I Apologize In Advance For This Post

I remember once when I read a Jeffery Deaver novel. I don’t remember which one it was now—I’m leaning toward The Lesson of Her Death. In any case, Deaver had a character in the book who, after being told something obvious, responded with: "Stating the obvious diminishes us both."

Sadly, since T-Stone is such an apparent dolt that it is impossible for him to complete basic reading comprehension, I must now state the obvious. So I apologize to anyone with an IQ above 82 (this obviously excludes T-Stone) for the following post. I also apologize since I know now, before I post it, that after it is posted T-Stone will completely ignore it (although he will comment on it anyway), so it won't benefit him either. I also apologize to myself for making me go through the tediousness that is forming rigorous logical connections amongst the obvious. To offset this, I will helpfully use the dispassionate third person, with occasional reference to the editorial we. (Sure, that's a non-sequitur...but who's counting?)

The original post is in bold, with the helpful contextual comments following after in plaintext (T-Stone: "plaintext" means "not in bold"; oh, and by bold I mean "darker" not "more courageous", in case you had to look that word up too).

I just read Wonderful Life by Stephen Jay Gould (1989. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.). It was the first Gould book I ever tried to read--I started several years ago, but unfortunately put aside for a while. I reread it from scratch this weekend, but this time with the added benefit of having read much of Gould’s other works, including Full House and The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (although I’ve not yet finished this massive tome). There is one specific issue relating to Wonderful Life that is relevant to some claims that our evolutionist friends have made over the years: Darwinism, despite claims to the contrary, is not predictive.

In this paragraph, we have the normative introductory phase of writing. The author of the piece begins by giving some basic information as to the content that will follow, specifically notating that he has just read Wonderful Life. Helpfully, the author provides the bibliographical reference to said book, should any readers wish to do research on their own, although most can find it by simply going to their library and asking for it via title and author’s name. The introductory paragraph in general is designed not just to catch the attention of people so that they will continue reading, but also to give us the thesis. Here, the introductory paragraph follows the general rule and ends with the thesis statement: "Darwinism, despite claims to the contrary, is not predictive."

Stripping away extra verbiage, we can summarize this thesis (T) by reducing it to a simple: T = Darwinism is not predictive (or an even simpler "Darwinism is unpredictive" except "unpredictive" is not a word according to Microsoft Word—which is basically God—despite the word being found at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/unpredictive; following convention, we shall obey the spellchecker and use the slightly longer thesis).

Gould illustrates this in Wonderful Life by the analogy of "running life’s tape again." This effectively demonstrates that evolution can never be predictable. At the risk of being repetitive to an extreme, we will look at several of his quotes below:

The first sentence of the second paragraph used the word "this" to refer back to the thesis statement, T. That is, one can substitute T for "this" in the sentence to understand the meaning, viz.: "Gould illustrates Darwinism is not predictive in Wonderful Life by the analogy of ‘running life’s tape again.’" Stated in this manner, the paragraph becomes redundant, as the next sentence merely repeats this same claim. However, since the original sentence used the word "this" instead of stating T, the second sentence has been written to assure us that the "this" is indeed referring to T. Thus, we have supreme confidence that the author’s claim is that Gould will demonstrate his (the author's) thesis statement in a series of quotes.

Therefore, we have the following claim. Claim1 = "Gould illustrates T by analogy of ‘running life’s tape again.’" Let us examine the first quote, which we will label as GS1 (GS stands for "Gould Statement"):

I believe that the reconstructed Burgess fauna, interpreted by the theme of replaying life's tape, offers powerful support for this different view of life: any replay of the tape would lead evolution down a pathway radically different from the road actually taken. But the consequent differences in outcome do not imply that evolution is senseless, and without meaningful pattern; the divergent route of the replay would be just as interpretable, just as explainable after the fact, as the actual road. But the diversity of possible itineraries does demonstrate that eventual results cannot be predicted at the start, and none would ever occur a second time in the same way, because any pathway proceeds through thousands of improbable stages. Alter any early event, ever so slightly and without apparent importance at the time, and evolution cascades into a radically different channel. (p. 51).

GS1 does lend support for Claim1 in the following way. 1) It defines the analogy of "running life’s tape again", here in the statement "replaying life’s tape" (which is functionally equivalent). 2) This analogy does indeed state "eventual results cannot be predicted at the start", thus establishing a link in the analogy to unpredictability. 3) The quote concludes "evolution cascades into a radically different channel" showing that Gould is indeed speaking of evolution in this quote. Even if we appeal to ambiguity in the term "Darwinism" we know that Darwinism deals with evolution. In fact, if Darwinism is a subset of evolution (as it is since there is evolution that is not Darwinian in theory), and if all evolution is unpredictable, then Darwinism would likewise be unpredictable, according to GS1. These three facts point toward Claim1 (Gould illustrates T by analogy of "running life’s tape again") being true.

The author comments on GS1 immediately after quoting it:

Naturally, Gould remained a Darwinist despite demonstrating the problems with Darwinism (and as an interesting side note, his examination of the philosophy of Walcott—discoverer of the Burgess Shale, who tried to shoehorn everything into the prevailing evolutionary paradigm—is relevant in looking at Gould too). But notice the framework here: evolution can be explained "after the fact" but "cannot be predicted at the start." This is illustrated further by Gould:

In terms of the thesis, the first part of the paragraph is indeed extraneous. It does, however, provide extra information in an admitted "side note" that some readers may find interesting. Since it is a side note, one should not expect it to deal with the main thesis. The paragraph does, however, conclude by the author commenting on how GS1 fits T, which as we have demonstrated above, it does do (utilizing Claim1). The author tells us there will be further evidence in GS2, which immediately follows:

I challenge any paleontologist to argue that he could have gone back to the Burgess seas and, without the benefit of hindsight, picked out Naraoia, Canadaspis, Aysheaia, and Sanctacaris for success, while identifying Marrella, Odaraia, Sidneyia, and Leanchoilia as ripe for the grim reaper. Wind back the tape of life, and let it play again. Would the replay ever yield anything like the history that we know? (p. 188)

It is immediately apparent that GS2 is once again dealing with "life’s tape." Further, as GS2 is in the form of a challenge, it indicates that Gould is strenuously stating that it is impossible to determine which species would be successful and which would not be. This only makes sense if Gould is talking about unpredictability again. The final rhetorical question demands an obvious "no" response. Thus, GS2 also provides support for Claim1 for the same reasons that GS1 does.

The author continues with his commentary on GS2:

Indeed, such a task is virtually impossible. So pervasive is this unpredictability that Gould rightly asks how it is possible for us to predict an alternate evolutionary sequence when we cannot even see how the sequence that did (supposedly) occur happened:

This paragraph serves as a transitional paragraph between two quotes. This paragraph is again extraneous in reference to GS2; it simply repeats the conclusions of the quotes already provided. However, it also preps us for the next quote, GS3:

After all, we cannot even make predictions when we know the line of descent: we cannot see the mayfly in Aysheaia, or the black widow spider in Sanctacaris. How can we specify the world that different decimations would have produced? (p. 292).


This quote is not speaking of "replaying the tape" specifically, although it is inferred by the fact that the concluding sentence asks us to consider "different decimations." Since "replaying the tape" is the analogy used to describe considering "different decimation", this is equivalent. Further, GS3 states we cannot make predictions "when we know the line of descent." Once again, GS3 provides support for Claim1.

So, to sum up, we have the following so far:

T = Darwinism is not predictive.
Claim1 = Gould illustrates T by analogy of "running life’s tape again."
Claim1 is supported by GS1, GS2, and GS3.

The author then transitions from providing evidence for Claim1 to providing other claims:

Now lest we be charged with twisting Gould’s words, it is important to note that Gould is specifically addressing his argument to catastrophes, and not to "normal" evolution. (It should also be noted, however, that this firm of a distinction is not clearly stated in Wonderful Life, although it is clearly assumed and you can spot it when you know it’s there; the clearer statements that Gould is not speaking universally of evolution here are actually found in other works Gould later penned.) Thus, Gould does seek to avoid some of the charge of circular reasoning that is inherent in the tautology problem—in fact, Gould does address this specifically, although only tangentially:

From the above, let us flesh out the claims:

Claim2 = "Gould is specifically addressing catastrophes, not normal evolution."
Claim3 = "Gould did not clearly state Claim2 in this writing."
Claim4 = "Gould does clearly state Claim2 in other writings."
Claim5 = "Claim2 can be used tangentially to avoid the tautology problem."

Claim2 is not argued for directly at this point, although if one understands Gould’s use of the term "decimation" it is obviously true from GS3. Claim2 will be supported later, however; GS6 will provide all the necessary evidence (see below).

Claim3 is a negative claim and, as such, cannot be proven. (That is, in order to prove it, one would have to look through the entirety of Wonderful Life to see that Claim2 is not in it.) However, Claim3 can be falsified by any counter quotes to the contrary, and thus the absence of counter quotes leads credence to the claim (although, naturally, it cannot be proven in that manner).

Claim4 is not argued for by the author, and thus we do have a genuine unsubstantiated claim here. This claim is, however, trivial inasmuch as it has no bearing on T and, if false, impugns Gould rather than the author.

Claim5 references the next Gould Statement, GS4. To see if Claim5 is unsubstantiated, we turn our attention to GS4:

Arguments that propose adaptive superiority as the basis for survival risk the classic error of circular reasoning. Survival is the phenomenon to be explained, not the proof, ipso facto, that those who survived were "better adapted" than those who died. This issue has been kicking around the courtyards of Darwinian theory for more than a century. It even has a name--the "tautology argument." Critics claim that our motto "survival of the fittest" is a meaningless tautology because fitness is defined by survival, and the definition of natural selection reduces to an empty "survival of those who survive."

Creationists have even been known to trot out this argument as a supposed disproof of evolution (Bethell, 1976; see my response in Gould, 1977)--as if more than a century of data could come crashing down through a schoolboy error in syllogistic logic. In fact, the supposed problem has an easy resolution, one that Darwin himself recognized and presented. Fitness--in this context, superior adaptation--cannot be defined after the fact by survival, but must be predictable before the challenge by an analysis of form, physiology, or behavior. (p. 236).


In GS4, we see that Gould does define for us what the "tautology argument" is and how it is used by creationists. Gould concludes that fitness must be predictable rather than defined after the fact in order to avoid the circular charge. Hence we see that if Claim2 is true (that is, if Gould is not speaking of evolution in totality, but catastrophe specifically), then Claim5 is also true: "Claim2 can be used tangentially to avoid the tautology problem." This is so because if Darwinism "normally" is predictive, then the tautology problem is only a problem at the time of catastrophe. This is considered a "tangential" claim because Gould immediately contradicts the basis for this claim in GS5, as the author points out:

Ironically, just a paragraph later, Gould refutes this very claim of "easy resolution":

In short, while the author demonstrates that Claim2 can be used to neutralize the tautology problem, he claims here that Gould contradicts himself. Thus, Claim6 = "Gould’s neutralizing of the ‘tautology problem’ in GS4 is contradicted by GS5."

GS5 is:

But if we face the Burgess fauna honestly, we must admit that we have no evidence whatsoever--not a shred--that losers in the great decimation were systematically inferior in adaptive design to those who survived. Anyone can invent a plausible story after the fact. For example, Anomalocaris, though the largest of Cambrian predators, did not come up a winner. So I could argue that its unique nutcracker jaw, incapable of closing entirely, and probably working by constriction rather than tearing apart of prey, really wasn't as adaptive as a more conventional jaw made of two pieces clamping together. Perhaps. But I must honestly face the counterfactual situation. Suppose that Anomalocaris had lived and flourished. Would I not then have been tempted to say, without any additional evidence, that Anomalocaris had survived because its unique jaw worked so well? If so, then I have no reason to identify Anomalocaris as destined for failure. I only know that this creature died--and so, eventually, do we all. (p. 236-237)

In support of this as a contradiction, the author took pains to spell it out:

In other words, Gould here argues that Natural Selection—or more specifically "Survival of the Fittest" is not a tautology because it is predictive; yet it is impossible to predict who will survive. In short, the way I see the argument shaping up is as follows:

Opponents to Darwinism say X neutralizes Natural Selection
Gould says that X does not neutralize Natural Selection because of Y.
Gould then says that Y is not true.

Frankly, I can’t see why Y is relevant then.

The logic, which we will label as LA1 (for Logical Argument 1) above does demonstrate Claim6.

Thus far, we have the following:

T = Darwinism is not predictive.
Claim1 = Gould illustrates T by analogy of "running life’s tape again."
Claim1 is supported by GS1, GS2, and GS3.

Claim2 = Gould is specifically addressing catastrophes, not normal evolution.
Claim2 is supported by GS3 (if you know Gould’s term) and by GS6 (which we will show next).

Claim3 = Gould did not clearly state Claim2 in this writing.
This is a universal negative and impossible to prove.

Claim4 = Gould does clearly state Claim2 in other writings.
This claim was not demonstrated, but is trivial.

Claim5 = Claim2 can be used tangentially to avoid the tautology problem
This claim was demonstrated by GS4

Claim6 = Gould’s neutralizing of the ‘tautology problem’ in GS4 is contradicted by GS5.
This claim was demonstrated by GS5 and the logical argument LA1.

The author then extrapolates on the error demonstrated in Claim6:

To be as charitable as possible, perhaps we can argue that Gould is saying Natural Selection is true for most of the time, just not when it really matters—at the time of mass extinction (which Gould labels as "decimation"). This also does fit with some of Gould’s other statements, wherein he specifically says that Natural Selection does not apply during these mass extinctions:

In other words, the author makes an attempt here to be as charitable as possible to Gould, knowing that most people try to avoid contradictions and do not have them in their thought intentionally. Thus, he proposes an Alternate Explanation (AE) for GS5, namely: AE1 = "Gould agrees Natural Selection occurs most of the time, just not during decimation." AE1 already has sympathetic evidence given Claim2—in fact, we can treat them identically. Both are further solidified by GS6:

Groups may prevail or die for reasons that bear no relationship to the Darwinian basis of success in normal times. Even if fishes hone their adaptations to peaks of aquatic perfection, they will all die if the ponds dry up. But grubby old Buster the Lungfish, former laughingstock of the piscine priesthood, may pull through--and not because a bunion on his great-grandfather's fin warned his ancestors about an impending comet. Buster and his kin may prevail because a feature evolved long ago for a different use has fortuitously permitted survival during a sudden and unpredictable change in rules. And if we are Buster's legacy, and the result of a thousand other similarly happy accidents, how can we possibly view our mentality as inevitable, or even probable? (p. 48)


Here, we clearly see that GS6 supports Claim2/AE1 for Gould specifically states that he is speaking of times that are in juxtaposition to "normal times."

The author points out:

In fact, this evolution of traits that can be fortuitously used during a catastrophe is key to Gould’s theory. Later, he calls this the "different-rules model" of catastrophic evolution, saying:

Here, we have Claim7 = "Evolution of traits that can be fortuitously used during a catastrophe is key to Gould’s theory." Claim7 is supported by GS6 and GS7, which is immediately quoted:

The different-rules model therefore fractures the causal continuity that Darwin envisaged between reasons for success within local populations and the causes of survival and proliferation through long stretches of geological time. Hence, this model strongly promotes the role of contingency, viewed primarily as unpredictability, in evolution. If long-term success depends upon incidental aspects of features evolved for different reasons, then how could we possibly know, if we rewound life's tape to a distant past, which groups were destined for success? Their performance and evolution during our observation would not be relevant. We might base some guesses on incidental features that usually imply survival through a mass extinction, but how could we do so with any confidence? In an important sense, these crucial features don't even exist until the different rules of mass extinctions make their incidental effects important--for extreme stress may be needed to "key up" these features, and animals may never experience such conditions during normal times. And how can we know, in our rich and multifarious world, what the next episode of mass extinction, somewhere down the road, will require? Unpredictability must rule if geological longevity depends upon lucky side consequences of features evolved for other reasons. (p. 310-311)


Here, the fact that Darwinism doesn’t work during catastrophe shows that Gould is specifically isolating his argument to times of catastrophe and not to times that are normative. Proof of Claim7 could not be clearer. As a result, the author concludes:

It is important to note that, again to be as charitable as possible, Gould is arguing that Darwinism works on "normal" times, but during catastrophe, "the causal continuity that Darwin envisioned" is fractured. Indeed, Gould’s argument is that it is because Darwinism doesn’t work when it comes to catastrophe that the unpredictability of evolution comes into play. If Darwinism was the only force at work in evolution, then it would be possible to simply look at the Burgess organisms and determine which one is better suited to survival.

From this, we can include some more claims:

Claim8 = Evolution is unpredictable because Darwinism doesn’t work during catastrophe.

Claim9 = Darwinism is not the only force at work in evolution.

Claim9 is found by using an implied logical argument, LA2:

. If Darwinism is the only force at work in evolution then we can predict the survival of organisms.

. We cannot predict the survival or organisms.

.: Therefore, Darwinism is not the only force at work in evolution.

(Naturally, we can also say that the first premise is wrong in that Darwinism is not predictive...but that merely serves to prove the thesis right off the bat.)

So we see the following:

T = Darwinism is not predictive.
Claim1 = Gould illustrates T by analogy of "running life’s tape again."
Claim1 is supported by GS1, GS2, and GS3.

Claim2 = Gould is specifically addressing catastrophes, not normal evolution.
AE1 = Gould agrees Natural Selection occurs most of the time, just not during decimation.

Claim2/AE1 is supported by GS3 (if you know Gould’s term) and by GS6 & GS7

Claim3 = Gould did not clearly state Claim2 in this writing.
This is a universal negative and impossible to prove.

Claim4 = Gould does clearly state Claim2 in other writings.
This claim was not demonstrated.

Claim5 = Claim2 can be used tangentially to avoid the tautology problem
This claim was demonstrated by GS4

Claim6 = Gould’s neutralizing of the ‘tautology problem’ in GS4 is contradicted by GS5.
This claim was demonstrated by GS5 and the logical argument LA1.

Claim7 = Evolution of traits that can be fortuitously used during a catastrophe is key to Gould’s theory.
This claim was demonstrated by GS6 and GS7.

Claim8 = Evolution is unpredictable because Darwinism doesn’t work during catastrophe.
This claim is demonstrated by GS7

Claim9 = Darwinism is not the only force at work in evolution.
This claim is demonstrated by GS7 and LA2.

At this point in the post, the author shifts his focus from exposition of Gould’s philosophy to a critique of it:

There are several glaring problems if we accept Gould’s theory, though. First, the unpredictability of Darwinism means that we do not have any scientific way to examine evolution. Evolution is simply narrative, which does not fit into the strict roles of scientific method. (Gould argues that we should not heed such rules at this point, but I find this to be nothing more than a case of special pleading that he would never allow a theist.) The problem is even summed up by Gould:

Here we have the following claims:

Claim10: The unpredictability of Darwinism means we have no scientific way to examine evolution.

Claim11: Gould argues we do not need to be concerned with the scientific method at this point.

Now it is possible given the context that the author should have used the term "evolution" in Claim10 instead of "Darwinism." If so, the author did engage in equivocation at this point. However, it should be noted that if there is any equivocation, the origin stems from the various Gould quotes first, which treat "Darwinism" and "evolution" as interchangeable. Likewise, if we keep the original claim that unpredictability is inherent in Darwinism specifically and not in evolution generally, Claim10 is supported by GS2 and GS3, as well as by the contradiction demonstrated in Claim6 above (wherein it was demonstrated that trying to separate Darwinism as the "normal" evolutionary mode from what occurs during catastrophe is contradicted by GS5).

As for the evidence of Claim10, we see it is supported by GS8:

Historical explanations are distinct from conventional experimental results in many ways. The issue of verification by repetition does not arise because we are trying to account for uniqueness of detail that cannot, both by laws of probability and time's arrow of irreversibility, occur together again. We do not attempt to interpret the complex events of narrative by reducing them to simple consequences of natural law; historical events do not, of course, violate any general principles of matter and motion, but their occurrence lies in a realm of contingent detail. (The law of gravity tells us how an apple falls, but not why that apple fell at that moment, and why Newton happened to be sitting there, ripe for inspiration.) And the issue of prediction, a central ingredient in the stereotype, does not enter into a historical narrative. We can explain an event after it occurs, but contingency precludes its repetition, even from an identical starting point. (p. 278)


GS8 also supports Claim11 by demonstrating how historical explanations are different from regular science, and that they are not rejected (by Gould) despite this.

Beyond the Gould statements, the author also gives us detailed reasons backing up Claim10 specifically. Claim11 is mostly ignored as being fairly trivial at this point, although this is a subjective call that could be wrong. On Claim10, the author writes:

In short, if we accept Gould’s reasoning, we have literally broken the back of Darwinism. Darwinism cannot explain which organisms will ultimately survive when it matters the most, and as a result is limited in scope to only times between the great extinctions. While this accounts for a great deal of time, if we accept the geological time scale, it still does not account for why any specific species survived the Permian extinction, or even the end of the Cretaceous period when the dinosaurs were killed off. Gould’s argument is that mammals survived not due to their being better adapted, but due purely to pure luck, and as such we could not look at a mammal in situ with a dinosaur and determine which one would survive and which one would die. Darwinism had nothing to do with survival at this point; pure chance was all that was involved. Furthermore, our reconstruction of the events can only be done via unscientific just-so stories.

In support of Claim10, we see:

Claim12 = "Darwinism cannot explain which animals actually survive an extinction event."

This is supported by the fact that we cannot predict which animals will survive (GS2 and GS3); something other than Darwinism is at work here (Claim9, supported by GS7 and LA2); and the fact that this is survival of the lucky rather than survival of the fittest (GS7).

We can now propose LA3.

. Science must be either predictive or explanatory
. Darwinism is not predictive (Claim1)
. Darwinism is not explanatory (Claim12)
.: Darwinism is not scientific

LA3 fully demonstrates Claim10.

The author then continues on to what he considers the more important event (given the fact that the above can allow Darwinism in instances other than during catastrophe and only runs into the logical problems fully during catastrophic events):

The second, more important problem, is that Darwin’s theory of Natural Selection doesn’t work during the space between mass extinctions either. Remember that the different-rules model Gould proposes is predicated on organisms gaining traits that serve absolutely no survival advantage while they get them, and which only later serve a purpose when a catastrophe hits. The heart of this problem is summed up in the previously quoted passage: "In an important sense, these crucial features don't even exist until the different rules of mass extinctions make their incidental effects important--for extreme stress may be needed to 'key up' these features, and animals may never experience such conditions during normal times."

The new claim, Claim13, is "Natural Selection doesn’t work between mass extinctions." This is immediately supported by the author’s quote of GS7. The traits that allow survivability through an extinction event give no survivability advantage during regular evolutionary times. Thus, there is no survivability advantage given to the organism under Natural Selection, which is immediately argued by the author:

In other words, animals must gain features that serve no purpose (in survivability terms), which (because science divorces itself from the realm of teleology) cannot have been introduced intentionally, and which then are not weeded out through normal evolution.

The author then concludes with the idea that we ought not expect these random variations to occur in organisms:

But the fact of the matter is that after a short time, a species reaches stasis when it comes to variety.

Claim14 = "Species reach stasis after a short time."

Claim14 is demonstrated by an appeal to Mayr (MS1):

With drastic selection taking place in every generation, it is legitimate to ask why evolution is normally so slow. The major reason is that owing to the hundreds or thousands of generations that have undergone preceding selection, a natural population will be close to the optimal genotype. The selection to which such a population has been exposed is normalizing or stabilizing selection. This selection eliminates all of those individuals of a population who deviate from the optimal phenotype. Such culling drastically reduces the variance in every generation. And unless there has been a major change in the environment, the optimal phenotype is most likely that of the immediately preceding generations. All the mutations of which this genotype is capable and that could lead to an improvement of this standard phenotype have already been incorporated in previous generations. Other mutations are apt to lead to a deterioration and these will be eliminated by normalizing selection. (What Evolution Is, 2001. New York: Basic Books. p. 135, italics his).

The author then demonstrates the tension for us:

Now Mayr was, of course, a gradualist while Gould was a catastrophist. Even so, this illustrates the problem for us. Either organisms evolve slowly and not too far away from the basic phenotype, or else organisms evolve rapidly so that when a random catastrophe occurs there will be a chance for some of the organisms to survive. This tension is part of the reason Dawkins (another gradualist) so despised Gould. When we look at organisms today, they appear to be very similar to their phenotypes—suggesting the slow evolution as put forth by Mayr; but this kind of evolution is destroyed by catastrophes, where it breaks down into oblivion as demonstrated by Gould. Clearly, the two positions cannot both be correct; and equally as clearly, they both fail at crucial points.

This paragraph clearly flows from the preceding texts. Gould’s position requires enough variety away from the main phenotype as to ensure a sufficient difference to allow survival through an extinction event, but Mayr states that such variety will not occur due to phenotype stasis. Gould and Mayr are at odds here, bringing us to the author’s ultimate conclusion:

Most evolutionists today argue amongst themselves as to which view is right: gradualism or catastrophism. Neither side seems to grasp that there is a third alternative available: neither side is right.

This is a simple illustration of the false dichotomy problem.

So, to wrap up our examination, we see the following:

T = Darwinism is not predictive.
Claim1 = Gould illustrates T by analogy of "running life’s tape again."
Claim1 is supported by GS1, GS2, and GS3.

Claim2 = Gould is specifically addressing catastrophes, not normal evolution.
AE1 = Gould agrees Natural Selection occurs most of the time, just not during decimation.

Claim2/AE1 is supported by GS3 (if you know Gould’s term) and by GS6 & GS7

Claim3 = Gould did not clearly state Claim2 in this writing.
This is a universal negative and impossible to prove.

Claim4 = Gould does clearly state Claim2 in other writings.
This claim was not demonstrated.

Claim5 = Claim2 can be used tangentially to avoid the tautology problem
This claim was demonstrated by GS4

Claim6 = Gould’s neutralizing of the ‘tautology problem’ in GS4 is contradicted by GS5.
This claim was demonstrated by GS5 and the logical argument LA1.

Claim7 = Evolution of traits that can be fortuitously used during a catastrophe is key to Gould’s theory.
This claim was demonstrated by GS6 and GS7.

Claim8 = Evolution is unpredictable because Darwinism doesn’t work during catastrophe.
This claim is demonstrated by GS7

Claim9 = Darwinism is not the only force at work in evolution.
This claim is demonstrated by GS7 and LA2.

Claim10: The unpredictability of Darwinism means we have no scientific way to examine evolution.
This claim is demonstrated by GS8 as well as LA3 and Claim12 below.

Claim11: Gould argues we do not need to be concerned with the scientific method at this point.
This claim is demonstrated by GS8.

Claim12 = Darwinism cannot explain which animals actually survive an extinction event.
This claim is demonstrated by GS2, GS3, GS7, and Claim9

Claim13 = Natural Selection doesn’t work between mass extinctions.
This claim is demonstrated by GS7.

Claim14 = Species reach stasis after a short time.
This claim is demonstrated by MS1.

Of these, we can see that T is supported by Claim1, Claim7, Claim8, Claim9, Claim10, Claim12, and Claim13. All of these claims are supported by other evidence. In fact, the only unsupported claims are trivial: Claim3 and Claim4. As such, whether we agree or disagree with the author, he has firmly established his case both in logic and in the writings of Gould.