Spinning in the dark

I'm going to comment on this exposition of the evidential problem of evil:

https://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/

The entry was written by a philosopher who specializes in the problem of evil (Nick Trakakis).

The evidential problem of evil is the problem of determining whether and, if so, to what extent the existence of evil (or certain instances, kinds, quantities, or distributions of evil) constitutes evidence against the existence of God, that is to say, a being perfect in power, knowledge and goodness. Evidential arguments from evil attempt to show that, once we put aside any evidence there might be in support of the existence of God, it becomes unlikely, if not highly unlikely, that the world was created and is governed by an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being. Such arguments are not to be confused with logical arguments from evil, which have the more ambitious aim of showing that, in a world in which there is evil, it is logically impossible—and not just unlikely—that God exists.

i) If that's a requirement for the evidential problem of evil, then I reject how the issue is framed. How is it reasonable set aside evidence in support of God's existence when considering whether the world was made and governed by an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God? For instance, what if the evidence for God's existence includes evidence of divine benevolence? Surely evidence of divine benevolence is directly germane to whether the existence of evil counts as evidence against the existence of God? At the very least, those have to be weighed against each other. 

ii) Moreover, it's unreasonable to consider the likelihood or not of God's existence in insolation to all the available evidence. Perhaps, though, Trakakis has in mind a kind of cumulative case against God's existence, where you assess each type of evidence individually, then combine them. Even so, that has to be counterbalanced by considering the positive evidence, if any, for God's existence. 

iii) Likewise, if there's evidence for God's omniscience and omnipotence, then that's directly germane to whether God might have a good reason not to prevent evil, even if the reason is inscrutable to humans. 

iv) I agree that more than sheer consistently is demanded, since an ad hoc explanation might be logically consistent. Rather, it should be consistent with the nature of God and his modus operandi. Not out of character. Not detached from theology. 

A theodicy may be thought of as a story told by the theist explaining why God permits evil. Such a story, however, must be plausible or reasonable in the sense that it conforms to all of the following:

a. commonsensical views about the world (for example, that there exist other people, that there exists a mind-independent world, that much evil exists);

b. widely accepted scientific and historical views (for example, evolutionary theory), and

c. intuitively plausible moral principles (for example, generally, punishment should not be significantly disproportional to the offence committed).

Judged by these criteria, the story of the Fall (understood in a literalist fashion) could not be offered as a theodicy. For given the doubtful historicity of Adam and Eve, and given the problem of harmonizing the Fall with evolutionary theory, such an account of the origin of evil cannot reasonably held to be plausible. 

i) From a secular standpoint, it's not a given that evil exists. If that reflects the viewpoint of the atheist, then he needs to justify moral realism on secular grounds. In principle, it's possible for him to address the problem of evil for the sake of argument, by attempting to show that Christian theism is self-contradictory in the regard. But those two approaches need to be disambiguated. 

ii) Ironically, metaphysical idealism is becoming an academic fad.

iii) A Christian may well disagree with the moral intuitions of an atheist. 

iv) Unless we're dealing with the evolutionary argument from animal suffering, or the Fall, I don't see that the status of evolution is generally relevant to the evidential argument from evil. 

v) The Fall, whether human or angelic, can't be an ultimate explanation for evil since that only pushes the question back a step to the origin of their moral defection. 

A similar point could be made about stories that attempt to explain evil as the work of Satan and his cohorts.

i) But demonic and diabolical evil are fixtures of Christian supernaturalism. So that can't be eliminated from a Christian theodicy. Although that falls short of an ultimate explanation for the origin of evil, yet given the existence of fallen angels, many particular evils are the result of demoniacal and diabolical agency. 

ii) Admittedly, Christian theism isn't the explicit target of the argument as formulated by Trakakis, but for a Christian, the evidential argument from evil must engage Christian theism. In that context, you can't just strip away angelic evil, as if that's piece of tape to peel off. That's part of the deep structure of Christian theology. 

iii) And besides the witness of biblical revelation, there's a lot of empirical evidence for demonic agency. It's just anti-intellectual prejudice and ignorance that brushes that aside. 

That may not plausible or reasonable to the atheist, but it begs the question to make his plausibility structure the benchmark. Here we may rapidly reach an impasse because both sides don't share the same plausibility structure. That doesn't mean no further progress is possible–inasmuch as each side can attempt to defend its own plausibility structure and critique the plausibility structure of the opposing side, but that will require a digression from the immediate bone of contention since both sides will have to take step back several paces and hash out some preliminary issues. And that, too, may lead to stalemate–so that they never return to the immediate bone of contention. An atheist is not entitled to simulate his plausibility structure as the privileged frame of reference. 

An important distinction is often made between a defence and a theodicy. A theodicy is intended to be a plausible or reasonable explanation as to why God permits evil. A defence, by contrast, is only intended as a possible explanation as to why God permits evil. A theodicy, moreover, is offered as a solution to the evidential problem of evil, whereas a defence is offered as a solution to the logical problem of evil. 

The basic problem I have with this approach is that once we bracket God , I no longer have a framework for what's plausible or reasonable. I'm at sea. I have no compass points. I'm intellectually lost. 

So I find the argument from evil tp be quite artificial and self-defeating. It's atheism, not Christianity, that must resort to ad hoc postulates. Without God I have nothing to work with. I can't get the argument started. Nothing is a given. There are no criteria. Nothing to lend the argument from evil any traction or foothold. You can't evaluate anything if you have no norms. The argument from evil has what little plausibility it enjoys by taking for granted many key assumptions that fade away once God removed from consideration. We left spinning in the dark.