Freewill theists, especially Arminian bloggers and their ilk, speak of freewill as if that's a transparent, self-evident concept. They in turn accuse Calvinists of either denying freewill or redefining freewill in some ad hoc fashion.
As a matter of fact, the concept of freewill is a very complex and hotly contested issue in contemporary philosophy. Here's an overview:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
Isn't it true, though, that most Calvinists would affirm a sort of Compatibilism/Soft Determinism? A view of the will which states that freedom is the ability to do that which one wants. In contrast to the Libertarian and Determinist position which defines freedom as the ability to do otherwise.
ReplyDeleteIf Compatibilism is the Calvinist stance, then freewill theists are essentially correct in stating the Calvinists have redefined freedom. Freedom is no longer about agency, it's about mechanic cause and effect. I can't help but agree with critics who call Calvinism out for its elimination of human responsibility. If humans are not the originator's of their actions, then it is silly to call them responsible. They literally have no choice. Choice is necessary for culpability. In a Determinist (either soft or hard) worldview, humans are instruments, just links at the end of a causal chain.
John Walker | freedominorthodoxy.blogspot.com
To judge by your tendentious, simplistic comment, you didn't even bother to read the article I linked to.
DeleteIt's also simplistic to define 'compatibilism' as a "view of the will which states that freedom is the ability to do that which one wants." This shows an ignorance of the position. And even on its own terms, at best it states a *necessary* but insufficient condition of freedom. Walker may want to familiarize himself with the various compatibilist positions:
Deletehttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html
To say that "If humans are not the originator's [sic] of their actions, then it is silly to call them responsible..." is simply to beg the very question at issue.
DeleteWhen presented in my philosophy class, this is the way the views were proposed. I'd love to hear your responses. Clearly you hold to Compatibilism, how would you describe the will?
DeleteThe follow up question is necessary as well, how do you define responsibility? (Beyond answering culpability)
DeleteCalvinism doesn't begin with a theory of the will. Calvinism begins with certain biblically-derived categories like absolute predestination, meticulous providence, divine hardening, spiritual inability, monergistic regeneration, perseverance, &c. To some extent it's up to philosophical theologians to postulate corresponding mechanisms.
DeleteWe also need to distinguish between local and global limiting conditions. Spiritual inability is a local limiting condition. A result of original sin. By contrast, predestination and providence are global in scope. Intrinsic.
I understand that matters of the will and responsibility are corollaries to the central features of Calvinism. However, for the system to be believable, it must have coherent accounts of the will and responsibility. If it cannot make sense of these, then perhaps the flaw is found in the system itself. Which would send us back to the text to reassess the accuracy of our exegesis.
DeleteHave you bothered to read the article I linked to? Are you aware of the intricacies and imponderables on both sides of the debate?
DeleteResponsibility isn't hard to define. Is that really what you're asking, for do you have in mind the necessary preconditions of responsibility?
DeleteCalvinism takes the position that the unregenerate are unable to exercise saving faith apart from God's unilateral grace. That's perfectly coherent. And the notion of blame isn't hard to define, so far as I can see.
But if you're demanding a psychological or metaphysical theory, Calvinism doesn't depend on that.
John Walker said...
DeleteI understand that matters of the will and responsibility are corollaries to the central features of Calvinism. However, for the system to be believable, it must have coherent accounts of the will and responsibility.
A good place to start:
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology: A Contemporary Introduction by Paul Manata
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteI realize that this is a slightly different question from the one at hand, but I figure that I'll ask it given that the general subject matters are the same. I've noticed that one argument that's been used here against Arminianism is the objection that God could have given creatures libertarian freedom without their having to sin, just as He has such freedom (or something like it). What would you say, Steve, to Pruss's response to that objection here: http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2013/11/moral-and-perfect-freedom.html?
ReplyDeletePruss is a lot smarter than me, so maybe I'm missing something but...
Delete(1) Pruss says: "God's action of inviting someone into communion with him very much has something very significant to be said for it that God's creating someone who will inevitably be in communion with him doesn't."
(2) Then Pruss says: "There is a value to loving someone by choice."
But I don't see where Pruss says what he says is very significant to be said about moral freedom over perfect freedom in his first point and what Pruss says in his second point is the issue in dispute, isn't it?
Perhaps Pruss means in his first point that what is very significant to be said is what he says in his second point, but, again, whether it's more valuable to create beings with moral freedom over perfect freedom is the contentious point.
"I've noticed that one argument that's been used here against Arminianism is the objection that God could have given creatures libertarian freedom without their having to sin, just as He has such freedom..."
DeleteAssume Arminianism. Not only *could* God give creatures libertarian freedom without their having to sin, but this is *EXACTLY* what will occur in the afterlife. Once we are in heaven, it is impossible for us to sin. This means either that it is possible to have libertarian free will without the possibility of sin, or that in heaven there is no LFW, which means LFW is not actually relevant to questions of morality.
Peter, they say that those heavenly actions can be traced back to prior libertarian free actions.For example, a prior LFW action to "choose Christ" which entails a changed nature that will result in moral perfection. This is similar to the response to whether Sam is responsible if he kills Bob while hypnotized. If Sam was forcibly hypnotized, then no. But if he freely underwent the hypnosis and knew (or even believed) that he would be hypnotized to kill Bob, then his act is (derivatively) free and responsible, traced back to a prior LFW and responsible action.
DeleteMr. Fletcher,
DeleteYou said: "...a prior LFW action to 'choose Christ' which entails a changed nature that will result in moral perfection." But doesn't the fact that a changed nature that results in *moral perfection* being the ultimate goal actually prove beyond all doubt that LFW is unnecessary for moral perfection? Is this not actually agreeing that one cannot be morally perfect so long as one has LFW? Indeed, all this type of morality seems to be saying is, "The purpose of LFW is for you to reject LFW."
Well, they say you can't get to moral perfection without a LFW choice to trust in Christ. It's not a "rejection" of LFW, for all the morally perfect actions are still L-free, but they are *derivatively* L-free and not *immediately* L-free. Also, they'll still hold to PAPs, you can just choose between goods. That leaves the sourcehood constraint. Since they say their heavenly actions have their "ultimate source" in the prior libertarian free action of the agent, they've satisfied all the desiderata for LFW.
DeleteHere's two libertarians that make this case:
http://people.nnu.edu/ktimpe/research/heavenly_freedom.pdf
http://people.nnu.edu/ktimpe/research/CowanReply.pdf
BTW, a problem for this view is infants who die in infancy and go to heaven. They never L-free set their will, "made a decision." So this view has to posit something like purgatory. Which is what the above authors do, and which is why many prominent libertarian protestants are finding it attractive and necessary to posit purgatory.
DeleteI wonder why they would think we need sourcehood of character formation though. Why isn't sourecehood of choice sufficient? So God creates creatures with LFW in the beatific state. We have PAP and sourcehood, just not sourcehood extending to our moral nature.
DeleteBut then I suppose this along the lines of what Pruss is addressing? There is value in moral character formation. But I don't see where he argues that there is more value in character formation sourcehood over against starting in a beatific state.
Besides, it seems like most of our character forming choices are made without proper knowledge of the scope or significance of those choices. If the point of this earthly life is to provide a stage for the source of our moral character, it seems the stage is woefully poor for what's to follow.
Do you know of any arguments that address the value of moral character sourcehood capacities over simple choice sourcehood?
Well, if you act *from* a character, or from a "will" that is *set*, then if that character or will *determines* your actions, you couldn't be free, per the very definition of LFW. To most clearly see this, they'll point to cases where we couldn't do otherwise but are, apparently, responsible (think here of the drunk who can't avoid punching someone who touches his girlfriend's arm). One example from Kane is Luther who, we'll suppose, means "I can do no other" *literally*. Is Luther responsible? Kane wants to say "yes." So how does it square with libertarianism? Well, his austere character had to have been formed by a prior LFW action.
DeleteWhen you bring up the "proper knowledge" point, that raises a good question of "luck." And this is a real problem for the view. But, compatibilism must have an answer too, for if we fail to meet the "epistemic constraint," then we too can't be responsible. So it's a live issue for both views, but more so for libertarianism.
If you'd like to read more on this from a libertarian, you can read:
http://www.amazon.com/Free-Will-2nd-Sourcehood-Alternatives/dp/1441146423/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1385510452&sr=8-1&keywords=timpe
By: "you couldn't be free, per the very definition of LFW" I mean "you couldn't be free, per the very definition of LFW, unless you were L-free in forming that character or setting that will"
Delete>>Well, if you act *from* a character, or from a "will" that is *set*, then if that character or will *determines* your actions, you couldn't be free, per the very definition of LFW.
DeleteBut in that case there is no PAP, right? I'm suggesting a scenario where PAP still obtains in a beatific state. Pruss talks about "freedom to choose between morally permissible actions, but with a perfect and infallible directedness at the good" and I assume he thinks PAP is still in play here. I'm familiar with Kane's Luther example (per his intro book) but he also talks about (something like) necessary but insufficient causes, if I remember correctly (it's been a few years since I've looked at it). And I assume this is the sort of "setness" that libertarians think will obtain at one level in the beatific state: our character is set to the range of goods.
So in the scenario I suggested we would not be responsible for our characters, granted, but we are still responsible for choices we make. So we have one level of sourcehood, what I referred to as simple choice sourcehood, and PAP. Doesn't that satisfy LFW or is it that a deeper kind of sourcehood--a sourcehood of character--is essential to LFW? If the latter then I'm wondering what arguments they offer for that. Maybe Timpe address this. Thanks for the suggested resource.
>>Well, if you act *from* a character, or from a "will" that is *set*, then if that character or will *determines* your actions, you couldn't be free, per the very definition of LFW.
DeleteIt occurs to me that maybe you mean "determines" in a weaker sense of "determines you to choose among the range of goods" instead of the stronger sense us Reformed folk usually think of. In which case, you would be saying that the deeper level of sourcehood is essential to LFW. But that strikes me as a hard case to make for libertarians. If we can be responsible for choices without a set character, so long as we are the source of our choices (simple choice sourcehood-SCS), such that we eventually set our character then why not think we can be responsible SCS with a given, set character?
PAP is insufficient for LFW. There appear to be some cases where there is no PAP yet we want to say the person is responsible. So you're leaving out this range of cases.
DeleteAgain, if we're not responsible for our characters, we can't be responsible for the choices that *flow from* those characters.
No, libertarians can allow for cases where a person's character is causally *sufficient* for their doing an action, so long as we can trace it back to prior LFW choice. You'd also have to prove that, in heaven, we will *always* have a range of choices that are all *equally* good. I don't see how you can prove that.
I have no idea what "choice sourcehood" means, as no one uses that phrase. To see whether it suffices for libertarianism and meets the *full range* of cases we need to account for, you'd need to spell it out.
I am not claiming this works, but recall the context. It was claimed that since we can't do otherwise in heaven than choose good, this debunks LFW. I offered their argument for why it doesn't.
>>PAP is insufficient for LFW. There appear to be some cases where there is no PAP yet we want to say the person is responsible. So you're leaving out this range of cases.
DeleteI agree. I didn't mention those cases because I didn't see that it was relevant.
>>Again, if we're not responsible for our characters, we can't be responsible for the choices that *flow from* those characters.
That's the part I don't get on the Libertarian view. I'll have to take a look at Timpe to see what he says.
>>No, libertarians can allow for cases where a person's character is causally *sufficient* for their doing an action, so long as we can trace it back to prior LFW choice.
I wasn't trying to challenge that.
>>You'd also have to prove that, in heaven, we will *always* have a range of choices that are all *equally* good. I don't see how you can prove that.
I agree.
>>I have no idea what "choice sourcehood" means, as no one uses that phrase. To see whether it suffices for libertarianism and meets the *full range* of cases we need to account for, you'd need to spell it out.
By the term "simple choice sourcehood" (maybe less confusingly simple-choice sourcehood) I was simply looking for some term to distinguish responsibility to choices from responsibility to character formation.
>>I am not claiming this works, but recall the context. It was claimed that since we can't do otherwise in heaven than choose good, this debunks LFW. I offered their argument for why it doesn't.
Okay, maybe there was some confusion. I wasn't trying to challenge that point. Anyway, I'll take a look at the resource and see if it address my question.
It's relevant because a theory of free will should be able to cover cases like that.
DeleteOne way to get that point is to think about manipulation cases. A mad scientist creates a person and gives him certain dispositions, character traits, etc., from which the person acts. Suppose this person meets the compatibilist criteria. Libertarians will not think this person is responsible for choosing Lucky Charms if that flows out of a character that was implanted in him. He has to be the source of it.
You're weren't trying to challenge that, fine, but you mentioned Kane and Luther's character being necessary but insufficient. So I was correcting you.
I hope I've at least offered one reason for why they think "simple choice sourcehood", which the manipulated agent presumably has, isn't enough.
>>You're weren't trying to challenge that, fine, but you mentioned Kane and Luther's character being necessary but insufficient. So I was correcting you.
DeleteAh, I see I've been unclear here. I wasn't trying to cast Luther's "here I stand" to Kane's idea of necessary but insufficient. I only meant to acknowledge that I was familiar with it and then, since you got me thinking about Kane's book, to try and jump back to another point Kane made about necessary but insufficient causes in order to draw out another example (in addition to Pruss) of how a libertarian may view the beatific state.
Entirely my fault. But if you don't mind I'll take one more crack at saying what my issue was:
I'll first try to illustrate this with something close to some actual views and then I'll use a more far removed illustration.
First illustration: Consider that some worldviews and religious traditions believe human nature is basically good. For instance, the Confucian philosopher Mencius believed humans were by nature good, but weak. Their weakness and bad tradition is the cause of the human predicament. Likewise, most people probably think of babies as being good. While they wouldn't ascribe moral blame to babies, they also usually don't have any problem praising babies. So people aren't in a neutral or probationary state according to some views. They have a good nature that they aren't responsible for forming.
Supposing that people remained in this good nature or only acted in accordance with it (suppose that some Confucian happened to be surrounded by the best tradition that never gave opportunity to his weakness) I don't see any problem with ascribing praise to such persons for their good actions. In other words, I think there is a prima facie plausibility that such persons are morally responsible for their good actions which flow from their good nature, despite the fact that these persons aren't responsible for their nature. They are the source of their choices to do good. They are not the source of their nature. (Hence I was trying to distinguish between two types or levels of sourcehood.)
Our Confucian can have PAP, he can have a level of sourcehood, he can have Kane's post-CFC determinism. He simply lacks ultimate sourcehood of character, but it seems moral responsibility still makes sense. So--and this is the question I've been concerned with since I butted into your conversation with Peter--have libertarians offered reasons for thinking the level of sourcehood described above is insufficient?
Second illustration: God is not responsible for his character. Yet he is a proper subject of moral praise. So God lacks the level of ultimate sourcehood that libertarians often want to ascribe to humans. Still, God is the source of his choices and actions (simple-choice sourcehood--SCS). Why think that SCS is not sufficient (with PAP, Kane's post-CFC determinsm, etc) when it comes to humans?
It can have PAP, it can have a level of sourcehood, it can have Kane's post-CFC determinism. It simply lacks ultimate sourcehood of character, but it seems moral responsibility still makes sense. So--and this is the question I've been concerned with since I butted into your conversation with Peter--have libertarians offered reasons for thinking the level of sourcehood described above is insufficient?
(Bringing character into the mix and distinguishing it from a person acting according to their nature may muddy things a bit, but just as much for the libertarian as for me, I would think.)
I posted a response and it disappeared. I don't want to type it again, at least now. lol Maybe tomorrow when I'm liquored up.
DeleteI'm not liquored up yet, so this will be an even shorter version than I had tried to post yesterday.
DeleteI do think some contexts of dialogues are being confused. There's (a) what libertarians believe and whether their views are internally consistent and (b) whether they're wrong, externally.I agree with (b) but have been presenting (a).
Your first illustration is interesting for several reasons. First, it's been argued that Confucianism is compatibilist. So this will automatically beg the question. Another problem is that it rests on a contentious point. Some action theorists (on all sides) think there's an asymmetry between praise and blame. So, they think the conditions that apply to praising aren't the conditions that apply to blaming (one reason, blaming is so much more consequential, it exposes people to certain harms). So, these philosophers might agree with you but say, "But that doesn't apply to blaming, and a *complete* theory of FW/MR needs to account for other cases." If you told a similar story about people "born bad," like, say, certain psychopaths, they'd say we shouldn't blame them (in the retributive sense, we can in a consequentialist sense). Those who don't share this asymmetrical view, if they're source incompatibilsts, will say different things. Some, like Kane, might say something like this: Fine, they're born good. But, to be ultimately responsible, they must come to a point where it's possible they could go bad (this is the indeterminism), they then struggle or fight through this and choose the good, thus *setting* their will. Sans that, I think Kane would say they're not praiseworthy (as he denies asymmetry). To support this intuition, recall I raised the problem of babies who die in infancy and go to heaven (digression: I don't think babies are *morally* praiseworthy). This is a problem for their view. So they've had to invoke (something like) purgatory. This allows for that "forming" or "setting" that typically (always?) happens when we come to a *crucial* will-forming fork in the road. E.g., child is born good. Raised well. Morally educated in a direction. But when he's 14 he's under extreme peer pressure and is offered drugs. He stands resolute, and thus sets his will in a certain way.
CONT.
CONT.
DeleteSecond illustration. Similar problem using this illustration. God's freedom is contentious. We shouldn't reason from his freedom to facts about our own. This is admitted by sophisticated libertarians (Timpe, Kane, O'Connor). Kane, citing Wolf, says God has self-perfecting freedom, but no created creature could have this kind of freedom. Ours has a *history*, and we *form* it through choices, etc. To read what some libertarians say about this, see:
https://www.academia.edu/2902569/AN_ANALOGICAL_APPROACH_TO_DIVINE_FREEDOM
and
http://www.indiana.edu/~scotus/files/Freedom_Hum_Face.pdf
Lastly, what would libertarians who hold to the view of source incompatibilism I've been attributing to them say in response to your suggestions? One way to get at this is by manipulation cases. So, they take it as a *datum* that manipulated agents can't be free. So, they ask you to consider two people, Jim and Judy. Both of these people are libertarian free, suppose. They each form their character. Jim becomes a beer swilling, wife beating bigot. Judy becomes a virtuous person, very courageous, etc. Now, a mad scientist *clones* Jim and Judy. So these people come "pre-set" with the above characters. Jim-the-clone runs out of the doctor's office, gets drunk, and punches a waitress. Judy-the-clone runs out, hears a child scream, and saves him from a stranger.
Suppose asymmetry is false. Then the libertarian will say neither clone is ultimately responsible, and they would say this *even if* these people had PAP and your simple-choice sourcehood.
Now, you surely may *disagree* with these people (I do), but that's the logic of their position (expressed briefly in a comments section. For more, read Pereboom's 4-Case argument for source incompatibilism).
Longer than I thought!
Thanks, that's helpful.
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