Should a Christian debater bracket his beliefs?

A recent exchange I had with a fellow Christian apologist:

Rob

It is, of course, possible that one or more of the Gospels is mistaken in this matter. 

Hays

Have the two positions evolved and diverged to the point where presuppositionalism is defined in part by commitment to inerrancy while evidentialism is now defined in part by lack of commitment to inerrancy?

Rob

When I say that it is "possible," I am speaking hypothetically and not about my own view. 

That having been said, if we are to engage skeptical views of the Bible honestly, we must be ready to acknowledge that in some instances there might be a plausible argument for an error in Scripture. As an evangelical, I maintain that if we knew enough about what was going on in problematic passages we would see that there are no errors, but that's different from claiming that we always have enough such information to show decisively that there are no errors.

Hays

i) It's true that inerrancy doesn't require us to have a solution at hand for every difficulty. I think some inerrantists try too hard to explain how apparent errors/contradictions aren't really erroneous or contradictory. The effort can backfire if it the explanation looks strained, ad hoc, and desperate.

Much better to say it's unreasonable to expect that we should have an explanation for every obscurity in Scripture, given our distance from the events. 

ii) That said, I'm somewhat unclear on how your statements go together. On the one hand you indicate that as an inerrantist, you don't actually think it's possible that one (or more) of the Gospels is mistaken on this point.

On the other hand, when you tell the skeptic that, hypothetically, it's possible that one (or more) of the Gospels is mistaken on this point, as a persuasive apologetic strategy (assuming that's what you mean), it suggests that you yourself think is wrong. But presumably the job of a Christian apologist is to defend and promote what he thinks is really the case. Our beliefs should map onto reality. We don't want to offer the skeptic an alternative that's not really the case, do we? We don't want to propose, as a fallback position, a falsehood as a substitute for reality. If the Bible, as the word of God, shares in God's infallibility, then our job is to defend that reality, and not an unreal substitution.

Rob

It is a perfectly understandable feature of rational discourse to state that something is 'possible' that one happens not to think is actually the case."=

Hays

But inerrancy derives from a doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration. While the dictionary definition of "inerrancy" is without error, the actual concept is infallibility, by virtue of inspiration. I think "inerrancy" has edged out "infallibility" in common usage because it has fewer syllables, which makes it easier to say. But the traditional orthodox concept is to be without possibility of error.

Rob

When speaking in the context of discussing the historical reliability of the text of an historical narrative in Scripture, where other participants in the discussion do not accept the divine inspiration of Scripture (and certainly not its inerrancy), to say that it is "possible" that a text is in error is to be understood in that context in which no commitment is being assumed with regard to the inerrancy of the text. I'm just not going to be so pedantic as to repeat "If we don't assume biblical inerrancy" before every comment on an apparent problem in Scripture.

Hays

i) Even when–or especially when–dealing with skeptics, it's important for them to understand what the Christian position represents. An apologist is a Christian spokesman, explaining the Christian position. An apologist ought to have a commitment to orthodox Christian theology. That's a given. That's understood. Skeptics should expect that from a Christian apologist.

ii) Of course, that's not their own viewpoint, but that doesn't mean he should accommodate their viewpoint. Rather, he should argue for his own viewpoint. No commitment should be assumed in the sense that he can't expect them to grant inerrancy. And he can't merely assert it to be the case. Likewise, inerrancy/inspiration needn't be the first stage of the argument. Rather, it can be the goal of the argument. The final stage he's aiming for and working towards. 

iii) It's not begging the question for a Christian apologist to operate with that presumptive commitment–inasmuch as he does have reasons for that commitment. It's not a bare or sheer assumption, but a well-grounded commitment.

Rob

Even if my immediate purpose is to defend the inerrancy of the Bible, doing so in a way that precludes a priori even considering the possibility of an error is unlikely to be a persuasive strategy. We will come across as refusing to consider any potential contrary evidence to our dogma. I don't think that's a winning approach.

Hays

i) The primary obligation of a Christian apologist should be to uphold and defend theological reality. He ought do his best to make a rational case, but representing and defending Christianity can't be hostage to the plausibility structure of the unbeliever. By definition, the unbeliever is unreasonable to some degree. In many cases, intransigently unreasonable.

ii) The standard of comparison must always be reality–including theological reality–and not what the unbeliever is prepared to accept. In a debate with a Hindu or Buddhist philosopher, is a Christian apologist suppose to bracket empirical evidence just because an Indian philosopher may regard the sensible world or physical universe as illusory or delusive (Maya)? No, you have to stand your ground and defend reality rather than offering him a substitute for reality, an option that doesn't square with what the real world is like. 

Consider a debate with an eliminative materialist. Is no commitment to be assumed with regard to consciousness in a debate between a dualist and an eliminative materialist? Hardly. The dualist will argue for his side of the position. He won't bracket consciousness to accommodate the eliminative materialist.

iii) We can acknowledge prima facie evidence against our position. But that in itself doesn't concede the possibility of error. After all, many things are true that may appear to be false. So that by itself creates no presumption that something is false.