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Tuesday, October 31, 2006

Possibly a Presuppositionalist: Strong Modal TAG

During my limited posting time I've been chipping away on a response to one of Dawson Bethrick’s latest “95%rhetoric and 5% substance” posts. I’m headed to the gym right now and so only have a few minutes to jot down a few replies to some questions/comments Interlocutor and Saint and Sinner asked/made in my “Coming Out Of The Closet” post.

Interlocutor said:

“The non-parenthetical part of this statement sounds even more radical than Steve's position. He seems to agree with your parenthetical statement--i.e. that the case is still being made.”

As Steve said for me, he can speak for himself. I think he would agree in that by “reject” the strong modal TAG I meant, I do not employ it as an argument. But this doesn’t mean that someday someone will do what hasn’t been done. Since the case hasn’t been made, I don’t make the strong claim, and hence I’ve “rejected” it as an argument I use.

“Anyway, if you reject "the strong modal version of TAG," which TA's do you support? [You wrote, "I still have no problem with transcendental arguments, and I employ them," and "I still use TAs, but now I just use more arguments."] How are these other TAs and your other arguments formulated? What are the arguments that you now use?”

Steve gave a link to many. At any rate, I can still use all the same arguments, just scale back the “impossibility” claim. I would still argue for logic, induction, morality, etc., along roughly the same lines.

“This is where I need a little better understanding. It seems to me that "the strong modal version of TAG" is the very soul of presuppositionalism. I don't think I understand the project of presuppositionalism without this version of TAG.”

This just tells us more about you than TAG, though. Read John Frame. Your comment would have the absurd conclusion that people like James Anderson, John Frame, Richard Pratt, and Greg Welty are not presupposition lists. Presuppositionalism is more than an argument. I take it to be an ethical attitude, an epistemologically self-conscious attitude, and more of a meta way to look at problems.

“Take your debate with Barker (perhaps this was before your rejection of the strong modal version of TAG). In that debate you kept going back to the idea that his "worldview" could not account for laws of logic and yours could and if he used laws of logic, he was begging the question against your "worldview" (correct me if I am misrepresenting you).”

But my debate first off isn’t the model for all presuppositionalists. Second, the above doesn’t employ the strong modal version. I still think his worldview couldn’t account for X, and I still think he was begging the question against mine. Saying those things don’t hinge on making the strong modal claim. If it did, then if someone had a worldview that rejected western logic, would you not agree that given what they say they couldn’t account for western logic? Would you then be a TAGster? Are you saying that someone can’t beg the question against your worldview? If not, are you a TAGster?


“So, it seems that your presuppositional method was to take two "worldviews"--i.e. the Christian "worldview" and a materialist "worldview"--and to suggest that the "worldview" that could account for the laws of logic, for instance, was true and the one that could not was false.”

Those were the only two options debating that day. Furthermore, the debate was over “rationality.” So, the one that could not account for them was not-rational, and the one that could was “rational.” This is true.

“This method, however, appears to presuppose the strong modal version of TAG that you have either "rejected" or, at least, admitted that it has not made it's case."

Well, it doesn’t.

“Let me clarify. Let's say that you say to Barker, "Your worldview cannot account for the laws of logic." Barker replies, "How do you know that?" You respond, "Well, tell me how you can account for laws of logic?" Barker says, "I don't know how to." You conclude, "Therefore, materialism cannot account for laws of logic and the Christian worldview is true." [Way oversimplified, I know.]”

Not only oversimplified, misleading. Barker admitted that he was a anti-realist about the laws of logic. When someone says, “I don’t know how to” my response isn’t what you said above. I don’t argue argumentum ad ignorantium. Depending on how the debate went from there. I could say many things, one being: “Okay, speak into the microphone a little louder so everyone can hear you.”

“This argument sounds different than the strong modal version of TAG (and it is). It is basically the argument, "If one worldview can account for 'undeniable phenomenon X' and another worldview cannot, then the worldview that can account for 'undeniable phenomenon X' is true and the worldview that cannot account for 'undeniable phenomenon X' is false." You suggest that Christianity can account for 'undeniable phenomenon X' (in this case, laws of logic) and that materialism cannot. According to your argument, then, Christianity is true and materialism is false.”

You also have to remember that in a debate it’s assumed that the two options debating are the only two options. No one has time, for practical purposes, to include every possible answer to the resolution. So, if a Hindu wants his day, he can have another debate. At any rate, if you’re still on my debate with Barker my conclusion was “My view of Christianity is rational, Barker’s version of materialism is not.”

“Of course, it seems all that you could really hope to establish is that Dan Barker, a proponent of materialism [?], cannot account for 'undeniable phenomenon X' (viz. laws of logic, in that specific case), not that materialism per se cannot account for 'undeniable phenomenon X.']”

Which is why, of course, I spoke of “Barker’s worldview” in the debate. On your view, then, nom one has ever defeated “Christianity” in a debate No one has ever disproved “Theism.” Just particular person’s versions of theism or Christianity.

“Or, perhaps, this is not true. Perhaps, all you are suggesting is that your "worldview" CAN account for laws of logic and that Barker's "worldview" CANNOT do so, but there are other "thought experiments and made up worldviews which are basically the same as mine." But this leads to a sticky problem (in fact, the problem that you allude to in your post). If all that is needed is that it is possible for a "worldview" to account for laws of logic, then materialism has a much better shot. The materialist doesn't have to explain "how" laws of logic can occur in that "worldview" (any more than you must explain "how" God imposed laws of logic on the universe) but only has to assert that the laws CAN exist in a materialist universe.”

But these other “worldviews” are all theistic one’s, specifically with a one-in-many God, who is very much like the God of the Bible. As I said, these other worldviews that can “possibly” do the trick or not a help to the atheist or the Unitarian. I’m not just “asserting” that they can exist, I’m offering certain preconditions, one’s which any materialist would deny. But of course these are all long and developed arguments. I’m just giving the program.

“The materialist, then, might say, "Though it may be extremely improbable, it is not impossible that the universe just came about in such a way that it is governed by laws of logic. In other words, laws of logic just are." The materialist, then, CAN account for laws of logic (even if the account "sounds improbable").”

That’s fine of he wants to admit he holds to his view on faith, that’s what I’ve always said. :-D Also, to give a basic example, what I’m arguing is that the materialist is like someone who says that all that exists are marbles, I argue that logic is necessarily a “non-marble.” Therefore, according to the materialist himself, they “can’t” exist.


Saint and Sinner:

“Aren't there sub-arguments that require *Revelation* in order to have epistemology (which would eliminate mere conceptual scheme "copy-cats" of Christianity)?”

Just push the debate into a possible worlds situation where there is a worldview that has a revelation, all the features you say are necessary for intelligibility, but then change the Trinity with a quadrinity. Or, I come to, the top apologist at my church, you and tell you that when I was in Africa I ran into a guy who had a book he said was from his god and I couldn’t refute him. You ask me to tell you about his religion. I then tell you that it had everything we say is necessary for the preconditions of intelligibility (note: I don’t even think *these* have been established, i.e., exactly *what* is necessary. Mike Butler admits that we could still have them minus the book of Jude. Could Adam have accounted for them? If so, he didn’t have an entire Bible. Etc.,) but it substituted a one-in-many quadrinity for the Trinity. So, how would the internal critique look go?

18 comments:

  1. Interlocutor:

    As far as learning about the presuppositionalist method, I don't think you really want to learn it. I think you want to honor your moniker. if you're serious about learning it I can recommend some books, you can read them, then in a couple months you can come back here with your questions.

    The ethical attirude et all will be discussed in the works I give you to study. Do you want to learn?

    I already told you how amterialism can't account for it. if someone tells me that only marbles exist, and if logic is a non-marble, then *they've* told me that logic doesn't exist.

    Now, if you want to hold out hope against hope that someday a materialist will do it, be my guest. Christian's don't have a corner of faith.

    To the extent that a materialist can "account" for logic they'll either end up not looking like a materialist or destroying logic in the process (i.e., tyhe universality, neccesity, immateriality, etc.).

    At any rate, it shouldn't be that hard for you to figure out.

    If logic is not material, and it exists, then someone who says that all that exists are material entities then they've argued logic away. All I'm doing is pointing that out.

    If you want positive arguments for logic's immateriality there are many places to look, for example, cf. Frege's book, The Foundations of Arithmatic.

    If logical laws would apply in all possible worlds then they'd apply in a materless world, thus they can't be material.

    These debates, as you've noted, can be much more detailed and much smarter men than you and I have covered these grounds.

    Furthermore, I deny your infallibalist constraint. I can be warranted in saying that materialism can't account for logic, even though there may be a *possibility* that one could, one day. Look, if you're saying that you can't know something, or assert that something is the case, (say, that your girlfriend is not a robot) unless you know that there is no *possibility* that you're wrong then you're in a pretty troubling predicament.

    So, if you would really love to learn something about presuppositionalism, I'll give you the books and await your return.

    If you want to say that someone who holds that only material things exist can allow for non-material thinsg to exist, then I'd say you're just telling us about yourself again.

    Now, you can try to give answers by resorting to conventionalism, definitions of language, etc. I don't think those work. Then you can say, "maybe one day" my team will come through. Fine. As I said, you're free to believe that.

    Now, as I said, i'm busy doing other things and so I'm not looking to get tied down into a debate right now. if you were really serious about wanting to learn, I'll give you the resources.

    thanks,

    PM

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  2. Paul,

    I can't speak for Interlocuter, but I'd like some of those resources, please?

    Thanks!

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  3. Thanks Paul, that should take up some of my time :-D

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  4. What's left of my "presuppositionalism?" Everything except strong modal TAG.

    What's left of the presuppositional project? Everything except strong modal TAG.

    Everyone has a worldview. I self-consciously recognize that mine is the Christian worldview.

    This has implications. Christ's word is supreme. It is *pre*eminant in my epistemic life.

    I begin with basic assumptions about the world, man, man's problem, how man resolves his problem, where we're going, why we're here, how we should then live, etc.

    I think that assuming this whole picture allows me to account for various thinsg we take for granted.

    I think that some of the presuppositions are preconditions for knowledge, but not all of them are necessary preconditions, some are sufficient.

    God's word has the place of ultimate authority in my life. So, "let God be true, but all men are liars" (Rom. 3:4). If I'm convinced that God's word teaches X then I believe X, in spite of contrary evidence even.

    But evidence is also controlled and determined by our presuppositions.

    Other than that, here's two articles with articulate my position fairly well:

    http://www.thirdmill.org/files/english/html/pt/PT.h.Frame.Presupp.Apol.1.html

    and

    http://www.thirdmill.org/files/english/html/pt/PT.h.Frame.Presupp.Apol.2.html

    hope that was helpful, as a thumbnail.

    I don't expect you'll slam me for not being "detailed" since *you* asked me for a thumbnail sketch.

    I hope you do well on the narrow mind next month.

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  5. "I'm not Witmer."


    well it was worth a shot :-D

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  6. Paul,

    Even purist physicalism doesn't claim that everything that exists is marble-like. You are making a caricature of the ontological claim that matter/energy/completeness of physics describe the substance of the universe.

    Quantum fields, energy, work, etc., are not particles, and thus are not "marble-like".

    You shouldn't continue to use that definition if you want to be intellectually honest and give the most honest representation of other philosophies.

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  7. To Danny And Interlocutor,

    I understand time restraints and so I thank you for your last question and I hope my last answer will give you another thumbnail sketch of my position.

    1. Marbles - But that was an illustration used to explain my point, I never said that the matter that existed was really like little marbles. maybe marbles = fermions

    You also knew this was in the context of brief explanations. What you both should have done, if you didn't see how the illustration worked, was to ask me some questions before pouncing.

    Actually, for my purposes, it doesn't matter. Everyone knows what a marble is and so they get the point. But let's put energy in its place. The illustration is the same.

    Or, just say that someone believes all that exists has weight, size, and spatio-temporal location. This too would not allow for the existence of things which are not-extended in space, universal, etc.

    Or, say that everything that exists is fermions. Logic is not fermionic.

    Get the point?

    Of course there are different forms of materialists, like emergentivists. But let's not call that "modern." There's also "eliminitivists." All you guys should be heard. I recognize that the critiques will look a bit different depending on who you're talking to.

    But, I don't think that emergentivists can give an account for logic (or the mind, for that matter- no pun intended!). I think logic has a normative aspect to it. I don't think one can account for norms in a worldview where everything is reducible, in principle, to third-person observation. Or, since I believe that logic is necessary, and so would exist in all possible worlds, including matter-less world, then we'd have a problem because logic would hold regardless of having anything to emerge from.

    So I'd make the argument that a worldview that says everything is marbles (= capable of description) then they can't allow for any non-marbles (i.e., normative).

    And so that is how my marble analogy should be used. People grasp the point in debate, but as you can see, I'm not afraid of being more specific if need be.

    2. I sure would allow a materialist that kind of dogmatism. Try it, or tell someone else to try it, in a debate. There's a big difference with presuppositions here. With me, I can be so "dogmatic" (though I don't think it's dogmatic when it's fleshed out) because I presuppose a being who *knows everything.* Based on trust in his word, then, I am warranted in believing that the evidence must be wrong, because the one who *cannot* be wrong has told me X.

    So, my "dogmatism" has a *rational* base, the materialists has a *irrational* base.

    Furthermore, as you know, almost everyone holds to their deepest convictions "despite the evidence." A stroll down memory lane, looking at the history of science and academia in general, shouts this to us very load and clear.

    Further problems would "emerge"(!) when we look at the materialists epistemology. See, I put together *worldviews* and test for consistency. Most materialists epistemologies would not allow holding to materialism *in spite* of the evidence to the contrary. So, depending on the scenario I'd be able to use this materialist dogmatism to (a) show an internal inconsistency and (b) show everyone that materialism is a faith commitment, which I believe it is.

    Moreover, plenty of examples have been given to materialists which I think, disprove materialism. There is a long standing tradition of dualists, you know. I think we've given some good arguments against materialism. In fact, some of them I think are pretty undeniable. So much so that the Churchland's et al. have had to eliminate beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. So, you either end in absurdity or try to hold materialism, *in spite* of the evidence. (Of course the above is all a thumbnail sketch in a combox.)

    What's the point of debating me? Because, as my debates have shown, I actually do give arguments. It should be obvious that I don't have *reasons* for what I believe. it should be obvious that I don't offer *reasons* against non-belief.

    Furthermore, given the fact that I think everyone holds to their most ultimate convictions, come hell or high water, then if I'm right here, you don't think you should debate anyone, not even yourself!

    Now let's flesh out what you're asking. The Bible tells me that I must trust God's word regardless of what men say. I must place my hopes and trust in the word of Jehovah. I'm told that there are only two positions - those for and those against, Christ. I am told to not put God's word to the test.

    So, what you're really asking me is to have an attitude of unbelief. To have the heart of an unbeliever rather than a believer. You're asking me to presuppose that God's word could be wrong.

    So, I should ask, what's the point in debating you? Do you tell all your opponents that should live and act and think as if their position was wrong. Does debate come down to who can beg the question in the sneakiest way?

    To tell believers that they should be unbelievers is a pretty strong statement that you're making.

    thanks for the dialogue.

    ~PM

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  8. lol

    above I wrote, "It should be obvious that I don't have *reasons* for what I believe. it should be obvious that I don't offer *reasons* against non-belief."

    That should read, "It should be obvious that I do have *reasons* for what I believe. It should be obvious that I [..] offer *reasons* against non-belief.:

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  9. Paul,

    Or, just say that someone believes all that exists has weight, size, and spatio-temporal location. This too would not allow for the existence of things which are not-extended in space, universal, etc.

    Or, say that everything that exists is fermions. Logic is not fermionic.

    Get the point?


    I get what you're trying to do -- apply a reductionist view and make something absurd appear in physicalism/materialism.

    The problem is that physicalism is not "everything that exists is X". As Interlocuter pointed out, "everything that exists is X, or supervenes/depends on X in some way."

    So while a physicalist may hold that the mind depends upon, or supervenes upon the brain, they may claim that there is another substance, in some way physical or supervening upon the physical, that composes "mind". So far as I can tell, that is still logically sound with the definition.

    Or, just say that someone believes all that exists has weight, size, and spatio-temporal location.

    But the point is that all physicalists would agree with the physical concept of work: force x distance. Show me the weight, size, and spatio-temporal location of work. Let us look at a simple example of lifting a rock, or a piston in a cylinder. The work doesn't "exist" with weight, size, or a spatio-temporal location.

    My point is not to be anal and semantic. It is not trivial. Physicalism is more inclusive and broad than you want it to be, so that you can show an absurdity by saying, "Well, so work is marble-like," or "Logic is marble-like." In the end, the problem is the same for both of these constructs. No one thinks (so far as I know) that either work or logic are reducible to marbles or fermions.

    These are both a little more complicated, and can only be made sense of within the context of some proposition that does involve a subject/object relationship.

    And as Interlocuter pointed out, there is quite a difference between implausibility and logical impossibility -- regarding any physicalist account of logic, for example.

    The same could be said of some components of the Xian worldview -- that it is extremely implausible to believe that 1,000,000 people left Egypt during the height of its kingdom's power (around the 14-13th BCE, if conservatives are right) and went into Israel about 40 years later, and didn't leave behind incontrovertible evidence thereof (considering the size of such a group, and the archeological imprint they ought to have made in leaving and in migrating into a new culture).

    So although I can say that seems very implausible, there is nothing logically impossible about it.

    It's the same with evolution and epistemic possibility. It is possible that evolved minds have truth-directed selection, in addition to survival/benefit-directed selection.

    It is not logically impossible.

    Thanks for the politeness, Paul. I can stay around and comment when everyone stays civil.

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  10. Daniel,

    I don't know if you're really reading what I'm writting?

    I addressed the emergent view as well.

    Furthermore, most physicalists agree that epiphenomena do not cause anything. But I think there is mental causation with respects to logic, i.e., inference causing one to draw conclusions.

    All of these fit with my marble analogy. I just don't think you're wanting to understand my illustration. Marble *does not* = any particular thing. It could be energy, work, fermionic, description, etc., etc., etc.

    So, you're not telling me anything that I don't know, and I *still* think logic is incompatible with physicalism. Why do you think that is?

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  11. You discount logic as being compatible with physicalism on what basis? I'll guess:
    i) Ontological
    ii) Epistemological

    I referenced an ontological explanation of logic -- conceptual nautral/intensional realism. Steve replied to it, and I'm working on a rejoinder.

    I haven't yet seen a formulation of the TA which says, "If logic, then not physicalism," or "If logic, then dualism." If I saw that, perhaps it would be easier to respond to you. I do not see how the "primary substance" of things determines or disallows logic to exist. You can appeal to "possible worlds" in which logic exists and this substance does not, but that implies that I believe matter/energy/work/etc. cause logic, or that logic is ontologically dependent upon those things. I do not know what that means. I am not sure that such a thing even makes sense.

    I know that logical arguments, with factual premises, are true. To say otherwise is self-refuting. I know that identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle are self-evident and incorrigible.

    I do not know that these things imply a substance, per se. The metaphysical requirement of universality refers to anything which actually does exist. If matter/energy/etc. have always existed, and everything that actually exists (or could exist) is based on physicalism, then I don't find a problem. I can conceive of possible worlds in which purple unicorns fly over my head, but that doesn't mean much. Saying you can conceive of possible worlds without matter/energy/etc. but with logical laws doesn't either.

    I also read over that thread you linked to about supporting the precondition of the triune God for logic to hold. You admitted that the premise is unsupported. It seems you believe some part of it is supported -- say, a general God, versus a triune, or quatrune (sp?) God. Again, it seems to go back to this question of universality, objectivity, etc. Of course, the physical universe clearly "accounts for" other objective/universal phenomena, whether I know how to explain it or not.

    As I said, I'm trying to think these things through, and I have a short intro to universals by Armstrong that I'm reading to try to include in my reply. Assuming I am completely ignorant of how to "account" for logic, though, doesn't mean that you have shown that logic cannot be accounted for within physicalism. That's like me telling you that you can't "account" for God by simply saying, "God just is", and then me declaring, "You can't account for God, therefore theism is false."

    If I can't account for logic, in the ontological/epistemic sense, I may just be ignorant. Can you account for fermions? Does that make it true that they do not exist? Does that make it true that particle physics is false?

    Anyway, I am writing a post on this, I promise, and so when I post it I'll put it up at DC and link to it here, and we can try to keep talking about this.

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  12. Danny,

    i)
    ii)
    and
    iii) Ethically, or normatively.

    I know you referenced that, and I didn't see anywhere where the guy allowed form norms.

    You also seem to have a very limited view of possible worlds talk. remember that Witmer said you should study before you go on and on about something you're unfamiliar with.

    My argument has never been "if Danny can't account for logic, then physicalism can't." Neither has it been, "if physicalists don't know *how* to account, therefore their worldview *can't.*" I addressed this strawman above. But by all means, if you want to hold physicalism by blind faith, be my guest ;-) My argument is that logic is X and physicalism can't allow for or account for X.

    Also, if I can't account for something that doesn't mean that they don't exist. With logic, it *does* exist, and that's just your problem. :-)

    Anyway, I'll wait for your post.

    ~PM

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  13. btw, those aren't the only 3. I have iv, v. vi, ... x reasons

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  14. Paul,

    You are something.

    But I certainly cannot account for what that something may be.

    whew.

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  15. Hi Nina,

    Glad to hear you live by blind faith!

    ~Paul

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  16. Paul,

    I have read some more of the Armstrong, and have started to actually appreciate the depth of this issue.

    I also read your comment, and got hit by something like a bullet between the eyes: you are the one making an argument.

    In philosophy, those advancing the argument are met with the burden of proof. Why am I struggling to learn metaphysics when Paul Manata is the one who says:

    My argument has never been "if Danny can't account for logic, then physicalism can't." Neither has it been, "if physicalists don't know *how* to account, therefore their worldview *can't.*" I addressed this strawman above. But by all means, if you want to hold physicalism by blind faith, be my guest ;-) My argument is that logic is X and physicalism can't allow for or account for X.

    Your argument is that physicalism can't account for X.

    Why do I feel like I have to present all of your premises and delve into the ontological, epistemic and metaphysical issues that are so complicated that they make my head spin?

    You sure haven't. And this realization rolled the boulder off of my shoulders. You don't have a serious metaphysical/ontological argument. You just have the assertion/challenge that you call an argument. (wipes sweat from brow)

    Since I have already written 1/2 of a post in reply to Steve, I'll finish it, as I said. But, I realize now where the burden of proof lies -- on the one making the argument. And it seems, so far, that the integral premises and support are clearly lacking.

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  17. Hi Paul,

    Glad to hear you're glad about my blind faith! That gives us a special bond!

    You go girl!

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