He’d much rather have a God who sovereignly decrees a person be raped, than have a God who accepts there are rapists in his universe.
http://evangelicalarminians.org/ff171201/
That comparison is supposed to make Arminianism look good in contrast to Calvinism.
Suppose the alternatives were between an Arminian world in which God doesn't allow rapists into his universe and a Calvinistic world in which "God sovereignly decrees a person be raped". If that was the choice, then Arminianism would certainly be more prima facie appealing than Calvinism.
But when it comes to the fact of evil, Arminians are in the same boat as Calvinists.
A God who "accepts" there are rapists in his universe. How euphemistic. The Arminian God has an open border policy on rapists?
In law enforcement, we tolerate a certain level of criminality because we lack the resources to prevent every crime. The best we can do is to keep crime at manageable levels. Keep crime from spiraling out of control. But the Arminian God doesn't suffer from the same limitations.
It's easy for the Arminian God to accept that there are rapists in his universe since the Arminian God will never be a raped. It's a whole lot easier to accept a hazardous situation from a position of safety. When you yourself are invulnerable. But that's sorry consolation to the rape victim. Evils that would be intolerable if they threatened me or my family are not as urgent when we're out of harm's way. And yet it's often virtuous to endanger yourself to save others.
I'm struck by moral smugness of the SEA contributor, as if his alternative is obviously superior.
“The owner’s servants came to him and said, ‘Sir, didn’t you sow good seed in your field? Where then did the weeds come from?’
ReplyDelete“‘An enemy did this,’ he replied.
“...The servants asked him, ‘Do you want us to go and pull them up?’
“‘No,’ he answered, ‘because while you are pulling the weeds, you may uproot the wheat with them.
I do not see these two systems the same. The C God decreed (grounding of his decree in himself) then made cirtain his decree would come to pass.
ReplyDeleteI am Arminian system, understanding exhaustive foreknowledge, God knows all things, therefore his allowance can be based off of future actuals incorporating true free agency.
The C system is prescripted and will necessarily to pass.
The A system is grounded in foreknowledge. God can determine to allow, but in his allowance he does not determine.
The
You're attacking claims I didn't make.
Deletei) I didn't say the two systems are the same.
ii) I didn't say that the Arminian God determines all events. I didn't comment on that one way or the other.
iii) Even if I granted your distinctions, merely drawing distinctions between Calvinism and Arminianism fails to show that those are morally relevant distinctions. Fails to show how the difference exonerates the Arminian God.
iv) That said, if the Arminian God has exhaustive foreknowledge, and he creates the scenario he foresees, then his creative action does in fact determine the outcome. If he creates a world with a foreseeable future, then the future cannot be other than what he made with that outcome in mind.
By the same token, the Arminian God renders the outcome certain by making a world with a foreseen future.
v) Allowing something to happen can determine or ensure (render certain) the outcome. Allowing a baby carriage to roll downhill into a busy intersection determines or ensures that outcome. If an event is bound to happen absent intervention, then nonintervention renders the outcome certain.
Steve - I do not think we can casually state that God has "accepted" that there are rapists in the Arminian system. That sounds like God simply is sitting back doing nothing. Has he not established laws to prevent such? He does not casually accept it, but mitigates against it. In Calvinism, does he not actually create the rapist with the intent of the rape? In your response to Dane, you said, "if the Arminian God has exhaustive foreknowledge, and he creates the scenario he foresees, then his creative action does in fact determine the outcome. If he creates a world with a foreseeable future, then the future cannot be other than what he made with that outcome in mind." That sounds more like Calvinism than Arminianism. I do not think Arminians suggest that knowledge requires causation. What we do know about God's creation is that it was "very good."
ReplyDeleteIt seems to me that your argument supposes that God is the only power in the universe, not just the supreme power. If the powers are in rebellion against God (and I think the Bible depicts this), then there must be some level of independence within the powers.
I do not see how knowledge determines anything. Using your example in the response, If I am within sight of the carriage, but some distance away, I can "see" the baby carriage rolling down the hill without actually causing it. So knowledge of an event does not necessitate causation, either directly or indirectly. Nor does the carriage rolling down the hill insure that the carriage will be hit since there are multiple factors that can occur apart from the seeing and by other agents. So I think your analogy is a bit weak.
It seems to me that ultimately your argument is raising the classic question of theodicy. How can God be both all powerful (and all knowing in this case) and good at the same time? Yes, God allows evil in the world. Both Calvinists and Arminians agree to that. It seems to me that the difference here is that in the Calvinist system of thought, God intends the evil and thus creates it. In the Arminian system of thought, God allows the evil without creating it (creation is made good, but is in rebellion). However, in God's creative nature, He is able to remolds what is evil into something for good.
These are just a few thoughts after a quick read of this issue raised.
"Steve - I do not think we can casually state that God has 'accepted' that there are rapists in the Arminian system."
DeleteI'm not the one who stated that. Rather, I was quoting the Arminian contributor at SEA.
"He does not casually accept it, but mitigates against it."
Very weakly. The Arminian God has the wherewithal to prevent it.
"In Calvinism, does he not actually create the rapist with the intent of the rape?"
In Arminianism, does he not create a world with that foreseen and therefore intended outcome? It's not an accident. The Arminian God knows that his creative fiat will have that result. Doesn't he will the consequences of his own actions?
"I do not think Arminians suggest that knowledge requires causation."
I didn't say that.
"It seems to me that your argument supposes that God is the only power in the universe, not just the supreme power."
And how did you infer that from what I said?
"I do not see how knowledge determines anything."
I didn't say that knowledge by itself determines anything.
"Nor does the carriage rolling down the hill insure that the carriage will be hit since there are multiple factors that can occur apart from the seeing and by other agents."
It's multiple factors that ensure some outcomes absent intervention. Some outcomes are inevitable unless an agent steps in to prevent it. In situations like that, inaction renders the outcome certain.
And even if it weren't absolutely certain, an agent can still be delinquent. If a small child falls into a swimming pool, it may not be inevitable that he will drown. Perhaps he will be able to pull himself out of the swimming pool.
Suppose I don't rescue him because there's a merely 90% that he will drown? Suppose he drowns. Is my dereliction exculpatory? Hardly!
"It seems to me that ultimately your argument is raising the classic question of theodicy."
That's because I'm responding to the SEA contributor, who's raising the classic question of theodicy.
"It seems to me that the difference here is that in the Calvinist system of thought, God intends the evil and thus creates it."
In Calvinism, God doesn't intend evil for evil's sake.
In Arminianism, if God knows that his actions will have a particular effect down the line, then he planned it to happen that way. Even if the outcome is the net effect of his own actions in combination with the actions of "free agents", God intended the net effect, and his contribution was a necessary condition for the net effect.
1) I did not say you saw these two systems as the same. My meaning was - “I” do not see these two systems being in the “same boat”. Being there is Evil does not place each system in the same boat. The difference is, regardless of what system one favors, evil carries with it DNA – the C evil carries with it information that the A does not. If I carry your boat analogy through, the C Evil is in a different boat altogether.
Delete2. I didn’t think I did ��
3. The distinctions are enough to affect *how* one would exonerate God.
If God desired to create beings that would follow him based on 1. Free choice 2. Free to love 3. 1 & 2 is Faith not Fact based, that these require by nature an inverse = evil including its continuance. Found within the DNA of Evil in the C system is God’s prescription; his autograph. In C God created Adam TO sin, not just merely knowing he would, as I have read in Horton others.
4. I would mostly say what you have said here is correct, but with one distinction. You said, “then his creative action does in fact determine the outcome.” The creative effect may make *certain* an outcome, but the creative agent did not *determine* it. When you use the word “determine” there carries with it, at least in these type of discussions… the script writer, the decisive factor, the author, a desired process & outcome. This always comes up in the argument against there being a benevolent God, therefore if evil exists, there is no God. You stated it very well in the last paragraph. There is a difference between “Certainty” & “Necessity”, and determinism lends itself to things necessarily coming to pass because God prescribed it to be so – vs - God creating a scenario he foresees, in that what he knows, given the variables, will certainly happen, this does not indict the creator. We do not normally think that because two “Little People” desiring to conceive a baby, knowing full well this conception will result in their child being “Little”, do not get blamed for something that will certainly happen. The blame is directed to the flaw in the DNA.
5. You are using “determine” and “certainly” and “ensure” interchangeably. In these types of conversations these words carry different implications.
Arminian: Rendering something certain by mere creation does not give authorship to the Creator of post creative events given said freedoms.
Calvinism: Decreeing determinatively how the creation is to be, makes the process of bringing it into being (creation) not the determining factor, but just another step in following the script.
Knowing a baby carriage will roll down a hill taking the life of a baby, and permitting it, whether by neglectful, or by accident, God allowing created laws to run their course does not indict God. Allowance or mere permission of the inverse of Love, Choice & Faith, that comes at this cost, but not beyond the scope of redemption, is not an indictable offence. God knowing makes certain events even when He did not necessitate them to be so. It’s not the same boat.
"Being there is Evil does not place each system in the same boat."
DeleteIt puts them in the same both respecting the existence of evil.
"Found within the DNA of Evil in the C system is God’s prescription; his autograph. In C God created Adam TO sin, not just merely knowing he would, as I have read in Horton others."
i) Horton is overrated.
ii) In Calvinism, God created Adam "to sin" in the instrumental sense that Adam's sin contributes to an overall objective.
iii) In Arminianism/Molinism, God doesn't merely know that Adam will sin. To begin with, Adam won't sin unless God makes him. So the action of the Arminian/Molinist God is a necessary cause of Adam's sin.
iv) Moreover, the Arminian/Molinist God presumably has some purpose in "allowing" Adam to sin. He creates agents knowing they will sin because there's some overriding good which outweighs that evil. Therefore, the occurrence of sin has a place in the plan of the Arminian/Molinist God.
"The creative effect may make *certain* an outcome, but the creative agent did not *determine* it. When you use the word “determine” there carries with it, at least in these type of discussions… the script writer, the decisive factor, the author, a desired process & outcome."
Actually, philosophically astute freewill theists concede that even freewill theism can generate deterministic outcomes. Take Hasker's statement regarding the providential uselessness of simple foreknowledge: "God 'sees' the entire future all at once, in a single glance as it were, including God’s own future actions and the reasons for which God will perform those actions. 9 Now, can we make any sense at all of the notion that God, on the basis of this knowledge of the future which already contains his own actions, determines what those actions shall be? I submit that we cannot. Those future actions are all already determined; they are spread out before him in his complete knowledge of the future. At this point, there is no 'determining' left to be done!" JETS 52/3 (September 2009), 539.
Here future actions are already determinate by virtue of God's exhaustive foreknowledge, including his knowledge of his own reasons and actions.
"There is a difference between 'Certainty' & 'Necessity'…"
You need to spell that out.
"and determinism lends itself to things necessarily coming to pass because God prescribed it to be so – vs - God creating a scenario he foresees, in that what he knows, given the variables, will certainly happen, this does not indict the creator."
DeleteThe Arminian/Molinst God doesn't merely foresee the outcome. He's a contributor to the outcome he foresees.
"We do not normally think that because two 'Little People' desiring to conceive a baby, knowing full well this conception will result in their child being 'Little', do not get blamed for something that will certainly happen."
If they foresaw that their baby would grow up to be a genocidal maniac, then their actions would be blameworthy.
"Rendering something certain by mere creation does not give authorship"
"Authorship" is a vague metaphor. And if you wish to drag that shopworn metaphor into the discussion, the God of freewill theism is arguably the "author" of sin and evil. Just by different means.
"Knowing a baby carriage will roll down a hill taking the life of a baby, and permitting it, whether by neglectful, or by accident, God allowing created laws to run their course does not indict God."
The immediate purpose of the illustration wasn't to assign blame but to show how letting something happen can be equivalent to ensuring or determining the outcome.
When, however, freewill theists deploy permission as if that's ipso facto exculpatory, then the illustration cuts against freewill theism.
"God allowing created laws to run their course does not indict God."
If I run over a child, who suddenly dashes in front of my car, by allowing the car to run its course (rather than applying the brakes or steering around the child), is my inaction not an indictable offense?
"God knowing makes certain events even when He did not necessitate them to be so."
How do you propose to distinguish conditional necessity from ensuring an outcome?
Steve said, “It puts them in the same both respecting the existence of evil.”
DeleteYour boat is adrift and to way too large to start analyzing particulars. As I said - C evil’s DNA is of a different Beast.
Dane said, “Found within the DNA of Evil in the C system is God’s prescription; his autograph. In C God created Adam TO sin, not just merely knowing he would, as I have read in Horton others."
Steven said, “Horton is overrated”
Are you? :)
Steve said, “In Calvinism, God created Adam "to sin" in the instrumental sense that Adam's sin contributes to an overall objective.”
Here in lies the difference. The issue is origination and the execution. Adam seems to be an instrument prescripted to do evil.
In an A system, evil is the inverse of freedom, love, and faith. Knowing the inverse to be certain, without evil being a determined objective (Determining Adam to sin), is no small distinction, for we find within evil itself, for Calvinism, after analyzing evil’s DNA, we find in its coding, it’s grounding in God. Where in A it’s Evil originated in the inverse of loving God. God knowing the inverse is different than the causation of the inverse.
You are going to have to establish that knowing an inverse to be true, is the same as prescripting, and causing the inverse to be true.
Steve said, “Adam won't sin unless God makes him.”
This is at least honest on your part to your perspective.
Foreknowledge is not determinative. Determining to allow evil vs determining evil are two different things no matter how hard you tease it out.
I’m not a Molinist
Dane
Delete"As I said - C evil’s DNA is of a different Beast."
Yes, you're very enamored with the DNA metaphor, but that's not an argument.
"Are you?"
If you think I'm overrated, why debate me?
"Here in lies the difference. The issue is origination and the execution. Adam seems to be an instrument prescripted to do evil."
Arminians must also fall back on some version of the greater good defense, in which case Adam has an instrumental role in Arminian theodicy as well.
"In an A system, evil is the inverse of freedom, love, and faith. Knowing the inverse to be certain, without evil being a determined objective (Determining Adam to sin), is no small distinction, for we find within evil itself, for Calvinism, after analyzing evil’s DNA, we find in its coding, it’s grounding in God."
Your constant repair to the DNA metaphor is a substitute for argument.
And I don't grant your assumptions about how love and faith require libertarian freedom. You're talking to a Calvinist, remember? So your appeals beg the question.
"Where in A it’s Evil originated in the inverse of loving God. God knowing the inverse is different than the causation of the inverse."
Burning a straw man inasmuch as I never suggested that knowing X is equivalent to causing X. Nevertheless, even in freewill theism, evil has its origin in divine actions, as a necessary preliminary condition for evil.
"You are going to have to establish that knowing an inverse to be true, is the same as prescripting, and causing the inverse to be true."
Since that's a straw man, the only thing I need to do is extinguish the fire you set.
"This is at least honest on your part to your perspective."
You may be confused by my syntax. I didn't say God made Adam sin, but rather, God made Adam. Unless God made Adam, he won't sin.
"Foreknowledge is not determinative."
If you're going to burn so many strawmen, you should get a fire permit.
"Determining to allow evil vs determining evil are two different things no matter how hard you tease it out."
In other words, you can't refute my argument.
"I’m not a Molinist"
Perhaps you can fry your red herring on the strawmen you're burning.
Steve said, “How do you propose to distinguish conditional necessity from ensuring an outcome?“
DeleteYour question is flawed. Who is stating “condition necessity”? Again you are confusing “certainty” with “necessity”
The knowledge of something does not necisarnaly make this knowledge causative of the event known.
For example, and I know every illustration has limitations, but on a simple level... Marty McFly knowing the Boston Red Sox we’re going to win a game in 1988, this knowledge did not necessitate the win, yet it will certainly happen.
Now with God, even if he plays a role in the event he knows, does not necessitate the outcome IF God determines the ground rules to be non-determinative. Again, knowing the inverse of love, freewill, and faith, does not determine the execution of this truth. This also does not rule out if God desires to be causative within his knowledge.
"Your question is flawed. Who is stating “condition necessity”?"
DeleteYou're the one who keeps positing an alleged distinction between certainty and necessity, so I'm questioning you on your ability, or not, to explain how you differentiate the two.
"Again you are confusing “certainty” with “necessity”"
You need to master the elementary difference between assertions and arguments. Alleging that I've confused the two fails to even begin to demonstrate your allegation.
"The knowledge of something does not necisarnaly make this knowledge causative of the event known."
You're stuck in a rut. You need to expand your conceptual repertoire so that you can respond to the actual state of the argument rather than reciting your cue card answers.
There are different kinds of necessity. Since you're the one who's continually casting the issue in those terms, you need to disambiguate what kind of necessity you have in mind.
"Now with God, even if he plays a role in the event he knows, does not necessitate the outcome IF God determines the ground rules to be non-determinative."
That simply begs the question of whether the outcome can be indeterminate if God knows that by doing X, Y will be the end-result.