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Wednesday, July 31, 2019

"The second worst objection to universalism"

Either Rauser is a sophist or a shallow thinker (admittedly, that might be a both/and proposition). 

i) Universalism is the best possible news for whom? It may be the best possible news for Mao, Stalin, and ISIS (to name a few), but how is it the best possible news for victims of horrific evil that their perps won't suffer retributive judgment for their vicious heinous crimes? 

ii) Perhaps Rauser would say it's the best possible news for victims because it means all victims of horrific evil will be saved. But that's not an argument for universalism. At best, that's an argument for the salvation of all victims, not all perps. 

iii) What did God tell us? God told us to tell everyone that everyone is heavenbound? Actually, God told us to tell sinners that you are eternally lost unless you put your faith in Jesus. 

The command doesn't exist in a vacuum. God didn't tell us to do that on condition that everyone is ultimately saved. The Gospel has a rationale. Universalism removes the rationale for evangelism. 

iv) Should we care about truth for truth's sake? If universalism is true, what if that's a truth which devalues other truths? Universalism amounts to moral relativism. The wicked never suffer retributive punishment for their atrocities. At most, they experience remedial therapy to awaken their conscience and make them contrite. There's no reason to think they even experience temporary suffering, if universalism is true, since remedial correction doesn't entail suffering–unlike retribution. 

v) If universalism is true, why is it important and worthwhile to know that? It doesn't change the outcome. If anything, it would embolden the wicked. They have nothing to lose. They can do whatever they want with impunity. They may have to undergo temporary remedial therapy after they die, but that's hardly a deterrent.  

10 comments:

  1. I wonder if Rauser would take Universalism to its logical conclusion with the idea that even Satan will be saved as some Unversalist do.

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  2. (i)(a) If universalism is true, is it not possible that Mao, Stalin, and ISIS will suffer retributive judgment for a finite period of time?

    (i)(b) If universalism is false, is it not the case that a murderer could still repent and be saved, thereby avoiding retributive judgment?

    (iii) If punishment for sin is for a finite period of time, why does that not provide a rationale for evangelism? Suppose there are two flights to some destination. I know one flight will get there without trouble but the other flight will crash. The passengers of the crashed plane will survive but undergo months of hardship before making it to the destination. This would seem to provide a rationale for telling all passengers to take one flight over the other.

    (iv)(a) It's not clear how one truth devalues another truth. Could someone run that line against eternal torment? For example, eternal torment devalues the truth of God's goodness?

    (iv)(b) Nor is it clear how universalism amounts to moral relativism.

    (iv)(c) I wonder if the same experience can be both retributive and remedial.

    (v)(a) If universalism is true it gives hope to everyone who has lost a loved one they believe to have been unsaved at death. It is further evidence of God's goodness, power, and faithfulness.

    (v)(b) If universalism is true and there are different rewards (or "levels") in the kingdom of God, then the wicked might lose something forever (even those saved at death might lose something). But you need to unpack why punishment of a finite duration is not a deterrent. Are we to believe no punishments in our criminal justice system, minus life imprisonment or death, serve as a deterrent?

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    1. "(i)(a) If universalism is true, is it not possible that Mao, Stalin, and ISIS will suffer retributive judgment for a finite period of time?"

      No, because the logic of universalism operates with remediation rather than retribution. They object to retributive punishment as pointless.

      "(i)(b) If universalism is false, is it not the case that a murderer could still repent and be saved, thereby avoiding retributive judgment?"

      In that case, he avoids retributive judgment by virtue of the vicarious atonement of Christ. Christ suffers retributive punishment (penal substitution) in the penitent's place.

      "(iii) If punishment for sin is for a finite period of time, why does that not provide a rationale for evangelism?"

      Because universalism operates with a different model. Not punishment but remediation.

      "(iv)(a) It's not clear how one truth devalues another truth."

      Perhaps my statement was ambiguous. If moral nihilism is true, that devalues moral realism. If existential nihilism is true, that devalues human worth. If eliminative materialism is true, that devalues consciousness. That kind of thing.

      My point is that there's nothing virtuous about following truth for truth's sake in cases where a certain position, if true, nullifies epistemic duties or the value of human life. Truth isn't valuable independent of the worldview in which truth adheres. If moral and/or existential nihilism is true, then it no longer matters what else is true because nothing is important in that event.

      "(iv)(b) Nor is it clear how universalism amounts to moral relativism."

      Rejecting retributive justice is morally relativistic. It's no longer a question of anyone receiving their just deserts, but getting what is good for them despite what they deserve.

      "(iv)(c) I wonder if the same experience can be both retributive and remedial."

      That's not a consistent universalist paradigm.

      "(v)(a) If universalism is true it gives hope to everyone who has lost a loved one they believe to have been unsaved at death. It is further evidence of God's goodness, power, and faithfulness."

      It's not an evidence of God's goodness and faithfulness if the wicked enjoy the same fate as everyone else.

      Moreover, there's a distinction between inclusivism and universalism. In theory, God could save the victims of terrible injustice without saving the assailants. Universalism is morally indiscriminate. But even if (ex hypothesi) we reject exclusivism, the logical alternative isn't universalism. There are intermediate positions along the spectrum. For instance, God could save Anne Frank without saving the Nazis.

      "(v)(b) If universalism is true and there are different rewards (or "levels") in the kingdom of God, then the wicked might lose something forever (even those saved at death might lose something). But you need to unpack why punishment of a finite duration is not a deterrent. Are we to believe no punishments in our criminal justice system, minus life imprisonment or death, serve as a deterrent?"

      You're recasting what I said. Remediation isn't punitive. It's not a question of temporary "punishment", but temporary remedial therapy or correction. A therapeutic model rather than a punitive (retributive) model.

      I think there's some confusion when remediation is called the "remedial theory of punishment" in contrast to the "retributive theory of punishment," but calling remediation punitive is a misnomer. That's a careless convention.

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    2. There are a number of versions of universalism (the same could be said for eternal torment) so I am hesitant to grant that all universalists will object to retributive punishment. It is worth steel-manning positions. Nonetheless, I will try not to comment on parts of your position that I believe rely on universalists rejecting retributive punishment.

      Granted that Christ suffers the retributive punishment for the saved murderer, that still means the murderer does not suffer said punishment. Your (i) still cuts against your own position (and probably any Christian position on the subject).

      Your statement about one truth devaluing another truth is unclear because it sounds like you are saying two different beliefs are both true. But the examples in your comment suggest your are saying that if this belief is true then that other belief is false.

      On universalism, the wicked only enjoy the same fate as the everyone else because they too place their faith in Christ. The difference is that the universalist allows for post-mortem conversion. If it is good for God to save people in this life it is hard to see why it is not good for God to save people after this life too.

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    3. Do all universalists allow for post-mortem conversion? I thought universalism is separable from post-mortem conversion.

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    4. "It is worth steel-manning positions."

      i) Sometimes, but the onus is on the proponent to steel-man his own position. The onus is not on a critic to make the opponent's argument for him.

      ii) Moreover, when I say consistent universalism rejects retribution in favor or remediation, I'm steel-manning universalism by critiquing an ideal version.

      "Your (i) still cuts against your own position (and probably any Christian position on the subject)."

      No it doesn't since retributive justice is still satisfied, given penal substitution–in contrast to a theological paradigm (universalism) where remediation is the preferred alternative. Unlike remediation, penal substitution isn't morally relativistic, because just deserts are still exacted. It doesn't replace retributive justice with an amoral alternative (mere remediation).

      "Your statement about one truth devaluing another truth is unclear because it sounds like you are saying two different beliefs are both true. But the examples in your comment suggest your are saying that if this belief is true then that other belief is false."

      There are two kinds of examples:

      i) If X is true, that falsifies Y.

      ii) Even if both X and Y are true, the truth of X nullifies the value of Y.

      "On universalism, the wicked only enjoy the same fate as the everyone else because they too place their faith in Christ. The difference is that the universalist allows for post-mortem conversion."

      In which case they have no incentive to repent in this life so long as they find evil pleasing. Take Pablo Escobar.

      "If it is good for God to save people in this life it is hard to see why it is not good for God to save people after this life too."

      You're overlooking the context of my statement. I was responding to Rauser, who said universalism is the best possible news. But as I pointed out, that depends on one's perspective. Is it the best possible news for the victim of Pablo Escobar that Escobar is heavenbound?

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    5. Just to recap:

      i) In part I'm responding to Rauser's glib intuition. He acts like it's self-evident that universalism is "the best possible news". But that's not an intuition shared by Nazi hunters like Simon Wiesenthal (to take a stock example). And it's inadequate for Rauser to say my intuition trumps your intuition. My intuition is better than your intuition.

      ii) Furthermore, it's no coincidence that Rauser is an outspoken critic of penal substitution, annihilationist, and hopeful universalism. All these positions are interrelated. They operate with a remedial framework rather than a retributive framework. The objective is to reform the sinner, not to exact just deserts. So it's not properly punitive at all.

      Conversely, it's no coincidence that classic Protestant theology subscribes to penal substitution, retributive justice, and everlasting punishment. These are interrelated positions. They operate within a retributive framework rather than a remedial framework. They regard retributive justice as good in its own right, and not, at most, an instrumental good (means to an end). Likewise, vicarious atonement to satisfy divine justice.

      So these are competing theological paradigms. Complete, self-contained, opposing packages.

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    6. --On universalism, the wicked only enjoy the same fate as the everyone else because they too place their faith in Christ. The difference is that the universalist allows for post-mortem conversion. If it is good for God to save people in this life it is hard to see why it is not good for God to save people after this life too.--

      The episode of the dwarfs in the closing chapters of CS Lewis' The Last Battle (Narnia series) seems to indicate a universal offer of salvation post-death. Albeit with the caveat that there will be still be those with doggedly proud stubbornness who might FREELY choose not to accept it.

      Case in point: Old Hermione... ahem, excuse me, I mean RICHARD DAWKINS, who has stated that no evidence could ever convince him of the existence of God. He'd probably spend all eternity reasoning to himself that what his senses inform him about are a very, very long illusion conjured by playful trickster aliens.

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  3. Is hell then justified by the desire not to let Mao, Stalin, Pol Pot etc., have a happy (or at least a non-annihilated) afterlife?

    Note, though, that if the traditional Christian view is true, then Mr. Weinberg, the cheerful orthodox Jew who owns the local deli, and Miss Allison, the kindly agnostic school librarian, will be roasting on the same eternal grill as Uncle Joe and Adolf.

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    1. I anticipate that objection under (ii).

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