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Wednesday, May 27, 2009

Epistemic Certainty and Belief in God

* Below is an edited excerpt from Dr. Michael Sudduth's forthcoming book, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology. It is posted here with his permission


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*An excerpt from Michael Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (2006 draft)

Section III of chapter 13

Epistemic Certainty and Belief in God

Many theists maintain that they are certain of the truth of various theological propositions, among them being the proposition that God exists. I want to argue that for at least one important sense of certainty this position is false. The relevant sense of certainty here is what is called epistemic certainty, a species of certainty distinguished from so-called psychological certainty. The latter is merely descriptive and refers to a cognizer having maximal conviction or assurance of the truth of some proposition. While many theists are psychologically certain of God’s existence, this is epistemologically uninteresting. People have psychological certainty regarding all sorts of false propositions (e.g., Santa Claus exists, the world is flat, Elvis is alive). By contrast, a belief that is epistemically certain has some epistemic merit or credential, an epistemic merit or credential that is in some respect unsurpassed by other beliefs. I’ll argue that theistic belief (and belief in other theological propositions) is not epistemically certain.

I. Epistemic Certainty as Indubitability

Most accounts of epistemic certainty are tied to beliefs having some sort of epistemic immunity. This is typically articulated in terms of immunity from doubt or indubitability, where this means roughly the absence of any grounds for doubting a proposition p or doubting that one knows that p.1 Recall here that we’ve been working with a view of propositional knowledge according to which a person S knows that p just if (A) S firmly believes that p (belief condition), (B) S’s belief that p is (adequately) warranted (warrant condition), and (C) S’s belief that p is true (truth condition). More precisely, then, we can say that if a proposition p is epistemically certain for some person (in the sense of being epistemically indubitable), then it is logically impossible for (A) to be satisfied and for there to be any grounds for doubting that either (B) or (C) is satisfied. Since (B) and (C) are necessary conditions for knowledge, grounds for doubting either (B) or (C) will constitute grounds for doubting whether the persons knows that p.

A fairly crucial question, though, is what constitutes a ground or reason for doubting some proposition p? A baseline requirement is typically that there is no proposition q such that

(1) adding q to S’s beliefs would at least lower the warrant of S’s belief that p (ever so slightly).2

To this is frequently added:

(2) q is epistemically possible3 for S, meaning either that:

(a) S lacks conclusive reasons for believing the denial of q

or

(b) S is not warranted in believing the denial of q.

So a person S’s belief that p will be epistemically certain only if4 there is no epistemically possible proposition q for S that would result in lowering the warrant of S’s belief that p ever so slightly if q were added to S’s beliefs.

Is theistic belief indubitable and hence epistemically certain in this sense?

First, there are presumably many propositions that, if added to a person’s beliefs, would result in the warrant of theistic belief being lowered to some degree, however minimal: (i) theistic belief is produced by non-truth-aimed cognitive faculties (maybe in conjunction with the proposition “beliefs generated by non-truth directed faculties are unlikely to be true”), (ii) the concept of God involved in theistic belief is apparently inconsistent, (iii) there is Nth degree of apparently gratuitous evil in the world, (iv) the conjunction of theism and some other apparently true proposition is clearly logically inconsistent, (v) the conjunction of theism and some other true proposition is apparently logically inconsistent, and (vi) the sources of theistic belief among the various theistic religions and denominational divisions therein often yield incompatible propositions about God as output. Now we need not maintain that any of these propositions gives us good reasons to suppose that theism is false, or even good reasons for no longer believing that theism is true. They are simply some reason to suppose that theism is false or some reason for no longer believing that theism is true. Nor is it necessary that any of these propositions, if accepted, lower the warrant of theistic belief significantly, but only that they do so ever so slightly. Hence, if knowledge does not require epistemic certainty, then satisfying conditions (1) and (2) would be consistent with knowing theism to be true. The point here is not that theistic belief has no significant epistemic credentials, but only that it does not have the best possible epistemic credentials. All that is necessary, then, is to find propositions that would suffice to lower the warrant of theistic belief ever so slightly, and these would be any proposition that at least minimally counts against the truth of theism or at least minimally counts against our thinking that theism is true.

Secondly, since doubt makers need not have significant epistemic credentials, it seems fairly clear that there is going to be some proposition q that both lowers the warrant of theistic belief if added to S’s belief and is epistemically possible for S, at least for most cognizers. Indeed, the candidate doubt maker need not be warranted at all. It must only be the case that we are not warranted (conclusively or otherwise) in believing their denials. But it certainty seems that at least some of the relevant propositions above are such that we lack conclusive reasons for believing their denials. Indeed, we might even suppose that (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) have some degree of warrant for most cognizers.

But isn’t it the case that if a person were warranted in her theistic belief, then she would be warranted in denying any proposition logically incompatible with theism? And in that case, condition (2) will not be satisfied. Apart from the fact that this would be applicable only to epistemic certainty cashed out in terms of the conjunction of (1) and (2b), it is misguided for at least two other reasons. First, since doubt makers need not be reasons for believing that theism is false, many of them will be compatible with the truth of theism and even compatible with S’s theistic belief being warranted. So even if a person’s being warranted in theistic belief entailed that she is warranted in denying every proposition logically incompatible with theism, she would not on that account be warranted in denying every candidate doubt maker for theism, as in the case of (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) above. Secondly, the supposition that if a person is warranted in believing that p, then the person is warranted in affirming every entailment of p (and thus warranted in denying every proposition that is logically incompatible with p) is questionable.5 This so-called “entailment principle” overlooks the possibility that my warrant for believing p may be less than my warrant for believing some proposition that is incompatible with p. In that case, while I may indeed be warranted in believing p, I’m not necessarily warranted in disbelieving every proposition that is incompatible with p. I might of course if theistic belief had maximal warrant. But is this so?

II. Epistemic Certainty as Maximal Warrant

The idea of “maximal warrant” introduces a more modest way to think of epistemic certainty. On this view, a proposition p is epistemically certain for a person S just if S is warranted in believing p and there is no other proposition q that has more warrant for S than his belief that p.6 Now an indubitable belief will be maximally warranted, but a belief can be maximally warranted even if it is not indubitable. After all, there might be no proposition q more warranted or better justified than p for a person S, but it still may be that q is epistemically possible for S and such that q would lower the warrant of S’s belief that p if q were added to the rest of S’s beliefs. Indeed, there might be some other proposition q, which has as much warrant for S as S’s belief that p, but where q is doubt-maker for p. So this is a more modest account of certainty. It does not entail indubitability. We might suppose, then, that while theistic belief is not indubitably certain, there is no belief that has more warrant for a person than theistic belief, and so theistic belief is certain in this more modest sense.

One of the problems with this proposal, though, is that it appears that there are beliefs that have more warrant than any paradigm case of theistic belief. For example, take any number of introspectively evident beliefs about one’s current states of consciousness, e.g., I feel tired, it seems to me that there is a computer in front of me, I am thinking now. It is generally held that these sorts of beliefs have fairly strong epistemic credentials, perhaps the strongest sort human beliefs can have. Different reasons have been proposed for supposing why this is the case, most of which involve different accounts of how introspective beliefs involve particular entailments between the conditions of knowledge. One might suppose, for example, that introspective beliefs can’t be true without our believing them and we can’t believe them without their being true. So the truth condition entails the belief condition, and conversely. One might further suppose that in this case introspective beliefs enjoy the best sort of epistemic credentials possible. After all, warrant is a truth-indicating property. Perhaps there is no better indication that a proposition is true than if its truth is entailed by our simply believing it. Alternatively, we might suppose that introspective beliefs that are in fact based on self-presenting states of consciousness are based on grounds that guarantee the truth of the belief, for in this case the ground of the belief would be what makes the belief true. Hence, for introspective beliefs the warrant condition (being connected to the grounds of a belief) entails the truth condition, and this might be viewed as the best conceivable sort of warrant. Finally, on other accounts introspective beliefs are warranted simply by our holding them, even if their truth is not entailed either by their being held or warranted.7 In each of these three cases, we see ways of explaining why introspective beliefs enjoy a sort of privileged epistemic status.

Now it is fairly obvious that theistic beliefs are not beliefs about our current states of consciousness, but neither they do appear to have the sort of epistemic credentials that such beliefs possess. Consider the three accounts of these credentials. First, unless one adopts a radically anti-realist view of God, theistic beliefs are not made true by our believing them, nor does the truth of any theistic proposition guarantee that anyone will believe it.8 Secondly, theistic beliefs are not based on grounds that make theistic belief true and thus that guarantee the truth of beliefs based on such grounds. The putative grounds of theistic belief, be it religious experience, intuition, the sensus divinitatis, inference from various features of the world, are not identical to the fact that makes theism true. Are theistic beliefs the sort of beliefs that would at least be warranted simply by virtue of our holding them? This seems doubtful, even in those cases where the beliefs are true theistic beliefs. Perhaps a person comes to hold some true theistic belief on the grounds that he has communicated with apparitions from beyond the grave who have spoken to him of the beauties of heaven, but he is simply suffering from a mental disorder. From the vantage point of most externalist and internalist epistemologies, it’s hard to see how the person’s belief would be warranted in this circumstance.9 The warrant of theistic beliefs is not just given by the mere fact that one holds such beliefs. It is thus hard to see how theistic beliefs can be warranted to the same degree as beliefs about our current states of consciousness.10

One might suppose, though, that a different answer can be drawn from Plantinga’s epistemology. On Plantinga’s view, a person whose relevant cognitive faculties are functioning properly will hold a firm theistic belief that has a high degree of warrant. In fact, on Plantinga’s view, theistic belief is indefeasible for all fully rational persons. No proposition a fully rational person entertains could serve as a defeater for theistic belief. That’s a pretty substantial epistemic credential. Of course, defeaters against theistic belief exist according to Plantinga, but only because the epistemic integrity of some other aspect of our cognitive establishment (perhaps the sensus divinitatis) has been compromised, say by the noetic effects of sin. It may very well be true that apart from the noetic effects of sin, humans would believe in God just as firmly as they believe in their own existence, the existence of an external world, other minds, and various a priori truths, and perhaps our theistic beliefs would be just as warranted as these other beliefs. But this is an ideal view of the human cognitive situation, at best true for some original cognitive design plan and perhaps true for us in our final state. But now we see through a glass darkly, as it were. As indicated in prior chapters, the noetic effects of sin are a factor in assessing the degree to which all our beliefs can be warranted, including belief in God. It is hard to see how theistic belief can be maximally warranted for humans under any post-lapsarian cognitive design plan.11

So I think we must conclude that there isn’t a very strong case for supposing that theistic beliefs are epistemically certain in either the sense of indubitability or maximal warrant. In fact, this looks just plain false.

III. The Senses in which Belief in God is Certain

In what sense, then, can theistic belief be certain?

Many theists are psychologically certain of the existence of God and other theological propositions. However practically useful such a belief is, psychological certainty says nothing about the normative axis of belief, the epistemic merits or credentials of a belief. So we must look elsewhere for a relevant and plausible sense in which theists may have certainty concerning the existence of God and other theological propositions.

If God’s existence is logically necessary, then theistic belief is certain in a purely logical sense, for then it will not be logically possible to believe that God exists and for this belief to be false.12 But this isn’t epistemic certainty. Since it is logically possible to believe a logically necessary truth and yet not know the proposition, or even be warranted in holding it, clearly there is a sense in which it is impossible to be mistaken in a belief and yet for this to carry no epistemic significance. Suppose Jack believes nothing is red and non-colored because a character in a cartoon asserts it and Jack is inclined to accept whatever he hears cartoon characters affirm. His belief is true, but it would seem to have little by way of warrant. The logical status of the proposition tells us nothing about the positive epistemic status of his belief in the proposition.13

I would suggest that the relevant and plausible kind of certainty is moral certainty. A morally certain belief is beyond all reasonable doubt, though not beyond all possible doubt. In positive terms, such beliefs are highly probable. Morally certain beliefs entitle us to be sure about our beliefs, and at least some of them they carry a degree of warrant that is plausibly sufficient, together with the satisfaction of the truth condition, for knowledge. Thus morally certain theistic beliefs do justice to the Biblical passages that suggest Christians ought to be sure about their faith and that Christians have knowledge of God.14


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1 This is not the same as saying that it psychologically impossible to doubt the proposition. Clearly enough it might be psychologically impossible to doubt a proposition even if there are grounds for doubting it. Many children find it impossible not to believe in Santa Claus. Grounds or reasons for doubting his existence are not hard to come by. Indubitability is a normative concept.

2 This need not be a reason for supposing that the denial of p is true. It can simply be a reason for our no longer thinking that p is true.

3 (2) shows us that a doubt raiser need not have any significant epistemic credentials. It is sufficient that a statement’s negation not have any significant epistemic credentials. Recall that Descartes conceded that doubt makers might be very doubtful themselves, but this is acceptable when searching – as Descartes was - for the least or slightest ground of doubt. See E.M. Curley, Descartes against the Skeptics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 85-86, and Jeffrey Tlumak, “Certainty and Cartesian Method,” in Descartes Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Michael Hooker (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 44-53.

4 Whether such conditions are sufficient is another issue. Klein, for example, thinks that the idea of absolute certainty requires a third condition to the effect that there be no true proposition, d, such that if D were added to S’s beliefs, the warrant for believing p would be reduced. With this addition, certainty will entail truth. See Klein, “Certainty,” in A Companion to Epistemology ed., Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), pp. 61-64.

5 To cite a counter-example proposed by Audi (Belief, Justification, and Knowledge (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988), p. 78). Suppose I add up some figures in column and believe that the total is 10,395. Suppose that I am correct and this belief is warranted. Suppose that I know I am correct. It follows, though, that the total is 10,395, even if I made a mistake in my addition. But it seems implausible to suppose that I could be warranted in believing this consequence, much less know it. Hence, we are not necessarily warranted in believing every entailment of propositions we are warranted in believing.

6 For instance, according to Roderick Chisholm: “p is certain for S = Df For every q, believing p is more justified for S than withholding q, and believing p is at least as justified for S as is believing q.” (Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 12). See also Feldman, “Epistemic Appraisal and the Cartesian Circle,” Philosophical Studies 27 (1975), p. 43.

7 See Alston, “Self-Warrant” in Alston, Epistemic Justification (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). Cf. Alston, “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” p. 106 in same volume for the contrasting theory of truth-warrant.

8 My believing that there is a God makes it true that “Michael Sudduth believes that there is a God”. But the proposition that is made true by my act of believing that there is a God is not a proposition about God. It is a proposition about Michael Sudduth’s mental state.

9 The actual grounds of the belief in this situation would not satisfy either a proper function or reliability constraint on warrant. So the externalist must reject the idea that theistic belief is warranted in this situation. Of course, an internalist might concede that in this situation a person has evidence for the truth of his belief and thus is justified or rational in some weak sense. But is this enough for warrant? No. There is some true proposition, such that if the person were to believe it, he would no longer be justified (in an internalist sense) in his belief, namely that proposition describing the fact that he suffers from a cognitive disorder. Hence, from an internalist perspective, the person’s belief would not pass the test of an indefeasibility clause designed to rule out Gettier cases. So there is a clear sense in which the person’s belief would not be warranted even from an internalist perspective, whatever other epistemic merits it might have.

10 Something similar should probably be said for at least some self-evident truths known a priori, for instance those who negations are evidently self-contradictory and so must be false. Even if the denial of theism contains an implicit contradiction, the contradiction isn’t as evident as the denial of, say, “all red things are colored.”

11 Perhaps there are exceptions here, e.g., the beliefs of Moses on Mt. Sinai, St. Paul on the road to Damascus, or the disciples with the resurrected Christ. But most people are not in this sort of privileged position.

12 This does not require that the denial of theism be self-contradictory. There are some logically necessary propositions whose negations are not self-contradictory, e.g., 2 + 2 = 4.

13 Of course if a person knows that God exists, then it is logically impossible for the person to be mistaken in this belief since knowing p entails (by definition) that S believes p and p is true. But in this sense all knowledge is infallible. There’s nothing unique here about the knowledge of God. Nevertheless, it is logically possible for a person to believe p and not know p. A more rigorous understanding of infallibility would be that a person’s belief that p entails that S knows that p. Where knowledge entails that the person is warranted in the belief and the belief is true, it would follow that an infallible belief is true and warranted. But as far as I can see theistic belief is not infallible in this sense, for reasons already noted above in text.

14 Turretin distinguished between three kinds of certainty: mathematical, moral, and theological. Institutio theologiae elencticae, II.iv.22. Turretin denied that theological propositions have mathematical certainty, and this would seem to conform to the negative axis of my argument. He also denied that the certainty of theological propositions is merely moral, and this would seem to conflict with the positive axis of my argument. Although theological certainty appears to be located in between mathematical and moral certainty, it isn’t adequately clear whether or how it is epistemically distinct from them. Turretin unpacks moral certainty as equivalent to conjecture, the acceptance of probabilities on the grounds of evidence. This may be a weaker view of moral certainty than the one I’m employing above. Moreover, if—as seems plausible—Turretin saw theological certainty as partaking of the psychological qualities of mathematical certainty and the epistemic qualities of moral certainty, then our accounts will be roughly identical.

37 comments:

  1. I really don't understand your fascination with Sudduth.

    Sudduth's fundamental problem is his essential relativism, which I've discussed at greater length on my own blog (link).

    -TurretinFan

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  2. TF,

    My fascination with Sudduth was spawned back in '92 when I caught the guitar pick he threw from stage during one of his rock concerts. Now, on the anniversary of that event, I wear glam rock makeup, spandex, and try to deduce my existence from the Bible in order to know it (I've got a 237 line derivation going so far).

    Regarding your post:

    Yes, you have faith that God exists and feel certain based on faith---like the Muslim and the Mormon.

    However, nothing you said showed that you have *epistemic* certainty, despite your piety to the contrary. Heck, even Paul brought up *possible* reasons for the falsity of Christianity, i.e., "if Jesus is not raised from the dead."

    You also failed to interact with Sudduth’s paper in any *substantive* way. Besides ignorantly calling him a “relativist,” the only other critique you made was that he failed to couch his terms in the manner you do: unwarranted dogmatism, a bark that doesn’t live up to the bite.

    So, (a) interact with Sudduth’s paper in a substantive way and (b) provide an *argument* for why you think one can have *epistemic* certainty of Christianity (I'm not even sure what is the content of your epistemic certainty. Is it the Reformed faith? Paedobaptism? 6 day creationism? Just God's existence? The "whole enchalada?"). That you, “take the Bible as God’s word” isn’t it. On top of that, the whole, “Even if I can’t persuade anyone that Christianity is true, it just is, take my word for it!”, is apologetically inadequate.

    I really cannot understand your fascination with all the anti-intellectual responses you've been giving me.

    -Paul

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  3. Some Sudduth thoughts:

    **********

    "I provide two clear accounts of certainty and argue that theistic belief is not certain in
    either of these two senses. (The fact that my accounts of certainty draw on widely held
    views is a tangential point at best). TF does not say whether he thinks that theistic
    belief is, contrary to my arguments, certain in the senses I laid out. He also hasn't
    spelled out his own account of certainty, so we don't know whether we should prefer
    his view of certainty to what is widely held in the community of Christian and
    non-Christian philosophers."

    **********

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  4. "Instead, knowledge is belief that rests on a proper foundation. This is not really disputed. What is disputed, evidently, is what constitutes certainty.Certainty is connected with the foundation for the belief...As a matter of objective fact, however, God's word is the most sure foundation upon which belief can be based."

    http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2009/05/epistemic-certainty-competing-warrants.html

    i) Of course, one of the problems with this statement is that it confounds the truth of the Bible with beliefs about the Bible. Assuming the Bible is true, and a solid foundation, how to we acquire beliefs about the Bible whose epistemic status is commensurate with the source? What's the relation between belief and the Bible? The relation between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge. How do we know what the Bible knows?

    I'm not trying to be sceptical. I'm addressing TF on his own grounds.

    ii) In addition, the Westminster Confession denies that saving faith requires certainty. For, according to the WCF, a true believer may struggle to arrive at the assurance of salvation.

    So either TF must say that saving faith (as defined by the WCF) falls short of knowledge, or else that certainty is not a condition of knowledge.

    "Thus, when God conveys truth to men (whether it be in propositions provided innately to man or propositions provided in Scripture) such truth has better warrant for belief than the testimony of our own eyes, even while it informs us of the general reliability of our senses."

    If his epistemology includes both innate knowledge and sense knowledge, then it bears no resemblance to Scripturalism.

    ReplyDelete
  5. Paul:

    My comment regarding his essential relativism was backed up with evidence of it in action. So, your calling it "ignorant" (rather than dealing with the evidence) raises all sorts of red flags from where I'm sitting as to what sort of discussion you're willing to have about the subject.

    His relativistic presuppositions make the vast bulk of his argumentation pointless and meaningless. I've substantively addressed them, and not his reasoning that proceeds from those presuppositions. Thus, your gripe about lack of substantive interaction is misplaced.

    Your comparison of the Christian faith to that of the Muslim or Mormon ignores the objective superiority of our warrant for believing what we do.

    -TurretinFan

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  6. Steve:

    as per how the object and subject meet:

    Faith comes by hearing and hearing by the Word of God. I'm sure you know the rest of the context.

    The fact that certainty is not a requirement for salvation is seemingly an irrelevant point to the discussion.

    And for some reason - you've gone and equated knowledge and certainty in your response to me, which would make sense (I guess) if I insisted on that. I've presented my position on colloquial terms, though, so such a tactic would be misplaced as it relates to me.

    -TurretinFan

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  7. "TF does not say whether he thinks that theistic belief is, contrary to my arguments, certain in the senses I laid out."

    Quite right. I do not. I focused on whether those standards of certainty are themselves the correct way to view the problem and showed that they are not.

    -TurretinFan

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  8. TURRETINFAN SAID:
    Steve:

    as per how the object and subject meet:

    Faith comes by hearing and hearing by the Word of God. I'm sure you know the rest of the context.

    The fact that certainty is not a requirement for salvation is seemingly an irrelevant point to the discussion.

    And for some reason - you've gone and equated knowledge and certainty in your response to me, which would make sense (I guess) if I insisted on that. I've presented my position on colloquial terms, though, so such a tactic would be misplaced as it relates to me.

    *********************

    For some reason you're misrepresenting as well as dodging what I actually said. The question at issue is not whether saving faith rises to the level of certainty, but whether it rises to the level of knowledge.

    Are you defining saving faith as knowledge in a merely colloquial sense? If so, what does the colloquial sense amount to?

    For example, do you think saving faith is a possibly mistaken belief?

    You also duck the question of how you think hearing can be a source of knowledge.

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  9. "For some reason you're misrepresenting as well as dodging what I actually said. The question at issue is not whether saving faith rises to the level of certainty, but whether it rises to the level of knowledge."

    Saving faith is a variety of things. One part where I would tend to disagree with Clark is on his reduction of saving faith seemingly to bare assent (assensus only).

    But yes, saving faith rises to the level of knowledge.

    "Are you defining saving faith as knowledge in a merely colloquial sense? If so, what does the colloquial sense amount to?"

    You don't know what the colloquially sense of "know" means? Or are you just being obtuse? I don't get it.

    "For example, do you think saving faith is a possibly mistaken belief?"

    No. Any belief is either actually mistaken or not. Saving faith is necessarily in the truth.

    "You also duck the question of how you think hearing can be a source of knowledge."

    How I think that? I think it because the Bible says it. That was implicit in my last comment. I'm surprised that was unclear.

    -TurretinFan

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  10. And to clarify my definition of saving faith - I simply adopt Turretin's lengthy and excellent explanation from his Institutes.

    -TurretinFan

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  11. TF,

    You did not argue that Sudduth's position was relativistic (I'm sorry you think you did), that you think you did is evidence about what kind of fruitful discussion we can have. Seemingly not much of one, yet I desire to be shown otherwise.

    Here's what you said,

    "Sudduth's fundamental problem in his attempt to bolster his thesis that "theistic belief (and belief in other theological propositions) is not epistemically certain" is his essential relativism. This is seen in his frequent appeals to consensus authority at critical junctures ("Most accounts of epistemic certainty are tied ..." "A baseline requirement is typically that ..." "It is generally held that these sorts of beliefs have ...")".

    It is nothing but sheer ignorance to claim a position is "relativistic" due to its setting out putative accounts of certainty.

    Sudduth never claimed, not can you show that his position is, that truth is a construction of human minds. You have not shown that he's a relativist. My assertion that your claim was ignorant was correct and it was a waste of time to demand I back it up, since I was obviously correct.

    Indeed, you are quite right. Your response is indicative of the kind of fruitless conversation we will have. You simply refuse to be rigorous and cautious and careful in these discussions. I am struggling to figure out your aproach in these matters.

    "Your comparison of the Christian faith to that of the Muslim or Mormon ignores the objective superiority of our warrant for believing what we do"And they say the same.

    Anyway, it now looks like you deny that "philosophical certainty" is "complete assurance," but now you're *adding* to your claim that it is "assurance" that is *based on* a certain type of grounds.

    But, none of what you say here shows that we can have epistemic certainity, even granting that the Bible is true. Indeed, I already refuted your position by pointing out that the Bible itself gives possible ways it could be false. If we really found the bones of Jesus, that would falsify Christianity.

    "Quite right. I do not. I focused on whether those standards of certainty are themselves the correct way to view the problem and showed that they are not".

    This is another one of your anti-intellectual moves (one of many). You've made the positive claims about "certainity" and what knowledge is, yet you refuse to spell any of this out.

    Even if those views of certainity are not, that does nothing to show that you can have certainty, or what you mean by it so we can analyse your position. You seem content to simply announce that you can be epistemically certain, nevermind demonstrating it (and the argument you hint at undermines you).

    TF, really what this is, is your position boils down to sheer fideism.

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  12. Paul,

    Yes, if you insist on that style of dialog you will not get my participation.

    -TurretinFan

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  13. TF,

    I do apologize, but there's only so long that charity gets you a free pass to make unargued assertions, to refuse to develop your own positive position (even when repeatedly asked), and fail to interact with arguments.

    Christian apologetics deserves more than "My Bible says God exists." And, epistemic certainity is not had because you have faith, even though other kinds of certainity can be so had with faith.

    So, I'll put your I.O.U aside and gladly resume dialogue when you decide to shoulder your burden and interact with the points people make.

    ReplyDelete
  14. TURRETINFAN SAID:

    “You don't know what the colloquially sense of ‘know’ means? Or are you just being obtuse? I don't get it.”

    You’re the one who drives a wedge between the “colloquial” definition of knowledge and some higher degree of knowledge. Therefore, it’s incumbent on you to define your own terms. If you think this is just a “semantic quibble,” then you need to spell out exactly what you think constitutes knowledge in the merely “colloquial” sense of the word.

    “How I think that? I think it because the Bible says it. That was implicit in my last comment. I'm surprised that was unclear.”

    You still don’t get it, do you?

    The question is how you know what the Bible says. You appeal to hearing. That utilizes sensory perception. So do you think sensory perception yields “knowledge”? What kind of “knowledge” does the sensory perception of Scripture yield? Does sensory perception yield certainty? Does certainty also attach to your memory of Scripture?

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  15. I don't intend this is a further debate on the topic - and hopefully it will not lead that way.

    Christian apologetics deserves more than "My Bible says God exists."The Rocks and Trees say that. One's own conscience says that. The Bible says a lot more than that, and in a great deal more particularity.

    I am sincerely concerned as well by the approach that some folks associated with Van Til take in apologetics, though obviously for very different reasons.

    I do share your concern that the best apologetic presentation be given, and I will carefully consider the criticism you have provided.

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete
  16. "You’re the one who drives a wedge between the “colloquial” definition of knowledge and some higher degree of knowledge."

    Well, I think that was really Clark and especially Robbins and Gerrity who do that. I am quite willing to speak of knowledge in a colloquial sense. I don't think that semantic game is worth the penny.

    "Therefore, it’s incumbent on you to define your own terms."

    When I say, I'm just using the ordinary sense of the word "know" - that counts as defining it, unless you honestly still don't follow me, or unless I missing the point of your request (i.e. your request is not actually for your information).

    "If you think this is just a “semantic quibble,” then you need to spell out exactly what you think constitutes knowledge in the merely “colloquial” sense of the word."

    I think your quibble with Gerrity and company was largely about semantics. I've tried to avoid that by just using colloquial English.

    "You still don’t get it, do you?"

    I guess not ...

    "The question is how you know what the Bible says."

    Read it, hear it, etc.

    "You appeal to hearing."

    ok

    "That utilizes sensory perception."

    Sure.

    "So do you think sensory perception yields “knowledge”?"

    The senses are just a conduit for the information. It really has nothing to do with conduit - which we can see from the fact that the same information can be communicated to one by any of the senses (though communicating by taste would often be quite tedious). It seems possible that scientists could eventually find ways to get information to our brains independently of any of senses, by electrical signals over a copper wire, or something like that.

    Incidentally, Clark has already addressed this line of questions, probably in a more systematic way than I can regurgitate here.

    "What kind of “knowledge” does the sensory perception of Scripture yield?"

    None in itself. The senses perceive the phenomena, but the mind perceives the noumena - the ideas.

    "Does sensory perception yield certainty?"

    Not in itself.

    "Does certainty also attach to your memory of Scripture?"

    Certainty of memory? I'm not sure what that means. I understand how knowledge can be certain, but not memory. Memory is the storage of information.

    -TurretinFan

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  17. TF,

    I just don't see where you're actually arguing for anything. You're offering theological platitudes. You've not spelled out your position in any rigorous way, and you've not specifically shown why the accounts of certainity Sudduth offered are wrong, or put forth an alternative account of certainity for us to look at. You have to understand that it hard to have an actual dialogue that moves toward something when one side takes the above approach. I don't mean this in a mean way, I'm just describing the situation as I see it.

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  18. TURRETINFAN SAID:

    “Well, I think that was really Clark and especially Robbins and Gerrity who do that. I am quite willing to speak of knowledge in a colloquial sense. I don't think that semantic game is worth the penny.”

    Evading the question.

    “When I say, I'm just using the ordinary sense of the word ‘know’ - that counts as defining it, unless you honestly still don't follow me, or unless I missing the point of your request (i.e. your request is not actually for your information).”

    Evading the question.

    “I think your quibble with Gerrity and company was largely about semantics. I've tried to avoid that by just using colloquial English.”

    Evading the question.

    “Read it, hear it, etc.”

    And do you think these sensory processes confer knowledge? What kind of knowledge–as you define it?

    “The senses are just a conduit for the information.”

    Are they reliable conduits? What’s the quality of information they conduct or conduce? Is that process a reliable means of acquiring knowledge?

    “It really has nothing to do with conduit - which we can see from the fact that the same information can be communicated to one by any of the senses (though communicating by taste would often be quite tedious).”

    A nature of the conduit has obvious implications for the quality of transmission. Water can’t rise above its own level (unless you use a pump).

    You keep appealing to the “foundation” or source. But that is mediated by the mode of transmission.

    Do you think the mode of transmission (sensory perception) rates the same degree of certainty (your preferred category, not mine) as the source of information (Scripture) it conveys?

    For example, you say that “certainty in the strictest sense is only possible via revelation from God…Therefore, nothing can be known with absolute certainty aside from what is taught in Scripture [or General Revelation] or what is properly deduced from Scripture [and/or General Revelation].”

    But if the input is uncertain, the output is uncertain. If the process of transmission is uncertain, then the resultant belief is uncertain.

    If the source (e.g. Scripture) is certain, but the process of transmission is uncertain, then the certainty of the source can’t confer certainty on the end-product of that process–belief in the source.

    “Incidentally, Clark has already addressed this line of questions, probably in a more systematic way than I can regurgitate here.”

    Since Clark rejected sense-knowledge, does that mean you accept or reject his position?

    “The senses perceive the phenomena, but the mind perceives the noumena - the ideas.”

    The senses are the filter. Is the sensory filter reliable or unreliable?

    “Certainty of memory? I'm not sure what that means. I understand how knowledge can be certain, but not memory. Memory is the storage of information.”

    You indicated that saving faith counts as knowledge–although you refuse to define your terms. You even indicated that saving faith involved an unmistakable belief.

    However, saving faith is contingent on knowledge of the Gospel, which is–in turn–contingent on recollection of the Gospel. You can’t believe what you can’t remember. You can’t believe the Bible unless you remember the Bible.

    For example, you say that “certainty in the strictest sense is only possible via revelation from God…Therefore, nothing can be known with absolute certainty aside from what is taught in Scripture [or General Revelation] or what is properly deduced from Scripture [and/or General Revelation].”

    But if your memory of divine revelation is uncertain, then your knowledge of revelation is uncertain–in which case (by your own yardstick), revelation cannot be an object of “absolute certainty.”

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  19. "Evading the question."

    I guess if saying that the question is a loaded question is "evading the question" ...

    "And do you think these sensory processes confer knowledge? What kind of knowledge–as you define it?"

    They convey information. Information is converted to knowledge by the mind. Ordinarily, the senses provide knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word (and if you don't know what that means, feel free to say you don't know what that means, but if you do know what it means, it seems obstreperous for you to continue to ask for it).

    "Are they reliable conduits? What’s the quality of information they conduct or conduce? Is that process a reliable means of acquiring knowledge?"

    They are generally, but not perfectly, reliable. The quality of the information that they convey varies. For example, when they convey the contents of "Pravda," they are often conveying outright fabrications. The senses themselves are not the source of the information, they are just a conduit.

    "A nature of the conduit has obvious implications for the quality of transmission. Water can’t rise above its own level (unless you use a pump)."

    That claim seems to assume a particular relationship between the conduit and the information. However, as noted above, the information is quite independent of the particular conduit, since we can obtain the same information by hearing the spoken word, reading the written word, or fingering the brailled word. The independence of the information from the conduit undermines the assumption that the conduit itself is at issue.

    "You keep appealing to the “foundation” or source. But that is mediated by the mode of transmission."

    That's because we're dealing with certainty. Certainty is not a function of the media, but of the source. The most perfect eyesight would not get truth from "Pravda," but a blind man can hear the Word of the Lord and, believing, have certain truth.

    "Do you think the mode of transmission (sensory perception) rates the same degree of certainty (your preferred category, not mine) as the source of information (Scripture) it conveys?"

    No, I think the question itself confuses categories, as I've explained above.

    "But if the input is uncertain, the output is uncertain. If the process of transmission is uncertain, then the resultant belief is uncertain."

    Again, this confuses the issues and conflates the categories. The certainty of the Word of God is rooted in its author, not in the vehicle of its conveyance.

    [END OF PART 1 - restricted comment length]

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  20. [BEGIN PART 2]

    "If the source (e.g. Scripture) is certain, but the process of transmission is uncertain, then the certainty of the source can’t confer certainty on the end-product of that process–belief in the source."

    Why not? This is what you seem to take as an assumption, but something which makes no sense to me.

    "Since Clark rejected sense-knowledge, does that mean you accept or reject his position?"

    That's another of your loaded questions. Since any response I give will be labeled "evading the question," I'll not waste my time ...


    "The senses are the filter. Is the sensory filter reliable or unreliable?"

    You treat the senses as though they are the filter. The senses, however, don't interact with the ideas. They "filter" on an entirely different level in the process of obtaining knowledge.

    "You indicated that saving faith counts as knowledge–although you refuse to define your terms. You even indicated that saving faith involved an unmistakable belief."

    I wish you wouldn't misrepresent me. I said I was going with just the ordinary sense of "knowledge." You're a smart guy: that should be more than enough "definition" for you.

    "However, saving faith is contingent on knowledge of the Gospel, which is–in turn–contingent on recollection of the Gospel. You can’t believe what you can’t remember. You can’t believe the Bible unless you remember the Bible."

    We receive the Bible as the Word of God. That faith in the Word of God has only tangential relations to memory. Human memory is imperfect, of course, but we are placing our confidence in God, not in our senses and not in our memory.

    "But if your memory of divine revelation is uncertain, then your knowledge of revelation is uncertain–in which case (by your own yardstick), revelation cannot be an object of “absolute certainty.”"

    The same argument mutatis mutandis provided above regarding the senses addresses this criticism.

    -TurretinFan

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  21. T-fan -- don't assume these guys are vantillian. They are not! I am now officially writing them off as agnostics that have an itchy intellectual interest in Christianity.

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  22. See what "certain" knowledge gets you?

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  23. TIM HARRIS SAID:
    "T-fan -- don't assume these guys are vantillian. They are not! I am now officially writing them off as agnostics that have an itchy intellectual interest in Christianity."

    Is this supposed to be a joke? Have you read anything on this blog?

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  24. TF,

    I want to see if I'm understanding you correctly. If I've read you right, what you've said is:

    There is information that is out there. That information can contain either truth or falsehood. The senses are a conduit for information. The mind then turns that information into knowledge in ways that do not depend on the conduit or the mind, but only on the information (?!).

    This last part doesn't at all follow.

    I think part of it comes from this statement:

    ---
    Certainty is not a function of the media, but of the source.
    ---

    No, certainty is a function of the mind that examines the information.

    You can be certain of something that is false because your mind has made a mistake. You can alos be certain of something that is false because you've misread/misheard/misfelt/mis-etc. it. Furthermore, you can be certain of something that is false because the information itself was false even if the conduit of your senses and your mental faculties work perfectly (this seems to be something you agree with given your example of Pravda).

    This is the part where you are equivocating. Certainty cannot both be something only dependent upon the source and also be something that is dependent upon the mind--unless the source and the mind are the same thing, which I would not expect you to hold to, but maybe you do.

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  25. BTW, while writing the above I didn't include the obvious "You can be certain of something because the information is certain and your conduit/mind is also accurate" (added: and a whole host of other ways that you can be certain of true statements for wrong reasons) but for completeness, that is also a possibility.

    The problem is, how do you distinguish between those types of certainty when they all appear in the mind as the same type of certainty?

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  26. timharris said:
    T-fan -- don't assume these guys are vantillian. They are not! I am now officially writing them off as agnostics that have an itchy intellectual interest in Christianity.

    5/28/2009 11:53 AM


    TF--a qualification: Don't assume we are lock-step Van Tillians with a hero-worship mentality that supposes that any and all philosophical advancement came to a halt when Van Til arrived on the scene due to Van Til's infallibility and incapability of being wrong on any matter whatsoever. We don't hold to the motto: "Van Til said it, that settles it!"

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  27. In contrast, I do hold to the idea that "The Bible says it, that settles it." No amount of name-calling or derogatory labels will shake me from that.

    ***

    "The mind then turns that information into knowledge in ways that do not depend on the conduit or the mind, but only on the information (?!)."

    I can understanding why this seems unclear. The mind turns the information from the senses into knowledge in a way that is not dependent on the mechanism whereby the senses obtained the information. I'm not sure why you say it is not dependent on the mind ... of course thought is a mental process.

    "No, certainty is a function of the mind that examines the information."

    Well - there is of course a subjective aspect of certainty. That is to say, a particular person can be unshakably sure of something, but for objectively ridiculous reasons.

    Objectively, though, what gives the best warrant for something being true is divine revelation. That's why information from the New York Times is more certain than information from Pravda, but why information from the Scripture is as certain as you can possibly get. There's no better source of information, even if there are folks who are subjectively uncertain (or even skeptical) about what Scripture says.

    -TurretinFan

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  28. TF said:
    ---
    The mind turns the information from the senses into knowledge in a way that is not dependent on the mechanism whereby the senses obtained the information.
    ---

    Only if the information that comes from the senses to the mind is equivalent to the objective information. But this is obviously not the case. An easy example: my father is color blind. He looks at an evergreen tree and he sees what he calls "orange." To him, aspen tree leaves are always yellow. The only reason that he "knows" aspen trees are green in the summer is because he has been told that they are green.

    But the fact of the matter is that my father has never seen the color "green." (As an aside, my mom has said she wants to get to heaven before my dad so she can see his reaction the first time he's able to see colors that everyone else takes for granted.)

    In any case, another problem arises for my father, in that red lights, green lights, and yellow lights all look the same to him. This means the only way he can tell what color a traffic light is, is the position the light is on the pole. My dad stops when the top light is shining, goes when the bottom light is shining. If you mixed those up, it would be impossible for him to know whether to stop or go safely.

    So it seems plain to me that it's frankly absurd to think that certainty is something that can be constructed in the mind via information gleaned from the senses. The only way to even begin this is to assert that our senses are certain themselves. Yet you yourself have said only: "They [the senses as a conduit of information] are generally, but not perfectly, reliable."

    TF said:
    ---
    Objectively, though, what gives the best warrant for something being true is divine revelation. That's why information from the New York Times is more certain than information from Pravda, but why information from the Scripture is as certain as you can possibly get. There's no better source of information, even if there are folks who are subjectively uncertain (or even skeptical) about what Scripture says.
    ---

    The problem is that you must be specific as to information about what?

    If I want information about who won the Super Bowl this year, I won't find that in the Scriptures. I will find that in the New York Times, although I grant it won't be in Pravda (if Pravda is even still around). With that information, I can know with as much certainty as I can know anything that Pittsburgh won the Super Bowl this year. I can scour the pages of the Bible and never get that knowledge.

    In other words, it's manifestly false that there's no better source of information if the information you want isn't information contained in the Bible in the first place.

    If you seek to get around this by saying that it is true that we can never know for certainty anything not found in Scripture, but that we can know for certainty what is in Scripture, then I merely point out that the very statement "information from the Scripture is as certain as you can possibly get" is not in Scripture and therefore cannot be known with certainty either, which means (as I tried to point out in our previous exchange) that you are using an uncertain statement to create certainty, which is impossible (you cannot gain certainty when your starting position is itself uncertain because you will never be able to avoid the initial uncertainty!).

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  29. PP:

    I understand, I think, where you are coming from. You are suggesting, in essence, that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Therefore, unless the senses are completely reliable, it does not matter whether the source of information that is mediated by the senses is reliable. Have I understood your basic argument correctly?

    -TurretinFan

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  30. TF,

    To make a crude table below let words in [ALL CAPS] refer to things that are working "properly" (or are objectively true, or however you want to phrase this) while things in [lower case] refer to thinks that are *not* working "properly"/"objective"/etc.


    We have the following:

    INFORMATION + SENSE + MENTAL

    INFORMATION + SENSE + mental

    INFORMATION + sense + MENTAL

    INFORMATION + sense + mental

    information + SENSE + MENTAL

    information + SENSE + mental

    information + sense + MENTAL

    information + sense + mental

    Each of these possibilities can be experienced subjectively as identical in the mind (ie. as being "certain"). Only the first one is warranted certainty; the rest are false certainties. My understanding of your position is that all four of the first four options = certainty.

    On my view, when we approach the Bible, we are engaged in various modes of the first four rows above, but three of the four possibilities will give you false ideas of certainty about what you derrived from Scripture. This is why you can have genuine Bible believers who disagree on an interpretation of Scripture.

    Thus, I would argue that even granting the premise that the Bible is the infallible Word of God (as I do), we do not have certainty because it is still possible we could be in any one of rows 2, 3, or 4; it is not necessary that we are in row 1. And I would argue that due to sin, we are almost always sitting in row 2, since our senses are generally more reliable than our thinking is.

    However, I would take your position to mean that any of those 4 still = certainty, because the information remains objectively true throughout.

    Is that an accurate summary of your position?

    [BTW, to put my example fully back into your original illustration, reading the New York Times would be using any one of all eight of the above, since the information given could be, or could not be, objectively true (and typically isn't).]

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  31. Furthermore, I should clarify that just because something isn't certain in my above chart doesn't mean it's 100% false either.

    Thus, suppose your thinking is 95% accurate but your senses and the information you look at are both at 100%. You'd still be in row 2, just as much as someone who's thinking is 0% accurate. So there are limitations to the example, but I hope the main point comes through.

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  32. PP:

    "Is that an accurate summary of your position?"

    No, unfortunately not. I'll think about how to express my position more clearly. I have a few ideas that I'm churning over mentally on how to express it. Right now a brief answer is that certainty is on a different level of the inquiry than the question about the transmission of the information.

    I do understand how the issue of transmission is implicated. My analogy is going to be the text of the Bible, but trying to explain it in a way that will not be misunderstood is going to take some time and thought.

    -TurretinFan

    P.S. incidentally, was I right in understand your link/chain approach?

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  33. TF,

    The chain idea is a close enough start. However, the real flaw is that you've couched this in terms of certainty, whereas I would not do so myself. In other words, 99.7% is good enough for me :-D I don't need to know anything with 100% certainty, although it would certainly (to be ambiguous) be nice if I was 100% certain.

    So I would say that if we were trying to construct a system whereby we could be *certain* of our conclusions, then if any part of the chain is uncertain the conclusions that follow from it are also uncertain. In that regard, your weakest link notion would be an accurate description.

    However, this is different from another concept that I would employ, which would be whether or not what we know is true (not whether or not we can know it with certainty, but just simply whether or not some proposition P is true). It is possible that we can all be certain that something is true when in reality it is false. Likewise, we can be convinced that something is false when it is really true. And furthermore we have the somewhat less interesting instances where we are sure something is true when it really is true and we are sure something is false when it really is false.

    Additionally, I would add that we can be convinced something is true for false reasons. E.g., an Elect Arminian will reason:

    1. God loves all men.
    2. I am a man.
    3. Therefore God loves me.

    His conclusion is true, but his first premise is false. Indeed, when he becomes reforemd, he says:

    1. God loves His Elect.
    2. I am Elect.
    3. Therefore God loves me.

    Now you can see that both conclusions are identical, yet the reasons given for the conclusions are not. So we can be convinced something is true for wrong reasons. Likewise, we can be convinced something is false for wrong reasons. And furthermore, it is possible that we believe something to be false for true reasons, and we can also believe something to be false for false reasons.

    In any case, following that we'd have to deal with "how do we know what we know?" and "at what point do our beliefs become knowledge?" and things of that nature.

    ReplyDelete
  34. TURRETINFAN SAID:

    “I guess if saying that the question is a loaded question is ‘evading the question’...”

    i) You’re acting paranoid. Asking you do define your own terms, to explain your own usage, is hardly a loaded question.

    Here’s a loaded question:

    “Was the Bush administration right or wrong to torture detainees?”

    And here’s a question that’s not a loaded question:

    “Is waterboarding torture?”

    A loaded question is when the questioner introduces his own tendentious definition of terms into the question.

    It is not a loaded question when the questioner is asking someone how he defines his own usage. Just the opposite.

    You’re now acting as if my questions are a form of entrapment. If you’re that paranoid, then further dialogue is futile.

    “They convey information. Information is converted to knowledge by the mind. Ordinarily, the senses provide knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word (and if you don't know what that means, feel free to say you don't know what that means, but if you do know what it means, it seems obstreperous for you to continue to ask for it).”

    An evasive response since you refuse to define key terms. You need to drop the conspiratorial suspicions. It doesn’t become you.

    “That claim seems to assume a particular relationship between the conduit and the information. However, as noted above, the information is quite independent of the particular conduit, since we can obtain the same information by hearing the spoken word, reading the written word, or fingering the brailled word. The independence of the information from the conduit undermines the assumption that the conduit itself is at issue.”

    That’s an illogical response. The fact that different media can convey the same information is irrelevant to the quality of transmission. Whether the mode of transmission is hearing or reading, it’s possible for the medium to garble the information.

    “That's because we're dealing with certainty. Certainty is not a function of the media, but of the source.”

    If the message is garbled by the medium, that has a direct effect on the certainty of the readout.

    I’m not stating for a fact that this happens in any particular case. Just pointing out the internal relation between the message and the messenger.

    “The certainty of the Word of God is rooted in its author, not in the vehicle of its conveyance.”

    Which confuses two distinct issues:

    i) There’s the certainty of the Word in and of itself.

    ii) That’s distinct from our beliefs about the Word.

    And, yes, the vehicle can make a difference. Take a unisex translation of the Bible. That distorts the original message.

    “Why not? This is what you seem to take as an assumption, but something which makes no sense to me.”

    Belief in the source is hardly identical with the source in itself. Rather, that involves a fallible process of understanding–in contradistinction to the infallible source.

    “That's another of your loaded questions. Since any response I give will be labeled "evading the question," I'll not waste my time ...”

    And I’m not going to waste any more time with you since you are no longer debating in good faith.

    I haven’t labeled your responses “evading the question.” Rather, I’ve labeled your refusal to respond “evading the question.” There’s an obvious difference between the two.

    You were the one who said: “Incidentally, Clark has already addressed this line of questions, probably in a more systematic way than I can regurgitate here.”

    That’s why I was asking you how you position yourself in relation to his epistemology.

    When I ask you a perfectly innocent question of clarification, which follows directly on the heels of your own statement, and you react in this petty, defiant, paranoid fashion, then, indeed, it would be a waste of time to pursue the matter any further.

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  35. “You treat the senses as though they are the filter. The senses, however, don't interact with the ideas.”

    Ideas are encoded in sensory media, like the written or spoken word.

    “I wish you wouldn't misrepresent me. I said I was going with just the ordinary sense of ‘knowledge.’ You're a smart guy: that should be more than enough ‘definition’ for you.”

    Misrepresented you? I originally asked you "Do you think saving faith is a possibly mistaken belief?"

    To which you replied: “No. Any belief is either actually mistaken or not. Saving faith is necessarily in the truth.”

    But when, in response to your answer, I say "You indicated that saving faith counts as knowledge–although you refuse to define your terms. You even indicated that saving faith involved an unmistakable belief,” you accuse me of misrepresenting you.

    How does that misrepresent you given your statement that “Any belief is either actually mistaken or not. Saving faith is necessarily in the truth”?

    Are you keeping track of your own statements at this point? Or are you simply reacting in the heat of the moment?

    “We receive the Bible as the Word of God. That faith in the Word of God has only tangential relations to memory. Human memory is imperfect, of course, but we are placing our confidence in God, not in our senses and not in our memory.”

    Saving faith takes an object. The promises of the Gospel. If you don’t remember the promises of the Gospel, then your faith has no corresponding object.

    You can’t place direct confidence in God. Such confidence is mediated by your beliefs. What you believe about God. And that, in turn, involves your understanding of, and recollection of, the Gospel.

    However, your unresponsive “responses” have degenerated to the point where further discussion is unproductive. I’m done with you.

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  36. TF,

    "Well - there is of course a subjective aspect of certainty. That is to say, a particular person can be unshakably sure of something, but for objectively ridiculous reasons.

    Objectively, though, what gives the best warrant for something being true is divine revelation"
    .

    You don't even admit you've changed horses midstream. When intially asked to define epistemic certainity, you gave the subjective definition. We went round and round and you defended the subjective definition and tried to claim that there's no distinction between psychological certainity and epistemic certainty. Now, you locate a distinction between psychological certainity and other kinds (ones *based* on a kind of *grounds) without ever admitting you were intially wrong. This is a dishonest debate tactic.

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  37. I highly respect the brilliant members of the Triablogue blogging team, as well as some of their obviously intelligent guests (I include Mr. Anderson in that company). They are good men of God, they are better read than I am in certain areas (some of which are relevant to this topic), and while there is disagreement between us, I bear no ill will to them for disagreeing strongly with the errors that they believe I hold. In fact, I appreciate their willingness to spend time trying to correct me. I would do the same for them, if I could.

    That said, this conversation with respect to several (but by no means all) of the folks here has ceased to be irenic with accusations flying (in my opinion) somewhat prematurely and irresponsibly.

    I cannot see how my continued presence here (in these comment boxes) can meaningfully contribute to the peace and edification of the Body of Christ.

    I will shortly be providing a debate challenge to Mr. Manata via my own blog (http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/), which I would hope would help to provide a forum where a more dispassionate conversation could take place.

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete