Pages

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Trust & Obey


My unqualified condemnation of those who bludgeoned babies to death in Rwanda is rooted in a belief that you ought never ever bludgeon babies (NEBB). NEBB is not only a basic belief, it is as indubitable as any belief I have (and more indubitable than most). Though I am not clear on the mode by which I know NEBB, fortunately I need not know how I know to know that I know. It may be that I know NEBB as an immediate intuition,25 or perhaps I know it by a faculty of moral perception that parallels sense perception.
 
In this paper I have argued that genocide is always a moral atrocity from which it follows that if Yahweh is God then Yahweh did not command the Canaanite genocide. To this end I critiqued four arguments Paul Copan uses to justify the genocide while providing four counter arguments against the possibility of divinely mandated genocide. While this may not yet tell us how we should respond to biblical narratives of divinely sanctioned violence, at the very least it will save Christians from the sorry spectacle of attempting to convince ourselves and others of that which everybody knows cannot be true.


There are several basic problems with Rauser’s claim:

i) “Everyone” doesn’t know that cannot be true. For starters, the OT writers didn’t think divinely commanded “genocide” was “morally atrocious.”

And from Rauser’s standpoint, it wasn’t just OT writers. If, like Rauser, you reject the inspiration of Scripture, then ancient Israelites didn’t practice genocide or child sacrifice because the Bible sanctioned that practice; rather, the Bible sanctioned that practice because ancient Israelites practiced genocide and child sacrifice.

(I don’t think the Bible sanctions infant sacrifice. I’m merely playing along with Rauser’s allegation for the sake of argument.)

On the liberal view of Scripture, which Rauser espouses, the OT merely canonizes the prevailing social mores of the day.

Furthermore, child sacrifice was a common ANE custom. It wasn’t just an OT phenomenon.

ii) That, however, counts as prima facie evidence against Rauser’s appeal to “immediate intuition” or a “faculty of moral perception.” For if that’s the case, then why wasn’t that immediate intuition or moral perception shared by ancient Israel and other ANE civilizations?

Same problem applies to the perpetrators of the Rwandan massacres. I haven’t studied the issue, but from my recollection of news coverage at the time of the event, this was on a massive scale.

iii) In principle, Rauser could postulate that OT writers, ancient Israelites, and other ancient Near Easterners knew these practically were morally atrocious, and violated their conscience in so doing. And that could be the case.

But unless Rauser has independent evidence for an “immediate intuition” or “faculty of moral perception” according to which genocide and infant sacrifice are morally atrocious, how can he discount the prima facie evidence to the contrary?

What’s his evidence for “an immediate intuition” or “faculty of moral perception” that condemns genocide or child sacrifice? He can’t appeal to empirical evidence or testimonial evidence, then preemptively discount empirical or testimonial evidence to the contrary without vicious circularity.

iv) There is also the dilemma of secular ethics. On the one hand, Rauser is appealing to a free-floating faculty of moral perception or immediate intuition to judge religious ethics, but without a religious grounding for ethics, what does his appeal amount to? Aren’t objective moral norms dead in the water apart from God?

v) Apropos (iv), the feasible options don’t range between secular ethics and religious ethics, but between rival religious ethics. Secular ethics is a nonstarter. I

vi) Then there’s the hypothetical case of an ostensible divine command which might be so repugnant to us that this would call into question the source of the command. However, that raises two additional issues:

a) A command might be deliberately repugnant as test of faith. Indeed, that’s how many construe the command to sacrifice Isaac.

The test actually involves a counterfactual command, yet its counterfactual status can’t be known in advance of the attempted compliance with the command. Only the divine speaker is privy to his ulterior motives. Only by attempting to obey it does the human subject discover that it was just a test. That the command was never in play.

b) Or a command might be repugnant to us because we lack sufficient information to appreciate the overriding considerations which justify the command.

For instance, suppose a police captain orders a sharpshooter to kill a baby in a stroller. On the face of it, that’s morally atrocious. On the face of it, we’d say the sharpshooter has both the right and the obligation to defy a direct order from his commanding officer in that instance.

But suppose, as it turns out, the baby in the stroller is not a real baby. Suppose it’s a dummy, concealing a powerful bomb. 

vii) Rauser also sidesteps the question of whether the identity of the divine speaker can be known. If so, then his objections are moot.

4 comments:

  1. "My unqualified condemnation of those who bludgeoned babies to death in Rwanda is rooted in a belief that you ought never ever bludgeon babies (NEBB)."

    But presumably Rauser also has this belief: you never ever allow anyone to bludgeon a baby if you can stop it {NEAABBIYCST).

    So Rauser's view demands Open Theism.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Steve said...

    vi) Then there’s the hypothetical case of an ostensible divine command which might be so repugnant to us that this would call into question the source of the command. However, that raises two additional issues:

    a) A command might be deliberately repugnant as test of faith. Indeed, that’s how many construe the command to sacrifice Isaac.

    The test actually involves a counterfactual command, yet its counterfactual status can’t be known in advance of the attempted compliance with the command. Only the divine speaker is privy to his ulterior motives. Only by attempting to obey it does the human subject discover that it was just a test. That the command was never in play....

    vii) Rauser also sidesteps the question of whether the identity of the divine speaker can be known. If so, then his objections are moot.


    Steve, I don't want to sidetrack the discussion and you have your apologetical/reading priorities but this posts touches on a subject I've been pondering about. As always, I understand if you'd rather not deal with the issues I raise at this time.

    Regarding your above comments:

    1. How would you account for Abraham's ability to determine it was the one true God who was really speaking to him rather than a lesser deity or even an evil deity/spirit/daemon (etc) when he was given the command to sacrifice his son?

    2. This brings up the issues of divine voluntarism, Divine Command Theory, and God being Ex Lex. If I recall, you reject al three while Peter Pike (and possibly other Triabloggers) subscribe to them. One day in the future could you more fully explain why you reject them?

    Paul, if you don't mind telling us, where do you side on divine essentialism vs. voluntarism debate? Is God "Ex Lex", or "A Law Unto Himself"? I assume no Calvinist would say God is "Sub Lego".

    I like term W.L. Craig has used of "Divine Command Essentialism" whereby virtues flow from God's nature, while our moral duties (as God's creatures) flow from His voluntary commands. However, as a Calvinist would obviously disagree with how Craig cashes that term out since he finds certain Calvinistic distinctives (e.g. election) morally reprehensible.

    For those interested, here's a link to a blog where Steve and I discuss this issue in a way that was in-depth for me, but superficial for Steve.

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/04/authorship-of-evil.html

    ReplyDelete
  3. typo correction:

    "However, as a Calvinist [*I*] would obviously disagree with how Craig cashes that term out since he finds certain Calvinistic distinctives (e.g. election) morally reprehensible."

    Steve, you titled this blog as "Trust and Obey". One could define "faith" (a synonym for "trust") is the positive assenting response to God's revelation (whether promise, command, or propositional truth) which leads to obedience. How, epistemologically and rationally, could Abraham know it was the same God who was speaking to him to sacrifice his son who had previously promised him that he would have a son (and through him many descendants)?

    With Abraham's limited knowledge of God (not having a closed inscripturated Revelation like we do), doesn't it seem natural for Abraham to have had a voluntaristic view of God's relation to morality for him to accept that God could really command the sacrifice of his son?

    ReplyDelete
  4. ANNOYED PINOY said...

    "1. How would you account for Abraham's ability to determine it was the one true God who was really speaking to him rather than a lesser deity or even an evil deity/spirit/daemon (etc) when he was given the command to sacrifice his son?"

    i) Since I'm not in Abraham's situation, I can't say. I can't describe his experience from the inside out.

    However, it stands to reason that God has ways of making himself evident to people if he wants to. After all, God has direct access to our minds.

    ii) I also don't assume that we need to have a person-invariant position. For instance, perhaps God never puts a believer in a dilemma whereby the believer has good reason to think that God has spoken to him as well a good reason to think it would be immoral for him to do what God told him to do.

    2. This brings up the issues of divine voluntarism, Divine Command Theory, and God being Ex Lex. If I recall, you reject al three while Peter Pike (and possibly other Triabloggers) subscribe to them. One day in the future could you more fully explain why you reject them?

    i) I believe that I've already explained myself on that score.

    ii) In general, I think divine command theory needs to be supplemented. However, some versions (e.g. Philip Quinn) are already quite nuanced to avoid the more obvious objections.

    ReplyDelete