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Sunday, March 18, 2007

The Immorality of Hell

I recently had a brief exchange with atheist Spencer Lo over the supposed immorality of God sending people to hell for committing sins he foreordained they would commit.

The exchange is brief but interesting since it gets into issues of compatibilism and moral responsibility.

I asked Spencer (through James Lazarus) if he wanted to post some final thoughts, or each have one more round, with him having the last word, but at this time he's letting the discussion go since he's writing his Masters Thesis (he's getting an MA in philosophy).

His non-response to my final post should not be taken as in any way his conceding my points. He also told Jim Lazarus that he may respond once he's done with his Thesis paper. If so, I will post it along with my future rejoinder.

For the moment, then, I post the exchange we had with the hopes that it will be helpful for Calvinists who hold to compatibilism.

Spencer's argument will be posted first, my response, his response, and lastly, my response.



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1. Ought implies can is essential to moral responsibility.

2. If God predetermined all human actions, no person can act contrary to the way he or she was predetermined to act.

3. God commands humans to act in accordance with his laws, and warns that any deviation from them is punishable by an eternity in hell.

4. Since all humans act contrary to God's laws (no one's perfect), God must have predetermined that no would always act in accordance with his laws. (from 2, 3)

5. Whenever humans act contrary to God's laws, God must have predetermined that they would have deviated from them. (restatement of 4)

6. Humans cannot be expected to act in accordance with God's laws, whenever God predetermined that wouldn't. (from 2)

7. Humans cannot be morally responsible for not acting in accordance with God's laws, when they do not act in accordance with God's laws. (from 1, 5, 7)

8. Therefore, humans do not deserve to spend an eternity in hell.


- Spencer Lo

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**********

1. How is "can" being used in the argument? In one sense, all Calvinists believe people "can" do otherwise in the sense that their body operates just fine. That is, God is not moving their arms to do an evil act against their will. they have the "ability" to do otherwise. For example, it was prophesied that Jesus' bones would not break. God predetermined that Jesus' bones wouldn't break during the crucifixion. Now, Calvin asks, "Where Jesus' bones unbreakable bones?" Of course not, they still "could" have been broken.

2. Why is "being able to do otherwise" a precondition for saying an act is immoral? Or for moral responsibility? Say that Spencer, hating the Whereican government, is well known for wanting to shoot the president of Whereica. Now, an evil crime Lord, James Lazarus, wants the president dead so he can move forward with his nefarious plot to rule the world. James thus hires Spencer to do the job. Now, James, a staunch proponent of the "failure is not an option" school of villainhood, implants a device into Spencer's cerebral cortex that, if Jim Lazarus presses a button, will make Spencer go though with the assassination plot. This is a back-up plan, in case Spencer has a failure of of nerve.

Well, it should be fairly obvious that Spencer "can't" do otherwise. So, the question is, if Spencer shoots the president, and does this without having Lazarus pressing the button, should Spencer "ought" not have killed the president?

3. Is Spencer or Jim a determinist? If so, how can there be "oughts" in their worldviews?

4. Isn't Spencer a Buddhist, and Jim a physicalist (or something near enough)? How is identity of a *person* through time accounted for? Moral responsibility also presupposes that the person punished forthe crime is the person who did the crime (note, I critique memory views of identity in my response to RSS, and other physicalist (supervenient) views of identity in an old post of mine (The Convenience of Supervenience).

5. With respects to P.5, the point is that persons have *chosen* to do so "freely" were "feely" means "they did what they wanted to do and where not compelled."

6. I deny that P.6 follows from P2. God certainly can *expect* them to act according to his laws, since he calls all men to an account.

7. Ought implies "obligation." Men are obligated to obey God's law, whether they "can" do so or not.

8. "Can" should be viewed ethically not metaphysically. Men are not puppets being forced to go this way or that, against their will. No, our arms, legs, eyes, and mouth all work the same whether we sin or not. If Spencer kicks some person, that does not mean that he didn't have the metaphysical "ability" to not kick the person in that his sensory-motor skills were broken.

In Calvinistic (Christian) philosophy, the reason men "can't" obey God's laws is because that takes a desire to do so, and all men (without the regenerating work of the spirit) do not have that desire. Their nature is set against god and his law, hating it. It's rather like a lion, in some ways, who has the "choice" to eat lettuce or Gazelle flank. The lion's "body" works fine and nothing is broken with his control of his body to maneuver his mouth the chew the lettuce. But, it's not in his nature to choose the lettuce. And so as Jeremiah asks,

"Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard its spots? Neither can you do good who are accustomed to doing evil" (Jer. 13:23).

And I think the point here is that these things are part of their very nature (the point isn't to say that God could call skin color morally reprehensible, and so as we all know, all analogies break down). Men are ethically set against God and his law in such a way that, for them to do good is like an Ethiopian to change his skin color. In this way men "can't" obey God's law, unless they have a change in nature, becoming born again.

This doesn't mean that there isn't a law, though. This doesn't mean that the King of the Universe doesn't have obligations for all persons who live in his kingdom. And, this doesn't mean that God cannot expect men to live up to his law. That, they "ought" to live up to his law. Even though men ethically cannot choose to do good, this doesn't apply to the converse. They (ethically) "can" choose to do bad, and so since *they* have *chosen* from their *own desires* to do evil things, and they know these things are wrong, that these things "ought not" be done, i.e., that they *should not* be doing these things, then they most certainly deserve to go to hell, which is where they chose to go, the want to go there, and they desire it. Hell is a place where people will live without any common grace. They will not have God giving the regular blessing we enjoy now, while he waits patiently for his elect to come in. God will not restrain sin anymore, like he does now (pause... if you think the earth is bad, people are evil sick and disgusting, note that God is actually *restraining* people from being as bad and evil as they can be). And so people will go there, because that's where they wanted to go.

And, just because God determined that, that does not logically imply that *they* haven't chosen and desired to go there. Compatibilism is applied here.


I don't know, those are a few rough thoughts on the matter.

**********

**********

Paul:
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1. How is "can" being used in the argument? In one sense, all Calvinists believe people "can" do otherwise in the sense that their body operates just fine.
---------------

Suppose I mean logical possibility. I claim that given the facts of the situation, it is logically impossible for a reprobate to choose God. One only has two options; either you reject God for eternity, or you come to accept him. I'll argue that the reprobate can't choose otherwise, in the strongest sense of "cannot" possible: it would entail a contradiction. Whether or not being able to choose otherwise makes the reprobate morally culpable is a debate for next time.

Let's look at the facts of the situation. (i) The only way for a person to choose Jesus is if Jesus chooses him first. (ii) God has determined who the reprobates are before any of them were born. (iii) Whoever God has determined to be a reprobate will never be chosen by Jesus, and will always reject him.

It follows from these three facts that a reprobate cannot logically choose Jesus. Why? The necessary and sufficient condition for choosing God consists in Jesus choosing you first. If Jesus has not chosen you first, then you cannot choose Jesus. It's irrelevant that a reprobate's body "operates just fine," because there's nothing that the body can do which could enable one to choose Christ. A person can open his mouth and assert the words, "Jesus, please save me," but that won't save him; those words need to be spoken from the heart. Since the unsaved can't desire what he doesn't want to desire, unless Jesus changes his desires, there's nothing that the unsaved himself can do to desire salvation. Hence, there's nothing that the reprobate could do, himself, to choose to speak those words from the heart. This all goes to show that there is no sense in which the reprobate "could" choose.

I'll make my point more explicit. It is logically impossible for the reprobate to accept Christ because that would contradict the facts.

If a reprobate could choose Jesus, then (i) would be false; it would not be true that Jesus has to chose you before you can choose Jesus. Jesus choosing you wouldn't be the necessary sufficient condition for salvation, if one could choose Jesus without Jesus choosing him.

If a reprobate could choose Jesus, then (ii) would be false. It would not be true that you're a reprobate if you could choose Jesus, since a reprobate is someone who, by definition, would never chose Jesus.

**********

**********

Hey Spencer,

Okay, and I deny that the ability to do otherwise is a condition on moral responsibility. That is, I deny the "ought implies can" principle.

I affirm that (i) having alternative possibilities is not required for moral responsibility, and (ii) there is no reason why moral responsibility and determinism (or divine foreordination, for that matter)would be incompatible other than the fact that such determinism (or foreordination) would preclude alternative
possibilities.

Once premise 1 is refuted, then premise 6 does not follow from 2 (and 1). I'd defend both (i) and (ii) by appeals to Frankfurt-type counter example and (ii) by Fischer's refutations of source incompatibilists. Also, given my view, I see no reason to accept your argument as bearing on my theological distinctives. Though I'd say it's a good argument against libertarians (assuming they granted the sovereignty of God in the sense you employ it).

Also, I'd add that your argument is incoherent for assuming an deterministic worldview and a libertarian one. Your argument hinges upon my accepting determinism, but if so I reject libertarianism, but P1 asks me to accept libertarianism, and if I did that I'd reject other premises. So, your argument mixes internal and external critiques.

I think we can briefly look at your argumentation, though:


1) If you mean "logical possibility" (broadly logical) then I'd disagree. It is true that S cannot choose Christ in our world W where God has decreed that S would not chose Christ. But, it could be that at W* S is not reprobate since the decree is not the same. The same decree qualification is required, because if God's decree with respect to S in W* is that S be elect in W* -i.e. if W* were actual, then S would be elect - then it is not the case that S would be *necessarily* reprobate; for God could have decreed differently.

So, just because a person is actually reprobate, it doesn't follow that it is "logically impossible" for him to choose to come to Christ. For who knows if God's decree with respect to that person could have been different in another possible world?

But, if the decree is the same, then we can say that at any world W*, if God's decree is the same as in W, and S is decreed reprobate in W, S will be decreed reprobate in W*.

Same with physical determinism. One could ask, "could S have done different?" And, since there is no logical necessity to our physical laws being what they are, or what has happened physically in our world must physically have happened in all possible physical worlds, then govern a world W* with different laws or antecedent events, then S "could have" done different in the "broadly logical sense." And, therefore, your comments, construed as "logically possible," are false. Now, I suppose you could exegete Holy Scripture and make the case that God must have decreed in W* who he decreed in W (the actual world). But, minus that, it's false to say that by "can" you mean "logical possibility" and, based on that, S "cannot" chose Christ.

2. I maintain that *your construal* of "can" or "cannot" is subject to a serious reductio. If "ought implies can" in the "broadly logical sense" of "logically possible or impossible," then how could you say that S "ought" not, say, beat his wife for merely saying his name? Imagine the possible world W* where the laws of biology are such that, not unlike when a doctor hits your knee to check your reflexes, every time you hear your wife’s voice, you automatically swing your arm forward and punch her. So, it is "logically possible" that S "can't* refrain from hitting his wife for merely saying his name, therefore S has no moral obligation to not hit his wife!

3. Even if you change your "supposings," I still find your account problematic. I still don't know what you mean by "can" or "cannot." There are many different ways to look at this. To begin with an obvious example, which will prove my point without recourse to any moral dilemma, let's look at this example: due to psychological factors, a woman might freeze upon seeing a mouse in her kitchen. Paralyzed by fear, she "cannot" move a muscle. But, she "physically" can in the sense that this phobia is "all in her head." So, she "can" physically throw a glass at the mouse, psychologically she "cannot."

Now, take moral cant's and can's. Say that S is raised in a culture where the tribe members have a moral obligation to kill witch-people (say, all those from the tribe upstream). Now, say that S meets witch-S in the jungle. We would say that S not kill witch-S. But, S may reply, "I just can't let witch-S go. It is my duty to kill it." Certainly S *physically* can refrain from killing witch-S, but morally S believes he cannot, and this belief is as powerful for him as any other basic belief.

A more contemporary example, is that of someone raised in Hitler's Germany. S is reared in a society where he cannot help (as a psychological fact) to hate and act badly against the Jews. Say that S cannot help but see Jews as evil and in need of extermination. But S ought not do this, even though he might not be able to think or act otherwise.

Of course S would be *physically* able to refrain from killing Jews.

So, how is "can" being used?

I think it is obvious that in some cases, given that S cannot do act A, S is still obligated to do (or refrain from doing) A. So, there are some cases where one still has the ought even though one cannot refrain from an immoral act (see above).

Having proven that there are some ways in which people have obligations, even though they "cannot" act otherwise, I must wonder how you're using "can." Perhaps (and this would fit with both examples you gave me on the phone) you mean something like this maxim: Ought implies 'can' where 'can' means 'physically able.'

In this case, we can say that the witch-S murderer, and the Jew hater, ought not do the immoral acts they do, because they 'can' physically refrain from doing those immoral acts.

So, either "ought implies can" is outright false, or you save it by appeal to mere physical ability. The latter renders your argument without any teeth. Because, as you admitted above, people "can" physically utter the words "I choose Jesus," in the sense that their body is able to perform this function, it's not broken. The vocal cords are in tact. The speaker can form their mouth to make the English words intelligible, etc. And so even though God determined that S would ~A, S is still *physically* able to A. More specifically, God determined that people would put His son to death. But, these people still had the physical ability to refrain from hammering the nails into his hands. They were not trying to hold back with all their might, shouting "No, we don't want to crucify the Lord of glory!," while God was just stronger, pushing their hands down, thus rendering them physically unable.

Since I take it to be obvious that, given different things which refrain us from doing something (i..e, psychological, moral, etc), there can be cases where S just can't A but nevertheless ought to do A, I'll try to refute the last out, i.e., "ought implies that we physically can:"

4. Suppose that I promised to pick Spencer's parents up from downtown New York, after the Chinese new years parade. One would say I 'ought' to do so since, after all, I promised that I would do that.

Now, suppose that I purposefully handcuff myself to the bed in my hotel (since I'm visiting New York to see Laz and Spencer). Thus it appears that people can control their moral obligations. If you don't want to be obligated by a moral "ought," render yourself unable to do it. In that case, then obligation disappears.

Once I eliminate my "can," I eliminate the obligation. To respond that I should not posture myself as to not be able to do the obligation seems wrong since up until I render myself unable, I still "can" do it, but the second I incapacitate myself, the obligation leaves that second. And, now there is no more obligation. It "disappears" as soon as I render myself unable to perform it. Further, if we have 2nd level duties to perform 1st level duties, do we have 3rd level duties to perform 2nd level duties, and on and on...

5. And, take my Frankfurt-type counter examples: Why is "being able to do otherwise" a precondition for saying an act is immoral? Or for moral responsibility? Say that Spencer, hating the Whereican government, is well known for wanting to shoot the president of Whereica. Now, an evil crime Lord, James Lazarus, wants the president dead so he can move forward with his nefarious plot to rule the world. James thus hires Spencer to do the job. Now, James, a staunch proponent of the "failure is not an option" school of villainhood, implants a device into Spencer's cerebral cortex that, if Jim Lazarus presses a button, will make Spencer go though with the assassination plot. This is a back-up plan, in case Spencer has a failure of nerve.

Well, it should be fairly obvious that Spencer "can't" do otherwise. So, the question is, if Spencer shoots the president, and does this without having Lazarus pressing the button, should Spencer "ought" not have killed the president?

Here, though Spencer *psychologically* and *morally* could refrain from killing the president, Spencer could not do so physically. But, it turns out that Spencer didn't refrain from killing the president, but Spencer could not have done otherwise. So, if "ought implies can," then why is Spencer morally to blame for shooting the president?

6. Lastly, if Spencer cannot show that libertarian free agency is possible, given prevailing secular accounts of the world we live in (a deterministic one), which would put him up against the majority of atheists, naturalists and scientists today, then either Spencer must hold that ought does not imply can, or that there are no moral oughts. If the former, accepted. If the latter, so much the worse for his argument against the immorality of sending people to hell. If he wants to say that it is strictly an *internal* critique, then he must change his argument to premises I accept, and also deal with the arguments which show how I have no internal incoherence here.

best,

~PM

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The End

34 comments:

  1. :::YAWN!!!:::

    (how shocking...Paul has to recycle old crap and make sure more and more people read his drivel!)

    :::YAWN!!!:::

    ^Anon

    ReplyDelete
  2. Calvinists have doubled up on their theologies resulting in an overly complex system.

    For example, reformed protestants will look at a verse like this:

    Acts 4:27-28 "For truly in this city there were gathered together against Your holy servant Jesus, whom You anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose predestined to occur."

    ... and see compatibilism as the answer for how God's choice and man's will can interact to produce the same result.

    Then when discussing how we choose Jesus, suddenly compatibilism is thrown out the window and an alternative theory is brought in called total depravity. This is where believers can't choose God as a compatible act with God's sovereign will, but rather God has to make extra-ordinary intervention to make a person's will compatible with choosing God. Two opposite systems - compatibilism and extraordinary intervention are brought to bear when one would have sufficed.

    ReplyDelete
  3. ^Anon,

    Um, this just happened. If you follow the link, you'd find out this took place last week. I've never posted it before. But, you can make dork moves like that since you're "anonymous."

    Orthodox,

    "Then when discussing how we choose Jesus, suddenly compatibilism is thrown out the window and an alternative theory is brought in called total depravity.

    Well, thanks for showing how ignorant you are of reformed theology. Ya know, it'd be nice to if you'd actually cite Calvinists. Compatibilism is not thrown out the window. People chose what they desire, and so whjen it comes to chosing Jesus, the ones who don't chose him don't desire to.

    You appear to be totally ignorant about Calvinism and compatibilism.

    "This is where believers can't choose God as a compatible act with God's sovereign will, but rather God has to make extra-ordinary intervention to make a person's will compatible with choosing God."

    This isn't compatibilism.

    Anyway, "believers" have chosen God. Maybe you meant "unbelievers?" Let's start thinking straight.

    Lastly, good think you mentioned that God needs to change their nature. You see, before, they could only chose according to their nature, after, they chose according to their new nature.

    What you've done is just show that Calvinists are consistently compatibilist, and that you're rather ignorant about both the theological and philosophical notions in play here.

    Please, all I ask is that you at least study up on what you're going to talk about before you post in the combox. We all have lives I assume, and I'm sure I can speak for both of us when I say that we'd rather not have it wasted by someone who makes an argument that misrepresents a position, especially when he could have read a few Stanford Encyclopedia papers and a few papers on Monergism so as to at least know what he's talking about.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Anonymous,

    Paul hasn't posted this before.

    Funny that you've just proven that you don't read the posts here at Triablogue, just come in an "YAWN" behind them.

    Folks, this is what atheists are reduced to. All we can do is thank God for using atheists to mock atheism. An anti-intellectual philosophy, driven by emotion and hatred of God and theists rather than by intellect and science.

    ReplyDelete
  5. Folks...Paul posted this in the past, at another blog.

    Doesn't matter if its last week, or last year, its 'old crap.'

    ^anon: 1

    Paul: 0

    Reap the whirlwind!!!

    ReplyDelete
  6. Anon,

    Paul posted his discussion that just took place in the combox of another blog.

    This is quite frequent. People, like your debunking buddies, will post email exchanges. Do they have to recycle old drivel? So, what's wrong with his posting a convo that few people read, so that the readers of this blog could read?

    You're making yourself look more and more stupid. Like Momma Nature's tool. Besides, you posted the same thing twice, why did ^Anonymous have "to recycle old crap and make sure more and more people read his drivel!)

    :::YAWN!!!:::

    ^Anon"

    ^^Anon- 1

    ^Anon - 0

    ReplyDelete
  7. ^anon, you are a moron!

    You will bow to the Dominionist hordes when we eventually take over this planet!!!

    "Every knee shall bow..."

    DrDobson

    ReplyDelete
  8. Man Paul! You sure get in these guys skin. They act like Muslim extremists who hate Christians. It's too funny watching these guys comment on every one of your posts. I can't offer an explanation for their behavior other than they're all out of intellectual ammo, and so now are just throwing anything they have.

    To "^Anon," how does it feel not being able to beat theism in an intellectual fight? And, even if Paul recycled an old post of his (which he didn't, if you follow the link), what does that have to do with the substance of his post? So, why do you feel the need to resort to fallacies in order to "beat" theism? What a sad, and pathetic, life you must have.

    ReplyDelete
  9. "caustic personality, pompous attitude, or deceptive posting practices. "

    On the other hand the atheists who post here have touched me deeply with their profound humility (and profound is what it is) and thoughtfulness (to even mention it brings a tear to the eye!) , expressing themselves through words of sweet, loving kindness, their tremulous posts reverberating with love for mankind. With them honesty isn't a mere regular habit, but a doctrine. When I want to be healed on the inside I gratefully immerse myself in the delightful, comforting, charming, compassion-filled posts that atheists grace this website with.

    Thank you atheists.

    Thanks for the understanding, thanks for the memories, thanks for the high levels of integrity and reasonableness you display in post after post. You are an example to us all.

    Thank you for the kind words.

    Thank you for the love.

    ReplyDelete
  10. I wonder why Paul keeps deleting posts here?

    What is he afraid of?

    I think he PWNS all those retard atheists.

    ReplyDelete
  11. "I wonder why Paul keeps deleting posts here?"

    Because there is no purpose for your posts. They have nothing to do with the topic of my threads. Post something of substance, or else find somewhere else to troll. Perhaps you should read the rules of engagement here:

    * Posting comments is a privilege, not a right. This privilege can be abused and revoked. Abuse it and lose it.

    * You are here as a houseguest. Behave like one or find yourself back on the curb!

    * Ad hominem invective, as a substitute for reasoned argument, is unacceptable.

    * Triablogue has the technical wherewithal to delete improper comments. We’re very loathe to exercise this prerogative, but there may be lurkers out there who have something they need to ask or want to say, but are scared off by the tone of the combox if it gets out of hand.

    * There are trolls who, left to their own devices, will infiltrate the combox and take it over, turning the combox into a parasitic, parallel universe to further their own agenda. This is impermissible.

    So, if you can't adhere to house rules, find the door and don't let it hit you on the way out.

    And, you don't need to go away mad, just go away.

    I don't have the time to babysit the comboxes of my posts. Post substance, honest critiques/questions, relevant objections, etc., or else crawl back into whatever atheist discussion board you came from. Since I've posted at many of them, I know full well that you can post something of zero substance and receive laudatory comments from your peers.

    Hopefully I've been clear.

    ReplyDelete
  12. >Well, thanks for showing how
    >ignorant you are of reformed
    >theology. Ya know, it'd be nice to
    >if you'd actually cite Calvinists.
    >Compatibilism is not thrown out the
    >window. People chose what they
    >desire, and so whjen it comes to
    >chosing Jesus, the ones who don't
    >chose him don't desire to.

    Yes the ones who DON'T choose Jesus do so compatibly. But what I said was that the ones who *DO* choose Jesus DON'T do so compatibly. They have to have the special intervention in their will (aka "regeneration") to give them the predisposition to NOW choose Jesus. Special intervention into people's wills is manifestly NOT compatibilism. That is incompatibilism. It is saying that people's unadulterated will wouldn't result in God's will without God fiddling in the inner workings of the will.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Compatibilism is that people chose according to their desires and nature. Regeneration brings about a new nature, which desires to choose Jesus.

    This is compatibilism.

    So, the one's who *DO* chose Jesus, do so compatibilistically.

    Or, take physical determinism, of the secular variety.

    Say that S only chooses actions X, Y, and Z because they are consistent with his nature.

    Then, suppose that S is blasted by a gamma ray from Alpha Centauri, giving S a new nature which only choses X*, Y*, and Z*.

    None of this would be inconsistent with naturalistic and physicalist determinism, and so why with theological determinism.

    Look, your wrong. Feel free to make other critiques, but the one you're making is simply wrong.

    ReplyDelete
  14. Maybe I'm just dense, but perhaps you could help me understand this...

    Can a person have the desire to repent without God first giving them this desire?

    ReplyDelete
  15. "Maybe I'm just dense, but perhaps you could help me understand this...

    Can a person have the desire to repent without God first giving them this desire?"


    Despite the vagueness, no, someone cannot truly repent (using biblical definitions) unless God changes their nature.

    ReplyDelete
  16. Thanks for the response to my question.

    I guess I don't understand what all of the debate is about then.

    A person can't repent of their sins, seek forgiveness, and submit their hearts to Christ unless God gives them this desire/ability/whatever.

    So, God causes it to happen. Period.

    Or did I miss something?

    ReplyDelete
  17. Ramesh doesn't seem to get it.

    He continues to post in comboxes things that clearly violate rules for posting.

    He inconsistently wants to paint me in a bad light, when he is clearly acting like an ass and violating posting policy.

    Ramesh can't take it that I won't sink to his level, and so he continues to act like a spoiled 5 yr old.

    Ramesh pretends to be on the moral high ground, but with his constant reposting of the same post I've deleated 5 or 6 times, his violation of our requests here, and his mere ad hominem attacks (without substance, i.e., the fallacious kind), he shows himself to be tossed to and fro by inconsistencies and double-standardness.

    Ramesh, if you can't control yourself, leave graciously, or wind up posting something relevant to my post, then don't you think your attempted mud slinging rings a bit hollow? You kind of look like a child molesting catholic priest, telling his congregation to bastain from sex outside of marriage.

    ReplyDelete
  18. Dude,

    "Thanks for the response to my question.

    I guess I don't understand what all of the debate is about then."


    Sure, you're welcome.

    If you can't understand what the libertarian vs. compatibilism debates are about, I'm sure you could peruse the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website and become conversant with he literature.

    "A person can't repent of their sins, seek forgiveness, and submit their hearts to Christ unless God gives them this desire/ability/whatever."

    Well, this is sloppy and shows that you didn't bother to read (or read that actively) the post. First, in what sense is "can't." Being used? Second, if in the compatibilist sense, so what? This isn't unique to Christian theism. You'd also need to show how the vast majority of atheist are wrong here as well. Most naturalists are determinists, and most of them are compatibilists. That someone "can't" do something in a compatibilist sense isn't problematic to moral responsibility or freedom... at all.

    "So, God causes it to happen. Period.

    Or did I miss something?"


    Yeah, God causes everything to happen, though he uses means to bring about the ends. The means (in this case, choices of men) allow the end to be accomplished. Without the means, no end.

    For the compatibilist, it is freedom from *coercion* rather than freedon from *causation* that we're concerned with.

    And, btw, are you saying that *nothing* can *cause* our choices? So, are your choices *uncaused?* Are they, what, like accidents? Do they just "pop" into existence from nothing? If they're uncaused events, more like accidents than motivated actions, then why hold people morally responsible? Do you beat your children for accidently knocking over a glass of milk?

    So, as I said above, you might want to explore the literature on the topic.

    ReplyDelete
  19. Well, most of that went over my head. I'm a pretty simple minded guy, and haven't bothered to become an expert on philosophy.

    It seems to me, that you're saying, that a person can't choose to become a Christian unless God causes it to happen. Maybe there are all sort of fancy ways to describe that, but to me, I guess it just sounds like only the ones God chooses to save get saved.

    Seems like kind of an odd plan to me, that only the ones God chooses to save, get saved, and the ones that don't get chosen, get to go to hell, without really having any real choice in the matter.

    But hey, I'm just a simple minded guy. If I have to read 12 books on philosophy to understand this, it really isn't worth it to me.

    And besides...if I'm supposed to be saved, I will be, right?

    Thanks for your time. Reading this blog has been an interesting time tonight. :)

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  20. "Well, most of that went over my head. I'm a pretty simple minded guy, and haven't bothered to become an expert on philosophy."

    Or, perhaps you're lazy and don't want to do your homework? Perhaps, what they say is true: "ignorance is bliss."

    "It seems to me, that you're saying, that a person can't choose to become a Christian unless God causes it to happen. Maybe there are all sort of fancy ways to describe that, but to me, I guess it just sounds like only the ones God chooses to save get saved."

    It seems to me that I said you'd need to define the worlds *you're* using. What, you don't know how you're using words? And, yes, the only ones who come to Jesus, are those chosen from the foundation of the world. You've yet to list any problems. Perhaps your sensibilities are your guide to what is true or not?

    Furthermore, unless you reject phsyicalism and atheism, then you do only what you're determined to do. So, add self-refuting to lazy.

    "Seems like kind of an odd plan to me, that only the ones God chooses to save, get saved, and the ones that don't get chosen, get to go to hell, without really having any real choice in the matter."

    Good thing truth isn't determined by what doesn't "seem odd to you."

    And, yes, the ones who go to hell do have a "real choice in the matter." But, rather than broaden your horizons, engage my position, you're content to be a sophomore about it.

    "But hey, I'm just a simple minded guy. If I have to read 12 books on philosophy to understand this, it really isn't worth it to me."

    No, one or two articles would do, but you're too lazy even for that. Keep brushing that one tooth up there in the Ozark mountains.

    "And besides...if I'm supposed to be saved, I will be, right?"

    Yes, but not without the means. Don't make the sophomore mistake of confusing determinism with fatalism.

    "Thanks for your time. Reading this blog has been an interesting time tonight. :) "

    You're welcome, anytime we can help, just let us know.

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  21. >Compatibilism is that people chose
    >according to their desires and
    >nature. Regeneration brings about a
    >new nature, which desires to choose
    >Jesus.
    >
    >This is compatibilism.

    God making extraordinary intervention to meddle with the nature is not compatibilism.

    Let's go back to the text above:

    Acts 4:27-28 "For truly in this city there were gathered together against Your holy servant Jesus, whom You anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose predestined to occur."

    According to you, the compatibilism of this verse could be that Pilate may well be a good man who didn't want to hurt Jesus, but God zaps Pilate's nature so that he wants to crucify him and brings about God's big plan.

    Sorry, but God going around zapping people's nature so that he can pull off his plans is not compatibilism

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  22. Why all the insults? I'm lazy and a sophomore? I'm just being honest about how I feel.

    If I'm supposed to be saved, I will be, according to you. Sounds good to me. No use getting all worked up about it, because its out of my hands.

    If I feel this way, its because God made me feel this way for a reason. I didn't call you names or anything, because you have different interests than me. What is your problem?

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  23. ^"A man is perfectly entitled to laugh at a thing because he happens to find it incomprehensible. What he has no right to do is to laugh at it as incomprehensible, and then criticise it as if he comprehended it.”—G.K, Chesterton

    Dude, if you admit to being almost entirely ignorant of our faith then you should stop making snide remarks about it.

    I'm glad to see that you're showing an interest in Christianity though :)

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  24. anonymous...you said

    *Dude, if you admit to being almost entirely ignorant of our faith then you should stop making snide remarks about it.*

    What did I say that was snide? I said I didn't understand things. I asked questions. I appreciated Paul's answers. Just not sure why he is name calling? I didn't do anything to deserve that, did I?

    I found this blog and post by reading some stuff on Debunking Xianity, which isn't that interesting of a site. I really don't have the desire to become a philosopher just to understand this stuff. No big deal to me. I still don't get why I am a one-toothed lazy sophomore?

    Paul?

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  25. Dude,

    Your sarcasm is evident to all.

    You don't not understand because you don't have the time to read 12 books, but because you're too lazy to read even 1 or 2 articles.

    You're putting on a show, trying to get a point accross, then when the point is met, you pretend to be stupid so you don't have to deal with the arguments, and can just reassert your critique.

    You obviously think it's a problem God determining everything. But rather than interact, you're pretending to be ignorant so you can continue to say their's a problem.

    I mean, maybe your little one-man-play works over at Debunking Christianity, but we're smarter than those guys. Didn't you know? :-)

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  26. Orthodox,

    "God making extraordinary intervention to meddle with the nature is not compatibilism."

    Well, despite the fallacious use of emotive language, all you're doing is reasserting what you've been saying since your first comment. Your complain doesn't become true after the 10th time saying it. Try offering an argument rather than a mere assertion.

    "According to you, the compatibilism of this verse could be that Pilate may well be a good man who didn't want to hurt Jesus, but God zaps Pilate's nature so that he wants to crucify him and brings about God's big plan."

    Well, I don't think any are good, no not one. But, even if God "zapped Pilate's nature" and then Pilate chose to do X, according to his new nature, he'd still be chosing according to his nature.

    And, please don't respond if all you're going to say is,

    "That's not compatibilism."

    But, if you persist in thinking assertions and ignorant statements stand in for arguments, then:

    "The Orthodox church is mistaken."

    Now, no matter what you say, I'll just reassert that.

    Stupid, huh?

    Well, now you know how you're being viewd.

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  27. Paul,

    I really don't get you...

    what did I say that was incorrect?

    What did I say to warrant your abusive attitude?

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  28. Dude,

    You get me.

    Go play games somewhere else.

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  29. OK Paul, I'll stop posting here, but as I said above:

    "what did I say that was incorrect?

    What did I say to warrant your abusive attitude?"

    I don't feel I said anything 'incorrect' or anything to warrant being called names.

    whatever...

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  30. Dude,

    I never said you said anything incorrect. I said you were being sloppy and not wanting to interact with what I've said. You've allowed yourself to be able to assert your complaints about "odd plans" because you just plead ignorance.

    You're playing games, pretending to be an ignoramous, etc., warrants the stern attitude.

    The names I called were accurate. If someone can't bother to read about 10 pages on the internet so that they can understand a position and how to use terms appropriately, they're not stupid, they're lazy.

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  31. Is "regeneration" an act of man's free will? If not, then it is NOT compatibilism. This is about as basic as it gets folks.

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  32. Regeneration is something done to man, compatibilism simply tells us that freedom is compatible with determinism.

    So, all Orthodox has done, again, is assert some claim, which he has yet to tie to anything, to show any logical rigor, that is simply unargued.

    Feel free to make an argument... we'll be waiting.

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  33. >So, all Orthodox has done, again, is
    >assert some claim, which he has yet
    >to tie to anything, to show any
    >logical rigor, that is simply
    >unargued.

    Try to keep up.

    The point is that Calvinists, having spent so much time establishing compatibilism, throw it away at the final gate, at the place where all the controversy is: at the point of conversion.

    5 point calvinism doesn't need compatibilism. It's a mere side issues to the central premise that man cannot choose God as an act of choice compatible with God's will. Contrary to how the rest of the Calvinist universe works, God has to make special extraordinary intervention to pull his plans together in salvation. That's the one thing he can't pull off with pure compatibilism.

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  34. Orthodox,

    I am keeping up.

    And, what I've found, is that you're all bark and no bite. All talk and no action. All you've done is to assert that we throw away compatibilism.

    Compatibilism states that free will is compatible with determinism. It says that people always choose consistent with their desires, nature, etc.

    So, how are we inconsistent?

    A sinner S, does not want to chose God because of S's nature, God changes S's nature (which was determined from the foundation of the world, so this is still part of determined events), and now S desires to chose God, and S does so freely.

    Now, are we going to get another Soprano's response? More tough guy talk and mere assertions? Is that how the Eastern Orthodox Church rolls these days?

    ReplyDelete