Thursday, January 19, 2006

Invidious comparisons

***QUOTE***

I am so incredibly tired of Protestant/Catholic debates. Who cares about Protestantism? Of those Protestant denominations who actually have some idea what the Reformation was about (what they think it was about) and still believe in it, they are tiny. Last I heard the OPC for example split yet again, from a vast multitude of 22,000 worldwide to 20,000. The believing reformation bodies are miniscule. The vast hordes of evangelicals, pentacostals, baptists and other assorted monstantists and manicheans are rapidly mutating into some other religion, either by pure quackadoxy or some new “movement” to “challenge” Christians yet again. The liberal denominations will probably be extinct by the end of this next century and they are pretty much just empty shells at this point. They are just as fad driven, moralistic and vaporous as their conservative counterparts.

So I say, who the hell cares about Protestantism? Why should we care about it? Sure, its loud and pervasive, but it is but a wiff of cloud. Bump it and it breaks.

Quite true, Orthodoxy doesn’t dominate the American religion scene, but neither do reformation bodies and thats the point. They did and they no longer do. While Orthodoxy has maintained ist ecclesial inegrity and identity, Protestantism while being dominant hasn’t. Princeton? Harvard? Yale? Where are the Protestant schools now? As a Christian, Catholic or not, I’d be spiritually be better off going to Notre Dame than any of those places. And Orthodoxy has a much deeper, older, richer and more stable theological and spiritual tradition than Protestantism. Protestantism had all the breaks and it is now all broken.

Orthodoxy is growing quite well in the US, among other places. More of our candidates for the priesthood now are converts than cradle. And about 1/3 of our membership are converts and growing. Sure Pentacostals gain lots of converts through the front door, but the OPC, PCA or LCMS aren’t bringing them in by the truckload. Pentacostals and other quackadox don’t count when we are talking about the Protestant estbalishment in the US.

I can easily agree also that average Orthodox aren’t as well informed as they should be (the same is true for most Protestants, classical or no who are professing Pelagians and Sabellians), particularly in the more ethnic nether regions, but the Orthodox Church as a body and as an institution isn’t floundering and constantly being redefined as Protestantism is. There simply isn’t a Protestant establishment in the English speaking world to worry about any more. There are pockets of resistence and thats about it.

As to the length of time and influence, it depends on what one means by “Protestant.” If you include Calvary Chapel and other homegrown megachurches I agree. But not longer than the presbyterians, baptists, methodists and lutherans-they are finished as insitutitions by and large. They used to own the cultural and theological lexicon but no longer. The other evangelical type homegrown bodies simply aren’t institutional and don’t have the theology to become so. Manicheanism and Montanaism don’t lend themselves to culture building.

Orthodoxy has had unique challenges. Political and military conflicts in the west over religion or that impacted religion directly were over and hence never seriously affected Protestantism in the US. Orthodoxy was for a long time the province of the Russians on the northern west coast for a very long time. For all kinds of interesting political and economic reasons when the support from that polis diminished and later outright collapsed, so did the mission. Moreover, Orthodoxy accomodated itself to the language of various cultures of the pacific northwest very well but didn’t do so with the English language at the time. That has been changing for the last 20-30 years. The institutional hegemony that Protestantism held in the US and the enculturated Protestant bias certainly didn’t help matters. And there is that little incident of supressing and exterminating Orthodox Christians by the Communists in Russia and Eastern countries from which many Orthodox communities are now emerging. I dare say, it isn’t obvious to me that give these kinds of challenges that Protestantism would have done any better.

http://catholica.pontifications.net/?p=1333#comments

***END-QUOTE***

Such is Perry Robinson’s indictment of Protestantism in general, and Calvinism in particular. By way of reply:

1.Perry’s disdain for independent churches, parachurch ministry, “homegrown bodies” and the like is simply the reflex reaction of his ecclesiastical pride and prejudice.

The NT church was a loosely aligned affiliation of house-churches, with minimal government.

Why, I’ve even read about a 1C religious sect which consisted of 120 members total. The combined membership could be squeezed into one room (Acts 1:12-15). It was miniscule compared to the state religion or Judaism.

2.Traditionally, Catholicism and Orthodoxy rack up big numbers because they have national churches that practice infant baptism. So you’re really counting national populations. That adds up in a hurry. It also says nothing about the piety of the populace.

3.It’s true that Calvinism no longer wields the cultural clout it once did before the 20C. That’s not an internal weakness of Calvinism. Rather, that’s due to mass immigration from Catholic countries, which diluted the religious balance of power.

4.What about the state of Orthodoxy in, say, modern-day Greece?

5.Again, you can blame the state of Russian Orthodoxy on the commies, but that fails to explain why the pre-revolutionary church was so weak that it could pose no effective resistance to the communist takeover and its aftermath in the first place.

6.Perry can wax as rhapsodic as he likes about the “ecclesial inegrity and identity” of the Orthodox church as well as “a much deeper, older, richer and more stable theological and spiritual tradition than Protestantism.”

But what strikes me is the total lack of church discipline. The SBC went out of its way to distance itself from Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. When Joe Lieberman ran as Al Gore’s Veep, he was excommunicated by several orthodox rabbis for his liberal social policies.

Now, in this country we’ve had such high profile Orthodox American political players as Michael Dukakis, Arianna Huffington, George Stephanopolous, and the late Paul Tsongas. All of them are aggressive social l liberals.

Where is the Greek Orthodox Church of American in all of this? Why the resounding silence? I’ll choose moral integrity over ecclesial integrity any day of the week.

7.I never knew that clouds were breakable. Or do Protestant clouds have a different chemical composition than Orthodox clouds?

"No Other Gods" Conference - July 21-22

Most of the plenary and workshop descriptions for the "No Other Gods"
conference http://www.rctr.org/conference.htm have been posted online
here http://www.rctr.org/descriptions.htm.

Jeff Downs
Resource Inex/Blog, http://www.rctr.org

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Cyber-sermons

Religious following for cyber sermons

Thursday, December 29, 2005; Posted: 2:54 p.m. EST (19:54 GMT)

SAN DIEGO, California (CNN) -- Even the faithful miss church occasionally, but these days they do not have to miss the sermon -- they can download it to their play lists.

Cyber sermons are catching on with a religious audience who are on the run, torn between worship and work.

Evangelical Christian and software designer Craig Patchett, from San Diego, California, started "Godcasting" for digital disciples about a year ago when he set up The GodCast Network (TGN).

"There's a call out there to spread that information -- podcasting is one of the easiest ways to do it," he told CNN.

Podcasts are essentially talk radio for your digital audio player, available on the Web for download, and cover content from politics to comedy to children's stories.

Religion appears to be the fastest growing segment of the podcast community, and Patchett believes this is based on word of mouth.

"As Christians, we are called to take what we have -- the information we have about our religion -- and share it with others, so there's a call out there to spread that information. Podcasting is one of the easiest ways to do it," he said.

Patchett's pastor, Bob Botsford, says fears that technology may replace Sundays at church, miss the point.

"Jesus never said, 'Go unto the world and build big churches.' He just said, 'Go share the good news.' And this is just another way to do that."

Godcast listener Ian McCallum told CNN that listening to sermons on his MP3 player allowed him to stay in touch with his faith, even when he is on the road.

"I travel a lot and frequently have to leave on Sundays, and so I don't get to hear the sermon, to stay connected with the church."

A largely grassroots effort taking off in a short time, podcasting was an arcane term only last year, the domain of a few techies.

Now, companies like Yahoo! are trying to profit from the phenomenon with the development earlier this year of Yahoo! Podcasts.

"We're really excited about it and we think it's going to grow in all kinds of different ways, video all kinds of new devices a really bright future," Yahoo's! Joe Hayashi said.

Spiritual listings on the Web site Podcastalley.com have nearly tripled since July to about 500 cyber sermons.

Just about every faith is represented. Pope Benedict XVI began recording podcasts in August.

Now, terms like "Godcasting," "iGod," and "pod preachers" are circulating on the Internet, in a case of religion embracing technology -- that fits in a pocket.

n CNN's Maggie Lake contributed to this story

http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/12/27/spark.godcasting/index.html

Let's Be Honest

It has become pretty evident that Paul McCain does not possess the ability to 1) understand what he reads, 2) retain what he reads, and 3) represent fairly what he reads. Furthermore, his lack of ability to receive the slightest amount of criticism on his own blog without deleting it shows that he is not to be taken seriously. We have one particular example, where McCain chose to further his efforts of ad hominem attacks upon James White. When a few commenters criticize him for posting such empty rhetoric, he simply deletes their comments. “Double standard” is the word that should be used, for he keeps those comments that are far more lacking than those which he deleted. The only difference is that the ones which are kept are in his favor. So when your tactic in debate is to plug your ears and chant, “Nanny, Nanny, Boo-Boo; I can’t hear you,” it is quite evident that truth is not one of your main objectives. Having this perspective, let’s look at something McCain has posted recently. Steve Hays has already commented about the first half, but since this quote was about me in particular I would like to respond to it in full:

I’m enjoying my ongoing/running debates with Calvinist bloggers. They’ve illustrated classic Calvinist errors in Christology quite well. I had a conversation about Christ’s post-Resurrection appearances. A Calvinist has tried to argue these were in fact Theophanies. They really just have no use for the Personal Union, and can’t deal with the human nature of Christ after his death. Here is how one Calvinist explains the “appearance” of Jesus among his disciples on that first Easter…one possibility? Why, Jesus had a key to the room! So desperate are they to avoid the possibility that the human nature of Christ has communicated attributes from the divine nature they really seriously suggest such a thing. It would be rather funny, were it not such serious Christological error.

The amount of assertions in this one paragraph is simply amazing. Before I respond to the thing as I whole, I’d like us to stand back and count.

1. They’ve illustrated classic Calvinist errors in Christology quite well. No matter how many times McCain makes this assertion, it doesn’t justify itself. What error? Why? McCain has yet, in his many times asserting this argument ad nauseam to 1) give a definition of the particular error, and 2) show that Calvinism affirms such an error. McCain’s method of a “response” is to quote a piece of a post and then stand back and say something like, “See! They illustrate classic errors!” and then that is it. Assertions do not justify themselves, Mr. McCain.

2. A Calvinist has tried to argue these were in fact Theophanies. No where was such a thing argued. Rather, what was argued was that McCain’s usage of these examples did not prove his position. Retention is the key, Mr. McCain.

3. They really just have no use for the Personal Union, and can’t deal with the human nature of Christ after his death. How so?

4. Why, Jesus had a key to the room! So desperate are they to avoid the possibility that the human nature of Christ has communicated attributes from the divine nature they really seriously suggest such a thing. What’s wrong, exegetically, with suggesting such a thing? Better yet, justify your particular assertions about the passage. In addition, justify your assumption that a communication of attributes leads to a divination of the human nature, to the extent that it can be either illocal or omnipresent.

5. It would be rather funny, were it not such serious Christological error. How is this a Christological error? Define the error and show that it indeed represents our position.

Now that we have noted the assumptions and assertions that McCain has yet to justify, we can respond to his comment as a whole. First of all, McCain has not even attempted to make an exegetical case for his position. He simply alludes to these appearances, but he doesn’t even give us a Scriptural reference! Furthermore, he gives these examples and assumes that the reader agrees that they naturally lead to his position, but he fails to make such a connection.

In any case, it is obvious that McCain completely missed the point of my last response to him. That, or he read it while wearing his normal “Nanny, Nanny, Boo-B00; I can’t hear you” blinders. Let’s read my statement in context:

The term appear in these texts (e.g. Mark 16:9) does not necessitate that Jesus was, before the appearance, invisible, and it especially does not necessitate that his human nature was either illocal or omnipresent. Consider the possibilities. For instance, there is the example of Jesus meeting with the disciples behind a locked door: “Eight days later, his disciples were inside again, and Thomas was with them. Although the doors were locked, Jesus came and stood among them and said, ‘Peace be with you.’” (John 20:26). But let’s not put things into the text that can’t be derived from the text. Jesus could have simply opened the door after performing a miracle that caused the door to be unlocked. Or he could have created a key. There are many possibilities. But let’s assume that Jesus actually “appeared” before them, in the sense that he was once invisible and then visible. Does this argue for an illocal or omnipresent human nature? Could not Jesus have simply caused their eyes to not be able to see him, and then “opened their eyes”? To make the silent argument that Mr. McCain makes from these appearances simply exceeds the actual texts.

Suffice to say, I did not assert that Jesus “had a key.” My point was that for me to assert such a thing would be equally plausible, and there is no difference than my asserting such a thing and the assumptions that McCain is eisegeting into this passage. McCain has not offered the slightest exegesis concerning the matter, and if he chooses to continue to make assertions based upon these texts, I could just as easily (using the same standard) respond with, “Jesus had a key.”

But where McCain takes this is hilarious. He states, “It would be rather funny, were it not such serious Christological error.” But what is so wrong with saying that Jesus had a key? How is this a Christological error? If I stated that Jesus ate turkey sandwiches, would this be a Christological error? If I stated that Jesus didn’t particularly like chocolate, would this be a Christological error? Obviously, the fact that Jesus would have a key would destroy McCain’s wishful thinking concerning these examples. And to him, it would be a Christological error. To us, it would simply be another person’s assumptions being labeled as unjustified. Let’s be honest.

Evan May.

Acts 13:48 Flibbertigibbeted

***QUOTE***

Acts 13:48 Revisited

As a Calvinist [insert laugh-track here], one of the prooftexts I have come to rely upon to support my position has been Acts 13:48: “Now when the Gentiles heard, they rejoiced and glorified the word of the Lord, and such as were appointed to eternal life believed.” I no longer think this verse really supports a distinctively Calvinistic soteriology, and now believe that it can fit most any orthodox soteriology (Calvinist, Arminian, or Roman Catholic).

http://www.communiosanctorum.com/?p=135


***END-QUOTE***

What a surprise! Another Reformed prooftext bites the dust as Paul [insert heresy of choice] Owen thinks it can fit most any “orthodox” soteriology.

This, keep in mind, is a man who believes that Muslims worship the true God.

Reading comprehension

***QUOTE***

I'm enjoying my ongoing/running debates with Calvinist bloggers. They've illustrated classic Calvinist errors in Christology quite well. I had a conversation about Christ's post-Resurrection appearances. A Calvinist has tried to argue these were in fact Theophanies. They really just have no use for the Personal Union, and can't deal with the human nature of Christ after his death.

http://cyberbrethren.typepad.com/cyberbrethren/

***END-QUOTE***

Paul McCain has a problem with reading comprehension. The problem is not that he’s trying to misrepresent my position. The problem is that he lacks critical detachment. He can’t see around his own position long enough to see any other position for what it is. His own precommitments create a mental block to grasping any viewpoint other than his own.

I never said the Easter appearances were theophanies. I was giving a specific answer to a specific question. What I said was that, with respect to our Lord’s ability to appear or disappear at will, this phenomenon was analogous to OT theophanies.

Not only did I say this, but I gave several exegetical arguments in support of my contention.

McCain manages to distort what I actually said as well as disregard the supporting evidence.

Creepy stuff!

***QUOTE***

Comments:
Ah, yes, the wonderfully reassuring Calvinist doctrine of God choosing some He created to roast in hell.

Ok, kids, now get out your decoder rings, we are going to read the Bible Calvinist style! Ready....here we go.

"All" ... dial in the code and you will see that really that word is "some"

"World" ... dial in that code and you will see that word is really "some of the world."

You get the picture.

Creepy stuff indeed.

# posted by ptmccain : 1/17/2006 7:01 PM

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/01/double-predestination.html

***END-QUOTE***

Gene Bridges, in his excellent reply, hasn’t left much for me to say by way of responding to McCain’s latest salvo. So my own rejoinder will be a footnote to his—a mopping-up operation.

1.On a side note, I find it odd that McCain keeps trying to drag me into a fight over Lutheranism. While I have some definite disagreements with Lutheran theology, there's almost nothing I disagree with in Lutheran theology that I don't disagree with in a number of other theological traditions, while Lutheranism has a number of compensatory virtues which are absent from the other theological traditions. Indeed, it even has virtue lacking in the Reformed tradition—an unsurpassed musical legacy. Hence, until McCain came along, I've had next to nothing to say by way of explicit criticism of the Lutheran tradition.

McCain suffers from a deep-seated antipathy towards Calvinism which I just can't reciprocate towards Lutheranism. Indeed, when I was still living in California I used to attend a WELS church for the singing and preaching.

2.It’s striking to see how Mr. McCain simply blew past all the verses I cited in support of double predestination.

Now, I’ll grant you that citing a concatenation of prooftexts is not the same thing as proving your point. It’s not a substitute for exegesis. But Lutheranism needs to do something with all these passages as well.

Calvinism didn’t invent the doctrine of election whole cloth. And Calvinism didn’t invent the doctrine of reprobation whole cloth. This is not the implication of a belief-system. Rather, Calvinism taking its cue from the witness of Scripture.

3.It’s always funny to see so many critics of Calvinism appeal to the passages of Scripture which seem to speak of the atonement in cosmic or universal terms.

Our critics act as if they held the patent on these particular verses of Scripture. But if we were to interpret words like “world” and “all” the way McCain chooses to do, then the only theological tradition which could monopolize on these passages of Scripture is universalism.

And this is not just a hypothetical position. In our own time, writers like Thomas Talbott, Marilyn McCord Adams, and Jan Boda have penned book-length defenses of universalism.

4. Regarding the “universal” (“every,” “all”) passages, McCain doesn’t know the function of a universal quantifier. He doesn’t know the difference between sense and referent. If he’d doing any serious reading in Biblical semantics he’d know this.

5. Regarding the “cosmic” (“world) passages, McCain is like an old-time fundamentalist who assumes that a word has the same meaning for a contemporary reader that it had for the original author. As Vern Poythress put it:

“’Plain interpretation,’ let us say, is interpretation of a text by interpreters against the context of the interpreters’ tacit knowledge or their own worldview and historical situation. It minimizes the role of the original historical and cultural context. Grammatical-historical interpretation differs from plain interpretation precisely over the question of the primary historical and cultural context for interpretation. Plain interpretation reads everything as if it were written directly to oneself, in one’s own time and culture,” Understanding Dispensationalists (Zondervan 1987). I’d add that more astute fundamentalists are correcting for this mistake.

Now, when, as 21C reader, you come across a word like the “world,” what comes to mind? Doesn’t it conjure up a mental image of the globe, as seen from outer space by Apollo 11? Doesn’t it trigger a mental map of glowing cities and swarming multitudes scattered all across the face of the earth?

When we, as modern readers, come across this word, we bring a tacit geography to bear on the meaning. We prejudge the meaning based on our own experience and usage.

But to assume that this must be what John or Paul intended courts a gross anachronism.

If McCain were to spend a little time with the standard Greek lexicons and dictionaries (e.g., BAG, DNTT, EDNT, TLNT), he’d see that his assumption is quite unscholarly and simplistic.

Let’s take some concrete examples. In the most recent major commentary on John, this is how Andrew Lincoln interprets Jn 3:16:

“Some argue that the term ‘world’ here simply has neutral connotations—the created human world. But the characteristic use of “the world” (ho kosmos) elsewhere in the narrative is with negative overtones—the world in its alienation from and hostility to its creator’s purposes. It makes better sense in a soteriological context to see the latter notion as in view. God loves that which has become hostile to God. The force is not, then, that the world is so vast that it takes a great deal of love to embrace it, but rather that the world has become so alienated from God that it takes an exceedingly great kind of love to love it at all,” The Gospel According to St. John (Henrickson 2005), 154.

In other words, Jn 3:16 defines the love of God, not by the number of the people whom God loves, but by the kind of people whom God loves.

And if McCain were to consult a concordance of Johannine usage, he could see for himself that this is, in fact, characteristic of Johannine usage.

Or let’s consider the universal language of the Pastoral Epistles. This is how one scholar, in a standard commentary on the Pastorals, broaches the question. He begins with a discussion of the "Ephesian heresy”:

“Paul explicitly calls the teaching ‘Jewish’ (Titus 1:14) and speaks of ‘those of the circumcision” (Titus 1:10). The opponents want to be known as teachers of the law (1 Tim 1:7), and to apply its restrictive function to all people for both salvation and lifestyle…Repeatedly Paul calls the teaching ‘myths’ (1 Tim 1:4; 2 Tim 4:4; Titus 1:14). ‘Myths and genealogies’ (1 Tim 1:4; Titus 3:9) are probably haggadic Midrash: allegorical reinterpretations of the OT, perhaps as fanciful interpretations of the OT genealogies…along the order of those found in Jubilees and Pseudo-Philo Biblical Antiquities…The heresy appears to be sectarian and exclusive, or anti-Gentile (1 Tim 2:1-7), warranting Paul’s emphasis on the universal offer of salvation to all people (1 Tim 2:6; 4:10; cf. 1:15), including Gentiles (1 Tim 2:7),” W. Mounce, Pastoral Epistles (T. Nelson, 2000), lxix-lxx.

Regarding 1 Tim 2:5 in particular, he then says:

“The only other place Paul speaks about a mediator is in Gal 3:19, where he identifies Moses as the mediator of the OT law…It is also possible that here Paul is contrasting Christ’s mediatorial work for all people with the Jewish concept of Moses as mediator for Jews along,” ibid. 88.

On this interpretation, Paul’s point in 1 Tim 2:5 is that Christ is the only mediator for Jews and Gentiles alike.

Another scholar approaches the same question from the same point of departure, but arrives at a somewhat different interpretation:

“Much remains uncertain about the false teachers in 1 Timothy since Paul dismisses their teaching instead of refuting it. It may be that they were consumed with genealogies because they restricted salvation along certain ethnic lines (1 Tim 1:4)…When Paul says that God desires all to be saved (1 Tim 2:4) and that Christ was the random for all (1 Tim 2:6), he may be responding to some who excluded Gentiles from salvation for genealogical reasons,” T. Schreiner, “Paul: Apostle of God’s Glory in Christ (IVP 2001), 184-85.

“Tit 2:11 should be interpreted along similar lines…Paul counters Jewish teachers (Tit 12:10,14-15; 3:9) who construct genealogies to exclude some from salvation,” ibid. 185.

“Some object to the interpretation proposed here, arguing that ‘all’ must include all people without exception. Good reasons exist, however, to think that ‘all’ or ‘world’ must be interpreted carefully. For instance, the hymnic statement in 1 Tim 3:16 says that Christ ‘was believed by the world.” The word kosmos here cannot mean that every person without exception has trusted in Jesus Christ, for it was obvious to Paul that many in the world disbelieved. Paul almost certainly means that the whole world, comprising both Jews and Gentiles, believes. In other words, ‘world’ here denotes all without distinction and not all without exception,” ibid. 185-86.

“Such an interpretation is also a sensible reading of 2 Cor 5:14-15…The ‘all’ for whom Christ died are not all without exception but all without distinction, including both Jews and Gentiles. Such an interpretation would explain how ‘all died’ when Christ died for them…2 Cor 5:15 seems to support this view as well: ‘he died for all so that those living should no longer live for themselves but for the one who died and has been raised for them.’ When Paul uses the phrase ‘those living (hoi zontes)…[it] refers to those who are spiritually alive. Those who are spiritually alive are the ‘all’ for whom Christ died in 2 Cor 5:14. In dying to the power of sin in Christ, they also came to life in Christ,” 186.

Schreiner’s entire excursus is well worth reading.

Both Schreiner and Mounce begin by trying to isolate and identify the Ephesian heresy. In order to know what Paul is affirming, you need to know what Paul is opposing.

In addition to this general consideration, Schreiner and Mounce both construe the text before them on the basis of specific contextual delimiters.

This, Mr. McCain, is how to do exegesis. In a sense, you do have to decode the text of Scripture. You cannot simply use your own cultural code. Rather, you need to dial in the cultural code of the original author, audience, and opponent.

That’s what the grammatico-historical method is all about. McCain defends his own position by resorting to obscurantism. But although the Bible was written for us, it wasn’t written to us. So one must make some elementary effort to bridge the gap between now and then. It means what it meant.

Hyper-Calvinism redux

***QUOTE***

Comments:
[From the editors of the book from which the Zwingli passage quoted in the post is taken:]

"The real point is that Zwingli could make the assertion because it was congruent with his whole conception of the divine sovereignty and the election of grace. The redemptive purpose and activity of God was not limited by the chronology or the geography of the incarnation and the atonement. The decree of election upon which all salvation depends was a decree from all eternity, enclosing men of all generations within its embrace. Chronologically the patriarchs and pious Israelites preceded the coming of the Saviour, but this did not prevent their salvation by anticipatory faith. Similarly the pious heathen might well be the recipients of divine grace and redemption even though they remained outside the temporal reach of the Gospel. They were not saved because of their piety, but because of the eternal activity of God in election and atonement. The temporality of the Redeemer's life and death did not set any limit to the possibilities of God's eternal grace. In outward form, no doubt, the assertion was determined by Zwingli's humanistic predilections, but its theological foundation was uncompromisingly Reformed."

Zwingli and Bullinger (Library of Christian Classics) by G. W. Bromiley

# posted by K7 : 1/17/2006 1:43 PM

Um, so does that mean Zwingli believed what Paul Owen does??

# posted by Hello : 1/17/2006 4:21 PM

I posted the above comment perhaps looking for some of the patented sorting-out and getting at the underlying matter and showing just where Zwingli is out of biblical bounds, if he is in the passage quoted by Owen...that Hays is known for being able to do...

I suspect there may be a difference between pre-Incarnation requirements regarding salvation and post-Incarcanation, but that may be a wrong thing to say, in many ways.

Also, I suspect there may be room for debate in the area of Hays' position that God is making a statement regarding people's non-election when He puts them in times and places where they can't hear of Jesus Christ and the position that God's decree of election is not constrained by such temporal and physical limitations (etc., etc.)

Owen probably would like to lasso Zwingli into the view that people who deny Jesus is God come in the flesh can still be saved (Muslims, Jews, for instance), and I think obviously Herr Zwingli is not saying that in that passage.

But I'll gladly step aside and let the Triablogue crew sort it out.

# posted by K7 : 1/17/2006 6:02 PM

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/01/by-jove.html

***END-QUOTE***

Thanks for putting Zwingli in context. K7 has pretty much answered his own question, but I’ll flesh out the answer.

Zwingli is falling into the trap of Hyper-Calvinism. It’s a cardinal error to set time and eternity in a state of opposition, as if all that matters is the eternal decree and its predestined end irrespective of its historical means.

The eternal decree is the fountainhead of history. Providence is the mirror image of predestination.

The content of saving faith varies with one’s position in redemptive history. Revelation supplies the object of faith, but revelation is progressive. OT saints put their faith in the Christ of promise—the Christ of type and prophecy, the Christ who was to come, whereas we, who live on the other side of the cross, on the sunny side rather than the shadow, must put our faith in the Christ of fulfillment, the Christ who has come, for to whom much is given, much is required.

Bracketing the special case of infants and mental incompetents, election and regeneration are not enough. Faith requires an object. The grace of God is coordinated with the means of grace—the Gospel (Rom 10:5-18).

This is not a personal criticism of Zwingli. He was, like all of us, a child of his time. He flattened out the progressively of revelation and redemption.

One of the achievements of covenant theology was to recover the importance of time and place. Chronology and geography are the fingerprints of eternity, as God imprints his invisible decree upon the paper and ink of time and space.

But, unlike Zwingli, Paul-the Hyper-Calvinist-Owen is without excuse.

Hey, Bubba, are you saved?

Al Kimel has started a thread on the assurance of salvation, using the exchange between Antonio Rosa, on the one hand, and Evan May as well as yours truly, on the other hand, as his point of departure.

This has triggered a lot of activity in the combox. Not surprisingly, Antonio has posted some comments.

Here I think we need to set the record straight. For some time now, Antonio has been spoiling for a fight with Reformed bloggers. He’s been spamming Reformed weblogs all over the place, trying to bait the Calvinist contingent into a fight over his antinomian alternative.

Given that he’s so eager to pick a fight with us, it’s very revealing to observe that as soon as Evan and I rose to the challenge, Antonio fled the ring faster than a cat with its tail on fire. Evan and I had only to land the first counterpunch before Antonio immediately disengaged any direct interaction with our counterarguments. Now he’s reduced to rear-guard bragging and sniping as he takes refuge in a safe, third-party venue to cloak his unceremonious defeat in the rhetoric of victory.

Perry Robinson has also posted a number of comments.

***QUOTE***

Perry Robinson Says:
January 17th, 2006 at 7:34 pm

On Assurance

Why is confidence the essential mark of faith in the first place? Why not loyalty for example? And even if we were to read Luther as saying that we need to trust Christ and his word, how does that not simply move the problem for assurance rather than solve it? Now I need to be assured that it is Christ speaking.

Why do we even require the kind of absolute psychological certainty that classical Protestantism seemed to be aiming for? It is because we don’t believe tha the voice in confession is really speaking for God because the church is just human. The irony is that Protestantism treated the Bible in the same way and now struggles with the same problem-is this really God speaking in these pages? They just relocated the problem.

While this is ancedotal, every single person that I have known that professed an absolute assurance of salvation fell into gross immorality, gross and explicit heresy or flat out disbelief. I am not sure why Christians need the kind of assurance that either the Lordship/non-Lordship Protestants are bickering about.

Certaintly (PUN!) talking about self authenticating experiences is useless since we can think we have the testimony of the Spirit and not actually have it. We then need a way to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic assurance which undermines the entire reason for appealing to self authenticating experiences in the first place.

The irony of Protestantism concerning assurance is that once you sever everything publically accessible from being united with the divine and turn it into a contingent tool, it becomes impossible to derive the kind of assurance that the Protestant conscience requires and subjectivism is the natural, if not logical consequence. The problem is ultimately Christological. (Like I haven’t said that before.)

http://catholica.pontifications.net/?p=1333#comments

***END-QUOTE***

These comments raise some serious issues which deserve serious attention.

1.As Robinson knows, the classic Protestant position was framed in reference to the conflict with Rome. Rome anathematizes the assurance of salvation, barring private revelation. The very nature of Catholic soteriology renders the assurance of salvation impossible. It was to this that Luther and Calvin were reacting.

2.When, to take one example, the Westminster Confession appeals to the promises of the Gospel, the inner work of grace, and the witness of the Spirit (WCF 18:2), it isn’t making this stuff up, as a polemical ploy to counter the opposing claims of Rome. This really is in Scripture.

3.What we have in Scripture is a conditional assurance, contingent upon conditional promises. It is necessary to do equal justice to both the conditional and the promissory character of assurance. Catholicism errs by accentuating the conditional aspect at the expense of the promissory aspect, while antinomianism errs by accentuating the promissory aspect at the expense of the conditional aspect. But a Scriptural doctrine of assurance must do equal justice to both the promiser (God) and the promisee (the believer).

4.Relocating the original problem is not always a false move. Let’s take an illustration. For centuries, the church of Rome used the Vulgate as its source of exegetical theology.

Now, when you switch from the Vulgate to the Greek and Hebrew, there is a sense in which you simply relocate the problem. There are text-critical uncertainties regarding our Greek and Hebrew MSS, just as there are text-critical uncertainties regarding the Vulgate. There are semantic ambiguities regarding the Greek and Hebrew, just as there are semantic ambiguities regarding the Latin. So there’s a systematic parallel between the uncertainties attaching to the exegesis of the Vulgate, and the exegesis of the original Greek and Hebrew.

Does it follow that a Protestant exegete is in the same sinking boat as a traditional Catholic commentator? Not at all.

You may be asking the same questions in each case, and the same uncertainties may attach to your answers, but asking the right questions of the wrong source makes a world of difference.

In the case of the Vulgate, this is a translation of the original. Hence, many uncertainties are the artifice of a translation, of a Latin text, of Jerome’s own usage—uncertainties that do not answer to the Greek and Hebrew. It makes no small difference to ask the right questions of the right source.

What is worse—there are two ways to go wrong with the Vulgate. For even when you get it right, you may still be wrong inasmuch as there may well be nothing in the Greek and Hebrew to back up the Latin. In this event, to be certain is to be certainly wrong.

Likewise, when it comes to the rules of interpretation, the traditional Catholic commentator endeavored to construe the text consistent with the unanimous consensus of the church Fathers, whereas a Protestant exegete employs the grammatico-historical method.

Does the grammatico-historical method solve all our problems? Does it clear up every ambiguity in the original text? Obviously not.

But, again, there’s a world of difference between asking the right questions, and asking the wrong questions—between applying a sound standard, and applying an unsound standard.

A correct standard doesn’t guarantee a correct application of the standard; hence, it doesn’t guarantee a correct result; however, to apply an incorrect standard pretty well guarantees an incorrect result.

5.Having a map of New York City doesn’t ensure that I can’t lose my way, but using a map of Cincinnati to find my way around New York City is a sure way to lose my way and to stay utterly lost.

Are there some circumstantial, person-variable complexities that arise when we try to relate the promises of salvation to the conditions of salvation? Yes, but at least we’re asking the right questions of the right source.

If we can’t give a uniform answer, that’s because the question of assurance is an inherently individual question which varies from one individual to the next. The driver can still make a wrong turn. But it makes no small difference whether he’s using the right roadmap or the wrong roadmap. There’s a difference between making a wrong turn in spite of having the right roadmap, for having the right roadmap enables you to detect and correct your mistake; and making a wrong turn because you were following the wrong roadmap.

Tuesday, January 17, 2006

For Paul McCain-The Extensional Fallacy

Dr. Paul McCain continues to allow his emotions to skew his exegesis of Scripture.

He writes in Double Presdestination:


Ah, yes, the wonderfully reassuring Calvinist doctrine of God choosing some He
created to roast in hell.

Ok, kids, now get out your decoder rings, we
are going to read the Bible Calvinist style! Ready....here we go.

"All"
... dial in the code and you will see that really that word is "some"

"World" ... dial in that code and you will see that word is really "some
of the world."

You get the picture.

A. First, the sad truth for Dr. McCain is that the Bible itself discusses this issue:

Proverbs 16:4: The Lord has created everything with its own purpose, even the wicked for the day of evil.

Then there's Jude 4: "For certain men have crept in unnoticed, those who were long beforehand marked out for this condemnation, ungodly men who turn the grace of God into licentiousness and deny our Master and Lord Jesus Christ.

By the way, just like our Arminian friends, Dr. McCain still must answer his own objection. It is undeniable God chooses some to "roast in hell." If He did not choose some for that purpose, then every person would hear the gospel and be saved. Men would not be born in lands completely cut off from the gospel. In fact, even if this argument from outrage he and the Arminians offer is correct, then we are still left with a God who creates people knowing full well they will reject the gospel or not ever have any hope of hearing it. Why does He do this if He loves everybody redemptively?

Now, he may say that it arbitrary if God creates some to reprobate for His glory, but that would be a non-sequitur. I should think that what is arbitrary has no purpose, so this objection would, in point of fact, supply its own reason.

Besides, Paul declares of Pharaoh, "For this purpose I raised you up."

B. I realize that Dr. McCain says he repudiates Arminianism. However, he's borrowing a page from Arminianism on this issue. How ironic.

C. As to his latter statements, Dr. McCain, one would think, would understand the basic rules of exegesis. On the other hand, maybe not, since the best he's been able to do of late is say "Read the Formula of Concord."

Let's review this basic exegetical fallacy for him one more time.

Over on the right of this blog is an index of articles Steve has archived. I copied his essay "Favorite Fallacies" 1 and 2 awhile back. I encourage Dr. Mccain to review them.

Steve writes: Christians who deny special redemption typically appeal to the “pantos” (“all’) passages of Scripture. But this confuses extension (referent) with intension (sense). A universal quantifier has a standard intension, but a variable extension. That follows from the nature of a quantifier, which is necessarily general and abstract rather than specific and concrete marker in the text. That’s what makes it possible to plug in concrete content. A universal quantifier is a class quantifier. As such, it can have no fixed range of reference. In each case, that must be supplied by the concrete context and specific referent. In other words, a universal quantifier has a definite intension but indefinite extension. So its extension is relative to the level of generality of the reference-class in view. Thus, there is no presumption in favor of taking “all” or “every” as meaning everyone without exception.

Dr. McCain, there is no presumption for taking words like "world" and "all" to mean "all person without exception." “All” or “every” is always relative to all of something. All of what? What world?

Take 1 John 5:18 and 19:

18We know that no one who is born of God sins; but He who was born of God keeps him, and the evil one does not touch him.

19We know that we are of God, and that the whole world lies in the power of the evil one.

So, here we have the whole world being under the power of the evil one, but immediately before this, we have believers excluded. This is the world of unbelievers and the world system, yet it is "the whole world."

Then we have 1 John 2:2: 2and He Himself is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.

Shouldn't we allow John to define what he means by "world" here instead of assuming it means "all persons without exception?" Or should we let our outrage define it for us? Is this the whole world, every person without exception? Is it the known geographical world? Is it the planet? Is it the world system? Is it the world of unbelievers? There are many ways to define the term.

It just so happens we have a linguistic parallel here with John 11:51 - 52:

51Now he did not say this on his own initiative, but being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus was going to die for the nation,

52and not for the nation only, but in order that He might also gather together into one the children of God who are scattered abroad.

Notice:

1 John 2:2

And
He Himself
is the propitiation for
our sins
and not for ours only
but also
for
the world

John 11:51 - 52
he prophesied that
Jesus
would die for
the nation
and not for the nation only
but also
that He would gather together in one
the children of God scattered abroad

Who, then, composes “the whole world” in 1 John 2:2? Answer: “the children of God scattered abroad.” Thus “our” refers to Jewish Christians and “the whole world” to those who are Gentiles scattered abroad or, more broadly, “our” refers to “all believers alive at the time John wrote his epistle,” and “the whole world” could refer to “all believers yet to come.” Either way this is the whole world of believers.

Once more just to be clear: Dr. McCain, there is no presumption for taking words like "world" and "all" to mean "all person without exception." “All” or “every” is always relative to all of something. All of what? What world?

In the end, his argument is simply an argument from outrage. Perhaps one of these days he will decide to present an exegetical argument instead of repeating the Formula of Concord. Otherwise, he simply proves he's a one trick pony. If he wishes to critique Reformed exegesis, he will need to offer his own positive exegetical presentation, not facile, hit-and-run arguments from emotion.




Are Homosexuals Acceptable in Christian Films?

Question: Can someone affirm both of these statements at the same time?

1) Homosexuality is an abomination to God
2) Homosexual [actors] are acceptable in Christian films

"And Then They Are All Mine"

“Unmitigated gall” were the words that Michael Farris, President of Patrick Henry College used to describe a recent article by liberal professor Bill Savage at Northwestern University, entitled, “Lessons Learned: Red States May Be Outbreeding Blue States, but Blue Cities–Particularly Blue College Towns–Can Help Turn the Tide.” The article is a perfect representation of the mentality of so many professors on college campuses, seeking to mold young people with values much different than those with which they were raised. Consequently, college campuses are breeding grounds for future leaders that will undoubtedly oppose certain Christian values. Bill Savage notes that conservatives, statistically, are having more children than liberals. However, this is what he states:

But even if this prediction comes to pass, one other fact remains which makes me sanguine that blue America’s Urban Archipelago can grow larger, more contiguous, and more politically powerful even without my offspring. If we assume that red-state secondary education systems don’t utterly collapse due to under funding caused by Republican anti-tax mania, then colleges and universities will come into play.

The Chrildren of red states will seek a higher education, and that education will very often happen in blue states or blue islands in red states. For the foreseeable future, loyal ditto heads will continue to drop off their children at the dorms. After a teary-eyed hug, Mom and Dad will drive their SUV off toward the nearest gas station, leaving their beloved progeny behind.

And then they are all mine.

Farris noted that the article “is decorated with cartoon illustrations to depict the children of conservatives. Included are: a pair of farm overalls, a baseball cap with the letters WWJD, a Bible, a yellow ribbon with the words, ‘Support our Troops,’ and a slice of red meat—making fun of Christianity, patriotism, and meat eaters. Like so many other professors on college campuses today, Savage intends to use our children’s college experience to change the foundation of moral values we’ve given them. A parent’s beliefs, especially those of conservative Christians, will be usurped by the liberal machine of the American college campus.”—a very sad reality.

Evan May.

By Jove!

Paul-the-papistical-syncretistic-mariolatrous-schismatic-Owen (hereafter Paul P.S.M.S. Owen for short) has sallied forth with yet another “clarification” concering his aforesaid views regarding the salvation of Muslims, Mormons, and pagans:

***QUOTE***

Allow me to clarify a few terms as I understand them, pertaining to a Christian view of other religions:

Pluralism: All religions are equally true, and all lead to God.

Inclusivism: Christianity is uniquely true, though God can still save people who seek Him according to the light they find in other religions.

Exclusivism: Only Christianity is ultimately a true path to eternal life, and the Spirit of God does NOT work with soteric efficacy through the teachings and rituals of any other religion. This does not necessarily mean that God may not choose to save others outside the visible Church however. The secret operation of the Spirit may result in grace being received by others who do not in this life accept the claims of the gospel with cognitive understanding. Though exclusivists hold differing views, some examples could be: those who die in infancy; those who are limited by mental handicaps; other elect persons who never receive an effective witness of the claims of Christ (some would limit this to those who receive no exposure to the Bible and Christianity at all). But if any such persons do receive eternal life, it is not out of God’s consideration of their response to, or through the activity of, the works which distinguish any religion other than Christianity. All other religions are soterically impotent.

http://www.communiosanctorum.com/?p=134

***END-QUOTE***

He doesn’t say which of these represents his own point of view. Having thus defined these three positions, Paul P.S.M.S. Owen proceeds to illustrate his distinctions by an approving quote from Zwingli:

***QUOTE***

With those distinctions in mind, it is interesting to note the following quote from the Swiss Reformer Zwingli:

“The good which we shall enjoy is infinite and the infinite cannot be exhausted, therefore no one can become surfeited with it, for it is ever new and yet the same. Then you may hope to see the whole company and assemblage of all the saints, the wise, the faithful, brave, and good who have lived since the world began. Here you will see the two Adams, the redeemed and the redeemer, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Judah, Moses, Joshua, Gideon, Samuel, Phineas, Elijah, Elisha, Isaiah, and the Virgin Mother of God of whom he prophesied, David, Hezekiah, Josiah, the Baptist, Peter, Paul; here too, Hercules, Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, Antigonus, Numa, Camillus, the Catos and Scipios; here Louis the Pious, and your [King Francis I] predecessors, the Louis, Philips, Pepins, and all your ancestors who have gone hence in faith. In short there has not been a good man and will not be a holy heart or faithful soul from the beginning of the world to the end thereof that you will not see in heaven with God” (Zwingli, “Exposition of the Christian Faith,” chapter X).

***END-QUOTE***

Now, whatever the technical distinction between pluralism, inclusivism, and exclusivism, it becomes clear, as a practical matter, that exclusivism has exactly the same cash value as pluralism and inclusivism where Paul P.S.M.S. Owen is concerned.

So, when I get to heaven, I can expect to see Hercules on a pink cloud. I assume I’ll also see Zeus in heaven since Zeus was the father of Hercules. No doubt, from the oh-so gracious perspective of Paul P.S.M.S. Owen, Zeus is just another name for God the Father.

Also, as long as Perseus made it to heaven, it only seems fair that the Minotaur made it to heaven too. After all, the Minotaur, confined, as he was, to that dark and dingy labyrinth, could well be just another one of the “ elect persons who never receive an effective witness of the claims of Christ.”

But if Perseus, Hercules, and the Minotaur do receive eternal life, it is not out of God’s consideration of their response to, or through the activity of, the works which distinguish any religion other than Christianity. All other religions are soterically impotent.

And so that our Muslim brothers in the Lord are not disappointed by a prudishly Puritan afterlife, I assume that heaven will also be peopled by Bacchus, Venus, Helen of Troy, and the Three Graces.

Double predestination

Double predestination is a synonym for election and reprobation. Both are controversial, but reprobation is more controversial. That’s because reprobation is really the acid test of one’s commitment to election.

Reprobation is simply the flip side of election. There are two lines of evidence for reprobation: direct and indirect:

1.Direct evidence in support of double predestination or reprobation comes from such verses of Scripture as Isa 6:9; Mal 1:2-3; Mt 11:25-26; Lk 2:34; Jn 3:19; 9:39; 12:39-40; Rom 9:11-13,17-22; 11:7; 1 Thes 5:9, 2 Thes 2:11; 1 Pet 2:6-8, and Jude 4.

2.Indirect evidence in support of double predestination or reprobation comes from the fact that reprobation is the logical corollary of election: if everyone will not be saved, and those that are to be saved are saved because God chose to save them, then the lost are damned because God chose not to save them, but rather, to reject them and condemn them.

As Geerhardus Vos puts it: “No more is necessary than to combine the two single truths, that all saving grace, inclusive of faith, is a supernatural gift of God, and that not all men are made recipients of this gift, to perceive immediately that the ultimate reason why some are saved and others passed by can lie in God alone.”

BTW, there’s nothing wrong with drawing inferences from Scripture. Jesus often castigated the religious establishment for failing to ponder the implicit teaching of Scripture. Both Paul and the author of Hebrews draw inferences from OT narrative theology.

In some circles, the phrase “double predestination” is contested. This goes back, in part, to a dispute between Berkouwer and Van Til. Both come out of the Dutch-Reformed tradition. However, Berkouwer, unlike Van Til, defected from Calvinism in mid-career.

There’s a partial asymmetry between election and reprobation. Election is unconditional in the sense that it does not take human merit or demerit into account. By contrast, reprobation has a conditional aspect inasmuch as God condemns sinners. This is not a sufficient condition of reprobation, otherwise everyone would be damned. Hence, reprobation remains a sovereign deed. Nevertheless, demerit is a necessary condition of reprobation. But both election and reprobate are determinate for the fate of the elect and the reprobate.

Separation of church & state?-2

The repetition of this error in the Court's opinion in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948), and, inter alia, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962), does not make it any sounder historically. Finally, in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1567, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963), the Court made the truly remarkable statement that "the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States" (footnote omitted). On the basis of what evidence we have, this statement is demonstrably incorrect as a matter of history.(4) And its repetition in varying forms in succeeding opinions of the Court can give it no more authority than it possesses as a matter of fact; stare decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters of history.

None of the other Members of Congress who spoke during the August 15th debate expressed the slightest indication that they thought the language before them from the Select Committee, or the evil to be aimed at, would require that the Government be absolutely neutral as between religion and irreligion. The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke who concerned, appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another; but it was definitely not concerned about whether the Government might aid all religions evenhandedly. If one were to follow the advice of Justice BRENNAN, concurring in Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 236, 83 S.Ct., at 1578, 10 L.Ed.2d 844, and construe the Amendment in the light of what particular "practices . . . challenged threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent," one would have to say that the First Amendment Establishment Clause should be read no more broadly than to prevent the establishment of a national religion or the governmental preference of one religious sect over another.

The actions of the First Congress, which reenacted the Northwest Ordinance for the governance of the Northwest Territory in 1789, confirm the view that Congress did not mean that the Government should be neutral between religion and irreligion. The House of Representatives took up the Northwest Ordinance on the same day as Madison introduced his proposed amendments which became the Bill of Rights; while at that time the Federal Government was of course not bound by draft amendments to the Constitution which had not yet been proposed by Congress, say nothing of ratified by the States, it seems highly unlikely that the House of Representatives would simultaneously consider proposed amendments to the Constitution and enact an important piece of territorial legislation which conflicted with the intent of those proposals. The Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50, reenacted the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and provided that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Id., at 52, n. (a). Land grants for schools in the Northwest Territory were not limited to public schools. It was not until 1845 that Congress limited land grants in the new States and Territories to nonsectarian schools. 5 Stat. 788; C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment 163 (1964).

On the day after the House of Representatives voted to adopt the form of the First Amendment Religion Clauses which was ultimately proposed and ratified, Representative Elias Boudinot proposed a resolution asking President George Washington to issue a Thanksgiving Day Proclamation. Boudinot said he "could not think of letting the session pass over without offering an opportunity to all the citizens of the United States of joining with one voice, in returning to Almighty God their sincere thanks for the many blessings he had poured down upon them." 1 Annals of Cong. 914 (1789). Representative Aedanas Burke objected to the resolution because he did not like "this mimicking of European customs"; Representative Thomas Tucker objected that whether or not the people had reason to be satisfied with the Constitution was something that the States knew better than the Congress, and in any event "it is a religious matter, and, as such, is proscribed to us." Id., at 915. Representative Sherman supported the resolution "not only as a laudable one in itself, but as warranted by a number of precedents in Holy Writ: for instance, the solemn thanksgivings and rejoicings which took place in the time of Solomon, after the building of the temple, was a case in point. This example, he thought, worthy of Christian imitation on the present occasion. . . ." Ibid.

Boudinot's resolution was carried in the affirmative on September 25, 1789. Boudinot and Sherman, who favored the Thanksgiving Proclamation, voted in favor of the adoption of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the Religion Clauses; Tucker, who opposed the Thanksgiving Proclamation, voted against the adoption of the amendments which became the Bill of Rights.

Within two weeks of this action by the House, George Washington responded to the Joint Resolution which by now had been changed to include the language that the President "recommend to the people of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness." 1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, p. 64 (1897). The Presidential Proclamation was couched in these words:

"Now, therefore, I do recommend and assign Thursday, the 26th day of November next, to be devoted by the people of these States to the service of that great and glorious Being who is the beneficent author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be; that we may then all unite in rendering unto Him our sincere and humble thanks for His kind care and protection of the people of this country previous to their becoming a nation; for the signal and manifold mercies and the favorable interpositions of His providence in the course and conclusion of the late war; for the great degree of tranquillity, union, and plenty which we have since enjoyed; for the peaceable and rational manner in which we have been enabled to establish constitutions of government for our safety and happiness, and particularly the national one now lately instituted; for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed, and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge; and, in general, for all the great and various favors which He has been pleased to confer upon us.

"And also that we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions; to enable us all, whether in public or private stations, to perform our several and relative duties properly and punctually; to render our National Government a blessing to all the people by constantly being a Government of wise, just, and constitutional laws, discreetly and faithfully executed and obeyed; to protect and guide all sovereigns and nations (especially such as have shown kindness to us), and to bless them with good governments, peace, and concord; to promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue, and the increase of science among them and us; and, generally, to grant unto all mankind such a degree of temporal prosperity as He alone knows to be best." Ibid.

George Washington, John Adams, and James Madison all issued Thanksgiving Proclamations; Thomas Jefferson did not, saying:

"Fasting and prayer are religious exercises; the enjoining them an act of discipline. Every religious society has a right to determine for itself the times for these exercises, and the objects proper for them, according to their own particular tenets; and this right can never be safer than in their own hands, where the Constitution has deposited it." 11 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 429 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).

As the United States moved from the 18th into the 19th century, Congress appropriated time and again public moneys in support of sectarian Indian education carried on by religious organizations. Typical of these was Jefferson's treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians, which provided annual cash support for the Tribe's Roman Catholic priest and church.(5) It was not until 1897, when aid to sectarian education for Indians had reached $500,000 annually, that Congress decided thereafter to cease appropriating money for education in sectarian schools. See Act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 62, 79; cf. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 77-79, 28 S.Ct. 690, 694-696, 52 L.Ed. 954 (1908); J. O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Constitution 118-119 (1949). See generally R. Cord, Separation of Church and State 61-82 (1982). This history shows the fallacy of the notion found in Everson that "no tax in any amount" may be levied for religious activities in any form. 330 U.S., at 15-16, 67 S.Ct., at 511-512.

Joseph Story, a Member of this Court from 1811 to 1845, and during much of that time a professor at the Harvard Law School, published by far the most comprehensive treatise on the United States Constitution that had then appeared. Volume 2 of Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 630-632 (5th ed. 1891) discussed the meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment this way:

"Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the amendment to it now under consideration [First Amendment], the general if not the universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the State so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation.
. . . . .

"The real object of the [First] [A]mendment was not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means of religious persecution (the vice and pest of former ages), and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present age. . . ." (Footnotes omitted.)

Thomas Cooley's eminence as a legal authority rivaled that of Story. Cooley stated in his treatise entitled Constitutional Limitations that aid to a particular religious sect was prohibited by the United States Constitution, but he went on to say:

"But while thus careful to establish, protect, and defend religious freedom and equality, the American constitutions contain no provisions which prohibit the authorities from such solemn recognition of a superintending Providence in public transactions and exercises as the general religious sentiment of mankind inspires, and as seems meet and proper in finite and dependent beings. Whatever may be the shades of religious belief, all must acknowledge the fitness of recognizing in important human affairs the superintending care and control of the Great Governor of the Universe, and of acknowledging with thanksgiving his boundless favors, or bowing in contrition when visited with the penalties of his broken laws. No principle of constitutional law is violated when thanksgiving or fast days are appointed; when chaplains are designated for the army and navy; when legislative sessions are opened with prayer or the reading of the Scriptures, or when religious teaching is encouraged by a general exemption of the houses of religious worship from taxation for the support of State government. Undoubtedly the spirit of the Constitution will require, in all these cases, that care be taken to avoid discrimination in favor of or against any one religious denomination or sect; but the power to do any of these things does not become unconstitutional simply because of its susceptibility to abuse. . . ." Id., at * 470--* 471.

Cooley added that

"[t]his public recognition of religious worship, however, is not based entirely, perhaps not even mainly, upon a sense of what is due to the Supreme Being himself as the author of all good and of all law; but the same reasons of state policy which induce the government to aid institutions of charity and seminaries of instruction will incline it also to foster religious worship and religious institutions, as conservators of the public morals and valuable, if not indispensable, assistants to the preservation of the public order." Id., at *470.

It would seem from this evidence that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had acquired a well-accepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade preference among religious sects or denominations. Indeed, the first American dictionary defined the word "establishment" as "the act of establishing, founding, ratifying or ordaining," such as in "[t]he episcopal form of religion, so called, in England." 1 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1st ed. 1828). The Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the "wall of separation" that was constitutionalized in Everson.

The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history. See Walz, 397 U.S., at 671-673, 90 S.Ct., at 1412-1413; see also Lynch, supra, at 673-678, 104 S.Ct., at 1359-1362. As drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers inscribed the principles that control today. Any deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of that Charter and will only lead to the type of unprincipled decision-making that has plagued our Establishment Clause cases since Everson.

The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of any church as a "national" one. The Clause was also designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others. Given the "incorporation" of the Establishment Clause as against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects. As its history abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.

The Court strikes down the Alabama statute because the State wished to "characterize prayer as a favored practice." Ante, at 2492. It would come as much of a shock to those who drafted the Bill of Rights as it will to a large number of thoughtful Americans today to learn that the Constitution, as construed by the majority, prohibits the Alabama Legislature from "endorsing" prayer. George Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of "public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God." History must judge whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority of the Court today, which has strayed from the meaning of the Establishment Clause.

The State surely has a secular interest in regulating the manner in which public schools are conducted. Nothing in the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, properly understood, prohibits any such generalized "endorsement" of prayer. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
__________________

1. Reynolds is the only authority cited as direct precedent for the "wall of separation theory." 330 U.S., at 16, 67 S.Ct., at 512. Reynolds is truly inapt; it dealt with a Mormon's Free Exercise Clause challenge to a federal polygamy law.

2. The New York and Rhode Island proposals were quite similar. They stated that no particular "religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others." 1 Elliot's Debates, at 328; id., at 334.

3. In a letter he sent to Jefferson in France, Madison stated that he did not see much importance in a Bill of Rights but he planned to support it because it was "anxiously desired by others . . . [and] it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice." 5 Writings of James Madison, 271 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).

4. State establishments were prevalent throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries. See Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 1, Art. III; N. H. Const. of 1784, Art. VI; Md. Declaration of Rights of 1776, Art. XXXIII; R. I. Charter of 1633 (superseded 1842).

5. The treaty stated in part:

"And whereas, the greater part of said Tribe have been baptized and received into the Catholic church, to which they are much attached, the United States will give annually for seven years one hundred dollars towards the support of a priest of that religion . . . [a]nd . . . three hundred dollars, to assist the said Tribe in the erection of a church." 7 Stat. 79.

From 1789 to 1823 the United States Congress had provided a trust endowment of up to 12,000 acres of land "for the Society of the United Brethren, for propagating the Gospel among the Heathen." See, e.g., ch. 46, 1 Stat. 490. The Act creating this endowment was renewed periodically and the renewals were signed into law by Washington, Adams, and Jefferson.

Congressional grants for the aid of religion were not limited to Indians. In 1787 Congress provided land to the Ohio Company, including acreage for the support of religion. This grant was reauthorized in 1792. See 1 Stat. 257. In 1833 Congress authorized the State of Ohio to sell the land set aside for religion and use the proceeds "for the support of religion . . . and for no other use or purpose whatsoever. . . ." 4 Stat. 618-619.

6. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 2095, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 44 L.Ed.2d 217 (1975) (partial); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 49 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 53 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).

Many of our other Establishment Clause cases have been decided by bare 5-4 majorities. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 100 S.Ct. 840, 63 L.Ed.2d 94 (1980); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1984); cf. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 93 S.Ct. 2814, 37 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973).

7. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968).

8. Meek, 421 U.S., at 362-366, 95 S.Ct., at 1761-1763. A science book is permissible, a science kit is not. See Wolman, 433 U.S., at 249, 97 S.Ct., at 2606.

9. See Meek, supra, at 354-355, nn. 3, 4, 362-366, 95 S.Ct., at 1761-1763.

10. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947).

11. Wolman, supra, 433 U.S., at 252-255, 97 S.Ct., at 2608-2609.

12. Wolman, supra, at 241-248, 97 S.Ct., at 2602-2605; Meek, supra, at 352, n. 2, 367-373, 95 S.Ct., at 1756, n. 2, 1764-1767.

13. Regan, 444 U.S., at 648, 657-659, 100 S.Ct., at 844, 848-849.

14. Levitt, 413 U.S., at 479-482, 93 S.Ct., at 2818-2820.

15. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948).

16. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952).

***END-QUOTE***

Separation of church & state?-1

Ed Darrell has responded to my “Philosophy of design” post as follows:

***QUOTE***

So much to correct, so little time . . .

It was judicial activism that led the Marshal Court to claim, contrary to all the evidence, that the Bill of Rights did not apply against the states, in 1833. Since then we fought a war to correct that misimpression, we passed the 14th Amendment, and we've finally got courts who are returning to the views of the founders at about mid-20th century.

The First Amendment prevents all governments from declaring a religion contrary to the faith of a citizen.

But that's gravy. Each and every one of the state constitutions does the same. Since 1778, Americans have granted no government any duty, right or privilege with respect to religion. Since 1778, Americans have created no formal role for any church in their government. It's unlikely they will backtrack now, and God bless those judges who preserve our religious rights. If they are activist judges, God bless activist judges.

None of the states had established churches after 1778, and only four states had even a vestige. All those vestiges were methodically eliminated. No state had an established church in 1787 when the Constitution was written, nor in 1789 when the First Amendment was written. Had the authors of the First Amendment intended that states should have the ability to establish a church, it would have had to have been explicitly included in the amendment, since such things did not exist, nor did the right. As you know, there is no clause of the First Amendment which authorizes states to establish churches.

I've heard Dembski describe his religious reasons for backing ID a couple of times, and state that they are superior to his science claims.

But we're willing and ready to take any serious science arguments for ID. As you know, under the Lemon rules, were there science behind intelligent design, religious motivation alone would not stop the teaching of ID.

Alas for ID, no one has been able to find any science to back it that will stand up to even cursory scrutiny in a federal court with fair rules of evidence.

The God of ID not being "sectarian" isn't enough to save it from the establishment clause. That clause forbids government from taking the side of a non-sectarian God, even the God of Abraham, against other beliefs and against no beliefs.

The Lemon test was created by the Supreme Court for lower courts to apply. Judges Jones' court was the trial court, and he correctly applied the Lemon test. That's the best we have until someone gets another case to appeal. That's unlikely, though, because, legally, Judge Jones' decision is very, very tight. Other courts will give it due deference. That's what the Supreme Court did with the Overton decision in the Arkansas case, too -- it was the Louisiana court which accurately applied the reasoning of the Arkansas case. A case does not need to have the approval of the Supreme Court to be valid -- it needs the disapproval of a higher court to make it invalid.

No, the case does not prohibit learning about religion. The Establishment clause prohibits teaching any one religious view as the correct one. History students may still learn about the Great Awakening.

As I noted, it's the IDists who wish to flout original intent. It is inconceivable that the founders wished religion to be taught to kids in public schools -- absolutely 180 degrees contrary to the express views of Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Franklin, among others.

It is a pipe dream to think that judicial review does not exist legally in the United States.

The public school system benefits every citizen in the nation, and that is why everybody pays property taxes to support it. If your neighbor's kid is uneducated, it affects you. You get the benefits of public education especially if you choose to take your kids out. No free rides here -- no work, no eat.

# posted by Ed Darrell : 1/16/2006 5:14 PM

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/01/philosophy-of-design.html

***END-QUOTE***

By way of reply:

1. As a friend of mine who’s writing a book on the history of natural theology pointed out, Darrell’s argument fails to distinguish between natural and revealed religion. The Founding Fathers regarded civil religion as a cornerstone of public morality. Indeed, The Declaration of Independence, which is the charter document of our Republic, grounds the very idea of civil rights in religion:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights”; “the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle them…”

2. Regarding Marbury v. Madison, to which Darrell alludes, this is what Jefferson had to say:

"The question whether the judges are invested with exclusive authority to decide on the constitutionality of a law has been heretofore a subject of consideration with me in the exercise of official duties. Certainly there is not a word in the Constitution which has given that power to them more than to the Executive or Legislative branches."

—Thomas Jefferson to W. H. Torrance, 1815. ME 14:303

"But the Chief Justice says, 'There must be an ultimate arbiter somewhere.' True, there must; but does that prove it is either party? The ultimate arbiter is the people of the Union, assembled by their deputies in convention, at the call of Congress or of two-thirds of the States. Let them decide to which they mean to give an authority claimed by two of their organs. And it has been the peculiar wisdom and felicity of our Constitution, to have provided this peaceable appeal, where that of other nations is at once to force."

—Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, 1823. ME 15:451

"But, you may ask, if the two departments [i.e., federal and state] should claim each the same subject of power, where is the common umpire to decide ultimately between them? In cases of little importance or urgency, the prudence of both parties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground; but if it can neither be avoided nor compromised, a convention of the States must be called to ascribe the doubtful power to that department which they may think best."

—Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright, 1824. ME 16:47

"The Constitution . . . meant that its coordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action but for the Legislature and Executive also in their spheres, would make the Judiciary a despotic branch."

—Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, 1804. ME 11:51

"To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions [is] a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men and not more so. They have with others the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. Their maxim is boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem [good justice is broad jurisdiction], and their power the more dangerous as they are in office for life and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves."
—Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis, 1820. ME 15:277

"In denying the right [the Supreme Court usurps] of exclusively explaining the Constitution, I go further than [others] do, if I understand rightly [this] quotation from the Federalist of an opinion that 'the judiciary is the last resort in relation to the other departments of the government, but not in relation to the rights of the parties to the compact under which the judiciary is derived.' If this opinion be sound, then indeed is our Constitution a complete felo de se [act of suicide]. For intending to establish three departments, coordinate and independent, that they might check and balance one another, it has given, according to this opinion, to one of them alone the right to prescribe rules for the government of the others, and to that one, too, which is unelected by and independent of the nation. For experience has already shown that the impeachment it has provided is not even a scare-crow . . . The Constitution on this hypothesis is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please."

—Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, 1819. ME 15:212

"This member of the Government was at first considered as the most harmless and helpless of all its organs. But it has proved that the power of declaring what the law is, ad libitum, by sapping and mining slyly and without alarm the foundations of the Constitution, can do what open force would not dare to attempt."

—Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, 1825. ME 16:114

"My construction of the Constitution is . . . that each department is truly independent of the others and has an equal right to decide for itself what is the meaning of the Constitution in the cases submitted to its action; and especially where it is to act ultimately and without appeal."

—Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, 1819. ME 15:214

3. Regarding the history of the Establishment Clause, here is some of what the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist had to say in Wallace v. Jaffree:

***QUOTE***

Thirty-eight years ago this Court, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 512, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947), summarized its exegesis of Establishment Clause doctrine thus:

"In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.' Reynolds v. United States, [98 U.S. 145, 164, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879)]."

This language from Reynolds, a case involving the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment rather than the Establishment Clause, quoted from Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association the phrase "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and State." 8 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113 (H. Washington ed. 1861).(1)

It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.

Jefferson's fellow Virginian, James Madison, with whom he was joined in the battle for the enactment of the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty of 1786, did play as large a part as anyone in the drafting of the Bill of Rights. He had two advantages over Jefferson in this regard: he was present in the United States, and he was a leading Member of the First Congress. But when we turn to the record of the proceedings in the First Congress leading up to the adoption of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, including Madison's significant contributions thereto, we see a far different picture of its purpose than the highly simplified "wall of separation between church and State."

During the debates in the Thirteen Colonies over ratification of the Constitution, one of the arguments frequently used by opponents of ratification was that without a Bill of Rights guaranteeing individual liberty the new general Government carried with it a potential for tyranny. The typical response to this argument on the part of those who favored ratification was that the general Government established by the Constitution had only delegated powers, and that these delegated powers were so limited that the Government would have no occasion to violate individual liberties. This response satisfied some, but not others, and of the 11 Colonies which ratified the Constitution by early 1789, 5 proposed one or another amendments guaranteeing individual liberty. Three--New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia--included in one form or another a declaration of religious freedom. See 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 659 (1891); 1 id., at 328. Rhode Island and North Carolina flatly refused to ratify the Constitution in the absence of amendments in the nature of a Bill of Rights. 1 id., at 334; 4 id., at 244. Virginia and North Carolina proposed identical guarantees of religious freedom:

"[A]ll men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, and . . . no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to others." 3 id., at 659; 4 id., at 244.(2)

On June 8, 1789, James Madison rose in the House of Representatives and "reminded the House that this was the day that he had heretofore named for bringing forward amendments to the Constitution." 1 Annals of Cong. 424. Madison's subsequent remarks in urging the House to adopt his drafts of the proposed amendments were less those of a dedicated advocate of the wisdom of such measures than those of a prudent statesman seeking the enactment of measures sought by a number of his fellow citizens which could surely do no harm and might do a great deal of good. He said, inter alia:

"It appears to me that this House is bound by every motive of prudence, not to let the first session pass over without proposing to the State Legislatures, some things to be incorporated into the Constitution, that will render it as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as it has been found acceptable to a majority of them. I wish, among other reasons why something should be done, that those who had been friendly to the adoption of this Constitution may have the opportunity of proving to those who were opposed to it that they were as sincerely devoted to liberty and a Republican Government, as those who charged them with wishing the adoption of this Constitution in order to lay the foundation of an aristocracy or despotism. It will be a desirable thing to extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community, any apprehensions that there are those among his countrymen who wish to deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly fought and honorably bled. And if there are amendments desired of such a nature as will not injure the Constitution, and they can be ingrafted so as to give satisfaction to the doubting part of our fellow-citizens, the friends of the Federal Government will evince that spirit of deference and concession for which they have hitherto been distinguished." Id., at 431-432.

The language Madison proposed for what ultimately became the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment was this:

"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." Id., at 434.

On the same day that Madison proposed them, the amendments which formed the basis for the Bill of Rights were referred by the House to a Committee of the Whole, and after several weeks' delay were then referred to a Select Committee consisting of Madison and 10 others. The Committee revised Madison's proposal regarding the establishment of religion to read:

"[N]o religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." Id., at 729.

The Committee's proposed revisions were debated in the House on August 15, 1789. The entire debate on the Religion Clauses is contained in two full columns of the "Annals," and does not seem particularly illuminating. See id., at 729-731. Representative Peter Sylvester of New York expressed his dislike for the revised version, because it might have a tendency "to abolish religion altogether." Representative John Vining suggested that the two parts of the sentence be transposed; Representative Elbridge Gerry thought the language should be changed to read "that no religious doctrine shall be established by law." Id., at 729. Roger Sherman of Connecticut had the traditional reason for opposing provisions of a Bill of Rights--that Congress had no delegated authority to "make religious establishments"--and therefore he opposed the adoption of the amendment. Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland thought it desirable to adopt the words proposed, saying "[h]e would not contend with gentlemen about the phraseology, his object was to secure the substance in such a manner as to satisfy the wishes of the honest part of the community."

Madison then spoke, and said that "he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." Id., at 730. He said that some of the state conventions had thought that Congress might rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to infringe the rights of conscience or to establish a national religion, and "to prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language would admit." Ibid.

Representative Benjamin Huntington then expressed the view that the Committee's language might "be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion. He understood the amendment to mean what had been expressed by the gentleman from Virginia; but others might find it convenient to put another construction upon it." Huntington, from Connecticut, was concerned that in the New England States, where state-established religions were the rule rather than the exception, the federal courts might not be able to entertain claims based upon an obligation under the bylaws of a religious organization to contribute to the support of a minister or the building of a place of worship. He hoped that "the amendment would be made in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronize those who professed no religion at all." Id., at 730-731.

Madison responded that the insertion of the word "national" before the word "religion" in the Committee version should satisfy the minds of those who had criticized the language. "He believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform. He thought that if the word 'national' was introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent." Id., at 731. Representative Samuel Livermore expressed himself as dissatisfied with Madison's proposed amendment, and thought it would be better if the Committee language were altered to read that "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience." Ibid.

Representative Gerry spoke in opposition to the use of the word "national" because of strong feelings expressed during the ratification debates that a federal government, not a national government, was created by the Constitution. Madison thereby withdrew his proposal but insisted that his reference to a "national religion" only referred to a national establishment and did not mean that the Government was a national one. The question was taken on Representative Livermore's motion, which passed by a vote of 31 for and 20 against. Ibid.

The following week, without any apparent debate, the House voted to alter the language of the Religion Clauses to read "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." Id., at 766. The floor debates in the Senate were secret, and therefore not reported in the Annals. The Senate on September 3, 1789, considered several different forms of the Religion Amendment, and reported this language back to the House:

"Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion." C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment 130 (1964).

The House refused to accept the Senate's changes in the Bill of Rights and asked for a conference; the version which emerged from the conference was that which ultimately found its way into the Constitution as a part of the First Amendment.

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

The House and the Senate both accepted this language on successive days, and the Amendment was proposed in this form.

On the basis of the record of these proceedings in the House of Representatives, James Madison was undoubtedly the most important architect among the Members of the House of the Amendments which became the Bill of Rights, but it was James Madison speaking as an advocate of sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of incorporating the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty into the United States Constitution. During the ratification debate in the Virginia Convention, Madison had actually opposed the idea of any Bill of Rights. His sponsorship of the Amendments in the House was obviously not that of a zealous believer in the necessity of the Religion Clauses, but of one who felt it might do some good, could do no harm, and would satisfy those who had ratified the Constitution on the condition that Congress propose a Bill of Rights.(3) His original language "nor shall any national religion be established" obviously does not conform to the "wall of separation" between church and State idea which latter-day commentators have ascribed to him. His explanation on the floor of the meaning of his language--"that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law" is of the same ilk. When he replied to Huntington in the debate over the proposal which came from the Select Committee of the House, he urged that the language "no religion shall be established by law" should be amended by inserting the word "national" in front of the word "religion."

It seems indisputable from these glimpses of Madison's thinking, as reflected by actions on the floor of the House in 1789, that he saw the Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion. Thus the Court's opinion in Everson--while correct in bracketing Madison and Jefferson together in their exertions in their home State leading to the enactment of the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty--is totally incorrect in suggesting that Madison carried these views onto the floor of the United States House of Representatives when he proposed the language which would ultimately become the Bill of Rights.