Pages

Monday, November 19, 2012

Why should the Big Bang singularity help the Kalam cosmological argument?

I’m puzzled by why Jeff Lowder plugs this article:


It’s true that the Big Bang singularity doesn’t help the Kalam cosmological argument, but then, why should it? A cosmological argument based on the Big Bang singularity is an a posteriori theistic proof, whereas the Kalam version of the cosmological argument is an a priori theistic proof. The Kalam argument isn’t based on astrophysics, but on the metaphysical impossibility of a concrete actual infinite (i.e. an infinite past). You can try to attack the underlying assumptions of the Kalam argument, but it’s a purely philosophical argument rather than a scientific argument. The soundness or unsoundness of the Kalam argument is not contingent on evidentiary premises supplied by modern cosmology. So the objection is irrelevant.

15 comments:

  1. I actually have a question about Kalam. Can the argument be used if someone believes in divine timelessness? It seems not because doesn't a view of divine timelessness imply a B-theory of time, and it seems that Craig and others argue that if a B-theory is true, then Kalam is not a good argument. Then I think about the Muslim's, Bonaventure, and others who developed the argument and didn't think that it caused problems for Kalam. Am I confusing a B-theory with timelessness? I guess God could create a world with A-theory time, and yet still be outside of it, is that right?

    ReplyDelete
  2. Yeah. Many people consistently accept both A-theory and divine timelessness. As far as i can see, there is no necessary connection between the two views.

    ReplyDelete
  3. As I understand it, the problem with holding to the conjunction of the A-theory with divine timelessness is that tensed propositions like 'I am tying this now' would have truth values and God wouldn't be able to know them which seems to call his omniscience into question.

    ReplyDelete
  4. There's a related issue. Craig is the leading proponent of the Kalam cosmological argument. He's also an aggressive A-theorist. Are these linked? Does the Kalam argument necessarily presuppose the A-theory of time?

    According to presentism, time isn't actually infinite, but finite. Very finite! Only the present instant actually exists. The past used to exist, while the future has yet to exist. A classic potential infinite.

    But according to the B theory, the actual timeline is a given totality. Past, present, and future exist all at once (although they don't exist at the same time). The timeline doesn't "grow."

    Does that mean a temporal infinite is possible after all?

    Perhaps one could get around this by claiming that the timeline is an actually finite. It had a beginning or first moment. and it has an ending or last moment.

    That's true for some cosmological models.

    Is that consistent with Christian doctrine? Creation has a beginning, but no ending. If we assume the B-theory, would that be an actual finite or actual infinite?

    ReplyDelete
  5. I noticed that problem a while ago. The only way to get out of the dilemma if we rule out actual infinities is to accept Craig's weird scheme where God is timeless sans creation and in time avec creation. And, in all honesty, I don't even know what that means! And apparently neither does Paul Helm (see this article: http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.ca/2007/12/and-then.html ). But I did learn a neat trick: if you use a pinch of french (just a pinch, mind you!) you can cover up the fact that you've made no sense! ;)

    A while back I decided to run this problem past Alexander Pruss on his blog. As usual, his comments were de intelligence. :D Here's the link: http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.ca/2011/08/actual-infinity.html

    ReplyDelete
  6. David,

    Is that a problem for timelessness? Couldn't the defender of timelessness say that while God may not know that x event is happening right now, he does now that event x will occur at november 20th at 1131 pm in the year 2012. In this case tense would be something creatures now, and would not be knowable to God by definition, just as God cannot know my intentional states as I know them (he cannot say I, Blake Reas, type these words at t.) That doesn't seem to be tensed in the problematic way, though I could be wrong. Cheers!

    ReplyDelete
  7. To correct something I said. It is not that event x will occur, but "that event x occurs at time t". sorry.

    ReplyDelete
  8. PA, I'd say that it is a problem for timelessness but only on the A-Theory. Your strategy for dealing with the tensed statements I brought up is to translate them into tenseless statements but on the A-Theory you have to 'take tense seriously' because there is an objective 'now'. So long as we can say that there is an objective now that only creatures can know it forces us into saying that creatures can know something that God is necessarily ignorant of - a theologically undesirable conclusion!

    The parallel you're going for with statements indexed to yourself as the subject, as I see it, doesn't quite work. When you say 'I Blake Reas type these words at t' that can be translated into an objective statement like 'Blake Rease types these words at t' without losing any content (Or perhaps translating it into 'Blake Reas types "I Blake Reas type these words t" at time t'). That's not the case with tensed statements.

    ReplyDelete
  9. Ok, I see. That makes total sense. So that means I hold to a B-theory. Does that make Kalam an argument that a Classical theist cannot use? Thanks for the help here.

    ReplyDelete
  10. God, Time and Relativity: William Lane Craig 'Exploring the Mutual Implications of Relativity Theory and Conceptions of Divine Eternity' http://youtu.be/0Uvf1YXwZTc

    ReplyDelete
  11. PA, Not necessarily. There’s two philosophical problems that WLC raises concerning the possibility of an actual infinite. The first is that the existence of an actual infinite leads to unacceptable paradoxes but that can be called into question. (In Alexander Pruss’ response to my argument he says that he doesn’t see any logical contradiction in holding to an actual infinite or even with the Hilbert Hotel example) But, secondly, there’s the problem of traversing an actual infinite. If I have an infinitely long road to walk using my finite strides I won’t ever get to the ‘end’! As I see it, as a B-Theorist you can take Pruss’ stance on the possibility of an actual infinite but retain the belief that traversing it would be impossible ergo you could hold that the world will exist forever but we will never reach the end. Or you could say ‘apox on all these metaphysical speculations!’ and go with the empirical evidence for the universe having a beginning. Besides, I find that most people – in this scientistic age – have little patience for overtly philosophical arguments and are more easily persuaded by the empirical arguments in favour of a beginning to physical time and space anyway.

    I’m primarily a theologian who dabbles in analytic philosophy so I’m open to being corrected on this. In any case, I’m glad you’ve found this helpful. :)

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. To clarify, we also need to distinguish between an abstract actual infinite and a concrete actual infinite.

      Delete
    2. Good point, Steve. I've been assuming that we're talking about a concrete actual infinite.

      Also, I've heard that some (all?) Thomists - Brian Davies for example - believe in timelessness without accepting the B-Theory but I haven't been able to find anything on it (though I haven't been looking too hard!). If anyone knows where I can find some articles on Thomists deal with these issues I'd be grateful.

      Delete