper-sword the Objectivist runs off to battle (and their battle cry is: existence exists!). The problem, though, is that "nature is nature" tells us nothing about how nature behaves. So, Thorn (and other Objectivists) set up the theist as one who goes along with Objectivist mumbo-jumbo. The theist in the conversation should have said, "God may be required for the law of identity, but that's not what I said. I said that God guarantees a general law-like governing of His universe." That nature operates with a general uniformity, in a law-like way, does not translate to the claim that nature is nature. Nature could still be nature yet not behave orderly. Nature may act lawlessly, it would still be nature.

So, who is the naive one?

Moving on, Ex-Believer. You had another commenter that tells us,

"I'll be the first to admit that I'm not well versed in TAG. However, if you want a layman’s opinion, it makes no sense to me. I know it's presup. But, how can you justify a presupposition. If I were to presuppose the existence of, say, the Flying Spaghetti Monster using the same argument, The theists would refute it. Yet some use the very same argument to justify the existence of something just as well prove, namely God.

I just don't get it."

Thanks for your opinion.

i. Thanks for your autobiographical remark about the ability of what your cognitive faculties can, or can not, grasp.

ii. Van Tillians would argue that presuppositions are justified transcendentally.

iii. Fine, presuppose the Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM). That's my argument. Everyone presupposes some ultimate authority. Let's see if said being can provide the transcendentals.

iv. You couldn't use the same argument since FSM is not Trinitarian.

v. If you end up making it all the "same" as my argument then all you're doing is saying that my worldview is correct, yet you just call it by a different name. But who's afraid of my worldview dressed up in different clothes.

vi. Appealing to the FSM does not help out your atheism, anyway.

vii. If FSM could provide the transcendentals then you'd refute atheism, naturalism, and physicalism.

viii. Now, if you want to say that you wouldn't refute that because FSM is a physical being, in the natural world, then you'd have a rough time trying to argue for non-physical laws of logic, and morality, etc.

I know you "just don't get it." That's where we came up with the phrase, "ignorance is bliss."


Moving on, Ex-believer (EB) writes a post called "Justifying TAG." He makes sure that everyone knows that his post is a question, and not a critique. EB writes,

Paul pointed out that TA's were justified according to modus ponens, so that

<> P-->Q
<> P
:.Q

I'm assuming that P = universal laws of logic and Q = the Christian God, so that "If universal laws of logic exist, then the Christian God exists. Universal laws of logic exist, therefore the Christian God exists."

But I had said in my original comment that TAG is person varied. Since it is a skeptic-refuting argument then the antecedent would be that which the skeptic accepts. Indeed, why I don't even like getting in to discussions of form is because of the Van Tillian program where "all things prove God's existence." Greg Bahnsen has written about just a few of the things TAG would aim to prove:

predication, reason, explanation, interpretation, learning, certainty, universals, possibility, cause, substance, being, or purpose, counting, coherence, unity, or system in experience or in a conception of a "universe," logic, individuating of facts, unchanging "natures" or laws in a chance universe, uniformity, science, connecting logic and facts or predication to reality, avoiding contradictions, avoiding the irrationalism or scepticism which arise from the tension between knowing discursively and knowing-asystematic, etc.

So, should the mixed hypothetical run thus:

If predication, reason, explanation, interpretation, learning, certainty, universals, possibility, cause, substance, being, or purpose, counting, coherence, unity, or system in experience or in a conception of a "universe," logic, individuating of facts, unchanging "natures" or laws in a chance universe, uniformity, science, connecting logic and facts or predication to reality, avoiding contradictions, avoiding the irrationalism or scepticism which arise from the tension between knowing discursively and knowing-asystematic, etc, are possible then God is the case .

Predication, reason, explanation, interpretation, learning, certainty, universals, possibility, cause, substance, being, or purpose, counting, coherence, unity, or system in experience or in a conception of a "universe," logic, individuating of facts, unchanging "natures" or laws in a chance universe, uniformity, science, connecting logic and facts or predication to reality, avoiding contradictions, avoiding the irrationalism or scepticism which arise from the tension between knowing discursively and knowing-asystematic, etc, are possible.

Therefore God is the case?

But what of Bahnsen's "etcetera?" Furthermore, many people do not grant that, say, we can individuate (think many Eastern philosophies). They won't accept that that is the case. Maybe with them I would show how their assuming that The Buddha was good, presupposes a Christian worldview (i.e., the very act of asserting that Buddha is good).

So, needless to say, "P" is not any "one" thing.

"Normally, after making an argument, people seek to support each of their premises."

This is audience dependant. I may argue with someone about, say, free will. I might say, "Well, if the Bible claims that God ordains our free choices, then you'd be forced to deny your will-o'-the-wisp understanding of "fee will." Now let's say I go to a certain passage, say, Acts 2:23 and show how God foreordained the free choices of men. Just for arguments sake, let's say the fellow I was talking to said, "Hmmm, okay, I see it." So, I do not need to prove or support the conditional, and in this case I don't need to support my understanding of the text.

But I grant that in your case I'd need to go further.

"Now, correct me if I'm wrong (and, admittedly, I may be), but the way presuppositionalists normally attempt to justify the first premise (i.e. that the existence of universal laws of logic presupposes the existence of God) seems to be to say something along the line of 'Prove to me that universal laws of logic can exist without God; you can't, therefore premise one is true.'"

A few things:

i. If the argument was that you could not account or make sense of logic within your worldview, then you'd need to show how you can.

ii. Since you have a burden as well, you need to show how you can reason autonomously. If you assume that you can have logic without God then you're begging the question against my worldview. So, you can't just assume you're autonomous and not expect to have to justify your autonomy.

iii. We're debating entire worldviews.

iv. If your argument assumes universal laws of logic then you must offer an account of how such things are possible, unless you just want some freebies.

v. There's a two-step method in play. The first is to argue negatively, i.e., you can't account for logic given what you say about the world. The second is to show how, say, logic does presuppose God's existence.

vi. The argument is usually retortive in that the attempt is made to show that by denying the transcendental claim you do so only by performing it.

Like I said, I may be wrong about how presuppers justify that premise. It seems, though, that this is what Bahnsen meant by his "impossibility of the contrary" arguments. Instead of saying, "In various forms, the fundamental argument advanced by the Christian apologist is that the Christian worldview is true because of the impossibility of the contrary," [see here] he should have said, "The fundamental argument advanced by the Christian apologist is that the first premise of TAG is true because of the impossibility of the contrary and, therefore, the Christian God exists."

I've argued with Manata before that it seems like Bahnsen's argument is more like:

P v Q
~P
:.Q

[I.e. "Non-Christian world view or Christian world view; not non-Christian world view, therefore, Christian world view."]

i. The Christian worldview is true by the impossibility of the contrary. We're not trying to prove just "if logic, then God" but rather the entire worldview.

ii. Transcendental Arguments take the form of modus ponens. I'll sidestep debate here because the burden is one you, considering the fact that you're the only person in the history of the world who has made the stricture of a TA a disjunctive syllogism.

iii. Notice that EB misstates his symbols above. He says that the argument is "the Christian worldview or the non-Christian worldview." He translates that as:

P v Q.

Really, that would be translated P v ~P.

The disjunctive syllogism comes in handy when someone says something like, "Okay, well maybe you've proven that Christianity can offer the preconditions for the possibility of, say, logic, science, and morality. You've refuted Atheism, Islam, Mormonism, Buddhism, et al. But how do you know that there is not some other undiscovered worldview that can do the same?"

In that case the person has set up the argument as:

C v A

~A

:.C

and then

C v I

~I

:.C

and then

C v M

~M

:.C

So, they would say, what about "Y?" You haven't refuted Y.

And it is there that Bahnsen would say, "No, by using the transcendental argument I really did prove that Christianity is the case and it and only it provides the transcendentals. You see, there are only two worldviews and all I've been doing is giving illustrations on how many different ways I can refute that worldview in its various forms. The non-Christian worldview is like a family in that there are different family members who look a bit different, but they are all members of the same family. Likewise, atheism and Buddhism are just distant cousins. So, my argument is not as you have set it up, rather, it is:

C v ~C

~~C

:.C."

That's something like what Bahnsen would say, and that shows where you may have the idea of the disjunctive syllogism coming in.

[As an aside, EB tries to argue for non-universal laws of logic. He argues that is how physical brains evolved, i.e., to grammatically relate nouns to each other. He writes,

When I say that the universe contains objects, I have the idea of "nouns" in mind. Now, what if the brain has simply evolved in a way that it attempts to grammatically relate nouns to each other? The laws of logic rely on words like "and," "or," "not," "is," etc. These words do not name things that exist in the universe. The laws of logic are made up of these words, however. The law of non-contradiction could not exist, for example, if the concept of "not" didn't exist.

i. It could not be the case that before humans a rock could have been a rock and not a rock at the same time and in the same relationship i.e, r could not be ~r.

to which he would respond:

"Before language, there was no such thing as a negation (no matter which symbol you choose for it--"not" or "~"). Our language introduced negations."

ii. He confuses one's ability to express a concept with the existence of the concept itself. This just begs the question, then.

iii. There was also no word "rock." This would not mean that there were nor rocks?! Just because human language could not express laws of logic does not mean said laws didn't exist.

iv. For language to be useful it must represent reality. The laws of logic expressed by our language must represent reality.

v. EBs defense of logic is self-refuting since it says that before language there were no laws of logic, which of course makes a statement about time before language in which the contradictory is false (or, was there logic and not-logic before language?). So, it affirms that contradictions did not exist, or could not obtain, before language yet it also affirms that logic (and the law of non-contradiction) didn't come about until language-using humans!

Recent Trends In Resurrection Scholarship

Michael Licona writes:

"In a survey of French, German, and English sources that touch on the subject of the resurrection of Jesus written between 1975-2005, [Gary] Habermas discovered that of those scholars making a pronouncement of historical, nonhistorical, or unknown, approximately 75 percent awarded historicity, concluding that Jesus rose from the dead in either a bodily or nonbodily sense. Habermas further discovered that approximately 75 percent of those awarding historicity also held that Jesus rose bodily. This is a huge change from the scholarly consensus of the two decades prior to 1975." (Paul Meets Muhammad [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 2006], n. 4 on pp. 174-175)

The book Licona is referencing was published earlier this year. In that book, Habermas writes:

"Over the past five years, I have tracked well over two thousand scholarly publications on the resurrection. Each source appeared between 1975 and the present, in German, French, or English, written by a wide range of critical scholars....As firmly as ever, most contemporary scholars agree that, after Jesus' death, his early followers had experiences that they at least believed were appearances of their risen Lord. Further, this conviction was the chief motivation behind the early proclamation of the Christian gospel. These basics are rarely questioned, even by more radical scholars. They are among the most widely established details from the entire New Testament....This [the belief that the earliest Christians thought they saw Jesus risen from the dead] has been a mainstay of critical thought since nineteenth-century German theology....More recently, James D.G. Dunn agreed: 'It is almost impossible to dispute that at the historical roots of Christianity lie some visionary experiences of the first Christians, who understood them as appearances of Jesus, raised by God from the dead.'...I have argued elsewhere that, while they still hold a decidedly minority position among the total number of commentators, recent decades have revealed a slight increase in scholars who espouse naturalistic hypotheses to account for Jesus' resurrection....As it was at the end of nineteenth-century German liberalism, as well as at the end of the twentieth century, probably the single most popular alternative to Jesus' resurrection was the hallucination, or subjective vision, theory....After a hiatus of many decades, arguably almost a century, the subjective vision theory has made a comeback....One old standby, the swoon or apparent death theory, has even appeared in a few places recently, although it is seldom espoused by scholars....Each of the naturalistic theories was attacked piece by piece by the liberal scholars in the nineteenth century, as each criticized the others' approaches. In the twentieth century, critical scholarship has largely rejected wholesale the naturalistic approaches to the resurrection....Exhibiting an amazing amount of consensus, most researchers across a very wide conceptual spectrum have rejected naturalistic approaches as explanations for the earliest Christians' belief in the resurrection of Jesus....Accordingly, the path of natural alternative theories is definitely a minority approach....Even before the publication of N.T. Wright's monumental volume The Resurrection of the Son of God in 2003, the tide had begun to turn toward the view that Jesus not only was raised miraculously from the dead but also appeared in a spiritual body. So, the resurrection is an event that happened to Jesus, rather than either an internal experience or a natural occurrence. The risen Jesus featured both bodily continuity, including qualities that could be observed and perhaps even touched, as well as transformed discontinuity. Thus, Jesus appeared as far more than a vision of light from heaven. Further, it was usually held that firm historical evidence accompanied these appearances....While sporting a few new wrinkles as well as some improvements, the view that Jesus was raised bodily is currently the predominant position, if judged in terms of scholarly support. Moreover, some scholars who reject this view still hold that it was at least the New Testament position, including Paul's own teaching. This is a marked change from recent decades when Paul's view was often interpreted far differently....less than one-quarter of critical scholars who addressed the historicity question offered naturalistic theories...The almost three-quarters of remaining scholars hold either of the two views that Jesus was raised from the dead in some sense....[more than three-quarters of these people] take the position that Jesus was resurrected in a real, though still transformed, body...The supernatural view that Jesus rose from the dead in one of two senses is a distinct majority position over the natural option (almost three to one). Very surprisingly, while the supernatural internal category (the old 'objective vision theory') was the most popular among scholars through the middle to late twentieth century, it has been relegated to a minority response in recent years, in favor of bodily appearances of the risen Jesus (more than three to one)." (Robert Stewart, ed., The Resurrection of Jesus [Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 2006], pp. 78-80, 82-84, 86, 88, 90-92)

In another book, William Craig discusses four historical facts accepted by most New Testament scholars:

1. After his crucifixion, Jesus was buried by Joseph of Arimathea in the tomb.
2. On the Sunday following the crucifixion, Jesus’ tomb was found empty by a group of his women followers.
3. On multiple occasions and under various circumstances, different individuals and groups of people experienced appearances of Jesus alive from the dead.
4. The original disciples believed that Jesus was risen from the dead despite their having every reason not to.

Craig comments:

"For these and other reasons, the majority of New Testament critics concur that Jesus was buried by Joseph of Arimathea in the tomb. According to the late John A.T. Robinson of Cambridge University, the burial of Jesus in the tomb is ‘one of the earliest and best attested facts about Jesus.’…in the words of Jacob Kremer, an Austrian specialist in the resurrection, ‘By far most exegetes hold firmly to the reliability of the biblical statements concerning the empty tomb.’…This [the fact that early Christians experienced what they thought were encounters with the risen Jesus] is almost universally acknowledged among New Testament scholars…[atheistic scholar Gerd] Ludemann himself concludes, ‘It may be taken as historically certain that Peter and the disciples had experiences after Jesus’ death in which Jesus appeared to them as the risen Christ.’…Ludemann himself admits that historical analysis leads to the ‘abrupt origination of the Easter faith of the disciples.’ In summary, there are four facts agreed on by the majority of scholars who have written on these subjects that any adequate historical hypothesis must account for: Jesus’ burial by Joseph of Arimathea, the discovery of his empty tomb, his postmortem appearances and the origin of the disciples’ belief in his resurrection." (in Paul Copan and Ronald Tacelli, ed., Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? [Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000], pp. 33-34)

In their 2004 book, Gary Habermas and Michael Licona mention five facts accepted by the large majority of scholars:

1. Jesus died by crucifixion.
2. Jesus’ disciples believed that he rose and appeared to them.
3. The church persecutor Paul was suddenly changed.
4. The skeptic James, brother of Jesus, was suddenly changed.
5. The tomb was empty.

Habermas and Licona write:

"On the state of Resurrection studies today, I (Habermas) recently completed an overview of more than 1,400 sources on the resurrection of Jesus published since 1975. I studied and catalogued about 650 of these texts in English, German, and French. Some of the results of this study are certainly intriguing. For example, perhaps no fact is more widely recognized than that early Christian believers had real experiences that they thought were appearances of the risen Jesus. A critic may claim that what they saw were hallucinations or visions, but he does not deny that they actually experienced something....roughly 75 percent of scholars on the subject accept the empty tomb as a historical fact." (The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Kregel Publications, 2004], pp. 60, 70)

Habermas and Licona explain that even "the majority of nonbelieving scholars" (p. 149) accept such facts, not just Christian scholars. And even many professing Christian scholars are Christian in name, but reject much of what Christians have traditionally believed. Skeptics sometimes suggest that a scholarly consensus on facts related to Jesus’ resurrection isn’t of much significance, because so many of the scholars are Christians, but traditional Christians make up only a small percentage of scholarship.

"A Christian disease"

John W. Loftus said:

“ I'm not defending her. Let her defend her own views.

But many of you Christians accept the Kalam Cosmological Argument which was first proposed by a Muslim. Why the double standard?”

i) To begin with, the Kalam argument was first proposed by a Byzantine theologian—John Philoponus. It was also favored by Bonaventura.

In addition, it made it’s way into Islamic philosophical theology. But that’s not where it got off the ground.

As a student of William Lane Craig, you ought to be more conversant with the history of this argument.

ii) But supposing, to play along with your objection, that we Christians did adopt and/or adapt an argument of non-Christian origin, in what sense is that a double standard?

One of the problems with Murdock is the quality of her sources. And where historical sources are concerned, the provenance of the source is often quite germane to its reliability, or lack thereof.

“Many influential philosophers and scientists have had stupid ideas too.”

I simply find it highly ironic that a satellite of the Secular Outpost which incessantly assails Christian believers for their alleged gullibility would invite a New Age quackster like Ms. Murdock to be a member of your team.

But, hey, that’s fine by me. Water seeks its own level. In this case, the gutter.

“Oh, and one more thing. I do not want to be like Christians who will distance themselves, excommunicate and shun people who do not believe exactly like I do.

That's a Christian disease I've left in the dust.

You, however, can have at it. I see it daily on this Blog, where you debate with your fellow believers over minutia when you should have a concerted intellectual attack against those who do not believe.

But then, that's Christianity for ya........”

There are several things wrong with this diagnosis:

i) The T-bloggers are very selective about what theological traditions we critique.

ii) We do two things at Triablogue: (a) we warn fellow travelers against taking various wrong turns, and (b) we point them in the right direction.

We don’t merely focus all our fire what is wrong with this or that path, but we also present and defend a positive alternative.

iii) Secularism has its orthodoxies too. To dissent on matters of evolution or abortion or feminism or affirmative action or homosexual rights, and so on and so forth, will get you blacklisted and banished to the liberal equivalent of Siberian exile as well.

iv) There is no party line at Triablogue. We are all social conservatives and theological conservatives (mostly Calvinist), but beyond that, I have never told my team members what they can write about. I didn’t make them fill out a questionnaire before I invited them to join.

I have no idea what position they take on a whole host of issues.

I did happen to know, even before I invited them to come on board, that some of them don’t see eye to eye with me on certain issues.

I’m a theonomist whereas Vestrup is a libertarian.

I incline to the presuppositional end of the spectrum whereas Jason inclines to the evidentialist end.

I’m an amil, but I suspect that Jason is a premil.

I invite people to join who have (a) talent and who (b) share some of my axial concerns.

We have an overlapping vision and mission.

But by the same token, we disagree on certain issues while some of them also have areas of concern that are of little or no concern to me. That’s their business. Their prerogative. And they’re free to talk about whatever they care about, whether or not that happens to intersect with my primary areas of concern.

v) My blogroll is also quite ecumenical, within the bounds of Evangelicalism. It is by no means restricted to the Reformed.

It is because all Bible-believing Christians belong to the same family of God that we can disagree without disowning each other.

vi) There is also a great deal of networking and fellowshipping that goes on between conservative Christians of varying theological traditions.

Oh, sure, you can tick off some horror stories, but that’s a very one-sided picture of the totality.

Good Friday Meditation

From Psalm 118

11They surrounded me, yes, they surrounded me;
In the name of the LORD I will surely cut them off.

12They surrounded me like bees;
They were extinguished as a fire of thorns;
In the name of the LORD I will surely cut them off.

13You pushed me violently so that I was falling,
But the LORD helped me.

14The LORD is my strength and song,
And He has become my salvation.

15The sound of joyful shouting and salvation is in the tents of the righteous;
The right hand of the LORD does valiantly.

16The right hand of the LORD is exalted; T
he right hand of the LORD does valiantly.

17I will not die, but live,
And tell of the works of the LORD.

18The LORD has disciplined me severely,
But He has not given me over to death.

19Open to me the gates of righteousness;
I shall enter through them, I shall give thanks to the LORD.

20This is the gate of the LORD;
The righteous will enter through it.

21I shall give thanks to You, for You have answered me,
And You have become my salvation.

22The stone which the builders rejected
Has become the chief corner stone.

23This is the LORD'S doing;
It is marvelous in our eyes.

24This is the day which the LORD has made;
Let us rejoice and be glad in it.

25O LORD, do save, we beseech You;
O LORD, we beseech You, do send prosperity!

26Blessed is the one who comes in the name of the LORD;
We have blessed you from the house of the LORD.

27The LORD is God, and He has given us light;
Bind the festival sacrifice with cords to the horns of the altar.

28You are my God, and I give thanks to You;
You are my God, I extol You.

29Give thanks to the LORD, for He is good;
For His lovingkindness is everlasting.

News of the Weird, Part Deux

From some folks on an email list of which I am a part:

I found this effort of the pope to be rather ironic:

"the Pope will leadprayers against 'insane, risky and dangerous' ventures in
attempting 'to take God's place without being God'". He was referring to
those attempting genetic manipulation.

See http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,13509-2134140,00.html

So, let's just get this straight shall we. The one who takes the name Holy Father, and is said to be the Vicar of Christ is leading prayers against ventures in attempting to "take God's place without being God."

Ooookay.

Jerry Falwell preaches Arminian, but prays like a Calvinist!

by Alan

Ergun Caner's sermon was classic American Pop Arminianism. After an hour in a half of refuting Ergun Caner exegetically and historically, Dr. White finished with playing the closing prayer by Jerry Falwell. Here's the program.

Immediately before he prayed, Falwell made this comment to the audience,

He will not force you against your will to come to the cross.

I kid you not, just after he made this statement, he closed in prayer in which he made the following request to God,

Do not let one person say 'no' to your precious will. Save the lost.

At 1:08 toward the very end of this clip, you can hear Jerry Falwell make this Arminian statement before he prays, then immediately contradict himself when he prays Calvinisticly.

Jerry Falwell, what about this so-called libertarian free will of man as you teach? How can you tell God, "Do not let one person say 'no' to your precious will," and at the same time say that God "will not force you against your will"? Should not God respect man’s free will if he says ‘no’? Which is it Rev. Falwell?

This phenomenon is nothing new. Invariably, Arminians pray Calvinisticly, “God, change my unbelieving relative’s heart.” I have never heard them pray, “God, only whisper in my relative’s ear, but don’t change their heart unless you’ve been given permission.”

I don’t know about you, but I am glad that God subdued my rebelious will. I am thankful that when I was spitting in the face of God, he demonstrated his grace and love in penetrating my will and raising me up to spiritual life.

Evidently, for many Evangelicals including Caner and Falwell this is not loving of God to do.

Cheers.

Jesus, Friend Of Sinners

"Jesus, remember me when You come in Your kingdom" (Luke 23:42)

Jesus, Thou art the sinner’s Friend;
As such I look to Thee;
Now, in the fullness of Thy love,
O Lord, remember me.

Remember Thy pure Word of grace,
Remember Calvary’s tree,
Remember all Thy dying groans,
And then remember me.

Thou wondrous Advocate with God,
I yield my soul to Thee;
While Thou art pleading on the throne,
Dear Lord, remember me.

Lord, I am guilty, I am vile,
But Thy salvation’s free;
Then, in Thine all abounding grace,
Dear Lord, remember me.

Howe’er forsaken or despised,
Howe’er oppressed I be,
Howe’er forgotten here on earth,
Do Thou remember me.

And when I close my eyes in death,
And human help shall flee,
Then, then, my dear redeeming God,
O then remember me.

(Richard Burnham, "Jesus, Thou Art the Sinner's Friend")

Resources In Chinese

The good folks at Monergism. com are featuring a Chinese Language Reformed Theology Resource Site.

Please pass this on to those you know who may benefit from it.

Moonbat central

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Lippardian philippics

As I was going back through the archive I noticed that Jim Lippard did get around to responding to my remarks.

He makes a number of intelligent comments, so his response merits a reply. Here, then, is my own belated reply.

“I'm not assuming that--clearly, any absolute moral principle is going to involve sets of circumstances simply in order for it to applicable at all. Principles about killing are applicable to situations in which killing occurs. Likewise, I think everybody agrees that consequences matter--but for the deontologist, bad consequences are never sufficient to override fundamental rights.”

Agreed.

“But let's go to the specifics of what I was commenting on--particular Christian arguments in the comments of Ed Brayton's blog that slavery was a justifiable, moral institution in some historical circumstances. Do you buy that? If so, then you must not believe in an inalienable human right of self-ownership (or, an alternate formulation for Christians who believe God owns human beings, an inalienable right not to be owned by other human beings).”

i) I’ve not read Brayton’s argument, so my own comments will be irrespective of his argument.

ii) As a Christian I’m naturally committed to Biblical ethics.

iii) I don’t have much use for the Enlightenment paradigm of natural rights or human rights, although this linguistic usage is so entrenched that it’s sometimes easier for me to accommodate to that conventional framework.

But speaking for myself, I see nothing of value in the conceptual scheme of natural/human rights that cannot be better preserved by simply speaking of the right or wrong way to treat people.

This is more fundamental. For unless it’s wrong to deny someone his rights, how have you wronged him by denying him his rights? So it’s more to the point to speak in terms of right or wrong conduct.

This has another advantages as well, such as avoiding the connotations of humanistic autonomy involved with making an individual a locus of rights.

Moreover, it avoids the reductio ad absurdum of saying that someone has the right to do wrong.

iv) Whether slavery is ever a morally justifiable institution depends, in part, on the definition of slavery, as well as the available alternatives.

One form of OT slavery was indentured service for debtors. A debtor would make restitution by becoming an indentured servant for seven years.

I see nothing morally objectionable in this practice. Indeed, it’s a great improvement over our current system.

Another form of vassalage was the enslavement of POWs. This was admittedly harsh, but less harsh than the customary alternative of executing all war captives.

The problem with repatriating POWs is that they might well live to fight you another day.

So I regard this form of slavery as a necessary evil given the practical options at that time and place.

v) Americans naturally associate slavery with the Southern institution, which was raced-based and originally involved kidnapping (a capital offense in Scripture).

For this there is no moral warrant.

vi) As a rule, slavery is wrong. I’d give a couple of reasons:

a) To the extent that a slave master is free to do whatever he pleases with his chattel, the potentiality and reality of abuse is considerable.

b) It keeps adults in the perpetual status of an underage minor. This is wrong, for adults have adult responsibilities.

“At some point, if you water down an absolute principle enough by adding additional qualifications (particularly qualifications that themselves don't seem to have any moral relevance, such as a time index), it becomes indistinguishable from a purely relativistic one.”

True, but it also depends on whether the qualifications are merely ad hoc, or if they are intrinsic elements of any well-rounded ethical system.

“i. I'm happy with the Amnesty International definition here:
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/torture/definition.shtml”

I believe that this is the definition Lippard is alluding to:

“We usually use the term "torture" to refer to the deliberate infliction of severe pain or suffering by state agents, or similar acts by private individuals for which the state bears responsibility through consent, acquiescence or inaction. We also use the term "torture" to refer to deliberate pain or suffering inflicted by members of armed political groups.”

Lippard gets credit for defining his terms.

Contrary to Lippard, I am not happy with such a blanket definition. It allows an interrogator no flexibility or discretion in extracting actionable intel, without which effective counterterrorism is impossible.

What we mean by severe physical pain is fairly obvious. “Suffering” far less obvious, especially in the case of psychological trauma.

For example, does this definition rule out sleep deprivation?

“ii. My position is not a muddle and it does make sense. You should read up a little more on the law, specifically on defenses of justification and excuse, and on the necessity defense. If you think all exceptions can be codified, you don't understand the law or the function of the judiciary.”

This is not a question of codifying every conceivable exception. To the contrary, Lippard takes the position that “torture” should be banned across the board. No exceptions whatsoever.

If he had his way, the interrogator and his superiors would assume all legal liability. They would be vulnerable to indictment for violating such a broad, unqualified law.

Sure, they could attempt to defend themselves in a court of law or military tribunal after having been indicted.

Once again, that’s no way to conduct counterterrorism. Can secular ethics address a real world threat? Or is it a bunch of man-made rules that disarm us and leave us utterly defenseless against an unscrupulous enemy?

I continue to reject the way the whole issue has been framed. The point is not to ban torture, but allow informal exceptions.

Rather, the point is to discuss what is necessary to extract intel from an unwilling informant. What techniques are most effective? How do these techniques range along a spectrum of pain and suffering?

The exceptions to codify would not be exceptions to torture, but exceptions from the more inhumane and ineffectual forms of coercive interrogation.

“iii. I think taking a fuzzy position on this subject is very likely to lead to abuse.”

i)Depends on what you mean by “fuzzy.” You yourself said that every contingency cannot be written into law. Some flexibility is necessary to get the job done.

ii)What is actually right trumps what is potentially wrong.

iii)Moreover, “abuse” is not necessarily the worse case scenario. This admittedly legitimate concern must be balanced against other equally legitimate concerns.

Suppose a terrorist knew about a plot to fly a jumbo jet into a crowded sports stadium? Or poison the water supply?

Also, we’re not talking pure hypotheticals, here. We’ve recovered Al-Qaeda training manuals and hard-drives. We, and especially the intelligence community, have a pretty firm idea of what the jihadis would like to do to us if given the chance.

Both sides in this debate can come up with horror stories and worst-case scenarios. We still need to prioritize.

“Since you offer a "ticking time bomb" justification for torture, you should be able to conceive of similar situations where murder is necessary for the resolution. The difference between you and I is that you think this really provides a justification and the course of action is right, while I think the course of action is still wrong and deserves punishment, even if it's the best (or only) way to prevent some worse consequence from occurring.”

i) Not all homicide is murder. There’s such a thing as justifiable homicide. That’s what the rules of engagement are all about, as a matter of law.

ii) My position is not limited to the ticking time bomb scenario. It is, rather, the more general proposition that we should be able to extract intel from declared enemies of the United States who would do us harm—harm on a massive scale.

iii) To say that a given course of action is wrong and deserving of punishment even though it is the best or only way to prevent some worse consequence from occurring is morally incoherent and a classic example of an ethical system which is impotent to address a real world threat.

You end up punishing the very people who, through their action, prevented a worse consequence. They’re rewarded for saving our lives and our livelihood by…what? Imprisonment?

iv) I continue to reject the framework of “torture” as the controlling paradigm.

“ii. I think the function of law is a bit broader than that, but if you add the proviso that everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty, I think I can agree with your statements.”

The presumption of innocence is applicable in cases of criminal prosecution, when the objective is to ascertain guilt or innocence and mete out a suitable sentence.

It is not relevant in counterintelligence, when the objective is not to establish whether the informant broke the law, but to extract actionable intel to prevent a future atrocity.

A trial is about a past event (was a crime committed?) while counterintelligence or counterterrorism is about preventing a future event (a plot to massacre the innocent).

“iii. If you're going to advocate originalism, I think you can do that in a reasonable way, but not with originalism of intent. You can't measure original intent except in a very indirect and unreliable way; original meaning is more feasible.”

“Original intent” is a term of art. It doesn’t mean divining the mind of the Framers.

Rather, based on such considerations as what laws were on the books when the Constitution was ratified, as well as the minutes of the Constitutional Convention, as well as the conduct of the Founders when some of them held office, we can block out what the Constitution allows or disallowed in many cases.

“iv-v. I disagree with your interpretation; I think it's best to adhere to these conventions even if one's enemy doesn't, on the basis of respect for basic human rights.”

i)This is not about human rights. This is about the laws of warfare.

To treat a detainee humanly, and to treat him as a POW who can respond to an interrogator by giving name, rank, and serial number, are two very different things.

One side assumes a heightened risk in its methods of detention under the assumption that the other side will assume the same risk, for the benefit of each side’s respective POWs.

If, however, one side does not uphold its end of the bargain, then it would be irrational for the other side to continue to assume a heightened risk. Once you withdraw the original rationale for a certain code of conduct, there is no reason to continue with business as usual.

ii)What is more, unilateral enforcement is a disincentive for anyone to honor the laws of war. For if those who violate the laws of war are rewarded with equal treatment, they obviously have no incentive to do otherwise.

“ii. It takes an extreme case to make anything like a reasonable argument for justifying torture. There are no borderline cases in the middle.”

i)You continue to cling to this simplistic and tendentious characterization of the issue, as if all forms of coercive interrogation constitute “torture,” not to mention a sweeping definition of torture which makes no distinction between physical and mental distress or duress.

ii)It doesn’t take an extreme case to justify coercive interrogation. All it takes is a credible threat of murder and mayhem if our enemies get the upper hand in this conflict.

iii)And there are plenty of borderline cases between, say, sleep deprivation and mutilation.

“i. The checks on the judiciary are that the executive appoints the judiciary with the advice and consent of the legislative, and the legislative authors and the executive signs into effect the laws they interpret. What further check do you think there should be?”

It matters not what laws Congress can pass and the executive can sign if the judiciary can invoke the unconstitutional right to strike down laws that are passed by the voters duly elected representatives.

“ii. I agree with your first sentence, but I believe the actual effects of the Yoo/Gonzales positions have been demonstrably immoral.”

What are you alluding to? Abu Graib? GITMO?

“In answer to your question, I tend to lean towards a rule utilitarian position, with basic values being evolutionary (biologically and socially) in origin (cf., Axelrod on evolution of cooperation), though I'm not entirely decided about what's the best meta-ethical framework. I have Erik Wielenberg's Value and Virtue in a Godless World on my to-read list, as I've heard that it is quite good.”

I don’t see how your utilitarianism is consistent with your position that “torture” is always wrong and deserving of punishment.

“In my opinion, most ethical and epistemological issues can be productively debated even without agreement on metaphysics, because there is often common ground on enough of the relevant basic facts and principles regardless of their source.”

That depends on how consistent an ethicist is with his worldview.

A self-conscious secularist may be amoral because his worldview is unable to ground or generate moral absolutes.

Ecclesiastical Humor

Time to lighten the mood...

From our friend and brother, Scripture Searcher:

No Christian expositor of the Bible, ministering in these wild, weird, and wacky
times, has much time in any sermon for humor, but woe be unto any of us
when we cannot find room in our lives (and sermons) for
a little of the light stuff....

-----
Don't Miss Church

It was Palm Sunday and, because of a sore throat, five-year-old Johnnystayed home from church with a sitter. When the family returned home,they were carrying several palm branches. The boy asked what
they were for. "People held them over
Jesus' head as he walked by."

"Wouldn't you know it, " the boy fumed,
"the one Sunday I don't go,
He shows up!"

-----
Too Much Television

One Easter Sunday morning as the minister was preaching the children'ssermon, he reached into his bag of props and pulled out an egg. Hepointed at the egg and asked the children, "What's in Here?"

"I know, I know" a little boy exclaimed..."Pantyhose!"

-----

A Holiday for Everyone

An atheist complained to a friend, "Christians have their specialholidays, such as Christmas and Easter. And Jews celebrate theirholidays, such as Passover and Yom Kippur. Muslims have theirholidays, too. Every religion has holidays to celebrate. But weatheists," he said, "have no recognized national holiday.
It's an unfair discrimination"

His friend replied..."Well, why don't you celebrate
April 1st?"


-----
Squirrel Problem

A small town had three churches; Presbyterian, Methodist, and Baptist.All three had a serious problem with squirrels in the church. Eachchurch in its own fashion had a meeting to deal
with the squirrel problem.

The Presbyterians decided that it was predestined that squirrels be inthe church and that they would just have to live with them.

The Methodists decided they should deal with the squirrels lovingly inthe style of Charles Wesley. They humanely trapped them
and released them in a park at the edge of town.

Within 3 days, they were all back in the church.

The Baptists had the best solution. They voted the squirrels in as members. Now they only see them at Christmas and Easter.

Regeneration and the Supernatural

by Alan

The following explanation of regeneration from the Canons of Dordt is one of my favorites. The Dordtian divines placed the miracle of regeneration on the par of creation and the resurrection from the dead. I hope the following Synod of Dordt article on regeneration renews a spirit of delight in the miracle that God has performed in his elect.

***QUOTE***

The Canons of Dordt
Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine: Of the Corruption of Man, His Conversion to God, and the Manner Thereof.

Article 12

And this is the regeneration so highly celebrated in Scripture, and denominated a new creation: a resurrection from the dead, a making alive, which God works in us without our aid. But this is in no wise effected merely by the external preaching of the gospel, by moral suasion, or such a mode of operation, that after God has performed his part, it still remains in the power of man to be regenerated or not, to be converted, or to continue unconverted; but it is evidently a supernatural work, most powerful, and at the same time most delightful, astonishing, mysterious, and ineffable; not inferior in efficacy to creation, or the resurrection from the dead, as the Scripture inspired by the author of this work declares; so that all in whose heart God works in this marvelous manner, are certainly, infallibly, and effectually regenerated, and do actually believe. - Whereupon the will thus renewed, is not only actuated and influenced by God, but in consequence of this influence, becomes itself active. Wherefore also, man is himself rightly said to believe and repent, by virtue of that grace received (emphasis mine).

***END-QUOTE***

Immigration punditry

A couple of conservative pundits on the immigration issue:

***QUOTE***

Activists who are organizing mass marches and demonstrations in cities across America may well be congratulating themselves on the huge numbers of people they can get to turn out to protest efforts in Congress to reduce illegal immigration.

No doubt that will impress many in the media and intimidate many politicians. But how these marches will be seen by millions of other Americans is another question entirely.

The Mexican flags and the strident assertions of a right to violate American laws are a danger signal to this society, as they would be to any society.

The releasing of children from schools to take part in these marches and the support of the marchers' goals by some religious leaders demonstrate that this contempt for the laws of the land has spread well beyond immigrant communities.

For some, this is just another extension of their general anti-establishment attitudes and activities. They are ready to protest virtually anything at any time.

Both liberals and free-market libertarians often see this as an abstract issue about poor people being hindered from moving to jobs by an arbitrary border drawn across the southwest desert.

Intellectuals' ability to think of people in the abstract is a dangerous talent in a world where people differ in all the ways that make them people. The cultures and surrounding circumstances of those people are crucial for understanding what they are likely to do and what the consequences are likely to be.

Some free-market advocates argue that the same principle which justifies free international trade in commodities should justify the free movement of people as well. But this ignores the fact that people have consequences that go far beyond the consequences of commodities.

Commodities are used up and vanish. People generate more people, who become a permanent and expanding part of the country's population and electorate.

It is an irreversible process -- and a potentially dangerous process, as Europeans have discovered with their "guest worker" programs that have brought in many Muslims who are fundamentally hostile to the culture and the people that welcomed them.

Unlike commodities, people in a welfare state have legal claims on other people's tax dollars and expensive services in schools and hospitals, not to mention the high cost of imprisoning many of them who commit crimes.

Immigrants in past centuries came here to become Americans, not to remain foreigners, much less to proclaim the rights of their homelands to reclaim American soil, as some of the Mexican activist groups have done.

In the wars that this country fought, immigrant groups were among the most patriotic volunteers, earning the respect of American citizens on the battlefield with their blood and their lives.

Today, immigrant spokesmen promote grievances, not gratitude, much less patriotism. Moreover, many native-born Americans also promote a sense of separatism and grievance and, through "multi-culturalism," strive to keep immigrants foreign and disaffected.

http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/thomassowell/2006/04/11/193239.html

So here's the funny part. As my colleague Rich Lowry has noted, liberals and Democrats tend to oppose free trade agreements, most recently the Central America Free Trade Agreement, on the grounds that they "export American jobs" to underpaid Latin American workers. But the same people generally favor importing underpaid Latin American workers into the United States to take many of the same jobs. One hand giveth, the other taketh away. The cynicism in all of this is fairly breathtaking. It seems that what many liberals prefer is not preserving American jobs or bringing more undocumented workers, but importing undocumented Democrats.

http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/jonahgoldberg/2006/04/12/193445.html

***END-QUOTE***

History, prodigy, & credibility

Why are there folks who don’t believe the Bible? What is it about the Bible that they find unbelievable?

Well, some of them are offended at certain aspects of Biblical ethics, like hell and holy war.

But I suppose the main reason they find the Bible unbelievable is the miraculous dimension.

Because nothing miraculous has ever happened to them or to anyone they know, it has an air of unreality.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Bible reported no miraculous events. Would removing the signs and wonders remove an intellectual impediment to believing in the Scriptures?

There are, in fact, liberal apologetes who attempt to render the Christian faith more acceptable to modern man by disinfecting the Bible of all supernaturalism.

And, at one level, the answer is yes. It isn’t just that unbelievers deny the miraculous events in Scripture. They are also sceptical of the ordinary events because the ordinary events are associated with a book full of portents and prodigies.

If the same book were to report the same historical events without the presence of the supernatural incidents, unbelievers would find its historical reportage more credible.

But assuming that we would separate the naturalistic elements from the supernaturalistic elements in Scripture, would this operation make the Bible more believable as a record of God’s existence?

By removing the miraculous side of Scripture, would those who otherwise find the Bible unbelievable suddenly find it a more credible record of God’s existence?

The answer is obviously not. If nothing out of the ordinary ever happened in Scripture, an unbeliever would scarcely take that as evidence for the existence of God.

An unbeliever is of the opinion that you can explain natural history and human history without recourse to divine agency.

The only evidence for the existence of God would in fact be evidence of something that cannot be accounted for by natural forces alone, if at all.

This isn’t the case for a Christian. We don’t believe that nature is self-explanatory. Even apart from the miraculous aspect of human experience, the ordinary course of nature still demands a supernatural cause.

But, for the average unbeliever, that is not the case.

Suppose we expurgated the Gospels of every dominical miracle. Would the unbeliever find the life of Jesus more plausible?

At one level, yes. He might believe in Jesus the same way he believes in the existence of Alexander or Cicero or Caesar Augustus.

But would that operation render him any more likely to believe in the divinity of Christ or the divine mission of Christ?

Obviously not. Remove the miraculous element, and Christ is, to all appearances, just another man.

So they would be more likely to believe in the existence of Jesus, in his words and deeds, as long as that could be abstracted from the supernatural claims and miraculous deeds.

So this poses an acute dilemma for the unbeliever. On the one hand, his primary evidence for disbelieving in Scripture are the reported miracles.

On the other hand, his primary evidence for the existence of God would be the occurrence of one or more well-documented miracles.

For an unbeliever, a bona fide miracle or series of miracles would attest the existence of God, yet he automatically discounts any attestation to the occurrence of a miracle.

This is the conundrum of unbelief: a miracle would be the only compelling reason to believe in God, but a reported miracle is a compelling reason to discredit the witness.

Vicious circularity doesn’t get any tighter than this.

James Barrat And The Gospel Of Judas

I saw James Barrat, the producer of the recent National Geographic Channel program on the Gospel of Judas, on John Kasich's "Heartland" last Saturday on the FOX News Channel. A video clip of that segment is now available on the "Heartland" web site. (It's under the title "Jesus Asked for Betrayal?".) I recommend watching it. John Kasich didn't do well in responding to Barrat, nor did the other guest on the program, but Barrat's behavior gives us an indication of where the media, and National Geographic specifically, are coming from on this issue. Barrat claims that there's a scholarly consensus that none of the four gospels were written by the people they've traditionally been attributed to, and he suggests that the Gospel of Judas was a significant candidate for inclusion in the canon.

Strange Baptist Fire: Coming Soon!

We have a new blog coming soon: “Strange Baptist Fire.” Basically, the purpose of this blog is to have an official response to the material that the anonymous folks at BaptistFire are putting up on their site, with a desire to present truth to “fence-sitting” Southern Baptists that might frequent BaptistFire. I will be posting on this site, joining some of your favorite bloggers like Gene Bridges, Nathan White, Timmy Brister, Dustin Segars, and possibly some others! Keep your eyes open for more details!

Evan May.

Etymology tells the story

Here are some more gems that I’ve been able to glean from Ms Murdock’s (aka Archarya S.) popular article.

“It should be noted that a common earlier English spelling of Krishna was "Christna," which reveals its relation to '"Christ."

http://www.truthbeknown.com/origins4.htm

i)What does a variant English spelling have to do with a Sanskrit name?

ii)And even if they were cognates, how does that establish a genealogical relation between the concept of Krishna and the concept of Christ?

I mean, I suppose you could also say that an English sports car is “related” to a South American feline, since they share the same name (“Jaguar”), but the prospects of a successful paternity suit are decidedly slim.

iii)“Christos” is simply a Septuagintal loanword for the Lord’s Anointed (Heb.=mashiach).

Continuing:

“Indeed, according to Hotema, the very name "Christ" comes from the Hindi word "Kris" (as in Krishna), which is a name for the sun.75

Furthermore, since Horus was called "Iusa/Iao/Iesu"76 the "KRST," and Krishna/Christna was called "Jezeus," centuries before any Jewish character similarly named, it would be safe to assume that Jesus Christ is just a repeat of Horus and Krishna, among the rest.”

http://www.truthbeknown.com/origins5.htm

Except for the irritating little fact that “Iesous” is simply a Greek transliteration for Joshua.

Moving along:

“Massey has stated that Revelation, rather than having been written by any apostle called John during the 1st Century C.E., is a very ancient text that dates to the beginning of this era of history, i.e. possibly as early as 4,000 years ago.86 Massey asserts that Revelation relates the Mithraic legend of Zarathustra/Zoroaster.87”

http://www.truthbeknown.com/origins6.htm

Fascinating to think that a book authored in the age of cuneiform would be written in Koine Greek.

No less fascinating to think a book written in 2000 BC would contain a set of letters addressed to seven 1C churches in Asia Minor.

Equally fascinating that such a book would anticipate the much later mythology of Zoroastrianism and Mithraism.

If nothing else, Ms Murdock and her fellow Debunkers should be commended for their faith in predictive prophecy.

For a more detailed evaluation of Ms Murdock’s scholarship, see Mike Licona’s review of her book on The Christ Conspiracy.

http://www.answeringinfidels.com/content/view/34/49/

http://www.answeringinfidels.com/content/view/37/49/