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Sunday, July 20, 2008

"Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence!"

This is a Humean rule of evidence which was popularized by Carl Sagan. A variant on this slogan is that “extraordinary events demand extraordinary evidence.”

It’s since been picked up by atheists generally to quash any and all reported miracles. But what does this slogan mean, and is it a sound rule of evidence?

1.What makes a claim an “extraordinary” claim? Does that simply mean the event in question is exceptional, out of the ordinary, or unusual?

But unbelievers think that many natural events are extraordinary in that weak sense. Likewise, they think that many human events or historical events are extraordinary in that weak sense. And they don’t demand extraordinary evidence (whatever that means) for such events. So they must have something stronger in mind.

2.They often appeal to the uniformity of nature. So do they define “extraordinary” in the sense that miracles don’t happen, inasmuch as that would run counter to the uniformity of nature?

But, of course, that definition begs the question. Whether miracles do or don’t happen is the very point at issue. You can’t very well presume that miracles never happen without begging the question.

Hence, reported miracles don’t have to overcome the presumption that miracles never happen. For that would assume the very thing the unbeliever must prove.

3.Perhaps, though, the unbeliever thinks the onus is on the believer. Since the believer is asserting that miracles happen, the believer assumes the burden of proof.

However, the unbeliever is asserting that miracles don’t happen, so he—in turn—shoulders a commensurate burden of proof.

4.Frequently, the uniformity of nature is underwritten by appeal to the laws of nature. Here we have a strong claim: miracles don’t happen because miracles can’t happen.

And why can’t they happen? Because that would violate the laws of nature.

Extraordinary events don’t demand extraordinary evidence as long as they’re the right kind of event—natural events, consistent with natural law. A miracle is the wrong kind of extraordinary event for ordinary evidence to suffice.

But there are several problems with this claim:

5.An unbeliever can’t very well presume that the laws of nature preclude miracles. For he’s making a very ambitious claim. A claim about the state of the world.

That’s something he needs to defend. He can’t merely stipulate that his view of the world is right. He must argue for his view of natural law. Therefore, it’s not as if reported miracles must overcome the presumption that natural law precludes their occurrence.

Even if natural law did preclude the miraculous, that, of itself, is a claim which demands a supporting argument.

6.Keep in mind that a natural “law” is just an anthropomorphic metaphor. Literally speaking, there are no “laws” of nature. That’s a figure of speech which is borrowed from human affairs and then projected onto nature.

7.Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we formulate the possibility of miracles within a natural law framework, what would be extraordinary about an event that “violated” the laws of nature?

That would only be extraordinary under the assumption that natural laws are the ultimate factors governing reality. An absolute limiting condition. They demarcate what is possible and impossible.

But, of course, the unbeliever cannot very well presume such a grandiose position. He needs to argue for it.

8.To see the problem with (7), ask yourself the following question: “Is there something extraordinary about the idea that God would do something contrary to the laws of nature?”

On the face of it, there’s nothing extraordinary about such an idea. If God is more ultimate than nature, then God is more ultimate than natural law. So God isn’t bound by nature law. Rather, the laws of nature depend on God.

On the face of it, there’s no presumption that God would never do something contrary to the laws of nature. That would only follow if the laws of nature are ultimate and autonomous.

9. Of course, at this point, the unbeliever will object to the introduction of God into the equation. After all, the unbeliever doesn’t believe in God.

But why doesn’t he believe in God? Does he take the position that God’s existence is an extraordinary claim demanding extraordinary evidence?

But why is God’s existence extraordinary? After all, many theologians argue that God is a necessary being. And if God is a necessary being, then it would be extraordinary if he didn’t exist. Indeed, his nonexistence would be impossible. So his existence is not extraordinary: rather, it’s inevitable.

10. Of course, an unbeliever will deny that God is a necessary being. But if a theologian must argue that God is a necessary being, then an atheologian must argue that God is not a necessary being. An atheist or agnostic can’t merely presume that God is not a necessary being. His own denial is a belief. A belief with its own burden of proof.

On the basis of 1-10, there’s no prima facie assumption that a reported miracle amounts to an extraordinary claim. If an unbeliever is going to classify a reported miracle as an extraordinary claim, then he must mount an argument for his category. It’s not something he’s entitled to take for granted.

He is making a claim about the state of the world. That’s not something he can merely stipulate to be the case—especially when his claim is controversial.

11.What about extraordinary evidence? What an unbeliever really means is that, practically speaking, no evidence will ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.

But that, of itself, is a very ambitious claim. It’s an extraordinary claim to claim that, practically speaking, no evidence can ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.

Indeed, it begs the question. It really boils down to supposition that since miracles either don’t occur or can’t occur, then there is no possible evidence for miracles. But that’s tendentious.

6 comments:

  1. The atheist, at least the strong athiest who claims there is no god and does not try to hide behind the "lack of belief" gambit, implicity asserts that all existence, life, mind, and objective reason are themselves the result of mindless processes...which is the mainstream view of scientISM.

    Of course, none of this has been demonstrated to be the case, only theorized about.

    That is an EXTRAORDINARY claim and something more than just "science will provide these answers someday" is not extraordinary evidence.

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  2. If something occurs that is outside of not only my own personal experience, but the cumulative experience of science, especially since science exists to test boundaries and conditions to see what the laws of nature are and when/if they change, much skepticism should be brought to bear on the claim.

    I would say it is a good deal simpler than you are making it here, and perhaps this could be seen more clearly if we remove the context from "miracle" to "violation" of the laws of nature. Suppose that I, scientist X, am working under conditions that no one has worked under before: say, a particle accelerator of potential 20 TeV. If I see something under those conditions that "appears" to violate the laws of physics, the same amount of scrutiny should be brought to bear on my claim as any other claim that a violation has occurred, be it of divine origin or not. And the purpose of the doubt here is to actually find out the truth: the verification principle in the philosophy of science. If the claim is true, and if the violation is natural, then the conditions and test may be repeated and ought to produce the same "violation": at which time, and once fully described, it no longer is a violation, but another law of nature!

    On the other hand, suppose that we aren't discovering new laws of nature by creating conditions and tests which are extraordinary, but rather we're in the realm of the mundane. In these conditions, a supposed violation would probably draw just as much scrutiny from you (a believer) as from me (an unbeliever). If I claim that I have a dragon in my shed (to use Sagan as you did in your post), for instance, you would be naturally skeptical and would require more evidence than my "say-so" about it. But if I claim to have a lawn mower in my shed, you won't even blink.

    Ditto with religion: the issue is not whether or not a God logically could violate the laws of nature, but whether the evidence we have (the say-so of anonymous persons 2000 years ago) is enough to convince us that violations did happen.

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  3. d said...

    “If something occurs that is outside of not only my own personal experience, but the cumulative experience of science, especially since science exists to test boundaries and conditions to see what the laws of nature are and when/if they change, much skepticism should be brought to bear on the claim…whether the evidence we have (the say-so of anonymous persons 2000 years ago) is enough to convince us that violations did happen.”

    You’re begging the question by assuming that the cumulative evidence goes against the occurrence of miracles.

    “I would say it is a good deal simpler than you are making it here, and perhaps this could be seen more clearly if we remove the context from ‘miracle’ to ‘violation’ of the laws of nature.”

    I already addressed that framework. Pay attention.

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  4. I apologize that I did not read as carefully through some of the points you made as others, and thus I obviously repeated a little of what you'd said.

    Now first differentiate between a logical argument aimed at "disproving" miracles versus what I said, which is a logical argument aimed at supporting the premise that, whether the events are claimed to be of natural or supernatural origin, skepticism should be brought to bear on a claim that is extraordinary, in the sense that it has not before been experienced or described.

    And what I mean by "skepticism" is simply requiring a higher level of evidence to warrant belief, as exemplified in the analogy with Sagan's dragon in the shed.

    My major criticism of your points 4-8 is that the scientific method contains a verification principle for finding out if something is, indeed, a law: empirical demonstration that is repeatable. If conditions X produce event Y that was, at first, unknown, without scientific description and therefore appeared as a "violation" of the laws of nature, then reproduce conditions X to probe Y again.

    Thus the ugly difference appears between the scientific method and a historical/document-based method for probing alleged violations of the laws of nature: reproducability.

    You said: "You’re begging the question by assuming that the cumulative evidence goes against the occurrence of miracles."

    By cumulative evidence I mean the day in, day out experience of human beings and the cumulative record of history and science. A miracle is by definition a very rare event, so all I mean is that the mundane is itself a bit of evidence against the extraordinary: we are more skeptical of things that go against our understanding of the world. To repeat: I'm not saying we are able to argue from induction and logically disprove miracles, but I don't think Hume did either. All it involves is the level of evidence being inversely proportional to the ordinariness of a claim to warrant belief: the more ordinary a claim, the less evidence that is required to substantiate belief in it (e.g., the claim that there is a lawn mower in my shed); the less ordinary (more extraordinary) a claim, the more evidence that is required (e.g., the claim that there is a dragon in my shed).

    Are you implying that miracles are substantiated by anything other than ancient documents? Would you say that the weight of evidence of experience and science is not "against" miracles by definition? Ditto with violations to any laws of nature, whether natural or not...

    It seems that modern miracles (almost always "faith healings") are 99.9% of the time easily dismissed because the person uses a combination of modern medicine and prayer, ruining any claim of supernatural intervention by muddying up the water.

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  5. D SAID:

    “Now first differentiate between a logical argument aimed at ‘disproving’ miracles versus what I said, which is a logical argument aimed at supporting the premise that, whether the events are claimed to be of natural or supernatural origin, skepticism should be brought to bear on a claim that is extraordinary, in the sense that it has not before been experienced or described.”

    To presume that miracles have not been experienced begs the question. That’s one of the basic fallacies of the Humean rule of evidence, popularized by Sagan.

    The sceptic is not entitled to presume that. Hence, there’s no presumption for the Christian to overcome. Both sides have a burden of proof to discharge.

    “And what I mean by ‘skepticism’ is simply requiring a higher level of evidence to warrant belief.”

    The demand for a higher level of evidence piggybacks on the tendentious assumption that miracles have not been experienced. You’re reasoning in a circle.

    “My major criticism of your points 4-8 is that the scientific method contains a verification principle for finding out if something is, indeed, a law: empirical demonstration that is repeatable. If conditions X produce event Y that was, at first, unknown, without scientific description and therefore appeared as a ‘violation’ of the laws of nature, then reproduce conditions X to probe Y again.”

    You’re applying the wrong framework to miracles. A miracle is not like a chemical reaction where, if certain initial conditions are in place, that’s a sufficient condition to yield a uniform effect.

    Science generally deals with impersonal forces. So, left to their own devices, these operate with a mechanistic regularity.

    A miracle, by contrast, is the result of personal agency. A supernatural agent effects the miracle—directly or indirectly.

    Personal agency involves rational discretion. It doesn’t operate with mechanical regularity.

    “Thus the ugly difference appears between the scientific method and a historical/document-based method for probing alleged violations of the laws of nature: reproducability.”

    Miraculous events, as a subset of historical events, are unique events. They’re repeatable in the generic sense that certain *types* of miracles are repeatable, but they are not replicable—any more than historical events are replicable.

    Hence, historical documents are the proper source of information for past miracles. And it’s a question of sifting testimonial evidence.

    “By cumulative evidence I mean the day in, day out experience of human beings and the cumulative record of history and science. A miracle is by definition a very rare event, so all I mean is that the mundane is itself a bit of evidence against the extraordinary: we are more skeptical of things that go against our understanding of the world.”

    Miracles don’t go against my understanding of the world.

    Every historical event is a rare event. Indeed, every historical event is a unique event.

    Certain *kinds* of events recur, but it’s not like reproducing a chemical reaction. You can’t reproduce the year 1812 in a laboratory.

    “To repeat: I'm not saying we are able to argue from induction and logically disprove miracles, but I don't think Hume did either. All it involves is the level of evidence being inversely proportional to the ordinariness of a claim to warrant belief: the more ordinary a claim, the less evidence that is required to substantiate belief in it (e.g., the claim that there is a lawn mower in my shed); the less ordinary (more extraordinary) a claim, the more evidence that is required (e.g., the claim that there is a dragon in my shed).”

    Do I need extraordinary evidence that some people have a rare blood type? By definition, the evidence would be rare. What would constitute extraordinary evidence for a rare blood type?

    More to the point, a miracle is not a weird or anomalous event. It’s a purposeful event—the result of personal agency.

    It’s not like a dragon in the shed.

    “Are you implying that miracles are substantiated by anything other than ancient documents?”

    Yes, modern miracles.

    “Would you say that the weight of evidence of experience and science is not ‘against’ miracles by definition?”

    Science is irrelevant, and I wouldn’t expect people to ordinarily experience miracles.

    “Ditto with violations to any laws of nature, whether natural or not...”

    You’re assuming that laws of nature are the ultimate reality. That begs the question.

    “It seems that modern miracles (almost always ‘faith healings’) are 99.9% of the time easily dismissed because the person uses a combination of modern medicine and prayer, ruining any claim of supernatural intervention by muddying up the water.”

    Not all answered prayers are that easy to explain away. And 99.9% is an ersatz statistic.

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  6. As a scholar and apologist I would argue that there is some fairly good extraordinary evidence for the judeo-christian God of the Bible. Even Napoleon admitted as such. When the nation of Israel was reborn in 1948 even many secular intellectuals marveled at the historically unique reality unfolding there. Of course the skeptics will cry "confirmation bias" whereas the believers will argue that the judeo-Christian Western civilization is a product of Christian values and ethics. Yes, its a circular game but possession is nine tenths,and the judeo_christian West is winning that game! Whither the medieval squalor of Islam and Hinduism and the luddite reality of eastern religions, pantheism and the self destructive downward spiral of secularist hedonism. At what point do the prophecies stop being "self fulfilling"? At what point does the ascendancy and survival of Christianity become evidence or an evidentiary analog? Why are secularist claims of unaided spontaneous abiogenisis, first cause, and uniqueness of humans, etc, not considered "extraordinary claims"? Tu Quo que!

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