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Monday, June 29, 2020

Omnipotence isn't what you think it is


I frequent a couple of apologetics groups on Facebook, and in one of them there was a recent discussion on the old atheist’s question, “If God is all powerful, can He make a rock too heavy for Him to lift?”  Now most Christians have been asked this question at some point if they’ve ever talked to atheists, and the majority of apologetically-minded Christians probably learned an answer along the lines of, “When we say God is all powerful, we don’t mean that He can do everything, but that He can do everything that is logically possible to do.  Everyone agrees that God cannot make a square circle, because that would be logically impossible to do.  Asking for an all powerful being to do something that would make Him no longer all powerful is, on the face of it, a logical absurdity.”

There is a problem with this argument.  The problem is not immediately obvious, however. After all, contained in the meaning of “all powerful” is the necessity of certain inabilities, which are in fact required in order to make something “all powerful”.  For example, if something is “all powerful” then that thing is incapable of being defeated.  So if God is all powerful, that means He cannot be defeated, say if I were to play Him in a game of chess.  Note, this doesn’t mean God cannot lose, for it is certainly still possible that God could throw a game and let me win. What I’m saying is that it is impossible for God to want to win and not be able to do so.  Thus, contained in the concept of “all powerful” is the notion that certain things are impossible to do.  God cannot want to win and still lose if He is all powerful.

So the logic checks out in the argument.  Because the concept of “all powerful” contains aspects which necessitate the inability to do certain things, it’s logically absurd to hold that something cannot be “all powerful” if it cannot do those things which are necessarily impossible to do given one is “all powerful.” 

What, then, is the flaw in this response to the atheist?  The flaw comes from the Christian maintaining that the definition of omnipotence is “the ability to do all that is logically possible to do.”

For normal theism, this claim is certainly something that is obtainable.  That’s why the argument has worked in philosophy for centuries.  But for the Christian who holds to the inspiration of Scripture, we cannot agree that it is possible for God to do all that is logically possible to do.   The Bible, in fact, gives us a specific example where this is refuted.  It’s found in a clause in the middle of Hebrews 6:18:

“It is impossible for God to lie.”

That’s correct.  God cannot lie.  The passage does not say God will not lie even though He could.  It says it is impossible for God to lie.  (We can also add in Titus 1:2, which contains the clause “God, who never lies”, but the fact that Hebrews literally uses the word “impossible” makes it all the clearer.)

Now here’s the rub.  Is it logically possible to lie?  Clearly, yes.  Humans lie all the time.  No one can make a square circle, so square circles are logically impossible.  But anyone can say they made a square circle, which would be a lie.  It is therefore obvious that lying is logically possible to do.

Furthermore, we know that God can speak.  He spoke the entire creation into existence, and the Bible records Him speaking directly to many individuals.  So the impossibility of God to lie is not because God cannot form words.

Given all that, we are left with the following:

1) God can do anything that is logically possible (per definition).
2) God can speak.
3) Speaking lies is logically possible.
4) Therefore, God can speak lies.
5) But, Hebrews 6:18 says it is impossible for God to speak lies.

(5) contradicts (4). Since there’s a contradiction, then (at least one of) 1, 2, 3 or 5 must be wrong.  But the only one that seems to be capable of being wrong is the first.

And there is good news for the Christian on that front.  Nowhere in the Bible does it ever say that God is able to do anything that is logically possible to be done.  In fact, if we let the Bible define God’s power, we see it in passages such as these:

Daniel 4:35 –  “…he does according to His will among the host of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand or say to him, ‘What have you done?’”

Isaiah 14:27 – “For the LORD of hosts has purposed, and who will annul it? His hand is stretched out, and who will turn it back?”

Isaiah 43:13 – “Also henceforth I am he; there is none who can deliver from my hand; I work, and who can turn it back?”

Job 42:2 – “I know that you can do all things, and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted.”

It’s also implicit in the fact that God created all things and indeed maintains all that exists. Romans 1:20 declares “his eternal power” is seen “in the things that have been made”, and Hebrews 1:3 says “He upholds the universe by the word of his power.”  Indeed, Colossians 1:17 even declares: “And he is before all things, and in him all things hold together.”

There are many more passages that could be quoted on that topic, but I think the one that is most succinct for Christians to use is found in Psalm 135:6.  “Whatever the LORD pleases, he does, in heaven and on earth, in the seas and all deeps.”  I maintain that for a Christian apologist, this should be the definition of omnipotence that we use.

In fact, I would maintain that using this passage, we can also see why it is impossible for God to lie. God does whatever He pleases.  It does not please God to tell a lie.  It is impossible for Him lying to please Him, and therefore it is impossible for Him to lie.

So would there be any downsides to using this type of argumentation?  Some may think that God’s omnipotence may be cheapened if we don’t assert He is capable of doing anything that is logically possible to do.  As if saying that God can do whatever He wants to do, instead of saying God can do every single logically possible thing, somehow lessens His abilities!  I suppose someone could argue, “So if God wants to do nothing, then Him doing only nothing would make him ‘omnipotent’?  That seems absurd.”  And it would seem absurd until you realized that if God can always do what He wants, then if He wants to do nothing there is absolutely no power strong enough to force Him to do anything.  That means He would need quite a bit of power in order to maintain His ability to do nothing, should He so desire.  None can thwart Him and force Him to do anything if He wants to do nothing!

If God wants to do something, He does it; if He does not, none can make Him do it.  This seems to be a perfectly fine definition of omnipotence.

In fact, not only do I not think this definition lessens God’s omnipotence at all, I think it gives us the ability to argue for omnipotence in the context of a personal God.  If we stick with the language of “anything that is logically possible to do”, then God can be viewed as an impersonal force. But if, instead, we maintain that God does whatever He chooses to do, then we necessarily have a personal being who is interacting with His creation.  If God does whatever He desires, and there are certain things we know He will never desire, then we have confidence that there are certain things that are impossible to occur.  Thus, we can rest in knowing that it is impossible for God to lie, and that impossibility is because of His omnipotence. Nothing can ever force God to lie.

That definition of omnipotence tells me something about the nature and character of God.  And that, in my mind, is required in apologetics even more than simply making a logical argument that could be satisfied by an impersonal Deistic god.

28 comments:

  1. I believe it was Blanchard (at least for me) who said that, for an unstoppable force, there is no immovable object, rendering the question incoherent. No matter the 'heaviness' of the object, the unstoppable force that is God can cope. With ease. By definition.

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  2. Four not-that-related comments/musings:

    (1) St Thomas apparently said that all say that God is omnipotent, but precisely what we mean by omnipotence is difficult to define. ST I Question 25 Article 3. If it vexes Thomas, it will surely vex me or other mere mortals.

    (2) I myself understand omnipotence in a colloquial sense as being able to actualize any potential, or to be able to do anything logically possible. You can get seriously deep into a rigorous definition though involving possible worlds and such, cf the Stanford online encyclopedia of philosophy's article on this. Not exactly Joel Osteen level stuff.

    (3) Feser's first argument in his Five Proofs book (which leads to a purely actual actualizer that he identifies with God) says that "all power dervies from the purely actual actualizer" and then "to be that from which all power derives is to be omnipotent". This definition avoids your purported paradox at least on the surface.

    (4) Limitations on God's actions (such as his lying) are not problems for omnipotence (as in (2)) because lying is a species of moral imperfection*, and God is morally perfect. So unless I'm being dense, which is certainly logically possible, I don't see how God not being able to lie is an example of a possible thing that God cannot do. It is impossible given God's character.

    * --- yes, I know there are examples where lying may in fact bring about a greater good. But I'm speaking casually here.

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    1. Hello Eric,
      Yes, there are philosophical answers that one could provide, but my point is that a Christian need not provide the philosophical answers. Theists, in general, may need those defenses, but Christianity does not because the Bible never makes the claim that God can do all things that are logically possible. The verses where "all things" are used (e.g., Matthew 19:26, Genesis 18:14, and even Philippians 4:13 which is applied to us, not to God) clearly have context that limit what the "all things" being referred to are (I can go into those if needed, but am just mentioning them here in passing). And using the other verses I've posted above, the Bible seems happy in just saying God can do whatever He wants to do and there's nothing anyone can do to stop Him.

      This, to me, doesn't mean God can do everything that is logically possible to be done, because the limiting factor is not what is *logically possible* but what *God wants*. In other words, there is something more restrictive for the Christian worldview than simply logical possibility. Christians would agree that God cannot do something that is logically impossible, but we also maintain that God cannot do something that would violate His character (something you echoed in your 4th point).

      And regarding that fourth point, I would say this. Clearly, God's inability to lie is for a different reason than God's inability to create a square circle. God cannot make a circle that is simultaneously a square in the same respect and time because the definition of "square" and the definition of "circle" rule each other out. That is not the reason why God cannot lie, however. It is certainly within the capability of God to utter sounds that cohere to linguistic meaning in such a manner that falsehoods are conveyed as if they were true. So the reason He is incapable of doing so is not because it's logically impossible, but because (as you stated) of His character.

      More to the point, square circles themselves are logically impossible. We can't even imagine scenarios where it could be possible. Lies, themselves, clearly are logically possible because we've experience with them every time we turn on the news. The grounds for which we say God cannot make a square circle is because of the impossibility of a square circle to exist. The grounds for which we say God cannot lie is NOT because of the impossibility of lies to exist, for lies clearly do exist. So the reason God can't do the former is not the same reason why God cannot do the latter. If the former is what is meant by a logical impossibility, then logical impossibility is not the reason the latter cannot be done.

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    2. I'm in general agreement, but I think that Christians "may need those defenses" as well as theists, despite your correctly saying that Bible makes no (explicit) claim that God can do all things logically possible (though I think there is an implicit claim to such a thing).

      All truth is God's truth. Thus, a purely natural-theological sort of argument, if it is correct, should be consistent with God. I think it is perfectly fair to attack Christian theism based on natural-theological arguments that purport to show tensions in our concept of God. (In fact, were I an atheist, this is how I'd proceed rather than promulgating frivolous and lazy charges of biblical errors, liberal criticism, or stale naturalism.)

      As an example, I've been intellectually enamored with divine simplicity for well over a year now. It is in the Lutheran confessions one of the first things confessed, that God is "without parts" and his essence is his existence. This leads to seeming mindblowing assertions such as God's love is his justice, which is his mercy, which is is will, which is .... (etc) I can see some sort of very weak analogy at the creaturely level, though not enough to make me truly comfortable with the idea. Yet doing away with simplicity would appear to make God not God anymore; for then God himself (being parts) would require some prior cause or something to bring the parts together. This isn't a very God sort of thing.

      Now I don't think scripture talks about simplicity in an explicitly metaphysical way. Yet, if God has parts, I'll have a lot of things to rearrange in my head, because I don't see how God can be God with parts. So this is an example of an extrabiblical concept that must be rigorously defended by a Christian too. Or at least it seems that way to me.

      (I've been enamored with natural theology the last few years, because it takes one to the doorstep of the Christian church, and makes the scriptural claims that much more plausible when one has a general theistic conviction in the first place. It clearly hasn't sanctified me, but it has been intellectually fulfilling.)

      All this should be taken as more musing on my part, FWIW.

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    3. Hello again Eric!
      I enjoy your musings :-) I do think that the philosophical defenses can be helpful in certain exchanges, but that it's not likely to be useful against philosophically adroit atheists. By which I mean that I've met (a very small handful of) atheists who were sophisticated enough to point out that "It is impossible for God to lie" is not a logical impossibility, and so it cannot be accurate to say that God can do *EVERYTHING* that is logically possible to do. This could lead to an apologist running into problems, in that he or she is now being forced to defend a position that's not even Biblically required and which, on the face of it at least, would be contradictory for the Christian to maintain.

      In any case, I can see how our approaches would differ. I would use natural-theological arguments if that's what I believed would help my audience in a particular discussion, but if I'm presenting my own apologetic from scratch, I'm going to be focused on a Scripturally grounded presentation first and foremost. Each approach has strengths and weaknesses dependent upon who the audience is (it's my recognition of that fact that keeps me from arguing that *only* presuppositional apologetics is "real" apologetics, for example).

      So yeah, thinking about divine simplicity is actually something I almost mentioned in my own comments, but didn't want to get sidetracked. I originally started off more in the natural-theological camp than I am now, and part of the reason I stepped out of that camp was because of the realization that while I believe divine simplicity is almost certainly true, if push came to shove and it came into conflict with divine freedom in such a way that I actually could not resolve it, I would assert the truth of divine freedom (since that's in the Bible) and jettison divine simplicity (since that isn't in the Bible).

      Again, I'm not at that point in the debate since I have at least resolved the tension to my own satisfaction and, as you stated, changing the concept of simplicity out would definitely cause many things to need to be rearranged. So I believe I understand where you're coming from on it. But, again, my primary concern is fidelity to the Word of God, so if push comes to shove and I can't resolve something from philosophy, I will stick to what I am sure of from Scripture.

      Again, I don't think there's anything "wrong" with philosophy by saying this. It's just how I put things in my mental hierarchy.

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  3. I think the word 'omnipotence' is just a verbal shortcut, like 'trinity'. Uprooted from its biblical moorings, it becomes too vague, lending itself to goofy verbal tricks.

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    1. I agree, and that is one of my concerns with Christian philosophers. The concept of God they defend is almost always the concept of God presented via the Greek philosophers, and not the God of the Bible. This is not to say that Yahweh is not compatible with many of the conclusions of the Greek philosophers, but that the concept of God being defended is not the personal, triune God of Christianity. Necessarily, if something can be proven from classical theism apart from the Bible, then it is not the Biblical God which has been proven (even if the Biblical God remains a POSSIBLE option since He is still consistent with what has been proven). There's nothing unique about the philosophical arguments that points to Christianity as opposed to, say, Deism.

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  4. Peter, what are your thoughts on limitations (inherent or otherwise) to omniscience? Such as whether God can know what an animal’s first person perspective is like?

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  5. Hi Guys, just a quick thought on this interesting discussion. If we consider a possible world as a logically coherent description of reality, and if God lies in no possible world, then it would also seem to follow that it is impossible for God to lie. If that is correct, then it would seem to follow that it has not been proven false that: God can do all that's logically possible (for God to do).

    I think the confusion lies within Premise 3, "Speaking lies is logically possible." That premise would seem to invite a clarifying context for its truth value to be established. I think there's a vagueness with the premise that invalidates the argument. Logically possible for whom or what to lie? Snakes, spirits, humans and many other things lie in many possible worlds. It's logically possible for those sorts of things to lie. We might say that God only lies in impossible worlds, but impossible worlds are logically incoherent.

    Ron

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    1. I think you've made a good point. Acts require actors and not every actor can do every act. God qua God can't make a fist. Nor can cats, but I can.

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    2. The Potato Philosopher:
      But God created all of us, and we do have fists, so it is indeed the case that God not only *can* create fists, but He has created all fists. :-)

      But as to what I believe you meant by that, God can't lie for a completely different reason than why God can't shape His own hand into a fist. God is immaterial and incorporeal, so that's why He can't make a fist of His own hand; but God *can* speak. God is also fully capable of knowing what is true and what is not true. This seems to be all that is required in order to have the natural ability to lie. If you know something is true, and you can speak, then it is possible for you to speak something that you know is not true.

      In fact, if He wanted to, God could read aloud something we all know to be false. For example, we could ask God to read the statement, "Chicago is higher in elevation than Denver." It is clearly possible that He could read that out loud, since we would know it is not a lie. If He did so, it is because He is reading a quote, not making a false statement as if it were true.

      So the inability is not found in God's inability to form the words or even in saying words He knows are false. The inability is in God asserting those false words ARE TRUE. And that inability has nothing to do with the logical impossibility of stating false words as if they are true. They have to do with God's character, not with logical possibilities.

      In fact, the only way I can see it being logically necessary for God to be incapable of lying is if anything that God says as if it's true automatically becomes true. But if that is logically possible, then God could easily say, "It is possible for God to lie" and then that would automatically become true, so if the logical necessity is due to whatever God saying automatically becoming true, I find that to be self-defeating.

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  6. One other clarifying point from the comment box.

    _____

    "This, to me, doesn't mean God can do everything that is logically possible to be done, because the limiting factor is not what is *logically possible* but what *God wants*. In other words, there is something more restrictive for the Christian worldview than simply logical possibility. Christians would agree that God cannot do something that is logically impossible, but we also maintain that God cannot do something that would violate His character (something you echoed in your 4th point)."
    _____

    God not being able do wo what violates his character is a limiting factor, but it is a limiting factor in an entirely different sense than "what *God wants*" is a limiting factor. God doesn't want many things that don't violate his character. So, although there is no possible world in which God violates his character; there are still an infinite possible worlds in which *God wants* things differently, yet without violating his character.

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    1. Hello Reformed Apologist,
      Just wanted to let you know I'm not ignoring you. I'm busy this afternoon, but will respond to your points as I am able! Thanks for sharing your thoughts as thinking about your points will make the afternoon pass faster for me :-D

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    2. No worries, Peter. Also, I need to create a new google account. RA comes up and it's the only way in which I can currently post. I wish I could just be seen as Ron. (I can't post from my iPhone, which became a problem years ago. Steve was aware of at least one other with that inconvenience. I used to email him my comments rather than posting. Maybe he preferred it that way! :)

      Let me make an additional post. Feel free to address only the essence of what your infer from the flurry of posts of mine.

      “Lying is possible” appears vague to me. I think “Lying is possible” needs to be contextualized. If the argument is valid, it must be able to survive specificity with respect to the premise “Lying is possible.” Possible for whom is not addressed. So, "lying is possible" applies universally for you.

      My point is that God cannot do what is logically possible for humans does not imply he cannot do all that is logically possible for him. There would appear to be an onus of proof to show that “lying is possible” applies to God. I believe your argument hangs on that premise being true for God. If lying is possible for God, then I'd hope we can agree that God must lie in at least one logically coherent reality. If he doesn’t, then it is logically impossible for God to lie, in which case premise three doesn’t apply to God (making the argument invalid).

      I tried to illustrate the point by focusing on possible worlds. God cannot deny himself in any sense, including a logical sense, in any possible world. It’s logically impossible for God to lie because God is truth and cannot deny himself. If God could deny himself by a lie, a possible world would reflect that possibility.

      That God cannot deny himself presupposes the modality of possibility. God cannot be both p1 *capable of lying* and p2 *not capable of lying* in the same sense of lying. To affirm “God is p1” and “God is p2” would entail a logical contradiction. If “God is p2” is true, then “God is p1” is a logical contradiction to p2. If it is a logical impossibility that God is capable of lying, then it hasn’t yet been established that it *false* that p3: God can do anything that is logically possible. Again, that God cannot do what is logically possible for humans does not imply that he cannot do all that is logically possible for him. God's inability to do the impossible (e.g. lie) does not contradict his ability to do all that is possible. It is not possible for God to do that which is impossible does not imply that God can't do all that is possible.


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    3. Thanks Ron (I'll try to remember and call you Ron as well) :-)

      I think the issue I have with how you're presenting this is that it appears to me that the reason God cannot lie has nothing to do with logic, but rather His character. And what I mean by that is that if God were to lie, it would be inconsistent with Him being "all good"--but what good is, is not defined by logic. If it were, you could logically reason to all morality. But I would argue that logic will not get you to a position that one morally ought to always tell the truth. In fact, via logic, one can easily argue that there are many times when lying is more beneficial (at least to you) than telling the truth would be.

      Regarding possible worlds, I can imagine a possible world in which it is possible for God to lie, but then I don't equate God and truth. I presume you're speaking of passages like John 17:17, which declares that God's word is truth. But that statement does not mean truth is God, because it's not insisting upon a 1:1 correlation of truth and God. In other words, I do not think it's meaningful to say that "2 + 2 = 4" is in any sense God. It's the same problem I have with people who say "God is love, so anything that is loving is divine." The equation doesn't go both ways.

      In terms of possible universes, then, I can at least imagine a possible universe wherein God does not deny Himself, but may potentially say that "2 + 2 = 5." You might say, "But wouldn't that make the whole universe collapse since so much stuff is built on mathematics?" If so, I would respond: No because lies, by their nature, aren't going to be consistent with realty. So this hypothetical universe would still be based on the fact that 2 + 2 = 4, but God could still *SAY* 2 + 2 = 5 to mislead someone.

      Logic itself doesn't compel us to deny this universe. There is nothing *irrational* about thinking that God could be otherwise identical with all his attributes, but having a character that permits Him to lie at one particular point in time for a specific reason. The reason this doesn't happen isn't because it's logically impossible, but because God's character is such that He would never do so.

      What I would therefore argue is that God's character--His morality in particular--is not logically necessary, but instead is simply who He is. He is the kind of being for whom lying is an action He would never do.

      To convince me otherwise, you would need to show me what makes it logically necessary for God to be incapable of lying, which would require (at minimum) a demonstrating why it's *logically necessary* that a lie is immoral. In my mind, it's not enough to say (for example) that a perfectly good being would logically never tell a lie, because that only bumps the question back a step and you'd have to establish how logic can define "perfectly good" for us.

      If you can stipulate from logic alone that God's character must be a certain way, I would agree that it's logically impossible for Him to be any other way. But if logic isn't compelling Him to be a certain way, then I think we have to conclude that He is that way for reasons OTHER than logic, and thus it's not a logical imperative.

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  7. I can imagine a possible world in which it is possible for God to lie."

    Peter,

    Maybe we have a different understanding of possibility and possible worlds. Are you trying to distinguish that statement in quotes from:

    I can imagine God lies in a possible world.

    Or more plainly:

    It is possible for God to lie.

    The reason I ask is if it's possible for God to lie in a possible world, then why should we not believe that it is possible for God to lie (in this world) and, therefore, that God *does lie* in at least one possible world (and arguably in an infinite possible worlds given that an additional irrelevant instantiation within the possible world in which the lie occurs could be altered infinitely yet without having any affect on the lie - like a particle of moon dust being altered into an "infinite number" of shades of blue.)

    Since you can imagine it being possible for God to lie in a possible world, then on what basis do you believe that God has not lied or will not lie in this world? What guarantees are there if it's possible for God to lie?

    Prove God cannot lie:

    p1. (Assume the opposite of what we're trying to prove) God can lie

    P2. If God can lie, then God can withhold forgiveness to those who confess according to 1 John 1:9

    p3.God cannot withhold forgiveness to those who confess according to 1 John 1:9 (Contradiction)

    p4. It is false that God can lie (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)

    p5. God cannot lie (Law of negation)

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    1. Peter (and Ron), good discussion. Would you mind sharing your thoughts on the relevant distinctions between God *lying* and God *deceiving*?

      Clearly there are distinctions, but I can see how the edges could quickly become fuzzy and thereby such distinctions appear ad hoc to an atheist philosopher, or even a mildly sophisticated village atheist.

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    2. Coram Deo,

      This discussion has many ambiguities. I've chosen to focus on one linchpin to the thesis in order to keep the "edges" from becoming "fuzzy.

      Peter stated:

      “I think the issue I have with how you're presenting this is that it appears to me that the reason God cannot lie has nothing to do with logic, but rather His character.”

      If it's not clear, then let me say now that the *reason* God cannot lie and whether it is *possible* that God can lie are two different modal considerations. The question we are to be discussing as it relates to the proof from the OP pertains to whether it is *possible* for God to lie. That has much to do with logic given the OP. Nowhere in the OP's proof does the reason for God being able or not able to lie come into view.

      Another matter of confusion is here:

      “1) God can do anything that is logically possible (per definition).
      2) God can speak.
      3) Speaking lies is logically possible.
      4) Therefore, God can speak lies.
      5) But, Hebrews 6:18 says it is impossible for God to speak lies.
      (5) contradicts (4). Since there’s a contradiction, then (at least one of) 1, 2, 3 or 5 must be wrong. But the only one that seems to be capable of being wrong is the first.”

      Obviously 5 contradicts 4. We agree on that. What’s confusing is that if we assume that 5 (being Scripture) is true, then obviously 4 must be false if 4 and 5 contradict. But it’s being argued in the comments box that 4 is true, God can speak lies. But if God can speak lies and 4 contradicts 5, then Hebrews 6:18 is false.

      There are many reductios to the overall thesis. We've only touched on a few.





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    3. Thanks Ron. I had Jeremiah 20:7 in mind specifically. I take it we all agree this verse is true, as is Hebrews 6:18, therefore my line of questioning about distinctions between God *lying* and God *deceiving*.

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  8. It may have to be do with secondary causes and the morally sufficient reason God would have for causing one to believe something false.

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    1. I can easily see morally sufficient reasons for humans to cause someone to believe something false, or even for lying. The well worn (and very real) example of lying to (or deceiving) Nazis about hiding Jews for instance. Or the praise Rahab the harlot seems to recieve in Hebrews for lying about her knowledge of the Hebrew spies, and which way they went.

      It's somewhat more difficult to extrapolate this to God, however if I'm able to extend and assign deception to God, it seems a short bridge to assigning lying to Him.

      Hebrews 6:18 remains a bullwark of sorts, but there again it seems trivially easy to me to imagine a thoughtful atheist to object to the distinction between *deceiving* and *lying* along the lines of, "Ok, but you're just playing semantic games and you functionally have a distinction without a difference because the potential of having a *deceiving* omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent deity ought to hardly be more comforting to its hapless finite creatures than a *lying* deity when the final result is the same, false beliefs of divine origin."

      That's sort of what I was getting at.

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  9. Peter,

    I'll deal with some other things you said and let it go.

    1. “5) contradicts (4). Since there’s a contradiction, then (at least one of) 1, 2, 3 or 5 must be wrong. But the only one that seems to be capable of being wrong is the first.”

    If an argument takes an invalid form, then none of the premises need to be false for there to be a false conclusion or a resulting contradiction.

    If 4 contradicts 5 and 5 is Scripture, then 4 is false. Yet it has been asserted, contrary to 4, it is possible for God to lie: “I can imagine a possible world in which it is possible for God to lie.” The entire project got off to a shaky start.

    2. “God's character--His morality in particular--is not logically necessary, but instead is simply who He is.”

    False dichotomy. Why can’t God be simply who he is and logically necessary. They aren’t mutually exclusive concepts. Logical necessity is the strongest kind of necessity. There is no possibility of not God. The proposition God exists cannot be false. That’s all that is meant.

    3. “To convince me otherwise, you would need to show me what makes it logically necessary for God to be incapable of lying, which would require (at minimum) a demonstrating why it's *logically necessary* that a lie is immoral.”

    In the OP lies were immoral otherwise there was no point in your proof since obviously God can do moral things. But if you’d like to pivot by pointing to something like justifiable lying, then go ahead and substitute an act that you deem necessarily sin. Then you may apply the same arguments against your position. Nothing of substance has changed.

    4. “If you can stipulate from logic alone that God's character must be a certain way, I would agree that it's logically impossible for Him to be any other way.”

    How would one prove anything apart from logic? Secondly, the use of “alone” is curious. If there were a second way to prove something in addition to logic, then it would be an arbitrary stricture to reject the logical argument based on it not being “alone.”

    5. “But if logic isn't compelling Him to be a certain way, then I think we have to conclude that He is that way for reasons OTHER than logic, and thus it's not a logical imperative.”

    The task was never to show that logic *compels* God to be who God is. The point was to put forth a logical argument for the impossibility of God sinning. Surely we may predicate about ontological things.

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  10. Thanks for everyone who has been responding. I wish I had more time to respond to it all. However, a lot of it doesn't address where I think the topic needs to go (at least if you want to convince me--feel free to go wherever you want if you don't mind not convincing me!) :-)

    The main issue so far is that no one has yet provided any REASON why I should accept the belief that it is *logically impossible* for God to lie. The only argument presented so far has been that it's possible that something can be logically possible for humans to do while being logically impossible for God to do. But no one has yet demonstrated that a lie falls into such a category.

    Frankly, I do not believe it is possible to use logic to state any moral claim, and the onus would be on the one claiming it *is* possible for logic to generate morality to actually prove morality from logic. I'm not going to "gift" moral standards to your position for free. You have to do the groundwork to show how logic necessitates specific moral claims. You have to earn the ability to say why logic is the reason why God cannot lie.

    Now you could say, as I do, that it is impossible for God to lie for a reason other than logic, and that given that other reason, logically it follows that God cannot lie. But if so, it's not logical necessity, but rather whatever the other reason is, that gives us the result of God not lying. Add on the fact that there's clearly a difference between God being unable to create a circular square (something which is plainly due to logical impossibility, in that it is impossible for ANYONE to create a circular square) and God being unable to lie (something which is not a logical impossibility given that humans lie all the time), and I cannot see how "logical impossibility" can be leveraged here.

    In other words, the onus is on the one saying that the thing that can clearly be done by humans is logically impossible to be done by God.

    So why is it that God cannot lie? If you say it's because of His character, then yes, *GIVEN* His character, He cannot lie. But we can substitute out His character for another type of character that would lie and I do not see how *logic* would break like it would if there were a circular square. (Our theology would break, yes, because it's predicated on the actual character God has; but logic makes no moral claims.) Likewise, if God chooses to lie, how would that defeat His omnipotence, or His eternality, or His transcendence, or anything else? What *necessary* attribute of God would "break" if God were to lie? A square has four, and only four, straight edges--a circle has either no straight edges or an infinite number of them, depending on how you define "straight edge"--but either way, it clearly does not have exactly four. Thus, trying to make a circular square violates the definition of both square and circle. How is the definition of God violated if God can lie?

    Perhaps I'm just not seeing what logically necessary attributes would be falsified about God if God could lie that would lead to incoherence (and thus logical impossibility), but I'm being as clear as possible about what needs to be demonstrated to convince me that it's logically impossible for God to lie instead of that God cannot lie because His character will not allow Him to lie.

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    1. Peter, I guess I'm not trying to convince as much as I'm trying to grasp how in a conversation with an atheist it's anything more than a pyrrhic victory to win the argument that God can't *lie* while conceding He can *deceive* when the net result is the same in either case, false beliefs resulting from divine agency.

      I'm sure I'm missing something, but I can't quite put my finger on it.

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    2. Hello Coram Deo,
      The only reason I haven't addressed your question specifically is because it's a little tangential to the point of my post. I don't mind going on tangents though, it's just a matter of prioritizing my time. Since I do have a little time now, I would say one main difference is that deception need not involve falsehoods. In fact, you can deceive people saying nothing but truthful statements intended to form a false conclusion in the mind of the listener. As a semi-humorous example that I stole from my Dad, I often tell people, "I think you're a good person. I don't care what they said on the news last night." Both of these sentences are true in and of themselves, but the intention is to make the person think someone on the news had said they aren't a good person (even though they're not going to believe that even happened).

      So it is certainly possible to deceive by telling only truthful statements. Another way that happens is by only telling PART of the truth, without providing it all. This is why our legal system requires "The truth, the WHOLE truth, and nothing but the truth." If I saw Mr. Jones walking down the street at the same time that Mr. Smith was murdered, but I clearly saw that Mr. Jones did not murder Mr. Smith, I could truthfully say, "I saw Mr. Jones in the area when the murder occurred" in an attempt to deceive people into thinking Mr. Jones committed the murder. All without me ever saying that I saw Mr. Jones actually commit the murder, so all without actually lying.

      Of course, that distinction doesn't seem very satisfactory in most instances, as you rightly pointed out. In fact, I've recently stated in a post regarding my experiences with Steve Hays that I went through a time where it felt like God had deceived me by me believing He had promised something that He had not. I felt betrayed because God knew that I had believed He was going to act when He had not said He would, and yet He did nothing to correct my false belief when He could have. All that to say, even though now I would look at that and say there was no deception at all, the fact that I FELT as if there had been at the time was quite horrible. If God really had deceived me in that manner, subjectively I would feel justified in my sense of betrayal even though logically I could comprehend a valid justification for His deception if I wanted to look at it in that manner.

      In any case, setting aside the overlapping subjective feelings under both deception and lying, there's also the fact that in English deception and lying are seen as essentially the same thing. But I think we can differentiate it and look at deception as something that does not involve lying, but still makes a false belief become present in the mind of the one who is deceived. If we differentiate in that way and examine the case of God doing the actions, a lie would be when God speaks something false as if it were true, so the falsehood originates in the mind of God; deception, on the other hand, originates in the mind of the one who is deceived. That is, the deceived individual takes in truth and comes to false conclusions about that truth without investigating further. So the falsehood is not from what God has said, but from what the individual has assumed was meant by what is said.

      I'm not sure this fully encompasses everything, but at least to me I can see a relevant difference if deception and lying are defined in such a distinct manner. I would need to do a word study on the Hebrew and Greek terms used in the Bible before truly staking a flag on this concept though.

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  11. "The main issue so far is that no one has yet provided any REASON why I should accept the belief that it is *logically impossible* for God to lie."

    Peter,

    I think I've given ample reasons to abandon your position.

    Let me take another stab at it just dealing with what I believe are some internal inconsistencies with your position.

    You say, "It is *impossible* for God to lie." Yet elsewhere you say, "God can speak lies." You even went so for to say that you "can imagine a possible world in which it is *possible* for God to lie..."

    How can it be "*possible* for God to lie" if "It is *impossible* for God to lie"?

    Another logical contradiction is you also say:

    "God cannot lie... even though he could."

    How do you reconcile "God cannot lie" with God "could" lie? If God could lie, then God could have lied at t1, though at t1 he also "cannot lie." Contradiction.

    Molinists distinguish between might and would counterfactuals. However, you've taken both the logic and the metaphysic to a whole new level with "cannot." By "cannot" you've eliminated any sort of might-counterfactual. Molinists are notorious for trying to reconcile might with would by conveniently dismissing the grounding objection. However, I know no one who speaks in terms of could x and cannot x. Could but won't, yes. That I can wrap my mind around, but that too is problematic. But you're using terms like cannot and impossible.

    I can't get inside your head but if I had to guess it would be that you are wanting to communicate that God could lie in that God has the equipment to lie (ability to communicate etc.), but that his nature necessarily prevents him from lying (he cannot lie due to his holiness etc.). If my guess is correct, then you might want to consider that the semantic and logical problem you run into is that *could* indicates true possibility. Therefore, "God could lie" implies God does lie in a possible world(s). Yet if "God cannot lie" then there is no possible world in which God does lie. Again this leaves a contradiction. If I had to guess again, I think you are thinking that the equipment to lie (a will, ability to communicate etc.) is a sufficient condition for the *possibility* to lie. That's just false.

    The problems I think transcend our working with a common taxonomy. I think we're just way too far apart even if we employed the same terminology.

    Best,

    Ron

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    1. Hello Ron,
      You said:
      ---
      You say, "It is *impossible* for God to lie." Yet elsewhere you say, "God can speak lies." You even went so for to say that you "can imagine a possible world in which it is *possible* for God to lie..."

      How can it be "*possible* for God to lie" if "It is *impossible* for God to lie"?
      ---

      I thought I've been fairly clear on this. My claim throughout has been that it is LOGICALLY possible for God to lie, but that it is impossible for God to lie *given* His character. I mean, I literally said: "Now you could say, as I do, that it is impossible for God to lie for a reason other than logic, and that given that other reason, logically it follows that God cannot lie." It seems quite unlikely that you could read that and still conclude I'm arguing for both sides of a contradiction. You might disagree with my distinctions but you cannot deny I've made them.

      On top of that, you are still not giving me any REASON to accept your view. By which I mean you've presented nothing whatsoever positive about your position. You are not showing me where logic necessitates God must have the character that He has. You haven't established that it's logically impossible for God to lie. As far as I can tell, you haven't even begun to try to do so.

      You said:
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      Therefore, "God could lie" implies God does lie in a possible world(s)
      ---

      In a hypothetical, non-existent universe. I don't treat possible worlds as if they have any actual ontology. There is only the real universe we live in.

      But yes. As I have stated, *IF* God's character was different, then He would be able to lie without destroying logic. And I asked you directly: "if God chooses to lie, how would that defeat His omnipotence, or His eternality, or His transcendence, or anything else? What *necessary* attribute of God would 'break' if God were to lie? … How is the definition of God violated if God can lie?"

      It seems to me that if it were the case that the inability to lie was predicated on logical impossibility, you could actually demonstrate it when asked directly.

      You said:
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      The problems I think transcend our working with a common taxonomy. I think we're just way too far apart even if we employed the same terminology.
      ---

      That may be, but I've actually given you my reasoning and I've given you how I'm using words. You've not provided any actual support for your own view. It's like you just assume it's right and don't feel any need to bother explaining it. Well, don't be surprised that you're not convincing me then.

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