I believe Erik Wielenberg is regarded as a highly competent atheist philosopher. A few years ago he gave a talk:
"The Absurdity of Life in a Christian Universe as a Reason to Prefer that God Not Exist" is meant to be a parody of an existential argument for God's existence. Many Christian philosophers and apologists contend that atheism entails moral nihilism, and a few atheists admit that or come close to that admission. Wielenberg is laboring to turn the tables on that allegation. Here's "the Absurdity Argument":
Claim C makes life absurd = df. Claim C's truth makes (or would make) true at least one claim C1 such that most (actual) human beings are such that if they were to accept C1 they would experience negative psychological consequences that would make it difficult or impossible for them to be happy (without also failing to accept at least one entailment of C).
1. Necessarily, if God exists, then whenever a person P experiences undeserved involuntary suffering, P is better off overall than P would have been without the suffering.2. So: Necessarily, if God exists, then whenever a person A causes another person B to experience undeserved involuntary suffering, B is better off overall than B would have been without the suffering (from 1).3. God's existence makes it true (or would make it true) that each of us is morally obligated to pursue the good of others.4. Necessarily, if (i) A is morally obligated to pursue B's good and (ii) A's performing act X would make B better off overall, then (iii) A has a fact-relative reason to perform X.5. So, God's existence makes it true (or would make it true) that C: each of us has a fact-relative reason to cause others to experience undeserved involuntary suffering (from 2, 3, and 4).6. Most human beings are such that if they were to accept (C), they would experience negative psychological consequences that would make it difficult or impossible for them to be happy (without also failing to accept at least one entailment of (C)).7. Therefore, the claim that God exists makes life absurd (from 5 and 6)
Let's examine some of the premises:
Premise #1
is based on the principle "that a morally perfect God would not permit the existence of any gratuitous evil, evil that is not necessary in order to prevent an equal or worse evil or necessary to produce some great good."
1) Of course, that's just the argument from evil. So the onus lies on Wielenberg to demonstrate the existence of gratuitous evil. That requires him to refute theodicies which deny it.
2) Even assuming the existence of gratuitous evil, there are Christian philosophers like Peter van Inwagen who argue that gratuitous evil is consistent with God's existence. So Wielenberg needs to refute that as well.
"the further claim that if God permits a certain evil to befall a particular individual, God's moral perfection requires not merely that the evil be compensated for somewhere in the universe but…in the life of the very person who endures that evil…compensated, only if that suffering ultimately makes that person better off overall than she would have been otherwise. To treat the sufferer merely as a means to an end, which is incompatible with God's moral perfection."
1) Once again, Wielenberg can't just stipulate that to be the case. He needs to argue for his claims. So his syllogism isn't a free-standing argument, but requires subsidiary arguments to justify the premises.
2) Another problem is that Wielenberg has given different definitions of what constitutes gratuitous evil: "undeserved involuntary suffering," "evil that is not necessary in order to prevent an equal or worse evil or necessary to produce some great good."
But those aren't equivalent concepts. Perhaps that's shorthand for: a morally perfect God won't permit undeserved involuntary suffering unless the sufferer is compensated (i.e. ultimately better off than he'd otherwise be). But it's up to Wielenberg to clarify how these claims go together.
1) Is it self-evident that a morally perfect God won't use anyone merely as a means to an end or expose them to uncompensated unmerited suffering?
i) What if there's a prima facie obligation not to be used merely as a means to an end, but an agent may forfeit that immunity through wrongdoing?
ii) What constitutes undeserved suffering? Suppose Pablo Escobar is punished for a crime he didn't commit. Although his suffering for that particular crime is undeserved, he richly deserves to suffer for his many other crimes, so is a morally perfect God required to shield Escobar from unmerited suffering whatsoever? What if Escobar's unmerited suffering in one case makes up for suffering he merits in other cases–which he evaded? Does his general culpability create a liability to suffer justly, even in cases where there's no direct correspondence between his suffering and a particular crime? Does his guilt in general waive the right not to suffer in situations where there's no guilty action in particular?
Premise #3
"Love your neighbor as yourself"–an obligation to promote/persue what is genuinely good for others. However, commenting on
Premise #4
Wielenberg admits that #3 is a defeasible, prima facie obligation. Other features in the situation may override that obligation, viz. breaking a promise, benefiting one party at the cost of harming other parties. So you have to take the "net benefit" into account.
Suppose you see two neighbors in a violent altercation. You may obligated to take sides if you know that one is acting in self-defense while the other is an unprovoked assailant.
Premise #6
fails to distinguish between making someone suffer and allowing them to suffer. But surely those are morally different in at least some situations. For instance, there's a great deal of suffering I can't prevent. But that's different from the infliction of suffering on my part.
As it stands, Wielenberg's attempt to counter the existential argument for God is grossly underdeveloped and comically tendentious.
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