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Saturday, July 11, 2015

Scripturalism and knowledge


1. This post is a continuation of the debate over Scripturalism. It will focus on the definition of knowledge. It's my understanding that Scripturalists typically stake out the following position:
i) To count as knowledge, a belief must not only be true, but be infallibly true. 
ii) Apropos (i), beliefs derived from sensory perception don't count as knowledge, for even if a particular belief thus derived is true, it's possible (counterfactually) for that belief to be false. Even if you weren't mistaken in any particular case, you could be mistaken in any particular case.
That's because sensory perception is fallible. Misperception is possible. Likewise, beliefs derived from sensory perception are fallible. For instance, we might form a false or unjustified belief by observing an unrepresentative sample. 
iii) Conversely, the only objects of knowledge are Biblical propositions or propositions deducible from Biblical statements. 
2. Assuming that's an accurate description of Scripturalist epistemology, it presents the following difficulties:
i) Scripture doesn't formally define knowledge. It uses some Greek and Hebrew words for knowledge, but we need to distinguish between the meaning of words and the meaning of concepts. Take the following comparison:
Internalists about justification think that whether a belief is justified depends wholly on states in some sense internal to the subject. According to one common such sense of ‘internal’, only those features of a subject's experience which are directly or introspectively available count as ‘internal’—call this ‘access internalism’. According to another, only intrinsic states of the subject are ‘internal’—call this ‘state internalism’. 
Externalists about justification think that factors external to the subject can be relevant for justification; for example, process reliabilists think that justified beliefs are those which are formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones. 
Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition; doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. 
Part of what is problematic about lucky guesses is precisely that they are so lucky: such guesses are formed in a way such that it is unlikely that they should turn out true. According to a certain form of knowledge reliabilism, it is unreliability, not lack of justification, which prevents such beliefs from amounting to knowledge.  
Another move in a similar spirit to K-Reliabilism replaces the justification clause in the JTB [justified true belief] theory with a condition requiring a causal connection between the belief and the fact believed; 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
The Bible doesn't operate at that level of analysis. It doesn't draw those distinctions. It doesn't unpack the concept of knowledge in detail. Looking up the dictionary definition of words in a Greek or Hebrew lexicon doesn't give you concepts of knowledge.
So Scripturalism generates an internal dilemma: A Scripturalist is working with a model of knowledge that he can't derive from Scripture itself. 
ii) Even at the level of words, many Scripturalists can't read the Bible in the original languages. They read the Bible in translation. But in that event they don't know revealed propositions inasmuch as their beliefs are mediated by a fallible conduit. Their understanding of Scripture is based on their understanding of English, Spanish, Chinese (whatever their mother tongue). They aren't accessing Biblical propositions directly, but indirectly–via a translation in their mother tongue. Suppose your mother tongue is English, and you read the Bible in English. By Scripturalist criteria, that doesn't count as knowledge, since God didn't reveal his word in English. 
iii) Moreover, even if you can read the Bible in Greek and Hebrew, most of us don't learn Greek and Hebrew directly. Most of us didn't grow up in homes and communities where that was the native language. Rather, we use our mother tongue as a bridge in learning Greek and Hebrew. 
iv) Furthermore, even if Greek and Hebrew was your mother tongue, language acquisition is something you pick up by a fallible empirical process. Take feral children who never learn a human language because they didn't hear it spoken during their formative years. So it doesn't count as knowledge, by Scripturalist criteria.
In addition, our understanding of Biblical Greek and Hebrew is based on more than Biblical Greek and Hebrew. Rather, that's supplemented by other sources of Greek and Hebrew–before, during, or sometime after the Bible was written. So, once again, our understanding of Biblical Greek and Hebrew doesn't count as knowledge, by Scripturalist criteria. 
v) I'd add that from a mainstream Calvinist perspective, with its commitment to meticulous providence and special providence, our understanding of the world can properly inform and supplement our understanding of the Bible. It's only a problem on Scripturalist criteria. 
vi) Returning to (i), where does a Scripturalist get his concept of knowledge? Not from Scripture. 
Although Scripture doesn't formally define knowledge, it gives examples of knowledge. And if you deny that these constitute knowledge, that presents a problem for Scripturalism. For instance: 
16 And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, “You may surely eat of every tree of the garden, 17 but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die” (Gen 2:16-17).
But if, according to Scripturalism, sensory perception is untrustworthy, if beliefs derived from sensory perception never count as knowledge, then Adam and Eve were unable to obey the prohibition. Adam and Eve couldn't know for a fact which fruit free was the forbidden tree, in contrast to the permissible fruit trees. 
But in that event, in what sense did they or even could they disobey the prohibition? If the identity of the forbidden tree wasn't an object of knowledge, given a downgraded view of sensory perception (a la Scripturalism), then Adam or Eve could accidentally consume the forbidden fruit. Their belief regarding which tree was the forbidden tree was a fallible belief, necessarily based in part on observation. Observing the location and appearance of the tree, which God pointed out to them (or Adam in particular).
To take another example:
29 The next day he saw Jesus coming toward him, and said, “Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world! 30 This is he of whom I said, ‘After me comes a man who ranks before me, because he was before me.’ 31 I myself did not know him, but for this purpose I came baptizing with water, that he might be revealed to Israel.” 32 And John bore witness: “I saw the Spirit descend from heaven like a dove, and it remained on him. 33 I myself did not know him, but he who sent me to baptize with water said to me, ‘He on whom you see the Spirit descend and remain, this is he who baptizes with the Holy Spirit.’ 34 And I have seen and have borne witness that this is the Son of God.”35 The next day again John was standing with two of his disciples, 36 and he looked at Jesus as he walked by and said, “Behold, the Lamb of God!” 37 The two disciples heard him say this, and they followed Jesus (Jn 1:29-37).
Here we see an striking interplay between revelation and observation. God gives the Baptist a sign to single out the Messiah. This involves a revelatory element. God discloses to the Baptist the significance of this visible clue or sensory manifestation. However, it also requires an empirical element. Something the Baptist must see. 
In addition, the disciples follow Jesus based on the Baptist's witness. But that assumes facial recognition. They rely on their eyesight to tell who the Baptist is referring to or pointing to. 
But by Scripturalist criteria, the Baptist didn't know that Jesus was the Messiah, despite the sign which God gave him. For that depends on sensory perception of the sign. 
Let's take one more example:
5 and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve. 6 Then he appeared to more than five hundred brothers at one time, most of whom are still alive, though some have fallen asleep. 7 Then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles. 8 Last of all, as to one untimely born, he appeared also to me (1 Cor 15:5-8).
The post-Resurrection appearances of Christ are empirical phenomena. Tangible and audiovisual phenomena. Seeing Jesus, hearing Jesus, touching Jesus. 
i) But by Scripturalist criteria, that's fallible, and what's fallible falls short of knowledge. So the eyewitness testimony to the Resurrection, which Paul appeals to, is demoted by Scripturalism to an unreliable report. Testimonial evidence based on sensory perception can never rise to the level of knowledge. It's defeasible opinion, at best. 
Yet Scripturalists claim to take the Bible as their starting-point, in developing a theory of knowledge. But if you truly began with the Bible, how would you ever arrive at the conclusion that beliefs derived from sensory perception never count as knowledge?
Or suppose a Scripturalist weakens the original (infallibilist) position by conceding that there can be different kinds of knowledge. He may grudgingly admit the possibility of sense knowledge, but classify that as an infer kind of knowledge. If so, where does Scripture give that rating system for different kinds of knowledge. Where does it indicate that that's an infer kind of knowledge or inferior source of knowledge? Consider the aforesaid examples, which we could easily multiple. 
3. In addition, the infallibilist criterion not only demotes sensory perception, but memory. After all, human memory is fallible. Even when our recollection is correct, it's possible (counterfactually) that we misremembered. On that view, memory is just as untrustworthy as sensory perception.
But don't even Scripturalists rely on their memory of what Scripture teaches? Don't they rely on their recollection of Biblical propositions and logical deductions from Biblical statements? 
But if memory fails the infallibilist condition, if remembered beliefs never count as knowledge, then how can Scripturalists know anything at all? What's left? 
4. For that matter, if the possibility of drawing false inferences from sensory perception disqualifies sensory perception as a source of knowledge, then doesn't the possibility of drawing false inference from Scripture disqualify Scripture as a source of knowledge? If sensory perception is fallible, so is human reason. 
Scripturalism is self-refuting. It reduces to global skepticism. 

36 comments:

  1. Well argued. I'm still trying to understand Ryan's nuanced development of knowledge from the other thread. It seemed like he was moving away from the types of Scripturalist distinctives outlined above, but at what point is a system of thought refined to the point of being redefined?

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  2. More critiques of Scripturalism:

    Critiques of Clarkianism and Scripturalism
    http://misclane.blogspot.com/2013/10/critiques-of-clarkianism-and.html

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  3. Steve,

    Some interesting points, some of which would not apply to the case of my particular understanding, some of which would. I would like to make an extended reply, it's just going to take time. You've had several able critics of Scripturalism and years of familiarity with this material. I'm only recently catching up to speed on a few of these issues. In my opinion, I also find it easier to critique than forward a positive position. Not saying you haven't done so or anything, just excusing myself for not being able to respond to this kind of post - or others you've written which Annoyed Pinoy archives - very quickly.

    Do you think any beliefs meet an infallibilist criterion for knowledge? If not, would you mind commenting on the argument I gave in my Aquascum post?

    //I do think infallibilist knowledge is possible - necessarily possible, actually. After all, the claim that "all [human] knowledge is fallible" would itself be fallible. It could be false. So even on purely fallibilistic grounds, infallibilist knowledge is necessarily possible.

    But I think we can do better than that. If a pure fallibilist would admit infallible knowledge is necessarily possible, wouldn't he also have to acknowledge there is criteria according to which we could discriminate between fallible and infallible knowledge? The reason we wouldn't have infallible knowledge would only be because we couldn't satisfy the criteria. Then again, what of our knowledge of that criteria? If it were infallible, he wouldn't be a pure fallibilist. But if it were fallible, then he couldn't really acknowledge that there is any criteria according to which we could discriminate between fallible and infallible knowledge. Satisfaction of a fallible criteria would yield fallible beliefs.

    Further, while I've argued pure fallibilism would necessarily entail that any belief could be false, such would seemingly include that necessary entailment! So in effect, pure fallibilism rejects necessity. It corresponds to pure possibilism in which everything and anything goes. In that case, everything could be true, could be false, could be both true and false, meaningless, etc. I don't see that this can be intelligibly defended, for any such defense would presuppose that concepts or propositions mean something definite. So either pure fallibilism is, as Aquascum would say, "self-referentially incoherent," or I've misunderstood what pure fallibilism is, in which case there would seem to be a case to be made for infallibilism anyway.//

    On a related note, do you think our beliefs have temporal parts or occur over distinct points time? In that case, all our beliefs would be memorial.

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    1. "Do you think any beliefs meet an infallibilist criterion for knowledge?"

      I don't object to infallible beliefs in principle. I think some beliefs *are* infallible.

      I just object to saying no belief counts as knowledge unless it's infallible.

      Although criteria are useful and necessary up to a point, it's hard to *start* with criteria. It's hard to avoid vicious circularity. As Chisholm put it, summarizing Montaigne, "To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedure is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle."

      Back to you:

      "On a related note, do you think our beliefs have temporal parts or occur over distinct points time? In that case, all our beliefs would be memorial."

      i) Human consciousness is finite. We have many beliefs which are so engrained that we act on them or take them for granted without consciously thinking about them at the time.

      ii) Likewise, "memory" is a bit ambiguous. We have forgotten memories (paradoxical as that sounds) in the sense that we have buried memories which we can't consciously retrieve. The memories are still there (as it were). Stored away. Occasionally, something happens to us that triggers an old memory. It comes out of the blue.

      iii) Our recollection of past events is typically subconscious. We're not simultaneously aware of everything that ever happened to us. That would be extremely distracting. Usually we're aware of the present situation.

      However, we can summon many of our memories. Retrieve them from storage. Raise them from subconsciousness to consciousness, and then reflect on them. Reminisce about old times.

      Many of our memories are available, without being something we're presently aware of. And some memories are inaccessible (see above).

      At a practical level, I think many of our beliefs are mental habits. Subliminal beliefs that inform our outlook and behavior.

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    2. i) I think the philosophical objection to sense knowledge goes something like this:

      Oftentimes (maybe most of the time), beliefs formed on the basis of sensory perception are accurate. But every now and then, sensory perception lets us down. So even if sensory perception is generally reliable, how can we trust it unless we have a way of telling when it lets us down?

      ii) Mind you, this statement of the problem is a bit paradoxical. The admission that sensory perception sometimes lets us down presumes that we are correcting misperceptions, or misinterpretations of observation, on the basis of *something*. What is that something? Is it more instances of the same kind? Is it an underlying reason, such as what causes the phenomenon?

      iii) A secular epistemologist might have a pragmatic answer: if we have no alternative to reliance on sensory perception, then we must trust our senses even when they let us down. Sometimes our luck runs out.

      iv) But Reformed theism has resources which secular philosophy lacks. Take Biblical witnesses to the Resurrection (e.g. Lk 24; Jn 20-21; 1 Cor 15).

      In a random universe, it's possible for witnesses to misperceive events, misinterpret what they see, or misremember. Mind you, given the number of independent witnesses, that becomes vanishingly unlikely.

      But from the standpoint of Reformed theology, predestination and providence, it is God's intention that belief in the Resurrection based on sensory perception of the Risen Christ matches reality. That's not just getting lucky.

      Indeed, there are many situations where God has coordinated the variables (e.g. viewing conditions, our mental state at the time) so that sensory perception *will* be an accurate source of information. The correlation is providential.

      By the same token, there are situations in which God has predestined sensory perception to let us down.

      Since, however, the whole process is out of out hands, since that's in God's hands, it's not so much a matter of trusting our senses, but trusting divine providence. Even if beliefs based on sensory perception are sometimes wrong, even that serves a purpose in the wisdom of God. It's not the luck of the draw–for better or worse.

      And, of course, the same considerations apply to memory and reason. These are fallible.

      There's no point fretting about variables beyond our control. We do the best we can with what God put at our disposal. Even if we err, that's not the end of the world. For even our unavoidable mistakes further God's design.

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    3. Steve,

      Thanks for the reply, some good thoughts. Two more questions if you have the time:

      "I think some beliefs *are* infallible."

      Can you think of an example of a belief in which you or I could be infallibly justified and, if so, what? Or is infallibilist justification only applicable to non-humans?

      "And, of course, the same considerations apply to memory and reason. These are fallible."

      My question about whether our beliefs have temporal parts probably wasn't clear enough. I'm interested in whether it takes time for us to think anything at all. Given a proposition we believe, did it take time for us to believe it? Our belief occurs in time, but does it occur over or across time?

      If so, wouldn't any belief require the use of memory, say, in remembering the affirmed subject of the proposition of which we are predicating something? If so, and if our memorial beliefs are *necessarily* fallible (I don't think you've said one way or another your position on this), then how could any of *our* beliefs be infallible (again, not sure of your position on this either)?

      I have no position here, just looking for some insight if you have any.

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    4. "Can you think of an example of a belief in which you or I could be infallibly justified and, if so, what? Or is infallibilist justification only applicable to non-humans?"

      i) For starters, I'm not sure why we need to cast the issue in terms of infallbilist justification rather than infallible belief.

      Suppose God intends Mary Magdalene to truly believe that Jesus rose from the dead. Not merely that, but God has prearranged conditions (e.g. her mental state, physical evidence) such that she could not be mistaken in perceiving that it was Jesus who rose from the dead.

      ii) Moreover, once we take meticulous providence into account, surely there are many situations in which God intends us to form a true belief. Not only that, but given providential circumstances, we could not be wrong in that situation.

      iii) If you wish to cash it (i.e. knowledge) out in terms of some condition additional to the truth condition and the belief condition, that needn't necessarily be a justification condition. Perhaps it could utilize a reliabilist theory of knowledge or causal theory of knowledge. Either if these might be easily adapted to a doctrine of Reformed providence.

      [Quoting me: "And, of course, the same considerations apply to memory and reason. These are fallible."

      I wasn't speaking for myself in that statement. Rather, I assume Scripturalists typically think memory and reason are fallible. Surely they think memory is fallible. Sometimes memory fails us. And they certainly think human begins can and often do draw false inferences. Construct unsound or invalid arguments, &c.

      And even if they think memory is often correct, if they also make infallibilism a condition of knowledge, then memorial beliefs never amount to knowledge. Same thing with deductive arguments.

      It's an all-or-nothing approach. Unless we can never misremember, memory is never infallible. And if memory is never infallible, then memorial beliefs never count as knowledge. That's my understanding to the typical Scripturalist approach.

      However, I myself am not rejecting the possibility or actuality of infallible memories or infallible reasoning. If, say, God predestined me to correctly remember my mother's birthdate, then isn't my belief infallible? If that's a true belief, and if, by virtue of predestination, that belief could not be otherwise, then isn't that belief infallibly true? Not merely inerrant, but infallible. Foreordination procludes me from misremembering her birthdate. It isn't even possible for me to misremember her birthdate, if God predestined me to correctly remember when she was born.

      Naturally, that doesn't mean God always predestines me not to forget or misremember her birthdate. But just in cases where he does predestine me not to forget or misremember it.

      Given predestination and providence, we could extend that to a vast range of true beliefs.

      iv) Of course, that's distinct from the verification of a true belief. If you make verification a condition of knowledge, then that complicates matters.

      "I'm interested in whether it takes time for us to think anything at all. Given a proposition we believe, did it take time for us to believe it? Our belief occurs in time, but does it occur over or across time?"

      Do you mean the moment we arrive at a belief? Or the process by which we arrive at a belief? Sometimes a belief just *comes* to us. At other times, that's a laborious process. And at still other times, there's a tacit belief, based on subliminal information processing, where the belief will later surface.

      "If so, and if our memorial beliefs are *necessarily* fallible."

      If a belief is not only true, but foreordained, then there's a sense in which it's necessarily infallible. I cannot believe other than what God predestined me to believe. In cases where I believe rightly, I could not believe otherwise. I could not believe wrongly. Could not believe something else (i.e. believe an alternative to my true belief).

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    5. "I'm not sure why we need to cast the issue in terms of infallbilist justification rather than infallible belief."

      "Need" is context based. We don't need infallibilist justification to satisfy conditions under which we possess certain legitimate forms of "knowledge." We do need it to satisfy conditions for another type of knowledge. You could then ask if we need this type of knowledge. I think so, and the reason why can be illustrated by something you say later:

      "If a belief is not only true, but foreordained, then there's a sense in which it's necessarily infallible."

      In this case, all true beliefs are infallible, as you say. But in each example you give, we're supposing or hypothesizing the beliefs these people have are true. On externalism, these people wouldn't themselves necessarily be aware of the truth status of all of their own true beliefs, in which case they couldn't necessarily defend them over against what false beliefs God may also have foreordained.

      Do we need to be able to defend every true belief? No. Does our inability to defend every true belief suggest it's illegitimate to refer to those beliefs as knowledge? No, so long as it's specified the kind of knowledge it is. But we do need to be able to defend Christianity when performing apologetics. In addition to the first reply, which is about infallibilist justification, that's why I think internalist justification is "needed."

      You're right, verification conditions do complicate matters. That's why I'm asking what beliefs you think we could have which would satisfy them, if you think we even can have any. You're smart.

      "I wasn't speaking for myself in that statement. Rather, I assume Scripturalists typically think memory and reason are fallible. Surely they think memory is fallible."

      Typically, yes. But if infallibilist, internalist justification is possible in principle, and all our beliefs rely on memory - or even just beliefs relevant to forming infallibly, internally justified beliefs - I would suppose a transcendental argument could be constructed to defend against the idea all memorial beliefs are fallible in respect to justification. This could be a way in which memorial and sensory beliefs are relevantly disanalogous. That's why I'm interested in whether the actual believing of a proposition always, in human cases, requires memory. But this is just a suspicion.

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    6. "On externalism, these people wouldn't themselves necessarily be aware of the truth status of all of their own true beliefs, in which case they couldn't necessarily defend them over against what false beliefs God may also have foreordained."

      i) Indeed, given predestination, both true and false beliefs are foreordained. And so that raises the question of how to sort them out.

      However, looming in the background of that question is the ominous specter of the Cartesian demon. Internalist justification isn't exempt from machinations of the Cartesian demon.

      Moreover, that's not confined to Calvinism–or even theism. Naturalistic evolution can be a Cartesian demon, if our brains are the byproduct of a mindless process.

      Indeterminism can be a Cartesian demon, if our beliefs are the result of random factors beyond our control.

      The question is whether you're demanding an inhuman level of certainty, including the ability to refute ingenious thought-experiments. I recently discussed the Cartesian demon:

      http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2015/06/carrier-on-cartesian-demons.html

      ii) Of course, inasmuch as global skepticism is self-refuting, it is possible to construct a transcendental argument against it. The question, though, is how much knowledge a transcendental argument can salvage.

      "Do we need to be able to defend every true belief? No. Does our inability to defend every true belief suggest it's illegitimate to refer to those beliefs as knowledge? No, so long as it's specified the kind of knowledge it is. But we do need to be able to defend Christianity when performing apologetics. In addition to the first reply, which is about infallibilist justification, that's why I think internalist justification is 'needed.'"

      i) Okay, but that fails to distinguish between whether I'm justified in what I believe, and whether I can give a justification for what I believe. In fact, if I can give a justification for what I believe, then is there not a sense in which I was justified in what I believe apart from that subsequent defense? The defense of what I believe isn't what constituted my warrant, but merely uncovered its hidden foundations.

      ii) Assuming that distinction, externalism might be the right model for my being justified, while internalism might be the right model for my giving a justification.

      "You're right, verification conditions do complicate matters. That's why I'm asking what beliefs you think we could have which would satisfy them, if you think we even can have any. You're smart."

      i) If predestined true beliefs are infallibly true, then that satisfies the infallibilist condition–at least in principle. That would require an argument for predestination.

      ii) Of course, that only pushes the question back a step–if it's a question of how to verify which beliefs meet the truth condition. Mind you, I don't think that's distinct from the question of how we verify or falsify beliefs generally.

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    7. "Of course, inasmuch as global skepticism is self-refuting, it is possible to construct a transcendental argument against it. The question, though, is how much knowledge a transcendental argument can salvage."

      I wouldn't found internally and infallibly justified beliefs on transcendental arguments. I think that at the very least requires omniscience and likely more, given there are contingent truths.

      But I do think we can use TAGs to show that if infallibly, internally justified beliefs are in some sense "needed" - at least on Christianity - that only means some such knowledge must be foundational in character rather than the product of inferential argumentation. TAGs can be a way we can argue for or defend our foundations even while it is from foundations themselves that these are known.

      In this case, to the extent that foundational knowledge is involved in a defense of foundational knowledge, such apologetics isn't about justifying what we are already justified in believing - although apologetics can serve that function in other contexts. It's about showing how we can in principle have internally, infallibly justified beliefs in the first place.

      "Okay, but that fails to distinguish between whether I'm justified in what I believe, and whether I can give a justification for what I believe."

      I don't know that it's fair to say I didn't distinguish it, since the sort of justification I mentioned was specifically internalist, and I've already mentioned several times I believe beliefs can be externally justified and in some sense known apart from internalist justification.

      But it's fair to bring out the distinction, sure. I don't disagree with your qualifications in i) or ii) here, ii) especially is a nice, short way of putting things, whether or not you yourself agree with it.

      "Of course, that only pushes the question back a step–if it's a question of how to verify which beliefs meet the truth condition. Mind you, I don't think that's distinct from the question of how we verify or falsify beliefs generally."

      Right, so how do we do that?

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    8. "In this case, to the extent that foundational knowledge is involved in a defense of foundational knowledge"

      should read:

      "In this case, to the extent that TAGs are involved in a defense of foundational knowledge."

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    9. I don't have to be fair–I'm a Calvinist! :-)

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    10. Are you using verification and justification (or internalist justification) synonymously?

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    11. Lol. And yes, I am. I guess I should have asked if you were as well.

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    12. That's a tall order. Several issues:

      i) I think one can get too blogged down in debates over the nature of justification. Defending a particular model of justification, even if it's the right model, doesn't actually defend any of our actual beliefs.

      Suppose access internalism is the way to go. But all you've done is to defend a theory of justification, rather than defending your beliefs. To say in the abstract that the justification of a belief depends on having access to the subject's experience doesn't identify what the subject's experience is, and how that experience provides evidence for his belief.

      If, on the other hand, you take a particular belief, consider the experience that generated that belief, and explain how the experience provides evidence for the belief, then you can skip the preliminaries altogether. You don't have to first prove internalism to prove the belief. For whether internalism or externalism is the way to go, defending a particular belief will still come down to specific evidence, specific inferences therefrom.

      ii) There's the question of how much we're trying to prove. As you know, every argument must take some things for granted. Whenever we try to prove something, the argument will include some presuppositions we don't attempt to prove by that argument.

      So it depends, in part, on the target audience.

      iii) When it comes to "foundational" knowledge, I think transcendental argumentation is good. Ask a programmatic question like: What must the world be like for human reason to be reliable? What kind of world must we be living in for memory to be reliable? What must the world be like for sensory perception to be reliable? What kind of world must we be living in for moral realism to be true?

      What properties must the world have for these results to be the case? Can a godless universe secure human reason, or memory, or sensory perception, or moral realism?

      You compare and contrast a theistic model with an atheistic model. What are the consequences of atheism with respect to human reason or memory?

      If you deny a divine Creator, meticulous providence, &c., where does that leave reason, memory, and perception?

      Some secular philosophers helpfully detail the skeptical or reductionistic consequences of naturalism. Conversely, design theory arguments, the argument from reason, Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, Welty/Anderson's theistic conceptual realism, &c., can pencil in many details.

      iv) Take another example: suppose you make a case for indirect realism. Suppose you show that's the best theory of perception.

      Given the gap between appearance and reality, how do we know (or do we?) that we're not living in a Matrix-like illusion? Mind you, even in the Matrix, some theistic proofs still apply.

      But absent divine revelation to supply an intersubjectival frame of reference, how can I tell where appearance ends and reality begins?

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    13. "When it comes to "foundational" knowledge, I think transcendental argumentation is good... absent divine revelation to supply an intersubjectival frame of reference, how can I tell where appearance ends and reality begins?"

      Yes. And here is where I think TAGs for infallibly and internally justified beliefs, TAGs for self-authenticating communication from a person or persons who is or are omniscient, etc. work in favor of a qualified Scripturalism - or if not Scripturalism because so far changed from Clark's formulation as to become too different to be identified with it - a revelational epistemology nonetheless.

      Thanks for the thoughts.

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  4. Ryan, quick comment. Your argument for the conclusion that "infallible knowledge" is necessarily possible seems a bit quick. When you say "all human knowledge is fallible could be false", what is type of 'could' at work here? Is it the 'could' of metaphysical or epistemological possibility? If the former, isn't your argument just viciously circular? If the latter, so what? That x is epistemologically possible doesn't entail, so I think, that it's metaphysically possible. Now, you could make some argument for the entailment, but until then your inference isn't as straightforward as you seem to suppose.

    Second, why think "pure fallibilism" entails that any belief could be false? I assume you mean the proposition *believed* could be false? How does that argument go? In your mind, does pure fallibilism entail we always and only believe cobtingently true propositions?

    - Paul

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    1. Paul,

      Thanks for the reply, it was very helpful.

      "When you say "all human knowledge is fallible could be false", what is type of 'could' at work here?"

      Epistemic possibility. I'm primarily interested in the internal consistency and defensibility of the pure fallibilists position, so I do need to revise statements like "In that case, everything could be true, could be false, could be both true and false, meaningless, etc.," to something like, "In that case, for the pure fallibilist, his own position would admit as possible that everything could be true, could be false, could be both true and false, meaningless, etc."

      "Second, why think "pure fallibilism" entails that any belief could be false? I assume you mean the proposition *believed* could be false? How does that argument go?"

      That was definitional, as in it's my understanding of what pure fallibilism is supposed to mean. It was misleading of me to say "I've argued pure fallibilism would necessarily entail that any belief could be false," I should have said "I've argued one's belief in pure fallibilism would on his own grounds necessarily entail that his own belief in pure fallibilism could be false." I need to work on clarifying this, you're right.

      "In your mind, does pure fallibilism entail we always and only believe cobtingently true propositions?"

      No, only that even if we believed a necessary truth, we wouldn't be able to identify it as such.

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    2. Thanks. Do you put the inflibilist constraint on the 'truth' or the 'justification/warrant' condition of knowledge?

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    3. Justification. But I want to make clear I don't think every belief that is legitimately known must be infallibly justified. I'm only arguing for infallibilist justification in principle. So I wouldn't say I "constrain" knowledge.

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    4. So it's not just that the proposition believed can't be mistaken, but that, in the epistemic position in which you find yourself, you can't possibly be mistaken. What do you think such a position looks like?

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    5. In the first place, I'm not sure how propositions themselves could be mistaken, unless by that you mean false. But we don't "know" any of our false beliefs, so I don't see how a question of being "mistaken" could even be taken in any other way than that we ourselves can't be mistaken.

      "What do you think such a position looks like?"

      That's a question which deserves a book length treatment.

      As I said in my above conversation with Steve, I think various TAGs can't be used to argue for foundational knowledge - where knowledge is in this case referring to internally and infallibly justified beliefs - without its being the case TAGs become premises for that foundational knowledge. That thought would further imply TAGs don't need to be known at all in order to have foundational knowledge, although obviously useful for apologetic purposes in persuading and convincing. On the other hand, foundational knowledge we have must at least be able to account for TAGs in principle such that one could know them on that basis. As I said in my reply to Aquascum:

      //...am I saying everyone needs to engage in apologetics and exegesis? No. Am I saying everyone possesses internally justified or infallible knowledge? No. Am I saying everyone knows the law of non-contradiction or himself? No.

      But - and here's the point - are these ideas incompatible with Scripturalism? Or rather, are the contradictories of these ideas compatible with Scripturalism? Can one intelligibly defend a worldview which precludes internalist justification, infallible knowledge, the law of non-contradiction, or self-knowledge? No. But then, given such an answer, and given Scriptural affirmations of self-knowledge, the legitimacy of apologetics and interpretation of Scripture, etc. - given these things, is it not the case that Scripturalists necessarily could have internally justified, infallible knowledge, self-knowledge, or knowledge of the law of non-contradiction? I argue yes.//

      So I leave as the conclusion of this comment - or the foundation for it, depending on how you look at it - that I think divine revelation alone can constitute foundational knowledge for Christians in the sense you are asking about.

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    6. Right; seems clear by a mistaken proposition I meant false. And I obviously know enough about epistemology such that we don't know false propositions, so it seems a bit uncharitable to read me that way. I was clearly talking about a infallibilism constraint just in the *truth* condition of the components that *taken together* would equal knowledge.

      As for the answer to the justification question, sounds like all you have now is an IOU. Shame, I was looking for a substantive position to evaluate. I wish you well as you develop it!

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    7. I wasn't intending to be uncharitable, I just didn't know if I had missed something here. Sorry. I've cited your writing as instrumental in helping me see ways in which Clark's and Cheung's metaphysical positions are flawed, I'm not looking to make enemies here.

      I'm not sure what you're looking for in regards to your question. I mean, I guess you could read specific posts on my blog, I just doubted you were looking to be forwarded that. It's just too broad of a question for me to answer in a single comment. Perhaps someone more capable could do it.

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    8. I haven't read any of your posts, so you can leave a couple of links to ones that you take it answer that question and I'll read 'em.

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    9. http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/02/necessary-and-sufficient-conditions-for.html

      http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/10/scripturalism-and-foundationalism.html

      http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/05/aquascum-developing-scripturalism-and.html

      I think these posts best show how I view the relationship between apologetics and internally and infallibly justified belief. The first two posts were written before I was aware of the internalist-externalist debate, so excuse the presumption in them that knowledge is internally and infallibly justified belief. The reply to Aquascum also has links to various specific TAGs, if you are so inclined to read them.

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    10. This is me, different account already signed in.

      Ok, thanks. Oh, to get back to one of the points. So you say 'can' is the 'can' of epistemic possibility. But all that only tells us is that, "for all you know," all human knowledge is false could be false. That is, it's *consistent* with what you know that (a) all human knowledge is fallible is true and (b), that (a) is false. But whether (a) *is* false is a metaphysical matter. Perhaps God has constructed us such that we could never be in such a privileged epistemological position such that, given that position, it's impossible that our belief could be false. So i'm wondering how you move from mere epistemic possibility to metaphysical possibility?

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    11. Metaphysical possibility has to do with what can be true in some possible world, right?

      TAGs are designed to show what must be true across all possible worlds, or all possible worlds in which we exist, anyway. Do you accept any TAGs as sound? For all we know, could global skepticism be sound, concepts or propositions mean nothing definite, everything be true, be false, be both true and false, be meaningless, etc.?

      I think epistemologies and metaphysical necessities are reflected in one another. If one were to say, "yes, we must admit certain things as epistemologically necessary in order to ___," isn't he also admitting the metaphysical necessity that "across all possible worlds [in which we exist], we must admit certain things as epistemologically necessary in order to ___"?

      "But whether (a) *is* false is a metaphysical matter."

      Is this assertion metaphysically necessary, true across all possible worlds (or all possible worlds in which we exist)?

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    12. In response to my 3rd paragraph, I suppose you will reply that something could be epistemologically necessary in one possible world in which we exist but not another.

      Perhaps the way to go is to get at metaphysical necessity from metaphysical possibility. In order for there to be metaphysical possibility, it is metaphysically necessary that there are possible worlds and truths. This is also an epistemic necessity. What do you think?

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    14. Ryan,

      I'm afraid we're miscommunicating. I have not read your interactions with Steve. I have read any of your blog posts (yet). I have not brought up TAG, and so am not unclear why you're bringing that up. What I did read was you quick argument for "possibly false that (all human knowledg is fallible)". So references to other topics will be lost on me, or irrelevant.

      I asked you whether your use of "could be false" was epistemic possibility and you said yes (epistemic possibility is "for all I know/ consistent with all my knowledge"). But I take it that your conclusion about humans, the way they have been constructed, their psychology, the epistemic situations they providentially find themselves in, in other words your drawing a metaphysical conclusion.

      My question has been, how are you bridging the gap from epistemic possibility to metaphysical possibility? Just because x is epistemically possible to S, that doesn't imy that x is metaphysically possible. Example: 1,000 years ago it was epistemically possible to Gorba the Greek that water had the structure xyz. However, assuming Kripkean arguments here, this wasn't a metaphysical possibility (if you don't like the example, others are easy to come by).

      So I'm just talking about your argument. I have no ulterior motive. I'm not trying to defend or allude to TAG, or Van Til, or anything broader than the specific argument from you I began this subthread with.

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    15. Really helpful and interesting dialogue Paul and Ryan. Good discussion.

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    16. Sorry for the late reply. Thanks for the clarification, I admit it's been a bit difficult for me to grasp the objection, primarily because I'm unfamiliar with the phrases epistemic/metaphysical possibility/necessity.

      The reason I brought up TAGs was not to suggest you had any ulterior motive. I brought them up because I think any metaphysical beliefs we form are founded on epistemic assumptions we hold. To the extent that TAGs show what we have to believe in order to make sense of anything, I think that also will extend to what metaphysical conclusions we are able to consistently hold, hold such that we can make sense of anything.

      If I understand you correctly, your question about metaphysical possibilities is due to the following statement in my above paragraphs (correct me if I'm wrong):

      //I don't see that this can be intelligibly defended, for any such defense would presuppose that concepts or propositions mean something definite. So either pure fallibilism is, as Aquascum would say, "self-referentially incoherent," or I've misunderstood what pure fallibilism is, in which case there would seem to be a case to be made for infallibilism anyway.//

      My argument was that pure fallibilism leads to certain implications, implications which for that reason we ought to reject pure fallibilism, analogous to the way in which, say, trivialism, global skepticism, or any other contradictory of the conclusion of a sound TAG means we ought to reject those positions: those positions can't be intelligibly defended. Assuming those positions leads us to the conclusion they are false. That's what I think is the case here with respect to pure fallibilism. It can't be the case everything is meaningless, for example. The truth of that would undercut the position itself.

      So are you asking how it follows that an unintelligible position is incapable of being intelligibly defended? I'm sorry if it seems like I'm trying to change the terms of discussion. I'll look up Kripke's statements on the subject if you don't think this attempt at a short cut is advisable.

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  5. Clark regarding not knowing who you think is in front of you.“So long as substitution is possible, certainty is impossible.” Presumably by certainly Clark meant knowledge. I'm afraid what Clark has done is not limit man in his finitude but God in his power to communicate.

    Paul, with my last phone upgrade I lost many emails including yours. If you have mine, please shoot me an email. Listened for the first time yesterday your Barker debate. Good stuff.

    That's all for now.

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  6. Clark regarding not knowing who you think is in front of you.“So long as substitution is possible, certainty is impossible.” Presumably by certainly Clark meant knowledge. I'm afraid what Clark has done is not limit man in his finitude but God in his power to communicate.

    I should add: sometimes I think clarkians conflate knowledge of knowledge with knowledge.

    Paul, with my last phone upgrade I lost many emails including yours. If you have mine, please shoot me an email. Listened for the first time yesterday your Barker debate. Good stuff.

    That's all for now.

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  7. Paul, if you ever consider debating atheists again here are three atheists I'd like to see you debate.

    Justin Schieber
    or
    Ozymandias Ramses II (an obvious pseudonym)
    or
    Matt Dillahunty
    or
    a dialogue with Steve Shives

    I'd especially like to see a debate with the 2nd or 1st on the list. The 2nd (Ozy) because I had dialogued with him for years in the early 2000's. Ozy studied philosophy as a undergraduate and was knowledgeable enough that he was allowed to teach classes to other undergraduates. His background is in epistemology. That was his the area of research when he eventually decided to stop pursuing his doctorate. He said that the closer he got to getting his doctorate, the less appealing it became to him.

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