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Monday, April 26, 2021

Death for Life

I have often heard the charge from atheists that the idea of divine justice requiring the death of Christ in order for us to be saved is simply a ludicrous belief to hold to. Of course, this conundrum isn't limited to atheists as there are many non-Christian theists (and even some who call themselves Christian) who have issues with substitutionary atonement as well, but I am most familiar with the atheist objections given the circles that I run in. Regardless of who makes the complaint, the objection seems to boil down to the fact that it seems to be illogical for someone to gain eternal life at the expense of the life of an innocent person.

What has struck me is that not only is it not illogical to have this understanding, but it's actually the way things already are in our everyday life. Recently, I've been in some discussions regarding diet. Specifically, I had surgery on my feet back in November, and through the recovery process I need to maintain a lot better control over blood sugar levels in my diet. As a result of this need, the wound care clinic that provides the post-op care required me to attend a diabetes nutrition class. Ironically enough, the dietitian in that class came to the conclusion that I need to eat even more carbohydrates. In fact, she recommended that I have upwards of 250 grams per day. I think anyone who's ever had to control their blood sugar ought to realize just how ridiculous following that advice would be. (Incidentally, I usually maintain around 50 grams of carbohydrates per day and still have fasting blood sugars that are a tad higher than they want.)

Anyway, the point is that I've been thinking about diet lately, so it was natural for my brain to consider that topic when I thought about the objection that penal substitution makes no sense. I made a simple observation, one that is obvious, but which most of us do not think about. That is, whether you are consuming meat products or vegetable products, you are eating things that were, at one point, alive.

We do not consume inanimate objects, like dirt. Our food is the product of living beings. And it's not just byproducts—some of which we can eat (e.g., milk, honey, fruit, etc.), but none of which provide enough nutrients on their own to sustain life. To live, we need to eat animals and entire plants, killing those creatures in the process.

In other words, to consider that eternal life requires the sacrifice of an eternal living Person is somehow incomprehensible is to ignore the fact that our mortal life already requires the sacrifice of mortal beings. We live every day because animals and plants have died. It didn't have to be this way. Plants, after all, can use photosynthesis and get their energy directly from the sun. In that aspect, there's no reason why God couldn't have created human beings, and even all other animals, with photosynthesis. So I have to think that the very fact that we consume plants and animals was already meant as a picture for us of the coming sacrifice Christ would make on our behalf as well.

Which, as a further thought exercise for the future, might also have some bearing on the supralapsarian vs. infralapsarian debate too. I leave that thought exercise up to the reader.

14 comments:

  1. I thought you were going in the direction of organ donation, but that analogy works too.

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    1. The reason I didn't use the analogy of organ donation is that they are not needed normally. That is, in extreme circumstances they can definitely save a life, but historically they did not occur until very recently and even now are fairly rare in terms of all the medical procedures that are out there. Eating food, on the other hand, occurs for most people every day, and it's the exception rather than the rule to find someone who is fasting for any significant length of time. And even while fasting, your body is still burning the stored energy from previously eaten plants and animals.

      So, yeah, the vast majority of energy that you are using throughout just basic day to day living cost the life of something somewhere. This, I think, ought to put away any confusion as to whether or not penal substitution is somehow illogical or unjust, at least on its face. In other words, those who have an initial emotional reaction against the doctrine need to actually come up with real arguments instead.

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  2. I think the chief objection to substitutionary atonement is a combination of the justice objection and the nonsense objection. We eat other living entities, but you can't actually be forgiven and made clean by having someone else (ordinary, just a man) take your place. For example, if the brother of a rapist-murderer offered to die in place of the rapist-murderer, and if the state took the offer, that would not take away the guilt of the real rapist-murderer. It seems arbitrary for God to "deem" it to be so.

    IMO this is one of many reasons for the vast importance of the doctrine of Jesus' deity. He wasn't just any man taking our sins upon him but God himself. In that case, it seems that there could be special metaphysical value for purposes of our being ultimately forgiven and cleansed in God's "bearing" our sins and forgiving them in and by the act of "bearing" them, since all sin is, inter alia, sin against God.

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    1. I agree. I've been reading through George Hutchinson's "The Problem of Original Sin in American Presbyterianism," and this is why I think the position of Samuel Baird in the Realist School is most reasonable:

      "According to our understanding of the Scriptures, it was provided in the eternal covenant that the elect should be actually ingrafted into Christ by his Spirit, and their acceptance and justification is by virtue of this their actual union to him… Thus, the sin of Adam, and the righteousness of Christ are severally imputed to their seed, by virtue of the union, constituted in the one case by the principle of natural generation, and in the other, by ‘the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,’ the Holy Spirit, the principle of regeneration…

      If the imputation of Christ’s righteousness be founded in a real inbeing in him, wrought by the uniting power of his Spirit in regeneration,—if it is thus that we are brought within the provisions of the covenant of grace to our justification, it follows, (we will venture the word,) incontestably, that the imputation to us of Adam’s sin, is founded in a real inbeing in him, by natural generation, by virtue of which we come under the provisions of the covenant of works, to our condemnation. But this, according to our reviewer [Hodge], is “simply a physiological theory,” involving “a mysterious identity,” which he cannot admit. Hence the necessity of ignoring the doctrine, in its relation to justification."

      https://archive.org/details/rejoindertoprinc00bair/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater

      So with Adamic imputation, so too with the imputation of Christ's righteousness. We are not viewed by God merely as if we are righteous - and Roman Catholics would have a serious argument against us, as I used to think, if this legal fiction were really the case. Rather, we are really righteous, not because of anything we have done or earned, but because the Spirit has really united us to Christ's person and work.

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    2. Yes, I agree the "justice" question is another avenue that is brought up. I would suspect it's brought up more frequently with non-atheists, given that most of the atheists I've dealt with believe in a subjective understanding of justice. Of course, that doesn't stop them from making other moral claims, but typically the conversations I've had that delve into atonement are after we've had the conversations about "if morality is relative, then who are you to say that God's morality is wrong anyway?"

      That said, I would imagine when dealing with theists who hold to objective morality but who reject penal substitution, their objections are going to be far more focused on the idea that declaring a guilty person to be innocent and an innocent person to be guilty is actually the definition of injustice, not justice. So your observations are definitely needed at that point!

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    3. I actually think I have found the above most useful in responding to Catholics who charge Protestants with holding to a concept of justification that is a legal fiction. I think that in some cases, this objection goes through (e.g. against Charles Hodge, John Murray, J. V. Fesko, and other theologians who are okay with God reckoning us only as if we are righteous, and not really so).

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    4. Ryan, the thing about imputation though is that it doesn't address the issue of Jesus' death. In fact, that gets us into the whole active and passive obedience of Christ theological "thing"--are we justified by Jesus' death or by the righteousness of Jesus' sinless life? The idea that we are engrafted into him and thus participate in his righteousness *sounds* like it could be satisfied regardless of how (or whether) he died. So if substitutionary atonement is to make sense there needs to be some idea of his death being a place where he "takes upon him" our sins and dies for them and thus they can be really metaphysically forgiven in the eyes of God. I realize that my sense of how his being God helps with this is a bit vague (which I deplore, being of an analytical turn of mind), but it seems that it does help.

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    5. Lydia...you wrote: "I realize that my sense of how his being God helps with this is a bit vague (which I deplore, being of an analytical turn of mind), but it seems that it does help."

      I've wondered about that too, like suppose there were a legit sinless non-God person at any time during the history of mankind. Could that person have been a worthy sacrifice?

      There was a time I probably would have said "yes".

      I don't think so anymore, at least from the perspective that if there ever were such a person, that person fulfilled only one of the requirements that could have bought our salvation - "perfect fulfillment of the law". But that person could not represent us before the Father because s/he would not be our "head" (unless that person were given that responsibility by God.)

      So, your "deity" topic is pretty pertinent in that regard at least at first blush. At the time Jesus entered the scene, any "head" we could have claimed was long dead, and a sinner anyway, so the only person who could represent us would be God Himself, right?

      (sorry for the word salad, just thinking out loud a bit.)


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    6. Good points as well, Jeff. You said:
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      I've wondered about that too, like suppose there were a legit sinless non-God person at any time during the history of mankind. Could that person have been a worthy sacrifice?
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      To answer that myself, I recall the parable Jesus told in Luke 17:7-10:

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      “Will any one of you who has a servant plowing or keeping sheep say to him when he has come in from the field, ‘Come at once and recline at table’? Will he not rather say to him, ‘Prepare supper for me, and dress properly, and serve me while I eat and drink, and afterward you will eat and drink’? Does he thank the servant because he did what was commanded? So you also, when you have done all that you were commanded, say, ‘We are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty.’”
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      So in that regard, living a perfect life only results in you having done that which was already your duty. Living a morally perfect life is what you *ought* to do, so having done that you have not actually done anything more than the bare minimum already.

      Now, I do have to preface that the following view that I have is based on the fact that I'm also a modified Divine Command Theorist, in that I believe that morality is that which God declares to be good and it's based on His own decisions (which in turn are based upon His nature, which is why I don't view it to be arbitrary--but this is a different discussion). Given that view, which you may or may not also accept, I would argue that part of the reason why the divinity of Christ is necessary is precisely because God was never under the obligations that He put man under. The Law was implemented to govern man's behavior, not God's. So the fact that He then submitted to those laws when He did not have to, lived a perfect life, and then died, is (in my view, at least partly) the reason why His life and death being imputed to a sinner is actually capable of saving that person. In other words, using the same parable from Luke 17, the master who willingly submits to the laws He has created and obeys them perfectly has not "only done what was [His] duty"; He has done even that which was not his duty.

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    7. But if God's commands are not arbitrary but are based on his nature, then aaakshully, Jesus *couldn't* have been in the relevant situations and have done anything *other than* obeying God's commands. For example, if Jesus while on earth had walked up to some child and plunged a knife into him and killed him, it would have been murder, even though he was God. (I would say, anyway.) Or having sex with lots of women, or fill in the blank. Whether the term "duty" applies to God Incarnate or not seems a bit like quibbling, either way one argues, but at least as regards absolute, objective moral wrongs (which do exist), he certainly wasn't free to flout them just because he was God.

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    8. "Ryan, the thing about imputation though is that it doesn't address the issue of Jesus' death."

      Participation is certainly not intended as a sufficient account of atonement, but it is a necessary component. You mentioned that:

      "...if the brother of a rapist-murderer offered to die in place of the rapist-murderer, and if the state took the offer, that would not take away the guilt of the real rapist-murderer. It seems arbitrary for God to "deem" it to be so."

      In the case of the state, you are correct. That is partially because the rapist-murderer has no realistic union with the brother (for starters) a la Baird. Our union with Christ by the regeneration of the Spirit makes it possible for God to non-arbitrarily deem us as having satisfied the demands of justice... *if* Jesus actually satisfied those demands, as you imply.

      What those demands are takes us from a discussion from the means of atonement to the grounds for it. Why did Jesus have to *die*? Because guilt is only removed by punishment. Jesus took the penalty we who become united with Him deserved. Why did *Jesus* have to die? His death not only enables the removal of the curse-guilt of the Adamic covenant in which we participated through Adam, His life, after which ours is patterned, fulfills its stipulations. We're in agreement, I think.

      The question of why Jesus needed to be the federal head rather than someone else (a righteous, incarnate angel, say) is a good one. The a fortiori argument of Romans 8:32ff. comes to mind, but it doesn't answer whether it *had* to be Jesus who died.

      One possible answer which would itself need fleshing out: atonement is not an end in itself. Those who are justified are glorified. If preredemptive glorification would have, at some point, also entailed mankind's becoming united with Christ - and this would also deal with some ideas that the fall of mankind was fortunate for the elect, who otherwise would not have so great a union - then in redemptive history, conformity to Christ's image in particular is necessary. The idea Jesus would have become incarnate had Adam not sinned is not a common view, however.

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    9. Thanks for your thoughts, Lydia. I actually really enjoy discussing this part of my views, even when others disagree :-D

      Lydia said:
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      But if God's commands are not arbitrary but are based on his nature, then aaakshully, Jesus *couldn't* have been in the relevant situations and have done anything *other than* obeying God's commands.
      ---

      Depending on what you mean, I don't think I have a problem with saying that persons (whether divine or human) are consistent with their nature, so in that sense I don't see any problem with saying that Jesus would never violate His nature, and His nature is righteous. In other words, I don't have a problem saying that Jesus actually couldn't have sinned because His nature is such that it would not have allowed Him to sin--I think that's part of what makes His nature worth worshipping. I understand why others may take a different view on this, especially regarding the passage saying He was tempted in all manners the same way we are but without sin...but for me, I simply don't see it as being contradictory to be tempted while having the strongest nature that is able to withstand that temptation making it impossible (for all practical terms) to sin.

      Lydia said:
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      For example, if Jesus while on earth had walked up to some child and plunged a knife into him and killed him, it would have been murder, even though he was God.
      ---

      On my view, Jesus would only have done so if His nature allowed Him to do so, and as such it would not have been murder had His nature allowed Him to do so. But His nature would never allow Him to do so, which is why we rightly view an unprovoked attack on a child as being implicitly wrong. (I'll explain more in the next bit.)

      Lydia said:
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      Whether the term "duty" applies to God Incarnate or not seems a bit like quibbling, either way one argues, but at least as regards absolute, objective moral wrongs (which do exist), he certainly wasn't free to flout them just because he was God.
      ---

      That's hits on one of the reasons that I hold to my form of DCT. I agree that Christ was unable to flaunt the objective rules, but they are objective rules precisely because they are consistent with who He is, and He is immutable. Now hypothetically, were He to have a different nature, He would have a different morality; but because He does not have that different nature, even imagining what it would be seems utterly alien to us. The whole idea of "wrongness" that we feel about certain actions is, in my view, precisely because those ideas are contrary to who God fundamentally is (His nature), and we have been created in His image, so we share that inherit repulsion toward those same behaviors.

      That's why I always stress my version of Divine Command Theory is a modified form of it because I know the classical sense does often carry the baggage you're attacking. I don't know that a classical DCT theorist would agree that I am one, but my view fits closest with it, so I think "modified DCT" fits.

      For me, the chain of morality is this: Something is moral or immoral because God says it is, not because it is intrinsically so; and God declares what is moral or immoral based upon His nature, which is immutable; so therefore morality is objective and unchanging. It is "arbitrary" in that it is whatever God wants it to be, but it is certainly not "arbitrary" in the sense that God is necessarily consistent (He cannot deny Himself, as Paul put it). That is, we are not going to wake up tomorrow and discover that God has changed so that murder is now obligated. Hypothetically, *IF WE DID* wake up to that world, then it would be true that murder is now moral and not murdering would be immoral; but that hypothetical world is not possible given the actual nature of God.

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    10. Plus there's the uniqueness of the God-man. Jesus qua God could not sin, Jesus qua man was tempted in all ways as we are, yet He was without sin. This is morally glorious because at some point in temptation we sinners give in. He never did meaning he endured a depth of temptation beyond what any else endured, and overcame.

      Also to the other interlocutor's comment about whether a mere sinless man (not God incarnate) might be a candidate for salvation it's been well answe already, but I'd add a further observation that a person like that would be worthy of worship, and God will not brook worship of a mere creature. This is why worship of Jesus Christ is good and right, and in keeping with the first commandment.

      Also technically speaking because the Abrahamic covenant was ratified and entered into unilaterally by God, He was rewu to fulfill the obligation of the blood oath if *either* party failed to uphold the covenant requirements...which of course as a sinner Abram and his descendants could not perfectly uphold, meaning the blood of the covenant ratifier had to be spilt.

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    11. Wow, so major autocorrect failures there...ugh.

      "answe" = "answered"
      "rewu" = "required"

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