I'm going to comment on some statements by Muller in his review of Oliphint's critique of Thomism.
One preliminary observation: a theologian is not an end in himself. We shouldn't devote the same attention to exegeting a theologian that we devote to exegeting Scripture. Christianity is a revealed religion. Biblical revelation is the primatial source of Christian theology. Interpreting Aquinas is secondary to interpreting biblical revelation.
The problem is most apparent in Oliphint's highly selective use of Aquinas' commentary on John 1:9, which leaves out the portions that undermine his argument. Aquinas indicates that human beings are enlightened by "the light of natural knowledge," which insofar as it is light is such by participation in the "true light," which is the Word. He adds, "If any one is not enlightened, it is due to himself, because he turns from the light that enlightens."10 Aquinas also distinguishes this true light, given to all by God, from which human beings turn away, from the "false light" which "the philosophers prided themselves on having," citing Romans 1:21.11
But is that a valid prooftext for natural revelation/natural theology? Considered in isolation, Jn 1:9 is somewhat ambiguous: is the scope creational or Incarnational? However, in the larger context of the Gospel, the Incarnation introduces a new situation; it generates a contrast between light and shadow. Prior to the Incarnation, spiritual darkness prevailed. So I doubt this verse has reference to general revelation. That doesn't automatically falsify natural revelation or natural theology, but if Aquinas feels the need for some Biblical warrant for that category, then he needs to find a different, and better prooftext.
Oliphint also makes several crucial mistakes in his interpretation of Aquinas' proofs of the existence of God. He dismisses Aquinas' use of Exodus 3:14 as insufficient to show the Christian context in which the proofs are deployed on the rather slim ground that, had Aquinas really intended to be biblical, he would not simply have cited the verse he would have "shown how the content of revelation grounded his arguments" instead of proceeding by "natural reason."3 But citation of texts, presumably interpreted exegetically elsewhere, is a common practice, and this understanding of Exodus 3:14, rooted in Augustine, was a commonplace--not, by the way, available to "natural reason."Nor is the citation of Exodus 3:14 the only indication of a theological and biblical backdrop to the proofs: in the first article, on whether the existence of God is self-evident, Aquinas bases his argument with an objection drawn from John of Damascus' De fide orthodoxa and John 14:6--and then counters the objections with a point from Aristotle's Metaphysics interpreted by way of a reference to Psalm 52:1. In the second article, whether it can be demonstrated that God exists, draws objections from Hebrews 11:1 and from John of Damascus, countering them with a citation of Romans 1:20. Then, when Aquinas poses the question leading to the proofs of whether God exists, he offers no references in his objections and counters them with Exodus 3:14. The process of argument is on the basis of reason, but the argument with the objectors is an argument among Christians.Aquinas uses the Boethian esse-id quod est distinction to indicate the same issue as his own essence-existence distinction, which points directly toward Aquinas' stress on God as "He who is" (Exodus 3:14).Even with the post-biblical trinitarian language in view, we are quite unable to make clear "that God's essence is who he is and that there is no possibility that he could be otherwise." A series of qualifications of the term essence must be added, including the point that in God there is no real distinction between essence and existence, a point, as Aquinas indicated, that can be gathered from Exodus 3:14.These considerations not only of Van Til's misconceptions but specifically of what Aristotle and Aquinas understood concerning knowledge of essences and of things or particulars, brings us back to the impact of Exodus 3:14 on metaphysics and, accordingly, on the framing of a Christian philosophy. Aquinas' approach, in focusing on the identity of the First Mover as "He who is," the existent One, opens up a philosophy that can argue creation ex nihilo and a doctrine of providence, specifically on the ground that the One in whom there is no real distinction between essence and existence can know the essences of potential things and confer existence.
1. Notice how much is riding on the use of Exod 3:14 to prootext Thomism. But there are two basic problems with that appeal:
i) Aquinas was not a Hebraist. He relies on his memory of the Vulgate. But there are different ways of rendering the Hebrew phrase in Exod 3:14, and there's no agreement among Hebraists on the one best way to construe it.
ii) Even if we could settle on a preferred rendering, the Thomistic interpretation overloads the statement with a lot of metaphysical freight. What reason is there to think the meaning of Exod 3:14 corresponds to Thomistic metaphysics? Isn't that specialized gloss highly anachronistic? Ironically, as Muller himself documents, Aquinas is filtering Scripture through tinted lenses that have no basis in original intent.
If Aquinas erected a theological edifice on a nonexistent foundation, you can't remove the foundation but pretend that the ediface remains intact. Either lay a new foundation for the old edifice or build a new edifice from scratch.
2. That doesn't necessarily falsify Thomistic metaphysics and epistemology. But if Aquinas feels the need for a biblical prooftext to anchor his position, he will have to look elsewhere.
For Aquinas, reason, "the light of nature," is itself a gift of God to human beings in the original creation of humanity that is capable of knowing not only that God exists, but that God is good, wise, and powerful. Where reason falls short, because of its finitude, its rootedness in sense perception, and the errors brought about by sin, is that, without the aid of revelation, it cannot know the truths of salvation.
i) Actually, the primary explanation for why unaided reason cannot know the truths of salvation is not "because of its finitude, its rootedness in sense perception, and the errors brought about by sin," but because the truths of salvation involve historical knowledge. That's not intuitive or universal, but based on a series of historical particulars. Redemptive events at a given place and time.
ii) I, for one, deny that reason in general is rooted in sense perception. To a great extent, human knowledge depends on sense perception. But humans have innate, God-given categories that they bring to the analysis of sensory input. Human knowledge is a combination of intuition and observation.
This "Thomistic" assumption should have a familiar ring in Reformed circles. It is paralleled by the very first sentence of the Westminster Confession--as also by the second article of the Belgic Confession, and Calvin's commentary on the passage. Oliphint's claim that Aquinas' reading has "no basis" in the text of Scripture becomes an indictment of Calvin and the Reformed tradition as well.
i) It's true that the Westminster Confession refers to the "light of nature". That doesn't authorize us to import the whole of Thomistic natural theology into that Spartan phrase.
ii) As for "an indictment of Calvin and the Reformed tradition as well," that's political jargon, as if Oliphint is guilty of sedition. But we shouldn't turn this into a loyalty oath. What matters is whether it's true, and demonstrably true.
Both Aquinas and the Reformed orthodox writers begin with prolegomenal discussions in which Scripture is set forth as the primary authority in doctrinal matters--so that both actually do begin biblically. Neither Aquinas nor the Reformed orthodox begin with the "ontological Trinity" because both recognize that the proper beginning point of knowledge (as distinct but not separate from faith) cannot be a point of doctrine like the Trinity that is neither self-evident nor demonstrable. Oliphint has confused the principium essendi with the principium cognoscendi, and has failed to recognize that cognitive principia, more generally understood, are self-evident, incontestable notions, some directly available to reason, some given by revelation.
i) That sets the bar awfully high. In the history of philosophy, how many claims are "self-evident, incontestable notions"?
ii) While it makes sense to begin with Scripture, to make a case for Scripture–isn't the Trinity the ultimate source of Scripture? Who's the God behind Scripture? Who's the God that inspired Scripture, if not the Trinity? So the Trinity and the Bible are inseparable, as cause and effect. It traces back to the Triune God.
Copleston notes, rather pointedly, that it is "not true to say that the intellect, according to St. Thomas, has no knowledge of corporeal particulars." As Copleston continues, this primary object of the intellect is not the abstracted universal "as such" but the universal as abstracted from the particular.4 Aquinas rests this view, moreover, on a distinction between sensory and intellective knowing. The primary object of the intellect is the form or universal that has been abstracted from the particular, with the particular external object being known by the intellect indirectly, by means of the abstracted universal--but also with the external object being directly and concretely known to sense.5
i) No doubt we form many generalizations by sampling particular instances. But is that always or even normally the basis for our knowledge of universals? How would we derive an understanding of logical and numerical relations by process of abstraction from concrete examples? Unless we already had a sense of mathematical relations, how could we group or count objects in the first place? Recognizing a numerical sequence or numerical cluster requires something in the mind to which that corresponds. You can't very well number things without having numerical concepts to work with.
Likewise, unless we already had a sense of logical relations, how could we infer anything from observation? You can't infer inference itself. That can't be bootstrapped.
ii) On the face of it, isn't Copleston's description circular? On the one hand, the intellect abstracts universals from particulars. On the other hand, the intellect knows particulars via universals.
Maybe Thomism has a way around that. I'm just commenting on Muller's representations.
Third, inasmuch as the Westminster Confession of Faith and Reformed Orthodoxy in general are largely in agreement with Aquinas on issues of epistemology, natural theology, doctrine of God, and, indeed, apologetics, Oliphint's and Van Til's views at best stand at the margin of what can be called Reformed and, at worst, create a kind of sectarian theology and philosophy that is out of accord with the older Reformed tradition and its confessions.
i) Unless we can justify our traditions, appeal to tradition reduces to playacting. It is always necessary that tradition match reality. Truth isn't based on mutual agreement, but agreement with what is the case. We should only be true to tradition insofar as tradition is true to revealed reality. Otherwise, this is Catholicism-lite. Like a literary tradition that takes on a life of its own, based on imaginative extrapolations that have no grounding in the real world.
ii) That's a wild overgeneralization about the WCF in relation to Thomism. The Westminster Divines are generally Puritans. Is Puritan epistemology equivalent to Thomistic epistemology? Other than a glancing reference to the "light of nature," there's not much natural theology in the WCF.
What does he mean by Reformed Orthodoxy? Does that include Jonathan Edwards? Is he a Thomist? Is Warfield a Thomist? Or William Cunningham? What about the Augustinian tradition?
Thanks for that, Steve. That Muller locates a Thomistic theory of knowledge in the Westminster standards (let alone anywhere in the Reformed tradition) indicates something more going on here than an honest critique of Oliphint. Anything worthwhile he thought he wanted to say lost credibility.
ReplyDelete“Reformed orthodoxy” agrees with Aquinas on apologetics? Even if that were the consensus, one wonders how anyone might begin to defend such a claim. Does John 1:9 tell us that too?
Good work.
Ron
*But is that a valid prooftext for natural revelation/natural theology*
ReplyDeleteCalvin on John 1:9 - http://biblehub.com/commentaries/calvin/john/1.htm
Highlights:
"The distinction is, that whatever is luminous in heaven and in earth borrows its splendor from some other object; but Christ is the light, shining from itself and by itself, and enlightening the whole world by its radiance; so that no other source or cause of splendor is anywhere to be found.
Which enlighteneth every man. The Evangelist insists chiefly on this point, in order to show, from the effect which every one of us perceives in him, that Christ is the light. He might have reasoned more ingeniously, that Christ, as the eternal light, has a splendor which is natural, and not brought from any other quarter; but instead of doing so, he sends us back to the experience which we all possess.
This passage is commonly explained in two ways. Some restrict the phrase, every man, to those who, having been renewed by the Spirit of God, become partakers of the life-giving light.......But since the Evangelist employs the general phrase, every man that cometh into the world, I am more inclined to adopt the other meaning, which is, that from this light the rays are diffused over all mankind, as I have already said. For we know that men have this peculiar excellence which raises them above other animals, that they are endued with reason and intelligence, and that they carry the distinction between right and wrong engraven on their conscience. There is no man, therefore, whom some perception of the eternal light does not reach.
But as there are fanatics who rashly strain and torture this passage, so as to infer from it that the grace of illumination is equally offered to all, let us remember that the only subject here treated is the common light of nature, which is far inferior to faith; for never will any man, by all the acuteness and sagacity of his own mind, penetrate into the kingdom of God. It is the Spirit of God alone who opens the gate of heaven to the elect. Next, let us remember that the light of reason which God implanted in men has been so obscured by sin, that amidst the thick darkness, and shocking ignorance, and gulf of errors, there are hardly a few shining sparks that are not utterly extinguished."
Notice Calvin's emphases - does this not sound as though Calvin accepts this passage as a proof text for General Revelation?:
...and enlightening the whole world....
...There is no man, therefore, whom some perception of the eternal light does not reach....
...let us remember that the only subject here treated is the common light of nature....
Calvin, in his Institutes, also echoes Aquinas here that to the extent that if "the perception of the eternal light" is inefficacious for any man, it is due to his sin.
Is Calvin then also a poor, benighted Thomist?
*the Thomistic interpretation overloads the statement with a lot of metaphysical freight*
ReplyDeleteLikewise, Calvin on Ex. 3:14: http://biblehub.com/commentaries/calvin/exodus/3.htm
" I am that I am. The verb in the Hebrew is in the future tense, "I will be what I will be;" but it is of the same force as the present, except that it designates the perpetual duration of time. This is very plain, that God attributes to himself alone divine glory, because he is self-existent and therefore eternal; and thus gives being and existence to every creature. Nor does he predicate of himself anything common, or shared by others; but he claims for himself eternity as peculiar to God alone, in order that he may be honored according to his dignity. Therefore, immediately afterwards, contrary to grammatical usage, he used the same verb in the first person as a substantive, annexing it to a verb in the third person; that our minds may be filled with admiration as often as his incomprehensible essence is mentioned. But although philosophers discourse in grand terms of this eternity, and Plato constantly affirms that God is peculiarly to on (the Being); yet they do not wisely and properly apply this title, viz., that this one and only Being of God absorbs all imaginable essences; and that, thence, at the same time, the chief power and government of all things belong to him. For from whence come the multitude of false gods, but from impiously tearing the divided Deity into pieces by foolish imaginations? Wherefore, in order rightly to apprehend the one God, we must first know, that all things in heaven and earth derive [43] at His will their essence, or subsistence from One, who only truly is. From this Being all power is derived; because, if God sustains all things by his excellency, he governs them also at his will. And how would it have profited Moses to gaze upon the secret essence of God, as if it were shut up in heaven, unless, being assured of his omnipotence, he had obtained from thence the buckler of his confidence? Therefore God teaches him that He alone is worthy of the most holy name, which is profaned when improperly transferred to others; and then sets forth his inestimable excellency, that Moses may have no doubt of overcoming all things under his guidance. We will consider in the sixth chapter the name of Jehovah, of which this is the root."
Notice Calvin's emphasis on the second usage of "I Am" - "Therefore, immediately afterwards, contrary to grammatical usage, he used the same verb in the first person as a substantive, annexing it to a verb in the third person; that our minds may be filled with admiration as often as his incomprehensible essence is mentioned."
Calvin's stress on the second, substantive form, ungrammatical as it is, again echoes Aquinas here, as Muller says, "A series of qualifications of the term essence must be added, including the point that in God there is no real distinction between essence and existence, a point, as Aquinas indicated, that can be gathered from Exodus 3:14."
Calvin would seem to share Aquinas' comfort with the degree of freight placed here?
Is that supposed to be an argument from authority? Appealing to Calvin's opinion doesn't settle the question of what Jn 1:9 or Exod 3:14 mean. I gave an argument for my interpretation of Jn 1:9. You offer no direct counterargument to what I said.
DeleteCalvin is not an authority-figure. The issue can only be determined by proper evidence and inference.
As for Exod 3:14, Biblical archeology has greatly enhanced our knowledge of Hebrew. Quoting a very dated commentary is not the way to determine what the Hebrew phrase in Exod 3:14 means. Moreover, as I point out, even if we settled on a particular rendering, that doesn't justify imputing to the text a far more specialized claim that it actually makes.
[Advance apologies for the pointedness...]
DeleteArgument from authority? Kind of. Point is to show the continuity with so-called "Thomistic" thought, supposedly so sub-Biblical and sub-Reformed, with at least Calvin on this. This is part of Muller's point - Oliphint, Van Til, et al are indeed outside of Reformed Orthodoxy, at least with respect to epistemology, their claim to fame.
*As for "an indictment of Calvin and the Reformed tradition as well," that's political jargon, as if Oliphint is guilty of sedition.*
Yep, that's the point. Regarding the Van Tillian attempt to "own" the Calvinist/Reformed high ground, at least on this, they fail. They are guilty of sedition on their own terms.
Also, as to your own political use of these words, lest we forget, it was Van Til that started this political witch hunt against the so-called "Thomists" in the Reformed camp, including, so he thought, Old Princeton, et al. Pace your rhetorical question at the end - yes, Van Til did himself insinuate that Warfield was too Thomistic, too Arminian. At least a back-handed admission that all three (plus Edwards, et al) stand on the same ground, and he, Van Til, does not?
My argument that you insist is "missing" is staring you right in the face, it's the same argument that Muller is making against Oliphint. Muller's wider project is to point out the obvious to those with eyes to see - that the Van Tillian line is at least outside of the historic Reformed norm. A point you have just made.
And as for "Biblical archeology"....who's arguing from authority now? Whose "archeology" are we talking here? Why should their conclusions be the final court? Have these findings from "Biblical archeology," let alone their application to the text, been agreed on by all?
I won't even get into the "very dated" nonsense. Truth is never outdated, and such arguments-from-age have no weight; you are begging the question.
"Argument from authority? Kind of. Point is to show the continuity with so-called 'Thomistic' thought, supposedly so sub-Biblical and sub-Reformed, with at least Calvin on this. This is part of Muller's point - Oliphint, Van Til, et al are indeed outside of Reformed Orthodoxy, at least with respect to epistemology, their claim to fame."
DeleteThe first question any Calvinist should ask is not whether something is outside of Reformed Orthodoxy, but whether Reformed Orthodoxy is biblical. Whether there's continuity between Thomism and Calvin is separate from whether Thomism is biblical.
The proper question at issue is whether Thomism is true. Moreover, that's not an all-or-nothing proposition. It could be right about some things and wrong about other things.
"Yep, that's the point. Regarding the Van Tillian attempt to 'own' the Calvinist/Reformed high ground, at least on this, they fail. They are guilty of sedition on their own terms."
That evinces the fact that you're playacting. You betray a teamplayer mentality, as if what matters is loyalty to your team rather than fidelity to divine revelation.
"it was Van Til that started this political witch hunt against the so-called "Thomists" in the Reformed camp, including, so he thought, Old Princeton, et al."
Van Til, Thomism, Scottish Common Sense Realism, &c. all need to be assessed on the merits.
"Pace your rhetorical question at the end - yes, Van Til did himself insinuate that Warfield was too Thomistic, too Arminian."
Was Warfied a Thomist? Isn't Old Princeton usually classified in terms of Scottish Common Sense Realism?
"At least a back-handed admission that all three (plus Edwards, et al) stand on the same ground, and he, Van Til, does not?"
No it doesn't since the question was whether Edwards, Cunningham, and Warfield are Reformed Thomists.
"My argument that you insist is 'missing' is staring you right in the face, it's the same argument that Muller is making against Oliphint. Muller's wider project is to point out the obvious to those with eyes to see - that the Van Tillian line is at least outside of the historic Reformed norm. A point you have just made."
DeleteYou're a blind partisan traditionalist. But Reformed tradition, which isn't monolithic, must always be answerable to Scripture and reason. Thomism is largely philosophical theology. Philosophical theology must be subject to rational scrutiny, like philosophy in general. Thomism doesn't enjoy the authority of divine revelation.
If you treat a faith-tradition as unaccountable to exegetical and philosophical scrutiny, then it's just a coin toss which faith-tradition you adopt.
"And as for "Biblical archeology"....who's arguing from authority now? Whose "archeology" are we talking here? Why should their conclusions be the final court? Have these findings from 'Biblical archeology,' let alone their application to the text, been agreed on by all? I won't even get into the 'very dated' nonsense. Truth is never outdated, and such arguments-from-age have no weight; you are begging the question."
i) That betrays self-reinforcing ignorance on your part. Yes, we have a better understanding of ancient Hebrew than 16C Divines. Thanks to biblical archeology, we have a larger sample of ancient Hebrew to work with, in addition to ancient texts in cognate languages. Plus, the computer age enables us to conduct exhaustive comparative analysis of syntax and semantics. You need to learn what an argument from authority is.
ii) Sometimes truth is outdated. The daily news contains many temporally indexed statements about what happened "today" or "yesterday".
iii) More to the point, the question at issue isn't whether truth is outdated, but what is true. There are advances in knowledge.
iv) You have a impious, disrespectful attitude towards the word of God. Our duty is not fidelity to Calvin or some faith-tradition, but divine revelation. Our duty is not to rubber-stamp traditional interpretations, but to ascertain what Scripture actually means. You're no better than a Roman Catholic apologist who freezes a traditional interpretation regardless of whether that's exegetically sustainable.
v) The only reason to be a Calvinist is because Calvinism is demonstrably true. It must always be possible to defend the truth of Calvinism. Not simply default to your faith-tradition as an unquestionable given.
vi) And Thomism is a horse of another color because much of that is based on reason. Thomism should never be elevated to an article of faith. That idolizes philosophy. Philosophical theology must always be open to rational examination.
Thanks for your reply and patience, these things do get heated, don’t they! I always appreciate your consistent level strain; better than mine.
DeleteFirst, let’s review the basics. Oliphint writes a book making certain claims about Aquinas. Muller writes a response providing what he believes are necessary correctives. You write a blog article about the same, focusing on a few key aspects. I write a comment about an even smaller subset of key aspects, just two of the disputed verses, and only to show, at least tentatively, a basic interpretive agreement about those verses between Aquinas and Calvin. I only did so to provide a small (even if perhaps misguided) example of what I am personally quite sure is a much wider degree of continuity on some central matters, at least between Calvin and Aquinas (but not necessarily Thomism). As that basic point has not been disputed, I’ll take it that the point has been made.
Why was I interested enough to take the time do so? Because of the struggle to define Reformed orthodoxy. I’m happy to concede that “Reformed Orthodoxy” must itself be tested against Scripture, etc. But the fact remains that the historical witness to this Scriptural exercise, especially as practiced by some key actors such as Calvin, is one of the grounds on which this struggle takes place. It has simply become a commonplace, a “tradition,” that Van Til, et al have this ground to themselves. They seem to want Calvin to be on their side, and opposed to all things Aquinian/Thomist. I was just pushing back a bit on this neo-traditional conceit, as was Muller (he of course going further).
My basic point, which you have so far substantially acceded too, is that if you are going to throw out Aquinas on the grounds of his interpretation, and the basis for it, of those meagre 2 verses I bothered to comment on, then you may find yourself having to throw out Calvin too, and perhaps much more besides. Of course there are further distinctives that do separate Calvin and Aquinas, and perhaps one can keep the same interpretation on different grounds, but those options have not been on the table yet.
So much for the basics. Just a few quick thoughts on the remainder.
1 – I do not consider myself a Thomist or a Calvinist. I agree with much that both say, I disagree with much. I do accept that vast majority of what is usually denominated “Calvinist” theology (aka, Dort, Westminster, etc.). To the degree that Calvin’s theology better reflects Scripture and the Spirit’s witness to the same, I am happy to be counted as such a “traditionalist”. Of course, the same applies to Aquinas. I’m sure the same can be said of you, so no arbitrary name-calling or Procrustean amputations, please.
2 – *The proper question is whether Thomism is true*. Do try to keep up – Oliphint, following Van Til, presupposes that Thomism is both untrue and antithetical to the historic Reformed witness. Muller’s point, and my own, is to throw some cautionary sand into those gears. That’s all.
3 – *playacting* Umm, this is speculative on your part (see above). However, again, lets keep the focus on Oliphint, Van Til, et al. Would you disagree that there are few, if any, subsets of Reformed thought that are indeed more reflexively prone to “teamplayer mentality” than they?
4 – *Was Warfied a Thomist? Isn't Old Princeton usually classified in terms of Scottish Common Sense Realism?* Often (not always). But even then, SCSR is usually classified as in the same category as Thomism, Rationalism, Arminianism, etc. That begs the question of what SCSR actually taught of course. Again, it was Van Til who made the connection between all these. That’s what I said, that and nothing more. For the record, I disagree with both sides of Van Til’s understanding of these things. A) To be more closely aligned with Thomism and SCSR is not so unbiblical or unscriptural as he believed and, B) the extent to which OP (and Edwards, et al) were so aligned was simply exaggerated by him.
[part 2 following...]
5 – *blind-partisan traditionalist* (in a shocked, old-lady voice) Well, I never! This is too silly even to be upset over. My….from engaging in a simple exercise of demonstrating a level of agreement between Aquinas and Calvin on a pair of verses to…..”blind-partisan traditionalist.” What is one to say? In a condescending old-lady voice, “bless your heart!” Insecure much?
DeleteActually, I take it as a compliment – the charge of “traditionalist” is the last refuge of a failed argument. In this context, I welcome it.
But beyond that, it is possible to be a Van Tillian traditionalist too, or any other kind – time is not a necessary property of tradition. I’ll try not to speculate as much as you do, but how much of your own bent have you exposed here? You go on in this second post to make such “traditional” claims as *Thomism is largely philosophical theology* and *Thomism is a horse of another color because much of that is based on reason*, etc. Perhaps, but this is the point in dispute; Oliphint, et al agree with you, Muller, seemingly, does not. Are you relying more on your own “blind-partisan tradition” than on argument?
So, again, back to the basics - you attempted to substantiate these charges – your argument being at least in part based on those two verses I commented on. You clearly attempted to make the case that Aquinas’/Muller’s understanding of these verses is the reason-based, philosophical theology you find so objectionable. Again (enough with the agains!), my point was simply to show a basic, but not necessarily total or even conclusive, agreement about these same verses from Calvin. The point should be clear – to the extent that your argument is based on how to interpret those 2 verses, then either a) Calvin may be, with respect to these verses, just as “based on reason” and “philosophical theology” as was Aquinas, or b) these interpretations are not so based; and Aquinas may not be as bad, and even more informing of the historic Reformed tradition, than many are wont to admit. If you choose the former, then perhaps Calvin is equally wrong with Aquinas, and the modern “Reformed” tradition had best look elsewhere. If the latter, then perhaps the modern “Reformed” can look a little more gimlet-eyed at Aquinas. I think that is all that Muller is getting at.
The fact that this point seemingly continues to elude you suggests your own “blind-partisanship” here.
6 – A final coda on the use of “partisan” – again, such language finds no bite with me. Van Til is as much to blame for any “partisan”-inducing mentality as anyone else in this debate. Look in the mirror.
7 – Finally, as to “archaeology.” Do you not notice your own trap here? *Sometimes truth is outdated. The daily news contains many temporally indexed statements about what happened "today" or "yesterday"* But this is equally true of what you affirm to be the truths of “Biblical Archaeology”. Advances in knowledge? Yep, and what you think is “knowledge” about archaeology today, may not be so true tomorrow. That was, after all, one of Van Til’s own points on this very subject (it was also OPs view, btw). And why is going to the historic Christian witness of less validity than going to “archaeology”? You can call this a “self-reinforcing ignorance” all you like, but yours is at least equally a “self-reinforcing dependence” on self-admitted shifting ground. *You need to learn what an argument from authority is.* Pardon me, but again, look in the mirror!
I'm out, have fun piling on. Back to life I go!
[Sorry for all the deletions - stupid spelling mistakes!]
So much for signing off! For some reason, I completely missed this part the first time:
Delete*You have a impious, disrespectful attitude towards the word of God. Our duty is not fidelity to Calvin or some faith-tradition, but divine revelation. Our duty is not to rubber-stamp traditional interpretations, but to ascertain what Scripture actually means. You're no better than a Roman Catholic apologist who freezes a traditional interpretation regardless of whether that's exegetically sustainable.*
Quite frankly, this is both ill-informed and presumptive. You do not know me. To the extent that my brief comments contradict your thinking, or that, given space and time limits, my comments are inadequate, do not warrant you in making such a false accusation. We are in the ether here, on the internet, and so some allowance is called for when tempted to take such things too personally. But this very allowance should be taken by you as well.
I am not defending any particular tradition, as should be clear, but merely pointing out some inconsistencies within at least the Van Tillian tradition's view of Thomism. If you can't see that and deal with it, that's on you.
I don't necessarily demand an apology; this is your site and I am a guest. But you should consider against your conscience and God's Word whether or not you are the one who has been impious and disrespectful to Scripture here.
Pip,
ReplyDeletePlease make things easy for this dimwit.
1. If Calvin follows Thomas on x, does that make x the Reformed tradition? Do these two points, Thomas and Calvin, draw the line of Reformed orthodoxy?
2. Is the Ligonier apologetic close enough to the line to be considered an example of *the* Reformed apologetic? How about Craig? Is Ligonier free of obvious fallacy? Is the Reformed tradition fallacious in the discipline of apologetics?
3. Can you point me to a place in Calvin where he employs a thomistic apologetic?
*sigh* First off, I can understand that my comments may come off as impious or flippant, if so, I am willing to apologize. And at the same time, I need to be open to learn, even if unwillingly, but if so, be patient and forgiving. Finally, I'm out of time at the moment, so this thread will have to stay open till next week for me to have any more time for this.
DeleteThat being said, I can respond briefly to the first two questions, the third will have to wait. Maybe Steve can suspend his comment closing time policy?
1 - Of course not, and that was not what I meant, nor, to my own limited understanding, what Muller is arguing for. This all started by simply pointing out the similarity between Calvin's exegesis on those two verses with what Muller represented Aquinas as saying. Please take note of my many words of restraint "not conclusive," "seemingly," "caution," etc. Do not try to infer a mountain of my beliefs from such a small sample. This is what got Steve casting such false accusations about my view of God's Word. Practice your own caution.
2 - I have not, to my knowledge, brought up the "Ligonier apologetic". I have not read that book, I'm not a big fan of Gerstner, and though I've always benefited from Sproul's talks, have only read a few of his books. Not sure what they have to do with this. Please don't presume to know who has informed my own (limited) understanding of these things. For the record, what does inform this is Calvin (reading through his Institutes again this year), Old Princeton, Ursinus (reading his Commentary on Heidelberg for the third time right now), the Puritans, 19th century Free Church of Scotland types (Cunningham and Buchanan), etc. This is almost my exclusive diet. I just don't read much modern theology post-Machen.
3. You'd have to make it easy for this dimwit too - what exactly is meant by an "apologetic"? If you could give me a target, that would help.
Otherwise, I'm sorry to have to sign off for the weekend.
RA,
DeleteTo give you a target as well, here is from a comment I posted on Oct. 31, 2017 (see "post hoc rationalizations"). I do like how this describes what should be our relationship to Scripture and would hope this reflects my own attitude. I'd be happy to get some feedback:
1) Should this view be considered "Classical", "Rationalist", etc.?
2) What in it would you correct and how?
Thanks!
To follow up on the last post, as to what OP meant, here is something from the one OP guy who is perhaps beset upon the most by modern readers, Archibald Alexander. This quote is from his Evidences of the Christian Religion (1825). Just prior to this quote he spends several pages rehearsing the varieties of "cognitive bias" (again, this is not new...) that result in the abuse of reason. Now, in this section, he talks about submission to the Scriptures:
"Before I leave the consideration of the various classes of persons, who, while they profess to be guided by reason, make an improper use of this faculty, I ought to mention a set of men, distinguished for their learning and ingenuity, who profess to receive the Christian revelation, and glory in the appellation of rational Christians. They proceed on the plausible and (if rightly understood) correct principle, of receiving nothing as true, but what their reason approves; but these very men, with all their fair appearances of rationality, are chargeable with as gross a dereliction of reason, as can well be conceived; and, in regard to consistency, are more vulnerable, than any of those already mentioned. For, while they admit that God has made a revelation, they insist upon the right of bringing the truths revealed to the test of human judgment and opinion, and reject them as unreasonable if they do not accord with this standard. But the declaration of God is the highest reason which we can have for believing anything. To set up our opinion against the plain expression of his will, is surely presumption of the highest kind. Perhaps, however, I do not represent the case with perfect accuracy. Perhaps, no man is chargeable with such an inconsistency, as to admit a thing to be contained in an undoubted revelation, and yet reject it. [he means this last sentence as a rhetorical question...]
The exact state of the matter is this. The Scriptures, it is admitted, contain a revelation from God; but there are many things in the Bible, which, if taken in the most obvious sense, are inconsistent with reason; now as nothing inconsistent with reason can be from God, it is concluded, that this cannot be the true sense of Scripture. Accordingly, their wits are set to work, and their learning laid under contribution, to invent and defend some other sense. Upon these principles, a man may believe just as much, or as little as he pleases, of what the Bible contains; for it has been found that no text is so stubborn as not to yield to some of the modes of treatment, which have been adopted. But I maintain, that this whole procedure is contrary to right reason. The plain course which reason directs us to pursue, is, after examining the evidences of revelation, and being satisfied, to come to the interpretation of the Scriptures with an unbiased mind; and in the exercise of a sound judgment, and with the aid of those helps and rules which reason and experience suggest, to obtain the sense of the several parts of the document; and although this sense may contradict our preconceived opinions, or clash with our inclinations, we ought implicitly to receive it; and not by a refined ingenuity, and laboured critical process, extort a meaning, that will suit our own notions. This is not to form our opinions by the Word of God, but to cut down the sublime and mysterious doctrines of revelation, to the measure of our narrow conceptions. And thus, in the creed of many called rational Christians, the divine system of heavenly truth is shorn of its glory, and comes forth little more than an improved theory of Natural Religion. There is no reason in this."
"First, let’s review the basics. Oliphint writes a book making certain claims about Aquinas. Muller writes a response providing what he believes are necessary correctives. You write a blog article about the same, focusing on a few key aspects."
DeleteIn the OP I deliberately avoided direct comment on Aquinas as well as direct comment on Oliphint's book. I'm not exegeting Aquinas or Oliphint. I intentionally confined my remarks to a few of Muller's claims.
"My basic point, which you have so far substantially acceded too, is that if you are going to throw out Aquinas on the grounds of his interpretation, and the basis for it, of those meagre 2 verses I bothered to comment on, then you may find yourself having to throw out Calvin too, and perhaps much more besides."
i) That's a fallacious all-or-nothing approach, as if we must either affirm Calvin/Aquinas in toto or reject them in toto. But we can and should be more discriminating. It isn't necessary to buy into the entire package.
ii) One problem is conflating Reformed Scholasticism, which is pretty Thomistic, with Reformed orthodoxy or Reformed tradition, which is more varied. Put another way, we need to distinguish between Reformed theology and the philosophical resources used to expound and defend it.
"The proper question is whether Thomism is true*. Do try to keep up – Oliphint, following Van Til, presupposes that Thomism is both untrue and antithetical to the historic Reformed witness. Muller’s point, and my own, is to throw some cautionary sand into those gears. That’s all."
No, that's not all. Truth and historical continuity are separable in principle and frequently in practice.
"However, again, lets keep the focus on Oliphint, Van Til, et al. Would you disagree that there are few, if any, subsets of Reformed thought that are indeed more reflexively prone to 'teamplayer mentality' than they?"
DeleteUnfortunately, because humans are social creatures, a teamplayer mentality is the default setting. That needs to be consciously resisted.
" This is too silly even to be upset over. My….from engaging in a simple exercise of demonstrating a level of agreement between Aquinas and Calvin"
No, you did more than that. Your affirmed the "sedition", "outside of Reformed Orthodoxy," argument from authority, paradigm.
"the charge of 'traditionalist' is the last refuge of a failed argument."
To the contrary, there's a serious issue about people who defend tradition for tradition's sake.
"You go on in this second post to make such “traditional” claims as *Thomism is largely philosophical theology* and *Thomism is a horse of another color because much of that is based on reason*, etc. Perhaps, but this is the point in dispute"
Is that the point in dispute? I don't object to philosophical theology, per se. I do object to taking one philosopher/philosophical theologian/philosophical tradition as the paradigm. Philosophical theology should be more eclectic and discriminating.
"If you choose the former, then perhaps Calvin is equally wrong with Aquinas"
It's quite possible for Calvin to misinterpret a passage of Scripture. He was a great theologian, but not infallible.
" A final coda on the use of “partisan” – again, such language finds no bite with me. Van Til is as much to blame for any “partisan”-inducing mentality as anyone else in this debate. Look in the mirror."
You keep recasting the issue in terms of Van Til, but I didn't write a post defending Van Til's reading of Aquinas.
On a final point, it's just a fact that our understanding of ancient languages is based on the samples available to us, as well as cognate languages. Archeology uncovers a wider sample. Do you think we should just ignore that additional information and stick with what was available in the 16C?
Yes, that means some interpretations may be revisable in light of new discoveries. That's unavoidable.
"To the extent that my brief comments contradict your thinking"
Red herring. I responded to you according to how you chose to frame the issue.
"but merely pointing out some inconsistencies within at least the Van Tillian tradition's view of Thomism. If you can't see that and deal with it, that's on you."
That's recasting the OP. I didn't defend Van Til or Oliphint. I didn't directly engage Aquinas. Rather, I interacted with some statements in Muller's review. My narrow restriction was deliberate. Aquinas filtered through Muller.
The OP didn't use Oliphant's interpretation of Aquinas or Van Til's interpretation of Aquinas as the frame of reference. To the contrary, the OP used Muller's interpretation of Aquinas as the frame of reference. I granted his reading for discussion purposes, then critiqued Aquinas via Muller's reading.
DeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteRA,
DeleteI saw the deleted comment in my email. No worries about the content, if I can dish it out, I can take it. Say what you want!
But I see your point about not answering the questions, so to be brief:
1 - As for Ligonier, I just don't know enough about that approach to make a judgment. I'm sometimes tempted to read it, or Gerstner for that matter, but usually I find that I need to be able to say that I'm ignorant of it so as to deflect accusations of being a "beholden" to them somehow. I do think Gerstner does cross the line into an unhealthy rationalism, but that's from sampling his massive (and quite tedious) three-volume study of Edwards.
2 - Craig. Sometimes I think he hits home runs, but his theology is weak (putting it mildly). I'm first in line to affirm that one's theology informs one's apologetic, and so I would not endorse him. But again, I really know little of Craig, other than from some Youtube debates and clips.
3 - "Is the Reformed tradition fallacious in the discipline of apologetics"
Aside from the obvious, that there is probably not a single such apologetic (as well as the issue of what generational/theological cohort you're talking about), and since I count myself as broadly reformed, I'd have to say no. The issue is the specific content of that. I lean (obviously!) away from Van Til, et al, and more toward OP. But I'm happy to place them in the same broader category. If given a choice between, say Oliphint or Craig, I'd be happy to go with Oliphint. I just don't think I face that choice.
Pip,
ReplyDeleteMuller made reckless claims about what is the Reformed position on apologetics and epistemology, as if there was one and it’s Thomistic. I know only two Reformed denominations that might have definite leanings, the OPC and the PRCA. The former has a strong affinity to Van Til, the latter to Gordon Clark. As for seminaries, which ones promote Thomistic thought?
Please mind, I’m not making a case for any particular views. I’m merely pointing out that Muller’s assessment of things is dubious.
Well, as the song goes, I guess "we just disagree." I think Muller is more right than wrong.
DeleteYes, I'm aware of the de facto enforcement of a specific apologetic within some of the NAPARC denoms. I have to go with Kim Riddlebarger on this - such is not in the Confessions or their respective Books of Order (so far as I know), and so it's dubious to try to enforce this. If any denomination wants to make such a stand, let them go the full length of updating their ruling documents, otherwise there should be a bit more freedom.
I happen to be Baptist, so for me this all started when such topics became current in my own church and our wider circle. In general I try to stay away from pushing any particular view as well, what gets my gander up is when the other side does.
Btw, are there some good sources of push back against Muller? A book, or blog series, etc.? (please, nothing from the Trinity Foundation! I kid....kind of.)
Well, as the song goes, I guess "we just disagree." I think Muller is more right than wrong.
ReplyDeleteNo problem with disagreeing. No problem with you not addressing my points (or Steve’s). If you care to defend the notion that the Reformed tradition has a Thomistic bent on apologetics and epistemology I’d like to learn more.
If I engaged poorly, so be it. Call it as you see it. But poor engagement is not non-engagement. I can’t be accused of not engaging. I can’t spend all my time on responding to each new salvo, nor every item in them. At some point I have to stop. And, as this is Mr. Hays’ blog and not mine, if he has the final word, my letting that stand is not a failure to engage but just respect to him and my own limited time.
DeleteYou originally asked three questions, I tried to answer the first two, but explicitly begged off the last. I did so quite honestly, the first two could be dealt with quickly, the last one couldn’t. If you thought I had already either given poor answers to, or simply ignored, your third question, then I’m sorry if I gave that impression; I don’t believe I did.
I never claimed Calvin to be a Thomist, or of using a “Thomist” apologetic. My original question was rhetorical, with a presupposed answer of “no”. Mr. Hays ended his section on John 1:9 by saying “That doesn't automatically falsify natural revelation or natural theology, but if Aquinas feels the need for some Biblical warrant for that category, then he needs to find a different, and better prooftext.” Likewise, he critiqued the use of Ex. 3:14 as not able to bear sufficient “metaphysical freight”. Both of these interpretations he implicitly or explicitly declared to be Thomist. I pointed out that Calvin shared Aquinas’ interpretation of these two verses.
If these interpretations are indeed Thomist, then either Calvin is wrong here, or if the interpretation is right, then the implied “Thomism” here may not be “Thomist” after all. This is Muller’s own point – the only time he uses the word Thomist, Muller places it in scare-quotes (he only mentions “Thomist” once in his review series). Muller is not asserting Calvin’s “Thomist” bona fides, but challenging the definition of the bona fides. Either Calvin’s same interpretations can be defended on some Calvinist, Non-Thomist grounds, or Mr. Hays’ critique of Aquinas’ interpretations applies to Calvin as well, and consequently his critique is what accused Calvin of being Thomist, not me.
Strictly speaking, I need not accept the challenge to defend Calvin’s “Thomism” since my point was to challenge the charge of “Thomism” for these interpretations in the first place. Mr. Hays argued the disputed interpretations of John 1:9 and Exodus 3:14 are necessarily Thomist. I was simply raising the question that it is Thomist at all by showing that Calvin shared those interpretations with Aquinas (Calvin actually reads almost like an abridgement of Aquinas’ commentary).
This is what I meant by saying that my argument was kind of one from authority. I assert that Calvin is not a Thomist, I presumed Mr. Hays agrees. But Calvin would seem to share, at least with those two verses, the same interpretations as Aquinas. If Calvin is not a Thomist, then how did he come to the same interpretations? Did he fail to be sufficiently non-Thomist at this point, or are these interpretations not necessarily Thomist at all? The problem is that Mr. Hays asserted an essentially Thomist nature to these interpretations, prior to the knowledge that Calvin shared those interpretations; so your third question is one that Mr. Hays must answer. To the degree you are quite convinced that Calvin is no Thomist and value his non-Thomist hermeneutic/apologetic, and then to the degree you are convinced these interpretation, shared with Aquinas, are Thomist, then that is your conundrum, not mine.
The point was, as I said in an earlier comment, not to make some complete didactic argument, but to throw some “cautionary sand” into your gears. It’s meant to make you stop and question your own presuppositions – are you presupposing what you are trying to prove, simply out of your animus to Aquinas and Muller?
Furthermore, this demand from you to show examples of Calvin’s Thomist apologetics is a question begging trap. The bigger issue here is how do we define apologetics as either Calvinist/Reformed or Thomist in the first place. Take for example these two interpretations. The substance of the interpretations are shared between Calvin and Aquinas. Mr. Hays says they are examples of Thomism, Mr. Muller, seemingly, does not. So, if (and note the “ifs”) the exegesis of these verses are indeed shared in their essential meaning, and if they represent presuppositions that inform an apologetic from these verses, then Calvin and Aquinas agree on this apologetic. But what if these interpretations are incorrect, as Mr. Hays insists? They are Thomist then? And if they are in fact more correct than not? They are Calvinist/Reformed? Or even worse, just because they are shared and just to keep Calvin free from all Thomist stain, they are still Thomist just because Aquinas made them? If Aquinas says 2+2 = 4, is this now a Thomist mathematics? If we agree with it, or the source, we call it properly Reformed; if we disagree we call it Thomist. What does this accomplish?
DeleteI have no obligation to descend the depths with Mr. Hays to argue whether these interpretations represent Thomism or not. That wasn’t the point. The point is, that having argued they are Thomist, Mr. Hays is left with Calvin along with Aquinas at the bottom of that well. I have no need to “defend” Muller’s view, or even Calvin’s or Aquinas’, my only point is that if Mr. Hays wants to treat these interpretations as Thomist, then he is placing this same charge on Calvin (at least with respect to these verses).
Finally, I asked for aids from you. As this is about larger issues of Reformed apologetics, I’m happy to pursue this a bit, to the limited degree I can. In preparation for this, I asked you to provide some framing for me – ‘what exactly is meant by an "apologetic"’. I was offering you the opportunity to set the terms. Setting you up for the win, as it were. I did so for at least two reasons, especially in light of Mr. Hays’ observations:
1) What is even meant by an “apologetic”?
Calvin says of Jn 1:9 that this light is “diffused over all mankind” and “There is no man, therefore, whom some perception of the eternal light does not reach”, and that despite sin swallowing this up such that “there are hardly a few shining sparks that are not utterly extinguished”, still, this verse refers to the “common light of nature”. Aquinas says substantially the same. But Mr. Hays says that they had both find a better proof text for “natural theology.” Why should I accept Mr. Hays over Aquinas and Calvin?
On Ex. 3:14, Calvin, and Aquinas seems to lay great stress on the importance of God’s declaration of “I am”. Mr. Hays says this verse ought not be overloaded with too much “metaphysical freight”. When Jesus uses this same verse to declare Himself in John 8:57, was He (the Author of these words in the first place) placing too much “metaphysical freight” on His own words? Did those who were about to stone Him for doing so think likewise?
2) I need to know what conditions would satisfy you, what you would accept as sufficient demonstration. If I know your terms, then it’s easier for me to either give a defense or cry mea culpa and keep learning.
I even gave you an example of what I consider an apologetic (or at least a starting point from submission to Scripture) from Old Princeton. I asked for feedback. I also asked for feedback on Muller, competent resources that critique him so that I can learn. On both accounts, you provided none. Perhaps I’m wrong on all this, but if so I was asking for help so as to better engage.
But what did I receive from you? Snarky, faux triumphalism, and avoiding (and misunderstanding) the actual point at issue that I was making.
"Why should I accept Mr. Hays over Aquinas and Calvin?"
DeleteBecause this is not an argument from authority. I explained why I don't think Jn 1:9 works as a prooftext for general revelation. You made no effort to directly rebut my explanation.
"On Ex. 3:14, Calvin, and Aquinas seems to lay great stress on the importance of God’s declaration of “I am”. Mr. Hays says this verse ought not be overloaded with too much “metaphysical freight”. When Jesus uses this same verse to declare Himself in John 8:57, was He (the Author of these words in the first place) placing too much “metaphysical freight” on His own words? Did those who were about to stone Him for doing so think likewise? "
That's a highly equivocal. In Jn 8:58, Jesus uses language that evokes a direct comparison with Yahweh.
But to say Jesus is Yahweh is quite different from inferring the nature of Yahweh from the ambiguous Hebrew of Exod 3:14, and imposing on it a much more specialized meaning than that simple clause actually purports.
"The substance of the interpretations are shared between Calvin and Aquinas. Mr. Hays says they are examples of Thomism, Mr. Muller, seemingly, does not."
I don't know what that's supposed to mean:
i) By definition, an example from Aquinas will be an example of Thomism.
ii) I've deliberately avoided commenting directly on Aquinas. That's because there are conflicting interpretations of Aquinas. Thomism is a lifetime study. He's a complex, voluminous thinker who's spawned a vast secondary literature. Moreover, he's in dialogue with church councils, church fathers, popes, Jewish and Muslim thinkers. It spirals out in all directions.
In addition, while Aquinas is a clear thinker, he doesn't have a free hand. Rather, he's an apologist for medieval Catholicism. Therefore, any inconsistencies in medieval Catholicism will be replicated in Aquinas. If medieval Catholicism is inconsistent, then it's inevitable that no consistent interpretation of Aquinas is possible. Interpreters can quote different statements by Aquinas, depending on which side of the contradiction he's expounding and defending.
As a result, I confined by comments to Muller's exposition of Aquinas. He aims to be correcting Oliphint's misunderstanding of Aquinas. For the sake of argument, I grant Muller's representations of Aquinas, then comment on that. Even if Muller's interpretation is correct, that doesn't resolve some basic problems in Thomism.
Pip, I deleted the comment because I later saw that you had taken minimal effort to respond. But your subsequent responses indicate no real interest in engaging. Responding yes, but not engaging.
ReplyDeleteYes, I'm aware of the de facto enforcement of a specific apologetic within some of the NAPARC denoms. I have to go with Kim Riddlebarger on this - such is not in the Confessions or their respective Books of Order (so far as I know), and so it's dubious to try to enforce this.
ReplyDeletePrecisely. If the OPC and PRCA have no confessional distinctives in these areas, then nobody does! In other words, they’re more aligned with a particular bent than any Reformed denomination yet it even can’t be said of those denominations that they have a codified view on epistemology and apologetics. Accordingly, how does Muller find it among the other split Ps?
Actually, the primary explanation for why unaided reason cannot know the truths of salvation is not "because of its finitude, its rootedness in sense perception, and the errors brought about by sin," but because the truths of salvation involve historical knowledge. That's not intuitive or universal, but based on a series of historical particulars. Redemptive events at a given place and time.
ReplyDeleteOops
“Ooops” what? I don’t even know what this is referring to. Something about historical facts?
DeleteI thought we agreed on this last June (http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2017/06/induction-and-universal-generalizations.html?showComment=1497553829319#c621023190921077366).
I still affirm this, do you?